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United States Supreme Court NEW YORK et al. v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION et al.(2002) No. 00-568 Argued: October 3, 2001Decided: March 4, 2002 </s> When the Federal Power Act (FPA) became law in 1935, most electric utilities operated as separate, local monopolies subject to state or local regulation; their sales were "bundled," meaning that consumers paid a single charge for both the cost of the electricity and the cost of its delivery; and there was little competition among utility companies. Section 201(b) of the FPA gave the Federal Power Commission (predecessor to respondent Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)) jurisdiction over "the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such energy at wholesale in interstate commerce"; §205 prohibited, among other things, unreasonable rates and undue discrimination "with respect to any transmission or sale subject to the [Commission's] jurisdiction"; and §206 gave the Commission the power to correct such unlawful practices. Since 1935, the number of electricity suppliers has increased dramatically and technological advances have allowed electricity to be delivered over three major "grids" in the continental United States. In all but three States, any electricity entering a grid becomes part of a vast pool of energy moving in interstate commerce. As a result, power companies can transmit electricity over long distances at a low cost. However, public utilities retain ownership of the transmission lines that their competitors must use to deliver electricity to wholesale and retail customers and thus can refuse to deliver their competitors' energy or deliver that power on terms and conditions less favorable than those they apply to their own transmissions. In Order No. 888, FERC found such practices discriminatory under §205. Invoking its §206 authority, FERC (1) ordered "functional unbundling" of wholesale generation and transmission services, which means that each utility must state separate rates for its wholesale generation, transmission, and ancillary services, and must take transmission of its own wholesale sales and purchases under a single general tariff applicable equally to itself and others; (2) imposed a similar open access requirement on unbundled retail transmissions in interstate commerce; and (3) declined to extend the open access requirement to the transmission component of bundled retail sales, concluding that unbundling such transmissions was unnecessary and would raise difficult jurisdictional issues that could be more appropriately considered in other proceedings. After consolidating a number of review petitions, the District of Columbia Circuit upheld most of Order No. 888. Here, the petition of New York etal. (collectively New York) questions FERC's assertion of jurisdiction over unbundled retail transmissions, and the petition of Enron Power Marketing, Inc. (Enron), questions FERC's refusal to assert jurisdiction over bundled retail transmissions. </s> Held: </s> 1.FERC did not exceed its jurisdiction by including unbundled retail transmissions within the scope of Order No. 888's open access requirements. New York insists that retail transactions are subject only to state regulation, but the electric industry has changed since the FPA was enacted, at which time the electricity universe was neatly divided into spheres of retail versus wholesale sales. The FPA's plain language readily supports FERC's jurisdiction claim. Section 201(b) gives FERC jurisdiction over "electric energy in interstate commerce," and the unbundled transmissions that FERC has targeted are made such transmissions by the national grid's nature. No statutory language limits FERC's transmission jurisdiction to the wholesale market, although the statute does limit FERC's sales jurisdiction to that market. In the face of this clear statutory language, New York's arguments supporting its contention that the statute draws a bright jurisdictional line between wholesale and retail transactions are unpersuasive. Its argument that the Court of Appeals applied an erroneous standard of review because it ignored the presumption against federal pre-emption of state law focuses on the wrong legal question. The type of pre-emption at issue here concerns the rule that a federal agency may pre-empt state law only when it is acting within the scope of congressionally delegated authority. Because the FPA unambiguously gives FERC jurisdiction over the "transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce," without regard to whether the transmissions are sold to a reseller or directly to a consumer, FERC's exercise of this power is valid. New York's attempts to discredit this straightforward statutory analysis by reference to the FPA's legislative history are unavailing. And its arguments that FERC jurisdiction over unbundled retail transmissions will impede sound energy policy are properly addressed to FERC or to the Congress. Pp. 1422. </s> 2.FERC's decision not to regulate bundled retail transmissions was a statutorily permissible policy choice. Contrary to Enron's argument, FERC chose not to assert jurisdiction over such transmissions, but it did not hold itself powerless to claim jurisdiction. Indeed, FERC explicitly reserved decision on that jurisdictional issue, and the reasons FERC supplied for doing so provide valid support for that decision. Having determined that the remedy it ordered constituted a sufficient response to the problems it had identified in the wholesale market, FERC had no §206 obligation to regulate bundled retail transmissions or to order universal unbundling. This Court also agrees with FERC's conclusion that regulating bundled retail transmissions raises difficult jurisdictional issues. Pp. 2226. </s> 225 F.3d 667, affirmed. </s> Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, Parts II and III of which were unanimous, and Parts I and IV of which were joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., joined. </s> NEW YORK etal., PETITIONERS </s> 00-568v. </s> FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSIONetal. </s> ENRON POWER MARKETING, INC., PETITIONER </s> 00-809v. </s> FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSIONetal. </s> on writs of certiorari to the united states court ofappeals for the district of columbia circuit </s> [March 4, 2002] </s> Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> These cases raise two important questions concerning the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or Commission) over the transmission of electricity. First, if a public utility "unbundles"--i.e., separates--the cost of transmission from the cost of electrical energy when billing its retail customers, may FERC require the utility to transmit competitors' electricity over its lines on the same terms that the utility applies to its own energy transmissions? Second, must FERC impose that requirement on utilities that continue to offer only "bundled" retail sales? </s> In Order No. 888, issued in 1996 with the stated purpose of "Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities,"1 FERC answered yes to the first question and no to the second. It based its answers on provisions of the Federal Power Act (FPA), as added by §213, 49 Stat. 847, and as amended, 16 U.S.C. §824 et seq., enacted in 1935. Whether or not the 1935 Congress foresaw the dramatic changes in the power industry that have occurred in recent decades, we are persuaded, as was the Court of Appeals, that FERC properly construed its statutory authority. </s> I </s> In 1935, when the FPA became law, most electricity was sold by vertically integrated utilities that had constructed their own power plants, transmission lines, and local delivery systems. Although there were some interconnections among utilities, most operated as separate, local monopolies subject to state or local regulation. Their sales were "bundled," meaning that consumers paid a single charge that included both the cost of the electric energy and the cost of its delivery. Competition among utilities was not prevalent. </s> Prior to 1935, the States possessed broad authority to regulate public utilities, but this power was limited by our cases holding that the negative impact of the Commerce Clause prohibits state regulation that directly burdens interstate commerce.2 When confronted with an attempt by Rhode Island to regulate the rates charged by a Rhode Island plant selling electricity to a Massachusetts company, which resold the electricity to the city of Attleboro, Massachusetts, we invalidated the regulation because it imposed a "direct burden upon interstate commerce." Public Util. Comm'n of R. I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89 (1927). Creating what has become known as the "Attleboro gap," we held that this interstate transaction was not subject to regulation by either Rhode Island or Massachusetts, but only "by the exercise of the power vested in Congress." Id., at 90. </s> When it enacted the FPA in 1935,3 Congress authorized federal regulation of electricity in areas beyond the reach of state power, such as the gap identified in Attleboro, but it also extended federal coverage to some areas that previously had been state regulated, see, e.g., id., at 87-88 (explaining, prior to the FPA's enactment, that state regulations affecting interstate utility transactions were permissible if they did not directly burden interstate commerce). The FPA charged the Federal Power Commission (FPC), the predecessor of FERC, "to provide effective federal regulation of the expanding business of transmitting and selling electric power in interstate commerce." Gulf States Util. Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747, 758 (1973). Specifically, in §201(b) of the FPA, Congress recognized the FPC's jurisdiction as including "the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce" and "the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce." 16 U.S.C. §824(b). Furthermore, §205 of the FPA prohibited, among other things, unreasonable rates and undue discrimination "with respect to any transmission or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission," 16 U.S.C. §§824d(a)-(b), and §206 gave the FPC the power to correct such unlawful practices, 16 U.S.C. §824e(a). </s> Since 1935, and especially beginning in the 1970's and 1980's, the number of electricity suppliers has increased dramatically. Technological advances have made it possible to generate electricity efficiently in different ways and in smaller plants.4 In addition, unlike the local power networks of the past, electricity is now delivered over three major networks, or "grids" in the continental United States. Two of these grids--the "Eastern Interconnect" and the "Western Interconnect"--are connected to each other. It is only in Hawaii and Alaska and on the "Texas Interconnect"--which covers most of that State--that electricity is distributed entirely within a single State. In the rest of the country, any electricity that enters the grid immediately becomes a part of a vast pool of energy that is constantly moving in interstate commerce.5 As a result, it is now possible for power companies to transmit electric energy over long distances at a low cost. As FERC has explained, "the nature and magnitude of coordination transactions" have enabled utilities to operate more efficiently by transferring substantial amounts of electricity not only from plant to plant in one area, but also from region to region, as market conditions fluctuate. Order No. 888, at 31,641. </s> Despite these advances in technology that have increased the number of electricity providers and have made it possible for a "customer in Vermont [to] purchase electricity from an environmentally friendly power producer in California or a cogeneration facility in Oklahoma," Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 681 (CADC 2000) (case below), public utilities retain ownership of the transmission lines that must be used by their competitors to deliver electric energy to wholesale and retail customers. The utilities' control of transmission facilities gives them the power either to refuse to deliver energy produced by competitors or to deliver competitors' power on terms and conditions less favorable than those they apply to their own transmissions. E.g., Order No. 888, at 31,643-31,644.6 </s> Congress has addressed these evolving conditions in the electricity market on two primary occasions since 1935. First, Congress enacted the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), 92 Stat. 3117, 16 U.S.C. §2601 et seq., to promote the development of new generating facilities and to conserve the use of fossil fuels. Because the traditional utilities controlled the transmission lines and were reluctant to purchase power from "nontraditional facilities," PURPA directed FERC to promulgate rules requiring utilities to purchase electricity from "qualifying cogeneration and small power production facilities." FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 751 (1982); see 16 U.S.C. §824a-3(a). </s> Over a decade later, Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct), 106 Stat. 2776. This law authorized FERC to order individual utilities to provide transmission services to unaffiliated wholesale generators (i.e., to "wheel" power) on a case-by-case basis. See 16 U.S.C. §§824j-824k. Exercising its authority under the EPAct, FERC ordered a utility to "wheel" power for a complaining wholesale competitor 12 times, in 12 separate proceedings. Order No. 888, at 31,646. FERC soon concluded, however, that these individual proceedings were too costly and time consuming to provide an adequate remedy for undue discrimination throughout the market. Ibid. </s> Thus, in 1995, FERC initiated the rulemaking proceeding that led to the adoption of the order presently under review. FERC proposed a rule that would "require that public utilities owning and/or controlling facilities used for the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce have on file tariffs providing for nondiscriminatory open-access transmission services." Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FERC Stats. & Regs., Proposed Regs., 1988-1999, ¶ ;32,514, p. 33,047, 60 Fed. Reg. 17662 (hereinafter NPRM). The stated purpose of the proposed rule was "to encourage lower electricity rates by structuring an orderly transition to competitive bulk power markets." NPRM 33,048. The NPRM stated: </s> "The key to competitive bulk power markets is opening up transmission services. Transmission is the vital link between sellers and buyers. To achieve the benefits of robust, competitive bulk power markets, all wholesale buyers and sellers must have equal access to the transmission grid. Otherwise, efficient trades cannot take place and ratepayers will bear unnecessary costs. Thus, market power through control of transmission is the single greatest impediment to competition. Unquestionably, this market power is still being used today, or can be used, discriminatorily to block competition."7 Id., at 33,049. </s> Rather than grounding its legal authority in Congress' more recent electricity legislation, FERC cited §§205-206 of the 1935 FPA--the provisions concerning FERC's power to remedy unduly discriminatory practices--as providing the authority for its rulemaking. See 16 U.S.C. §§824d-824e. </s> In 1996, after receiving comments on the NPRM, FERC issued Order No. 888. It found that electric utilities were discriminating in the "bulk power markets," in violation of §205 of the FPA, by providing either inferior access to their transmission networks or no access at all to third-party wholesalers of power. Order No. 888, at 31,682-31,684. Invoking its authority under §206, it prescribed a remedy containing three parts that are presently relevant. </s> First, FERC ordered "functional unbundling" of wholesale generation and transmission services. Id., at 31,654. FERC defined "functional unbundling" as requiring each utility to state separate rates for its wholesale generation, transmission and ancillary services, and to take transmission of its own wholesale sales and purchases under a single general tariff applicable equally to itself and to others. </s> Second, FERC imposed a similar open access requirement on unbundled retail transmissions in interstate commerce. Although the NPRM had not envisioned applying the open access requirements to retail transmissions, but rather "would have limited eligibility to wholesale transmission customers," FERC ultimately concluded that it was "irrelevant to the Commission's jurisdiction whether the customer receiving the unbundled transmission service in interstate commerce is a wholesale or retail customer." Id., at 31,689. Thus, "if a public utility voluntarily offers unbundled retail access," or if a State requires unbundled retail access, "the affected retail customer must obtain its unbundled transmission service under a non-discriminatory transmission tariff on file with the Commission." Ibid.8 </s> Third, FERC rejected a proposal that the open access requirement should apply to "the transmission component of bundled retail sales." Id., at 31,699. Although FERC noted that "the unbundling of retail transmission and generation ... would be helpful in achieving comparability," it concluded that such unbundling was not "necessary" and would raise "difficult jurisdictional issues" that could be "more appropriately considered" in other proceedings. Ibid. </s> In its analysis of the jurisdictional issues, FERC distinguished between transmissions and sales. It explained: </s> "[Our statutory jurisdiction] over sales of electric energy extends only to wholesale sales. However, when a retail transaction is broken into two products that are sold separately (perhaps by two different suppliers: an electric energy supplier and a transmission supplier), we believe the jurisdictional lines change. In this situation, the state clearly retains jurisdiction over the sale of power. However, the unbundled transmission service involves only the provision of `transmission in interstate commerce' which, under the FPA, is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Commission. Therefore, when a bundled retail sale is unbundled and becomes separate transmission and power sales transactions, the resulting transmission transaction falls within the Federal sphere of regulation." Id., at 31,781.9 </s> In 1997, in response to numerous petitions for rehearing and clarification, FERC issued Order No. 888-A, FERC Stats. & Regs., Regs. Preambles, July 1996-Dec. 2001, ¶ ;31,048, p. 30,172, 62 Fed. Reg. 12274. With respect to various challenges to its jurisdiction, FERC acknowledged that it did not have the "authority to order, suasponte, open access transmission services by public utilities," but explained that §206 of the FPA explicitly required it to remedy the undue discrimination that it had found. Order No. 888-A, at 30,202; see 16 U.S.C. §824e(a). FERC also rejected the argument that its failure to assert jurisdiction over bundled retail transmissions was inconsistent with its assertion of jurisdiction over unbundled retail transmissions. FERC repeated its explanation that it did not believe that regulation of bundled retail transmissions (i.e., the "functional unbundling" of retail transmissions) "was necessary," and again stated that such unbundling would raise serious jurisdictional questions. Order No. 888-A, at 30,225. FERC did not, however, state that it had no power to regulate the transmission component of bundled retail sales. Id., at 30,225-30,226. Rather, FERC reiterated that States have jurisdiction over the retail sale of power, and stated that, as a result, "[o]ur assertion of jurisdiction ... arises only if the [unbundled] retail transmission in interstate commerce by a public utility occurs voluntarily or as a result of a state retail program." Ibid. </s> II </s> A number of petitions for review of Order No. 888 were consolidated for hearing in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. After considering a host of objections, the Court of Appeals upheld most provisions of the order. Specifically, it affirmed FERC's jurisdictional rulings that are at issue in the present cases. 225 F.3d, at 681. </s> The Court of Appeals first explained that the open access requirements in the orders--for both retail and wholesale transmissions--were "premised not on individualized findings of discrimination by specific transmission providers, but on FERC's identification of a fundamental systemic problem in the industry." Id., at 683. It held that FERC's factual determinations were reasonable and that §§205 and 206 of the FPA gave the Commission authority to prescribe a market-wide remedy for a market-wide problem. Interpreting Circuit precedent--primarily cases involving the transmission of natural gas, e.g., Associated Gas Distributors v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981 (CADC 1987)--the Court of Appeals concluded that even though FERC's general authority to order open access was "limited," the statute made an exception "where FERC finds undue discrimination." 225 F. 3d, at 687-688. </s> In its discussion of "Federal Versus State Jurisdiction over Transmission Services," id., at 690-696, the Court of Appeals also endorsed FERC's reasoning. The Court of Appeals first addressed the complaints of the state regulatory commissions that Order No. 888 "went too far" by going beyond the regulation of wholesale transactions and "asserting jurisdiction over unbundled retail transmissions." Id., at 691, 692. The Court of Appeals concluded that the plain language of §201 of the FPA, which this Court has construed broadly,10 supported FERC's regulation of transmissions in interstate commerce that were part of unbundled retail sales, as §201 gives FERC jurisdiction over the "transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce." 16 U.S.C. §824(b)(1). Even if the FPA were ambiguous, the Court of Appeals explained that, given the technological complexities of the national grids, it would have deferred to the Commission's interpretation of §201 "as giving it jurisdiction over both wholesale and retail transmissions." 225 F. 3d, at 694. </s> The Court of Appeals next addressed the complaints of transmission-dependent producers and wholesalers that Order No. 888 did not "go far enough." Id., at 692. The Court of Appeals was not persuaded that FERC's assertion of jurisdiction over unbundled retail transmission required FERC to assert jurisdiction over bundled retail transmissions or to mandate unbundling of retail transmissions. Id., at 694. Noting that the FPA "clearly contemplates state jurisdiction over local distribution facilities and retail sales" the Court of Appeals held: </s> "A regulator could reasonably construe transmissions bundled with generation and delivery services and sold to a consumer for a single charge as either transmission services in interstate commerce or as an integral component of a retail sale. Yet FERC has jurisdiction over one, while the states have jurisdiction over the other. FERC's decision to characterize bundled transmissions as part of retail sales subject to state jurisdiction therefore represents a statutorily permissible policy choice to which we must also defer under Chevron [U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984)]." Id., at 694-695. </s> Because of the importance of the proceeding, we granted both the petition of the State of New York etal. (collectively New York) questioning FERC's assertion of jurisdiction over unbundled retail transmissions and the petition of Enron Power Marketing, Inc. (Enron), questioning FERC's refusal to assert jurisdiction over bundled retail transmissions. 531 U.S. 1189 (2001). We address these two questions separately. At the outset, however, we note that no petitioner questions the validity of the order insofar as it applies to wholesale transactions: The parties dispute only the proper scope of FERC's jurisdiction over retail transmissions. Furthermore, we are not confronted with any factual issues. Finally, we agree with FERC that transmissions on the interconnected national grids constitute transmissions in interstate commerce. See, e.g., FPC v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 466-467 (1972); n.5, supra. </s> III </s> The first question is whether FERC exceeded its jurisdiction by including unbundled retail transmissions within the scope of its open access requirements in Order No. 888. New York argues that FERC overstepped in this regard, and that such transmissions--because they are part of retail transactions--are properly the subject of state regulation. New York insists that the jurisdictional line between the States and FERC falls between the wholesale and retail markets. </s> As the Court of Appeals explained, however, the landscape of the electric industry has changed since the enactment of the FPA, when the electricity universe was "neatly divided into spheres of retail versus wholesale sales." 225 F.3d, at 691. As the Court of Appeals also explained, the plain language of the FPA readily supports FERC's claim of jurisdiction. Section 201(b) of the FPA states that FERC's jurisdiction includes "the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce" and "the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce." 16 U.S.C. §824(b). The unbundled retail transmissions targeted by FERC are indeed transmissions of "electric energy in interstate commerce," because of the nature of the national grid. There is no language in the statute limiting FERC's transmission jurisdiction to the wholesale market, although the statute does limit FERC's sale jurisdiction to that at wholesale. See ibid.; cf. FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621, 636 (1972) (interpreting similar provisions of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §717(b), to mean that FPC jurisdiction "applies to interstate `transportation' regardless of whether the gas transported is ultimately sold retail or wholesale"). </s> In the face of this clear statutory language, New York advances three arguments in support of its submission that the statute draws a bright jurisdictional line between wholesale transactions and retail transactions. First, New York contends that the Court of Appeals applied an erroneous standard of review because it ignored the presumption against federal pre-emption of state law; second, New York claims that other statutory language and legislative history shows a congressional intent to safeguard pre-existing state regulation of the delivery of electricity to retail customers; and third, New York argues that FERC jurisdiction over retail transmissions would impede sound energy policy. These arguments are unpersuasive. </s> The Presumption against Pre-emption </s> Pre-emption of state law by federal law can raise two quite different legal questions. The Court has most often stated a "presumption against pre-emption" when a controversy concerned not the scope of the Federal Government's authority to displace state action, but rather whether a given state authority conflicts with, and thus has been displaced by, the existence of Federal Government authority. See, e.g., Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985) (citing cases); see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992). In such a situation, the Court "`start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded ... unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'" Hillsborough County, 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)). These are not such cases, however, because the question presented does not concern the validity of a conflicting state law or regulation. </s> The other context in which "pre-emption" arises concerns the rule "that a federal agency may pre-empt state law only when and if it is acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority[,] ... [for] an agency </s> literally has no power to act, let alone pre-empt the validly enacted legislation of a sovereign State, unless and until Congress confers power upon it." Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986). This is the sort of case we confront here--defining the proper scope of the federal power. Such a case does not involve a "presumption against pre-emption," as New York argues, but rather requires us to be certain that Congress has conferred authority on the agency. As we have explained, the best way to answer such a question--i.e., whether federal power may be exercised in an area of pre-existing state regulation--"is to examine the nature and scope of the authority granted by Congress to the agency." Ibid. In other words, we must interpret the statute to determine whether Congress has given FERC the power to act as it has, and we do so without any presumption one way or the other. </s> As noted above, the text of the FPA gives FERC jurisdiction over the "transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and ... the sale of such energy at wholesale in interstate commerce." 16 U.S.C. §824(b). The references to "transmission" in commerce and "sale" at wholesale were made part of §201 of the statute when it was enacted in 1935.11 Subsections (c) and (d) of §201 explain, respectively, the meaning of the terms "transmission" and "sale of electricity at wholesale."12 This statutory text thus unambiguously authorizes FERC to assert jurisdiction over two separate activities--transmitting and selling. It is true that FERC's jurisdiction over the sale of power has been specifically confined to the wholesale market. However, FERC's jurisdiction over electricity transmissions contains no such limitation. Because the FPA authorizes FERC's jurisdiction over interstate transmissions, without regard to whether the transmissions are sold to a reseller or directly to a consumer, FERC's exercise of this power is valid. </s> Legislative History </s> Attempting to discredit this straightforward analysis of </s> the statutory language, New York calls our attention to numerous statements in the legislative history indicating that the 1935 Congress intended to do no more than close the "Attleboro gap," by providing for federal regulation of wholesale, interstate electricity transactions that the Court had held to be beyond the reach of state authority in Attleboro, 273 U.S., at 89. To support this argument, and to demonstrate that the 1935 Congress did not intend to supplant any traditionally state-held jurisdiction, New York points to language added to the FPA in the course of the legislative process that evidences a clear intent to preserve state jurisdiction over local facilities. For example, §201(a) provides that federal regulation is "to extend only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by the States." 16 U.S.C. §824(a). And §201(b) states that FERC has no jurisdiction "over facilities used for the generation of electric energy or over facilities used in local distribution or only for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce, or over facilities for the transmission of electric energy consumed wholly by the transmitter." 16 U.S.C. §824(b). </s> It is clear that the enactment of the FPA in 1935 closed the "Attleboro gap" by authorizing federal regulation of interstate, wholesale sales of electricity--the precise subject matter beyond the jurisdiction of the States in Attleboro. And it is true that the above-quoted language from §201(a) concerning the States' reserved powers is consistent with the view that the FPA was no more than a gap-closing statute. It is, however, perfectly clear that the original FPA did a good deal more than close the gap in state power identified in Attleboro. The FPA authorized federal regulation not only of wholesale sales that had been beyond the reach of state power, but also the regulation of wholesale sales that had been previously subject to state regulation. See, e.g., Attleboro, 273 U.S., at 85-86 (noting, prior to the enactment of the FPA, that States could regulate aspects of interstate wholesale sales, as long as such regulation did not directly burden interstate commerce). More importantly, as discussed above, the FPA authorized federal regulation of interstate transmissions as well as of interstate wholesale sales, and such transmissions were not of concern in Attleboro. Thus, even if Attleboro catalyzed the enactment of the FPA, Attleboro does not define the outer limits of the statute's coverage. </s> Furthermore, the portion of §201(a) cited by New York concerning the preservation of existing state jurisdiction is actually consistent with Order No. 888, because unbundled interstate transmissions of electric energy have never been "subject to regulation by the States," 16 U.S.C. §824(a). Indeed, unbundled transmissions have been a recent development. As FERC explained, at the time that the FPA was enacted, transmissions were bundled with the energy itself, and electricity was delivered to both wholesale and retail customers as a complete, bundled package. Order No. 888, at 31,639. Thus, in 1935, there was neither state nor federal regulation of what did not exist.13 </s> Moreover, we have described the precise reserved state powers language in §201(a) as a mere "`policy declaration'" that "`cannot nullify a clear and specific grant of jurisdiction, even if the particular grant seems inconsistent with the broadly expressed purpose.'" FPC v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215 (1964) (quoting Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 515, 527 (1945)); see also United States v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295, 311 (1953). Because the FPA contains such "a clear and specific grant of jurisdiction" to FERC over interstate transmissions, as discussed above, the prefatory language cited by New York does not undermine FERC's jurisdiction. </s> New York is correct to point out that that the legislative history is replete with statements describing Congress' intent to preserve state jurisdiction over local facilities. The sentiment expressed in those statements is incorporated in the second sentence of §201(b) of the FPA, as codified in 16 U.S.C. §824(b), which provides: </s> "The Commission shall have jurisdiction over all facilities for such transmission or sale of electric energy, but shall not have jurisdiction, except as specifically provided in this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter, over facilities used for the generation ofelectric energy or over facilities used in local distribution or only for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce, or over facilities for the transmission of electric energy consumed wholly by the transmitter." </s> Yet, Order No. 888 does not even arguably affect the States' jurisdiction over three of these subjects: generation facilities, transmissions in intrastate commerce, or transmissions consumed by the transmitter. Order No. 888 does discuss local distribution facilities, and New York argues that, as a result, FERC has improperly invaded the States' authority "over facilities used in local distribution," 16 U.S.C. §824(b). However, FERC has not attempted to control local distribution facilities through Order No. 888. To the contrary, FERC has made clear that it does not have jurisdiction over such facilities, Order No. 888, at 31,969, and has merely set forth a seven-factor test for identifying these facilities, without purporting to regulate them, id., at 31,770-31,771. </s> New York also correctly states that the legislative history demonstrates Congress' interest in retaining state jurisdiction over retail sales. But again, FERC has carefully avoided assuming such jurisdiction, noting repeatedly that "the FPA does not give the Commission jurisdiction over sales of electric energy at retail." Id., at 31,969. Because federal authority has been asserted only over unbundled transmissions, New York retains jurisdiction of the ultimate sale of the energy. And, as discussed below, FERC did not assert jurisdiction over bundled retail transmissions, leaving New York with control over even the transmission component of bundled retail sales. </s> Our evaluation of the extensive legislative history reviewed in New York's brief is affected by the importance of the changes in the electricity industry that have occurred since the FPA was enacted in 1935. No party to these cases has presented evidence that Congress foresaw the industry's transition from one of local, self-sufficient monopolies to one of nationwide competition and electricity transmission. Nor is there evidence that the 1935 Congress foresaw the possibility of unbundling electricity transmissions from sales. More importantly, there is no evidence that if Congress had foreseen the developments to which FERC has responded, Congress would have objected to FERC's interpretation of the FPA. Whatever persuasive effect legislative history may have in other contexts, here it is not particularly helpful because of the interim developments in the electric industry. Thus, we are left with the statutory text as the clearest guidance. That text unquestionably supports FERC's jurisdiction to order unbundling of wholesale transactions (which none of the parties before us questions), as well as to regulate the unbundled transmissions of electricity retailers. </s> Sound Energy Policy </s> New York argues that FERC jurisdiction over unbundled retail transmission will impede sound energy policy. Specifically, New York cites the States' interest in overseeing the maintenance of transmission lines and the siting of new lines. It is difficult for us to evaluate the force of these arguments because New York has not separately analyzed the impact of the loss of control over unbundled retail transmissions, as opposed to the loss of control over retail transmissions generally, and FERC has only regulated unbundled transactions. Moreover, FERC has recognized that the States retain significant control over local matters even when retail transmissions are unbundled. See, e.g., Order No. 888, at 31,782, n. 543 ("Among other things, Congress left to the States authority to regulate generation and transmission siting"); id., at 31,782, n. 544 ("This Final Rule will not affect or encroach upon state authority in such traditional areas as the authority over local service issues, including reliability of local service; administration of integrated resource planning and utility buy-side and demand-side decisions, including DSM [demand-side management]; authority over utility generation and resource portfolios; and authority to impose non-bypassable distribution or retail stranded cost charges"). We do note that the Edison Electric Institute, which is a party to these cases, and which represents that its members own approximately 70% of the transmission facilities in the country, does not endorse New York's objections to Order No. 888. And, regardless of their persuasiveness, the sort of policy arguments forwarded by New York are properly addressed to the Commission or to the Congress, not to this Court. E.g., Chemehuevi Tribe v. FPC, 420 U.S. 395, 423 (1975). </s> IV </s> Objecting to FERC's order from the opposite direction, Enron argues that the FPA gives FERC the power to apply its open access remedy to bundled retail transmissions of electricity, and, given FERC's findings of undue discrimination, that FERC had a duty to do so. In making this argument, Enron persistently claims that FERC held that it had no jurisdiction to grant the relief that Enron seeks.14 That assumption is incorrect: FERC chose not to assert such jurisdiction, but it did not hold itself powerless to claim jurisdiction. Indeed, FERC explicitly reserved decision on the jurisdictional issue that Enron claims FERC decided. See Order No. 888, at 31,699 (explaining that Enron's position raises "numerous difficult jurisdictional issues that we believe are more appropriately considered when the Commission reviews unbundled retail transmission tariffs that may come before us in the context of a state retail wheeling program"). Absent Enron's flawed assumption, FERC's ruling is clearly acceptable. </s> As noted above, in both Order No. 888 and rehearing Order No. 888-A, FERC gave two reasons for refusing to extend its open-access remedy to bundled retail transmissions. First, FERC explained that such relief was not "necessary." Order No. 888, at 31,699; see also Order No. 888-A, at 30,225. Second, FERC noted that the regulation of bundled retail transmissions "raises numerous difficult jurisdictional issues" that did not need to be resolved in the present context. Order No. 888, at 31,699; see also Order No. 888-A, at 30,225-30,226. Both of these reasons provide valid support for FERC's decision not to regulate bundled retail transmissions. </s> First, with respect to FERC's determination that it was not "necessary" to include bundled retail transmissions in its remedy, it must be kept in mind exactly what it was that FERC sought to remedy in the first place: a problem with the wholesale power market. FERC's findings, as Enron itself recognizes, concerned electric utilities' use of their market power to "`deny their wholesale customers access to competitively priced electric generation,'" thereby "`deny[ing] consumers the substantial benefits of lower electricity prices.'" Brief for Petitioner in No. 00-809, pp. 12-13 (quoting NPRM 33,052) (emphasis added). The title of Order No. 888 confirms FERC's focus: "Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services ...." Order No. 888, at 31,632 (emphasis added). Indeed, FERC has, from the outset, identified its goal as "facilitat[ing] competitive wholesale electric power markets." NPRM 33,049 (emphasis added). </s> To remedy the wholesale discrimination it found, FERC chose to regulate all wholesale transmissions. It also regulated unbundled retail transmissions, as was within its power to do. See Part III, supra. However, merely because FERC believed that those steps were appropriate to remedy discrimination in the wholesale electricity market, does not, as Enron alleges, lead to the conclusion that the regulation of bundled retail transmissions was "necessary" as well. Because FERC determined that the remedy it ordered constituted a sufficient response to the problems FERC had identified in the wholesale market, FERC had no §206 obligation to regulate bundled retail transmissions or to order universal unbundling.15 </s> Of course, it may be true that FERC's findings concerning discrimination in the wholesale electricity market suggest that such discrimination exists in the retail electricity market as well, as Enron alleges. Were FERC to investigate this alleged discrimination and make findings concerning undue discrimination in the retail electricity market, §206 of the FPA would require FERC to provide a remedy for that discrimination. See 16 U.S.C. §824e(a) (upon a finding of undue discrimination, "the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable ... regulation, practice, or contract ... and shall fix the same by order"). And such a remedy could very well involve FERC's decision to regulate bundled retail transmissions--Enron's desired outcome. However, because the scope of the order presently under review did not concern discrimination in the retail market, Enron is wrong to argue that §206 requires FERC to provide a full array of retail-market remedies. </s> Second, we can agree with FERC's conclusion that Enron's desired remedy "raises numerous difficult jurisdictional issues," Order No. 888, at 31,699, without deciding whether Enron's ultimate position on those issues is correct. The issues raised by New York concerning FERC's jurisdiction over unbundled retail transmissions are themselves serious. See Part III, supra. It is obvious that a federal order claiming jurisdiction over all retail transmissions would have even greater implications for the States' regulation of retail sales--a state regulatory power recognized by the same statutory provision that authorizes FERC's transmission jurisdiction. See 16 U.S.C. §824(b) (giving FERC jurisdiction over "transmission of electric energy," but recognizing state jurisdiction over "any ... sale of electric energy" other than "sale of electric energy at wholesale"). But even if we assume, for present purposes, that Enron is correct in its claim that the FPA gives FERC the authority to regulate the transmission component of a bundled retail sale, we nevertheless conclude that the agency had discretion to decline to assert such jurisdiction in this proceeding in part because of the complicated nature of the jurisdictional issues. Like the Court of Appeals, we are satisfied that FERC's choice not to assert jurisdiction over bundled retail transmissions in a rulemaking proceeding focusing on the wholesale market "represents a statutorily permissible policy choice." 225 F. 3d, at 695-696. </s> Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. </s> It is so ordered. </s> NEW YORK etal., PETITIONERS </s> 00-568v. </s> FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSIONetal. </s> ENRON POWER MARKETING, INC., PETITIONER </s> 00-809v. </s> FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSIONetal. </s> on writs of certiorari to the united states court ofappeals for the district of columbia circuit </s> [March 4, 2002] </s> Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. </s> Today the Court finds that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or Commission) properly construed its statutory authority when it determined that: (1) it may require a utility that "unbundles" the cost of transmission from the cost of electric energy to transmit competitors' electricity over its lines on the same terms that the utility applies to its own energy transmissions; and (2) it need not impose that requirement on utilities that continue to offer only "bundled" retail sales. Under the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. §824 et seq., FERC has jurisdiction over all interstate transmission, regardless of the type of transaction with which it is associated, and I concur in the Court's holding with respect to transmission used for unbundled retail sales and join Parts II and III of its opinion. I dissent, however, from the Court's resolution of the question concerning transmission used for bundled retail sales because I believe that the Court fails to properly assess both the Commission's jurisdictional analysis and its justification for excluding bundled retail transmission from the Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT). FERC's explanations are inadequate and do not warrant our deference. </s> I </s> While the Court does not foreclose the possibility that FERC's jurisdiction extends to transmission associated with bundled retail sales, the Court defers to FERC's decision not to apply the OATT to such transmission on the ground that the Commission made a permissible policy choice, ante, at 26 (quoting Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 695-696 (CADC 2000)), and by reference to FERC's assertions that: (1) such relief was not "necessary," ante at 24 (citing Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs., Regs. Preambles, Jan. 1991-June 1996, ¶ ;31,036, p.31,699; Order No. 888-A, FERC Stats. & Regs., Regs. Preambles, July 1996-Dec. 2001, ¶ ;31,048, p.30,225); and (2) "the regulation of bundled retail transmissions `raises numerous difficult jurisdictional issues' that did not need to be resolved in the present context.'" Ante, at 24 (citing Order No. 888, at 31,699; Order No. 888-A, at 30,225-30,226). The Court concludes that both reasons "provide valid support for FERC's decision not to regulate bundled retail transmissions." Ante, at 24.1 </s> I disagree. The Court defers to the Court of Appeals' characterization of FERC's decision as a "policy choice," rather than to any such characterization made by FERC itself.2 But a post-hoc rationalization offered by the Court of Appeals is an insufficient basis for deference. "[A]n agency's action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis articulated by the agency itself." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983) (emphasis added). </s> Therefore, in order to properly assess FERC's decision not to apply the OATT to transmission connected to bundled retail sales, we must carefully evaluate the two jus-tifications that the Court points to and relies on. Neither is sufficient. As I discuss below, FERC failed to explain why regulating such transmission is not "necessary," and FERC's inconclusive jurisdictional analysis does not provide a sound basis for our deference. </s> A </s> I cannot support the Court's reliance on FERC's explanation that "[a]lthough the unbundling of retail transmission and generation, as well as wholesale transmission and generation, would be helpful in achieving comparability, we do not believe it is necessary." Order No. 888, at 31,699. Aside from this conclusory statement, FERC provides no explanation as to why such regulation is unnecessary and attaches no findings to support this single statement. As such, we have no basis for determining whether FERC's decision is justified. A brief review of the electric industry, and the nature of transmission in particular, further calls into question both FERC's conclusory statement and its logical inference: That regulation of transmission is not necessary when used in connection with one type of transaction but is necessary when used for another. </s> An electric power system consists of three divisions: generation, transmission, and local distribution. Electricity is generated at power plants where "a fuel such as coal, gas, oil, uranium or hydro power is used to spin a turbine which turns a generator to generate electricity." Brief for Electrical Engineers etal. as Amici Curiae 12 (hereinafter Brief for Electrical Engineers). "[G]enerating stations continuously feed electric energy into a web of transmission lines (loosely referred to as `the grid') at very high voltages." P. Fox-Penner, Electric Utility Restructuring: A Guide to the Competitive Era 5 (1997) (hereinafter Fox-Penner). The transmission lines in turn feed "substations (essentially transformers) that reduce voltage and spread the power from each transmission line to many successively smaller distribution lines, culminating at the retail user." Id., at 23.3 </s> Unlike the other electricity components--and with the exception of transmission in Alaska, Hawaii, and parts of Texas--transmission is inherently interstate.4 It takes place over a network or grid, which consists of a configuration of interconnected transmission lines that cross state lines. Brief for Electrical Engineers 13. These lines are owned and operated by the Nation's larger utilities. No individual utility, however, has "`control over the actual transfers of electric power and energy with any particular electric system with which it is interconnected.'" Id., at 15 (quoting Florida Power & Light Co., 37 F.P.C. 544, 549 (1967)). Electricity flows at extremely high voltages across the network in uncontrollable ways and cannot be easily directed through a particular path from a specific generator to a consumer. Fox-Penner 26-27. The "[t]ransfer of electricity from one point to another will, to some extent, flow over all transmission lines in the interconnection, not just those in the direct path of the transfer." Van Nostrand's Scientific Encyclopedia 1096 (D. Considine ed., 8th ed. 1995). The energy flow depends on "where the load (demand for electricity) and generation are at any given moment, with the energy always following the path (or paths) of least resistance." Brief for Electrical Engineers 13. The paths, however, "change moment by moment." Fox-Penner 27. And "[t]rying to predict the flow of electrons is akin to putting a drop of ink into a water pipe flowing into a pool, and then trying to predict how the ink drop will diffuse into the pool, and which combination of outflow pipes will eventually contain ink." Ibid. </s> Nonetheless, buyers and sellers do negotiate particular contract paths, "route[s] nominally specified in an agreement to have electricity transmitted between two points." T. Brennan, Shock to the System 76 (1996) (emphasis added).5 In practice, however, it is quite possible that most of the power will never flow over the negotiated transmission lines. The transactional arrangements, therefore, bear little resemblance to the physical behavior of electricity transmitted on a power grid and, as such, it is impossible for either a utility or FERC to isolate or distinguish between the transmission used for bundled or unbundled wholesale or retail sales. </s> Given that it is impossible to identify which utility's lines are used for any given transmission, FERC's decision to exclude transmission because it is associated with a particular type of transaction appears to make little sense. And this decision may conflict with FERC's statutory mandate to regulate when it finds unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential treatment with respect to any transmission subject to its jurisdiction. See 16 U.S.C. §§824d, 824e.6 FERC clearly recognizes the statute's mandate, stating in Order No. 888-A that "our authorities under the FPA not only permit us to adapt to changing economic realities in the electric industry, but also require us to do so, as necessary to eliminate undue discrimination and protect electricity customers." Order No. 888-A, at 30,176.7 And it is certainly possible that utilities that own or control lines on the grid discriminate against entities that seek to use their transmission lines regardless of whether the utilities themselves bundle or unbundle their transactions.8 The fact that FERC found undue discrimination with respect to transmission used in connection with both bundled and unbundled wholesale sales and unbundled retail sales indicates that such discrimination exists regardless of whether the transmission is used in bundled or unbundled sales. Without more, FERC's conclusory statement that "unbundling of retail transmission" is not "necessary" lends little support to its decision not to regulate such transmission. And it simply cannot be the case that the nature of the commercial transaction controls the scope of FERC's jurisdiction. </s> To be sure, I would not prejudge whether FERC must require that transmission used for bundled retail sales be subject to FERC's open access tariff. At a minimum, however, FERC should have determined whether regulating transmission used in connection with bundled retail sales was in fact "necessary to eliminate undue discrimination and protect electricity customers." Order No. 888-A, at 30,176. FERC's conclusory statement instills little confidence that it either made this determination or that it complied with the unambiguous dictates of the statute. While the Court essentially ignores the statute's mandatory prescription by approving of FERC's decision as a permissible "policy choice," the FPA simply does not give FERC discretion to base its decision not to remedy undue discrimination on a "policy choice." </s> The Court itself struggles to find support for FERC's conclusion that it was not "necessary" to regulate bundled retail transmission in order to remedy discrimination. First, the Court points to the fact that FERC's findings concerned electric utilities' use of their market power to "`deny their wholesale customers access to competitively priced electric generation,' thereby `deny[ing] consumers the substantial benefits of lower electricity prices.'" Ante, at 24 (quoting Brief for Petitioner in No. 00-809, pp. 12-13). Second, the Court notes that the title of Order No. 888 confirms FERC's focus because it references promoting wholesale competition. Ante, at 24. Finally, the Court relies on the fact that FERC has identified its goal as "`facilitat[ing] competitive wholesale electric power markets.'" Ibid. (quoting Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ ;33,047, p.33,049). </s> I fail to understand how these statements support FERC's determination that it was not "necessary" to regulate bundled retail transmission. Utilities that bundle may use their market power to discriminate against those seeking access to the lines in connection with either retail or wholesale sales. It is certainly possible, perhaps even likely, that the only way to remedy undue discrimination and ensure open access to transmission services is to regulate all utilities that operate transmission facilities, and not just those that use their own lines for the purpose of wholesale sales or in connection with unbundled retail transactions. FERC does not suggest that the only entities that engage in discriminatory behavior are those that use their transmission facilities for wholesale sales or unbundled retail sales. And relying on FERC's reference to wholesale markets makes little sense when FERC regulates transmission connected to retail sales so long as the transmission is in a State that unbundles retail sales or where the utility voluntarily unbundles. See infra, at 15-16. </s> "We have frequently reiterated that an agency must cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner...." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn., 463 U.S., at 48. Here, FERC's failure to do so prevents us from evaluating whether or not the agency engaged in reasoned decisionmaking when it determined that it was not "necessary" to regulate bundled retail transmission. </s> B </s> The Court also relies on FERC's explanation that the prospect of unbundling retail transmission and generation "raises numerous difficult jurisdictional issues that we believe are more appropriately considered when the Commission reviews unbundled retail transmission tariffs that may come before us in the context of a state retail wheeling program." Order No. 888, at 31,699. The Court provides the following explanation for its decision to rely on this statement: </s> "But even if we assume, for present purposes, that Enron is correct in its claim that the FPA gives FERC the authority to regulate the transmission component of a bundled retail sale, we nevertheless conclude that the agency had discretion to decline to assert such jurisdiction in this proceeding in part because of the complicated nature of the jurisdictional issues." Ante, at 26. </s> This explanation is wholly unsatisfying, both because the Court's reliance on FERC's statement fails to take into account the unambiguous language of the statute and because FERC has given various inconsistent explanations of its jurisdiction. </s> 1 </s> FERC's statement implies that its decision not to regulate was based, at least in part, both on a determination that the statute is ambiguous and on a determination that certain interstate transmission may fall outside of its jurisdiction. The FPA, however, unambiguously grants FERC jurisdiction over the interstate transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce. 16 U.S.C. §824(b)(1). As the Court notes, "[t]here is no language in the statute limiting FERC's transmission jurisdiction to the wholesale market." Ante, at 14. The Court correctly recognizes that "the FPA authorizes FERC's jurisdiction over interstate transmissions, without regard to whether the transmissions are sold to a reseller or directly to a consumer." Ante, at 17. </s> Similarly, although FERC draws a jurisdictional line between transmission used in connection with bundled and unbundled retail sales, the statute makes no such distinction. The terms "bundled" and "unbundled" are not found in the statute.9 The only jurisdictional line that the statute draws with regard to transmission is between interstate and intrastate. See §824(b)(1). Congress does not qualify its grant to FERC of jurisdiction over interstate transmission. Nor does the Court explain how the statute grants FERC jurisdiction over unbundled retail transmission, yet is ambiguous with respect to the question of bundled retail transmission. </s> Even if I agreed that the statute is ambiguous, FERC did not purport to resolve an ambiguity in the passage upon which the Court relies. Instead, FERC refused to resolve what it considered to be a statutory ambiguity, in part because it determined that resolving this question was too difficult. Thus, while under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984), the Court will defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute, this passage does not provide an interpretation to which the Court can defer. </s> 2 </s> FERC does provide more explicit interpretations of its jurisdiction elsewhere. It is difficult, however, to isolate FERC's position on this matter because FERC presents different interpretations in its orders, its brief, and at oral argument. At certain points, FERC affirmatively states that it lacks jurisdiction to regulate this transmission; at other times, FERC is noncommittal. The Court's heavy reliance on one statement, therefore, is misplaced. And while the Court recognizes in a footnote that FERC made conflicting representations, see ante, at 23, n.14, in deciding to defer to the agency the Court fails to place any weight on the fact that the agency presented inconsistent positions. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) ("The fair measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute has been understood to vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of the agency's care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency's position..."). These inconsistencies alone, however, convince me that the Court should neither defer to the aforementioned statement of FERC's jurisdiction nor rely on any other explanation provided by FERC. </s> For example, in its brief FERC argues that because the statute is ambiguous, the Court of Appeals properly deferred under Chevron to FERC's reasonable decision not to regulate. Brief for Respondent FERC 49. FERC then contends that it made a reasonable finding that it lacked jurisdiction over the transmission component of bundled retail sales and that it was therefore not required to regulate the transmission component. Id., at 49-50; see also id., at 44 ("The Commission reasonably concluded that Congress has not authorized federal regulation of the transmission component of bundled retail sales of electric energy"). The brief also notes, however, that FERC has attempted to regulate transmission connected to retail bundled sales and maintains that it continues to believe that it has authority to require public utilities to treat customers of unbundled interstate transmission in a manner comparable to the treatment afforded bundled transmission users. Id., at 48.10 </s> At oral argument, FERC proposed a different explanation. It stated that the agency was not disclaiming its authority to order the unbundling of the transmission component of a retail sale. Tr. of Oral Arg. 42-43. FERC explained that it lacks jurisdiction over the transmission "as long as the State hasn't unbundled [the retail sale], the utility has not unbundled it, and FERC has not exercised whatever authority it would have to unbundle it." Id., at 50 (emphasis added). </s> FERC's orders present still more views of its jurisdiction. As already noted, when considering whether FERC should unbundle retail transmission and generation, FERC asserts that this particular question "raises numerous difficult jurisdictional issues" more appropriately considered at a later time. Order No. 888, at 31,699. FERC, at other points, however, makes clear its belief that there is a jurisdictional line between unbundled and bundled retail transmission. Explaining its "legal determination" that it has exclusive jurisdiction over unbundled retail transmission in interstate commerce, FERC notes that it found "compelling the fact that section 201 of the FPA, on its face, gives the Commission jurisdiction over transmission in interstate commerce (by public utilities) without qualification." Id., at 31,781. Nonetheless, when addressing why "its authority attaches only to unbundled, but not bundled, retail transmission in interstate commerce," FERC affirmatively states that "we believe that when transmission is sold at retail as part and parcel of the delivered product called electric energy, the transaction is a sale of electric energy at retail" and that "[u]nder the FPA, the Commission's jurisdiction over sales of electric energy extends only to wholesale sales." Ibid. </s> By contrast, when the "retail transaction is broken into two products that are sold separately," FERC "believe[s] the jurisdictional lines change." Ibid. FERC explains: </s> "In this situation, the state clearly retains jurisdiction over the sale of the power. However, the unbundled transmission service involves only the provision of `transmission in interstate commerce' which, under the FPA, is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Commission. Therefore, when a bundled retail sale is unbundled and becomes separate transmission and power sales transactions, the resulting transmission transaction falls within the Federal sphere of regulation." Ibid. </s> FERC here concludes that the act of unbundling itself changes its jurisdictional lines. Unbundling, FERC notes, may occur in one of two ways: (1) voluntarily by a public utility or (2) as a result of a State retail access program that orders unbundling. Ibid. Either action brings the transmission within the scope of FERC's jurisdiction. </s> Subsequently, in Order No. 888-A, FERC responded to rehearing requests by supplanting its earlier conclusion that "the matter raises numerous difficult jurisdictional issues" with the explanation quoted above from Order No. 888, at 31,781. See Order No. 888-A, at 30,225. It is possible, therefore, that FERC abandoned its "difficult jurisdictional issues" explanation altogether. Thus, while it is true that FERC, at one point, evades the jurisdictional question by deeming it too "difficult" to resolve, more often than not FERC affirmatively concludes that it in fact does not have jurisdiction over the transmission at issue here. From this survey of FERC's positions, I can only conclude that the Court's singular reliance on the one statement is misguided. </s> 3 </s> Finally, to the extent that FERC has concluded that it lacks jurisdiction over transmission connected to bundled retail sales, it ignores the clear statutory mandate. By refusing to regulate the transmission associated with retail sales in States that have chosen not to unbundle retail sales, FERC has set up a system under which: (a) each State's internal policy decisions concerning whether to require unbundling controls the nature of federal jurisdiction; (b) a utility's voluntary decision to unbundle determines whether FERC has jurisdiction; and (c) utilities that are allowed to continue bundling may discriminate against other companies attempting to use their transmission lines. The statute neither draws these distinctions nor provides that the jurisdictional lines shift based on actions taken by the States, the public utilities, or FERC itself. While Congress understood that transmission is a necessary component of all energy sales, it granted FERC jurisdiction over all interstate transmission, without qualification. As such, these distinctions belie the statutory text. </s> II </s> As the foregoing demonstrates, I disagree with the deference the Court gives to FERC's decision not to regulate transmission connected to bundled retail sales. Because the statute unambiguously grants FERC jurisdiction over all interstate transmission and §824e mandates that FERC remedy undue discrimination with respect to all transmission within its jurisdiction, at a minimum the statute required FERC to consider whether there was discrimination in the marketplace warranting application of either the OATT or some other remedy. </s> I would not, as petitioner Enron requests, compel FERC to apply the OATT to bundled retail transmissions. I would vacate the Court of Appeals' judgment and require FERC on remand to engage in reasoned decisionmaking to determine whether there is undue discrimination with respect to transmission associated with retail bundled sales, and if so, what remedy is appropriate. </s> For all of these reasons, I respectfully dissent from Part IV of the Court's opinion. </s> FOOTNOTES Footnote * </s> Together with No. 00-809, Enron Power Marketing, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission etal., also on certiorari to the same court. </s> FOOTNOTES Footnote 1 </s> FERC Stats. & Regs., Regs. Preambles, Jan. 1991-June 1996, ¶ ;31,036, p.31,632, 61 Fed. Reg. 21540 (1996). Order No. 888 also deals with the recovery of "stranded costs" by utilities, but this aspect of the order is not before us. </s> Footnote 2 </s> For example, in cases involving the interstate transmission of natural gas, we held that a State could regulate direct sales to consumers even when the gas was drawn from interstate mains, Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N. Y., 252 U.S. 23 (1920); Public Util. Comm'n of Kan. v. Landon, 249 U.S. 236 (1919), but that a State could not regulate the rate at which gas from out-of-state producers was sold to independent distributing companies for resale to local consumers, Missouri ex rel. Barrett v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298, 309 (1924). </s> Footnote 3 </s> The FPA was enacted as Title II of the Public Utility Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 847. Title I of the Public Utility Act--not at issue here--regulated financial practices of interstate holding companies that controlled a large number of public utilities. </s> Footnote 4 </s> In Order No. 888, FERC noted that the optimum size of electric generation plants has shifted from the larger, 500 megawatt plants (with 10-year lead time) of the past to the smaller, 50-to-150 megawatt plants (with 1-year lead time) of the present. These smaller plants can produce energy at a cost of 3-to-5 cents per kilowatt-hour, as opposed to the older plants' production cost of 4-to-15 cents per kilowatt-hour. Order No. 888, at 31,641. </s> Footnote 5 </s> See Brief for Respondent FERC 4-5. Over the years, FERC has described the interconnected grids in a number of proceedings. For example, in 1967, the FPC considered whether Florida Power & Light Co. (FPL)--a utility attached to what was then the regional grid for the southeastern United States--transmitted energy in interstate commerce as a result of that attachment. The FPC concluded that FPL's transmissions were in interstate commerce: "[S]ince electric energy can be delivered virtually instantaneously when needed on a system at a speed of 186,000 miles per second, such energy can be and is transmitted to FPL when needed from out-of-state generators, and in turn can be and is transmitted from FPL to help meet out-of-state demands; ... there is a cause and effect relationship in electric energy occurring throughout every generator and point on the FPL, Corp, Georgia, and Southern systems which constitutes interstate transmission of electric energy by, to, and from FPL." Inre Florida Power & Light Co., 37 F.P.C. 544, 549 (1967). This Court found the FPC's findings sufficient to establish the FPC's jurisdiction. FPC v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 469 (1972). </s> As amici explain in less technical terms, "[e]nergy flowing onto a power network or grid energizes the entire grid, and consumers then draw undifferentiated energy from that grid." Brief for Electrical Engineers etal. as Amici Curiae 2. As a result, explain amici, any activity on the interstate grid affects the rest of the grid. Ibid. Amici dispute the States' contentions that electricity functions "the way water flows through a pipe or blood cells flow through a vein" and "can be controlled, directed and traced" as these substances can be, calling such metaphors "inaccurate and highly misleading." Id., at 2, 5. </s> Footnote 6 </s> In addition to policing utilities' anticompetitive behavior through the various statutory provisions that explicitly address the electric industry, discussed in more detail below, the Government has also used the antitrust laws to this end. For example, in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973), the Court permitted the Government to seek antitrust remedies against a utility company which, among other things, refused to sell power at wholesale to some municipalities and refused to transfer competitors' power over its lines. Id., at 368. The Court concluded that the FPA's existence did not preclude the applicability of the antitrust laws. Id., at 372. </s> Footnote 7 </s> Later in the NPRM, FERC explained that §206 of the FPA authorizes FERC to remedy unduly discriminatory practices, and found: "that utilities owning or controlling transmission facilities possess substantial market power; that, as profit maximizing firms, they have and will continue to exercise that market power in order to maintain and increase market share, and will thus deny their wholesale customers access to competitively priced electric generation; and that these unduly discriminatory practices will deny consumers the substantial benefits of lower electricity prices." NPRM 33,052. </s> Footnote 8 </s> While it concluded that "the rates, terms, and conditions of all unbundled transmission service" were subject to its jurisdiction, FERC stated that it would "give deference to state recommendations" regarding the regulation of retail transmissions "when state recommendations are consistent with our open access policies." Order No. 888, at 31,689. </s> Footnote 9 </s> FERC also explained that it did not assert "jurisdiction to order retail transmission directly to an ultimate consumer," Order No. 888, at 31,781, and that States had "authority over the service of delivering electric energy to end users.... State regulation of most power production and virtually all distribution and consumption of electric energy is clearly distinguishable from this Commission's responsibility to ensure open and non-discriminatory interstate transmission service. Nothing adopted by the Commission today, including its interpretation of its authority over retail transmission or how the separate distribution and transmission functions and assets are discerned when retail service is unbundled, is inconsistent with traditional state regulatory authority in this area." Id., at 31,782-31,783. </s> With respect to distinguishing "Commission-jurisdictional facilities used for transmission in interstate commerce" from "state-jurisdictional local distribution facilities," ibid., FERC identified seven relevant factors, id., at 31,771, 31,783-31,784. Recognizing the state interest in maintaining control of local distribution facilities, FERC further explained that, "in instances of unbundled retail wheeling that occurs as a result of a state retail access program, we will defer to recommendations by state regulatory authorities concerning where to draw the jurisdictional line under the Commission's technical test for local distribution facilities ...." Id., at 31,784-31,785. </s> Footnote 10 </s> See FPC v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972); Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 319 U.S. 61 (1943). </s> Footnote 11 </s> This reference is found twice in §201 of the FPA. Section 201(a), as codified in 16 U.S.C. §824(a), states in full: "It is declared that the business of transmitting and selling electric energy for ultimate distribution to the public is affected with a public interest, and that Federal regulation of matters relating to generation to the extent provided in this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter and of that part of such business which consists of the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such energy at wholesale in interstate commerce is necessary in the public interest, such Federal regulation, however, to extend only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by the States." (Emphasis added.) </s> Section 201(b)(1), as codified in 16 U.S.C. §824(b)(1), states in full: "The provisions of this subchapter shall apply to the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and to the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce, but except as provided in paragraph (2) shall not apply to any other sale of electric energy or deprive a State or State commission of its lawful authority now exercised over the exportation of hydroelectric energy which is transmitted across a State line. The Commission shall have jurisdiction over all facilities for such transmission or sale of electric energy, but shall not have jurisdiction, except as specifically provided in this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter, over facilities used for the generation of electric energy or over facilities used in local distribution or only for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce, or over facilities for the transmission of electric energy consumed wholly by the transmitter." (Emphasis added.) </s> Footnote 12 </s> Section 201(c) of the FPA, as codified in 16 U.S.C. §824(c), explains that "[f]or the purpose of this subchapter, electric energy shall be held to be transmitted in interstate commerce if transmitted from a State and consumed at any point outside thereof; but only insofar as such transmission takes place within the United States." Finally, §201(d), as codified in 16 U.S.C. §824(d), states that the "term `sale of electric energy at wholesale' when used in this subchapter, means a sale of electric energy to any person for resale." </s> Footnote 13 </s> FERC recognized this point in reaching its jurisdictional conclusion: "Rather than claiming `new' jurisdiction, the Commission is applying the same statutory framework to a business environment in which ... retail sales and transmission service are provided in separate transactions.... Because these types of products and transactions were not prevalent in the past, the jurisdictional issue before us did not arise and ... the Commission cannot be viewed as `disturbing' the jurisdiction of state regulators prior to and after the Attleboro case." Order No. 888-A, at 30,339-30,340. </s> Footnote 14 </s> See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner in No. 00-809, p. 12 ("FERC ... held itself powerless to address the vast majority of the problem"); id., at 14 ("FERC determined, however, that it did not have authority to extend its functional unbundling remedy to transmissions for bundled retail sales"); id., at 18 ("FERC's decision that it did not have jurisdiction to apply [an open-access tariff] to transmissions for bundled retail sales was contrary to law"); id., at 20 ("[FERC found] no jurisdiction when the cost of the transmission is bundled with the cost of power at retail"). </s> Surprisingly, FERC seemed to agree with Enron's characterization of its holding at some places in its own brief. E.g., Brief for Respondent FERC 44-45 ("The Commission reasonably concluded that Congress has not authorized federal regulation of the transmission component of bundled retail sales of electric energy" (emphasis added)). Yet, FERC's brief also stated more accurately that FERC had decided not to assert jurisdiction, rather than concluded that it lacked the power to do so. E.g., id., at 15 ("[FERC] was not asserting jurisdiction to order utilities to unbundle their retail services ..."); id., at 49 (citing "the Commission's reasonable decision not to override the States' historical regulation of transmission that is bundled with a retail sale of energy"). </s> Footnote 15 </s> Indeed, given FERC's acknowledgement "that recovery of legitimate stranded costs is critical to the successful transition of the electric utility industry from a tightly regulated, cost-of-service utility industry to an open access, competitively priced power industry," NPRM 33,052, it was appropriate for FERC to confine the scope of its remedy to what was truly "necessary": the broader the remedy, the more complicated FERC's already challenging goal of permitting utilities to recover stranded costs. </s> FOOTNOTES Footnote 1 </s> I note that the "reasons" upon which the Court relies were made only in the specific context of FERC's explanation of its decision not to unbundle retail transmission and distribution. Order No. 888, at 31,698-31,699. The comments were not given as a general explanation for FERC's decision not to apply the OATT to transmission associated with bundled retail sales, and FERC did not rely on the second explanation in Order No. 888-A. See infra, at 15. </s> Footnote 2 </s> Specifically, the Court of Appeals stated that, in light of the fact that a regulator could reasonably construe the transmission component of bundled retail sales as either part of a retail sale or a transmission service in interstate commerce, "FERC's decision to characterize bundled transmissions as part of retail sales subject to state jurisdiction therefore represents a statutorily permissible policy choice to which we must also defer under Chevron [U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984)]." Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 694-695 (CADC 2000). </s> Footnote 3 </s> At the local distribution centers, "the power flow is split to send power to a number of primary feeder lines that lead to other transformers that again step down and feed the power to secondary service lines that in turn deliver the power to the utility's customers." Brief for Electrical Engineers 13. </s> Footnote 4 </s> In the contiguous United States, this system is composed of three major grids: the Eastern Interconnection, the Western Interconnection, and the Texas Interconnection. Restructuring of the Electric Power Industry: A Capsule of Issues and Events, Energy Information Administration 6 (DOE/EIA-X037, Jan. 2000). </s> Footnote 5 </s> FERC notes that whether transmission is in interstate commerce "does not turn on whether the contract path for a particular power or transmission sale crosses state lines, but rather follows the physical flow of electricity." Order No. 888, Appendix G, at 31,968. FERC states that "[b]ecause of the highly integrated nature of the electric system, this results in most transmission of electric energy being `in interstate commerce.'" Ibid. </s> Footnote 6 </s> Section 824d(b), for example, provides: </s> "No public utility shall, with respect to any transmission or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, (1) make or grant any undue preference or advantage to any person or subject any person to any undue prejudice or disadvantage, or (2) maintain any unreasonable difference in rates, charges, service, facilities, or in any other respect, either as between localities or as between classes of service." </s> Section 824e(a) further provides that whenever FERC, after conducting a hearing, finds that: </s> "any rate, charge, or classification, demanded, observed, charged, or collected by any public utility for any transmission or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or that any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential, the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate, charge, classification, . . . practice, or contract to be thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order." (Emphasis added.) </s> Footnote 7 </s> FERC likewise states in Order No. 888, at 31,634, that the "legal and policy cornerstone of these rules is to remedy undue discrimination in access to the monopoly owned transmission wires that control whether and to whom electricity can be transported in interstate commerce." FERC also recognized that to comply with the statute's mandate, it "must eliminate the remaining patchwork of closed and open jurisdictional transmission systems and ensure that all these systems, including those that already provide some form of open access, cannot use monopoly power over transmission to unduly discriminate against others." Id., at 31,635. </s> Footnote 8 </s> For example, the Electric Power Supply Association explains that transmission owning utilities may discriminate against entities that seek to use their transmission systems, thereby preventing the entities from using their lines, in the following ways: (1)They may block available transfer capacity--the capability of the physical transmission network to facilitate activity over and above its committed uses--by overscheduling transmission for their own retail loads across "valuable" transmission paths; (2)they may improperly avoid certain costs that other entities would be subject to; or (3)they may fail to make accurate disclosure of available transfer capability, causing "serious difficulties for suppliers attempting to schedule electricity sales across their transmission facilities." Brief for Respondent Electric Power Supply Association 7-9. Similarly, petitioner Enron explains that a "utility can reserve superior transmission capacity for its own bundled retail sales, at times even closing its facilities to other transmissions . . . forcing competitors of the utility to scramble for less direct, less predictable and more expensive transmission options." Brief for Petitioner in No. 00-809, pp. 41-42. </s> Footnote 9 </s> The difference between the two types of sales is that with an unbundled retail sale, a utility, either voluntarily or pursuant to state law, presents separate charges for the electricity, the transmission service, and the delivery service. In a bundled sale, all components are combined as one charge. See Brief for Petitioner in No. 00-809, at 4-5. </s> Footnote 10 </s> FERC earlier rejected the proposed curtailment provisions of a public utility's federal OATT that favored the utility's bundled retail customers over its wholesale transmission customers. It asserted that, in compliance with Order No. 888 and in order to enforce the OATT, it could regulate transmission curtailment in a manner that had an indirect effect upon the utility's services to its retail customers. Brief for Respondent FERC 48; see Northern States Power Co. v. FERC, 176 F. 3d 1090, 1095 (CA8 1999). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, noting that "FERC concede[d] that it has no jurisdiction whatsoever over the state's regulation of [the utility's] bundled retail sales activities," held that FERC exceeded its authority under the FPA. Id., at 1096. While I do not endorse the court's conclusion with respect to FERC's jurisdiction, I note that the Court of Appeals' pointed to the inconsistencies in FERC's position, explaining that "FERC's observation that no inherent conflict exists between its mandates and practical application is viewed through an adversarial bias." Id., at 1094.

United States Supreme Court VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC. et al. v. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION et al.(2002) No. 00-511 Argued: October 10, 2001Decided: May 13, 2002 </s> In order to foster competition between monopolistic carriers providing local telephone service and companies seeking to enter local markets, provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Act) entitle the new entrants to lease elements of the incumbent carriers' local-exchange networks, 47 U.S.C. §251(c), and direct the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to prescribe methods for state utility commissions to use in setting rates for the sharing of those elements, §252(d). Such "just and reasonable rates" must, inter alia, be "based on the cost (determined without reference to a rate-of-return or other rate-based proceeding) of providing the ... network element." §252(d)(1)(A)(i). Regulations appended to the FCC's First Report and Order under the Act provide, among other things, for the treatment of "cost" under §252(d)(1)(A)(i) as "forward-looking economic cost," 47 CFR §51.505, something distinct from the kind of historically based cost previously relied on in valuing a rate base, see, e.g., FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 596-598, 605; define the "forward-looking economic cost of an element [as] the sum of (1) the total element long-run incremental cost of the element [TELRIC,] and (2) a reasonable allocation of forward-looking common costs," §51.505(a), "incurred in providing a group of elements that "cannot be attributed directly to individual elements," §51.505(c)(1); and, most importantly, specify that the TELRIC "should be measured based on the use of the most efficient telecommunications technology currently available and the lowest cost network configuration, given the existing location of the incumbent['s] wire centers." §51.505(b)(1). The regulations also contain so-called "combination" rules requiring an incumbent, upon request and compensation, to perform the functions necessary to combine network elements for an entrant, unless the combination is not technically feasible. §§51.315(b)-(f). Challenges to the regulations, mostly by incumbent carriers and state commissions, were consolidated in the Eighth Circuit, which initially held, inter alia, that the FCC had no authority to control state commissions' ratesetting methodology and that the FCC misconstrued §251(c)(3)'s plain language in implementing the combination rules. Reversing in large part in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366, 384-385, this Court, among its rulings, upheld the FCC's jurisdiction to impose a new ratesetting methodology on the States and reinstated the principal combination rule, Rule 315(b), which forbids incumbents to separate currently combined network elements before leasing them to entrants who ask for them in a combined form. On remand, the incumbents' primary challenge went to the FCC's ratesetting methodology. The Eighth Circuit understood §252(d)(1) to be ambiguous as between "forward-looking" and "historical" cost, so that a forward-looking ratesetting method would presumably be reasonable, but held that §252(d)(1) foreclosed the use of the TELRIC methodology because the Act plainly required rates based on the actual, not hypothetical, cost of providing the network element. The court also invalidated the additional combination rules, Rules 315(c)-(f), reading §251(c)(3)'s reference to "allow[ing] requesting carriers to combine ... elements" as unambiguously requiring requesting carriers, not providing incumbents, to do any and all combining. </s> Held: </s> 1.The FCC can require state commissions to set the rates charged by incumbents for leased elements on a forward-looking basis untied to the incumbents' investment. Because the incumbents have not met their burden of showing unreasonableness to defeat the deference due the FCC, see Chevron U.S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-845, the Eighth Circuit's judgment is reversed insofar as it invalidated TELRIC. Pp. 25-58. </s> (A)This Court rejects the incumbents' argument that "cost" in §252(d)(1)'s requirement that "the ... rate ... be ... based on the cost ... of providing the ... network element" can only mean, in plain language and in this particular technical context, the past cost to an incumbent of furnishing the specific network element actually, physically, to be provided, as distinct from its value or the price that would be paid for it on the open market. At the most basic level of common usage, "cost" has no such clear implication. A merchant asked about the "cost" of his goods may reasonably quote their current wholesale market price, not the cost of the items on his shelves, which he may have bought at higher or lower prices. When the reference shifts into the technical realm, the incumbents are still unconvincing. "Cost" as used in calculating the rate base under the traditional cost-of-service method did not stand for all past capital expenditures, but at most for those that were prudent, while prudent investment itself could be denied recovery when unexpected events rendered investment useless. Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 312. And even when investment was wholly includable in the rate base, ratemakers often rejected the utilities' "embedded costs," their own book-value estimates, which typically were geared to maximize the rate base with high statements of past expenditures and working capital, combined with unduly low depreciation rates. See, e.g., Hope Natural Gas Co., supra, at 597-598. Equally important, the incumbents' plain-meaning argument ignores the statutory setting in which the mandate to use "cost" in valuing network elements occurs. First, the Act uses "cost" as an intermediate term in the calculation of "just and reasonable rates," §252(d)(1), and it was the very point of Hope Natural Gas that regulatory bodies required to set rates expressed in these terms have ample discretion to choose methodology, 320 U.S., at 602. Second, it would be strange to think Congress tied "cost" to historical cost without a more specific indication, when the very same sentence that requires "cost" pricing also prohibits any reference to a "rate-of-return or other rate-based proceeding," §252(d)(1), each of which has been identified with historical cost ever since Hope Natural Gas was decided. Without any better indication of meaning than the unadorned term, the word "cost" in §252(d)(1) gives ratesetting commissions broad methodological leeway, but says little about the method to be employed. Iowa Utilities Bd., supra, at 423. Pp. 25-29. </s> (B)Also rejected is the incumbents' alternative argument that, because TELRIC calculates the forward-looking cost by reference to a hypothetical, most efficient element at existing wire centers, not the actual network element being provided, the FCC's particular methodology is neither consistent with §252(d)(1)'s plain language nor within the zone of reasonable interpretation subject to Chevron deference. Pp. 29-52. </s> (1)The term "cost" is simply too protean to support the incumbents' argument that plain language bars a definition of "cost" untethered to historical investment. What the incumbents call the "hypothetical" element is simply the element valued in terms of a piece of equipment an incumbent may not own. Pp. 29-30. </s> (2)Similarly, the claim that TELRIC exceeds reasonable interpretative leeway is open to the objection that responsibility for "just and reasonable" rates leaves methodology largely subject to discretion. E.g., Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 790. The incumbents nevertheless field three arguments, which the Court rejects. Pp. 30-52. </s> (a)The incumbents argue, first, that a method of calculating wholesale lease rates based on the costs of providing hypothetical, most efficient elements may simulate the competition envisioned by the Act but does not induce it. There are basically three answers to this no-stimulation unreasonableness claim. Pp. 31-46. </s> (i)The basic assumption of the no-stimulation argument--that in a perfectly efficient market, no one who can lease at a TELRIC rate will ever build--is contrary to fact. TELRIC does not assume a perfectly efficient wholesale market or one that is likely to resemble perfection in any foreseeable time, cf. Iowa Utilities Board, supra, at 389-390, but includes several features of inefficiency that undermine the incumbents' argument. First, because the FCC has qualified any assumption of efficiency by requiring ratesetters to calculate cost on the basis of the existing location of the incumbent's wire centers, §51.505(b)(1), certain network elements will not be priced at their most efficient cost and configuration. Second, TELRIC rates in practice will differ from the products of a perfectly competitive market owing to lags in price adjustments built into the state-commission ratesetting process. Finally, because measurement of the TELRIC is based on the use of the most efficient telecommunications technology currently available, ibid., the marginal cost of a most efficient element that an entrant alone has built and uses would not set a new pricing standard until it became available to competitors as an alternative to the incumbent's corresponding element. Pp. 32-35. </s> (ii)It cannot be said that the FCC acted unreasonably in picking TELRIC to promote the mandated competition. Comparison of TELRIC with alternatives proposed by the incumbents as more reasonable--embedded-cost methodologies, an efficient component pricing rule, and "Ramsey pricing," the most commonly proposed variant of fixed-cost recovery ratesetting--are plausibly answered by the FCC's stated reasons to reject the alternatives, §51.505(d); First Report and Order ¶ ;¶ ;655, 696, 705, 709. Pp. 36-45. </s> (iii)The claim that TELRIC is unreasonable as a matter of law because it simulates, but does not produce, facilities-based competition founders on fact. The entrants say that they invested $55 billion in new facilities from 1996 through 2000, and the incumbents do not contest the figure. A regulatory scheme that can boast such substantial competitive capital spending in four years is not easily described as an unreasonable way to promote competitive investment in facilities. Pp. 45-46. </s> (b)Also unavailing is the incumbents' second reason for calling TELRIC an unreasonable exercise of the FCC's regulatory discretion: the supposed incapacity of this methodology to provide enough depreciation and allowance for capital costs to induce rational competition on the theory's own terms. This argument rests upon a fundamentally false premise, that the TELRIC rules limit the depreciation and capital costs that ratesetting commissions may recognize. On the contrary, First Report and Order ¶ ;702 gave state commissions considerable discretion on these matters, specifically permitting more favorable allowances for costs of capital and depreciation than were generally allowed under traditional ratemaking practice. The incumbents' fallback position, that existing rates of depreciation and costs of capital are not even reasonable starting points, is unpersuasive. This attack tends to argue in highly general terms, whereas TELRIC rates are calculated on the basis of individual elements. Those rates leave plenty of room for differences in the appropriate depreciation rates and risk-adjusted capital costs depending on the nature and technology of the specific element to be priced. In light of the many TELRIC rates to be calculated by state commissions across the country, the FCC's prescription of a general "starting point" is reasonable enough. Pp. 46-51. </s> (c)Finally, the incumbents' third argument, that TELRIC is needlessly and unreasonably complicated and impracticable, is unpersuasive. The record suggests that TELRIC rate proceedings are surprisingly smooth-running affairs, with incumbents and competitors typically presenting two conflicting economic models supported by expert testimony, and state commissioners customarily assigning rates based on some predictions from one model and others from its counterpart. At bottom, battles of experts are bound to be part of any ratesetting scheme, and the FCC was reasonable to prefer TELRIC over alternative fixed-cost schemes that preserve home-field advantages for the incumbents. Pp. 51-52. </s> (C)The incumbents' attempt to apply the rule of constitutional avoidance does not present a serious question. They say that "cost" should be construed by reference to historical investment in order to avoid the serious constitutional question whether a methodology so divorced from actual investment will lead to a taking of property in violation of the Fifth (or Fourteenth) Amendment. However, they do not argue that any particular, actual TELRIC rate is so unjust as to be confiscatory, despite the fact that some state commissions have already put TELRIC rates in place. This want of any rate to be reviewed is significant, given that this Court has never considered a taking challenge to a ratesetting methodology without being presented with specific rate orders alleged to be confiscatory. See, e.g., Duquesne, supra, at 303-304. Indeed, the general rule is that any question about the constitutionality of ratesetting is raised by rates, not methods. See, e.g., Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S., at 602. Thus, the policy of construing a statute to avoid constitutional questions is presumptively out of place when construing a measure like TELRIC that prescribes a method. The incumbents argue unpersuasively that this action is placed outside the general rule by strong signs that takings will occur if the TELRIC interpretation of §252(d)(1) is allowed. First, their comparison of historical investment in local telephone markets with the corresponding estimate of a TELRIC evaluation is spurious because their assumed numbers are clearly wrong. Second, they misplace their reliance on dicta in Duquesne, 488 U.S., at 315, to the effect that there may be a taking challenge if a ratemaking body makes opportunistic methodology changes just to minimize a utility's return on capital investment. There is no evidence that the decision to adopt TELRIC was arbitrary, opportunistic, or undertaken with a confiscatory purpose. Indeed, the indications in the record are very much to the contrary. Pp. 52-58. </s> 2.The FCC can require incumbents to combine elements of their networks at the request of entrants who cannot combine themselves, when they lease them to the entrants. Thus, the Eighth Circuit erred in invalidating the additional combination rules, Rules 315(c)-(f). Pp. 58-69. </s> (A)The Court rejects the incumbents' threshold objection that the Government's and competing carriers' challenge to the rules invalidation is barred by waiver because the Iowa Utilities Board petition to review the Eighth Circuit's earlier invalidation of Rule 315(b) did not extend to its simultaneous invalidation of Rules 315(c)-(f). The incumbents argue that the Eighth Circuit exceeded the scope of this Court's mandate when it revisited the unchallenged portion of its earlier holding, and that this Court should decline to reach the validity of Rules 315(c)-(f) because doing so would encourage the sort of strategic, piecemeal litigation disapproved in Communist Party of United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 30-31. However, that case does not block consideration of Rules 315(c)-(f) here. Addressing the issue now would not "make waste" of years of efforts by the FCC or the Eighth Circuit, id., at 32, n.8, would not threaten to leave a constitutional ruling pointless, and would direct the Court's attention not to an isolated, "long-stale" procedural error by the agency, ibid., but to the invalidation of FCC rules meant to have general and continuing applicability. There is no indication that litigation tactics prompted the failure last time to appeal on these rules, which were reexamined on remand at the Eighth Circuit's behest, not the Government's nor the competing carriers'. Any issue pressed or passed upon by a federal court is subject to this Court's broad discretion on certiorari, and there are good reasons to look at Rules 315(c)-(f). The Eighth Circuit passed on a significant issue that has been placed in a state of flux by a split among federal cases. Pp. 58-60. </s> (B)The Eighth Circuit read 47 U.S. C. §251(c)(3)'s requirement that "[a]n incumbent ... provide ... network elements in a manner that allows requesting carriers to combine such elements" as unambiguously excusing incumbents from any obligation to combine provided elements. But the language is not that plain. If Congress had treated incumbents and entrants as equals, it probably would be plain enough that the incumbents' obligations stopped at furnishing an element that could be combined. The Act, however, proceeds on the understanding that incumbent monopolists and contending competitors are unequal. Cf.§251(c). And because, within the actual statutory confines, it is not self-evident that in obligating incumbents to furnish, Congress silently negated a duty to combine, the Court reads §251(c)(3)'s language as leaving open who should do the work of combination. Under Chevron, that leaves the additional combination rules intact unless the incumbents can show them to be unreasonable. The Court finds, however, that those rules reflect a reasonable reading of the statute. They are meant to remove practical barriers to competitive entry into local-exchange markets while avoiding serious interference with incumbent network operations. The rules say an incumbent shall, for payment, "perform the functions necessary," Rules 315(c) and (d), to combine elements in order to put a competing carrier on an equal footing with the incumbent when the requesting carrier is unable to combine, First Report and Order ¶ ;294, when it would not place the incumbent at a disadvantage in operating its own network, and when it would not place other competing carriers at a competitive disadvantage, Rule 315(c)(2). This duty is consistent with the Act's goals of competition and nondiscrimination, and imposing it is a sensible way to reach the result the Act requires. Pp. 60-69. </s> 219 F.3d 744, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. </s> Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and Stevens, Kennedy, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, in which Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined as to Part III, and in which Thomas, J., also joined as to Part IV. Breyer, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Scalia, J., joined as to Part VI. O'Connor, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. </s> VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC., etal.,PETITIONERS </s> 00-511v. </s> FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION etal. </s> WORLDCOM, INC., etal., PETITIONERS </s> 00-555v. </s> VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC. etal. </s> FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, etal.,PETITIONERS </s> 00-587v. </s> IOWA UTILITIES BOARD etal. </s> AT&T CORP., PETITIONERS </s> 00-590v. </s> IOWA UTILITIES BOARD etal. </s> GENERAL COMMUNICATIONS, INC., PETITIONER </s> 00-602v. </s> IOWA UTILITIES BOARD etal. </s> on writs of certiorari to the united states court ofappeals for the eighth circuit </s> [May 13, 2002] </s> Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court.** </s> These cases arise under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Each is about the power of the Federal Communications Commission to regulate a relationship between monopolistic companies providing local telephone service and companies entering local markets to compete with the incumbents. Under the Act, the new entrants are entitled, among other things, to lease elements of the local telephone networks from the incumbent monopolists. The issues are whether the FCC is authorized (1) to require state utility commissions to set the rates charged by the incumbents for leased elements on a forward-looking basis untied to the incumbents' investment, and (2)to require incumbents to combine such elements at the entrants' request when they lease them to the entrants. We uphold the FCC's assumption and exercise of authority on both issues. </s> I </s> The 1982 consent decree settling the Government's antitrust suit against the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) divested AT&T of its local-exchange carriers, leaving AT&T as a long-distance and equipment company, and limiting the divested carriers to the provision of local telephone service. United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 552 F.Supp. 131 (DC 1982) aff'd subnom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). The decree did nothing, however, to increase competition in the persistently monopolistic local markets, which were thought to be the root of natural monopoly in the telecommunications industry. See S.Benjamin, D.Lichtman, & H.Shelanski, Telecommunications Law and Policy 682 (2001) (hereinafter Benjamin etal.); P.Huber, M.Kellogg, & J.Thorne, Federal Telecommunications Law §2.1.1, pp.84-85 (2d ed. 1999) (hereinafter Huber etal.); W.Baumol & J.Sidak, Toward Competition in Local Telephony 7-10 (1994); S.Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform 291-292, 314 (1982). These markets were addressed by provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act or Act), Pub L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, that were intended to eliminate the monopolies enjoyed by the inheritors of AT&T's local franchises; this objective was considered both an end in itself and an important step toward the Act's other goals of boosting competition in broader markets and revising the mandate to provide universal telephone service. See Benjamin etal. 716. </s> Two sets of related provisions for opening local markets concern us here. First, Congress required incumbent local-exchange carriers to share their own facilities and services on terms to be agreed upon with new entrants in their markets. 47 U.S.C. §251(c) (1994 ed., Supp.V). Second, knowing that incumbents and prospective entrants would sometimes disagree on prices for facilities or services, Congress directed the FCC to prescribe methods for state commissions to use in setting rates that would subject both incumbents and entrants to the risks and incentives that a competitive market would produce. §252(d). The particular method devised by the FCC for setting rates to be charged for interconnection and lease of network elements under the Act, §252(d)(1),1 and regulations the FCC imposed to implement the statutory duty to share these elements, §251(c)(3), are the subjects of this litigation, which must be understood against the background of ratemaking for public utilities in the United States and the structure of local exchanges made accessible by the Act. </s> A </s> Companies providing telephone service have traditionally been regulated as monopolistic public utilities.2 See J.Bonbright, Principles of Public Utility Rates 3-5 (1st ed. 1961) (hereinafter Bonbright); I.Barnes, Economics of Public Utility Regulation 37-41 (1942) (hereinafter Barnes). At the dawn of modern utility regulation, in order to offset monopoly power and ensure affordable, stable public access to a utility's goods or services, legislatures enacted rate schedules to fix the prices a utility could charge. See id., at 170-173; C.Phillips, Regulation of Public Utilities 111-112, and n.5 (1984) (hereinafter Phillips). See, e.g., Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 470-476 (1898) (statement of case); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877). As this job became more complicated, legislatures established specialized administrative agencies, first local or state, then federal, to set and regulate rates. Barnes 173-175; Phillips 115-117. See, e.g., Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 433 (1913) (Interstate Commerce Commission); Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 354-355 (1914) (jurisdictional dispute between ICC and Texas Railroad Commission). See generally T.McCraw, Prophets of Regulation 11-65 (1984). The familiar mandate in the enabling Acts was to see that rates be "just and reasonable" and not discriminatory. Barnes 289. See, e.g., Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 474, 49 U.S.C. §1(5) (1934 ed.). </s> All rates were subject to regulation this way: retail rates charged directly to the public and wholesale rates charged among businesses involved in providing the goods or services offered by the retail utility. Intrastate retail rates were regulated by the States or municipalities, with those at wholesale generally the responsibility of the National Government, since the transmission or transportation involved was characteristically interstate.3 See Phillips 143. </s> Historically, the classic scheme of administrative ratesetting at the federal level called for rates to be set out by the regulated utility companies in proposed tariff schedules, on the model applied to railroad carriers under the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 379. After interested parties had had notice of the proposals and a chance to comment, the tariffs would be accepted by the controlling agency so long as they were "reasonable" (or "just and reasonable") and not "unduly discriminatory." Hale, Commissions, Rates, and Policies, 53 Harv. L.Rev. 1103, 1104-1105 (1940). See, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 433, 445 (1911). The States generally followed this same tariff-schedule model. Barnes 297-298. See, e.g., Smyth, supra, at 470-476. </s> The way rates were regulated as between businesses (by the National Government) was in some respects, however, different from regulation of rates as between businesses and the public (at the state or local level). In wholesale markets, the party charging the rate and the party charged were often sophisticated businesses enjoying presumptively equal bargaining power, who could be expected to negotiate a "just and reasonable" rate as between the two of them. Accordingly, in the Federal Power Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 1063, and again in the Natural Gas Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 821, Congress departed from the scheme of purely tariff-based regulation and acknowledged that contracts between commercial buyers and sellers could be used in ratesetting, 16 U.S.C. §824d(d) (Federal Power Act); 15 U.S.C. §717c(c) (Natural Gas Act). See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 338-339 (1956). When commercial parties did avail themselves of rate agreements, the principal regulatory responsibility was not to relieve a contracting party of an unreasonable rate, FPC v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355 (1956) ("its improvident bargain"), but to protect against potential discrimination by favorable contract rates between allied businesses to the detriment of other wholesale customers. See ibid. Cf. New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 284, 296 (1947) ("The principal evil at which the Interstate Commerce Act was discrimination in its various manifestations"). This Court once summed up matters at the wholesale level this way: </s> "[W]hile it may be that the Commission may not normally impose upon a public utility a rate which would produce less than a fair return, it does not follow that the public utility may not itself agree by contract to a rate affording less than a fair return or that, if it does so, it is entitled to be relieved of its improvident bargain. In such circumstances the sole concern of the Commission would seem to be whether the rate is so low as to adversely affect the public interest--as where it might impair the financial ability of the public utility to continue its service, cast upon other consumers an excessive burden, or be unduly discriminatory." Sierra Pacific Co., supra, at 355 (citation omitted). </s> See also United Gas Pipe Line Co., supra, at 345. </s> Regulation of retail rates at the state and local levels was, on the other hand, focused more on the demand for "just and reasonable" rates to the public than on the perils of rate discrimination. See Barnes 298-299. Indeed, regulated local telephone markets evolved into arenas of state-sanctioned discrimination engineered by the public utility commissions themselves in the cause of "universal service." Huber etal. 80-85. See also Vietor 167-185. In order to hold down charges for telephone service in rural markets with higher marginal costs due to lower population densities and lesser volumes of use, urban and business users were charged subsidizing premiums over the marginal costs of providing their own service. See Huber etal. 84. </s> These cross subsidies between markets were not necessarily transfers between truly independent companies, however, thanks largely to the position attained by AT&T and its satellites. This was known as the "Bell system," which by the mid-20th century had come to possess overwhelming monopoly power in all telephone markets nationwide, supplying local-exchange and long-distance services as well as equipment. Vietor 174-175. See also R.Garnet, Telephone Enterprise: Evolution of Bell System's Horizontal Structure, 1876-1909, pp.160-163 (1985) (AppendixA). The same pervasive market presence of Bell providers that made it simple to provide cross subsidies in aid of universal service, however, also frustrated conventional efforts to hold retail rates down. See Huber etal. 84-85. Before the Bell system's predominance, regulators might have played competing carriers against one another to get lower rates for the public, see Cohen 47-50, but the strategy became virtually impossible once a single company had become the only provider in nearly every town and city across the country. This regulatory frustration led, in turn, to new thinking about just and reasonable retail rates and ultimately to these cases. </s> The traditional regulatory notion of the "just and reasonable" rate was aimed at navigating the straits between gouging utility customers and confiscating utility property. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944). See also Barnes 289-290; Bonbright 38. More than a century ago, reviewing courts charged with determining whether utility rates were sufficiently reasonable to avoid unconstitutional confiscation took as their touchstone the revenue that would be a "fair return" on certain utility property known as a "rate base." The fair rate of return was usually set as the rate generated by similar investment property at the time of the rate proceeding, and in Smyth v. Ames, 164 U.S. 578, 596-597 (1896)).4 </s> But Smyth proved to be a troublesome mandate, as Justice Brandeis, joined by Justice Holmes, famously observed 25 years later. Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Mo., 262 U.S. 276, 292 (1923) (dissenting opinion). The Smyth Court itself had described, without irony, the mind-numbing complexity of the required enquiry into fair value, as the alternative to historical investment: </s> "[I]n order to ascertain [fair] value, original cost of construction, the amount expended in permanent improvements, the amount and market value of its bonds and stock, the present as compared with the original cost of construction, the probable earning capacity of the property under particular rates prescribed by statute, and the sum required to meet operating expenses, are all matters for consideration, and are to be given such weight as may be just and right in each case. We do not say that there may not be other matters to be regarded in estimating the value of the property." 169 U.S., at 546-547. </s> To the bewildered, Smyth simply threw up its hands, prescribing no one method for limiting use of these numbers but declaring all such facts to be "relevant."5 Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., supra, at 294-298, and n.6 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). What is more, the customary checks on calculations of value in other circumstances were hard to come by for a utility's property; its costly facilities rarely changed hands and so were seldom tagged with a price a buyer would actually pay and a seller accept, id., at 292; West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. of Baltimore, 295 U.S. 662, 672 (1935). Neither could reviewing courts resort to a utility's revenue as an index of fair value, since its revenues were necessarily determined by the rates subject to review, with the rate of return applied to the very property subject to valuation. Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 309, n.5 (1989); Hope Natural Gas Co., supra, at601. </s> Small wonder, then, that Justice Brandeis was able to demonstrate how basing rates on Smyth's galactic notion of fair value could produce revenues grossly excessive or insufficient when gauged against the costs of capital. He gave the example (simplified) of a $1 million plant built with promised returns on the equity of $90,000 a year. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., supra, at 304-306. If the value were to fall to $600,000 at the time of a rate proceeding, with the rate of return on similar investments then at 6 percent, Smyth would say a rate was not confiscatory if it returned at least $36,000, a shortfall of $54,000 from the costs of capital. But if the value of the plant were to rise to $1,750,000 at the time of the rate proceeding, and the rate of return on comparable investments stood at 8 percent, then constitutionality under Smyth would require rates generating at least $140,000, $50,000 above capital costs. </s> The upshot of Smyth, then, was the specter of utilities forced into bankruptcy by rates inadequate to pay off the costs of capital, even when a drop in value resulted from general economic decline, not imprudent investment; while in a robust economy, an investment no more prescient could claim what seemed a rapacious return on equity invested. Justice Brandeis accordingly advocated replacing "fair value" with a calculation of rate base on the cost of capital prudently invested in assets used for the provision of the public good or service, and although he did not live to enjoy success, his campaign against Smyth came to fruition in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944). </s> In Hope Natural Gas, this Court disavowed the position that the Natural Gas Act and the Constitution required fair value as the sole measure of a rate base on which "just and reasonable" rates were to be calculated. Id., at 601-602. See also FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 602-606 (1942) (Black, Douglas, and Murphy, JJ., concurring). In the matter under review, the Federal Power Commission had valued the rate base by using "actual legitimate cost" reflecting "sound depreciation and depletion practices," and so had calculated a value roughly 25 percent below the figure generated by the natural-gas company's fair-value methods using "estimated reproduction cost" and "trended original cost." Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S., at 596-598, and nn.4-5. The Court upheld the Commission. "Rates which enable the company to operate successfully, to maintain its financial integrity, to attract capital, and to compensate its investors for the risks assumed certainly cannot be condemned as invalid, even though they might produce only a meager return on the so-called `fair value' rate base."6 Id., at 605. Although Hope Natural Gas did not repudiate everything said in Smyth, since fair value was still "the end product of the process of rate-making," 320 U.S., at 601, federal and state commissions setting rates in the aftermath of Hope Natural Gas largely abandoned the old fair-value approach and turned to methods of calculating the rate base on the basis of "cost." A.Kahn, Economics of Regulations: Principles and Institutions 40-41 (1988). </s> "Cost" was neither self-evident nor immune to confusion, however; witness the invocation of "reproduction cost" as a popular method for calculating fair value under Smyth, see n.5, supra, and the Federal Power Commission's rejection of "trended original cost" (apparently, a straight-line derivation from the cost of capital originally invested) in favor of "actual legitimate cost," Hope Natural Gas, supra, at 596. Still, over time, general agreement developed on a method that was primus inter pares, and it is essentially a modern gloss on that method that the incumbent carriers say the FCC should have used to set the rates at issue here. </s> The method worked out is not a simple calculation of rate base as the original cost of "prudently invested" capital that Justice Brandeis assumed, presumably by reference to the utility's balance sheet at the time of the rate proceeding. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 262 U.S., at 304-306. Rather, "cost" came to mean "cost of service," that is, the cost of prudently invested capital used to provide the service. Bonbright 173; P.Garfield & W.Lovejoy, Public Utility Economics 56 (1964). This was calculated subject to deductions for accrued depreciation and allowances for working capital,7 see Phillips 282-283 (table 8-1) ("a typical electric utility rate base"), naturally leading utilities to minimize depreciation by using very slow depreciation rates (on the assumption of long useful lives),8 and to maximize working capital claimed as a distinct rate-base constituent. </s> This formula, commonly called the prudent-investment rule, addressed the natural temptations on the utilities' part to claim a return on outlays producing nothing of value to the public. It was meant, on the one hand, to discourage unnecessary investment and the "fictitious capitalization" feared in Smyth, 169 U.S., at 543-546, and so to protect ratepayers from supporting excessive capacity, or abandoned, destroyed or phantom assets. Kahn, Tardiff, & Weisman, Telecommunications Act at three years: an economic evaluation of its implementation by the Federal Communications Commission, 11 Information Economics & Policy 319, 330, n.27 (1999) (hereinafter Kahn, Telecommunications Act). At the same time, the prudent-investment rule was intended to give utilities an incentive to make smart investments deserving a "fair" return, and thus to mimic natural incentives in competitive markets9 (though without an eye to fostering the actual competition by which such markets are defined). In theory, then, the prudent-investment qualification gave the ratepayer an important protection by mitigating the tendency of a regulated market's lack of competition to support monopolistic prices. </s> But the mitigation was too little, the prudent-investment rule in practice often being no match for the capacity of utilities having all the relevant information to manipulate the rate base and renegotiate the rate of return every time a rate was set. The regulatory response in some markets was adoption of a rate-based method commonly called "price caps," United States Telephone Assn. v. FCC, 188 F.3d 521, 524 (CADC 1999), as, for example, by the FCC's setting of maximum access charges paid to large local-exchange companies by interexchange carriers, In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 5 FCC Rcd 6786, 6787, ¶ ;1 (1990). </s> The price-cap scheme starts with a rate generated by the conventional cost-of-service formula, which it takes as a benchmark to be decreased at an average of some 2-3 percent a year to reflect productivity growth, Kahn, Telecommunications Act 330-332, subject to an upward adjustment if necessary to reflect inflation or certain unavoidable "exogenous costs" on which the company is authorized to recover a return. 5 FCC Rcd, at 6787, ¶ ;5. Although the price caps do not eliminate gamesmanship, since there are still battles to be fought over the productivity offset and allowable exogenous costs, United States Telephone Assn., supra, at 524, they do give companies an incentive "to improve productivity to the maximum extent possible," by entitling those that outperform the productivity offset to keep resulting profits, 5 FCC Rcd, at 6787-6788, ¶ ;¶ ;7-9. Ultimately, the goal, as under the basic prudent-investment rule, is to encourage investment in more productive equipment. </s> Before the passage of the 1996 Act, the price cap was, at the federal level, the final stage in a century of developing ratesetting methodology. What had changed throughout the era beginning with Smyth v. Ames was prevailing opinion on how to calculate the most useful rate base, with the disagreement between fair-value and cost advocates turning on whether invested capital was the key to the right balance between investors and ratepayers, and with the price-cap scheme simply being a rate-based offset to the utilities' advantage of superior knowledge of the facts employed in cost-of-service ratemaking. What is remarkable about this evolution of just and reasonable ratesetting, however, is what did not change. The enduring feature of ratesetting from Smyth v. Ames to the institution of price caps was the idea that calculating a rate base and then allowing a fair rate of return on it was a sensible way to identify a range of rates that would be just and reasonable to investors and ratepayers. Equally enduring throughout the period was dissatisfaction with the successive rate-based variants. From the constancy of this dissatisfaction, one possible lesson was drawn by Congress in the 1996 Act, which was that regulation using the traditional rate-based methodologies gave monopolies too great an advantage and that the answer lay in moving away from the assumption common to all the rate-based methods, that the monopolistic structure within the discrete markets would endure. </s> Under the local-competition provisions of the Act, Congress called for ratemaking different from any historical practice, to achieve the entirely new objective of uprooting the monopolies that traditional rate-based methods had perpetuated. H.R. Conf. Rep. No.104-230, p.113 (1996). A leading backer of the Act in the Senate put the new goal this way: </s> "This is extraordinary in the sense of telling private industry that this is what they have to do in order to let the competitors come in and try to beat your economic brains out.... </s> "It is kind of almost a jump-start.... I will do everything I have to let you into my business, because we used to be a bottleneck; we used to be a monopoly; we used to control everything. </s> "Now, this legislation says you will not control much of anything. You will have to allow for nondiscriminatory access on an unbundled basis to the network functions and services of the Bell operating companies network that is at least equal in type, quality, and price to the access [a] Bell operating company affords to itself." 141 Cong. Rec. 15572 (1995). (Remarks of Sen.Breaux (La.) on Pub. L. 104-104 (1995)). </s> For the first time, Congress passed a ratesetting statute with the aim not just to balance interests between sellers and buyers, but to reorganize markets by rendering regulated utilities' monopolies vulnerable to interlopers, even if that meant swallowing the traditional federal reluctance to intrude into local telephone markets. The approach was deliberate, through a hybrid jurisdictional scheme with the FCC setting a basic, default methodology for use in setting rates when carriers fail to agree, but leaving it to state utility commissions to set the actual rates. </s> While the Act is like its predecessors in tying the methodology to the objectives of "just and reasonable" and nondiscriminatory rates, 47 U.S.C. §252(d)(1), it is radically unlike all previous statutes in providing that rates be set "without reference to a rate-of-return or other rate-based proceeding," §252(d)(1)(A)(i). The Act thus appears to be an explicit disavowal of the familiar public-utility model of rate regulation (whether in its fair-value or cost-of-service incarnations) presumably still being applied by many States for retail sales, see Inre Implementation of Local Competition in Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 FCC Rcd 15499, 15857 ¶ ;704 (1996) (First Report and Order), in favor of novel ratesetting designed to give aspiring competitors every possible incentive to enter local retail telephone markets, short of confiscating the incumbents' property. </s> B </s> The physical incarnation of such a market, a "local exchange," is a network connecting terminals like telephones, faxes, and modems to other terminals within a geographical area like a city. From terminal network interface devices, feeder wires, collectively called the "local loop," are run to local switches that aggregate traffic into common "trunks." The local loop was traditionally, and is still largely, made of copper wire, though fiber-optic cable is also used, albeit to a far lesser extent than in long-haul markets.10 Just as the loop runs from terminals to local switches, the trunks run from the local switches to centralized, or tandem, switches, originally worked by hand but now by computer, which operate much like railway switches, directing traffic into other trunks. A signal is sent toward its destination terminal on these common ways so far as necessary, then routed back down another hierarchy of switches to the intended telephone or other equipment. A local exchange is thus a transportation network for communications signals, radiating like a root system from a "central office" (or several offices for larger areas) to individual telephones, faxes, and the like. </s> It is easy to see why a company that owns a local exchange (what the Act calls an "incumbent local exchange carrier," 47 U.S.C. §251(h)), would have an almost insurmountable competitive advantage not only in routing calls within the exchange, but, through its control of this local market, in the markets for terminal equipment and long-distance calling as well. A newcomer could not compete with the incumbent carrier to provide local service without coming close to replicating the incumbent's entire existing network, the most costly and difficult part of which would be laying down the "last mile" of feeder wire, the local loop, to the thousands (or millions) of terminal points in individual houses and businesses.11 The incumbent company could also control its local-loop plant so as to connect only with terminals it manufactured or selected, and could place conditions or fees (called "access charges") on long-distance carriers seeking to connect with its network. In an unregulated world, another telecommunications carrier would be forced to comply with these conditions, or it could never reach the customers of a local exchange. </s> II </s> The 1996 Act both prohibits state and local regulation that impedes the provision of "telecommunications service," §253(a),12 and obligates incumbent carriers to allow competitors to enter their local markets, §251(c). Section 251(c) addresses the practical difficulties of fostering local competition by recognizing three strategies that a potential competitor may pursue. First, a competitor entering the market (a "requesting" carrier, §251(c)(2)), may decide to engage in pure facilities-based competition, that is, to build its own network to replace or supplement the network of the incumbent. If an entrant takes this course, the Act obligates the incumbent to "interconnect" the competitor's facilities to its own network to whatever extent is necessary to allow the competitor's facilities to operate. §§251(a) and (c)(2). At the other end of the spectrum, the statute permits an entrant to skip construction and instead simply to buy and resell "telecommunications service," which the incumbent has a duty to sell at wholesale. §§251(b)(1) and (c)(4). Between these extremes, an entering competitor may choose to lease certain of an incumbent's "network elements,"13 which the incumbent has a duty to provide "on an unbundled basis" at terms that are "just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory." §251(c)(3). </s> Since wholesale markets for companies engaged in resale, leasing, or interconnection of facilities cannot be created without addressing rates, Congress provided for rates to be set either by contracts between carriers or by state utility commission rate orders. §§252(a)-(b). Like other federal utility statutes that authorize contracts approved by a regulatory agency in setting rates between businesses, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §824d(d) (Federal Power Act); 15 U.S.C. §717c(c) (Natural Gas Act), the Act permits incumbent and entering carriers to negotiate private rate agreements, 47 U.S.C. §252(a);14 see also §251(c)(1) (duty to negotiate in good faith). State utility commissions are required to accept any such agreement unless it discriminates against a carrier not a party to the contract, or is otherwise shown to be contrary to the public interest. §§252(e)(1) and (e)(2)(A). Carriers, of course, might well not agree, in which case an entering carrier has a statutory option to request mediation by a state commission, §252(a)(2). But the option comes with strings, for mediation subjects the parties to the duties specified in §251 and the pricing standards set forth in §252(d), as interpreted by the FCC's regulations, §252(e)(2)(B). These regulations are at issue here. </s> As to pricing, the Act provides that when incumbent and requesting carriers fail to agree, state commissions will set a "just and reasonable" and "nondiscriminatory" rate for interconnection or the lease of network elements based on "the cost of providing the ... network element," which "may include a reasonable profit."15 §252(d)(1). In setting these rates, the state commissions are, however, subject to that important limitation previously unknown to utility regulation: the rate must be "determined without reference to a rate-of-return or other rate-based proceeding." Ibid. In AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 384-385 (1999), this Court upheld the FCC's jurisdiction to impose a new methodology on the States when setting these rates. The attack today is on the legality and logic of the particular methodology the Commission chose. </s> As the Act required, six months after its effective date the FCC implemented the local-competition provisions in its First Report and Order, which included as an appendix the new regulations at issue. Challenges to the order, mostly by incumbent local-exchange carriers and state commissions, were consolidated in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Iowa Utilities Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 792 (1997), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999). See also California v. FCC, 124 F.3d 934, 938 (1997), rev'd in part, 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999) (challenges to Inre Implementation of Local Competition Provisions in Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 FCC Rcd 19392 (1996) (Second Report and Order)). </s> So far as it bears on where we are today, the initial decision by the Eighth Circuit held that the FCC had noauthority to control the methodology of state commissions setting the rates incumbent local-exchange carriers could charge entrants for network elements, 47 CFR §51.505(b)(1) (1997). Iowa Utilities Bd., supra, at 800. The Eighth Circuit also held that the FCC misconstrued the plain language of §251(c)(3) in implementing a set of "combination" rules, 47 CFR §§51.315(b)-(f) (1997), the most important of which provided that "an incumbent LEC shall not separate requested network elements that the incumbent LEC currently combines," §51.315(b). 120 F.3d, at 813. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals accepted the FCC's view that the Act required no threshold ownership of facilities by a requesting carrier, First Report and Order ¶ ;¶ ;328-340, and upheld Rule319, 47 CFR §51.319 (1997), which read "network elements" broadly, to require incumbent carriers to provide not onlyequipment but also services and functions, such as operations support systems (e.g., billing databases), §51.319(f)(1), operator services and directory assistance, §51.319(g), and vertical switching features like call-waiting and caller I.D., First Report and Order ¶ ;¶ ;263, 413. 120 F.3d, at 808-810. </s> This Court affirmed in part and in larger part reversed. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999). We reversed in upholding the FCC's jurisdiction to "design a pricing methodology" to bind state ratemaking commissions, id., at 385, as well as one of the FCC's combination rules, Rule315(b), barring incumbents from separating currently combined network elements when furnishing them to entrants that request them in a combined form, id., at 395. We also reversed in striking down Rule319, holding that its provision for blanket access to network elements was inconsistent with the "necessary" and "impair" standards of 47 U.S.C. §251(d)(2), 525 U.S., at 392. We affirmed the Eighth Circuit, however, in upholding the FCC's broad definition of network elements to be provided, id., at 387, and the FCC's understanding that the Act imposed no facilities-ownership requirement, id., at 392-393. The case then returned to the Eighth Circuit. Id., at 397. </s> With the FCC's general authority to establish a pricing methodology secure, the incumbent carriers' primary challenge on remand went to the method that the Commission chose. There was also renewed controversy over the combination rules (Rules 315(c)-(f)) that the Eighth Circuit had struck down along with Rule315(b), but upon which this Court expressed no opinion when it reversed the invalidation of that latter rule. 219 F.3d 744, 748 (2000). </s> As for the method to derive a "nondiscriminatory," "just and reasonable rate for network elements," the Act requires the FCC to decide how to value "the cost ... of providing the ... network element [which] may include a reasonable profit," although the FCC is (as already seen) forbidden to allow any "reference to a rate-of-return or other rate-based proceeding," §252(d)(1). Within the discretion left to it after eliminating any dependence on a "rate-of-return or other rate-based proceeding," the Commission chose a way of treating "cost" as "forward-looking economic cost," 47 CFR §51.505 (1997), something distinct from the kind of historically based cost generally relied upon in valuing a rate base after Hope Natural Gas. In Rule 505, the FCC defined the "forward-looking economic cost of an element [as] the sum of (1)the total element long-run incremental cost of the element [TELRIC]; [and] (2)a reasonable allocation of forward-looking common costs," §51.505(a), common costs being "costs incurred in providing a group of elements that "cannot be attributed directly to individual elements," §51.505(c)(1). Most important of all, the FCC decided that the TELRIC "should be measured based on the use of the most efficient telecommunications technology currently available and the lowest cost network configuration, given the existing location of the incumbent['s] wire centers." §51.505(b)(1). </s> "The TELRIC of an element has three components, the operating expenses, the depreciation cost, and the appropriate risk-adjusted cost of capital." First Report andOrder ¶ ;703 (footnote omitted). See also 47 CFR §§51.505(b)(2)-(3) (1997). A concrete example may help. Assume that it would cost $1 a year to operate a most-efficient loop element; that it would take $10 for interest payments on the capital a carrier would have to invest to build the lowest cost loop centered upon an incumbent carrier's existing wire centers (say $100, at 10 percent per annum); and that $9 would be reasonable for depreciation on that loop (an 11-year useful life); then the annual TELRIC for the loop element would be $20.16 </s> The Court of Appeals understood §252(d)(1)'s reference to "the cost ... of providing the ... network element" to be ambiguous as between "forward-looking" and "historical" cost, so that a forward-looking ratesetting method would presumably be a reasonable implementation of the statute. But the Eighth Circuit thought the ambiguity afforded no leeway beyond that, and read the Act to require any forward-looking methodology to be "based on the incremental costs that an [incumbent] actually incurs or will incur in providing ... the unbundled access to its specific network elements." 219 F. 3d, at 751-753. Hence, the Eighth Circuit held that §252(d)(1) foreclosed the use of the TELRIC methodology. In other words, the court read the Act as plainly requiring rates based on the "actual" not "hypothetical" "cost ... of providing the ... network element," and reasoned that TELRIC was clearly the latter. Id., at 750-751. The Eighth Circuit added, however, that if it were wrong and TELRIC were permitted, the claim that in prescribing TELRIC the FCC had effected an unconstitutional taking would not be "ripe" until "resulting rates have been determined and applied." Id., at 753-754. </s> The Court of Appeals also, and for the second time, invalidated Rules 315(c)-(f), 47 CFR §§51.315(c)-(f) (1997), the FCC's so-called "additional combination" rules, apparently for the same reason it had rejected them before, when it struck down Rule315(b), the main combination rule. Id., at 758-759. In brief, the rules require an incumbent carrier, upon request and compensation, to "perform the functions necessary to combine" network elements for an entrant, unless the combination is not "technically feasible." Id., at 759. The Eighth Circuit read the language of §251(c)(3), with its reference to "allow[ing] requesting carriers to combine ... elements," as unambiguously requiring a requesting carrier, not a providing incumbent, to do any and all combining. Ibid. </s> Before us, the incumbent local-exchange carriers claim error in the Eighth Circuit's holding that a "forward-looking cost" methodology (as opposed to the use of "historical" cost) is consistent with §252(d)(1), and its conclusion that the use of the TELRIC forward-looking cost methodology presents no "ripe" takings claim. The FCC and the entrants, on the other side, seek review of the Eighth Circuit's invalidation of the TELRIC methodology and the additional combination rules. We granted certiorari, 531 U.S. 1124 (2001), and now affirm on the issues raised by the incumbents, and reverse on those raised by the FCC and the entrants. </s> III </s> A </s> The incumbent carriers' first attack charges the FCC with ignoring the plain meaning of the word "cost" as it occurs in the provision of §252(d)(1) that "the just and reasonable rate for network elements ... shall be ... based on the cost (determined without reference to a rate-of-return or other rate-based proceeding) of providing the ... network element ...." The incumbents do not argue that in theory the statute precludes any forward-looking methodology, but they do claim that the cost of providing a competitor with a network element in the future must be calculated using the incumbent's past investment in the element and the means of providing it. They contend that "cost" in the statute refers to "historical" cost, which they define as "what was in fact paid" for a capital asset, as distinct from "value," or "the price that would be paid on the open market." Brief for Petitioners in No.00-511, p.19. They say that the technical meaning of "cost" is "past capital expenditure," ibid., and they suggest an equation between "historical" and "embedded" costs, id., at 20, which the FCC defines as "the costs that the incumbent LEC incurred in the past and that are recorded in the incumbent LEC's books of accounts," 47 CFR §51.505(d)(1) (1997). The argument boils down to the proposition that "the cost of providing the network element" can only mean, in plain language and in this particular technical context, the past cost to an incumbent of furnishing the specific network element actually, physically, to be provided. </s> The incumbents have picked an uphill battle. At the most basic level of common usage, "cost" has no such clear implication. A merchant who is asked about "the cost of providing the goods" he sells may reasonably quote their current wholesale market price, not the cost of the particular items he happens to have on his shelves, which may have been bought at higher or lower prices. </s> When the reference shifts from common speech into the technical realm, the incumbents still have to attack uphill. To begin with, even when we have dealt with historical costs as a ratesetting basis, the cases have never assumed a sense of "cost" as generous as the incumbents seem to claim.17 "Cost" as used in calculating the rate base under the traditional cost-of-service method did not stand for all past capital expenditures, but at most for those that were prudent, while prudent investment itself could be denied recovery when unexpected events rendered investment useless, Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 312 (1989). And even when investment was wholly includable in the rate base, ratemakers often rejected the utilities' "embedded costs," their own book-value estimates, which typically were geared to maximize the rate base with high statements of past expenditures and working capital, combined with unduly low rates of depreciation. See, e.g., Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S., at 597-598. It would also be a mistake to forget that "cost" was a term in value-based ratemaking and has figured in contemporary state and federal ratemaking untethered to historical valuation.18 </s> What is equally important is that the incumbents' plain-meaning argument ignores the statutory setting in which the mandate to use "cost" in valuing network elements occurs. First, the Act uses "cost" as an intermediate term in the calculation of "just and reasonable rates," 47 U.S.C. §252(d)(1), and it was the very point of Hope Natural Gas that regulatory bodies required to set rates expressed in these terms have ample discretion to choose methodology, 320 U.S., at 602. Second, it would have been passing strange to think Congress tied "cost" to historical cost without a more specific indication, when the very same sentence that requires "cost" pricing also prohibits any reference to a "rate-of-return or other rate-based proceeding," §252(d)(1), each of which has been identified with historical cost ever since Hope Natural Gas was decided.19 </s> The fact is that without any better indication of meaning than the unadorned term, the word "cost" in §252(d)(1), as in accounting generally, is "a chameleon," Strickland v. Commissioner, Maine Dept. of Human Services, 96 F.3d 542, 546 (CA1 1996), a "virtually meaningless" term, R.Estes, Dictionary of Accounting 32 (2ded. 1985). As Justice Breyer put it in Iowa Utilities Bd., words like "cost" "give ratesetting commissions broad methodological leeway; they say little about the `method employed' to determine a particular rate." 525 U.S., at 423 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). We accordingly reach the conclusion adopted by the Court of Appeals, that nothing in §252(d)(1) plainly requires reference to historical investment when pegging rates to forward-looking "cost." </s> B </s> The incumbents' alternative argument is that even without a stern anchor in calculating "the cost ... of providing the ... network element," the particular forward-looking methodology the FCC chose is neither consistent with the plain language of §252(d)(1) nor within the zone of reasonable interpretation subject to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-845 (1984). This is so, they say, because TELRIC calculates the forward-looking cost by reference to a hypothetical, most efficient element at existing wire-centers, not the actual network element being provided. </s> 1 </s> The short answer to the objection that TELRIC violates plain language is much the same as the answer to the previous plain-language argument, for what the incumbents call the "hypothetical" element is simply the element valued in terms of a piece of equipment an incumbent may not own. This claim, like the one just considered, is that plain language bars a definition of "cost" untethered to historical investment, and as explained already, the term "cost" is simply too protean to support the incumbents' argument. </s> 2 </s> Similarly, the claim that TELRIC exceeds reasonable interpretative leeway is open to the objection already noted, that responsibility for "just and reasonable" rates leaves methodology largely subject to discretion. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 790 (1968) ("We must reiterate that the breadth and complexity of the Commission's responsibilities demand that it be given every reasonable opportunity to formulate methods of regulation appropriate for the solution of its intensely practical difficulties"). See generally Chevron, supra, at 843-845, 866 ("When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail").20 The incumbents nevertheless field three arguments. They contend, first, that a method of calculating wholesale lease rates based on the costs of providing hypothetical, most efficient elements, may simulate the competition envisioned by the Act but does not induce it. Second, they argue that even if rates based on hypothetical elements could induce competition in theory, TELRIC cannot do this, because it does not provide the depreciation and risk-adjusted capital costs that the theory compels. Finally, the incumbents say that even if these objections can be answered, TELRIC is needlessly, and hence unreasonably, complicated and impracticable. </s> a </s> The incumbents' (and Justice Breyer's) basic critique of TELRIC is that by setting rates for leased network elements on the assumption of perfect competition, TELRIC perversely creates incentives against competition in fact. See post, at 11-14. The incumbents say that in purporting to set incumbents' wholesale prices at the level that would exist in a perfectly competitive market (in order to make retail prices similarly competitive), TELRIC sets rates so low that entrants will always lease and never build network elements. See post, at 12. And even if an entrant would otherwise consider building a network element more efficient than the best one then on the market (the one assumed in setting the TELRIC rate), it would likewise be deterred by the prospect that its lower cost in building and operating this new element would be immediately available to its competitors; under TELRIC, the incumbents assert, the lease rate for an incumbent's existing element would instantly drop to match the marginal cost21 of the entrant's new element once built. See ibid.; Brief for Respondents BellSouth etal. in Nos.00-555, etc., pp.28-29. According to the incumbents, the result will be, not competition, but a sort of parasitic free-riding, leaving TELRIC incapable of stimulating the facilities-based competition intended by Congress. </s> We think there are basically three answers to this no-stimulation claim of unreasonableness: (1)the TELRIC methodology does not assume that the relevant markets are perfectly competitive, and the scheme includes several features of inefficiency that undermine the plausibility of the incumbents' no-stimulation argument; (2)comparison of TELRIC with alternatives proposed by the incumbents as more reasonable are plausibly answered by the FCC's stated reasons to reject the alternatives; and (3)actual investment in competing facilities since the effective date of the Act simply belies the no-stimulation argument's conclusion. </s> (1) </s> The basic assumption of the incumbents' no-stimulation argument is contrary to fact. As we explained, the argument rests on the assumption that in a perfectly efficient market, no one who can lease at a TELRIC rate will ever build. But TELRIC does not assume a perfectly efficient wholesale market or one that is likely to resemble perfection in any foreseeable time. The incumbents thus make the same mistake we attributed in a different setting to the FCC itself. In Iowa Utilities Board, we rejected the FCC's necessary-and-impair rule, 47 CFR §51.319 (1997), which required incumbents to lease any network element that might reduce, however slightly, an entrant's marginal cost of providing a telecommunications service, as compared with providing the service using the entrant's own equivalent element. 525 U.S., at 389-390. "In a world of perfect competition, in which all carriers are providing their service at marginal cost, the Commission's total equating of increased cost (or decreased quality) with `necessity' and `impairment' might be reasonable, but it has not established the existence of such an ideal world." Id., at390. </s> Not only that, but the FCC has of its own accord allowed for inefficiency in the TELRIC design in additional ways affecting the likelihood that TELRIC will squelch competition in facilities. First, the Commission has qualified any assumption of efficiency by requiring ratesetters to calculate cost on the basis of "the existing location of the incumbent['s] wire centers." 47 CFR §51.505(b)(1) (1997). This means that certain network elements, principally local-loop elements, will not be priced at their most efficient cost and configuration to the extent, say, that a shorter loop could serve a local exchange if the incumbent's wire centers were relocated for a snugger fit with the current geography of terminal locations. </s> Second, TELRIC rates in practice will differ from the products of a perfectly competitive market owing to built-in lags in price adjustments. In a perfectly competitive market, retail prices drop instantly to the marginal cost of the most efficient company. See Mankiw 283-288, 312-313. As the incumbents point out, this would deter market entry because a potential entrant would know that even if it could provide a retail service at a lower marginal cost, it would instantly lose that competitive edge once it entered the market and competitors adjusted to match its price. See Brief for Respondents BellSouth etal. in Nos.00-555, etc., at 28-29. Wholesale TELRIC rates, however, are set by state commissions, usually by arbitrated agreements with 3- or 4-year terms, see Brief for Respondent Qwest Communications International, Inc. in Nos.00-511, etc. 39; Reply Brief for Petitioners Worldcom, Inc., etal. 6; Reply Brief for Respondent Sprint Corp. 7, and n.3; Reply Brief for Petitioner AT&T Corp. 11-12; and no one claims that a competitor could receive immediately on demand a TELRIC rate on a leased element at the marginal cost of the entrant who introduces a more efficient element. </s> But even if a competitor could call for a new TELRIC rate proceeding immediately upon the introduction of a more efficient element by a competing entrant, the competitor would not necessarily know enough to make the call; the fact of the element's greater efficiency would only become apparent when reflected in lower retail prices drawing demand away from existing competitors (including the incumbent), forcing them to look to lowering their own marginal costs. In practice, it would take some time for the innovating entrant to install the new equipment, to engage in marketing offering a lower retail price to attract business, and to steal away enough customer subscriptions (given the limited opportunity to capture untapped customers for local telephone service) for competitors to register the drop in demand. </s> Finally, it bears reminding that the FCC prescribes measurement of the TELRIC "based on the use of the most efficient telecommunications technology currently available," 47 CFR §51.505(b)(1) (1997). Owing to that condition of current availability, the marginal cost of a most-efficient element that an entrant alone has built and uses would not set a new pricing standard until it became available to competitors as an alternative to the incumbent's corresponding element.22 </s> As a reviewing Court we are, of course, in no position to assess the precise economic significance of these and other exceptions to the perfectly functioning market that the incumbents' criticism assumes. Instead, it is enough to recognize that the incumbents' assumption may well be incorrect. Inefficiencies built into the scheme may provide incentives and opportunities for competitors to build their own network elements, perhaps for reasons unrelated to pricing (such as the possibility of expansion into data-transmission markets by deploying "broadband" technologies, cf. post, at 15 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), or the desirability of independence from an incumbent's management and maintenance of network elements). In any event, the significance of the incumbents' mistake of fact may be indicated best not by argument here, but by the evidence of actual investment in facilities-based competition since TELRIC went into effect, to be discussed at Part III-B-2-a-(3), infra.23 </s> (2) </s> Perhaps sensing the futility of an unsupported theoretical attack, the incumbents make the complementary argument that the FCC's choice of TELRIC, whatever might be said about it on its own terms, was unreasonable as a matter of law because other methods of determining cost would have done a better job of inducing competition. Having considered the proffered alternatives and the reasons the FCC gave for rejecting them, 47 CFR §51.505(d) (1997); First Report and Order ¶ ;¶ ;630-711, we cannot say that the FCC acted unreasonably in picking TELRIC to promote the mandated competition. </s> The incumbents present three principal alternatives for setting rates for network elements: embedded-cost methodologies, the efficient component pricing rule, and Ramsey pricing.24 The arguments that one or another of these methodologies is preferable to TELRIC share a basic claim: it was unreasonable for the FCC to choose a method of setting rates that fails to include, at least in theory, some additional costs beyond what would be most efficient in the long run,25 because lease rates that incorporate such costs will do a better job of inducing competition.26 The theory is that once an entrant has its foot in the door, it will have a greater incentive to build and operate its own more efficient network element if the lease rates reflect something of the incumbents' actual and inefficient marginal costs. And once the entrant develops the element at its lower marginal cost and the retail price drops accordingly, the incumbent will have no choice but to innovate itself by building the most efficient element or finding ways to reduce its marginal cost to retain its market share. </s> The generic feature of the incumbents' proposed alternatives, in other words, is that some degree of long-run inefficiency ought to be preserved through the lease rates, in order to give an entrant a more efficient alternative to leasing. Of course, we have already seen that TELRIC itself tolerates some degree of inefficient pricing in its existing wire-center configuration requirement and through the ratemaking and development lags just described. This aside, however, there are at least two objections that generally undercut any desirability that such alternatives may seem to offer over TELRIC. </s> The first objection turns on the fact that a lease rate that compensates the lessor for some degree of existing inefficiency (at least from the perspective of the long run) is simply a higher rate, and the difference between such a higher rate and the TELRIC rate could be the difference that keeps a potential competitor from entering the market. See n.27, infra. Cf.First Report and Order ¶ ;378 ("[I]n some areas, the most efficient means of providing competing service may be through the use of unbundled loops. In such cases, preventing access to unbundled loops would either discourage a potential competitor from entering the market in that area, thereby denying those consumers the benefits of competition, or cause the competitor to construct unnecessarily duplicative facilities, thereby misallocating societal resources"). If the TELRIC rate for bottleneck elements is $100 and for other elements (say switches) is $10, an entering competitor that can provide its own, more efficient switch at what amounts to a $7 rate can enter the market for $107. If the lease rate for the bottleneck elements were higher (say, $110) to reflect some of the inefficiency of bottleneck elements that actually cost the incumbent $150, then the entrant with only $107 will be kept out. Is it better to risk keeping more potential entrants out, or to induce them to compete in less capital-intensive facilities with lessened incentives to build their own bottleneck facilities? It was not obviously unreasonable for the FCC to prefer the latter.27 </s> The second general objection turns the incumbents' attack on TELRIC against the incumbents' own alternatives. If the problem with TELRIC is that an entrant will never build because at the instant it builds, other competitors can lease the analogous existing (but less efficient) element from an incumbent at a rate assuming the same most efficient marginal cost, then the same problem persists under the incumbents' methods. For as soon as an entrant builds a more efficient element, the incumbent will be forced to price to match,28 and that rate will be available to all other competitors. The point, of course, is that things are not this simple. As we have said, under TELRIC, price adjustment is not instantaneous in rates for a leased element corresponding to an innovating entrant's more efficient element; the same would presumably be true under the incumbents' alternative methods, though they do not come out and say it. </s> Once we get into the details of the specific alternative methods, other infirmities become evident that undermine the claim that the FCC could not reasonably have preferred TELRIC. As for an embedded-cost methodology, the problem with a method that relies in any part on historical cost, the cost the incumbents say they actually incur in leasing network elements, is that it will pass on to lessees the difference between most-efficient cost and embedded cost.29 See First Report and Order ¶ ;705. Any such cost difference is an inefficiency, whether caused by poor management resulting in higher operating costs or poor investment strategies that have inflated capital and depreciation. If leased elements were priced according to embedded costs, the incumbents could pass these inefficiencies to competitors in need of their wholesale elements, and to that extent defeat the competitive purpose of forcing efficient choices on all carriers whether incumbents or entrants. The upshot would be higher retail prices consumers would have to pay. Id., ¶ ;¶ ;655 and 705. </s> There are, of course, objections other than inefficiency to any method of ratemaking that relies on embedded costs as allegedly reflected in incumbents' book-cost data, with the possibilities for manipulation this presents. Even if incumbents have built and are operating leased elements at economically efficient costs, the temptation would remain to overstate book costs to ratemaking commissions and so perpetuate the intractable problems that led to the price-cap innovation. See supra, at 14-15. </s> There is even an argument that the Act itself forbids embedded-cost methods, and while the FCC rejected this absolutistic reading of the statute, First Report and Order ¶ ;704,30 it seems safe to say that the statutory language places a heavy presumption against any method resembling the traditional embedded-cost-of-service model of ratesetting.31 At the very least, proposing an embedded-cost alternative is a counterintuitive way to show that selecting TELRIC was unreasonable. </s> Other incumbents say the FCC was unreasonable to pick TELRIC over a method of ratesetting commonly called the efficient component pricing rule (ECPR). See Brief for Respondent Qwest Communications International, Inc., in Nos.00-511, etc., 40-41. ECPR would base the rate for a leased element on its most efficient long-run incremental cost (presumably, something like the TELRIC) plus the opportunity cost to the incumbent when the entrant leasing the element provides a competing telecommunications service using it. See Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S., at 426 (Breyer,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); J.Sidak & D.Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and the Regulatory Contract 284-285 (1997); First Report and Order ¶ ;708. The opportunity cost is pegged to the retail revenue loss suffered by the incumbent when the entrant provides the service in its stead to its former customers. Ibid. </s> The FCC rejected ECPR because its calculation of opportunity cost relied on existing retail prices in monopolistic local-exchange markets, which bore no relation to efficient marginal cost. "We conclude that ECPR is an improper method for setting prices of interconnection and unbundled network elements because the existing retail prices that would be used to compute incremental opportunity costs under ECPR are not cost-based. Moreover, the ECPR does not provide any mechanism for moving prices towards competitive levels; it simply takes prices as given." Id., ¶ ;709. In effect, the adjustment for opportunity cost, because it turns on pre-existing retail prices generated by embedded costs, would pass on the same inefficiencies and be vulnerable to the same asymmetries of information in ratemaking as a straightforward embeded-cost scheme.32 </s> The third category of alternative methodologies proposed focuses on costs over an intermediate term where some fixed costs are unavoidable, as opposed to TELRIC's long run. See n.25, supra (defining the long run). The fundamental intuition underlying this method of ratesetting is that competition is actually favored by allowing incumbents rate recovery of certain fixed costs efficiently incurred in the intermediate term. </s> The most commonly proposed variant of fixed-cost recovery ratesetting is "Ramsey pricing." See Iowa Utilities Bd., supra, at 426-427 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Ramsey pricing was originally theorized as a method of discriminatory taxation of commodities to generate revenue with minimal discouragement of desired consumption. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 Econ. J. 47, 58-59 (1927). The underlying principle is that goods should be taxed or priced according to demand: taxes or prices should be higher as to goods for which demand is relatively inelastic. K.Train, Optimal Regulation: The Economic Theory of Natural Monopoly 122-125 (1991). As applied to the local-exchange wholesale market, Ramsey pricing would allow rate recovery of certain costs incurred by an incumbent above marginal cost, costs associated with providing an unbundled network element that are fixed and unavoidable over the intermediate run, typically the 3- or 4-year term of a rate arbitration agreement. The specific mechanism for recovery through wholesale lease rates would be to spread such costs across the different elements to be leased according to the demand for each particular element. First Report and Order ¶ ;696. Cf. B.Mitchell & I.Vogelsang, Telecommunications Pricing: Theory and Practice 43-61 (1991). Thus, when demand among entrants for loop elements is high as compared with demand for switch elements, a higher proportion of fixed costs would be added as a premium to the loop-element lease rate than to the switch lease rate. </s> But this very feature appears to be a drawback when used as a method of setting rates for the wholesale market in unbundled network elements. Because the elements for which demand among entrants will be highest are the costly bottleneck elements, duplication of which is neither likely nor desired, high lease rates for these elements would be the rates most likely to deter market entry, as our earlier example showed: if the rate for bottleneck elements went from $100 to $110, the $107 competitor would be kept out. This is what the FCC has said: </s> "[W]e conclude that an allocation methodology that relies exclusively on allocating common costs in inverse proportion to the sensitivity of demand for various network elements and services may not be used. We conclude that such an allocation could unreasonably limit the extent of entry into local exchange markets by allocating more costs to, and thus raising the prices of, the most critical bottleneck inputs, the demand for which tends to be relatively inelastic. Such an allocation of these costs would undermine the pro-competitive objectives of the 1996 Act." First Report and Order ¶ ;696 (footnote omitted). </s> (3) </s> At the end of the day, theory aside, the claim that TELRIC is unreasonable as a matter of law because it simulates but does not produce facilities-based competition founders on fact. The entrants have presented figures showing that they have invested in new facilities to the tune of $55 billion since the passage of the Act (through 2000), see Association for Local Telecommunications Services, Local Competition Policy & the New Economy 4 (Feb.2, 2001); Hearing on H.R. 1542 before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Ser. No. 107-24, p.50 (2001) (Statement of James H. Henry, Managing General Partner, Greenfield Hill Capital, LLP); see also M.Glover & D.Epps, Is the Telecommunications Act of 1996 Working?, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 1013, 1015 (2000) ($30billion invested through 1999). The FCC's statistics indicate substantial resort to pure and partial facilities-based competition among the three entry strategies: as of June 30, 2001, 33 percent of entrants were using their own facilities; 23 percent were reselling services; and 44 percent were leasing network elements (26 percent of entrants leasing loops with switching; 18 percent without switching). See FCC, Local Telephone Competition: Status as of June 30, 2001, p.2 (Feb. 27, 2002) (tables 3-4). The incumbents do not contradict these figures, but merely speculate that the investment has not been as much as it could have been under other ratemaking approaches, and they note that investment has more recently shifted to nonfacilities entry options. We, of course, have no idea whether a different forward-looking pricing scheme would have generated even greater competitive investment than the $55 billion that the entrants claim, but it suffices to say that a regulatory scheme that can boast such substantial competitive capital spending over a 4-year period is not easily described as an unreasonable way to promote competitive investment in facilities.33 </s> b </s> The incumbents' second reason for calling TELRIC an unreasonable exercise of the FCC's regulatory discretion is the supposed incapacity of this methodology to provide enough depreciation and allowance for capital costs to induce rational competition on the theory's own terms. This challenge must be assessed against the background of utilities' customary preference for extended depreciation schedules in ratemaking (so as to preserve high rate bases), see n.8, supra; we have already noted the consequence of the utilities' approach, that the "book" value or embedded costs of capital presented to traditional ratemaking bodies often bore little resemblance to the economic value of the capital. See FCC Releases Audit Reports on RBOCs' Property Records, Report No.CC 99-3, 1999 WL 95044 (FCC, Feb. 25, 1999) ("[B]ook costs may be overstated by approximately $5 billion"); Huber etal. 116 (We now know that "[b]y the early 1980s, the Bell System had accumulated a vast library of accounting books that belonged alongside dime-store novels and other works of fiction.... By 1987, it was widely estimated that the book value of telephone company investments exceeded market value by $25 billion dollars"). TELRIC seeks to avoid this problem by basing its valuation on the market price for most efficient elements; when rates are figured by reference to a hypothetical element instead of an incumbent's actual element, the incumbent gets no unfair advantage from favorable depreciation rates in the traditional sense. </s> This, according to the incumbents, will be fatal to competition. Their argument is that TELRIC will result in constantly changing rates based on ever cheaper, more efficient technology; the incumbents will be unable to write off each new piece of technology rapidly enough to anticipate an even newer gadget portending a new and lower rate. They will be stuck, they say, with sunk costs in less efficient plant and equipment, with their investment unrecoverable through depreciation, and their increased risk unrecognized and uncompensated.34 </s> The argument, however, rests upon a fundamentally false premise, that the TELRIC rules limit the depreciation and capital costs that ratesetting commissions may recognize. In fact, TELRIC itself prescribes no fixed percentage rate as risk-adjusted capital costs and recognizes no particular useful life as a basis for calculating depreciation costs. On the contrary, the FCC committed considerable discretion to state commissions on these matters. </s> "Based on the current record, we conclude that the currently authorized rate of return at the federal or state level is a reasonable starting point for TELRIC calculations, and incumbent LECs bear the burden of demonstrating with specificity that the business risks that they face in providing unbundled network elements and interconnection services would justify a different risk-adjusted cost of capital or depreciation rate.... States may adjust the cost of capital if a party demonstrates to a state commission that either a higher or a lower level of cost of capital is warranted, without that commission conducting a `rate-of-return or other rate based proceeding.' We note that the risk-adjusted cost of capital need not be uniform for all elements. We intend to re-examine the issue of the appropriate risk-adjusted cost of capital on an ongoing basis, particularly in light of the state commissions' experiences in addressing this issue in specific situations." First Report and Order ¶ ;702. </s> The order thus treated then-current capital costs and rates of depreciation as mere starting points, to be adjusted upward if the incumbents demonstrate the need. That is, for calculating leased element rates, the Commission specifically permits more favorable allowances for costs of capital and depreciation than were generally allowed under traditional ratemaking practice. </s> The incumbents' fallback position, that existing rates of depreciation and costs of capital are not even reasonable starting points, is unpersuasive. As to depreciation rates, it is well to start by asking how serious a threat there may be of galloping obsolescence requiring commensurately rising depreciation rates. The answer does not support the incumbents. The local-loop plant makes up at least 48 percent of the elements incumbents will have to provide, see First Report and Order ¶ ;378, n.818 ("As of ... 1995 ... [l]ocal loop plant comprises approximately $109 billion of total plant in service, which represents ... 48 percent of network plant"), and while the technology of certain other elements like switches has evolved very rapidly in recent years, loop technology generally has gone no further than copper twisted-pair wire and fiber-optic cable in the past couple of decades. See n.10, supra (less than 1 percent of local-exchange telephone lines employ technologies other than copper or fiber). We have been informed of no specter of imminently obsolescent loops requiring a radical revision of currently reasonable depreciation.35 This is significant because the FCC found as a general matter that federally prescribed rates of depreciation and counterparts in many States are fairly up to date with the current state of telecommunications technologies as to different elements. See First Report and Order ¶ ;702. </s> As for risk-adjusted costs of capital, competition in fact has been slow to materialize in local-exchange retail markets (as of June 30, 2001, the incumbents retained a 91 percent share of the local-exchange markets, FCC, Local Telephone Competition: Status as of June 30, 2001 (Feb. 27, 2002) (table 1)), and whether the FCC's assumption about adequate risk adjustment was based on hypothetical or actual competition, it seems fair to say that the rate of 11.25 percent mentioned by the FCC, First Report and Order ¶ ;702, is a "reasonable starting point" for return on equity calculations based on the current lack of significant competition in local-exchange markets. </s> A basic weakness of the incumbents' attack, indeed, is its tendency to argue in highly general terms, whereas TELRIC rates are calculated on the basis of individual elements. TELRIC rates leave plenty of room for differences in the appropriate depreciation rates and risk-adjusted capital costs depending on the nature and technology of the specific element to be priced (as between switches and loops for example). For that matter, even the blanket assumption that on a TELRIC valuation the estimated purchase price of a most efficient element will necessarily be lower than the actual costs of current elements is suspect. The New York Public Service Commission, for example, used the cost of the more expensive fiber-optic cable as the basis for its TELRIC loop fixed rates, notwithstanding the fact that competitors argued that the cheaper copper-wire loop was more efficient for voice communications and should have been the underlying valuation for loop rates. See 2 Lodging Material for Respondents Worldcom, Inc., etal. 655-657 (Opinion No.97-2, effective Apr. 1, 1997 (Opinion and Order Setting Rates for First Group of Network Elements)). In light of the many different TELRIC rates to be calculated by state commissions across the country, see Brief for Petitioners Worldcom, Inc., etal. in No.00-555, p.21 ("millions"), the Commission's prescription of a general "starting point" is reasonable enough. </s> c </s> Finally, as to the incumbents' accusation that TELRIC is too complicated to be practical, a criticism at least as telling can be leveled at traditional ratemaking methodologies and the alternatives proffered. "One important potential advantage of the T[E]LRIC approach, however is its relative ease of calculation. Rather than estimate costs reflecting the present [incumbent] network--a difficult task even if [incumbents] provided reliable data--it is possible to generate T[E]LRIC estimates based on a `green field' approach, which assumes construction of a network from scratch." App. 182 (Reply Comments of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration 24 (May 30, 1996)). To the extent that the traditional public-utility model generally relied on embedded costs, similar sorts of complexity in reckoning were exacerbated by an asymmetry of information, much to the utilities' benefit. See supra, at 13-14, 27. And what we see from the record suggests that TELRIC rate proceedings are surprisingly smooth-running affairs, with incumbents and competitors typically presenting two conflicting economic models supported by expert testimony, and state commissioners customarily assigning rates based on some predictions from one model and others from its counterpart. See, e.g., 1 Lodging Material for Respondents Worldcom, Inc., etal. 146-147, 367-368 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Inre: Determination of cost of basic local telecommunications service, pursuant to Section 364.025, Florida Statues, issued Jan. 7, 1999); 2 id., at 589-598, 701-704 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Opinion No. 97-2, supra). At bottom, battles of experts are bound to be part of any ratesetting scheme, and the FCC was reasonable to prefer TELRIC over alternative fixed-cost schemes that preserve home-field advantages for the incumbents. </s> * * * </s> We cannot say whether the passage of time will show competition prompted by TELRIC to be an illusion, but TELRIC appears to be a reasonable policy for now, and that is all that counts. See Chevron, 467 U.S., at 866. The incumbents have failed to show that TELRIC is unreasonable on its own terms, largely because they fall into the trap of mischaracterizing the FCC's departures from the assumption of a perfectly competitive market (the wire-center limitation, regulatory and development lags, or the refusal to prescribe high depreciation and capital costs) as inconsistencies rather than pragmatic features of the TELRIC plan. Nor have they shown it was unreasonable for the FCC to pick TELRIC over alternative methods, or presented evidence to rebut the entrants' figures as to the level of competitive investment in local-exchange markets. In short, the incumbents have failed to carry their burden of showing unreasonableness to defeat the deference due the Commission. We therefore reverse the Eighth Circuit's judgment insofar as it invalidated TELRIC as a method for setting rates under the Act. </s> C </s> The incumbents' claim of TELRIC's inherent inadequacy to deal with depreciation or capital costs has its counterpart in a further argument. They seek to apply the rule of constitutional avoidance in saying that "cost" ought to be construed by reference to historical investment in order to avoid a serious constitutional question, whether a methodology so divorced from investment actually made will lead to a taking of property in violation of the Fifth (or Fourteenth) Amendment. The Eighth Circuit did not think any such serious question was in the offing, 219 F.3d, at 753-754, and neither do we. </s> At the outset, it is well to understand that the incumbent carriers do not present the portent of a constitutional taking claim in the way that is usual in ratemaking cases. They do not argue that any particular, actual TELRIC rate is "so unjust as to be confiscatory," that is, as threatening an incumbent's "financial integrity." Duquesne Light Co., 488 U.S., at 307, 312. Indeed, the incumbent carriers have not even presented us with an instance of TELRIC rates, which are to be set or approved by state commissions and reviewed in the first instance in the federal district courts, 47 U.S.C. §§252(e)(4) and (e)(6). And this, despite the fact that some States apparently have put rates in place already using TELRIC. See First Report and Order ¶ ;631 and accompanying footnotes ("A number of states already employ, or have plans to utilize, some form of [long-run incremental cost] methodology in their approach to setting prices for unbundled network elements"). </s> This want of any rate to be reviewed is significant, given that this Court has never considered a taking challenge on a ratesetting methodology without being presented with specific rate orders alleged to be confiscatory. See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co., supra, at 303-304 (denial of $3.5 million and $15.4 million increases to rate bases of electric utilities); Smyth v. Ames, 289 U.S. 287, 305 (1933) ("[M]indful of its distinctive function in the enforcement of constitutional rights, the Court has refused to be bound by any artificial rule or formula which changed conditions might upset"). Undeniably, then, the general rule is that any question about the constitutionality of ratesetting is raised by rates, not methods, and this means that the policy of construing a statute to avoid constitutional questions where possible is presumptively out of place when construing statutes prescribing methods. </s> The incumbents say this action is one of the rare ones placed outside the general rule by signs, too strong to ignore, that takings will occur if the TELRIC interpretation of §252(d)(1) is allowed. First, they compare, at the level of the entire network (as opposed to element-by-element), industry balance-sheet indications of historical investment in local telephone markets with the corresponding estimate of a TELRIC evaluation of the cost to build a new and efficient national system of local exchanges providing universal service. Brief for Petitioners in No.00-511, pp.10-11, and n.6. As against an estimated $180 billion for such a new system, the incumbents juxtapose a value representing "total plant" on the industry balance sheet for 1999 of roughly $342 billion. They argue that the huge and unreasonable difference is proof that TELRIC will necessarily result in confiscatory rates. Ibid. (citing FCC, 1999 Statistics of Communications Common Carriers 51 (Aug. 1, 2000) (table 2.9, line no.32)). </s> The comparison, however, is spurious because the numbers assumed by the incumbents are clearly wrong. On the one side, the $180 billion is supposed to be based on constructing a barebones universal-service telephone network, and so it fails to cover elements associated with more advanced telecommunications services that incumbents are required to provide by lease under 47 U.S.C. §251(c)(3). See Application by Bell Atlantic New York for Authorization under Section 271 of the Communications Act, 15 FCC Rcd 3953, ¶ ;245 (1999), aff'd, 220 F.3d 607 (CADC 2000). See also Inre Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 14 FCC Rcd 20 432, ¶ ;41, and n.125 (1999) (explaining that the universal-service model may not be "appropriate [for] determining ... prices for unbundled network elements"). We do not know how much higher the efficient replacement figure should be, but we can reasonably assume that $180 billion is too low. </s> On the other side of the comparison, the "balance sheet" number is patently misstated. As explained above, any rates under the traditional public-utility model would be calculated on a rate base (whether fair value or cost of service) subject to deductions for accrued depreciation. See Phillips 310-315. The net plant investment after depreciation is not $342 billion but $166 billion, FCC, Statistics of Communications Common Carriers, at 51 (table 2.9, line no.50), an amount less than the TELRIC figure the incumbents would like us to assume. And even after we increase the $166 billion by the amount of net current liabilities ($22 billion) on the balance sheet, ibid., (line no.64 minus line no.13), as a rough (and generous) estimate of the working-capital allowance under cost of service, the rate base would then be $188 billion, still a far cry from the $342 billion the incumbents tout, and less than 5 percent above the incumbents' $180 billion universal-service TELRIC figure. What the best numbers may be we are in no position to say: the point is only that the numbers being thrown out by the incumbents are no evidence that TELRIC lease rates would be confiscatory, sight unseen. </s> The incumbent carriers' second try at nonrate constitutional litigation focuses on reliance interests allegedly jeopardized by an intentional switch in ratesetting methodologies. They rely on Duquesne, where we held as usual that a ratesetting methodology would normally be judged only by the "overall impact of the rate orders,"36 but went further in dicta. We remarked that "a State's decision to arbitrarily switch back and forth between methodologies in a way which required investors to bear the risk of bad investments at some times while denying them the benefit of good investments at others would raise serious constitutional questions." 488 U.S., at 315.37 In other words, there may be a taking challenge distinct from a plain-vanilla objection to arbitrary or capricious agency action38 if a ratemaking body were to make opportunistic changes in ratesetting methodologies just to minimize return on capital investment in a utility enterprise. </s> In Duquesne itself, there was no need to decide whether there might be an exception to the rate-order requirement for a claim of taking by rates, and there is no reason here to decide whether the policy of constitutional avoidance should be invoked in order to anticipate a rate-order taking claim. The reason is the same in each case: the incumbent carriers here are just like the electric utilities in Duquesne in failing to present any evidence that the decision to adopt TELRIC was arbitrary, opportunistic, or undertaken with a confiscatory purpose. What we do know is very much to the contrary. First of all, there was no "switch" of methodologies, since the wholesale market for leasing network elements is something brand new under the 1996 Act. There was no replacement of any predecessor methods, much less an opportunistic switch "back and forth." And to the extent that the incumbents argue that there was at least an expectation that some historically anchored cost-of-service method would set wholesale lease rates, no such promise was ever made. First Report and Order ¶ ;706 ("[C]ontrary to assertions by some [incumbents], regulation does not and should not guarantee full recovery of their embedded costs. Such a guarantee would exceed the assurances that [the FCC] or the states have provided in the past"). Cf. Duquesne, supra, at 315. Any investor paying attention had to realize that he could not rely indefinitely on traditional ratemaking methods but would simply have to rely on the constitutional bar against confiscatory rates.39 </s> IV </s> A </s> The effort by the Government and the competing carriers to overturn the Eighth Circuit's invalidation of the additional combination rules, 47 CFR §§51.315(c)-(f) (1997), draws the incumbents' threshold objection that the challenge is barred by waiver, since the 1999 petition to review the 1997 invalidation of Rule 315(b) did not extend to the Eighth Circuit's simultaneous invalidation of the four companion rules, Rules 315(c)-(f), 120 F.3d, at 813, 819, n.39.40 The incumbents must, of course, acknowledge that the Court of Appeals suasponte invited briefing on the status of Rules 315(c)-(f)41 on remand after this Court's reinstatement of Rule 315(b), Iowa Utilities Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1961): </s> "The demands not only of orderly procedure but of due procedure as the means of achieving justice according to law require that when a case is brought here for review of administrative action, all the rulings of the agency upon which the party seeks reversal, and which are then available to him, be presented. Otherwise we would be promoting the `sporting theory' of justice, at the potential cost of substantial expenditures of agency time. To allow counsel to withhold in this Court and save for a later stage procedural error would tend to foist upon the Court constitutional decisions which could have been avoided had those errors been invoked earlier." </s> We do not think Communist Party blocks our consideration of Rules 315(c)-(f). The issue there was raised by the petitioner's failure on an earlier trip to this Court to pursue a procedural objection to agency action. Litigation of the procedural point would not only have obviated the Court's need to review the constitutionality of an Act of Congress when the case got here, but could have saved five years of litigation during which time "the Board and the Court of Appeals [had] each twice more reconsidered [the] steadily growing record ...." Id., at 31-32, n.8. After all that time, petitioner sought review of the procedural point. </s> Nothing like that can be said about these cases. Addressing the issue now would not "make waste" of years of efforts by the FCC or the Court of Appeals, id., at 32, n.8, would not threaten to leave a constitutional ruling pointless, and would direct the Court's attention not to an isolated, "long-stale" procedural error by the agency, ibid., but to the invalidation of FCC rules meant to have general and continuing applicability. There is no indication of litigation tactics behind the failure last time to appeal on these rules, which were reexamined on remand at the behest of the court, not the Government or the competing carriers. </s> Any issue "pressed or passed upon below" by a federal court, United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 41 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted), is subject to this Court's broad discretion over the questions it chooses to take on certiorari, and there are good reasons to look at Rules 315(c)-(f). The Court of Appeals passed on a significant issue, and one placed in a state of flux, see Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1099, n.8 (1991) (citations omitted), by the split between these cases and US West Communications v. MFS Intelenet, Inc., 193 F.3d 1112, 1121 (CA9 1999), (affirming identical state-commission rules), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1284 (2000). We accordingly rejected the incumbents' claim of waiver when they raised it in opposition to the petition for certiorari, and we reject it again today. See Stevens v. Department of Treasury, 500 U.S. 1, 8 (1991). </s> B </s> The Eighth Circuit found the four additional combination rules at odds with the plain language of the final sentence of 47 U.S.C. §251(c)(3), which we quote more fully: </s> "[E]ach incumbent local exchange carrier has ... </s> . . . . . </s> "[t]he duty to provide, to any requesting telecommunications carrier for the provision of a telecommunications service, nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled basis at any technically feasible point on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.... An incumbent local exchange carrier shall provide such unbundled network elements in a manner that allows requesting carriers to combine such elements in order to provide such telecommunications service." </s> "Bundling" and "combination" are related but distinct concepts. Bundling is about lease pricing. To provide a network element "on an unbundled basis" is to lease the element, however described, to a requesting carrier at a stated price specific to that element. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S., at 394. The FCC's regulations identify in advance a certain number of elements for separate pricing, 47 CFR §51.319 (1997), but the regulations do not limit the elements subject to specific rates. A separately priced element need not be the simplest possible configuration of equipment or function, and a predesignated unbundled element might actually comprise items that could be considered separate elements themselves. For example, "if the states require incumbent LECs to provision subloop elements [which together constitute a local loop], incumbent LECs must still provision a local loop as a single, combined element when so requested, because we identify local loops as a single element in this proceeding." First Report and Order ¶ ;295. The "combination" provided for in Rules 315(b)-(f), on the other hand, refers to a mechanical connection of physical elements within an incumbent's network, or the connection of a competitive carrier's element with the incumbent's network "in a manner that would allow a requesting carrier to offer the telecommunications service." Id., ¶ ;294, n.620. </s> The additional combination rules are best understood as meant to ensure that the statutory duty to provide unbundled elements gets a practical result. A separate rate for an unbundled element is not much good if an incumbent refuses to lease the element except in combination with others that competing carriers have no need of; or if the incumbents refuse to allow the leased elements to be combined with a competitor's own equipment. And this is just what was happening before the FCC devised its combination rules. Incumbents, according to the FCC's findings, were refusing to give competitors' technicians access to their physical plants to make necessary connections. Inre Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 15 FCC Rcd 3696, 3910, ¶ ;482 (1999) (Third Report and Order), petitions for review pending subnom. United States Telecom Assn. v. FCC, Nos.00-1015, etc. (CADC). </s> The challenged additional combination rules, issued under §251(c)(3), include two that are substantive and two that are procedural, the latter having no independent significance here. Rule315(c) requires an incumbent to "perform the functions necessary to combine unbundled network elements in any manner, even if those elements are not ordinarily combined" in the incumbent's own network, so long as the combination is "[t]echnically feasible" and "[w]ould not impair the ability of other carriers to obtain access to unbundled network elements or to interconnect" with the incumbent's network. The companion Rule315(d) likewise requires the incumbent to do the combining between the network elements it leases and a requesting carrier's own elements, so long as technically feasible.42 </s> The rules are challenged alternatively as inconsistent with statutory plain language and as unreasonable interpretations. The plain language in question is the sentence that "[a]n incumbent local exchange carrier shall provide such unbundled network elements in a manner that allows requesting carriers to combine such elements in order to provide such telecommunications service." 47 U.S.C. §251(c)(3). The Eighth Circuit read this as unambiguously excusing incumbents from any obligation to combine provided elements, 219 F.3d, at 759. The ruling has a familiar ring, for this is the same reason that the Court of Appeals invalidated these rules in 1997 along with Rule 315(b), as being inconsistent with a plain limit on incumbents' obligation under §251(c)(3) to provide elements "on an unbundled basis." 120 F.3d, at 813. </s> But the language is not that plain. Of course, it is true that the statute would not be violated literally by an incumbent that provided elements so that a requesting carrier could combine them, and thereafter sat on its hands while any combining was done. But whether it is plain that the incumbents have a right to sit is a question of context as much as grammar. If Congress had treated incumbents and entrants as equals, it probably would be plain enough that the incumbents' obligations stopped at furnishing an element that could be combined. The Act, however, proceeds on the understanding that incumbent monopolists and contending competitors are unequal, cf.§251(c) ("Additional obligations of incumbent local exchange carriers"), and within the actual statutory confines it is not self-evident that in obligating incumbents to furnish, Congress negated a duty to combine that is not inconsistent with the obligation to furnish, but not expressly mentioned. Thus, it takes a stretch to get from permissive statutory silence to a statutory right on the part of the incumbents to refuse to combine for a requesting carrier, say, that is unable to make the combination, First Report and Order ¶ ;294, or may even be unaware that it needs to combine certain elements to provide a telecommunications service. Id., ¶ ;293. And these are the only instances in which the additional combination rules obligate the incumbents according to the FCC's clarification in the First Report and Order. </s> The conclusion that the language is open is certainly in harmony with, if not required by, our holding in Iowa Utilities Board dealing with Rule315(b). In reinstating that rule, we rejected the argument that furnishing elements "on an unbundled basis," §251(c)(3), must mean "physically separated," 467 U.S. 837 (1984), that leaves the FCC's rules intact unless the incumbents can show them to be unreasonable. </s> For the decision whether Rules 315(c)-(f) survive Chevron step two, Iowa Utilities Board is, to be sure, less immediate help, since in that case we found Rule315(b) reasonable because it prevented incumbents from dismantling existing combinations to sabotage competitors, 525 U.S., at 395, whereas here we deal not with splitting up but with joining together. We think, nonetheless, that the additional combination rules reflect a reasonable reading of the statute, meant to remove practical barriers to competitive entry into local-exchange markets while avoiding serious interference with incumbent network operations. </s> At the outset, it is well to repeat that the duties imposed under the rules are subject to restrictions limiting the burdens placed on the incumbents. An obligation on the part of an incumbent to combine elements for an entrant under Rules315(c) and (d) only arises when the entrant is unable to do the job itself. First Report and Order ¶ ;294 ("If the carrier is unable to combine the elements, the incumbent must do so"). When an incumbent does have an obligation, the rules specify a duty to "perform the functions necessary to combine," not necessarily to complete the actual combination. 47 CFR §§51.315(c)-(d) (1997). And the entrant must pay "a reasonable cost-based fee" for whatever the incumbent does. Brief for Petitioner Federal Parties in Nos.00-587, etc., 34. See also id., at 10, 34, n.14. </s> The force of the objections is limited further by the FCC's implementation in the rules of the statutory conditions that the incumbents' duty arises only if the requested combination does not discriminate against other carriers by impeding their access, and only if the requested combination is "technically feasible," §251(c)(3). As to the latter restriction, the Commission "decline[d] to adopt the view proffered by some parties that incumbents must combine network elements in any technically feasible manner requested." First Report and Order ¶ ;296. The concern was that such a rule "could potentially affect the reliability and security of the incumbent's network, and the ability of other carriers to obtain interconnection, or request and use unbundled elements." Ibid. </s> Thus, the incumbents are wrong to claim that the restriction to "technical feasibility" places only minimal limits on the duty to combine, since the First Report and Order makes it clear that what is "technically feasible" does not mean merely what is "economically reasonable," id., ¶ ;199, or what is simply practical or possible in an engineering sense, see id., ¶ ;¶ ;196-198. The limitation is meant to preserve "network reliability and security," id., ¶ ;296, n.622, and a combination is not technically feasible if it impedes an incumbent carrier's ability "to retain responsibility for the management, control, and performance of its own network," id., ¶ ;203. </s> This demanding sense of "technical feasibility," as a condition protecting the incumbent's ability to control the performance of its own network, is in accord with what we said in Iowa Utilities Board. There, for example, we reinstated the Commission's "pick and choose" rule43 in part because the duty to provide network elements on matching terms to all comers did not arise when it was "not technically feasible," §51.809(b)(2). 525 U.S., at 396. If "technically feasible" meant what is merely possible, it would have been no limitation at all. </s> The two substantive rules each have additional features that are consistent with the purposes of §251(c)(3). Rule 315(c), to the extent that it raises a duty to combine what is "ordinarily combined," neatly complements the facially similar Rule 315(b), upheld in Iowa Utilities Bd., id., at 395, forbidding incumbents to separate currently combined network elements when the entrant requests them in a combined form. If the latter were the only rule, an incumbent might well be within its rights to insist, for example, on providing a loop and a switch in a combined form when a na ;ve entrant asked just for them, while refusing later to combine them with a network interface device, which is also ordinarily combined with the loop and the switch, and which is necessary to set up a telecommunications link. But under Rule315(c), when the entrant later requires the element it missed the first time, the incumbent's obligation is to "perform the functions necessary," 47 CFR §51.315(c) (1997), for a combination of what the entrant cannot combine alone, First Report and Order ¶ ;294, and would not have needed to combine if it had known enough to request the elements together in a combined form in the first place. Cf.First Report and Order ¶ ;297 ("[I]ncumbent[s] must work with new entrants to identify the elements the new entrants will need to offer a particular service in the manner the new entrantsintend"). </s> Of course, it is not this aspect of Rule 315(c), requiring the combination of what is ordinarily combined, that draws the incumbents' (or Justice Breyer's, see post, at 26-27) principal objection; they focus their attack, rather, on the additional requirement of Rule315(c), that incumbents combine unbundled network elements "even if those elements are not ordinarily combined in the incumbent['s] network." 47 CFR §51.315(c) (1997). To build upon our previous example, this would seemingly require an incumbent to combine the loop, switch, and interface (ordinarily combined in its network), with a second loop and network interface (provided by the incumbent as a separate unbundled element), so that the competitive carrier could charge for a second-line connection, as for a fax or modem. See Brief for Petitioners Worldcom, Inc., etal. in No.00-555, p.48 (providing the example). </s> But this provision of Rule315(c) is justified by the statutory requirement of "nondiscriminatory access." §251(c)(3). As we have said, the FCC has interpreted the rule as obligating the incumbent to combine "[i]f the carrier is unable to combine the elements." First Report and Order ¶ ;294. There is no dispute that the incumbent could make the combination more efficiently than the entrant; nor is it contested that the incumbent would provide the combination itself if a customer wanted it or the combination otherwise served a business purpose. See Third Report and Order ¶ ;481. It hardly seems unreasonable, then, to require the incumbent to make the combination, for which it will be entitled to a reasonable fee; otherwise, an entrant would not enjoy true "nondiscriminatory access" notwithstanding the bare provision on an unbundled basis of the network elements it needs to provide a service. </s> As to Rule 315(d), it is hard to see how this rule is any less reasonable than §251(c)(2), which imposes a statutory duty to interconnect. The rule simply requires the incumbent to perform functions necessary to combine the unbundled elements it provides with elements owned by the requesting carrier "in any technically feasible manner." Essentially, it appears to be nothing more than an element-to-element version of the incumbents' statutory duty "to provide, for the facilities and equipment of any requesting ... carrier, interconnection with the local exchange carrier's network," in §251(c)(2). </s> In sum, what we have are rules that say an incumbent shall, for payment, "perform the functions necessary," 47 CFR §§51.315(c) and (d) (1997), to combine network elements to put a competing carrier on an equal footing with the incumbent when the requesting carrier is unable to combine, First Report and Order ¶ ;294, when it would not place the incumbent at a disadvantage in operating its own network, and when it would not place other competing carriers at a competitive disadvantage, 47 CFR §51.315(c)(2) (1997). This duty is consistent with the Act's goals of competition and nondiscrimination, and imposing it is a sensible way to reach the result the statuterequires. </s> * * * </s> The 1996 Act sought to bring competition to local-exchange markets, in part by requiring incumbent local-exchange carriers to lease elements of their networks at rates that would attract new entrants when it would be more efficient to lease than to build or resell. Whether the FCC picked the best way to set these rates is the stuff of debate for economists and regulators versed in the technology of telecommunications and microeconomic pricing theory. The job of judges is to ask whether the Commission made choices reasonably within the pale of statutory possibility in deciding what and how items must be leased and the way to set rates for leasing them. The FCC's pricing and additional combination rules survive that scrutiny. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part and affirmed in part, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. </s> VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC., etal.,PETITIONERS </s> 00-511v. </s> FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION etal. </s> WORLDCOM, INC., etal., PETITIONERS </s> 00-555v. </s> VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC. etal. </s> FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, etal.,PETITIONERS </s> 00-587v. </s> IOWA UTILITIES BOARD etal. </s> AT&T CORP., PETITIONERS </s> 00-590v. </s> IOWA UTILITIES BOARD etal. </s> GENERAL COMMUNICATIONS, INC., PETITIONER </s> 00-602v. </s> IOWA UTILITIES BOARD etal. </s> on writs of certiorari to the united states court ofappeals for the eighth circuit </s> [May 13, 2002] </s> Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Scalia joins as to Part VI, concurring in part and dissenting in part. </s> I agree with the majority that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Act or Telecommunications Act), 47 U.S.C. §251 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V), does not require a historical cost pricing system. I also agree that, at the present time, no taking of the incumbent firms' property in violation of the Fifth Amendment has occurred. I disagree, however, with the Court's conclusion that the specific pricing and unbundling rules at issue here are authorized by the Act. </s> I </s> The primary goal of the Telecommunications Act is to "promote competition and reduce regulation" in both local and long-distance telecommunications markets. Preamble, 110 Stat. 56; see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, p.1 (1996). As part of that effort, the Act requires incumbent local telecommunications firms to make certain "elements" of their local systems available to new competitors seeking to enter those local markets. 47 U.S.C. §251(c)(3) (1994 ed., Supp. V). If the incumbents and competitors cannot agree on the price that an incumbent can charge a new entrant, local regulators will determine the price. §252. The regulated price will depend upon the element's "cost." §252(d)(1)(A). In AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999), this Court held that the Act authorizes the FCC to set rules for determining those prices. </s> These cases require the Court to review the Commission's rules. Those rules create a "start-from-scratch" version of what the Commission calls a "Total Element Long-Run Incremental Cost" system (TELRIC). See A.Kahn, T.Tardiff, & D. Weisman, The Telecommunications Act at three years: an economic evaluation of its implementation by the Federal Communications Commission, 11 Info. Econ. & Policy 319, 326 (1999) (Lodged with the Clerk of this Court) (referring to the FCC's system as "TELRIC-Blank Slate") (hereinafter Kahn). In essence, the Commission requires local regulators to determine the cost of supplying a particular incumbent network "element" to a new entrant, not by looking at what it has cost that incumbent to supply the element in the past, nor by looking at what it will cost that incumbent to supply that element in the future. Rather, the regulator must look to what it would cost a hypothetical perfectly efficient firm to supply that element in the future, assuming that the hypothetical firm were to build essentially from scratch a new, perfectly efficient communications network. The only concession to the incumbent's actual network is the presumption that presently existing wire centers--which hold the switching equipment for a local area--will remain in their current locations. See Inre Implementation of the Local Competition Provision in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, ¶ ;685, 11 FCC Rcd. 15499 (1996) (hereinafter Order) (describing TELRIC as "based on costs that assume that wire centers will be placed at the incumbent LEC's current wire center locations, but that the reconstructed local network will employ the most efficient technology for reasonably foreseeable capacity requirements"). </s> An example will help explain the system as I understand it. Imagine an incumbent local telephone company's major switching center, say, in downtown Chicago, from which cables and wires run through conduits or along poles to subsidiary switching equipment, other electronic equipment, and eventually to end-user equipment, such as telephone handsets, computer modems, or fax machines located in office buildings or private residences. A new competitor, whom the law entitles to use an "element" of the incumbent firm's system, asks for use of such an "element," say, a single five-block portion of this system, thereby obtaining access to 20 downtown office buildings. Under the Commission's TELRIC, the incumbent's "cost" (upon which "rates" must be based) equals not the real resources that the Chicago incumbent must spend to provide the five-block "element" demanded, but the resources that a hypothetical perfectly efficient new supplier would spend were that supplier rebuilding the entire downtown Chicago system, other than the local wire center, from scratch. This latter figure, of course, might be very different from any incumbent's actual costs. </s> As a reviewing Court, we must determine, among other things, whether the Commission has "`abuse[d]'" its statutorily delegated "`discretion'" to create implementing rules. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983) (quoting Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A)). In doing so, we must assume that Congress intended to grant the Commission broad legal leeway in respect to the substantive content of the rules, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944), particularly since the subject matter is a highly technical one, namely ratemaking, where the agency possesses expert knowledge. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-844 (1984). </s> Nonetheless, that leeway is not unlimited. It is bounded, for example, by the scope of the statute that grants authority and by the need for the agency to show a "rational connection" between the regulations and the statute's purposes. State Farm, 463 U.S., at 56. We must determine whether, despite the leeway given experts on technical subject matter, agency regulations exceed these legal limits. See id., at 43; Overton Park, supra, at 416; Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A) (requiring agency action to be set aside if "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law"). And, reluctantly, I have come to the conclusion that they do. After considering the incumbents' objections and the Commission's responses, I cannot find that "rational connection" between statutory purpose and implementing regulation that the law demands. State Farm, supra, at 56. </s> II </s> Because the critical legal problem concerns the relation of the Commission's regulations to the statute's purpose, I must ask at the outset, what is that purpose? The relevant statutory provision says only that the agency shall set "rate[s]" (for "elements") "based on ... cost." 47 U.S.C. §252(d)(1). At first blush the word "cost" calls to mind traditional cost-based rate-setting. See Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §717c; Natural Gas Act of 1938, §§4a, 5, 52 Stat. 824; Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §10701 (1994 ed., Supp. V); Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U. S. C. §1302(c) (1976 ed., Supp. II) (repealed 1980); see also ante at 4-5 (discussing traditional rate-setting); J. Bonbright, A. Danielsen, & D. Kamerschen, Principles of Public Utility Rates 109-110, 388 (2d ed. 1988) (hereinafter Bonbright); Inre Implementation of Sections of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992: Rate Regulation, 9 FCC Rcd. 4527, 4555, ¶ ;55 (1994) (Commission rules referring to "[o]riginal cost" as traditional basis "for public utility valuation"). </s> An agency engaged in traditional ratemaking will seek to protect consumers by mandating low prices as the end result. In doing so, the agency will sometimes try to mimic the prices that it believes (hypothetically) the regulated firm (often a legal monopoly) would have set had it been an unregulated firm in a competitively structured industry. See ante at 13-14; Bonbright 89 ("[M]any economists have declared that ... the prices that would result without regulation but under pure or perfect competition would be the `ideal' prices"); 1 A. Kahn, The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions 63 (1988) (hereinafter Economics of Regulation) ("The traditional legal criteria of proper public utility rates have always borne a strong resemblance to the criteria of the competitive market in long-run equilibrium"). And the Commission's regulations are at least arguably consistent with an agency effort to find prices that replicate the end results of theoretically perfect competition. See Order ¶ ;¶ ;679, 738. </s> But that regulatory objective--low, competition-mimicking prices--is not the objective of the relevant statutory provision here. The Telecommunications Act is not a ratemaking statute seeking better regulation. It is a deregulatory statute seeking competition. It assumes that, given modern technology, local telecommunications markets may now prove large enough for several firms to compete in the provision of some services--but not necessarily all services--without serious economic waste. It finds the competitive process an indirect but more effective way to bring about the common objectives of competition and regulation alike, namely low prices, better products, and more efficient production methods. But it authorizes the Commission to promulgate rules that will help achieve that procedural goal--the substitution of competition for regulation in local markets--where that transformation is economically feasible. See ante, at 69 (accepting this rationale). The Act does not authorize the Commission to promulgate rules that would hinder the transition from a regulated to a competitive marketplace--whether or not those rules directly mandate lower "element" prices along the way. </s> Five considerations, taken together, convince me that the description of the statutory goal I have just given is an accurate one. First, the Act itself says that its objective is to substitute competition for regulation. Preamble, 110 Stat. 56, (stating that the goal of the Act is to "promote competition and reduce regulation" in both local and long distance telecommunications markets); see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 1; ante at 16, 17. </s> Second, the Act's history suggests the Congress would have thought that goal a reasonable one. The 20th century's history of telecommunications markets is primarilyone of regulation. For decades experts justified regulation on the ground that telecommunications providers were "natural monopolists," i.e., telecommunications markets would not support more than one firm of efficient size. See ante, at 2-3. But beginning in the 1970s, technological developments led to a change of expert opinion by undermining the "natural monopoly" rationale. Long distance telecommunications markets seemed newly capable of supporting several competing firms without significant economic waste. See R. Vietor, Contrived Competition: Regulation and Deregulation in America 185-190 (1994). And opinion began to change similarly in respect to local markets. In the case of local markets, however, the change was marked by hesitation and lingering uncertainty. See P. Huber, M. Kellogg, & J. Thorne, Federal Telecommunications Law 53, 86-87 (2d ed. 1999) (hereinafter Huber); P. Huber, M. Kellogg, & J. Thorne, The Geodesic Network II: 1993 Report on Competition in the Telephone Industry 2.1-2.5 (1992). That is because local telecommunications service had long demanded expensive fixed investment, for example, digging up streets to lay cables or stringing wires on overhead poles. See ante, at 17-18. And whether, or the extent to which, a new competitor could replicate, or avoid, that kind of investment without significantly wasting resources remained unclear. See Huber, at 34, 206. Thus, at the time Congress wrote the new Act, technological development seemed to permit nonwasteful competition in respect to some aspects of local service; but in respect to other aspects an incumbent local telecommunications provider might continue to possess "natural monopoly" advantages. Id., at 206-207. And these circumstances made it reasonable for Congress to try to secure local competition insofar as that competition would prove economically feasible, i.e., where competition would not prove seriously wasteful. See Order ¶ ;1. See also 47 U.S.C. §§271(c)(1)(A), 271(c)(1)(B) (recognizing that some local markets will not support more than one firm). </s> Third, the Act's structure and language indicate a congressional effort to secure that very end. The Act dismantles artificial legal barriers to new entry in local markets, thereby permitting new firms to enter if they wish. 47 U.S.C. §253(a); see ante, at 18-19 & n.12. But the Act recognizes that simple permission may not prove sufficient--perhaps because the incumbent will retain a "natural monopoly" form of control over certain necessary elements of service. It consequently goes on to promote new entry in three ways. See ante, at 19. First, it requires incumbents to "interconnect" with new entrants (at a price determined by the regulations before us), thereby allowing a new entrant's small set of subscribers to connect with the incumbent firm's likely larger customer base. §251(c)(2). Second, it requires incumbents to sell retail services to new entrants at wholesale rates, thereby allowing newly entering firms automatically to compete in retailing if they so desire. §251(c)(4). Third, it requires incumbents to provide new entrants "access to network elements," say telephone lines connecting homes or offices with switching centers, "on an unbundled basis." §251(c)(3). This third requirement permits a new entrant to compete selectively without replicating (or substituting) all of the elements the incumbent uses to offer the service in question. </s> Suppose, for example, the incumbent's control of certain existing cables, lines, or switching equipment would put the new entrant at an economic disadvantage because duplication of those "elements" would prove unnecessarily expensive. The new Act does not require the new entrant and incumbent to compete in respect to those elements, say, through wasteful duplication. Rather, the Act permits the new entrant to offer, and to compete with respect to, a related service by obtaining "access" to (and therefore using) those "elements" of the incumbent's network, while finding on its own other elements necessary to the service. It is as if a railroad regulator, anxious to promote railroad competition between City A and City B but aware that it would prove wasteful to duplicate a certain railroad bridge across the Mississippi River, ordered the bridge's owner to share the bridge with new competitors. The sharing would avoid wasteful duplication of the hard-to-duplicate resource--namely the bridge. But at the same time it would facilitate competition in the remaining aspects of the A-to-B railroad service. That, I assume, is why the Act says that the "elements" that must be shared are those for which access is "necessary" and in respect to which "failure to provide access" would "impair" the ability of the new entrant "to provide the services that it seeks to offer." §251(d)(2). See Iowa Utilities, 525 U.S., at 392 (Commission must give "substance to the `necessary' and `impair' requirements"); cf. id., at 416-417 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the "necessary" and "impair" provision's object is to require access to, and thereby force sharing of, those elements of an incumbent's system that would prove, to a significant degree, economically wasteful to duplicate). </s> To put the matter more concretely, imagine that a communications firm--a potential new entrant--wishes to sell voice, data, text, pictures, entertainment, or other communications services, perhaps in competition with the incumbent. That firm must decide how its service will reach a customer inside a house or office. Should the firm 1) run its own new cable into the house? 2) run wires through an already-existing electricity conduit? 3) communicate without wires, say by wireless or one-way or two-way satellite? 4) or use the incumbent's pair of twisted copper telephone service wires already in place? If the potential new entrant claims that all but the last of these possibilities are impractical or far too expensive--that using existing telephone wires is far cheaper (in terms of real resources expended) than the alternatives--then the new entrant is claiming that the incumbent's wires are a kind of "bridge" to which it must have access. And it may ask the regulator to make its new entry feasible by requiring the incumbent to permit it to use that "element" at a reasonable price. </s> Fourth, the Commission has described the Act's goals as including promotion of nonwasteful competition. The preamble to the Commission's price regulations describes their statutorily based aim as "giv[ing] appropriate signals to producers and consumers and ensur[ing] efficient entry and utilization of the telecommunications infrastructure." Order ¶ ;630 (emphasis added). The Commission also says that "the prices that potential entrants pay for these elements should reflect forward-looking economic costs in order to encourage efficient levels of investment and entry." Id., ¶ ;672 (emphasis added). And it adds that "Congress specifically determined that input prices should be based on costs because this would foster competition in the retail market." Id., ¶ ;710; see also id., ¶ ;1. </s> Fifth, the Solicitor General confirmed this view at oral argument when he said that the rates in question should be set in order to "encourage new entrants to come into the market," Tr. of Oral Arg. 60, to "allow them to enter the market at competitive rates," ibid., and to "encourage them to develop new technologies." Id., at 61. </s> The statute, then, seeks new local market competition insofar as local markets can support that competition without serious waste. And we must read the relevant rate setting provision--including the critical word "cost"--with that goal in mind. </s> III </s> The Commission's critics--Verizon, other incumbents, and experts whose published articles Verizon has lodged with the Court--concede that the statute grants the Commission broad authority to define "cost[s]." They also concede that every rate-setting system has flaws. Cf. e.g., Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Mo., 262 U.S. 276, 311-312 (1923) (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., dissenting) (criticizing "reproduction cost" systems because of the administrative difficulty of determining costs); Economics of Regulation 109-111 (criticizing "historical cost" systems because of their failure to provide proper incentives). </s> Nonetheless, the critics argue, the Commission cannot lawfully choose a system that thwarts a basic statutory purpose without offering any significant compensating advantage. They take the relevant purpose as furthering local competition where feasible. See Part II, supra. They add that rates will further that purpose (1) if they discourage new firms from using the incumbent's facilities or "elements" when it is significantly less expensive, economically speaking, for the entrant to build or to buy elsewhere, and (2) if they encourage new firms to use the incumbent's facilities when it is significantly less expensive, economically speaking, for the entrant to do so. They point out that prices that approximately reflect an actual incumbent's actual additional costs of supplying the services (or "element") demanded will come close to doing both these things. See Kahn 330 (prices set at "incremental cost," the cost of supplying an added "increment," will give challengers the "proper target at which to shoot" only if that cost reflects "the cost that society will actually incur if they purchase more" or the resources that it would save if they purchase less); G. Knieps, Interconnection and Network Access, 23 Fordham Int'l L.J. 90 (2000); see also J. Sidak & D. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and the Regulatory Contract (1998) (arguing that a market-determined efficient component pricing rule (M-ECPR) satisfies these objectives and that the FCC has misunderstood the M-ECPR system). But prices like the Commission's, based on the costs that a hypothetical "most efficient" firm would incur if hypothetically building largely from scratch, Order ¶ ;685, would do neither. Indeed, they would do exactly the opposite, creating incentives that hinder rather than further the statute's basic objective. </s> First, the critics ask, why, given such a system, would a new entrant ever build or buy a new element? After all, the Commission's rate-setting system sets the incumbent's compulsory leasing rate at a level that would rarely exceed the price of building or buying elsewhere. That is because the Commission's rate-setting system chooses as its basis the hypothetical cost of the most efficient method of providing the relevant service--i.e., the cost of entering a house through the use of electrical conduits or of using wireless (if cheaper in general) and it then applies those costs (based on, say, hypothetical wireless) as if they were the cost of the system in place (the twisted pair of wires). Why then would the new entrant use an electrical conduit, or a wireless system, to enter a house when, by definition, the Commission will require the incumbent to lease its pair of twisted wires at an equivalent price or lower--whether or not the incumbent will have to spend more, in fact, to provide the twisted wires? The rules further discourage independent building or buying by assessing a special penalty upon the new entrant that does so, for that entrant will have to worry that soon another newernew entrant will insist upon sharing the incumbent's equivalent of that very element at a still lowerregulation-determined price based on subsequent technological developments. </s> The Commission's system will tend to create instances in which (1) the incumbent's actual future cost of maintaining an element (say, a set of wires), will exceed (2) the new entrant's cost of building or buying elsewhere (say, through wireless or wires in electrical conduits) which, in turn, will equal, (or even exceed), (3) the hypothetical future "best practice" cost (namely, what the experts decide will, in general, be cheapest). In such a case (or in related cases, where technological improvements, actual or predicted, tend to offset various cost differences), the new entrant will uneconomically share the incumbent's facilities by leasing rather than building or buying elsewhere. And that result, in the assumed circumstances, is wasteful. It undermines the efficiency goal that the majority itself claims the Act seeks to achieve. Compare ante, at 38, 69. </s> Nor is the "sharing" of facilities (e.g., the wire pairs) that this result embodies consistent with the competition that the Act was written to promote. That is because firms that share existing facilities do not compete in respect to the facilities that they share, any more than several grain producers who auction their grain at a single jointly owned market compete in respect to auction services. Cf. Iowa Utilities, supra, at 429 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("It is in the unshared, not in the shared, portions of the enterprise that meaningful competition would likely emerge"). Yet rules that combine a strong monetary incentive to share with a broad definition of "network element," see 47 C.F.R. §§51.319(f)-(g); Order ¶ ;413, will tend to produce widespread sharing of entire incumbent systems under regulatory supervision--a result very different from the competitive market that the statute seeks to create. See Iowa Utilities, supra, at 386-387 (affirming the Commission's broad definition of "network element"). At the least, those rules are inconsistent with the Commission's own view that they will sometimes "serve as a transitional arrangement until fledgling competitors could develop a customer base and complete the construction of their own networks." In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, ¶ ;6, 15 FCC Rcd. 3696 (1999) (Third Report & Order). Why, given the pricing rules, would those "fledgling competitors" ever try to fly on their own? </s> Second, what incentive would the Commission's rules leave the incumbents either to innovate or to invest in a new "element?" The rules seem to say that the incumbent will share with competitors the cost-reducing benefits of a successful innovation, while leaving the incumbent to bear the costs of most unsuccessful investments on its own. But see infra, at 14-15. Why would investment not then stagnate? See, e.g., T. Jorde, G. Sidak, & D. Teece, Innovation, Investment, and Unbundling, 17 Yale J. Reg. 1, 8 (2000) ("It makes no economic sense for the [incumbent] to invest in technologies that lower its own marginal costs, so long as competitors can achieve the identical cost savings by regulatory fiat"); J. Sidak & D. Spulber, Deregulation and Managed Competition in Network Industries, 15 Yale J. Reg. 117, 124-125 (1998) ("If deprived of a return to capital facilities after capital has been sunk in irreversible investments, or if faced with reduced returns to investments already made, any economically rational company will eliminate or reduce similar capital investments in the future"); Armstrong, AT&T Scoffs at Possible Common Carrier Status, Telecommunications Reports, Nov. 9, 1998 (Chief Executive Officer of AT&T, which here supports the Commission's regulations), cited in Huber 206, n. 611 ("`No company will invest billions of dollars ... if competitors who have not invested a penny of capital, nor taken an ounce of risk, can come along and get a free ride on the investments and risks of others'"). </s> I recognize that no regulator is likely to enforce the Commission's rules so strictly that investment literally slows to a trickle. Indeed, the majority cites figures showing that in the past several years new firms have invested $30 to $60 billion in local communications markets. See ante, at 46. We do not know how much of this investment represents facilities, say broadband, for which an incumbent's historical network offers no substitute. Nor do we know whether this number is small or large compared with what might have been. Compare Federal Communications Commission, Statistics of Common Carriers, 2000/2001 Edition, Table 2.7; Federal Communications Commission, Statistics of Common Carriers, 1999 Edition, Table 2.7; Federal Communications Commission, Statistics of Common Carriers, 1998 Edition, Table 2.7; Federal Communications Commission, Statistics of Common Carriers, 1997 Edition, Table 2.7 (incumbents' similar investment over the same period amounts to over $100 billion); compare Federal Communications Commission, Statistics of Common Carriers, 2000/2001 Edition, Table 2.9 (total depreciated investment plus working capital equals $220 billion); ante, at 45, 50 (new entrants' market share provided by entrants' own facilities alone is 3%). Regardless, given the incentives, this independent investment would seem to have been made despite the "start from scratch" rules, not because of them. At best, such statistics do no more than show that at least some of the coincidences I describe below have, happily for the Commission and the public alike, come to pass. See infra, at 17, 19, 24. </s> The critics mention several other problems as well. They say, for example, that the Commission's regulations will exacerbate the problem of "stranded costs"--i.e., the need for a once-regulated incumbent to recover its reasonable, but now technologically outdated, historical investment. See supra, at III-C. They add that the regulations will make nearly redundant the statute's provisions for "element" rates set through negotiation. See 47 U.S.C. §252(a)(1). After all, given the Commission's regulations, how much is there to negotiate about? The regulations entitle the new entrant to a price equal to, or lower than, the price to which any rational incumbent could agree. See Brief for United States in Mathias v. Worldcom Technologies, Inc. No. 00-878, O.T. 2001, p.18, n. 5 ("[A]sa practical matter" carriers have little incentive tonegotiate). </s> Nor, in the critics' view, do the regulations possess any offsetting advantages. They lack that ease of administration that led Justices Holmes and Brandeis to favor use (for ratesetting purposes) of an incumbent's historic costs despite their economic inaccuracy. See Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 262 U.S., at 292-296 (dissenting opinion); see also ante, at 9-11. The hypothetical nature of the Commission's system means that experts must estimate how imaginary firms would rebuild their systems from scratch--whether, for example, they (hypothetically) would receive permission to dig up streets, to maintain unsightly telephone poles, or to share their pole costs with other users, say, cable operators--and they must then estimate what would turn out to be most "efficient" in such (hypothetical) future circumstances. The speculative nature of this enterprise, the critics say, will lead to a battle of experts, each asking a commission to favor what can amount to little more than a guess. See Kahn 333, 334, n. 36, 335 (describing three models introduced in regulatory proceedings, one of which reduced all actual expenses by 27% because railroad regulation had brought similar efficiency gains, another of which assumed that all utilities, including electricity producers, would rebuild entire systems from scratch at the same time, and the third of which assumed New Hampshire's telecommunications system was administratively most efficient but then reduced its actual administrative expenses by 25%). These administrative difficulties seem far greater than any difficulty likely involved in an effort to determine an actual incumbent's actual (past or likely future) costs. See Affidavit of W. Baumol, J. Ordover, & R. Willig, Comments of AT&T Corp., CC Docket 96-98: In the Matter of Implementation of Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, ¶ ;25, (May 16, 1996), App. 67 (TELRIC's estimates "do not simply accept the architecture, sizing, technology, or operating decisions" of the incumbents "as bases for calculating" costs). Assumptions are inevitable. And the resulting uncertainties mean a somewhat random sort of rate that can either exacerbate the incentive problems previously mentioned or alleviate those problems by a kind of regulatory coincidence. See ante, at 51 (describing how state commissioners "customarily assig[n] rates based on some predictions from one model and others from its counterpart"). </s> IV </s> The criticisms described in Part III are serious, potentially severing any rational relation between the Commission's regulations and the statutory provision's basic purposes. State Farm, 463 U.S., at 56. Hence, the Commission's responses are important. Do those responses reduce the force of the criticisms, blunt their edges, or suggest offsetting virtues? I have found six major responses. But none of them is convincing. </s> First, the FCC points out that rates will include not only a charge reflecting hypothetical "most-efficient-firm" costs but also a depreciation charge--a charge that can reconcile a firm's initial historic investment, say, in equipment, and the equipment's current value, which diminishes over time. See Order ¶ ;686 ("[P]roperly designed depreciation schedules should account for expected declines in the value of capital goods"). If, for example, an incumbent's reasonable investment, measured actually and historically, came to $50 million, but FCC experts predict a "most-efficient-firm-building-from-scratch" future replication cost of $30 million, a depreciation charge could permit the incumbent to recoup the otherwise missing $20 million. And, in theory, a state commission might structure a potentially complex depreciation charge so as both to permit recovery of historic investment and also to offset many of the improper investment incentives described in Part II, supra. </s> This response, however, does not reflect what the Commission's regulations actually say. Those regulations say nothing about permitting recovery of reasonable historic investment nor about varying the charge to offset perverse investment incentives. Rather, they strongly indicate the opposite. They clearly require state commissions to use current depreciation rates right alongside the Commission's new and different "most-efficient-firm-building-from-scratch" charges. See Order ¶ ;702. They do create an exception from "current" rates. But to take advantage of that exception "incumbent LECs" have to bear the "burden of demonstrating with specificity that the business risks that they face in providing unbundled network elements and interconnection services would justify a different ... depreciation rate." Ibid. Unless the exception is to swallow the rule, the term "business risks" must refer to some special situation--not to the ordinary circumstance in which a new entrant simply asks to share an "element" at rates determined under Commission "most-efficient-firm" rules. In any event, that is how 24 state commissions have read the language. See 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review--Review of Depreciation Requirements for Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, 15 FCC Rcd. 242, ¶ ;69 (1999). And the FCC nowhere explicitly says to the contrary. Hence the FCC depreciation rules as written do not respond to the critics' claims in the ordinary case, nor do they otherwise transform its "most-efficient-firm-building-from-scratch" system into a system that reflects historic costs. </s> Second, the FCC points out that a state commission can adjust permissible profit rates. In theory, such an adjustment could offset many of the improper investment incentives described in Part II, supra. But, like the depreciation regulations, the profit regulations say nothing about the matter. Indeed, like the depreciation regulations, they suggest the opposite. The relevant FCC regulations say that "the currently authorized rate of return at the federal or state level is a reasonable starting point." Order ¶ ;702 (emphasis added). They, too, add an exception, available to "incumbent LEC's" that successfully "bear the burden of demonstrating with specificity that the business risks that they face in providing unbundled network elements and interconnection services would justify a different risk-adjusted cost of capital." Ibid. But this exception, like the depreciation exception, cannot respond to the critics' claims in the ordinary case for similar reasons. </s> The FCC adds that it did not have "time" to offer more than "tentative guidance," Reply Brief for Federal Parties 11-12, that profits now may be too high, Order ¶ ;702, and that the incumbents may find other ways to lower their capital costs, id., ¶ ;687. These additions, however, concede the critics' basic point--that the "profit" rules as written do not provide an answer to Part III's claims. Rather, considered as a response to those claims, they must rest upon no more than hope for a regulatory coincidence. Most significantly, they hope that current market conditions mean that current profit rates somehow magically offset the adverse effects of the Commission's other regulations, see Part III, supra. See Reply Affidavit of J. Hausman ¶ ; 9, n.8, submitted with Reply Comments of the United States Telcom Association, CC Docket No. 96-98 (FCC filed May 30, 1996), App. 197 (testifying for critics that profit rates would have to double or triple to secure investment). Compare G. Hubbard & W. Lehr, Capital Recovery Issues in TSLRIC Pricing: Response to Professor Jerry A. Hausman, (July 18, 1996), App. 216, 221 (arguing for FCC defenders that Hausman overstates the need for change, but stating that "[I]f any adjustments ... are required ... such adjustments would be modest"). And the majority relies on its belief that that hope has been realized. Ante, at 50 (stating that in light of the fact that "competition in fact has been slow to materialize," "it seems fair to say" that the current rate is a "`reasonable starting point"'). Of course, one must sympathize with the FCC's time problem. But the statute did not require the FCC so quickly to create so complex a system. Rather, the statute seems to foresee rates set, not by FCC regulations primarily or in detail, but by negotiations among the parties, 47 U.S.C. ¶ ;252(a)(1), if not by state commissions. See Iowa Utilities, 525 U.S., at 412-420 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). </s> Third, the Commission supports the reasonableness and practicality of its system with the claim that "a number of states" have used it successfully, as have several European nations. Order ¶ ;681. As to domestic experience, I can find no evidence that, prior to the promulgation of the rules at issue here, any State had successfully implemented the FCC's version of TELRIC. It is hardly surprising that since then several States have tried to apply it. Nor is it surprising that their implementation has produced criticisms similar to those made here. See, e.g., MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. GTE Northwest, Inc., 41 F.Supp. 2d 1157, 1168-1169, and n.7 (DC Ore. 1999) (discussing problems with the FCC's TELRIC). </s> And the "foreign nation" part of the Commission's claim rests only upon a 1997 European Community paper referring to a "best current practice" approach as a future goal. See Commission of the European Communities, Recommendation on Interconnection in a liberalised telecommunications market, C(97) 3148, §§3.3, 3.5 (Oct. 15, 1997), http://europa.eu.int / ISPO / infosoc / telecompolicy / en / r3148-en.htm (Feb. 25, 2002). Indeed, Britain's FCC counterpart has said that, in the absence of a showing of inefficiency, the incumbent's actual current expenditures on capacity additions should be used "as the starting point." See Office of Telecommunications (Oftel), Access to Bandwidth: Indicative prices and pricing principles ¶ ;9 (May 2000), http://www.oftel.gov.uk / publications / broadband / llu / llu0500.htm (Feb. 25, 2002). </s> In fact, as I understand the European system, it may turn out in practice to work roughly as follows: The relevant European regulatory agency, seeking competition, encourages new firms to enter local markets in order to provide new voice, data, text, picture, entertainment, or other communications service. Like the Commission, the agency normally has the authority to insist that an incumbent firm "unbundle," e.g., that it permit a new entrant to use its pair of twisted wires running from switching center to the inside of a house. It also has the authority to set prices. But in exercising that authority, it has neither required, nor is it likely to rely upon, any one rate-setting method. Rather, it may encourage negotiation among the parties in order to reach agreed-upon prices low enough to prevent the incumbent from blocking entry but high enough to encourage the new firm to consider other entry methods, such as use of electricity conduits, or new cables, where economically feasible. If no agreement can be reached, the regulator, in determining the price, can use formulas, modified to take proper account of depreciation and historical cost, or it can look to prices set in other European nations as a yardstick to help produce competition. </s> This less formal kind of "play it by ear" system, in my view, is what the statute before us intended. The Act provides for price negotiation among the parties, it brings in State regulators where necessary to break deadlocks, and it permits the States to use a variety of different rate-setting approaches, looking to experience in other States as appropriate, in order to determine proper prices. The mysterious statutory parenthetical phrase "(determined without reference to a rate-of-return or other rate-based proceeding)", §252(d)(1), makes sense from this point of view. It reflects Congress's desire to obtain, not perfect prices but speedy results. It specifies that States need not use formal methods, relying instead upon bargaining and yardstick competition. See Iowa Utilities, supra, at 424-425 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); cf. Order ¶ ;631 (describing how the New York Commission "se[t] prices on a case-by-case basis"). I recognize, however, that the FCC has rejected this approach in favor of extraordinarily complex national rate-setting standards, which we review only to determine whether they will further, or serve as obstacles to the competitive marketplace that the statute seeks. Fourth, the FCC adds that its system seeks to base rates on the costs a hypothetical "most efficient firm" hypothetically would incur were it "building from scratch." And such a system, in its view, will "simulate" or "best replicat[e], to the extent possible, the conditions of a competitive market." Order ¶ ;679; see also id., ¶ ;738. This response, however, does not do more than describe that very feature of the system upon which the critics focus their attack. </s> As I have previously said, supra, at 5-6, such an objective is perhaps consistent with an ordinary ratesetting statute that seeks only low prices. But the problem before us--that of a lack of "rational connection" between the regulations and the statute--grows out of the fact that the 1996 Act is not a typical regulatory statute asking regulators simply to seek low prices, perhaps by trying to replicate those of a hypothetical competitive market. Rather, this statute is a deregulatory statute, and it asks regulators to create prices that will induce appropriate new entry. See Part II, supra. That being so, we may assume, purely for argument's sake, that the FCC rules could successfully "replicate" the prices toward which perfectly efficient, perfectly competitive markets would tend. But see Kahn 326-327 (stating that such prices are never achieved in any actual market); A. Kahn, Whom the Gods Would Destroy, or How Not to Deregulate 4 (2001) (Lodged with the Clerk of this Court) (stating that a firm in an actual market would determine efficient investment in light of its actual system, not a hypothetical system built from scratch). Still, those rules, if successful, would produce the strong incentives to demand sharing, and the strong disincentives to build independently, that Part II describes--for they would create a "sharing" or "interconnection" price equal to or lower than any price associated with the creation of independent facilities. They would thereby tend towards a system in which regulatory price setting would supplant, not promote, competition. And however congenial institutional regulators might find such a system, it differs dramatically from the system that the statute seeks to bring about. See Part II, supra. Cf. Iowa Utilities, supra, at 387-392 (setting aside Commission rules granting new entrants power to obtain access to virtually any existing element). At least that is the claim that underlies much of the criticism set forth in Part III, supra. And the Commission's response that its system simulates the conditions of a competitive market does not respond to that basic criticism. </s> Fifth, the Commission says that its regulations are simply suggestive, leaving States free to depart. Reply Brief for Federal Parties 11-12. The short but conclusive answer to this response is that the Commission considered a "suggestive" approach and rejected it. See Order ¶ ;66 (refusing to characterize rules as setting forth, not "requirements," but "`preferred outcomes,'" because the latter approach "would fail to establish explicit national standards for arbitration, and would fail to provide sufficient guidance to the parties' options in negotiations"). </s> Sixth, the majority (but not the Commission) points out that local commissions are likely to leave any given set of rates in effect for some period of time. And this "regulatory lag" will solve the problem. See ante, at 33-34. I do not understand how it could solve the main problem--that of leading new entrants to lease a more costly incumbent "element" where building or buying independently could prove less costly. See supra, at 11-13. Nor, given any new entrant's legal right to obtain a regulator's decision, am I certain that lags will prove significant. But, in any event, lags will differ, depending upon regulator, time, and circumstance, thereby introducing a near random element that might, or might not, ameliorate the system's otherwise adverse effects. </s> In sum, neither the Commission's nor the majority's responses are convincing. </s> V </s> Judges have long recognized the difficulty of reviewing the substance of highly technical agency decision making. Compare Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 66 (CADC 1976) (en banc) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) ("[T]he best way for courts to guard against unreasonable ... administrative decisions is not . . . themselves to scrutinize the technical merits . . . [but to] establish a decision-making process that assures a reasoned decision") (internal quotation marks omitted), with id., at 69 (Leventhal, J., concurring) (stating that judges must assure, on substantive review, "conformance to statutory standards and requirements of rationality," acquiring "whatever technical background is necessary"). This Court has emphasized the limitations the law imposes upon judges' authority to insist upon special agency procedures. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 543-548 (1978). But it has also made clear that judges nonetheless must review for rationality the substance of agency decisions, including technical decisions. State Farm, 463 U.S., at 56. That review requires agencies to undertake the difficult task of translating technical matters into language that judges can understand and preparing technical responses to challenges of the sort found here. But, despite the difficulty, review by generalist judges is important, both because technical agency decisions are often of great importance to the general public and because the law forbids agencies, in the name of technical expertise, to wrest themselves free of public control. </s> Agencies are, of course, expert in technical areas. That is why Judge Leventhal wrote that "the judges," when reviewing the rationality of substantive decisions, "must act with restraint." Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d, at 69. And I agree. But, he added, judges may not "abstain from any substantive review." Id., at 68. And again I agree. In this case, the critics' claims are strong. They suggest that the FCC's pricing rule, together with its original "forced leasing" twin, see Iowa Utilities, supra at 388-392 (finding original leasing rule unlawful), would bring about, not the competitive marketplace that the statute demands, but a highly regulated marketplace characterized by widespread sharing of facilities with innovation and technological change reflecting mandarin decision-making through regulation rather than decentralized decision-making based on the interaction of freely competitive market forces. And the Commission's replies are unsatisfactory. The majority nonetheless finds the Commission's pricing rules reasonable. As a regulatory theory, that conclusion might be supportable. But under this deregulatory statute, it is not. Under these circumstances, it would amount to abstention from, indeed abdication of, "rational basis" review, were I to agree that the record here demonstrates the "rational connection" between regulations and statutory purpose upon which the law insists. State Farm, supra, at 56; Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A); see also State Farm, supra, at 43 ("[W]e may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency's action that the agency itself has not given"). As Judge Leventhal properly put it, "Restraint, yes, abdication, no." Ethyl Corp., supra, at 69. The Court, of course, with 69 pages of careful analysis, does not abdicate its reviewing responsibility; but for the reasons stated here I cannot agree with its substantive conclusion. Consequently, I would affirm the Eighth Circuit's determination that the regulations are unlawful. </s> VI </s> I disagree with the majority about one further legal issue. The statute imposes upon an incumbent the </s> "duty to provide ... for the provision of a telecommunications service, nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled basis ... in a manner that allows requesting carriers to combine such elements in order to provide such telecommunications service." 47 U.S.C. §251(c)(3) (emphasis added). </s> The FCC, pointing to this provision, has said that (upon request) incumbents must themselves combine, among other things, elements that are ordinarily not combined. Rules 315(c)-(f), 47 CFR §§51.315(c)-(f) (2000). How, the incumbents ask, can a statute that speaks of the requesting carriers combining elements, grant the FCC authority to insist that they, the incumbents, combine the elements? </s> In Iowa Utilities, supra, the Court found authority for a somewhat similar rule--a rule that forbids incumbents to uncombine elements ordinarily found in combination. But, as the majority recognizes, ante, at 64, that different rule rests upon a rationale absent here. If an incumbent takes apart elements that it ordinarily keeps together, it is normally discriminating against the requesting carriers. And the statutory provision forbids discrimination. But here the incumbent simply keeps apart elements that it ordinarily keeps apart in the absence of a new entrant's demand. How does that discriminate? And if it does not discriminate, where does this statutory provision give the FCC authority to forbid it? </s> I cannot find the statutory authority. And I consequently would affirm the lower court on the point. </s> For these reasons, I dissent. </s> FOOTNOTES Footnote * </s> Together with No. 00-555, WorldCom, Inc., etal. v. Verizon Communications Inc. etal., No. 00-587, Federal Communications Commission etal. v. Iowa Utilities Board etal., No. 00-590, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board etal., and No. 00-602, General Communications, Inc. v. Iowa Utilities Board etal., also on certiorari to the same court. </s> FOOTNOTES Footnote * </s> *Justice Scalia joins Part III of this opinion. Justice Thomas joins Parts III and IV. </s> Footnote 1 </s> Section 252(d) separately provides for ratesetting with respect to reciprocal compensation for interconnected facilities, §252(d)(2), and resale, §252(d)(3). </s> Footnote 2 </s> Nationalization, the historical policy choice for regulation of telephone service in many other countries, was rejected in the United States. Cohen, The Telephone Problem and the Road to Telephone Regulation in the United States, 1876-1917, 3 J. of Policy History 42, 46, 55-56, 65 (1991) (hereinafter Cohen); S.Vogel, Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial Countries 26-27 (1996). </s> Footnote 3 </s> The first noteworthy federal rate-regulation statute was the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 379, which was principally concerned with railroad rates but generally governed all interstate rates. It was the model for subsequent federal public-utility statutes like the Federal Power Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 1063, the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, the Natural Gas Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 821, and the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973. The Communications Act of 1934 created the FCC and was the first statute to address interstate telephone regulation in an independent and substantive way. Federal regulation in the area had previously been undertaken incidentally to general interstate carrier regulation under the Interstate Commerce Act. The Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, 36 Stat. 539, was the earliest federal statute prescribing rates for interstate and foreign telephone and telegraph carriers, as part of revisions to railroad rates set by the Interstate Commerce Commission. See R.Vietor, Contrived Competition: Regulation and Deregulation in America 171 (1994) (hereinafter Vietor). </s> Footnote 4 </s> And the Court had no doubt who should make the sacrifice in that situation. "`If a corporation cannot maintain such a highway and earn dividends for stockholders, it is a misfortune for it and them which the Constitution does not require to be remedied by imposing unjust burdens upon the public.'" Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S., at 545 (citation omitted). </s> Footnote 5 </s> One of the referents of value that did prove possible was current replacement or reproduction cost, a primitive version of the criterion challenged in this case. See McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400, 417 (1926); Goddard, The Problem of Valuation: The Evolution of Cost of Reproduction as the Rate Base, 41 Harv. L.Rev. 564, 570-571 (1928). </s> Footnote 6 </s> The fair-value concept survived to some degree in the "used and useful" qualification to the prudent-investment rule, that a utility can only recover prudently invested capital that is being "used and useful" in providing the public a good or service. For example, the Pennsylvania rate statute upheld in Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989), provided that capital invested with prudence at the time but rendered useless by unforeseen events would not be recoverable through regulated rates, just as it would be worthless in terms of market value. Id., at 311-312, n.7 ("The loss to utilities from prudent ultimately unsuccessful investments under such a system is greater than under a pure prudent investment rule, but less than under a fair value approach"). </s> Footnote 7 </s> Operating cash, inventory, and accounts receivable constitute typical current assets. Current liabilities consist of accounts payable, such as taxes, wages, rents, interest payable, and short-term debt. Because, for example, accounts receivable may not be collected until after liabilities come due, working capital is capital needed to pay current liabilities in the interim. Z.Bodie & R.Merton, Finance 427 (prelim. ed. 1998). </s> Footnote 8 </s> For example, in 1997, regulated incumbent local-exchange carriers had an average depreciation cycle of 14.4 years for their assets (an average depreciation cost of $127 per line as against gross plant investment of $1,836 per line), roughly twice as long as the average cycle of 7.4 years for unregulated competitive carriers like Worldcom. Weingarten & Stuck, Rethinking Depreciation, 28 Business Communications Review 63 (Oct. 1998). </s> Footnote 9 </s> In a competitive market, a company may not simply raise prices as much as it may need to compensate for poor investments (say, in a plant that becomes unproductive) because competitors will then under-sell the company's goods. See N.Mankiw, Principles of Economics 308-310 (1998) (hereinafter Mankiw). </s> Footnote 10 </s> Some loop lines employ coaxial cable and fixed wireless technologies, but these constitute less than 1 percent of the total number of reported local-exchange lines in the United States. FCC, Local Telephone Competition: Status as of June 30, 2001 (Feb. 27, 2002) (table 5). </s> Footnote 11 </s> A mininetwork connecting only some of the users in the local exchange would be of minimal value to customers, and, correspondingly, any value to customers would be exponentially increased with the interconnection of more users to the network. See generally W.Arthur, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy 1-12 (1994). </s> Footnote 12 </s> Title 47 U.S.C. §253(a) (1994 ed., Supp.V) provides: </s> "No State or local statute or regulation, or other State or local legal requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service." </s> Footnote 13 </s> "Network element" is defined as "a facility or equipment used in the provision of a telecommunications service. Such term also includes features, functions, and capabilities that are provided by means of such facility or equipment, including subscriber numbers, databases, signaling systems, and information sufficient for billing and collection or used in the transmission, routing, or other provision of a telecommunications service." §153(29). </s> Footnote 14 </s> Section 252(a) provides: </s> "(a) Agreements arrived at through negotiation </s> "(1) Voluntary negotiations </s> "Upon receiving a request for interconnection, services, or network elements pursuant to section 251 of this title, an incumbent local exchange carrier may negotiate and enter into a binding agreement with the requesting telecommunications carrier or carriers without regard to the standards set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 251 of this title. The agreement shall include a detailed schedule of itemized charges for interconnection and each service or network element included in the agreement. The agreement, including any interconnection agreement negotiated before February 8, 1996, shall be submitted to the State commission under subsection (e) of this section." </s> Footnote 15 </s> Rates for wholesale purchases of telecommunications services are covered separately, and must be based on the incumbent's retail rates. §252(d)(3). </s> Footnote 16 </s> The actual TELRIC rate charged to an entrant leasing the element would be a fraction of the TELRIC figure, based on a "reasonable projection" of the entrant's use of the element (whether on a flat or per-usage basis) as divided by aggregate total use of the element by the entrant, the incumbent, and any other competitor that leases it. 47 CFR §51.511 (1997). See also First Report and Order ¶ ;682. </s> Footnote 17 </s> Nor is it possible to argue that "cost" would have to mean past incurred cost if the technical context were economics. See D.Carlton & J.Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization 50-74 (2d ed. 1994) (hereinafter Carlton & Perloff). "Sunk costs" are unrecoverable past costs; practically every other sort of economic "cost" is forward looking, or can be either historical or forward looking. "Opportunity cost," for example, is "the value of the best forgone alternative use of the resources employed," id., at 56, and as such is always forward looking. See Sidak & Spulber, Tragedy of the Telecommons: Government Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 97 Colum. L.Rev. 1081, 1093 (1997) (hereinafter Sidak & Spulber,Telecommons) ("Opportunity costs are ... by definition forward-looking"). </s> Footnote 18 </s> See, e.g., Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc. v. United Distribution Cos., 498 U.S. 211, 224-225 (1991); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. ICC, 744 F.2d 185, 193-194 (CADC 1984); Alabama Elec. Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 684 F.2d 20, 27 (CADC 1982). Cf.National Assn. of Greeting Card Publishers v. Postal Service, 462 U.S. 810, 832 (1983). </s> Footnote 19 </s> The incumbents make their own plain-language argument based on statutory context, relying on the part of §252(d)(1)(B) which provides that a just and reasonable rate "may include a reasonable profit." They say that because separate provision is made in §252(d)(1)(A) for factoring "cost" into the rate, "reasonable profit" may only be understood as income above recovery of the actual cost of an incumbent's investment. But as the FCC has noted, "profit" may also mean "normal" profit, which is "the total revenue required to cover all of the costs of a firm, including its opportunity costs." First Report and Order ¶ ;699, and n.1705 (citing D.Pearce, MIT Dictionary of Modern Economics 310 (1994)). That is to say, a "reasonable profit" may refer to a "normal" return based on "the cost of obtaining debt and equity financing" prevailing in the industry. First Report and Order ¶ ;700. This latter sense of "cost" (and accordingly "reasonable profit") is fully incorporated in the FCC's provisions as to "risk-adjusted cost of capital," namely, that "States may adjust the cost of capital if a party demonstrates ... that either a higher or a lower level of cost of capital is warranted, without . . conducting a `rate-of-return or other rate based proceeding.'" Id., ¶ ;702. </s> Footnote 20 </s> While Justice Breyer does not explicitly challenge the propriety of Chevron deference, he relies on our decision in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 56 (1983), to argue that the FCC's choice of TELRIC bears no "rational connection" to the Act's deregulatory purpose. See post, at 4, 17. State Farm involved review of an agency's "changing its course" as to the interpretation of a statute, 463 U.S., at 42; this case, by contrast, involves the FCC's first interpretation of a new statute, and so State Farm is inapposite to the extent that it may be read as prescribing more searching judicial review under the circumstances of that case. (Indeed, State Farm may be read to suggest the obverse conclusion, that the FCC would have had some more explaining to do it if had not changed its course by favoring TELRIC over forward-looking methodologies tethered to actual costs, given Congress's clear intent to depart from past ratesetting statutes in passing the 1996 Act.) </s> But even on Justice Breyer's own terms, FCC rules stressing low wholesale prices are by no means inconsistent with the deregulatory and competitive purposes of the Act. As we discuss below, a policy promoting lower lease prices for expensive facilities unlikely to be duplicated reduces barriers to entry (particularly for smaller competitors) and puts competitors that can afford these wholesale prices (but not the higher prices the incumbents would like to charge) in a position to build their own versions of less expensive facilities that are sensibly duplicable. See n.27, infra. See also infra, at 44-45 (discussing FCC's objection to Ramsey pricing). And while it is true, as Justice Breyer says, that the Act was "deregulatory," in the intended sense of departing from traditional "regulatory" ways that coddled monopolies, see supra, at 16 (remarks of Sen.Breaux), that deregulatory character does not necessarily require the FCC to employ passive pricing rules deferring to incumbents' proposed methods and cost data. On the contrary, the statutory provisions obligating the incumbents to lease their property, §251(c)(3), and offer their services for resale at wholesale rates, §251(c)(4), are consistent with the promulgation of a ratesetting method leaving state commissions to do the work of setting rates without any reliance on historical-cost data provided by incumbents. </s> Footnote 21 </s> "Marginal cost" is "the increase in total cost [of producing goods] that arises from an extra unit of production." See Mankiw 272; see also id., at 283-288, 312-313; Carlton & Perloff 51-52. </s> Footnote 22 </s> The Michigan state commission's September 1994 order implementing a long-run incremental cost method for leasing local-exchange network elements, which the FCC considered, see First Report and Order ¶ ;631, and n. 1508, makes this limitation more explicit by specifying that rates are to be set based on the costs of elements using the most efficient technology "currently available for purchase." Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Re A Methodology to Determine Long Run Incremental Cost, 156 P.U.R. 4th 1, 7, 13 (1994). </s> Footnote 23 </s> Justice Breyer characterizes these built-in inefficiencies as well as provisions for state-commission discretion as to permitted costs of depreciation and capital, see Part III-B-2-a-(2), infra, as "coincidences" that have favored considerable competitive investment by sheer luck. See post, at 15. He thus shares the assumption of an efficient market made by the incumbents in their argument, and like the incumbents, dismisses departures from the theoretical assumption of a perfectly competitive market as inconsistencies rather than pragmatic recognitions. The FCC is, of course, under no obligation to adopt a ratesetting scheme committed to realizing perfection in economic theory, see First Report and Order ¶ ;683 (rejecting pricing premised on a fully "hypothetical least-cost most efficient network"). </s> Footnote 24 </s> Justice Breyer proposes a "less formal kind of `play it by ear' system" based on recent European Community practices as yet another alternative, see post, at 21; but the incumbents do not appear to have advocated such an informal ratesetting scheme to the FCC, see First Report and Order ¶ ;¶ ;630-671, nor have they argued for this alternative before this Court. And to the extent that Justice Breyer's proposal emphasizes state commissions' discretion to vary rates according to local circumstances and the particulars of each case, this is a feature that is already built into TELRIC. See infra, at 48-49. </s> Footnote 25 </s> In the long run, "all of a firm's costs become variable or avoidable." First Report and Order ¶ ;677. See also Kahn, Telecommunications Act 326 ("[A]ll costs are variable and minimized"). In general, the costs of producing a good include variable and fixed costs. Variable costs depend on how much of a good is produced, like the cost of copper to make a loop which rises as the loop is made longer; fixed costs, like rent, must be paid in any event without regard to how much is produced. See Carlton & Perloff 51-56. The long run is a time frame of sufficient duration that a company has no fixed costs of production. </s> Footnote 26 </s> The argument that rates incorporating fixed costs are necessary to avoid an unconstitutional taking is taken up in Part III-C, infra. Indeed, the expert literature the incumbents rely on to advocate fixed-cost ratesetting systems, see infra, at 42-44, do so almost exclusively on the premise of averting unwanted confiscation, and thus offer little support for the incumbents' argument that recovery of fixed costs isa better way to spur competition (as opposed to compensatingincumbents). </s> Footnote 27 </s> Justice Breyer may be right that "firms that share existing facilities do not compete in respect to the facilities that they share," post, at 13, (at least in the near future), but this is fully consistent with the FCC's point that entrants may need to share some facilities that are very expensive to duplicate (say, loop elements) in order to be able to compete in other, more sensibly duplicable elements (say, digital switches or signal-multiplexing technology). In other words, Justice Breyer makes no accommodation for the practical difficulty the FCC faced, that competition as to "unshared" elements may, in many cases, only be possible if incumbents simultaneously share with entrants some costly-to-duplicate elements jointly necessary to provide a desired telecommunications service. Such is the reality faced by the hundreds of smaller entrants (without the resources of a large competitive carrier such as AT&T or Worldcom) seeking to gain toeholds in local-exchange markets, see FCC, Local Telephone Competition: Status as of June 30, 2001, p.4, n.13. (Feb. 27, 2002) (485 firms self-identified as competitive local-exchange carriers). Justice Breyer elsewhere recognizes that the Act "does not require the new entrant and incumbent to compete in respect to" elements, the "duplication of [which] would prove unnecessarily expensive," post, at 8. It is in just this way that the Act allows for an entrant that may have to lease some "unnecessarily expensive" elements in conjunction with building its own elements to provide a telecommunications service to consumers. In this case, low prices for the elements to be leased become crucial in inducing the competitor to enter and build. Cf. First Report and Order ¶ ;630 (wholesale prices should send "appropriate signals"). </s> Footnote 28 </s> That is to say, if the entrant could offer a telecommunications service at a lower retail price, competitors including the incumbent would have to match that price by looking into ways to reduce their marginal costs, and the incumbents' recalibrated costs would form the basis of new lease rates. </s> Footnote 29 </s> In theory, embedded cost could be lower than efficient cost, see Brief for Respondent Federal Parties 17, n. 8 (though the incumbents, understandably, do not avail themselves of this tack); in which case the goal of efficient competition would be set back for the different reason of too much market entry. </s> Footnote 30 </s> "We find that the parenthetical, `(determined without reference to a rate-of-return or other rate-based proceeding),' does not further define the type of costs that may be considered, but rather specifies a type of proceeding that may not be employed to determine the cost of interconnection and unbundled network elements." First Report and Order ¶ ;704 (footnote omitted). </s> Footnote 31 </s> The parenthetical provision that "cost" for ratemaking purposes must be "determined without reference to a rate-of-return or other rate-based proceeding," 47 U.S.C. §252(d)(1)(A)(i), was in the Senate version of the 1996 Act, but not in the House version. S. 652, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., §251(d)(6)(A) (1995) ("[T]he charge ... (A) shall be (i) based on the cost (determined without reference to a rate-of-return or other rate-based proceeding) of providing the unbundled element ..."). Both the Senate and House bills contained additional language that was not enacted to the effect that "rate of return regulation" would be "eliminated" or prescribing its "abolition." S. 652, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., §301(a)(3) (1995) provided: </s> "Rate of Return Regulation Eliminated-- </s> "(A) In instituting the price flexibility required under paragraph (1) the Commission and the States shall establish alternative forms of regulation for Tier 1 telecommunications carriers that do not include regulation of the rate of return earned by such carrier ...." </s> H.R. 1555, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., §248(b) (1995) stated: </s> "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, to the extent that a carrier has complied with sections 242 and 244 of this part, the Commission, with respect to rates for interstate or foreign communications, and State commissions, with respect to rates for intrastate communications, shall not require rate-of-return regulation." </s> The Commission inferred from the omission of the express prohibitions that Congress intended to forbid a "type of proceeding" not a method. This was a reasonable inference in light of the common practice of setting wholesale rates by contracts incorporating retail rates set in state rate-of-return proceedings, see, e.g., Boston Edison Co. v. FERC, 233 F.3d 60, 62, and n. 1 (CA1 2000), though not the only one: Congress may, for example, have balked at limiting state regulation at such a level of specificity. Less plausible is Justice Breyer's interpretation of the statutory language, as "reflect[ing] Congress' desire to obtain, not perfect prices but speedy results," post, at 22; he concludes that the provision "specifies that States need not use formal methods, relying instead upon bargaining and yardstick competition," ibid. Section 252(d)(1), however, specifies how a state commission should set rates when an incumbent and an entrant fail to reach a bargain, §252(a)(2); it seems strange, then, to read the statutory prohibition as affirmatively urging more bargaining and regulatory flexibility, rather than as firing a warning shot to state commissions to steer clear of entrenched practices perceived to perpetuate incumbent monopolies. </s> Footnote 32 </s> ECPR advocates have since responded that the FCC was wrong to assume a static tether to uncompetitive retail prices, because ECPR, properly employed, would dynamically readjust the opportunity-cost factor as retail prices drop. Sidak & Spulber, Telecommons 1097-1098. But this would not cure the distortions caused by passing any difference between retail price and most efficient cost back to the incumbents as a lease premium. </s> Footnote 33 </s> Nor, for that matter, does the evidence support Justice Breyer's assertion that TELRIC will stifle incumbents' "incentive... either to innovate or to invest" in new elements. Post, at 14. As Justice Breyer himself notes, incumbents have invested "over $100 billion" during the same period. Post, at 15. The figure affirms the commonsense conclusion that so long as TELRIC brings about some competition, the incumbents will continue to have incentives to invest and to improve their services to hold on to their existing customer base. </s> Footnote 34 </s> The incumbents also contend that underdepreciation, i.e., book values in excess of the economic value of assets, is another reason for increasing depreciation costs under TELRIC. Brief for Petitioners in No.00-511, pp.4-5. This argument is unpersuasive. As we have described, underdepreciation (to the extent of its continuation today, which the Government disputes, Brief for Respondent Federal Parties 38-39) was undertaken largely by the incumbents themselves, not forced upon them by regulators, as a means to keep the rate base inflated under the public-utility model of regulation. See supra, at 13-14, 27. For all we know, the incumbent carriers may yet be seeking low rates of depreciation in state retail-rate proceedings still conducted under that model, even as they seek high depreciation rates here today to factor into the wholesale prices they may charge for the same elements they use to provide retail services. In short, the incumbents have already benefited from underdepreciation in the calculation of retail rates, and there is no reason to allow them further recovery through wholesale rates. </s> Footnote 35 </s> Justice Breyer makes much of the availability of new technologies, specifically, the use of fixed wireless and electrical conduits, see post, at 12; but the use of wireless technology in local-exchange markets is negligible at present (36,000 lines in the entire Nation, less than 0.02 percent of total lines, FCC, Local Telephone Competition: Status as of June 30, 2001 (Feb. 27, 2002) (table 5)), and the FCC has not reported any use whatsoever of electrical conduits to provide local telecommunications service. </s> Footnote 36 </s> The Court upheld a Pennsylvania statute barring rate recovery of capital prudently invested in canceled power plants because the "overall impact of the rate orders," which allowed returns on common equity of 16 percent and overall returns of 11 to 12 percent, was not "constitutionally objectionable." 488 U.S., at 312; see also id., at 314 ("`It is not theory, but the impact of the rate order which counts'") (quoting Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S., at 602). The utilities in Duquesne, like the incumbents here, made "[n]o argument ... that ... reduced rates jeopardize the financial integrity of the companies, either by leaving them insufficient operating capital or by impeding their ability to raise future capital." 488 U.S., at 312. Nor did they show that allowed rates were "inadequate to compensate current equity holders for the risk associated with their investments under a modified prudent investment scheme." Ibid. </s> Footnote 37 </s> Justice Scalia, joined by Justice White and Justice O'Connor, concurred, and noted that "all prudently incurred investment may well have to be counted" to determine "whether the government's action is confiscatory." Id., at 317. </s> Footnote 38 </s> The incumbents make the additional argument that it was arbitrary or capricious for the FCC to reject historical costs, Brief for Petitioners in No. 00-511, pp. 44-49, but this is simply a restatement of the argument that the FCC was unreasonable in interpreting §252(d)(1) to foreclose the use of historical cost in ratesetting, which we have already addressed, see Part III-B-2, supra. </s> Footnote 39 </s> In fact, the FCC's order is more hospitable to early taking claims than any court would be under Duquesne: "Incumbent LECs may seek relief from the Commission's pricing methodology, if they provide specific information to show that the pricing methodology, as applied to them, will result in confiscatory rates." First Report and Order ¶ ;739. The FCC, in other words, is willing to consider a challenge to TELRIC in advance of a rate order, but any challenger needs to go beyond general criticism of a method's tendency, and to show with "specific information" that a confiscatory rate is bound to result. Additionally, as the FCC has acknowledged, the smallest, rural incumbent local-exchange carriers most likely to suffer immediately from the imposition of unduly low rates are expressly exempt from the TELRIC pricing rules under 47 U.S.C. §252(f)(1), see First Report and Order ¶ ;706, and other rural incumbents may obtain exemptions from the rules by applying to their state commissions under §252(f)(2). </s> Footnote 40 </s> AT&T did not raise the issue in the relevant petition for certiorari as it claims. See Pet. for Cert. in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., O.T. 1998, No.97-826, pp.9-10, 13. </s> Footnote 41 </s> See Order in Iowa Utilities Bd. v. FCC, No. 96-3321, etc. (CA8, June 10, 1999), pp.2-3 ("The briefs should also address whether or not, in light of the Supreme Court's decision, this court should take any further action with respect to ... §315(c)-(f)"). </s> Footnote 42 </s> Under Rules 315(e)-(f), an incumbent that denies a requested combination has the burden to prove technical infeasibility or to show how the combination would impede others' access. </s> Footnote 43 </s> "An incumbent LEC shall make available without unreasonable delay to any requesting telecommunications carrier any individual interconnection, service, or network element arrangement contained in any agreement to which it is a party that is approved by a state commission pursuant to section 252 of the Act, upon the same rates, terms, and conditions as those provided in the agreement." 47 CFR §51.809(a) (1997).

United States Supreme Court OWEN v. OWEN(1991) No. 89-1008 Argued: November 5, 1990Decided: May 23, 1991 </s> The Bankruptcy Code allows States to define what property is exempt from the estate that will be distributed among the debtor's creditors. The Florida Constitution provides a homestead exemption, which the state courts have held inapplicable to liens that attach before the property in question acquires its homestead status. Petitioner purchased his Florida condominium in 1984 subject to respondent's preexisting judgment lien, and the property first qualified as a homestead under a 1985 amendment to the State's homestead law. After petitioner filed a chapter 7 petition for bankruptcy in 1986, the Bankruptcy Court, inter alia, sustained his claimed homestead exemption in the condominium, but subsequently denied his postdischarge motion to avoid respondent's lien pursuant to Code 522(f). The District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that, since the lien had attached before the condominium qualified for the homestead exemption, the property was not exempt under state law. </s> Held: </s> 1. Judicial liens can be eliminated under 522(f) even though the State has defined the exempt property in such a way as specifically to exclude property encumbered by such liens. The section provides, inter alia, that "the debtor may avoid the fixing of a [judicial] lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under," in effect, 522(d), which lists federal exemptions, or under state law. At first blush, respondent's argument seems entirely reasonable that her lien does not "impair" petitioner's Florida homestead exemption within the meaning of 522(f) because the exemption is not assertable against preexisting judicial liens, and that permitting avoidance of the lien would not preserve the exemption, but expand it. However, this result has been widely and uniformly rejected by federal bankruptcy courts with respect to federal exemptions under 522(d). To determine the application of 522(f), those courts ask not whether the lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor is in fact entitled, but whether it impairs an exemption to which he would have been entitled but for the lien itself. This approach, which gives meaning to the phrase "would have been entitled" in the applicable text, is correct. A different approach cannot be adopted [500 U.S. 305, 306] for state exemptions, in light of the equivalency of treatment accorded to federal and state exemptions by 522(f). Pp. 308-314. </s> 2. This Court expresses no opinion on, and leaves for the Court of Appeals to resolve in the first instance, the questions whether respondent's lien can be said to have "impair[ed] an exemption to which [petitioner] would have been entitled" at the time the lien was fixed, in light of the fact that petitioner did not yet have a homestead interest; whether the lien in fact fixed "on an interest of the debtor" if, under state law, it attached simultaneously with petitioner's acquisition of his property interest; and whether the Florida statute extending the homestead exemption was retroactive. P. 314. </s> 877 F.2d 44, reversed and remanded. </s> SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 314. </s> Roger L. Fishell argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the breifs was Isidore Kirshenbaum. </s> Timothy B. Dyk argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was David A. Townsend. </s> JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The Bankruptcy Code allows the States to define what property a debtor may exempt from the bankruptcy estate that will be distributed among his creditors. 11 U.S.C. 522(b). The Code also provides that judicial liens encumbering exempt property can be eliminated. 522(f). The question in this case is whether that elimination can operate when the State has defined the exempt property in such a way as specifically to exclude property encumbered by judicial liens. </s> I </s> In 1975, Helen Owen, the respondent, obtained a judgment against petitioner Dwight Owen, her former husband, for approximately $160,000. The judgment was recorded in Sarasota County, Florida, in July, 1976. Petitioner did not at that time own any property in Sarasota County, but under [500 U.S. 305, 307] Florida law, the judgment would attach to any after-acquired property recorded in the county. B.A. Lott, Inc. v. Padgett, 153 Fla. 304, 14 So.2d 667 (1943). In 1984, petitioner purchased a condominium in Sarasota County; upon acquisition of title, the property became subject to respondent's judgment lien. Porter-Mallard Co. v. Dugger, 117 Fla. 137, 157 So. 429 (1934). </s> One year later, Florida amended its homestead law so that petitioner's condominium, which previously had not qualified as a homestead, thereafter did. Under the Florida Constitution, homestead property is "exempt from forced sale . . . and no judgment, decree or execution [can] be a lien thereon . . .," Fla. Const., Art. 10, 4(a). The Florida courts have interpreted this provision, however, as being inapplicable to preexisting liens, i.e., liens that attached before the property acquired its homestead status. Bessemer v. Gersten, 381 So.2d 1344, 1347, n. 1 (Fla. 1980); Aetna Ins. Co. v. LaGasse, 223 So.2d 727, 728 (Fla. 1969); Pasco v. Harley, 73 Fla. 819, 824-825, 75 So. 30, 32-33 (1917); Volpitta v. Fields, 369 So.2d 367, 369 (Fla. App. 1979); Lyon v. Arnold, 46 F.2d 451, 452 (CA5 1931). Preexisting liens, then, are in effect an exception to the Florida homestead exemption. </s> In January, 1986, petitioner filed for bankruptcy under chapter 7 of the Code, and claimed a homestead exemption in his Sarasota condominium. The condominium, valued at approximately $135,000, was his primary asset; his liabilities included approximately $350,000 owed to the respondent. The bankruptcy court discharged petitioner's personal liability for these debts, and sustained, over respondent's objections, his claimed exemption. </s> The condominium, however, remained subject to respondent's preexisting lien, and after discharge, petitioner moved to reopen his case to avoid the lien pursuant to 522(f)(1). The Bankruptcy Court refused to decree the avoidance; the District Court affirmed, finding that the lien had attached [500 U.S. 305, 308] before the property qualified for the exemption, and that Florida law therefore did not exempt the lien encumbered property. 86 B.R. 691 (MD Fla. 1988). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on the same ground. 877 F.2d 44 (1989). We granted certiorari. 495 U.S. 929 (1990). </s> II </s> An estate in bankruptcy consists of all the interests in property, legal and equitable, possessed by the debtor at the time of filing, as well as those interests recovered or recoverable through transfer and lien avoidance provisions. An exemption is an interest withdrawn from the estate (and hence from the creditors) for the benefit of the debtor. Section 522 determines what property a debtor may exempt. Under 522(b), he must select between a list of federal exemptions (set forth in 522(d)) and the exemptions provided by his State, "unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor . . . specifically does not so authorize," 522(b)(1) - that is, unless the State "opts out" of the federal list. If a State opts out, then its debtors are limited to the exemptions provided by state law. Nothing in subsection (b) (or elsewhere in the Code) limits a State's power to restrict the scope of its exemptions; indeed, it could theoretically accord no exemptions at all. </s> Property that is properly exempted under 522 is (with some exceptions) immunized against liability for prebankruptcy debts. 522(c). No property can be exempted (and thereby immunized), however, unless it first falls within the bankruptcy estate. Section 522(b) provides that the debtor may exempt certain property "from property of the estate"; obviously, then, an interest that is not possessed by the estate cannot be exempted. Thus, if a debtor holds only bare legal title to his house - if, for example, the house is subject to a purchase-money mortgage for its full value - then only that legal interest passes to the estate; the equitable interest remains with the mortgage holder, 11 U.S.C. 541(d). And since the [500 U.S. 305, 309] equitable interest does not pass to the estate, neither can it pass to the debtor as an exempt interest in property. Legal title will pass, and can be the subject of an exemption; but the property will remain subject to the lien interest of the mortgage holder. This was the rule of Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617 (1886), codified in 522. Only where the Code empowers the court to avoid liens or transfers can an interest originally not within the estate be passed to the estate, and subsequently (through the claim of an exemption) to the debtor. </s> It is such an avoidance provision that is at issue here, to which we now turn. Section 522(f) reads as follows: </s> "(f) Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is - </s> "(1) a judicial lien; or </s> "(2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest. . . ." </s> The lien in the present case is a judicial lien, and we assume without deciding that it fixed "on an interest of the debtor in property." See Farrey v. Sanderfoot, ante, p. 291. The question presented by this case is whether it "impairs an exemption to which [petitioner] would have been entitled under subsection (b)." Since Florida has chosen to opt out of the listed federal exemptions, see Fla.Stat. 222.20 (1989), the only subsection (b) exemption at issue is the Florida homestead exemption described above. Respondent suggests that, to resolve this case, we need only ask whether the judicial lien impairs that exemption. It obviously does not, since the Florida homestead exemption is not assertable against preexisting judicial liens. To permit avoidance of the lien, respondent urges, would not preserve the exemption, but would expand it. [500 U.S. 305, 310] </s> At first blush, this seems entirely reasonable. Several Courts of Appeals in addition to the Eleventh Circuit here have reached this result with respect to built-in limitations on state exemptions, 1 though others have rejected it. 2 What must give us pause, however, is that this result has been widely and uniformly rejected with respect to built-in limitations on the federal exemptions. Most of the federally listed exemptions (set forth in 522(d)) are explicitly restricted to the "debtor's aggregate interest" or the "debtor's interest" up to a maximum amount. See 522(d)(1)-(6), (8). If respondent's approach to 522(f) were applied, all of these exemptions (and perhaps others as well) 3 would be limited by unavoided encumbering liens, see 522(c). The federal homestead exemption, for example, allows the debtor to exempt from the property of the estate "the debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $7,500 in value, in . . . a residence." 522(d)(1). If respondent's interpretation of 522(f) were applied to this exemption, a debtor who owned a house worth $10,000 that was subject to a judicial lien for $9,000 would not be entitled to the full homestead exemption of $7,500. The judicial lien would not be avoidable under 522(f), since it does not "impair" the exemption, which is limited to the debtor's "aggregate interest" of $1,000. The uniform practice of bankruptcy courts, however, is to the contrary. To determine the application of 522(f), they ask not whether the lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor is in fact entitled, but whether it impairs an exemption [500 U.S. 305, 311] to which he would have been entitled but for the lien itself. 4 </s> As the preceding italicized words suggest, this reading is more consonant with the text of 522(f) - which establishes as the baseline, against which impairment is to be measured, not an exemption to which the debtor "is entitled," but one to which he "would have been entitled." The latter phrase denotes a state of affairs that is conceived or hypothetical, rather than actual, and requires the reader to disregard some element of reality. "Would have been" but for what? The answer given, with respect to the federal exemptions, has been but for the lien at issue, and that seems to us correct. </s> The only other conceivable possibility is but for a waiver - harking back to the beginning phrase of 522(f), "Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions. . . ." The use of contrary-to-fact construction after a "notwithstanding" phrase is not, however, common usage, if even permissible. Moreover, though one might employ it when the "notwithstanding" phrase is the main point of the provision in question [500 U.S. 305, 312] ("Notwithstanding any waiver, a debtor shall retain those exemptions to which he would have been entitled under subsection (b)"), it would be most strange to employ it where the "notwithstanding" phrase, as here, is an aside. The point of 522(f) is not to exclude waivers (though that is done in passing, waivers are addressed directly in 522(e)), but to provide that the debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien. In that context, for every instance in which "would have been entitled" may be accurate (because the incidentally mentioned waiver occurred), there will be thousands of instances in which "is entitled" should have been used. It seems to us that "would have been entitled" must refer to the generality, if not indeed the universality, of cases covered by the provision; and on that premise, the only conceivable fact we are invited to disregard is the existence of the lien. </s> This reading must also be accepted, at least with respect to the federal exemptions, if 522(f) is not to become an irrelevancy with respect to the most venerable, most common and most important exemptions. The federal exemptions for homesteads ( 522(d)(1)), for motor vehicles ( 522(d)(2)), for household goods and wearing apparel ( 522(d)(3)), and for tools of the trade ( 522(d)(6)), are all defined by reference to the debtor's "interest" or "aggregate interest," so that, if respondent's interpretation is accepted, no encumbrances of these could be avoided. Surely 522(f) promises more than that - and surely it would be bizarre for the federal scheme to prevent the avoidance of liens on those items, but to permit it for the less crucial items (for example, an "unmatured life insurance contract owned by the debtor," 522(d)(7)) that are not described in such fashion as unquestionably to exclude liens. </s> We have no doubt, then, that the lower courts' unanimously agreed-upon manner of applying 522(f) to federal exemptions - ask first whether avoiding the lien would entitle the debtor to an exemption, and if it would, then avoid [500 U.S. 305, 313] and recover the lien - is correct. 5 The question then becomes whether a different interpretation should be adopted for State exemptions. We do not see how that could be possible. Nothing in the text of 522(f) remotely justifies treating the two categories of exemptions differently. The provision refers to the impairment of "exemption[s] to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b)," and that includes federal exemptions and state exemptions alike. Nor is there any overwhelmingly clear policy impelling us, if we possessed the power, to create a distinction that the words of the statute do not contain. Respondent asserts that it is inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code's "opt-out" policy, whereby the States may define their own exemptions, to refuse to take those exemptions with all their built-in limitations. That is plainly not true, however, since there is no doubt that a state exemption which purports to be available "unless waived" will be given full effect, even if it has been waived, for purposes of 522(f) - the first phrase of which, as we have noted, recites that it applies "[n]otwithstanding any waiver of exemptions." See Dominion Bank of Cumberlands, NA v. Nuckolls, 780 F.2d 408, 412 (CA4 1985). Just as it is not inconsistent with the policy of permitting state-defined exemptions to have another policy disfavoring waiver of exemptions, whether federal- or state-created, so also it is not inconsistent to have a policy disfavoring the impingement of certain types of liens upon exemptions, whether federal- or state-created. We have no basis for pronouncing the opt-out policy absolute, but must apply it along with whatever other competing or limiting policies the statute contains. </s> On the basis of the analysis we have set forth above with respect to federal exemptions, and in light of the equivalency of treatment accorded to federal and State exemptions by 522(f), we conclude that Florida's exclusion of certain liens from the scope of its homestead protection does not achieve a [500 U.S. 305, 314] similar exclusion from the Bankruptcy Code's lien avoidance provision. 6 </s> III </s> The foregoing conclusion does not necessarily resolve this case. Section 522(f) permits the avoidance of the "fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor." Some courts have held it inapplicable to a lien that was already attached to property when the debtor acquired it, since in such a case there never was a "fixing of a lien" on the debtor's interest. See In re McCormick, 18 B.R. 911, 914 (Bkrtcy.Ct.WD Pa.), aff'd, 22 B.R. 997 (WD Pa. 1982); In re Scott, 12 B.R. 613, 615 (Bkrtcy. Ct. WD Okla. 1981). Under Florida law, the lien may have attached simultaneously with the acquisition of the property interest. If so, it could be argued that the lien did not fix "on an interest of the debtor." See Farrey v. Sanderfoot, ante, p. 291. The Court of Appeals did not pass on this issue, nor on the subsidiary question of whether the Florida statute extending the homestead exemption was a taking, cf. United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982). We express no opinion on these points, and leave them to be considered by the Court of Appeals on remand. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 See In re Pine, 717 F.2d 281 (CA6 1983); In re McManus, 681 F.2d 353 (CA5 1982). </s> [Footnote 2 See In re Brown, 734 F.2d 119 (CA2 1984); Dominion Bank of Cumberlands, NA v. Nuckolls, 780 F.2d 408 (CA4 1985); In re Thompson, 750 F.2d 628 (CA8 1984); In re Leonard, 866 F.2d 335 (CA10 1989). </s> [Footnote 3 Exemption (7) refers to a life insurance contract "owned" by the debtor, and exemptions (10) and (11) refer to various benefits, awards and payments that the debtor has a "right to receive." 522(d)(7), (10), (11). Only exemption (9), 522(d)(9), contains no language arguably excluding property subject to lien. </s> [Footnote 4 See, e.g., In re Simonson, 758 F.2d 103, 105 (CA3 1985), In re Brantz, 106 B.R. 62, 68 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ED Pa. 1989); In re Carney, 47 B.R. 296, 299 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Mass. 1985), In re Losieniecki, 17 B.R. 136, 138 (Bkrtcy. Ct. WD Pa. 1981). See also 3 Collier on Bankruptcy § 522.29 (15th ed. 1990); B. Weintraub & A. Resnick, Bankruptcy Law Manual § 4.082. (1986), Bowmar, Avoidance of Judicial Liens that Impair Exemptions in Bankruptcy: The Workings of 11 U.S.C. 522(f)(1), 63 Am. Bankr. L.J. 375, 387-388, and n. 85 (1989) (hereinafter Bowmar). Some courts have held that 522(f) allows the avoidance of liens even when, after the avoidance, there would be no debtor's interest in the property to which a 522(d) exemption could attach. See, e.g., In re Richardson, 55 B.R. 526 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ND Ohio 1985); In re Chesanow, 25 B.R. 228, 231 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Conn. 1982). But see, e.g., In re Hooper, 60 B.R. 640, 641 (Bkrtcy. Ct. WD Pa. 1986); In re Barone, 31 B.R. 540 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ED Pa. 1983). Today's opinion does not speak to this issue. Finally, at least one court has suggested that equity excluding the liens is required for there to be an "interest" within the scope of 522(f), In re Miller, 8 B.R. 43 (Bkrtcy. Ct. WD Mo. 1980), but that position has been rejected. In re Cole, 15 B.R. 322, 323, n. 1 (Bkrtcy. Ct. WD Mo. 1981). </s> [Footnote 5 For a more precise formulation, see In re Brantz, 106 B.R. at 68; In re Carney, 47 B.R. at 299; Bowmar 388-392. </s> [Footnote 6 In the dissent's view, the question is whether the lien impairs an "exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled at the time the lien `fixed'." Post at 317. Under the Code, however, the question is whether the lien impairs an "exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b)," and under subsection (b), exempt property is determined "on the date of the filing of the petition," not when the lien fixed. 11 U.S.C. 522(f), (b)(2)(A). We follow the language of the Code. </s> JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. </s> The Court's analysis puts the cart before the horse. As I read the statute at issue, it is not necessary to reach the issue [500 U.S. 305, 315] the majority addresses. In construing the lien avoidance provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, it is important to recognize a distinction between two classes of cases: those in which the lien attached to the exempt property before the debtor had any right to claim an exemption and those in which the lien attached after the debtor acquired that right. This case falls in the former category. As I shall explain, I believe it was correctly decided by the Bankruptcy Court, the District Court, and the Court of Appeals, and that the judgment should be affirmed. </s> I </s> The facts raise a straight forward issue: whether the lien avoidance provisions in 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 522(f) 1 apply to a judicial lien that attached before the debtor had any claim to an exemption. It is undisputed that respondent's judicial lien attached to petitioner's Sarasota condominium when he acquired title to the property in November, 1984. It is also undisputed that the petitioner was not entitled to a homestead exemption when he acquired title because he was single. At that time, the exemption was available only to a "head of a household" under Article 10, 4 of the Florida Constitution. An amendment that became effective in 1985 broadened the exemption to extend to "a natural person." Fla. Const., Art. 10, 4. On the effective date of this amendment, petitioner became entitled to the homestead exemption at issue in this case. 2 Thus, it is undisputed that the petitioner had an exemption on his condominium when he filed his bankruptcy petition in 1986, but did not [500 U.S. 305, 316] have a right to that exemption in 1984, when respondent's judicial lien attached. </s> As I read the text of 522(f), it does not authorize the avoidance of liens that were perfected at a time when the debtor could not claim an exemption in the secured property. The Bankruptcy Code deals with the subject of exemptions in two separate provisions that are relevant to this case. The first of these provisions, 522(b), identifies property that is exempt from the claims of general creditors. 3 Focusing on the legal interests in the property at the time of the bankruptcy, this section identifies property that is exempt from the bankrupt estate, and therefore cannot be sold by the trustee to satisfy the claims of general creditors. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, pp. 360-361 (1977); S. Rep. No. 95-989, pp. 75-76 (1978). In this case, petitioner's condominium in Sarasota, Florida was entitled to a homestead exemption as a matter of Florida law when he filed for bankruptcy and therefore was properly excluded from the estate. See 877 F.2d 44, 45 (CA11 1989). The property was fully protected from the claims of general creditors by the operation of 522(b). </s> The second provision that is relevant to this suit, 522(f), is concerned with the priority of secured creditors, not the [500 U.S. 305, 317] claims of general creditors. Section 522(f) establishes a rule of priority between the debtor's legal interest and creditors' security interests in exempt property as opposed to the property of the estate. The statute establishes the priority by allowing the debtor to avoid the fixing of judicial liens and certain nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interests under the right circumstances to the extent that they encumber the exemption. </s> As it applies to judicial liens, 522(f) raises two questions: (1) whether the exemption provides a basis for avoidance of the lien; and (2) if so, to what extent should the lien be avoided? The first question concerns the relative priority of conflicting claims on the same asset; on such issues, the timing of the claims is often decisive. The second question - I shall call it the "impairment question" - concerns the distribution of the proceeds of sale after the issue of priority has been resolved. This second question need not be reached unless the first question has been answered positively. </s> In determining whether the exemption provides a basis for avoiding the lien, 522(f) turns our attention towards the exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled at the time the lien "fixed." In United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982), this Court was presented with the question whether applying 522(f)(2) to avoid nonpossessory liens perfected before the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 would be a taking of property without compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. The Court avoided deciding that precise question by holding that 522(f) did not apply retroactively to liens that had been perfected before the Bankruptcy Reform Act was enacted. Although there is no such constitutional question presented here, Security Industrial Bank establishes that the critical date for determining whether a lien may be avoided under the statute is the date of the fixing of that lien. [500 U.S. 305, 318] </s> The date of the fixing of the respondent's lien on petitioner's condominium is therefore controlling in this case. Because it is undisputed that petitioner was not entitled to an exemption when the lien attached, the subsequently acquired exemption does not provide a basis for avoidance of the respondent's lien. 4 Thus, the priority question in this case was correctly decided by the Court of Appeals, and its judgment should be affirmed. </s> II </s> The Court frames the question it decides as whether the lien avoidance provisions in 522(f) "can operate when the State has defined the exempt property in such a way as specifically to exclude property encumbered by judicial liens." Ante at 306. That is an accurate description of the issue that has arisen in cases concerning the avoidability of nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money liens on household goods. See cases cited ante at 310, nn. 1 and 2. 5 In each of those cases, the State's definition of the exemption purported to [500 U.S. 305, 319] exclude property interests that were subject to otherwise avoidable liens under 522(f). Thus, the State's definition of the exemption itself defeated the purpose of the federal lien avoidance provisions by narrowing the category of exempt property. 6 </s> The majority and dissenting opinions in In re McManus, 681 F.2d 353 (CA5 1982), adequately identify the issue to which the Court's opinion today is addressed. In that case, a finance company (AVCO) held a promissory note secured by a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in the form of a chattel mortgage on some of the debtor's household goods and furnishings. The debtors sought to avoid AVCO's lien under 522(f) on the ground that their household goods and furniture were exempted under 522(b). The Bankruptcy Court and the District Court refused to avoid the lien. The Court of Appeals, following the reasoning of the Bankruptcy Court, affirmed. 7 Louisiana had established a homestead exemption for certain household goods and furniture. Yet it had also explicitly established in a separate code provision that, notwithstanding its definitions of homestead exemptions, any household goods or furniture encumbered by a mortgage are not exempt property. The majority of the Court of Appeals held that the liens were not avoidable, because the State of Louisiana had utilized its authority under 522(b) to define its exemptions to exclude household goods [500 U.S. 305, 320] subject to mortgages; hence, the liens did not impair an exemption to which the debtors would have been entitled under 522(b). </s> Under my reading of 522(f), the Court of Appeals erred because it focused its attention entirely on the situation at the time of the bankruptcy. If it had analyzed the case by noting that at the time AVCO's lien attached, the debtors were already entitled to an exemption, it should have concluded that the lien was avoidable. The dissenting judge came to that conclusion by correctly recognizing that the statutory text evidences an intent to consider the situation at the time of attachment. He wrote: </s> "The opening phrase of 522(f), "[n]otwithstanding any waiver of exemptions," indicates that the subsection's import is to return the situation to the status quo ante i.e., prior to any improvident waiver of any exemption by the debtor. When the debtors entered the creditors' office, they enjoyed an exemption under Louisiana law from seizure and sale of their household goods; and when they left the office, they could no longer claim an exemption for those goods solely because they had improvidently granted a security interest to the creditors covering such goods. I fail to see how this could be characterized as anything but a waiver of exemptions, subject to the avoiding power found in 522(f)." Id., at 358. 8 </s> [500 U.S. 305, 321] </s> Although the Court's opinion today resolves the question that was presented in McManus by adopting the position of the dissent in McManus, I disagree with the Court's reasoning. The Court simply overlooks the fact that, for purposes of determining whether a lien is avoidable - rather than for the purpose of determining the extent to which the lien should be avoided - the question whether the debtor "would have been entitled" to an exemption is addressed to the state of affairs that existed at the time the lien attached. </s> Finally, I must comment on the Court's conclusion "that Florida's exclusion of certain liens from the scope of its homestead protection does not achieve a similar exclusion from the Bankruptcy Code's lien avoidance provision." Ante at 313-314. This statement treats Florida's refusal to apply its broadened homestead exemption retroactively as the equivalent of Louisiana's narrowing definition of its household goods exemption to exclude properties subject to a chattel mortgage. The conclusion is flawed. Petitioner would not have been entitled to a homestead exemption at the time respondent's judicial lien attached; for that reason, the lien avoidance provisions in 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code are not applicable. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. </s> [Footnote 1 Section 522(f) provides: </s> "(f) Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is - </s> "(1) a judicial lien; or </s> "(2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest. . . . </s> [Footnote 2 The amendment was adopted in November, 1984, but became effective on January 8, 1985. See Fla. Const., Art. 11, 5. </s> [Footnote 3 Section 522(b) provides, in relevant part: </s> "Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may exempt from property of the estate the property listed in either paragraph (1) or, in the alternative, paragraph (2) of this subsection. </s> . . . . . </s> "Such property is - </s> "(1) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section, unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor under paragraph (2)(A) of this subsection specifically does not so authorize; or, in the alternative, </s> "(2)(A) any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than subsection (d) of this section, or State or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition at the place in which the debtor's domicile has been located for the 180 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition, or for a longer portion of such 180-day period than in any other place;. . . ." </s> [Footnote 4 I recognize that, in reading the text of 522(f), it is possible to find ambiguity in the timing issue from the placement of the phrase "under subsection (b) of this section." As I understand the interaction between 522(b) and 522(f), however, those words merely define the exempt property for the purposes of determining the priorities between the debtor and secured creditors - namely the kinds of exemptions that may justify an avoidance. The fact that 522(b) itself refers to the status of the lien at the time of bankruptcy for the purpose of identifying the property as exempt from the claims of general creditors is simply irrelevant to the priority question posed under 522(f). The Court's statement, ante at 314, n. 6, that "[w]e follow the language of the Code" ignores this point, ignores our holding in United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982), and ignores our holding in Farrey v. Sanderfoot, ante, p. 291. </s> [Footnote 5 Two of these cases, however, do address different issues. In re Brown, 734 F.2d 119 (CA2 1984) involved a judicial lien. In that case, the issue was whether the debtor could avoid a judicial lien on his homestead after a foreclosure sale where New York law did not allow an exemption on the proceeds of a foreclosure sale. In re Thompson, 750 F.2d 628 (CA8 1984), was concerned with the issue of whether a debtor could avoid a lien on a Nebraska exemption on livestock under 522(f)(2). </s> [Footnote 6 In this case, in contrast, Florida's definition of its household exemption excluded petitioner's property because it was not used as a family residence at the time his former spouse's lien attached. The subsequent broadening of Florida's homestead exemption was not even arguably intended to protect the interest of lienholders or to defeat the purposes of the federal lien avoidance provisions. </s> [Footnote 7 Another case with similar facts, Blazer Financial Services v. Gipson, was consolidated with In re McManus before the Court of Appeals. The debtors were a married couple who had filed a petition in bankruptcy and sought to avoid a finance company's nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in their household goods. See 681 F.2d, at 355. </s> [Footnote 8 Judge Dyer buttressed his conclusion by reference to the legislative history: </s> "This is clearly indicated in S. Rep. No. 95-989 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 76, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1978, pp. 5787, 5862: </s> "`[To] protect the debtors' exemptions, his discharge, and thus his fresh start, . . . [t]he debtor may avoid . . . to the extent that the property could have been exempted in the absence of the lien . . . a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in certain household and personal goods.' </s> "Thus, it was Congress's clear intent that a debtor benefit to the fullest extent possible exemptions granted to him by applicable state laws, even when he may have improvidently waived such exemptions. It is equally clear that Congress was particularly concerned with eradicating certain unconscionable [500 U.S. 305, 321] creditor practices in the consumer loan industry." In re McManus, 681 F.2d, at 358. </s> [500 U.S. 305, 322]

United States Supreme Court LUTWAK v. UNITED STATES(1953) No. 66 Argued: Decided: February 9, 1953 </s> Petitioners were convicted of a conspiracy to defraud the United States by obtaining the illegal entry thereto of three aliens as spouses of honorably discharged veterans. They had conspired to have three such veterans journey to Paris, there go through marriage ceremonies with three aliens, bring them to the United States, and obtain their entry under the War Brides Act. The parties to the marriages were not to live together as husband and wife and were to take whatever legal steps were necessary to sever the legal ties; but these facts were to be concealed from the immigration authorities. Held: </s> 1. For the purposes of this case, the question of the validity of the marriages is immaterial. Pp. 610-613. </s> 2. In the circumstances of this case, the trial court did not err in permitting the "wives" to testify against their "husbands." Pp. 613-615. </s> 3. It was not error for the trial court to admit testimony as to various acts of different petitioners, done after the conspiracy ended, without limiting the evidence to the particular defendant who performed the act, where the acts were relevant to show the spuriousness of the marriages and the intent of the parties in going through the marriage ceremonies. Pp. 615-618. </s> 4. On the record in this case, the admission against all of the conspirators, though not present when it was made, of a single declaration made after the conspiracy had ended was harmless error under Rule 52 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Pp. 618-620. </s> 195 F.2d 748, affirmed. </s> The Court of Appeals affirmed petitioners' conviction of a conspiracy to defraud the United States. 195 F.2d 748. This Court granted certiorari. 344 U.S. 809 . Affirmed, p. 620. [344 U.S. 604, 605] </s> Anthony Bradley Eben argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Richard F. Watt and Joseph L. Nellis. </s> Marvin E. Frankel argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Stern, Assistant Attorney General Murray, Beatrice Rosenberg and J. F. Bishop. </s> MR. JUSTICE MINTON delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The petitioners, Marcel Max Lutwak, Munio Knoll, and Regina Treitler, together with Leopold Knoll and Grace Klemtner, were indicted on six counts in the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. The first count charged conspiracy to commit substantive offenses set forth in the remaining five counts and conspiracy "to defraud the United States of and concerning its governmental function and right of administering" the immigration laws and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, by obtaining the illegal entry into this country of three aliens as spouses of honorably discharged veterans. Grace Klemtner was dismissed from the indictment before the trial because her constitutional rights had been violated before the grand jury. At the conclusion of all the evidence, the District Court dismissed the substantive counts against all of the defendants because venue had not been shown in the Northern District of Illinois. The jury acquitted Leopold Knoll and convicted the the three petitioners on the conspiracy count. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 195 F.2d 748, and we granted certiorari, 344 U.S. 809 . </s> We are concerned here only with the conviction of the petitioners of the alleged conspiracy. Petitioner Regina Treitler is the sister of Munio Knoll and Leopold Knoll, [344 U.S. 604, 606] and the petitioner Lutwak is their nephew. Munio Knoll had been married in Poland in 1932 to one Maria Knoll. There is some evidence that Munio and Maria were divorced in 1942, but the existence and validity of this divorce are not determinable from the record. At the time of the inception of the conspiracy, in the summer of 1947, Munio, Maria and Leopold were refugees from Poland, living in Paris, France, while Regina Treitler and Lutwak lived in Chicago, Illinois. Petitioner Treitler desired to get her brothers into the United States. </s> Alien spouses of honorably discharged veterans of World War II were permitted to enter this country under the provisions of the so-called War Brides Act which provides in pertinent part: </s> ". . . notwithstanding any of the several clauses of section 3 of the Act of February 5, 1917, excluding physically and mentally defective aliens, and notwithstanding the documentary requirements of any of the immigration laws or regulations, Executive orders, or Presidential proclamations issued thereunder, alien spouses or alien children of United States citizens serving in, or having an honorable discharge certificate from the armed forces of the United States during the Second World War shall, if otherwise admissible under the immigration laws and if application for admission is made within three years of the effective date of this Act, be admitted to the United States . . . ." 59 Stat. 659, 8 U.S.C. 232. </s> The first count of the indictment charged that the petitioners conspired to have three honorably discharged veterans journey to Paris and go through marriage ceremonies with Munio, Leopold and Maria. The brothers [344 U.S. 604, 607] and Maria would then accompany their new spouses to the United States and secure entry into this country by representing themselves as alien spouses of World War II veterans. It was further a part of the plan that the marriages were to be in form only, solely for the purpose of enabling Munio, Leopold and Maria to enter the United States. The parties to the marriages were not to live together as husband and wife, and thereafter would take whatever legal steps were necessary to sever the legal ties. It was finally alleged that the petitioners conspired to conceal these acts in order to prevent disclosure of the conspiracy to the immigration authorities. </s> The conspiracy to commit substantive offenses consisted in that part of the plan by which each of the aliens was to make a false statement to the immigration authorities by representing in his application for admission that he was married to his purported spouse, and to conceal from the immigration authorities that he had gone through a marriage ceremony solely for the purpose of gaining entry into this country with the understanding that he and his purported spouse would not live together as man and wife, but would sever the formal bonds of the ostensible marriage when the marriage had served its fraudulent purpose. </s> The statute defining conspiracy reads as follows: </s> "If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such parties do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." 18 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) 88, now 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 371. [344 U.S. 604, 608] </s> The sections of the statute which it was alleged the petitioners conspired to violate provide in pertinent part: </s> "Any alien who hereafter enters the United States at any time or place other than as designated by immigration officials or eludes examination or inspection by immigration officials, or obtains entry to the United States by a willfully false or misleading representation or the willful concealment of a material fact, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than one year or by a fine of not more than $1,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment." 45 Stat. 1551, 8 U.S.C. 180a. </s> "Whoever knowingly makes under oath any false statement in any application, affidavit, or other document required by the immigration laws or regulations prescribed thereunder, shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both." 43 Stat. 153, 165, 8 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) 220 (c), now 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1546. </s> From the evidence favorable to the Government, the jury could reasonably have believed that the following acts and transactions took place, and that the petitioners conspired to bring them about. Lutwak, a World War II veteran, was selected to marry Maria Knoll, his aunt by marriage. He went to Paris where he went through a marriage ceremony with Maria. They traveled to the United States, entering the port of New York on September 9, 1947. They represented to the immigration authorities that Maria was the wife of Lutwak, and upon that representation Maria was admitted. They never lived together as man and wife, and within a few months Munio and Maria commenced living together in this [344 U.S. 604, 609] country as man and wife, holding themselves out as such. Lutwak, in the meantime, represented himself to friends as an unmarried man. Lutwak and Maria were divorced on March 31, 1950. </s> Lutwak and Mrs. Treitler also found two women - Bessie Benjamin Osborne and Grace Klemtner - who were honorably discharged veterans of World War II, and who were willing to marry Munio and Leopold so that the brothers could come to the United States. Bessie Osborne was introduced to Treitler by Lutwak, and went to Paris accompanied by Treitler. There she went through a pretended marriage ceremony with Munio Knoll, and on their arrival at New York City, Munio was admitted on November 13, 1947, on the representation that he was married to Bessie Osborne. The marriage was never consummated and was never intended to be. The parties separated after entering the United States, and they never lived together as husband and wife at any time. Bessie Osborne's suit for divorce from Munio was pending at the time of the trial. </s> Still later, Grace Klemtner, who was also a World War II veteran and an acquaintance of Regina Treitler, went to Paris and went through a pretended marriage ceremony with Leopold. They then traveled to the United States, where Leopold was admitted on December 5, 1947, upon the representation that he was the husband of Grace Klemtner. They immediately separated after their entry into this country, and they never lived together as husband and wife at any time until about the time Grace Klemtner appeared before the grand jury which returned the indictment. This was approximately April 1, 1950, more than two years after the marriage ceremony in Paris. Bessie Osborne and Grace Klemtner received a substantial fee for participating in these marriage ceremonies. </s> There is an abundance of evidence in this record of a conspiracy to contract spurious, phony marriages for the [344 U.S. 604, 610] purposes of deceiving the immigration authorities and thereby perpetrating a fraud upon the United States, and of a conspiracy to commit other offenses against the United States. </s> Petitioners present three principal contentions: (1) Their conspiracy was not unlawful because the marriages involved were valid marriages; (2) the trial court erred in permitting the ostensible wives of these marriages to testify against their so-called husbands; and (3) the trial court erred in admitting testimony of various acts and declarations of different petitioners, done and said after the conspiracy had ended, without limiting the evidence to the particular defendant who performed the act or made the statement. </s> I. </s> At the trial, it was undisputed that Maria, Munio and Leopold had gone through formal marriage ceremonies with Lutwak, Bess Osborne and Grace Klemtner, respectively. Petitioners contended that, regardless of the intentions of the parties at the time of the ceremonies, the fact that the ceremonies were performed was sufficient to establish the validity of the marriages, at least until the Government proved their invalidity under French law. They relied on the general American rule of conflict of laws that a marriage valid where celebrated is valid everywhere unless it is incestuous, polygamous, or otherwise declared void by statute. See Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 223 ; Restatement, Conflict of Laws, 121, 132-134. Neither side presented any evidence of the French law, and the trial court ruled that in the absence of such evidence, the French law would be presumed to be the same as American law. The court later instructed the jury that "if the subjects agree to a marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with the understanding that they will put an end to [344 U.S. 604, 611] it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they have never really agreed to be married at all." The petitioners claim that the trial court erred in presuming that the French law relating to the validity of marriages is the same as American law, and they further contend that even under American law these marriages are valid. </s> We do not believe that the validity of the marriages is material. No one is being prosecuted for an offense against the marital relation. We consider the marriage ceremonies only as a part of the conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit offenses against the United States. In the circumstances of this case, the ceremonies were only a step in the fraudulent scheme and actions taken by the parties to the conspiracy. By directing in the War Brides Act that "alien spouses" of citizen war veterans should be admitted into this country, Congress intended to make it possible for veterans who had married aliens to have their families join them in this country without the long delay involved in qualifying under the proper immigration quota. Congress did not intend to provide aliens with an easy means of circumventing the quota system by fake marriages in which neither of the parties ever intended to enter into the marital relationship; that petitioners so believed is evidenced by their care in concealing from the immigration authorities that the ostensible husbands and wives were to separate immediately after their entry into this country and were never to live together as husband and wife. The common understanding of a marriage, which Congress must have had in mind when it made provision for "alien spouses" in the War Brides Act, is that the two parties have undertaken to establish a life together and assume certain duties and obligations. Such was not the case here, or so the jury might reasonably have found. Thus, when one of the aliens stated that he was married, and omitted to explain the true nature of his marital [344 U.S. 604, 612] relationship, his statement did, and was intended to, carry with it implications of a state of facts which were not in fact true. </s> Because the validity of the marriages is not material, the cases involving so-called limited-purpose marriages, 1 cited by petitioners to support their contention that the marriages in the instant case are valid, are inapplicable. All of those cases are suits for annulment in which the court was requested to grant relief to one of the parties to a marriage on the basis of his own admission that the marriage had been a sham. Where the annulment was denied, one or more of the following factors influenced the court: (1) A reluctance to permit the parties to use the annulment procedure as a quick and painless substitute for divorce, particularly because this might encourage people to marry hastily and inconsiderately; (2) a belief that the parties should not be permitted to use the courts as the means of carrying out their own secret schemes; and (3) a desire to prevent injury to innocent third parties, particularly children of the marriage. These factors have no application in the circumstances of the instant case. Similarly inapplicable are the cases where a marriage was entered into in order to render the wife incompetent to testify against her husband in a pending trial, because in none of those cases was it proved that the parties to the marriage did not intend to enter into the marital relationship in good faith. 2 Much more closely related is the case of United States v. Rubenstein, 151 F.2d 915, 918-919, in which the court held that where [344 U.S. 604, 613] two persons entered into a marriage solely for the purpose of facilitating the woman's entry into this country, and with no intention by either party to enter into the marriage relationship as it is commonly understood, for the purposes of that case they were never married at all. In the instant case, as in the Rubenstein case, there was no good faith - no intention to marry and consummate the marriages even for a day. With the legal consequences of such ceremonies under other circumstances, either in the United States or France, we are not concerned. </s> II. </s> Much of the evidence of the conspiracy comes from the lips of the so-called wives of these spurious marriages. The next question with which we are confronted is whether these so-called wives are competent to testify against their purported husbands in this criminal prosecution and thus incriminate the so-called husbands. </s> Civil marriage ceremonies were entered into by the parties in Paris as above indicated. Must these ostensible marriages be recognized as creating spouses in order that the marital relationship may be claimed to prevent the wives from testifying against the husbands? At common law the wife could testify neither for nor against her husband in a criminal case, but since Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 , the wife may testify in favor of the husband. </s> A review in the Funk case of the cases in this Court revealed the inconsistencies of the rule which made a wife incompetent to testify on behalf of her husband, and this Court resolved the question in favor of competency. The Funk case left the rules of evidence as to the competency of witnesses to be formulated by the federal courts or Congress in accordance with reason and experience. Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 12 . [344 U.S. 604, 614] There followed the promulgation by this Court of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads as follows: </s> "RULE 26. EVIDENCE. </s> ". . . The admissibility of evidence and the competency and privileges of witnesses shall be governed, except when an act of Congress or these rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience." </s> This rule was a paraphrase of Mr. Justice Stone's statement in Wolfle, at 12. </s> Under this rule, the competency of witnesses is to be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts in the light of reason and experience. The governing principles are not necessarily as they had existed at common law. Congress has not acted, and has specifically authorized this Court to prescribe rules of criminal procedure, but the rules do not specifically answer the problem here. Therefore, it is open to us to say whether we shall go further and abrogate this common-law rule disqualifying one spouse from testifying in criminal cases against the other spouse. </s> When the good faith of the marital relation is pertinent and it is made to appear to the trial court, as it was here, that the relationship was entered into with no intention of the parties to live together as husband and wife but only for the purpose of using the marriage ceremony in a scheme to defraud, the ostensible spouses are competent to testify against each other. Here again, we are not concerned with the validity or invalidity of these so-called marriages. We are concerned only with the application of a common-law principle of evidence to the circumstances of this case. In interpreting the common law in this instance, we are to determine whether [344 U.S. 604, 615] "in the light of reason and experience" we should interpret the common law so as to make these ostensible wives competent to testify against their ostensible husbands. The reason for the rule at common law disqualifying the wife is to protect the sanctity and tranquility of the marital relationship. It is hollow mockery for the petitioners in arguing for the policy of the rule to invoke the reason for the rule and to say to us "the husband and wife have grown closer together as an emotional, social, and cultural unit" and to speak of "the close emotional ties between husband and wife" and of "the special protection society affords to the marriage relationship." In a sham, phony, empty ceremony such as the parties went through in this case, the reason for the rule disqualifying a spouse from giving testimony disappears, and with it the rule. </s> "It has been said so often as to have become axiomatic that the common law is not immutable but flexible, and by its own principles adapts itself to varying conditions." Funk v. United States, supra, at 383. </s> The light of reason and experience do not compel us to so interpret the common law as to disqualify these ostensible spouses from testifying in this case. We therefore hold that in the circumstances of this case, the common-law rule prohibiting antispousal testimony has no application. These ostensible wives were competent to testify. </s> III. </s> Most of the evidence in this case consisted of testimony of the acts and declarations of the defendants. The petitioners contend that because some of these acts and declarations took place after the conspiracy ended, they were erroneously admitted without being properly limited to the defendant who did the act or made the statement [344 U.S. 604, 616] testified to. We must, therefore, decide when the conspiracy ended. The petitioners contend it ended when the last of the parties, Leopold Knoll, was admitted to the United States on December 5, 1947. Then and there, they say, the fraud if any was complete, and the conspiracy to violate the statutes was complete. The Government contends that a part of the conspiracy was an agreement among the conspirators to conceal their fraud by any means, and so it was alleged in the indictment. </s> But there is no statement in the indictment of a single overt act of concealment that was committed after December 5, 1947, and no substantial evidence of any. Such acts as were set forth and proved were acts that revealed and did not conceal the fraud. Therefore, there is no evidence in the record to establish as a part of the conspiracy that the conspirators agreed to conceal the conspiracy by doing what was necessary and expedient to prevent its disclosure. There was a statement of Munio Knoll in the record to one witness Haberman that indicated Munio's purpose to cover up and conceal the conspiracy. This is not evidence that the conspiracy included the further agreement to conceal. It is in the nature of an afterthought by the conspirator for the purpose of covering up. The trial court so understood it, and this statement of Munio Knoll, as testified to by Haberman, was limited by the Court as applicable against Munio Knoll only. </s> This Court in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 , rejected the Government's contention that in every conspiracy there is implicit an agreement as a part thereof for the conspirators to collaborate to conceal the conspiracy. </s> "The rule contended for by the Government could have far-reaching results. For under this rule plausible arguments could generally be made in conspiracy cases that most out-of-court statements offered in [344 U.S. 604, 617] evidence tended to shield co-conspirators. We are not persuaded to adopt the Government's implicit conspiracy theory which in all criminal conspiracy cases would create automatically a further breach of the general rule against the admission of hearsay evidence." Id., at 444. </s> While the concealment was alleged in this indictment as a part of the conspiracy, it was not proved. We think on this record that the conspiracy ended December 5, 1947. </s> It does not necessarily follow that acts and declarations made after the conspiracy ended are not admissible. In this case, the essential fact of the conspiracy was the existence of phony marriage ceremonies entered into for the sole purpose of deceiving the immigration authorities and perpetrating a fraud upon the United States. Acts which took place after the conspiracy ended which were relevant to show the spuriousness of the marriages and the intent of the parties in going through the marriage ceremonies were competent - such as the fact that the parties continued to live apart after they came to the United States; that money was paid the so-called marriages; and that suits were started to terminate whatever legal relationship there might have been upon the record. </s> Declarations stand on a different footing. Declarations of one conspirator may be used against the other conspirator not present on the theory that the declarant is the agent of the other, and the admissions of one are admissible against both under a standard exception to the hearsay rule applicable to the statements of a party. Clune v. United States, 159 U.S. 590, 593 . See United States v. Gooding, 12 Wheat. 460, 468-470. But such declaration can be used against the co-conspirator only when made in furtherance of the conspiracy. Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 217 ; Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 308 -309. There can be no furtherance of [344 U.S. 604, 618] a conspiracy that has ended. Therefore, the declarations of a conspirator do not bind the co-conspirator if made after the conspiracy has ended. That is the teaching of Krulewitch v. United States, supra, and Fiswick v. United States, supra. Those cases dealt only with declarations of one conspirator after the conspiracy had ended. They had no application to acts of a conspirator or others which were relevant to prove the conspiracy. True, there is dictum in Logan v. United States, supra, at 309, frequently repeated, which would limit the admissibility of both acts and declarations to the person performing them. This statement of the rule overlooks the fact that the objection to the declarations is that they are hearsay. This reason is not applicable to acts which are not intended to be a means of expression. The acts, being relevant to prove the conspiracy, were admissible, even though they might have occurred after the conspiracy ended. United States v. Rubenstein, 151 F.2d 915, 917-918; see Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 312 -313; Ferris v. United States, 40 F.2d 837, 839. </s> Relevant declarations or admissions of a conspirator made in the absence of the co-conspirator, and not in furtherance of the conspiracy, may be admissible in a trial for conspiracy as against the declarant to prove the declarant's participation therein. The court must be careful at the time of the admission and by its instructions to make it clear that the evidence is limited as against the declarant only. Therefore, when the trial court admits against all of the conspirators a relevant declaration of one of the conspirators after the conspiracy has ended, without limiting it to the declarant, it violates the rule laid down in Krulewitch. Such declaration is inadmissible as to all but the declarant. </s> In the trial of a criminal case for conspiracy, it is inevitable that there shall be, as there was in this case, evidence as to declarations that is admissible as against [344 U.S. 604, 619] all of the alleged conspirators; there are also other declarations admissible only as to the declarant and those present who by their silence or other conduct assent to the truth of the declaration. These declarations must be carefully and clearly limited by the court at the time of their admission and the jury instructed as to such declarations and the limitations put upon them. Even then, in most instances of a conspiracy trial of several persons together, the application of the rule places a heavy burden upon the jurors to keep in mind the admission of certain declarations and to whom they have been restricted and in some instances for what specific purpose. While these difficulties have been pointed out in several cases, e. g., Krulewitch v. United States, supra, at 453 (concurring opinion); Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 559 -560; Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1006-1007, the rule has nonetheless been applied. Blumenthal v. United States, supra; Nash v. United States, supra; United States v. Gottfried, 165 F.2d 360, 367. </s> In our search of this record, we have found only one instance where a declaration made after the conspiracy had ended was admitted against all of the alleged conspirators, even though not present when the declaration was made. 3 Was the admission of this one item of hearsay evidence sufficient to reverse this case? </s> We think not. In view of the fact that this record fairly shrieks the guilt of the parties, we cannot conceive how this one admission could have possibly influenced this jury to reach an improper verdict. A defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one. This [344 U.S. 604, 620] is a proper case for the application of Rule 52 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 4 We hold that the error was harmless. </s> Finding no reversible error in this record, the judgment is </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 E. g., Schibi v. Schibi, 136 Conn. 196, 69 A. 2d 831; Hanson v. Hanson, 287 Mass. 154, 191 N. E. 673. These and the other cases cited by petitioners are collected and discussed in a note, 14 A. L. R. 2d 624 (1950). </s> [Footnote 2 E. g., Norman v. State, 127 Tenn. 340, 155 S. W. 135; State v. Frey, 76 Minn. 526, 79 N. W. 518. </s> [Footnote 3 R. 208-209. Bessie Osborne testified: "I asked when action would be taken for divorce, and [Munio Knoll] asked me if I would wait two years because he wanted to become an American citizen, and it would take that long, and I agreed to wait." This hearsay statement attributed to Munio was admitted against all the defendants. </s> [Footnote 4 "(a) HARMLESS ERROR. Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." </s> MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER join, dissenting. </s> Whenever a court has a case where behavior that obviously is sordid can be proved to be criminal only with great difficulty, the effort to bridge the gap is apt to produce bad law. We are concerned about the effect of this decision in three respects. </s> 1. We are not convinced that any crime has been proved, even on the assumption that all evidence in the record was admissible. These marriages were formally contracted in France, and there is no contention that they were forbidden or illegal there for any reason. It is admitted that some judicial procedure is necessary if the parties wish to be relieved of their obligations. Whether by reason of the reservations with which the parties entered into the marriages they could be annulled may be a nice question of French law, in view of the fact that no one of them deceived the other. We should expect it to be an even nicer question whether a third party, such as the state in a criminal process, could simply ignore the ceremony and its consequences, as the Government does here. </s> We start with marriages that either are valid or at least have not been proved to be invalid in their inception. The Court brushes this question aside as immaterial, but we think it goes to the very existence of an [344 U.S. 604, 621] offense. If the parties are validly married, even though the marriage is a sordid one, we should suppose that would end the case. On the other hand, if the marriage ceremonies were for some reason utterly void and held for naught, as if they never had happened, the Government could well claim that entry into the United States as married persons was fraud. But between these two extremes is the more likely case - marriages that are not void but perhaps voidable. In one of these cases, the parties (on the trial) expressed their desire to stay married, and they were acquitted; and no one contends that their marriage is void. Certainly if these marriages were merely voidable and had not been adjudged void at the time of the entry into this country, it was not a fraud to represent them as subsisting. We should think that the parties to them might have been prosecuted with as much reason if they had represented themselves to be single. Marriages of convenience are not uncommon and it cannot be that we would hold it a fraud for one who has contracted a marriage not forbidden by law to represent himself as wedded, even if there were grounds for annulment or divorce and proceedings to that end were contemplated. </s> The effect of any reservations of the parties in contracting the marriages would seem to be governed by the law of France. It does not seem justifiable to assume what we all know is not true - that French law and our law are the same. Such a view ignores some of the most elementary facts of legal history - the French reception of Roman law, the consequences of the Revolution, and the Napoleonic codifications. If the Government contends that these marriages were ineffectual from the beginning, it would seem to require proof of particular rules of the French law of domestic relations. </s> 2. "The federal courts have held that one spouse cannot testify against the other unless the defendant spouse [344 U.S. 604, 622] waives the privilege. . . ." Griffin v. United States, 336 U.S. 704, 714 , and cases cited. The Court condones a departure from this rule here because, it says, the relationship was not genuine. We need not decide what effect it would have on the privilege if independent testimony established that the matrimonial relationship was only nominal. Even then, we would think the formal relationship would be respected unless the trial court, on the question of privilege, wanted to try a collateral issue. However, in this case, the trial court could only conclude that the marriage was a sham from the very testimony whose admissibility is in question. The Court's position seems to be that privileged testimony may be received to destroy its own privilege. We think this is not allowable, for the same reason that one cannot lift himself by his own bootstraps. </s> 3. We agree with the Court that the crime, if any, was complete when the alien parties obtained entry into the United States on December 5. We think this was the necessary result of the holding in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 . This requires rejection of the Government's contention that every conspiracy includes an implied secondary conspiracy to conceal the facts. This revival of the long-discredited doctrine of constructive conspiracy would postpone operation of the statute of limitations indefinitely and make all manner of subsequent acts and statements by each conspirator admissible in evidence against all. But, while the Court accepts the view of Krulewitch, we think its ruling on subsequent acts and declarations largely nullifies the effect of that decision and exemplifies the dangers pointed out therein. </s> For present purposes, we need not maintain that no admission or act of a conspirator occurring after the conspiracy has accomplished its object is admissible against a co-conspirator. And we do not question that at times [344 U.S. 604, 623] such evidence is admissible against the actor or speaker alone. But one of the additional leverages obtained by the prosecution through proceeding as for conspiracy instead of as for the substantive offense is that it may get into evidence against one defendant acts or omissions which color the case against all. </s> This case is a vivid illustration of that process in action. The statement of facts in the Government's brief is punctuated by eight separate footnotes to explain that the testimony recited in the text was limited to one or another defendant. We doubt that any member of this Court, despite our experience in sifting testimony, can carry in mind what was admitted against whom, and we are confident the jury could not. We will not prolong this opinion with an analysis of this testimony. Some of it was very damaging. For example, testimony was admitted, limited to Munio Knoll, that on one occasion he returned to his apartment and had difficulty getting in. When he gained admittance, petitioner Lutwak was going out through the window, leaving Knoll's wife to explain the phenomenon if she could. This testimony was not admitted against Lutwak, and the jury was adequately warned not to use it against him. But does anybody believe that the jury could forget that picture of Lutwak being caught taking hasty leave of his co-conspirator's wife and making a somewhat irregular exit? The salutary rule that evidence of acts which occurred long after the conspiracy terminated is admissible only against particular defendants should be observed in spirit as well as in letter. Here much of such evidence was of such remote probative value, and the instruction limiting its use was so predictably ineffectual, that its admission violated a substantial right of those defendants against whom it could not be used. </s> For these reasons we are impelled to dissent. </s> [344 U.S. 604, 624]

United States Supreme Court PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v. SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 ET AL.(2007) No. 05-908 Argued: December 4, 2006Decided: June 28, 2007 </s> Respondent school districts voluntarily adopted student assignment plans that rely on race to determine which schools certain children may attend. The Seattle district, which has never operated legally segregated schools or been subject to court-ordered desegregation, classified children as white or nonwhite, and used the racial classifications as a "tiebreaker" to allocate slots in particular high schools. The Jefferson County, Ky., district was subject to a desegregation decree until 2000, when the District Court dissolved the decree after finding that the district had eliminated the vestiges of prior segregation to the greatest extent practicable. In 2001, the district adopted its plan classifying students as black or "other" in order to make certain elementary school assignments and to rule on transfer requests. </s> Petitioners, an organization of Seattle parents (Parents Involved) and the mother of a Jefferson County student (Joshua), whose children were or could be assigned under the foregoing plans, filed these suits contending, inter alia, that allocating children to different public schools based solely on their race violates the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee. In the Seattle case, the District Court granted the school district summary judgment, finding, inter alia, that its plan survived strict scrutiny on the federal constitutional claim because it was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. In the Jefferson County case, the District Court found that the school district had asserted a compelling interest in maintaining racially diverse schools, and that its plan was, in all relevant respects, narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Held:The judgments are reversed, and the cases are remanded. No. 05-908, 426 F.3d 1162; No. 05-915, 416 F.3d 513, reversed and remanded. The Chief Justice delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III-A, and III-C, concluding: </s> 1.The Court has jurisdiction in these cases. Seattle argues that Parents Involved lacks standing because its current members' claimed injuries are not imminent and are too speculative in that, even if the district maintains its current plan and reinstitutes the racial tiebreaker, those members will only be affected if their children seek to enroll in a high school that is oversubscribed and integration positive. This argument is unavailing; the group's members have children in all levels of the district's schools, and the complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of members whose elementary and middle school children may be denied admission to the high schools of their choice in the future. The fact that those children may not be denied such admission based on their race because of undersubscription or oversubscription that benefits them does not eliminate the injury claimed. The group also asserted an interest in not being forced to compete in a race-based system that might prejudice its members' children, an actionable form of injury under the Equal Protection Clause, see, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pe&nacute;a, 515 U.S. 200, 211. The fact that Seattle has ceased using the racial tiebreaker pending the outcome here is not dispositive, since the district vigorously defends its program's constitutionality, and nowhere suggests that it will not resume using race to assign students if it prevails. See Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189. Similarly, the fact that Joshua has been granted a transfer does not eliminate the Court's jurisdiction; Jefferson County's racial guidelines apply at all grade levels and he may again be subject to race-based assignment in middle school. Pp.9-11. </s> 2.The school districts have not carried their heavy burden of showing that the interest they seek to achieve justifies the extreme means they have chosen--discriminating among individual students based on race by relying upon racial classifications in making school assignments. Pp.11-17, 25-28. </s> (a)Because "racial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection between justification and classification," Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 537 (Stevens, J., dissenting), governmental distributions of burdens or benefits based on individual racial classifications are reviewed under strict scrutiny, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505-506. Thus, the school districts must demonstrate that their use of such classifications is "narrowly tailored" to achieve a "compelling" government interest. Adarand, supra, at 227. </s> Although remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination is a compelling interest under the strict scrutiny test, see Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494, that interest is not involved here because the Seattle schools were never segregated by law nor subject to court-ordered desegregation, and the desegregation decree to which the Jefferson County schools were previously subject has been dissolved. Moreover, these cases are not governed by Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328, in which the Court held that, for strict scrutiny purposes, a government interest in student body diversity "in the context of higher education" is compelling. That interest was not focused on race alone but encompassed "all factors that may contribute to student body diversity," id., at 337, including, e.g., having "overcome personal adversity and family hardship," id., at 338. Quoting Justice Powell's articulation of diversity in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314-315, the Grutter Court noted that "'it is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified percentage of the student body is in effect guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic groups,' that can justify the use of race," 539 U.S., at 324-325, but "'a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element,'" id., at 325. In the present cases, by contrast, race is not considered as part of a broader effort to achieve "exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints," id., at 330; race, for some students, is determinative standing alone. The districts argue that other factors, such as student preferences, affect assignment decisions under their plans, but under each plan when race comes into play, it is decisive by itself. It is not simply one factor weighed with others in reaching a decision, as in Grutter; it is the factor. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275. Even as to race, the plans here employ only a limited notion of diversity, viewing race exclusively in white/nonwhite terms in Seattle and black/"other" terms in Jefferson County. The Grutter Court expressly limited its holding--defining a specific type of broad-based diversity and noting the unique context of higher education--but these limitations were largely disregarded by the lower courts in extending Grutter to the sort of classifications at issue here. Pp.11-17. </s> (b)Despite the districts' assertion that they employed individual racial classifications in a way necessary to achieve their stated ends, the minimal effect these classifications have on student assignments suggests that other means would be effective. Seattle's racial tiebreaker results, in the end, only in shifting a small number of students between schools. Similarly, Jefferson County admits that its use of racial classifications has had a minimal effect, and claims only that its guidelines provide a firm definition of the goal of racially integrated schools, thereby providing administrators with authority to collaborate with principals and staff to maintain schools within the desired range. Classifying and assigning schoolchildren according to a binary conception of race is an extreme approach in light of this Court's precedents and the Nation's history of using race in public schools, and requires more than such an amorphous end to justify it. In Grutter, in contrast, the consideration of race was viewed as indispensable in more than tripling minority representation at the law school there at issue. See 539 U.S., at 320. While the Court does not suggest that greater use of race would be preferable, the minimal impact of the districts' racial classifications on school enrollment casts doubt on the necessity of using such classifications. The districts have also failed to show they considered methods other than explicit racial classifications to achieve their stated goals. Narrow tailoring requires "serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives," id., at 339, and yet in Seattle several alternative assignment plans--many of which would not have used express racial classifications--were rejected with little or no consideration. Jefferson County has failed to present any evidence that it considered alternatives, even though the district already claims that its goals are achieved primarily through means other than the racial classifications. Pp.25-28. </s> the Chief Justice, joined by Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito, concluded for additional reasons in Parts III-B and IV that the plans at issue are unconstitutional under this Court's precedents. Pp.17-25, 28-41. </s> 1.The Court need not resolve the parties' dispute over whether racial diversity in schools has a marked impact on test scores and other objective yardsticks or achieves intangible socialization benefits because it is clear that the racial classifications at issue are not narrowly tailored to the asserted goal. In design and operation, the plans are directed only to racial balance, an objective this Court has repeatedly condemned as illegitimate. They are tied to each district's specific racial demographics, rather than to any pedagogic concept of the level of diversity needed to obtain the asserted educational benefits. Whatever those demographics happen to be drives the required "diversity" number in each district. The districts offer no evidence that the level of racial diversity necessary to achieve the asserted educational benefits happens to coincide with the racial demographics of the respective districts, or rather the districts' white/nonwhite or black/"other" balance, since that is the only diversity addressed by the plans. In Grutter, the number of minority students the school sought to admit was an undefined "meaningful number" necessary to achieve a genuinely diverse student body, 539 U.S., at 316, 335-336, and the Court concluded that the law school did not count back from its applicant pool to arrive at that number, id., at 335-336. Here, in contrast, the schools worked backward to achieve a particular type of racial balance, rather than working forward from some demonstration of the level of diversity that provides the purported benefits. This is a fatal flaw under the Court's existing precedent. See, e.g., Freeman, supra, at 494. Accepting racial balancing as a compelling state interest would justify imposing racial proportionality throughout American society, contrary to the Court's repeated admonitions that this is unconstitutional. While the school districts use various verbal formulations to describe the interest they seek to promote--racial diversity, avoidance of racial isolation, racial integration--they offer no definition suggesting that their interest differs from racial balancing. Pp.17-25. </s> 2.If the need for the racial classifications embraced by the school districts is unclear, even on the districts' own terms, the costs are undeniable. Government action dividing people by race is inherently suspect because such classifications promote "notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility," Croson, supra, at 493, "reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin," Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657, and "endorse race-based reasoning and the conception of a Nation divided into racial blocs, thus contributing to an escalation of racial hostility and conflict," Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 603 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). When it comes to using race to assign children to schools, history will be heard. In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, the Court held that segregation deprived black children of equal educational opportunities regardless of whether school facilities and other tangible factors were equal, because the classification and separation themselves denoted inferiority. Id., at 493-494. It was not the inequality of the facilities but the fact of legally separating children based on race on which the Court relied to find a constitutional violation in that case. Id., at 494. The districts here invoke the ultimate goal of those who filed Brown and subsequent cases to support their argument, but the argument of the plaintiff in Brown was that the Equal Protection Clause "prevents states from according differential treatment to American children on the basis of their color or race," and that view prevailed--this Court ruled in its remedial opinion that Brown required school districts "to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis." Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 300-301 (emphasis added). Pp.28-41. </s> Justice Kennedy agreed that the Court has jurisdiction to decide these cases and that respondents' student assignment plans are not narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling goal of diversity properly defined, but concluded that some parts of the plurality opinion imply an unyielding insistence that race cannot be a factor in instances when it may be taken into account. Pp.1-9. </s> (a)As part of its burden of proving that racial classifications are narrowly tailored to further compelling interests, the government must establish, in detail, how decisions based on an individual student's race are made in a challenged program. The Jefferson County Board of Education fails to meet this threshold mandate when it concedes it denied Joshua's requested kindergarten transfer on the basis of his race under its guidelines, yet also maintains that the guidelines do not apply to kindergartners. This discrepancy is not some simple and straightforward error that touches only upon the peripheries of the district's use of individual racial classifications. As becomes clearer when the district's plan is further considered, Jefferson County has explained how and when it employs these classifications only in terms so broad and imprecise that they cannot withstand strict scrutiny. In its briefing it fails to make clear--even in the limited respects implicated by Joshua's initial assignment and transfer denial--whether in fact it relies on racial classifications in a manner narrowly tailored to the interest in question, rather than in the far-reaching, inconsistent, and adhoc manner that a less forgiving reading of the record would suggest. When a court subjects governmental action to strict scrutiny, it cannot construe ambiguities in favor of the government. In the Seattle case, the school district has gone further in describing the methods and criteria used to determine assignment decisions based on individual racial classifications, but it has nevertheless failed to explain why, in a district composed of a diversity of races, with only a minority of the students classified as "white," it has employed the crude racial categories of "white" and "non-white" as the basis for its assignment decisions. Far from being narrowly tailored, this system threatens to defeat its own ends, and the district has provided no convincing explanation for its design. Pp. 2-6. </s> (b)The plurality opinion is too dismissive of government's legitimate interest in ensuring that all people have equal opportunity regardless of their race. In administering public schools, it is permissible to consider the schools' racial makeup and adopt general policies to encourage a diverse student body, one aspect of which is its racial composition. Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306. School authorities concerned that their student bodies' racial compositions interfere with offering an equal educational opportunity to all are free to devise race-conscious measures to address the problem in a general way and without treating each student in different fashion based solely on a systematic, individual typing by race. Such measures may include strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with general recognition of neighborhood demographics; allocating resources for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race. </s> Each respondent has failed to provide the necessary support for the proposition that there is no other way than individual racial classifications to avoid racial isolation in their school districts. Cf. Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 501. In these cases, the fact that the number of students whose assignment depends on express racial classifications is small suggests that the schools could have achieved their stated ends through different means, including the facially race-neutral means set forth above or, if necessary, a more nuanced, individual evaluation of school needs and student characteristics that might include race as a component. The latter approach would be informed by Grutter, though the criteria relevant to student placement would differ based on the students' age, the parents' needs, and the schools' role. Pp. 6-9. Roberts, C.J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III-A, and III-C, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts III-B and IV, in which Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion. Kennedy, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. </s> PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, PETITIONER </s> 05-908v. </s> SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 etal. on writ of certiorari to the united states court ofappeals for the ninth circuit </s> CRYSTAL D. MEREDITH, custodial parent and next friend of JOSHUA RYAN McDONALD, PETITIONER </s> 05-915v. </s> JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION etal. on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit [June 28, 2007] </s> Chief Justice Roberts announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III-A, and III-C, and an opinion with respect to Parts III-B and IV, in which Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito join. </s> The school districts in these cases voluntarily adopted student assignment plans that rely upon race to determine which public schools certain children may attend. The Seattle school district classifies children as white or nonwhite; the Jefferson County school district as black or "other." In Seattle, this racial classification is used to allocate slots in oversubscribed high schools. In Jefferson County, it is used to make certain elementary school assignments and to rule on transfer requests. In each case, the school district relies upon an individual student's race in assigning that student to a particular school, so that the racial balance at the school falls within a predetermined range based on the racial composition of the school district as a whole. Parents of students denied assignment to particular schools under these plans solely because of their race brought suit, contending that allocating children to different public schools on the basis of race violated the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection. The Courts of Appeals below upheld the plans. We granted certiorari, and now reverse. I </s> Both cases present the same underlying legal question--whether a public school that had not operated legally segregated schools or has been found to be unitary may choose to classify students by race and rely upon that classification in making school assignments. Although we examine the plans under the same legal framework, the specifics of the two plans, and the circumstances surrounding their adoption, are in some respects quite different. A </s> Seattle School District No. 1 operates 10 regular public high schools. In 1998, it adopted the plan at issue in this case for assigning students to these schools. App. in No. 05-908, pp. 90a-92a.1 The plan allows incoming ninth graders to choose from among any of the district's high schools, ranking however many schools they wish in order of preference. Some schools are more popular than others. If too many students list the same school as their first choice, the district employs a series of "tiebreakers" to determine who will fill the open slots at the oversubscribed school. The first tiebreaker selects for admission students who have a sibling currently enrolled in the chosen school. The next tiebreaker depends upon the racial composition of the particular school and the race of the individual student. In the district's public schools approximately 41 percent of enrolled students are white; the remaining 59 percent, comprising all other racial groups, are classified by Seattle for assignment purposes as nonwhite. Id., at 38a, 103a.2 If an oversubscribed school is not within 10 percentage points of the district's overall white/nonwhite racial balance, it is what the district calls "integration positive," and the district employs a tiebreaker that selects for assignment students whose race "will serve to bring the school into balance." Id., at 38a. See Parents Involved VII, 426 F.3d 1162, 1169-1170 (CA9 2005) (en banc).3 If it is still necessary to select students for the school after using the racial tiebreaker, the next tiebreaker is the geographic proximity of the school to the student's residence. App. in No. 05-908, at 38a. </s> Seattle has never operated segregated schools--legally separate schools for students of different races--nor has it ever been subject to court-ordered desegregation. It nonetheless employs the racial tiebreaker in an attempt to address the effects of racially identifiable housing patterns on school assignments. Most white students live in the northern part of Seattle, most students of other racial backgrounds in the southern part. Parents Involved VII, supra, at 1166. Four of Seattle's high schools are located in the north--Ballard, Nathan Hale, Ingraham, and Roosevelt--and five in the south--Rainier Beach, Cleveland, West Seattle, Chief Sealth, and Franklin. One school--Garfield--is more or less in the center of Seattle. App. in No. 05-908, at 38a-39a, 45a. </s> For the 2000-2001 school year, five of these schools were oversubscribed--Ballard, Nathan Hale, Roosevelt, Garfield, and Franklin--so much so that 82 percent of incoming ninth graders ranked one of these schools as their first choice. Id., at 38a. Three of the oversubscribed schools were "integration positive" because the school's white enrollment the previous school year was greater than 51 percent--Ballard, Nathan Hale, and Roosevelt. Thus, more nonwhite students (107, 27, and 82, respectively) who selected one of these three schools as a top choice received placement at the school than would have been the case had race not been considered, and proximity been the next tiebreaker. Id., at 39a-40a. Franklin was "integration positive" because its nonwhite enrollment the previous school year was greater than 69 percent; 89 more white students were assigned to Franklin by operation of the racial tiebreaker in the 2000-2001 school year than otherwise would have been. Ibid. Garfield was the only oversubscribed school whose composition during the 1999-2000 school year was within the racial guidelines, although in previous years Garfield's enrollment had been predominantly nonwhite, and the racial tiebreaker had been used to give preference to white students. Id., at 39a. </s> Petitioner Parents Involved in Community Schools (Parents Involved) is a nonprofit corporation comprising the parents of children who have been or may be denied assignment to their chosen high school in the district because of their race. The concerns of Parents Involved are illustrated by Jill Kurfirst, who sought to enroll her ninth-grade son, Andy Meeks, in Ballard High School's special Biotechnology Career Academy. Andy suffered from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and dyslexia, but had made good progress with hands-on instruction, and his mother and middle school teachers thought that the smaller biotechnology program held the most promise for his continued success. Andy was accepted into this selective program but, because of the racial tiebreaker, was denied assignment to Ballard High School. Id., at 143a-146a, 152a-160a. Parents Involved commenced this suit in the Western District of Washington, alleging that Seattle's use of race in assignments violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,4 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,5 and the Washington Civil Rights Act.6 Id., at 28a-35a. </s> The District Court granted summary judgment to the school district, finding that state law did not bar the district's use of the racial tiebreaker and that the plan survived strict scrutiny on the federal constitutional claim because it was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. 137 F.Supp. 2d 1224, 1240 (WD Wash. 2001) (Parents Involved I). The Ninth Circuit initially reversed based on its interpretation of the Washington Civil Rights Act, 285 F.3d 1236, 1253 (2002) (Parents Involved II), and enjoined the district's use of the integration tiebreaker, id., at 1257. Upon realizing that the litigation would not be resolved in time for assignment decisions for the 2002-2003 school year, the Ninth Circuit withdrew its opinion, 294 F.3d 1084 (2002) (Parents Involved III), vacated the injunction, and, pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code §2.60.020 (2006), certified the state-law question to the Washington Supreme Court, 294 F.3d 1085, 1087 (2002) (Parents Involved IV). </s> The Washington Supreme Court determined that the State Civil Rights Act bars only preferential treatment programs "where race or gender is used by government to select a less qualified applicant over a more qualified applicant," and not "[p]rograms which are racially neutral, such as the [district's] open choice plan." Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist., No. 1, 149 Wash. 2d 660, 689-690, 663, 72 P.3d 151, 166, 153 (2003) (en banc) (Parents Involved V). The state court returned the case to the Ninth Circuit for further proceedings. Id., at 690, 72 P.3d, at 167. </s> A panel of the Ninth Circuit then again reversed the District Court, this time ruling on the federal constitutional question. Parents Involved VI, 377 F.3d 949 (2004). The panel determined that while achieving racial diversity and avoiding racial isolation are compelling government interests, id., at 964, Seattle's use of the racial tiebreaker was not narrowly tailored to achieve these interests, id., at 980. The Ninth Circuit granted rehearing en banc, 395 F.3d 1168 (2005), and overruled the panel decision, affirming the District Court's determination that Seattle's plan was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest, Parents Involved VII, 426 F.3d, at 1192-1193. We granted certiorari. 547 U.S. __ (2006). B </s> Jefferson County Public Schools operates the public school system in metropolitan Louisville, Kentucky. In 1973 a federal court found that Jefferson County had maintained a segregated school system, Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Ed. of Jefferson Cty., 489 F.2d 925, 932 (CA6), vacated and remanded, 418 U.S. 918, reinstated with modifications, 510 F.2d 1358, 1359 (CA6 1974), and in 1975 the District Court entered a desegregation decree. See Hampton v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Ed., 72 F.Supp. 2d 753, 762-764 (WD Ky. 1999). Jefferson County operated under this decree until 2000, when the District Court dissolved the decree after finding that the district had achieved unitary status by eliminating "[t]o the greatest extent practicable" the vestiges of its prior policy of segregation. Hampton v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Ed., 102 F.Supp. 2d 358, 360 (2000). See Board of Ed. of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249-250 (1991); Green v. School Bd. of New Kent Cty., 391 U.S. 430, 435-436 (1968). In 2001, after the decree had been dissolved, Jefferson County adopted the voluntary student assignment plan at issue in this case. App. in No. 05-915, p. 77. Approximately 34 percent of the district's 97,000 students are black; most of the remaining 66 percent are white. McFarland v. Jefferson Cty. Public Schools, 330 F.Supp. 2d 834, 839-840, and n. 6 (WD Ky. 2004) (McFarland I). The plan requires all nonmagnet schools to maintain a minimum black enrollment of 15 percent, and a maximum black enrollment of 50 percent. App. in No. 05-915, at 81; McFarland I, supra, at 842. </s> At the elementary school level, based on his or her address, each student is designated a "resides" school to which students within a specific geographic area are assigned; elementary resides schools are "grouped into clusters in order to facilitate integration." App. in No. 05-915, at 82. The district assigns students to nonmagnet schools in one of two ways: Parents of kindergartners, first-graders, and students new to the district may submit an application indicating a first and second choice among the schools within their cluster; students who do not submit such an application are assigned within the cluster by the district. "Decisions to assign students to schools within each cluster are based on available space within the schools and the racial guidelines in the District's current student assignment plan." Id., at 38. If a school has reached the "extremes of the racial guidelines," a student whose race would contribute to the school's racial imbalance will not be assigned there. Id., at 38-39, 82. After assignment, students at all grade levels are permitted to apply to transfer between nonmagnet schools in the district. Transfers may be requested for any number of reasons, and may be denied because of lack of available space or on the basis of the racial guidelines. Id., at 43.7 </s> When petitioner Crystal Meredith moved into the school district in August 2002, she sought to enroll her son, Joshua McDonald, in kindergarten for the 2002-2003 school year. His resides school was only a mile from his new home, but it had no available space--assignments had been made in May, and the class was full. Jefferson County assigned Joshua to another elementary school in his cluster, Young Elementary. This school was 10 miles from home, and Meredith sought to transfer Joshua to a school in a different cluster, Bloom Elementary, which--like his resides school--was only a mile from home. See Tr. in McFarland I, pp.1-49 through 1-54 (Dec. 8, 2003). Space was available at Bloom, and intercluster transfers are allowed, but Joshua's transfer was nonetheless denied because, in the words of Jefferson County, "[t]he transfer would have an adverse effect on desegregation compliance" of Young. App. in No. 05-915, at 97.8 </s> Meredith brought suit in the Western District of Kentucky, alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court found that Jefferson County had asserted a compelling interest in maintaining racially diverse schools, and that the assignment plan was (in all relevant respects) narrowly tailored to serve that compelling interest. McFarland I, supra, at 837.9 The Sixth Circuit affirmed in a per curiam opinion relying upon the reasoning of the District Court, concluding that a written opinion "would serve no useful purpose." McFarland v. Jefferson Cty. Public Schools, 416 F.3d 513, 514 (2005) (McFarland II). We granted certiorari. 547 U.S. __ (2006). II </s> As a threshold matter, we must assure ourselves of our jurisdiction. Seattle argues that Parents Involved lacks standing because none of its current members can claim an imminent injury. Even if the district maintains the current plan and reinstitutes the racial tiebreaker, Seattle argues, Parents Involved members will only be affected if their children seek to enroll in a Seattle public high school and choose an oversubscribed school that is integration positive--too speculative a harm to maintain standing. Brief for Respondents in No. 05-908, pp. 16-17. This argument is unavailing. The group's members have children in the district's elementary, middle, and high schools, App. in No. 05-908, at 299a-301a; Affidavit of Kathleen Brose Pursuant to this Court's Rule 32.3 (Lodging of Petitioner Parents Involved), and the complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of Parents Involved members whose elementary and middle school children may be "denied admission to the high schools of their choice when they apply for those schools in the future," App. in No. 05-908, at 30a. The fact that it is possible that children of group members will not be denied admission to a school based on their race--because they choose an undersubscribed school or an oversubscribed school in which their race is an advantage--does not eliminate the injury claimed. Moreover, Parents Involved also asserted an interest in not being "forced to compete for seats at certain high schools in a system that uses race as a deciding factor in many of its admissions decisions." Ibid. As we have held, one form of injury under the Equal Protection Clause is being forced to compete in a race-based system that may prejudice the plaintiff, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pe&nacute;a, 515 U.S. 200, 211 (1995); Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993), an injury that the members of Parents Involved can validly claim on behalf of their children. </s> In challenging standing, Seattle also notes that it has ceased using the racial tiebreaker pending the outcome of this litigation. Brief for Respondents in No. 05-908, at16-17. But the district vigorously defends the constitutionality of its race-based program, and nowhere suggests that if this litigation is resolved in its favor it will not resume using race to assign students. Voluntary cessation does not moot a case or controversy unless "subsequent events ma[ke] it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur," Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (quoting United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Assn., Inc., 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968) (internal quotation marks omitted)), a heavy burden that Seattle has clearly not met. </s> Jefferson County does not challenge our jurisdiction, Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 05-915, p. 48, but we are nonetheless obliged to ensure that it exists, Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). Although apparently Joshua has now been granted a transfer to Bloom, the school to which transfer was denied under the racial guidelines, Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 05-915, at 45, the racial guidelines apply at all grade levels. Upon Joshua's enrollment in middle school, he may again be subject to assignment based on his race. In addition, Meredith sought damages in her complaint, which is sufficient to preserve our ability to consider the question. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983). III A </s> It is well established that when the government distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial classifications, that action is reviewed under strict scrutiny. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505-506 (2005); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); Adarand, supra, at 224. As the Court recently reaffirmed, "'racial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection between justification and classification.'" Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 537 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting); brackets omitted). In order to satisfy this searching standard of review, the school districts must demonstrate that the use of individual racial classifications in the assignment plans here under review is "narrowly tailored" to achieve a "compelling" government interest. Adarand, supra, at 227. </s> Without attempting in these cases to set forth all the interests a school district might assert, it suffices to note that our prior cases, in evaluating the use of racial classifications in the school context, have recognized two interests that qualify as compelling. The first is the compelling interest of remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992). Yet the Seattle public schools have not shown that they were ever segregated by law, and were not subject to court-ordered desegregation decrees. The Jefferson County public schools were previously segregated by law and were subject to a desegregation decree entered in 1975. In 2000, the District Court that entered that decree dissolved it, finding that Jefferson County had "eliminated the vestiges associated with the former policy of segregation and its pernicious effects," and thus had achieved "unitary" status. Hampton, 102 F.Supp. 2d, at 360. Jefferson County accordingly does not rely upon an interest in remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination in defending its present use of race in assigning students. See Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 05-915, at 38. Nor could it. We have emphasized that the harm being remedied by mandatory desegregation plans is the harm that is traceable to segregation, and that "the Constitution is not violated by racial imbalance in the schools, without more." Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280, n.14 (1977). See also Freeman, supra, at 495-496; Dowell, 498 U.S., at 248; Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974). Once Jefferson County achieved unitary status, it had remedied the constitutional wrong that allowed race-based assignments. Any continued use of race must be justified on some other basis.10 </s> The second government interest we have recognized as compelling for purposes of strict scrutiny is the interest in diversity in higher education upheld in Grutter, 539 U.S., at 328. The specific interest found compelling in Grutter was student body diversity "in the context of higher education." Ibid. The diversity interest was not focused on race alone but encompassed "all factors that may contribute to student body diversity." Id., at 337. We described the various types of diversity that the law school sought: "[The law school's] policy makes clear there are many possible bases for diversity admissions, and provides examples of admittees who have lived or traveled widely abroad, are fluent in several languages, have overcome personal adversity and family hardship, have exceptional records of extensive community service, and have had successful careers in other fields." Id., at 338 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). </s> The Court quoted the articulation of diversity from Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), noting that "it is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified percentage of the student body is in effect guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic groups, that can justify the use of race." Grutter, supra, at 324-325 (citing and quoting Bakke, supra, at 314-315 (opinion of Powell, J.); brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, what was upheld in Grutter was consideration of "a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element." 539 U.S., at 325 (quoting Bakke, supra, at 315 (opinion of Powell, J.); internal quotation marks omitted). </s> The entire gist of the analysis in Grutter was that the admissions program at issue there focused on each applicant as an individual, and not simply as a member of a particular racial group. The classification of applicants by race upheld in Grutter was only as part of a "highly individualized, holistic review," 539 U.S., at 337. As the Court explained, "[t]he importance of this individualized consideration in the context of a race-conscious admissions program is paramount." Ibid. The point of the narrow tailoring analysis in which the Grutter Court engaged was to ensure that the use of racial classifications was indeed part of a broader assessment of diversity, and not simply an effort to achieve racial balance, which the Court explained would be "patently unconstitutional." Id., at 330. </s> In the present cases, by contrast, race is not considered as part of a broader effort to achieve "exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints," ibid.; race, for some students, is determinative standing alone. The districts argue that other factors, such as student preferences, affect assignment decisions under their plans, but under each plan when race comes into play, it is decisive by itself. It is not simply one factor weighed with others in reaching a decision, as in Grutter; it is the factor. Like the University of Michigan undergraduate plan struck down in Gratz, 539 U.S., at 275, the plans here "do not provide for a meaningful individualized review of applicants" but instead rely on racial classifications in a "nonindividualized, mechanical" way. Id., at 276, 280 (O'Connor, J., concurring). </s> Even when it comes to race, the plans here employ only a limited notion of diversity, viewing race exclusively in white/nonwhite terms in Seattle and black/"other" terms in Jefferson County.11 But see Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 610 (1990) ("We are a Nation not of black and white alone, but one teeming with divergent communities knitted together with various traditions and carried forth, above all, by individuals") (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Seattle "Board Statement Reaffirming Diversity Rationale" speaks of the "inherent educational value" in "[p]roviding students the opportunity to attend schools with diverse student enrollment," App. in No. 05-908, at 128a, 129a. But under the Seattle plan, a school with 50 percent Asian-American students and 50 percent white students but no African-American, Native-American, or Latino students would qualify as balanced, while a school with 30 percent Asian-American, 25 percent African-American, 25 percent Latino, and 20 percent white students would not. It is hard to understand how a plan that could allow these results can be viewed as being concerned with achieving enrollment that is "'broadly diverse,'" Grutter, supra, at 329. </s> Prior to Grutter, the courts of appeals rejected as unconstitutional attempts to implement race-based assignment plans--such as the plans at issue here--in primary and secondary schools. See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Montgomery Cty. Public Schools, 197 F.3d 123, 133 (CA4 1999); Tuttle v. Arlington Cty. School Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 701 (CA4 1999); Wessman v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 809 (CA1 1998). See also Ho v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 147 F.3d 854, 865 (CA9 1998). After Grutter, however, the two Courts of Appeals in these cases, and one other, found that race-based assignments were permissible at the elementary and secondary level, largely in reliance on that case. See Parents Involved VII, 426 F.3d, at 1166; McFarland II, 416 F.3d, at 514; Comfort v. Lynn School Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 13 (CA1 2005). </s> In upholding the admissions plan in Grutter, though, this Court relied upon considerations unique to institutions of higher education, noting that in light of "the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university environment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition." 539 U.S., at 329. See also Bakke, supra, at 312, 313 (opinion of Powell, J.). The Court explained that "[c]ontext matters" in applying strict scrutiny, and repeatedly noted that it was addressing the use of race "in the context of higher education." Grutter, supra, at 327, 328, 334. The Court in Grutter expressly articulated key limitations on its holding--defining a specific type of broad-based diversity and noting the unique context of higher education--but these limitations were largely disregarded by the lower courts in extending Grutter to uphold race-based assignments in elementary and secondary schools. The present cases are not governed by Grutter. B </s> Perhaps recognizing that reliance on Grutter cannot sustain their plans, both school districts assert additional interests, distinct from the interest upheld in Grutter, to justify their race-based assignments. In briefing and argument before this Court, Seattle contends that its use of race helps to reduce racial concentration in schools and to ensure that racially concentrated housing patterns do not prevent nonwhite students from having access to the most desirable schools. Brief for Respondents in No. 05-908, at19. Jefferson County has articulated a similar goal, phrasing its interest in terms of educating its students "in a racially integrated environment." App. in No. 05-915, at 22.12 Each school district argues that educational and broader socialization benefits flow from a racially diverse learning environment, and each contends that because the diversity they seek is racial diversity--not the broader diversity at issue in Grutter--it makes sense to promote that interest directly by relying on race alone. The parties and their amici dispute whether racial diversity in schools in fact has a marked impact on test scores and other objective yardsticks or achieves intangible socialization benefits. The debate is not one we need to resolve, however, because it is clear that the racial classifications employed by the districts are not narrowly tailored to the goal of achieving the educational and social benefits asserted to flow from racial diversity. In design and operation, the plans are directed only to racial balance, pure and simple, an objective this Court has repeatedly condemned as illegitimate. </s> The plans are tied to each district's specific racial demographics, rather than to any pedagogic concept of the level of diversity needed to obtain the asserted educational benefits. In Seattle, the district seeks white enrollment of between 31 and 51 percent (within 10 percent of "the district white average" of 41 percent), and nonwhite enrollment of between 49 and 69 percent (within 10 percent of "the district minority average" of 59 percent). App. in No. 05-908, at 103a. In Jefferson County, by contrast, the district seeks black enrollment of no less than 15 or more than 50 percent, a range designed to be "equally above and below Black student enrollment systemwide," McFarlandI, 330 F.Supp. 2d, at 842, based on the objective of achieving at "all schools ... an African-American enrollment equivalent to the average district-wide African-American enrollment" of 34 percent. App. in No. 05-915, at 81. In Seattle, then, the benefits of racial diversity require enrollment of at least 31 percent white students; in Jefferson County, at least 50 percent. There must be at least 15 percent nonwhite students under Jefferson County's plan; in Seattle, more than three times that figure. This comparison makes clear that the racial demographics in each district--whatever they happen to be--drive the required "diversity" numbers. The plans here are not tailored to achieving a degree of diversity necessary to realize the asserted educational benefits; instead the plans are tailored, in the words of Seattle's Manager of Enrollment Planning, Technical Support, and Demographics, to "the goal established by the school board of attain-ing a level of diversity within the schools that approximates the district's overall demographics." App. in No. 05-908, at 42a. </s> The districts offer no evidence that the level of racial diversity necessary to achieve the asserted educational benefits happens to coincide with the racial demographics of the respective school districts--or rather the white/nonwhite or black/"other" balance of the districts, since that is the only diversity addressed by the plans. Indeed, in its brief Seattle simply assumes that the educational benefits track the racial breakdown of the district. See Brief for Respondents in No. 05-908, at 36 ("For Seattle, 'racial balance' is clearly not an end in itself but rather a measure of the extent to which the educational goals the plan was designed to foster are likely to be achieved"). When asked for "a range of percentage that would be diverse," however, Seattle's expert said it was important to have "sufficient numbers so as to avoid students feeling any kind of specter of exceptionality." App. in No. 05-908, at 276a. The district did not attempt to defend the proposition that anything outside its range posed the "specter of exceptionality." Nor did it demonstrate in any way how the educational and social benefits of racial diversity or avoidance of racial isolation are more likely to be achieved at a school that is 50 percent white and 50 percent Asian-American, which would qualify as diverse under Seattle's plan, than at a school that is 30 percent Asian-American, 25 percent African-American, 25 percent Latino, and 20 percent white, which under Seattle's definition would be racially concentrated. </s> Similarly, Jefferson County's expert referred to the importance of having "at least 20 percent" minority group representation for the group "to be visible enough to make a difference," and noted that "small isolated minority groups in a school are not likely to have a strong effect on the overall school." App. in No. 05-915, at 159, 147. The Jefferson County plan, however, is based on a goal of replicating at each school "an African-American enrollment equivalent to the average district-wide African-American enrollment." Id., at 81. Joshua McDonald's requested transfer was denied because his race was listed as "other" rather than black, and allowing the transfer would have had an adverse effect on the racial guideline compliance of Young Elementary, the school he sought to leave. Id., at 21. At the time, however, Young Elementary was 46.8 percent black. Id., at 73. The transfer might have had an adverse effect on the effort to approach district-wide racial proportionality at Young, but it had nothing to do with preventing either the black or "other" group from becoming "small" or "isolated" at Young. </s> In fact, in each case the extreme measure of relying on race in assignments is unnecessary to achieve the stated goals, even as defined by the districts. For example, at Franklin High School in Seattle, the racial tiebreaker was applied because nonwhite enrollment exceeded 69 percent, and resulted in an incoming ninth-grade class in 2000-2001 that was 30.3 percent Asian-American, 21.9 percent African-American, 6.8 percent Latino, 0.5 percent Native-American, and 40.5 percent Caucasian. Without the racial tiebreaker, the class would have been 39.6 percent Asian-American, 30.2 percent African-American, 8.3 percent Latino, 1.1 percent Native-American, and 20.8 percent Caucasian. See App. in No. 05-908, at 308a. When the actual racial breakdown is considered, enrolling students without regard to their race yields a substantially diverse student body under any definition of diversity.13 </s> In Grutter, the number of minority students the school sought to admit was an undefined "meaningful number" necessary to achieve a genuinely diverse student body. 539 U.S., at 316, 335-336. Although the matter was the subject of disagreement on the Court, see id., at 346-347 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id., at 382-383 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id., at 388-392 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), the majority concluded that the law school did not count back from its applicant pool to arrive at the "meaningful number" it regarded as necessary to diversify its student body. Id., at 335-336. Here the racial balance the districts seek is a defined range set solely by reference to the demographics of the respective school districts. </s> This working backward to achieve a particular type of racial balance, rather than working forward from some demonstration of the level of diversity that provides the purported benefits, is a fatal flaw under our existing precedent. We have many times over reaffirmed that "[r]acial balance is not to be achieved for its own sake." Freeman, 503 U.S., at 494. See also Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989); Bakke, 438 U.S., at 307 (opinion of Powell, J.) ("If petitioner's purpose is to assure within its student body some specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin, such a preferential purpose must be rejected ... as facially invalid"). Grutter itself reiterated that "outright racial balancing" is "patently unconstitutional." 539 U.S., at 330. </s> Accepting racial balancing as a compelling state interest would justify the imposition of racial proportionality throughout American society, contrary to our repeated recognition that "[a]t the heart of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class." Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) (quoting Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S., at 602 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); internal quotation marks omitted).14 Allowing racial balancing as a compelling end in itself would "effectively assur[e] that race will always be relevant in American life, and that the 'ultimate goal' of 'eliminating entirely from governmental decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as a human being's race' will never be achieved." Croson, supra, at 495 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.) (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 320 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting), in turn quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S., at 547 (Stevens, J., dissenting); brackets and citation omitted). An interest "linked to nothing other than proportional representation of various races ... would support indefinite use of racial classifications, employed first to obtain the appropriate mixture of racial views and then to ensure that the [program] continues to reflect that mixture." Metro Broadcasting, supra, at 614 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). </s> The validity of our concern that racial balancing has "no logical stopping point," Croson, supra, at 498 (quoting Wygant, supra, at 275 (plurality opinion); internal quotation marks omitted); see also Grutter, supra, at 343, is demonstrated here by the degree to which the districts tie their racial guidelines to their demographics. As the districts' demographics shift, so too will their definition of racial diversity. See App. in No. 05-908, at 103a (describing application of racial tiebreaker based on "current white percentage" of 41 percent and "current minority percentage" of 59 percent (emphasis added)). </s> The Ninth Circuit below stated that it "share[d] in the hope" expressed in Grutter that in 25 years racial preferences would no longer be necessary to further the interest identified in that case. Parents Involved VII, 426 F.3d, at 1192. But in Seattle the plans are defended as necessary to address the consequences of racially identifiable housing patterns. The sweep of the mandate claimed by the district is contrary to our rulings that remedying past societal discrimination does not justify race-conscious government action. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909-910 (1996) ("[A]n effort to alleviate the effects of societal discrimination is not a compelling interest"); Croson, supra, at 498-499; Wygant, 476 U.S., at 276 (plurality opinion) ("Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy"); id., at 288 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("[A] governmental agency's interest in remedying 'societal' discrimination, that is, discrimination not traceable to its own actions, cannot be deemed sufficiently compelling to pass constitutional muster"). </s> The principle that racial balancing is not permitted is one of substance, not semantics. Racial balancing is not transformed from "patently unconstitutional" to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it "racial diversity." While the school districts use various verbal formulations to describe the interest they seek to promote--racial diversity, avoidance of racial isolation, racial integration--they offer no definition of the interest that suggests it differs from racial balance. See, e.g., App. in No. 05-908, at 257a ("Q. What's your understanding of when a school suffers from racial isolation? A. I don't have a definition for that"); id., at 228a-229a ("I don't think we've ever sat down and said, 'Define racially concentrated school exactly on point in quantitative terms.' I don't think we've ever had that conversation"); Tr. in McFarland I, at 1-90 (Dec. 8, 2003) ("Q. How does the Jefferson County School Board define diversity...?" "A. Well, we want to have the schools that make up the percentage of students of the population"). </s> Jefferson County phrases its interest as "racial integration," but integration certainly does not require the sort of racial proportionality reflected in its plan. Even in the context of mandatory desegregation, we have stressed that racial proportionality is not required, see Milliken, 433 U.S., at 280, n. 14 ("[A desegregation] order contemplating the substantive constitutional right [to a] particular degree of racial balance or mixing is ... infirm as a matter of law" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 24 (1971) ("The constitutional command to desegregate schools does not mean that every school in every community must always reflect the racial composition of the school system as a whole"), and here Jefferson County has already been found to have eliminated the vestiges of its prior segregated school system. </s> The en banc Ninth Circuit declared that "when a racially diverse school system is the goal (or racial concentration or isolation is the problem), there is no more effective means than a consideration of race to achieve the solution." Parents Involved VII, supra, at 1191. For the foregoing reasons, this conclusory argument cannot sustain the plans. However closely related race-based assignments may be to achieving racial balance, that itself cannot be the goal, whether labeled "racial diversity" or anything else. To the extent the objective is sufficient diversity so that students see fellow students as individuals rather than solely as members of a racial group, using means that treat students solely as members of a racial group is fundamentally at cross-purposes with that end. C </s> The districts assert, as they must, that the way in which they have employed individual racial classifications is necessary to achieve their stated ends. The minimal effect these classifications have on student assignments, however, suggests that other means would be effective. Seattle's racial tiebreaker results, in the end, only in shifting a small number of students between schools. Approximately 307 student assignments were affected by the racial tiebreaker in 2000-2001; the district was able to track the enrollment status of 293 of these students. App. in No. 05-908, at 162a. Of these, 209 were assigned to a school that was one of their choices, 87 of whom were assigned to the same school to which they would have been assigned without the racial tiebreaker. Eighty-four students were assigned to schools that they did not list as a choice, but 29 of those students would have been assigned to their respective school without the racial tiebreaker, and 3 were able to attend one of the oversubscribed schools due to waitlist and capacity adjustments. Id., at 162a-163a. In over one-third of the assignments affected by the racial tiebreaker, then, the use of race in the end made no difference, and the district could identify only 52 students who were ultimately affected adversely by the racial tiebreaker in that it resulted in assignment to a school they had not listed as a preference and to which they would not otherwise have been assigned. As the panel majority in Parents Involved VI concluded: "[T]he tiebreaker's annual effect is thus merely to shuffle a few handfuls of different minority students between a few schools--about a dozen additional Latinos into Ballard, a dozen black students into Nathan Hale, perhaps two dozen Asians into Roosevelt, and so on. The District has not met its burden of proving these marginal changes ... outweigh the cost of subjecting hundreds of students to disparate treatment based solely upon the color of their skin." 377 F.3d, at 984-985 (footnote omitted). </s> Similarly, Jefferson County's use of racial classifications has only a minimal effect on the assignment of students. Elementary school students are assigned to their first- or second-choice school 95 percent of the time, and transfers, which account for roughly 5 percent of assignments, are only denied 35 percent of the time--and presumably an even smaller percentage are denied on the basis of the racial guidelines, given that other factors may lead to a denial. McFarland I, 330 F.Supp. 2d, at 844-845, nn. 16, 18. Jefferson County estimates that the racial guidelines account for only 3 percent of assignments. Brief in Opposition in No. 05-915, p.7, n.4; Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 05-915, at 46. As Jefferson County explains, "the racial guidelines have minimal impact in this process, because they 'mostly influence student assignment in subtle and indirect ways.'" Brief for Respondents in No. 05-915, pp.8-9. </s> While we do not suggest that greater use of race would be preferable, the minimal impact of the districts' racial classifications on school enrollment casts doubt on the necessity of using racial classifications. In Grutter, the consideration of race was viewed as indispensable in more than tripling minority representation at the law school--from 4 to 14.5 percent. See 539 U.S., at 320. Here the most Jefferson County itself claims is that "because the guidelines provide a firm definition of the Board's goal of racially integrated schools, they 'provide administrators with the authority to facilitate, negotiate and collaborate with principals and staff to maintain schools within the 15-50% range.'" Brief in Opposition in No. 05-915, at 7 (quoting McFarland I, supra, at 842). Classifying and assigning schoolchildren according to a binary conception of race is an extreme approach in light of our precedents and our Nation's history of using race in public schools, and requires more than such an amorphous end to justify it. </s> The districts have also failed to show that they considered methods other than explicit racial classifications to achieve their stated goals. Narrow tailoring requires "serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives," Grutter, supra, at 339, and yet in Seattle several alternative assignment plans--many of which would not have used express racial classifications--were rejected with little or no consideration. See, e.g., App. in No. 05-908, at 224a-225a, 253a-259a, 307a. Jefferson County has failed to present any evidence that it considered alternatives, even though the district already claims that its goals are achieved primarily through means other than the racial classifications. Brief for Respondents in No. 05-915, at8-9. Compare Croson, 488 U.S., at 519 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (racial classifications permitted only "as a last resort"). </s> IV Justice Breyer's dissent takes a different approach to these cases, one that fails to ground the result it would reach in law. Instead, it selectively relies on inapplicable precedent and even dicta while dismissing contrary holdings, alters and misapplies our well-established legal framework for assessing equal protection challenges to express racial classifications, and greatly exaggerates the consequences of today's decision. To begin with, Justice Breyer seeks to justify the plans at issue under our precedents recognizing the compelling interest in remedying past intentional discrimination. See post, at 18-24. Not even the school districts go this far, and for good reason. The distinction between segregation by state action and racial imbalance caused by other factors has been central to our jurisprudence in this area for generations. See, e.g., Milliken, 433 U.S., at 280, n.14; Freeman, 503 U.S., at 495-496 ("Where resegregation is a product not of state action but of private choices, it does not have constitutional implications"). The dissent elides this distinction between de jure and de facto segregation, casually intimates that Seattle's school attendance patterns reflect illegal segregation, post, at 5, 18, 23,15 and fails to credit the judicial determination--under the most rigorous standard--that Jefferson County had eliminated the vestiges of prior segregation. The dissent thus alters in fundamental ways not only the facts presented here but the established law. </s> Justice Breyer's reliance on McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971), post, at 23-24, 29-30, highlights how far removed the discussion in the dissent is from the question actually presented in these cases. McDaniel concerned a Georgia school system that had been segregated by law. There was no doubt that the county had operated a "dual school system," McDaniel, supra, at 41, and no one questions that the obligation to disestablish a school system segregated by law can include race-conscious remedies--whether or not a court had issued an order to that effect. See supra, at 12. The present cases are before us, however, because the Seattle school district was never segregated by law, and the Jefferson County district has been found to be unitary, having eliminated the vestiges of its prior dual status. The justification for race-conscious remedies in McDaniel is therefore not applicable here. The dissent's persistent refusal to accept this distinction--its insistence on viewing the racial classifications here as if they were just like the ones in McDaniel, "devised to overcome a history of segregated public schools," post, at 47--explains its inability to understand why the remedial justification for racial classifications cannot decide these cases. </s> Justice Breyer's dissent next relies heavily on dicta from Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S., at 16--far more heavily than the school districts themselves. Compare post, at 3, 22-28, with Brief for Respondents in No. 05-908, at 19-20; Brief for Respondents in No. 05-915, at 31. The dissent acknowledges that the two-sentence discussion in Swann was pure dicta, post, at 22, but nonetheless asserts that it demonstrates a "basic principle of constitutional law" that provides "authoritative legal guidance." Post, at 22, 30. Initially, as the Court explained just last Term, "we are not bound to follow our dicta in a prior case in which the point now at issue was not fully debated." Central Va. Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363 (2006). That is particularly true given that, when Swann was decided, this Court had not yet confirmed that strict scrutiny applies to racial classifications like those before us. See n.16, infra. There is nothing "technical" or "theoretical," post, at 30, about our approach to such dicta. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 399-400 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.) (explaining why dicta is not binding). </s> Justice Breyer would not only put such extraordinary weight on admitted dicta, but relies on the statement for something it does not remotely say. Swann addresses only a possible state objective; it says nothing of the permissible means--race conscious or otherwise--that a school district might employ to achieve that objective. The reason for this omission is clear enough, since the case did not involve any voluntary means adopted by a school district. The dissent's characterization of Swann as recognizing that "the Equal Protection Clause permits local school boards to use race-conscious criteria to achieve positive race-related goals" is--at best--a dubious inference. Post, at 22. Even if the dicta from Swann were entitled to the weight the dissent would give it, and no dicta is, it not only did not address the question presented in Swann, it also does not address the question presented in these cases--whether the school districts' use of racial classifications to achieve their stated goals is permissible. </s> Further, for all the lower court cases Justice Breyer cites as evidence of the "prevailing legal assumption" embodied by Swann, very few are pertinent. Most are not. For example, the dissent features Tometz v. Board of Ed., Waukegan City School Dist. No. 61, 39 Ill. 2d 593, 596-598, 237 N.E. 2d 498, 500-502 (1968), an Illinois decision, as evidence that "state and federal courts had considered the matter settled and uncontroversial." Post, at 25. But Tometz addressed a challenge to a statute requiring race-consciousness in drawing school attendance boundaries--an issue well beyond the scope of the question presented in these cases. Importantly, it considered that issue only under rational-basis review, 39 Ill. 2d, at 600, 237 N.E. 2d, at 502 ("The test of any legislative classification essentially is one of reasonableness"), which even the dissent grudgingly recognizes is an improper standard for evaluating express racial classifications. Other cases cited are similarly inapplicable. See, e.g., Citizens for Better Ed. v. Goose Creek Consol. Independent School Dist., 719 S.W. 2d 350, 352-353 (Tex. App. 1986) (upholding rezoning plan under rational-basis review).16 </s> Justice Breyer's dissent next looks for authority to a footnote in Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 472, n.15 (1982), post, at 56-57, but there this Court expressly noted that it was not passing on the propriety of race-conscious student assignments in the absence of a finding of de jure segregation. Similarly, the citation of Crawford v. Board of Ed. of Los Angeles, 458 U.S. 527 (1982), post, at 24, in which a state referendum prohibiting a race-based assignment plan was challenged, is inapposite--in Crawford the Court again expressly reserved the question presented by these cases. 458 U.S., at 535, n.11. Such reservations and preliminary analyses of course did not decide the merits of this question--as evidenced by the disagreement among the lower courts on this issue. Compare Eisenberg, 197 F.3d, at 133, with Comfort, 418 F.3d, at 13. </s> Justice Breyer's dissent also asserts that these cases are controlled by Grutter, claiming that the existence of a compelling interest in these cases "follows a fortiori" from Grutter, post, at 41, 64-66, and accusing us of tacitly overruling that case, see post, at 64-66. The dissent overreads Grutter, however, in suggesting that it renders pure racial balancing a constitutionally compelling interest; Grutter itself recognized that using race simply to achieve racial balance would be "patently unconstitutional," 539 U.S., at 330. The Court was exceedingly careful in describing the interest furthered in Grutter as "not an interest in simple ethnic diversity" but rather a "far broader array of qualifications and characteristics" in which race was but a single element. 539 U.S., at 324-325 (internal quotation marks omitted). We take the Grutter Court at its word. We simply do not understand how Justice Breyer can maintain that classifying every schoolchild as black or white, and using that classification as a determinative factor in assigning children to achieve pure racial balance, can be regarded as "less burdensome, and hence more narrowly tailored" than the consideration of race in Grutter, post, at 47, when the Court in Grutter stated that "[t]he importance of ... individualized consideration" in the program was "paramount," and consideration of race was one factor in a "highly individualized, holistic review." 539 U.S., at 337. Certainly if the constitutionality of the stark use of race in these cases were as established as the dissent would have it, there would have been no need for the extensive analysis undertaken in Grutter. In light of the foregoing, Justice Breyer's appeal to stare decisis rings particularly hollow. See post, at 65-66. </s> At the same time it relies on inapplicable desegregation cases, misstatements of admitted dicta, and other noncontrolling pronouncements, Justice Breyer's dissent candidly dismisses the significance of this Court's repeated holdings that all racial classifications must be reviewed under strict scrutiny, see post, at 31-33, 35-36, arguing that a different standard of review should be applied because the districts use race for beneficent rather than malicious purposes, see post, at 31-36. </s> This Court has recently reiterated, however, that "'all racial classifications [imposed by government] ... must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.'" Johnson, 543 U.S., at 505 (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S., at 227; emphasis added by Johnson Court). See also Grutter, supra, at 326 ("[G]overnmental action based on race--a group classification long recognized as in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited--should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry" (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted)). Justice Breyer nonetheless relies on the good intentions and motives of the school districts, stating that he has found "no case that ... repudiated this constitutional asymmetry between that which seeks to exclude and that which seeks to include members of minority races." Post, at 29 (emphasis in original). We have found many. Our cases clearly reject the argument that motives affect the strict scrutiny analysis. See Johnson, supra, at 505 ("We have insisted on strict scrutiny in every context, even for so-called 'benign' racial classifications"); Adarand, 515 U.S., at 227 (rejecting idea that "'benign'" racial classifications may be held to "different standard"); Croson, 488 U.S., at 500 ("Racial classifications are suspect, and that means that simple legislative assurances of good intention cannot suffice"). </s> This argument that different rules should govern racial classifications designed to include rather than exclude is not new; it has been repeatedly pressed in the past, see, e.g., Gratz, 539 U.S., at 282 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 301 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Adarand, supra, at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Wygant, 476 U.S., at 316-317 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and has been repeatedly rejected. See also Bakke, 438 U.S., at 289-291 (opinion of Powell, J.) (rejecting argument that strict scrutiny should be applied only to classifications that disadvantage minorities, stating "[r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination"). </s> The reasons for rejecting a motives test for racial classifications are clear enough. "The Court's emphasis on 'benign racial classifications' suggests confidence in its ability to distinguish good from harmful governmental uses of racial criteria. History should teach greater humility.... '[B]enign' carries with it no independent meaning, but reflects only acceptance of the current generation's conclusion that a politically acceptable burden, imposed on particular citizens on the basis of race, is reasonable." Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S., at 609-610 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also Adarand, supra, at 226 ("'[I]t may not always be clear that a so-called preference is in fact benign'" (quoting Bakke, supra, at 298 (opinion of Powell, J.))). Accepting Justice Breyer's approach would "do no more than move us from 'separate but equal' to 'unequal but benign.'" Metro Broadcasting, supra, at 638 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). </s> Justice Breyer speaks of bringing "the races" together (putting aside the purely black-and-white nature of the plans), as the justification for excluding individuals on the basis of their race. See post, at 28-29. Again, this approach to racial classifications is fundamentally at odds with our precedent, which makes clear that the Equal Protection Clause "protect[s] persons, not groups," Adarand, 515 U.S., at 227 (emphasis in original). See ibid. ("[A]ll governmental action based on race--a group classification long recognized as 'in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited,' Hirabayashi [v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)]--should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been infringed" (first emphasis in original); Metro Broadcasting, supra, at 636 ("[O]ur Constitution protects each citizen as an individual, not as a member of a group" (Kennedy, J., dissenting)); Bakke, supra, at 289 (opinion of Powell, J.) (Fourteenth Amendment creates rights "guaranteed to the individual. The rights established are personal rights"). This fundamental principle goes back, in this context, to Brown itself. See Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (Brown II) ("At stake is the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools ... on a nondiscriminatory basis" (emphasis added)). For the dissent, in contrast, "'individualized scrutiny' is simply beside the point." Post, at 55. </s> Justice Breyer's position comes down to a familiar claim: The end justifies the means. He admits that "there is a cost in applying 'a state-mandated racial label,'" post, at 67, but he is confident that the cost is worth paying. Our established strict scrutiny test for racial classifications, however, insists on "detailed examination, both as to ends and as to means." Adarand, supra, at 236 (emphasis added). Simply because the school districts may seek a worthy goal does not mean they are free to discriminate on the basis of race to achieve it, or that their racial classifications should be subject to less exacting scrutiny. </s> Despite his argument that these cases should be evaluated under a "standard of review that is not 'strict' in the traditional sense of that word," post, at 36, Justice Breyer still purports to apply strict scrutiny to these cases. See post, at 37. It is evident, however, that Justice Breyer's brand of narrow tailoring is quite unlike anything found in our precedents. Without any detailed discussion of the operation of the plans, the students who are affected, or the districts' failure to consider race-neutral alternatives, the dissent concludes that the districts have shown that these racial classifications are necessary to achieve the districts' stated goals. This conclusion is divorced from any evaluation of the actual impact of the plans at issue in these cases--other than to note that the plans "often have no effect." Post, at 46.17 Instead, the dissent suggests that some combination of the development of these plans over time, the difficulty of the endeavor, and the good faith of the districts suffices to demonstrate that these stark and controlling racial classifications are constitutional. The Constitution and our precedents require more. </s> In keeping with his view that strict scrutiny should not apply, Justice Breyer repeatedly urges deference to local school boards on these issues. See, e.g., post, at 21, 48-49, 66. Such deference "is fundamentally at odds with our equal protection jurisprudence. We put the burden on state actors to demonstrate that their race-based policies are justified." Johnson, 543 U.S., at 506, n.1. See Croson, 488 U.S., at 501 ("The history of racial classifications in this country suggests that blind judicial deference to legislative or executive pronouncements of necessity has no place in equal protection analysis"); West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) ("The Fourteenth Amendment ... protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures--Boards of Education not excepted"). </s> Justice Breyer's dissent ends on an unjustified note of alarm. It predicts that today's decision "threaten[s]" the validity of "[h]undreds of state and federal statutes and regulations." Post, at 61; see also post, at 27-28. But the examples the dissent mentions--for example, a provision of the No Child Left Behind Act that requires States to set measurable objectives to track the achievement of students from major racial and ethnic groups, 20 U.S.C. §6311(b)(2)(C)(v)--have nothing to do with the pertinent issues in these cases. </s> Justice Breyer also suggests that other means for achieving greater racial diversity in schools are necessarily unconstitutional if the racial classifications at issue in these cases cannot survive strict scrutiny. Post, at 58-62. These other means--e.g., where to construct new schools, how to allocate resources among schools, and which academic offerings to provide to attract students to certain schools--implicate different considerations than the explicit racial classifications at issue in these cases, and we express no opinion on their validity--not even in dicta. Rather, we employ the familiar and well-established analytic approach of strict scrutiny to evaluate the plans at issue today, an approach that in no way warrants the dissent's cataclysmic concerns. Under that approach, the school districts have not carried their burden of showing that the ends they seek justify the particular extreme means they have chosen--classifying individual students on the basis of their race and discriminating among them on that basis. *  *  * </s> If the need for the racial classifications embraced by the school districts is unclear, even on the districts' own terms, the costs are undeniable. "[D]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality." Adarand, 515 U.S., at 214 (internal quotation marks omitted). Government action dividing us by race is inherently suspect because such classifications promote "notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility," Croson, supra, at 493, "reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin," Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993), and "endorse race-based reasoning and the conception of a Nation divided into racial blocs, thus contributing to an escalation of racial hostility and conflict." Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S., at 603 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). As the Court explained in Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000), "[o]ne of the principal reasons race is treated as a forbidden classification is that it demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and essential qualities." All this is true enough in the contexts in which these statements were made--government contracting, voting districts, allocation of broadcast licenses, and electing state officers--but when it comes to using race to assign children to schools, history will be heard. In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I), we held that segregation deprived black children of equal educational opportunities regardless of whether school facilities and other tangible factors were equal, because government classification and separation on grounds of race themselves denoted inferiority. Id., at 493-494. It was not the inequality of the facilities but the fact of legally separating children on the basis of race on which the Court relied to find a constitutional violation in 1954. See id., at 494 ("'The impact [of segregation] is greater when it has the sanction of the law'"). The next Term, we accordingly stated that "full compliance" with Brown I required school districts "to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis." Brown II, 349 U.S., at 300-301 (emphasis added). </s> The parties and their amici debate which side is more faithful to the heritage of Brown, but the position of the plaintiffs in Brown was spelled out in their brief and could not have been clearer: "[T]he Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from according differential treatment to American children on the basis of their color or race." Brief for Appellants in Nos. 1, 2, and 4 and for Respondents in No. 10 on Reargument in Brown I, O.T. 1953, p.15 (Summary of Argument). What do the racial classifications at issue here do, if not accord differential treatment on the basis of race? As counsel who appeared before this Court for the plaintiffs in Brown put it: "We have one fundamental contention which we will seek to develop in the course of this argument, and that contention is that no State has any authority under the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a factor in affording educational opportunities among its citizens." Tr. of Oral Arg. in Brown I, p. 7 (Robert L. Carter, Dec. 9, 1952). There is no ambiguity in that statement. And it was that position that prevailed in this Court, which emphasized in its remedial opinion that what was "[a]t stake is the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis," and what was required was "determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis." Brown II, supra, at 300-301 (emphasis added). What do the racial classifications do in these cases, if not determine admission to a public school on a racial basis?Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could and could not go to school based on the color of their skin. The school districts in these cases have not carried the heavy burden of demonstrating that we should allow this once again--even for very different reasons. For schools that never segregated on the basis of race, such as Seattle, or that have removed the vestiges of past segregation, such as Jefferson County, the way "to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis," Brown II, 349 U.S., at 300-301, is to stop assigning students on a racial basis. The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race. </s> The judgments of the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Ninth Circuits are reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings. It is so ordered. </s> PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, PETITIONER </s> 05-908v. </s> SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 etal. on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit </s> CRYSTAL D. MEREDITH, custodial parent and next friend of JOSHUA RYAN McDONALD, PETITIONER </s> 05-915v. </s> JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION etal. on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit [June 28, 2007] </s> Justice Thomas, concurring. </s> Today, the Court holds that state entities may not experiment with race-based means to achieve ends they deem socially desirable. I wholly concur in The Chief Justice's opinion. I write separately to address several of the contentions in Justice Breyer's dissent (hereinafter the dissent). Contrary to the dissent's arguments, resegregation is not occurring in Seattle or Louisville; these school boards have no present interest in remedying past segregation; and these race-based student-assignment programs do not serve any compelling state interest. Accordingly, the plans are unconstitutional. Disfavoring a color-blind interpretation of the Constitution, the dissent would give school boards a free hand to make decisions on the basis of race--an approach reminiscent of that advocated by the segregationists in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S 483 (1954). This approach is just as wrong today as it was a half-century ago. The Constitution and our cases require us to be much more demanding before permitting local school boards to make decisions based on race. I </s> The dissent repeatedly claims that the school districts are threatened with resegregation and that they will succumb to that threat if these plans are declared unconstitutional. It also argues that these plans can be justified as part of the school boards' attempts to "eradicat[e] earlier school segregation." See, e.g., post, at 4. Contrary to the dissent's rhetoric, neither of these school districts is threatened with resegregation, and neither is constitutionally compelled or permitted to undertake race-based remediation. Racial imbalance is not segregation, and the mere incantation of terms like resegregation and remediation cannot make up the difference. A </s> Because this Court has authorized and required race-based remedial measures to address de jure segregation, it is important to define segregation clearly and to distinguish it from racial imbalance. In the context of public schooling, segregation is the deliberate operation of a school system to "carry out a governmental policy to separate pupils in schools solely on the basis of race." Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 6 (1971); see also Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs of Jackson, 391 U.S. 450, 452 (1968). In Brown, this Court declared that segregation was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Swann, supra, at 6; see also Green v. School Bd. of New Kent Cty., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968) ("[T]he State, acting through the local school board and school officials, organized and operated a dual system, part 'white' and part 'Negro.' It was such dual systems that 14 years ago Brown I[, 347 U.S. 483,] held unconstitutional and a year later Brown II[, 349 U.S. 294 (1955)] held must be abolished").1 Racial imbalance is the failure of a school district's individual schools to match or approximate the demographic makeup of the student population at large. Cf. Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 460 (1982). Racial imbalance is not segregation.2 Although presently observed racial imbalance might result from past de jure segregation, racial imbalance can also result from any number of innocent private decisions, including voluntary housing choices. See Swann, supra, at 25-26; Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 116 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). Because racial imbalance is not inevitably linked to unconstitutional segregation, it is not unconstitutional in and of itself. Dayton Bd. of Ed. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 413 (1977); Dayton Bd. of Ed. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 531, n.5 (1979) ("Racial imbalance ... is not per se a constitutional violation"); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992); see also Swann, supra, at 31-32; cf. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 740-741, and n.19 (1974). </s> Although there is arguably a danger of racial imbalance in schools in Seattle and Louisville, there is no danger of resegregation. No one contends that Seattle has established or that Louisville has reestablished a dual school system that separates students on the basis of race. The statistics cited in Appendix A to the dissent are not to the contrary. See post, at 69-72. At most, those statistics show a national trend toward classroom racial imbalance. However, racial imbalance without intentional state action to separate the races does not amount to segregation. To raise the specter of resegregation to defend these programs is to ignore the meaning of the word and the nature of the cases before us.3 B </s> Just as the school districts lack an interest in preventing resegregation, they also have no present interest in remedying past segregation. The Constitution generally prohibits government race-based decisionmaking, but this Court has authorized the use of race-based measures for remedial purposes in two narrowly defined circumstances. First, in schools that were formerly segregated by law, race-based measures are sometimes constitutionally compelled to remedy prior school segregation. Second, in Croson, the Court appeared willing to authorize a government unit to remedy past discrimination for which it was responsible. Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 504 (1989). Without explicitly resting on either of these strands of doctrine, the dissent repeatedly invokes the school districts' supposed interests in remedying past segregation. Properly analyzed, though, these plans do not fall within either existing category of permissible race-based remediation. 1 </s> The Constitution does not permit race-based government decisionmaking simply because a school district claims a remedial purpose and proceeds in good faith with arguably pure motives. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 371 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pe&nacute;a, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). Rather, race-based government decisionmaking is categorically prohibited unless narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. Grutter, supra, at 326; see also Part II-A, infra. This exacting scrutiny "has proven automatically fatal" in most cases. Jenkins, supra, at 121 (Thomas, J., concurring); cf. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) ("[R]acial discriminations are in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited"). And appropriately so. "The Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not only because those classifications can harm favored races or are based on illegitimate motives, but also because every time the government places citizens on racial registers and makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all." Grutter, supra, at 353 (opinion of Thomas, J.). Therefore, as a general rule, all race-based government decisionmaking--regardless of context--is unconstitutional. 2 </s> This Court has carved out a narrow exception to that general rule for cases in which a school district has a "history of maintaining two sets of schools in a single school system deliberately operated to carry out a governmental policy to separate pupils in schools solely on the basis of race."4 See Swann, 402 U.S., at 5-6. In such cases, race-based remedial measures are sometimes required.5 Green, 391 U.S., at 437-438; cf. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 745 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).6 But without a history of state-enforced racial separation, a school district has no affirmative legal obligation to take race-based remedial measures to eliminate segregation and its vestiges. Neither of the programs before us today is compelled as a remedial measure, and no one makes such a claim. Seattle has no history of de jure segregation; therefore, the Constitution did not require Seattle's plan.7 Although Louisville once operated a segregated school system and was subject to a Federal District Court's desegregation decree, see ante, at 7; Hampton v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Ed., 102 F.Supp. 2d 358, 376-377 (WD Ky. 2000), that decree was dissolved in 2000, id., at 360. Since then, no race-based remedial measures have been required in Louisville. Thus, the race-based student-assignment plan at issue here, which was instituted the year after the dissolution of the desegregation decree, was not even arguably required by the Constitution. 3 </s> Aside from constitutionally compelled remediation in schools, this Court has permitted government units to remedy prior racial discrimination only in narrow circumstances. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) (plurality opinion). Regardless of the constitutional validity of such remediation, see Croson, supra, at 524-525 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment), it does not apply here. Again, neither school board asserts that its race-based actions were taken to remedy prior discrimination. Seattle provides three forward-looking--as opposed to remedial--justifications for its race-based assignment plan. Brief for Respondents in No. 05-908, pp. 24-34. Louisville asserts several similar forward-looking interests, Brief for Respondents in No. 05-915, pp. 24-29, and at oral argument, counsel for Louisville disavowed any claim that Louisville's argument "depend[ed] in any way on the prior de jure segregation," Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 05-915, p.38. Furthermore, for a government unit to remedy past discrimination for which it was responsible, the Court has required it to demonstrate "a 'strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary.'" Croson, 488 U.S., at 500 (quoting Wygant, supra, at 277 (plurality opinion)). Establishing a "strong basis in evidence" requires proper findings regarding the extent of the government unit's past racial discrimination. Croson, 488 U.S., at 504. The findings should "define the scope of any injury [and] the necessary remedy," id., at 505, and must be more than "inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs," id., at 506. Assertions of general societal discrimination are plainly insufficient. Id., at 499, 504; Wygant, supra, at 274 (plurality opinion); cf. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). Neither school district has made any such specific findings. For Seattle, the dissent attempts to make up for this failing by adverting to allegations made in past complaints filed against the Seattle school district. However, allegations in complaints cannot substitute for specific findings of prior discrimination--even when those allegations lead to settlements with complaining parties. Cf. Croson, supra, at 505; Wygant, supra, at 279, n.5 (plurality opinion). As for Louisville, its slate was cleared by the District Court's 2000 dissolution decree, which effectively declared that there were no longer any effects of de jure discrimination in need of remediation.8 </s> Despite the dissent's repeated intimation of a remedial purpose, neither of the programs in question qualifies as a permissible race-based remedial measure. Thus, the programs are subject to the general rule that government race-based decisionmaking is unconstitutional. C </s> As the foregoing demonstrates, racial balancing is sometimes a constitutionally permissible remedy for the discrete legal wrong of de jure segregation, and when directed to that end, racial balancing is an exception to the general rule that government race-based decisionmaking is unconstitutional. Perhaps for this reason, the dissent conflates the concepts of segregation and racial imbalance: If racial imbalance equates to segregation, then it must also be constitutionally acceptable to use racial balancing to remedy racial imbalance. For at least two reasons, however, it is wrong to place the remediation of segregation on the same plane as the remediation of racial imbalance. First, as demonstrated above, the two concepts are distinct. Although racial imbalance can result from de jure segregation, it does not necessarily, and the further we get from the era of state-sponsored racial separation, the less likely it is that racial imbalance has a traceable connection to any prior segregation. See Freeman, 503 U.S., at 496; Jenkins, 515 U.S., at 118 (Thomas, J., concurring). </s> Second, a school cannot "remedy" racial imbalance in the same way that it can remedy segregation. Remediation of past de jure segregation is a one-time process involving the redress of a discrete legal injury inflicted by an identified entity. At some point, the discrete injury will be remedied, and the school district will be declared unitary. See Swann, 402 U.S., at 31. Unlike de jure segregation, there is no ultimate remedy for racial imbalance. Individual schools will fall in and out of balance in the natural course, and the appropriate balance itself will shift with a school district's changing demographics. Thus, racial balancing will have to take place on an indefinite basis--a continuous process with no identifiable culpable party and no discernable end point. In part for those reasons, the Court has never permitted outright racial balancing solely for the purpose of achieving a particular racial balance. II </s> Lacking a cognizable interest in remediation, neither of these plans can survive strict scrutiny because neither plan serves a genuinely compelling state interest. The dissent avoids reaching that conclusion by unquestioningly accepting the assertions of selected social scientists while completely ignoring the fact that those assertions are the subject of fervent debate. Ultimately, the dissent's entire analysis is corrupted by the considerations that lead it initially to question whether strict scrutiny should apply at all. What emerges is a version of "strict scrutiny" that combines hollow assurances of harmlessness with reflexive acceptance of conventional wisdom. When it comes to government race-based decisionmaking, the Constitution demands more. A </s> The dissent claims that "the law requires application here of a standard of review that is not 'strict' in the traditional sense of that word." Post, at 36. This view is informed by dissents in our previous cases and the concurrences of two Court of Appeals judges. Post, at 34-36 (citing 426 F.3d 1162, 1193-1194 (CA9 2005) (Kozinski, J., concurring); Comfort v. Lynn School Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 28-29 (CA1 2005) (Boudin, C.J., concurring)). Those lower court judges reasoned that programs like these are not "aimed at oppressing blacks" and do not "seek to give one racial group an edge over another." Comfort, supra, at 27 (Boudin, C.J., concurring); 426 F.3d, at 1193 (Kozinski, J., concurring). They were further persuaded that these plans differed from other race-based programs this Court has considered because they are "certainly more benign than laws that favor or disfavor one race, segregate by race, or create quotas for or against a racial group," Comfort, 418 F.3d, at 28 (Boudin, C.J., concurring), and they are "far from the original evils at which the Fourteenth Amendment was addressed," id., at 29; 426 F.3d, at 1195 (Kozinski, J., concurring). Instead of strict scrutiny, Judge Kozinski would have analyzed the plans under "robust and realistic rational basis review." Id., at 1194. These arguments are inimical to the Constitution and to this Court's precedents.9 We have made it unusually clear that strict scrutiny applies to every racial classification. Adarand, 515 U.S., at 227; Grutter, 539 U.S., at 326; Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) ("We have insisted on strict scrutiny in every context, even for so-called 'benign' racial classifications").10 There are good reasons not to apply a lesser standard to these cases. The constitutional problems with government race-based decisionmaking are not diminished in the slightest by the presence or absence of an intent to oppress any race or by the real or asserted well-meaning motives for the race-based decisionmaking. Adarand, 515 U.S., at 228-229. Purportedly benign race-based decisionmaking suffers the same constitutional infirmity as invidious race-based decisionmaking. Id., at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("As far as the Constitution is concerned, it is irrelevant whether a government's racial classifications are drawn by those who wish to oppress a race or by those who have a sincere desire to help those thought to be disadvantaged"). </s> Even supposing it mattered to the constitutional analysis, the race-based student assignment programs before us are not as benign as the dissent believes. See post, at 34-35. "[R]acial paternalism and its unintended consequences can be as poisonous and pernicious as any other form of discrimination." Adarand, supra, at 241 (opinion of Thomas, J.). As these programs demonstrate, every time the government uses racial criteria to "bring the races together," post, at 29, someone gets excluded, and the person excluded suffers an injury solely because of his or her race. The petitioner in the Louisville case received a letter from the school board informing her that her kindergartener would not be allowed to attend the school of petitioner's choosing because of the child's race. App. in No. 05-915, p.97. Doubtless, hundreds of letters like this went out from both school boards every year these race-based assignment plans were in operation. This type of exclusion, solely on the basis of race, is precisely the sort of government action that pits the races against one another, exacerbates racial tension, and "provoke[s] resentment among those who believe that they have been wronged by the government's use of race." Adarand, supra, at 241 (opinion of Thomas, J.). Accordingly, these plans are simply one more variation on the government race-based decisionmaking we have consistently held must be subjected to strict scrutiny. Grutter, supra, at 326. B </s> Though the dissent admits to discomfort in applying strict scrutiny to these plans, it claims to have nonetheless applied that exacting standard. But in its search for a compelling interest, the dissent casually accepts even the most tenuous interests asserted on behalf of the plans, grouping them all under the term "'integration.'" See post, at 37. "'[I]ntegration,'" we are told, has "three essential elements." Ibid. None of these elements is compelling. And the combination of the three unsubstantiated elements does not produce an interest any more compelling than that represented by each element independently. 1 </s> According to the dissent, integration involves "an interest in setting right the consequences of prior conditions of segregation." Post, at 37. For the reasons explained above, the records in these cases do not demonstrate that either school board's plan is supported by an interest in remedying past discrimination. Part I-B, supra. Moreover, the school boards have no interest in remedying the sundry consequences of prior segregation unrelated to schooling, such as "housing patterns, employment practices, economic conditions, and social attitudes." Post, at 38. General claims that past school segregation affected such varied societal trends are "too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy," Wygant, 476 U.S., at 276 (plurality opinion), because "[i]t is sheer speculation" how decades-past segregation in the school system might have affected these trends, see Croson, 488 U.S., at 499. Consequently, school boards seeking to remedy those societal problems with race-based measures in schools today would have no way to gauge the proper scope of the remedy. Id., at 498. Indeed, remedial measures geared toward such broad and unrelated societal ills have "'no logical stopping point,'" ibid., and threaten to become "ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless in their ability to affect the future," Wygant, supra, at 276 (plurality opinion). See Grutter, 539 U.S., at 342 (stating the "requirement that all governmental use of race must have a logical end point"). </s> Because the school boards lack any further interest in remedying segregation, this element offers no support for the purported interest in "integration." 2 </s> Next, the dissent argues that the interest in integration has an educational element. The dissent asserts that racially balanced schools improve educational outcomes for black children. In support, the dissent unquestioningly cites certain social science research to support propositions that are hotly disputed among social scientists. In reality, it is far from apparent that coerced racial mixing has any educational benefits, much less that integration is necessary to black achievement. Scholars have differing opinions as to whether educational benefits arise from racial balancing. Some have concluded that black students receive genuine educational benefits. See, e.g., Crain & Mahard, Desegregation and Black Achievement: A Review of the Research, 42 L. & Contemp. Probs. 17, 48 (1978). Others have been more circumspect. See, e.g., Henderson, Greenberg, Schneider, Uribe, & Verdugo, High Quality Schooling for African American Students, in Beyond Desegregation 166 (M. Shujaa ed. 1996) ("Perhaps desegregation does not have a single effect, positive or negative, on the academic achievement of African American students, but rather some strategies help, some hurt, and still others make no difference whatsoever. It is clear to us that focusing simply on demographic issues detracts from focusing on improving schools"). And some have concluded that there are no demonstrable educational benefits. See, e.g., Armor & Rossell, Desegregation and Resegregation in the Public Schools, in Beyond the Color Line: New Perspectives on Race and Ethnicity in America 239, 251 (A. Thernstrom & S. Thernstrom eds. 2002). </s> The amicus briefs in the cases before us mirror this divergence of opinion. Supporting the school boards, one amicus has assured us that "both early desegregation research and recent statistical and econometric analyses ... indicate that there are positive effects on minority student achievement scores arising from diverse school settings." Brief for American Educational Research Association as Amicus Curiae 10. Another brief claims that "school desegregation has a modest positive impact on the achievement of African-American students." App. to Brief for 553 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae 13-14 (footnote omitted). Yet neither of those briefs contains specific details like the magnitude of the claimed positive effects or the precise demographic mix at which those positive effects begin to be realized. Indeed, the social scientists' brief rather cautiously claims the existence of any benefit at all, describing the "positive impact" as "modest," id., at 13, acknowledging that "there appears to be little or no effect on math scores," id., at 14, and admitting that the "underlying reasons for these gains in achievement are not entirely clear," id., at 15.11 </s> Other amici dispute these findings. One amicus reports that "[i]n study after study, racial composition of a student body, when isolated, proves to be an insignificant determinant of student achievement." Brief for Dr. John Murphy etal. as Amici Curiae in No. 05-908, p.8; see also id., at 9 ("[T]here is no evidence that diversity in the K-12 classroom positively affects student achievement"). Another amicus surveys several social science studies and concludes that "a fair and comprehensive analysis of the research shows that there is no clear and consistent evidence of [educational] benefits." Brief for David J. Armor etal. as Amici Curiae 29. </s> Add to the inconclusive social science the fact of black achievement in "racially isolated" environments. See T. Sowell, Education: Assumptions Versus History 7-38 (1986). Before Brown, the most prominent example of an exemplary black school was Dunbar High School. Id., at 29 ("[I]n the period 1918-1923, Dunbar graduates earned fifteen degrees from Ivy League colleges, and ten degrees from Amherst, Williams, and Wesleyan"). Dunbar is by no means an isolated example. See id., at 10-32 (discussing other successful black schools); Walker, Can Institutions Care? Evidence from the Segregated Schooling of African American Children, in Beyond Desegregation 209-226 (M. Shujaa ed. 1996); see also T. Sowell, Affirmative Action Around the World: An Empirical Study 141-165 (2004). Even after Brown, some schools with predominantly black enrollments have achieved outstanding educational results. See, e.g., S. Carter, No Excuses: Lessons from 21 High-Performing, High-Poverty Schools 49-50, 53-56, 71-73, 81-84, 87-88 (2001); A. Thernstrom & S. Thernstrom, No Excuses: Closing the Racial Gap in Learning 43-64 (2003); see also L. Izumi, They Have Overcome: High-Poverty, High-Performing Schools in California (2002) (chronicling exemplary achievement in predominantly Hispanic schools in California). There is also evidence that black students attending historically black colleges achieve better academic results than those attending predominantly white colleges. Grutter, supra, at 364-365 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (citing sources); see also Fordice, 505 U.S., at 748-749 (Thomas, J., concurring). </s> The Seattle school board itself must believe that racial mixing is not necessary to black achievement. Seattle operates a K-8 "African-American Academy," which has a "nonwhite" enrollment of 99%. See App. in No. 05-908, p.227a; Reply Brief in No. 05-908, p.13, n.13. That school was founded in 1990 as part of the school board's effort to "increase academic achievement."12 See African American Academy History, online at http://www. seattleschools.org/schools/aaa/history.htm (all Internet materials as visited June 26, 2007, and available in Clerk of Court's case file). According to the school's most recent annual report, "[a]cademic excellence" is its "primary goal." See African American Academy 2006 Annual Report, p.2, online at http://www.seattleschools.org/area/ siso/reports/anrep/altern/938.pdf. This racially imbalanced environment has reportedly produced test scores "higher across all grade levels in reading, writing and math." Ibid. Contrary to what the dissent would have predicted, see post, at 38-39, the children in Seattle's African American Academy have shown gains when placed in a "highly segregated" environment. </s> Given this tenuous relationship between forced racial mixing and improved educational results for black children, the dissent cannot plausibly maintain that an educational element supports the integration interest, let alone makes it compelling.13 See Jenkins, 515 U.S., at 121-122 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]here is no reason to think that black students cannot learn as well when surrounded by members of their own race as when they are in an integrated environment"). </s> Perhaps recognizing as much, the dissent argues that the social science evidence is "strong enough to permit a democratically elected school board reasonably to determine that this interest is a compelling one." Post, at 38. This assertion is inexplicable. It is not up to the school boards--the very government entities whose race-based practices we must strictly scrutinize--to determine what interests qualify as compelling under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Rather, this Court must assess independently the nature of the interest asserted and the evidence to support it in order to determine whether it qualifies as compelling under our precedents. In making such a determination, we have deferred to state authorities only once, see Grutter, 539 U.S., at 328-330, and that deference was prompted by factors uniquely relevant to higher education. Id., at 328 ("Our holding today is in keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university's academic decisions"). The dissent's proposed test--whether sufficient social science evidence supports a government unit's conclusion that the interest it asserts is compelling--calls to mind the rational-basis standard of review the dissent purports not to apply, post, at 36-37. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) ("It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it"). Furthermore, it would leave our equal-protection jurisprudence at the mercy of elected government officials evaluating the evanescent views of a handful of social scientists. To adopt the dissent's deferential approach would be to abdicate our constitutional responsibilities.14 3 </s> Finally, the dissent asserts a "democratic element" to the integration interest. It defines the "democratic element" as "an interest in producing an educational environment that reflects the 'pluralistic society' in which our children will live." Post, at 39.15 Environmental reflection, though, is just another way to say racial balancing. And "[p]referring members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake." Bakke, 438 U.S., at 307 (opinion of Powell, J.). "This the Constitution forbids." Ibid.; Grutter, supra, at 329-330; Freeman, 503 U.S., at 494. Navigating around that inconvenient authority, the dissent argues that the racial balancing in these plans is not an end in itself but is instead intended to "teac[h] children to engage in the kind of cooperation among Americans of all races that is necessary to make a land of three hundred million people one Nation." Post, at 39-40. These "generic lessons in socialization and good citizenship" are too sweeping to qualify as compelling interests. Grutter, 539 U.S., at 348 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). And they are not "uniquely relevant" to schools or "uniquely 'teachable' in a formal educational setting." Id., at 347. Therefore, if governments may constitutionally use racial balancing to achieve these aspirational ends in schools, they may use racial balancing to achieve similar goals at every level--from state-sponsored 4-H clubs, see Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 388-390 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring), to the state civil service. See Grutter, 539 U.S. 347-348 (opinion of Scalia, J.). </s> Moreover, the democratic interest has no durational limit, contrary to Grutter's command. See id., at 342; see also Croson, 488 U.S., at 498; Wygant, 476 U.S., at 275 (plurality opinion). In other words, it will always be important for students to learn cooperation among the races. If this interest justifies race-conscious measures today, then logically it will justify race-conscious measures forever. Thus, the democratic interest, limitless in scope and "timeless in [its] ability to affect the future," id., at 276 (plurality opinion), cannot justify government race-based decisionmaking.16 </s> In addition to these defects, the democratic element of the integration interest fails on the dissent's own terms. The dissent again relies upon social science research to support the proposition that state-compelled racial mixing teaches children to accept cooperation and improves racial attitudes and race relations. Here again, though, the dissent overstates the data that supposedly support the interest. </s> The dissent points to data that indicate that "black and white students in desegregated schools are less racially prejudiced than those in segregated schools." Post, at 40 (internal quotation marks omitted). By the dissent's account, improvements in racial attitudes depend upon the increased contact between black and white students thought to occur in more racially balanced schools. There is no guarantee, however, that students of different races in the same school will actually spend time with one another. Schools frequently group students by academic ability as an aid to efficient instruction, but such groupings often result in classrooms with high concentrations of one race or another. See, e.g., Yonezawa, Wells, & Serna, Choosing Tracks: "Freedom of Choice" in Detracting Schools, 39 Am. Ed. Research J., No. 1, p.38 (Spring 2002); Mickelson, Subverting Swann: First- and Second-Generation Segregation in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools, 38 Am. Ed. Research J., No. 2, pp. 233-234 (Summer 2001) (describing this effect in schools in Charlotte, North Carolina). In addition to classroom separation, students of different races within the same school may separate themselves socially. See Hallinan & Williams, Interracial Friendship Choices in Secondary Schools, 54 Am. Sociological Rev., No. 1, pp. 72-76 (Feb. 1989); see also Clotfelter, Interracial Contact in High School Extracurricular Activities, 34 Urban Rev., No. 1, pp. 41-43 (Mar. 2002). Therefore, even supposing interracial contact leads directly to improvements in racial attitudes and race relations, a program that assigns students of different races to the same schools might not capture those benefits. Simply putting students together under the same roof does not necessarily mean that the students will learn together or even interact. </s> Furthermore, it is unclear whether increased interracial contact improves racial attitudes and relations.17 One researcher has stated that "the reviews of desegregation and intergroup relations were unable to come to any conclusion about what the probable effects of desegregation were ... [;] virtually all of the reviewers determined that few, if any, firm conclusions about the impact of desegregation on intergroup relations could be drawn." Schofield, School Desegregation and Intergroup Relations: A Review of the Literature, in 17 Review of Research in Education 356 (G. Grant ed. 1991). Some studies have even found that a deterioration in racial attitudes seems to result from racial mixing in schools. See N. St. John, School Desegregation Outcomes for Children 67-68 (1975) ("A glance at [the data] shows that for either race positive findings are less common than negative findings"); Stephan, The Effects of School Desegregation: An Evaluation 30 Years After Brown, in Advances in Applied Social Psychology 183-186 (M. Saks & L. Saxe eds. 1986). Therefore, it is not nearly as apparent as the dissent suggests that increased interracial exposure automatically leads to improved racial attitudes or race relations. </s> Given our case law and the paucity of evidence supporting the dissent's belief that these plans improve race relations, no democratic element can support the integration interest.18 4 </s> The dissent attempts to buttress the integration interest by claiming that it follows a fortiori from the interest this Court recognized as compelling in Grutter. Post, at 41. Regardless of the merit of Grutter, the compelling interest recognized in that case cannot support these plans. Grutter recognized a compelling interest in a law school's attainment of a diverse student body. 539 U.S., at 328. This interest was critically dependent upon features unique to higher education: "the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university environment," the "special niche in our constitutional tradition" occupied by universities, and "[t]he freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to education[,] includ[ing] the selection of its student body." Id., at 329 (internal quotation marks omitted). None of these features is present in elementary and secondary schools. Those schools do not select their own students, and education in the elementary and secondary environment generally does not involve the free interchange of ideas thought to be an integral part of higher education. See 426 F.3d, at 1208 (Bea, J., dissenting). Extending Grutter to this context would require us to cut that holding loose from its theoretical moorings. Thus, only by ignoring Grutter's reasoning can the dissent claim that recognizing a compelling interest in these cases is an a fortiori application of Grutter. C </s> Stripped of the baseless and novel interests the dissent asserts on their behalf, the school boards cannot plausibly maintain that their plans further a compelling interest. As I explained in Grutter, only "those measures the State must take to provide a bulwark against anarchy ... or to prevent violence" and "a government's effort to remedy past discrimination for which it is responsible" constitute compelling interests. 539 U.S., at 351-352, 353. Neither of the parties has argued--nor could they--that race-based student assignment is necessary to provide a bulwark against anarchy or to prevent violence. And as I explained above, the school districts have no remedial interest in pursuing these programs. See Part I-B, supra. Accordingly, the school boards cannot satisfy strict scrutiny. These plans are unconstitutional. III </s> Most of the dissent's criticisms of today's result can be traced to its rejection of the color-blind Constitution. See post, at 29. The dissent attempts to marginalize the notion of a color-blind Constitution by consigning it to me and Members of today's plurality.19 See ibid.; see also post, at 61. But I am quite comfortable in the company I keep. My view of the Constitution is Justice Harlan's view in Plessy: "Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (dissenting opinion). And my view was the rallying cry for the lawyers who litigated Brown. See, e.g., Brief for Appellants in Brown v. Board of Education, O.T. 1953, Nos. 1, 2, and 4 p.65 ("That the Constitution is color blind is our dedicated belief"); Brief for Appellants in Brown v. Board of Education, O.T. 1952, No. 1, p.5 ("The Fourteenth Amendment precludes a state from imposing distinctions or classifications based upon race and color alone");20 see also In Memoriam: Honorable Thurgood Marshall, Proceedings of the Bar and Officers of the Supreme Court of the United States, X (1993) (remarks of Judge Motley) ("Marshall had a 'Bible' to which he turned during his most depressed moments. The 'Bible' would be known in the legal community as the first Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896). I do not know of any opinion which buoyed Marshall more in his pre-Brown days ..."). The dissent appears to pin its interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause to current societal practice and expectations, deference to local officials, likely practical consequences, and reliance on previous statements from this and other courts. Such a view was ascendant in this Court's jurisprudence for several decades. It first appeared in Plessy, where the Court asked whether a state law providing for segregated railway cars was "a reasonable regulation." 163 U.S., at 550. The Court deferred to local authorities in making its determination, noting that in inquiring into reasonableness "there must necessarily be a large discretion on the part of the legislature." Ibid. The Court likewise paid heed to societal practices, local expectations, and practical consequences by looking to "the established usages, customs and traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good order." Ibid. Guided by these principles, the Court concluded: "[W]e cannot say that a law which authorizes or even requires the separation of the two races in public conveyances is unreasonable, or more obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment than the acts of Congress requiring separate schools for colored children in the District of Columbia." Id., at 550-551. </s> The segregationists in Brown embraced the arguments the Court endorsed in Plessy. Though Brown decisively rejected those arguments, today's dissent replicates them to a distressing extent. Thus, the dissent argues that "[e]ach plan embodies the results of local experience and community consultation." Post, at 47. Similarly, the segregationists made repeated appeals to societal practice and expectation. See, e.g., Brief for Appellees on Reargument in Briggs v. Elliott, O.T. 1953, No. 2, p. 76 ("[A] State has power to establish a school system which is capable of efficient administration, taking into account local problems and conditions").21 The dissent argues that "weight [must be given] to a local school board's knowledge, expertise, and concerns," post, at 48, and with equal vigor, the segregationists argued for deference to local authorities. See, e.g., Brief for Kansas on Reargument in Brown v. Board of Education, O.T. 1953, No. 1, p.14 ("We advocate only a concept of constitutional law that permits determinations of state and local policy to be made on state and local levels. We defend only the validity of the statute that enables the Topeka Board of Education to determine its own course").22 The dissent argues that today's decision "threatens to substitute for present calm a disruptive round of race-related litigation," post, at 2, and claims that today's decision "risks serious harm to the law and for the Nation," post, at 65. The segregationists also relied upon the likely practical consequences of ending the state-imposed system of racial separation. See, e.g., Brief for Appellees on Reargument in Davis v. County School Board, O.T. 1953, No. 3, p.37 ("Yet a holding that school segregation by race violates the Constitution will result in upheaval in all of those places not now subject to Federal judicial scrutiny. This Court has made many decisions of widespread effect; none would affect more people more directly in more fundamental interests and, in fact, cause more chaos in local government than a reversal of the decision in this case").23 And foreshadowing today's dissent, the segregationists most heavily relied upon judicial precedent. See, e.g., Brief for Appellees on Reargument in Briggs v. Elliott, O.T. 1953, No. 2, p. 59 ("[I]t would be difficult indeed to find a case so favored by precedent as is the case for South Carolina here").24 </s> The similarities between the dissent's arguments and the segregationists' arguments do not stop there. Like the dissent, the segregationists repeatedly cautioned the Court to consider practicalities and not to embrace too theoretical a view of the Fourteenth Amendment.25 And just as the dissent argues that the need for these programs will lessen over time, the segregationists claimed that reliance on segregation was lessening and might eventually end.26 </s> What was wrong in 1954 cannot be right today.27 Whatever else the Court's rejection of the segregationists' arguments in Brown might have established, it certainly made clear that state and local governments cannot take from the Constitution a right to make decisions on the basis of race by adverse possession. The fact that state and local governments had been discriminating on the basis of race for a long time was irrelevant to the Brown Court. The fact that racial discrimination was preferable to the relevant communities was irrelevant to the Brown Court. And the fact that the state and local governments had relied on statements in this Court's opinions was irrelevant to the Brown Court. The same principles guide today's decision. None of the considerations trumpeted by the dissent is relevant to the constitutionality of the school boards' race-based plans because no contextual detail--or collection of contextual details, post, at 2-22--can "provide refuge from the principle that under our Constitution, the government may not make distinctions on the basis of race." Adarand, 515 U.S., at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).28 </s> In place of the color-blind Constitution, the dissent would permit measures to keep the races together and proscribe measures to keep the races apart.29 See post, at 28-34, 64-65. Although no such distinction is apparent in the Fourteenth Amendment, the dissent would constitutionalize today's faddish social theories that embrace that distinction. The Constitution is not that malleable. Even if current social theories favor classroom racial engineering as necessary to "solve the problems at hand," post, at 21, the Constitution enshrines principles independent of social theories. See Plessy, 163 U.S., at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time .... But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. ... Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens"). Indeed, if our history has taught us anything, it has taught us to beware of elites bearing racial theories.30 See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 407 (1857) ("[T]hey [members of the "negro African race"] had no rights which the white man was bound to respect"). Can we really be sure that the racial theories that motivated Dred Scott and Plessy are a relic of the past or that future theories will be nothing but beneficent and progressive? That is a gamble I am unwilling to take, and it is one the Constitution does not allow. *  *  * </s> The plans before us base school assignment decisions on students' race. Because "[o]ur Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens," such race-based decisionmaking is unconstitutional. Plessy, supra, at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). I concur in the Chief Justice's opinion so holding. </s> PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, PETITIONER </s> 05-908v. </s> SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 etal. on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit </s> CRYSTAL D. MEREDITH, custodial parent and next friend of JOSHUA RYAN McDONALD, PETITIONER </s> 05-915v. </s> JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION etal. on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit [June 28, 2007] </s> Justice Kennedy, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. </s> The Nation's schools strive to teach that our strength comes from people of different races, creeds, and cultures uniting in commitment to the freedom of all. In these cases two school districts in different parts of the country seek to teach that principle by having classrooms that reflect the racial makeup of the surrounding community. That the school districts consider these plans to be necessary should remind us our highest aspirations are yet unfulfilled. But the solutions mandated by these school districts must themselves be lawful. To make race matter now so that it might not matter later may entrench the very prejudices we seek to overcome. In my view the state-mandated racial classifications at issue, official labels proclaiming the race of all persons in a broad class of citizens--elementary school students in one case, high school students in another--are unconstitutional as the cases now come to us. </s> I agree with The Chief Justice that we have jurisdiction to decide the cases before us and join Parts I and II of the Court's opinion. I also join Parts III-A and III-C for reasons provided below. My views do not allow me to join the balance of the opinion by The Chief Justice, which seems to me to be inconsistent in both its approach and its implications with the history, meaning, and reach of the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion, on the other hand, rests on what in my respectful submission is a misuse and mistaken interpretation of our precedents. This leads it to advance propositions that, in my view, are both erroneous and in fundamental conflict with basic equal protection principles. As a consequence, this separate opinion is necessary to set forth my conclusions in the two cases before the Court. I </s> The opinion of the Court and Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion (hereinafter dissent) describe in detail the history of integration efforts in Louisville and Seattle. These plans classify individuals by race and allocate benefits and burdens on that basis; and as a result, they are to be subjected to strict scrutiny. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505-506 (2005); ante, at 11. The dissent finds that the school districts have identified a compelling interest in increasing diversity, including for the purpose of avoiding racial isolation. See post, at 37-45. The plurality, by contrast, does not acknowledge that the school districts have identified a compelling interest here. See ante, at 17-25. For this reason, among others, I do not join Parts III-B and IV. Diversity, depending on its meaning and definition, is a compelling educational goal a school district may pursue. It is well established that when a governmental policy is subjected to strict scrutiny, "the government has the burden of proving that racial classifications 'are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.'" Johnson, supra, at 505 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pe&nacute;a, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)). "Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics." Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion). And the inquiry into less restrictive alternatives demanded by the narrow tailoring analysis requires in many cases a thorough understanding of how a plan works. The government bears the burden of justifying its use of individual racial classifications. As part of that burden it must establish, in detail, how decisions based on an individual student's race are made in a challenged governmental program. The Jefferson County Board of Education fails to meet this threshold mandate. </s> Petitioner Crystal Meredith challenges the district's decision to deny her son Joshua McDonald a requested transfer for his kindergarten enrollment. The district concedes it denied his request "under the guidelines," which is to say, on the basis of Joshua's race. Brief for Respondents in No. 05-915, p. 10; see also App. in No. 05-915, p. 97. Yet the district also maintains that the guidelines do not apply to "kindergartens," Brief for Respondents in No. 05-915, at 4, and it fails to explain the discrepancy. Resort to the record, including the parties' Stipulation of Facts, further confuses the matter. See App. in No. 05-915, at 43 ("Transfer applications can be denied because of lack of available space or, for students in grades other than Primary 1 (kindergarten), the racial guidelines in the District's current student assignment plan"); id., at 29 ("The student assignment plan does not apply to . . . students in Primary 1"); see also Stipulation of Facts in No. 3:02-CV-00620-JGH; Doc. 32, Exh. 44, p.6 (2003-04 Jefferson County Public Schools Elementary Student Assignment Application, Section B) ("Assignment is made to a school for Primary 1 (Kindergarten) through Grade Five as long as racial guidelines are maintained. If the Primary 1 (Kindergarten) placement does not enhance racial balance, a new application must be completed for Primary 2 (Grade One)"). </s> The discrepancy identified is not some simple and straightforward error that touches only upon the peripheries of the district's use of individual racial classifications. To the contrary, Jefferson County in its briefing has explained how and when it employs these classifications only in terms so broad and imprecise that they cannot withstand strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents in No. 05-915, at 4-10. While it acknowledges that racial classifications are used to make certain assignment decisions, it fails to make clear, for example, who makes the decisions; what if any oversight is employed; the precise circumstances in which an assignment decision will or will not be made on the basis of race; or how it is determined which of two similarly situated children will be subjected to a given race-based decision. See ibid.; see also App. in No. 05-915, at 38, 42 (indicating that decisions are "based on ... the racial guidelines" without further explanation); id., at 81 (setting forth the blanket mandate that "[s]chools shall work cooperatively with each other and with central office to ensure that enrollment at all schools [in question] is within the racial guidelines annually and to encourage that the enrollment at all schools progresses toward the midpoint of the guidelines"); id., at 43, 76-77, 81-83; McFarland v. Jefferson Cty. Public Schools, 330 F.Supp. 2d 834, 837-845, 855-862 (WD Ky. 2004). </s> When litigation, as here, involves a "complex, comprehensive plan that contains multiple strategies for achieving racially integrated schools," Brief for Respondents in No. 05-915, at 4, these ambiguities become all the more problematic in light of the contradictions and confusions that result. Compare, e.g., App. in No. 05-915, at 37 ("Each [Jefferson County] school ... has a designated geographic attendance area, which is called the 'resides area' of the school[, and each] such school is the 'resides school' for those students whose parent's or guardian's residence address is within the school's geographic attendance area"); id., at 82 ("All elementary students ... shall be assigned to the school which serves the area in which they reside"); and Brief for Respondents in No. 05-915, at 5 ("There are no selection criteria for admission to [an elementary school student's] resides school, except attainment of the appropriate age and completion of the previous grade"), with App. in No. 05-915, at 38 ("Decisions to assign students to schools within each cluster are based on available space within the [elementary] schools and the racial guidelines in the District's current student assignment plan"); id., at 82 (acknowledging that a student may not be assigned to his or her resides school if it "has reached ... the extremes of the racial guidelines"). </s> One can attempt to identify a construction of Jefferson County's student assignment plan that, at least as a logical matter, complies with these competing propositions; but this does not remedy the underlying problem. Jefferson County fails to make clear to this Court--even in the limited respects implicated by Joshua's initial assignment and transfer denial--whether in fact it relies on racial classifications in a manner narrowly tailored to the interest in question, rather than in the far-reaching, inconsistent, and adhoc manner that a less forgiving reading of the record would suggest. When a court subjects governmental action to strict scrutiny, it cannot construe ambiguities in favor of the State. </s> As for the Seattle case, the school district has gone further in describing the methods and criteria used to determine assignment decisions on the basis of individual racial classifications. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents in No. 05-908, p. 5-11. The district, nevertheless, has failed to make an adequate showing in at least one respect. It has failed to explain why, in a district composed of a diversity of races, with fewer than half of the students classified as "white," it has employed the crude racial categories of "white" and "non-white" as the basis for its assignment decisions. See, e.g., id., at 1-11. </s> The district has identified its purposes as follows: "(1) to promote the educational benefits of diverse school enrollments; (2) to reduce the potentially harmful effects of racial isolation by allowing students the opportunity to opt out of racially isolated schools; and (3) to make sure that racially segregated housing patterns did not prevent non-white students from having equitable access to the most popular over-subscribed schools." Id., at 19. Yet the school district does not explain how, in the context of its diverse student population, a blunt distinction between "white" and "non-white" furthers these goals. As the Court explains, "a school with 50 percent Asian-American students and 50 percent white students but no African-American, Native-American, or Latino students would qualify as balanced, while a school with 30 percent Asian-American, 25 percent African-American, 25 percent Latino, and 20 percent white students would not." Ante, at 15-16; see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in No. 05-908, pp. 13-14. Far from being narrowly tailored to its purposes, this system threatens to defeat its own ends, and the school district has provided no convincing explanation for its design. Other problems are evident in Seattle's system, but there is no need to address them now. As the district fails to account for the classification system it has chosen, despite what appears to be its ill fit, Seattle has not shown its plan to be narrowly tailored to achieve its own ends; and thus it fails to pass strict scrutiny. II </s> Our Nation from the inception has sought to preserve and expand the promise of liberty and equality on which it was founded. Today we enjoy a society that is remarkable in its openness and opportunity. Yet our tradition is to go beyond present achievements, however significant, and to recognize and confront the flaws and injustices that remain. This is especially true when we seek assurance that opportunity is not denied on account of race. The enduring hope is that race should not matter; the reality is that too often it does. This is by way of preface to my respectful submission that parts of the opinion by The Chief Justice imply an all-too-unyielding insistence that race cannot be a factor in instances when, in my view, it may be taken into account. The plurality opinion is too dismissive of the legitimate interest government has in ensuring all people have equal opportunity regardless of their race. The plurality's postulate that "[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race," ante, at 40-41, is not sufficient to decide these cases. Fifty years of experience since Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), should teach us that the problem before us defies so easy a solution. School districts can seek to reach Brown's objective of equal educational opportunity. The plurality opinion is at least open to the interpretation that the Constitution requires school districts to ignore the problem of de facto resegregation in schooling. I cannot endorse that conclusion. To the extent the plurality opinion suggests the Constitution mandates that state and local school authorities must accept the status quo of racial isolation in schools, it is, in my view, profoundly mistaken. </s> The statement by Justice Harlan that "[o]ur Constitution is color-blind" was most certainly justified in the context of his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896). The Court's decision in that case was a grievous error it took far too long to overrule. Plessy, of course, concerned official classification by race applicable to all persons who sought to use railway carriages. And, as an aspiration, Justice Harlan's axiom must command our assent. In the real world, it is regrettable to say, it cannot be a universal constitutional principle. </s> In the administration of public schools by the state and local authorities it is permissible to consider the racial makeup of schools and to adopt general policies to encourage a diverse student body, one aspect of which is its racial composition. Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); id., at 387-388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). If school authorities are concerned that the student-body compositions of certain schools interfere with the objective of offering an equal educational opportunity to all of their students, they are free to devise race-conscious measures to address the problem in a general way and without treating each student in different fashion solely on the basis of a systematic, individual typing by race. </s> School boards may pursue the goal of bringing together students of diverse backgrounds and races through other means, including strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race. These mechanisms are race conscious but do not lead to different treatment based on a classification that tells each student he or she is to be defined by race, so it is unlikely any of them would demand strict scrutiny to be found permissible. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958 (1996) (plurality opinion) ("Strict scrutiny does not apply merely because redistricting is performed with consciousness of race.... Electoral district lines are 'facially race neutral' so a more searching inquiry is necessary before strict scrutiny can be found applicable in redistricting cases than in cases of 'classifications based explicitly on race'" (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S., at 213)). Executive and legislative branches, which for generations now have considered these types of policies and procedures, should be permitted to employ them with candor and with confidence that a constitutional violation does not occur whenever a decisionmaker considers the impact a given approach might have on students of different races. Assigning to each student a personal designation according to a crude system of individual racial classifications is quite a different matter; and the legal analysis changes accordingly. </s> Each respondent has asserted that its assignment of individual students by race is permissible because there is no other way to avoid racial isolation in the school districts. Yet, as explained, each has failed to provide the support necessary for that proposition. Cf. Croson, 488 U.S., at 501 ("The history of racial classifications in this country suggests that blind judicial deference to legislative or executive pronouncements of necessity has no place in equal protection analysis"). And individual racial classifications employed in this manner may be considered legitimate only if they are a last resort to achieve a compelling interest. See id., at 519 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). </s> In the cases before us it is noteworthy that the number of students whose assignment depends on express racial classifications is limited. I join Part III-C of the Court's opinion because I agree that in the context of these plans, the small number of assignments affected suggests that the schools could have achieved their stated ends through different means. These include the facially race-neutral means set forth above or, if necessary, a more nuanced, individual evaluation of school needs and student characteristics that might include race as a component. The latter approach would be informed by Grutter, though of course the criteria relevant to student placement would differ based on the age of the students, the needs of the parents, and the role of the schools. III </s> The dissent rests on the assumptions that these sweeping race-based classifications of persons are permitted by existing precedents; that its confident endorsement of race categories for each child in a large segment of the community presents no danger to individual freedom in other, prospective realms of governmental regulation; and that the racial classifications used here cause no hurt or anger of the type the Constitution prevents. Each of these premises is, in my respectful view, incorrect. A </s> The dissent's reliance on this Court's precedents to justify the explicit, sweeping, classwide racial classifications at issue here is a misreading of our authorities that, it appears to me, tends to undermine well-accepted principles needed to guard our freedom. And in his critique of that analysis, I am in many respects in agreement with The Chief Justice. The conclusions he has set forth in Part III-A of the Court's opinion are correct, in my view, because the compelling interests implicated in the cases before us are distinct from the interests the Court has recognized in remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination and in increasing diversity in higher education. See ante, at 12-13. As the Court notes, we recognized the compelling nature of the interest in remedying past intentional discrimination in Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992), and of the interest in diversity in higher education in Grutter. At the same time, these compelling interests, in my view, do help inform the present inquiry. And to the extent the plurality opinion can be interpreted to foreclose consideration of these interests, I disagree with that reasoning. </s> As to the dissent, the general conclusions upon which it relies have no principled limit and would result in the broad acceptance of governmental racial classifications in areas far afield from schooling. The dissent's permissive strict scrutiny (which bears more than a passing resemblance to rational-basis review) could invite widespread governmental deployment of racial classifications. There is every reason to think that, if the dissent's rationale were accepted, Congress, assuming an otherwise proper exercise of its spending authority or commerce power, could mandate either the Seattle or the Jefferson County plans nationwide. There seems to be no principled rule, moreover, to limit the dissent's rationale to the context of public schools. The dissent emphasizes local control, see post, at 48-49, the unique history of school desegregation, see post, at 2, and the fact that these plans make less use of race than prior plans, see post, at 57, but these factors seem more rhetorical than integral to the analytical structure of the opinion. This brings us to the dissent's reliance on the Court's opinions in Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), and Grutter, 539 U.S. 306. If today's dissent said it was adhering to the views expressed in the separate opinions in Gratz and Grutter, see Gratz, 539 U.S., at 281 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 282 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id., at 291 (Souter, J., dissenting); id., at 298 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Grutter, supra, at 344 (Ginsburg, J., concurring), that would be understandable, and likely within the tradition--to be invoked, in my view, in rare instances--that permits us to maintain our own positions in the face of stare decisis when fundamental points of doctrine are at stake. See, e.g., Federal Maritime Comm'n v. South Carolina Ports Authority, 535 U.S. 743, 770 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting). To say, however, that we must ratify the racial classifications here at issue based on the majority opinions in Gratz and Grutter is, with all respect, simply baffling. </s> Gratz involved a system where race was not the entire classification. The procedures in Gratz placed much less reliance on race than do the plans at issue here. The issue in Gratz arose, moreover, in the context of college admissions where students had other choices and precedent supported the proposition that First Amendment interests give universities particular latitude in defining diversity. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312-314 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). Even so the race factor was found to be invalid. Gratz, supra, at 251. If Gratz is to be the measure, the racial classification systems here are a fortiori invalid. If the dissent were to say that college cases are simply not applicable to public school systems in kindergarten through high school, this would seem to me wrong, but at least an arguable distinction. Under no fair reading, though, can the majority opinion in Gratz be cited as authority to sustain the racial classifications under consideration here. </s> The same must be said for the controlling opinion in Grutter. There the Court sustained a system that, it found, was flexible enough to take into account "all pertinent elements of diversity," 539 U.S., at 341 (internal quotation marks omitted), and considered race as only one factor among many, id., at 340. Seattle's plan, by contrast, relies upon a mechanical formula that has denied hundreds of students their preferred schools on the basis of three rigid criteria: placement of siblings, distance from schools, and race. If those students were considered for a whole range of their talents and school needs with race as just one consideration, Grutter would have some application. That, though, is not the case. The only support today's dissent can draw from Grutter must be found in its various separate opinions, not in the opinion filed for the Court. B </s> To uphold these programs the Court is asked to brush aside two concepts of central importance for determining the validity of laws and decrees designed to alleviate the hurt and adverse consequences resulting from race discrimination. The first is the difference between de jure and de facto segregation; the second, the presumptive invalidity of a State's use of racial classifications to differentiate its treatment of individuals. </s> In the immediate aftermath of Brown the Court addressed other instances where laws and practices enforced de jure segregation. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); New Orleans City Park Improvement Assn. v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per curiam) (public parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (buses); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam) (golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam) (beaches). But with reference to schools, the effect of the legal wrong proved most difficult to correct. To remedy the wrong, school districts that had been segregated by law had no choice, whether under court supervision or pursuant to voluntary desegregation efforts, but to resort to extraordinary measures including individual student and teacher assignment to schools based on race. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1971); see also Croson, 488 U.S., at 519 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (noting that racial classifications "may be the only adequate remedy after a judicial determination that a State or its instrumentality has violated the Equal Protection Clause"). So it was, as the dissent observes, see post, at 13-14, that Louisville classified children by race in its school assignment and busing plan in the 1970's. Our cases recognized a fundamental difference between those school districts that had engaged in de jure segregation and those whose segregation was the result of other factors. School districts that had engaged in de jure segregation had an affirmative constitutional duty to desegregate; those that were de facto segregated did not. Compare Green v. School Bd. of New Kent Cty., 391 U.S. 430, 437-438 (1968), with Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974). The distinctions between de jure and de facto segregation extended to the remedies available to governmental units in addition to the courts. For example, in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986), the plurality noted: "This Court never has held that societal discrimination alone is sufficient to justify a racial classification. Rather, the Court has insisted upon some showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved before allowing limited use of racial classifications in order to remedy such discrimination." The Court's decision in Croson, supra, reinforced the difference between the remedies available to redress de facto and de jure discrimination: "To accept [a] claim that past societal discrimination alone can serve as the basis for rigid racial preferences would be to open the door to competing claims for 'remedial relief' for every disadvantaged group. The dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of shifting preferences based on inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs." Id., at 505-506. </s> From the standpoint of the victim, it is true, an injury stemming from racial prejudice can hurt as much when the demeaning treatment based on race identity stems from bias masked deep within the social order as when it is imposed by law. The distinction between government and private action, furthermore, can be amorphous both as a historical matter and as a matter of present-day finding of fact. Laws arise from a culture and vice versa. Neither can assign to the other all responsibility for persisting injustices. </s> Yet, like so many other legal categories that can overlap in some instances, the constitutional distinction between de jure and de facto segregation has been thought to be an important one. It must be conceded its primary function in school cases was to delimit the powers of the Judiciary in the fashioning of remedies. See, e.g., Milliken, supra, at 746. The distinction ought not to be altogether disregarded, however, when we come to that most sensitive of all racial issues, an attempt by the government to treat whole classes of persons differently based on the government's systematic classification of each individual by race. There, too, the distinction serves as a limit on the exercise of a power that reaches to the very verge of constitutional authority. Reduction of an individual to an assigned racial identity for differential treatment is among the most pernicious actions our government can undertake. The allocation of governmental burdens and benefits, contentious under any circumstances, is even more divisive when allocations are made on the basis of individual racial classifications. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Adarand, 515 U.S. 200. </s> Notwithstanding these concerns, allocation of benefits and burdens through individual racial classifications was found sometimes permissible in the context of remedies for de jure wrong. Where there has been de jure segregation, there is a cognizable legal wrong, and the courts and legislatures have broad power to remedy it. The remedy, though, was limited in time and limited to the wrong. The Court has allowed school districts to remedy their prior de jure segregation by classifying individual students based on their race. See North Carolina Bd. of Ed. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45-46 (1971). The limitation of this power to instances where there has been de jure segregation serves to confine the nature, extent, and duration of governmental reliance on individual racial classifications. </s> The cases here were argued upon the assumption, and come to us on the premise, that the discrimination in question did not result from de jure actions. And when de facto discrimination is at issue our tradition has been that the remedial rules are different. The State must seek alternatives to the classification and differential treatment of individuals by race, at least absent some extraordinary showing not present here. C </s> The dissent refers to an opinion filed by Judge Kozinski in one of the cases now before us, and that opinion relied upon an opinion filed by Chief Judge Boudin in a case presenting an issue similar to the one here. See post, at 35 (citing 426 F.3d 1162, 1193-1196 (CA9 2005) (concurring opinion) (citing Comfort v. Lynn School Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 27-29 (CA1 2005) (Boudin, C.J., concurring))). Though this may oversimplify the matter a bit, one of the main concerns underlying those opinions was this: If it is legitimate for school authorities to work to avoid racial isolation in their schools, must they do so only by indirection and general policies? Does the Constitution mandate this inefficient result? Why may the authorities not recognize the problem in candid fashion and solve it altogether through resort to direct assignments based on student racial classifications? So, the argument proceeds, if race is the problem, then perhaps race is the solution. The argument ignores the dangers presented by individual classifications, dangers that are not as pressing when the same ends are achieved by more indirect means. When the government classifies an individual by race, it must first define what it means to be of a race. Who exactly is white and who is nonwhite? To be forced to live under a state-mandated racial label is inconsistent with the dignity of individuals in our society. And it is a label that an individual is powerless to change. Governmental classifications that command people to march in different directions based on racial typologies can cause a new divisiveness. The practice can lead to corrosive discourse, where race serves not as an element of our diverse heritage but instead as a bargaining chip in the political process. On the other hand race-conscious measures that do not rely on differential treatment based on individual classifications present these problems to a lesser degree. </s> The idea that if race is the problem, race is the instrument with which to solve it cannot be accepted as an analytical leap forward. And if this is a frustrating duality of the Equal Protection Clause it simply reflects the duality of our history and our attempts to promote freedom in a world that sometimes seems set against it. Under our Constitution the individual, child or adult, can find his own identity, can define her own persona, without state intervention that classifies on the basis of his race or the color of her skin. *  *  * </s> This Nation has a moral and ethical obligation to fulfill its historic commitment to creating an integrated society that ensures equal opportunity for all of its children. A compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation, an interest that a school district, in its discretion and expertise, may choose to pursue. Likewise, a district may consider it a compelling interest to achieve a diverse student population. Race may be one component of that diversity, but other demographic factors, plus special talents and needs, should also be considered. What the government is not permitted to do, absent a showing of necessity not made here, is to classify every student on the basis of race and to assign each of them to schools based on that classification. Crude measures of this sort threaten to reduce children to racial chits valued and traded according to one school's supply and another's demand. </s> That statement, to be sure, invites this response: A sense of stigma may already become the fate of those separated out by circumstances beyond their immediate control. But to this the replication must be: Even so, measures other than differential treatment based on racial typing of individuals first must be exhausted. The decision today should not prevent school districts from continuing the important work of bringing together students of different racial, ethnic, and economic backgrounds. Due to a variety of factors--some influenced by government, some not--neighborhoods in our communities do not reflect the diversity of our Nation as a whole. Those entrusted with directing our public schools can bring to bear the creativity of experts, parents, administrators, and other concerned citizens to find a way to achieve the compelling interests they face without resorting to widespread governmental allocation of benefits and burdens on the basis of racial classifications. </s> With this explanation I concur in the judgment of the Court. </s> PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, PETITIONER </s> 05-908v. </s> SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 etal. on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit </s> CRYSTAL D. MEREDITH, custodial parent and next friend of JOSHUA RYAN McDONALD, PETITIONER </s> 05-915v. </s> JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION etal. on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit [June 28, 2007] </s> Justice Stevens, dissenting. </s> While I join Justice Breyer's eloquent and unanswerable dissent in its entirety, it is appropriate to add these words. </s> There is a cruel irony in The Chief Justice's reliance on our decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). The first sentence in the concluding paragraph of his opinion states: "Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could and could not go to school based on the color of their skin." Ante, at 40. This sentence reminds me of Anatole France's observation: "[T]he majestic equality of the la[w], forbid[s] rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread."1 The Chief Justice fails to note that it was only black schoolchildren who were so ordered; indeed, the history books do not tell stories of white children struggling to attend black schools.2 In this and other ways, The Chief Justice rewrites the history of one of this Court's most important decisions. Compare ante, at 39 ("history will be heard"), with Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. ___, ___ (2007) (slip op., at 11) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("It is a familiar adage that history is written by the victors"). </s> The Chief Justice rejects the conclusion that the racial classifications at issue here should be viewed differently than others, because they do not impose burdens on one race alone and do not stigmatize or exclude.3 The only justification for refusing to acknowledge the obvious importance of that difference is the citation of a few recent opinions--none of which even approached unanimity--grandly proclaiming that all racial classifications must be analyzed under "strict scrutiny." See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pe&nacute;a, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). Even today, two of our wisest federal judges have rejected such a wooden reading of the Equal Protection Clause in the context of school integration. See 426 F. 3d 1162, 1193-1196 (CA9 2005) (Kozinski, J., concurring); Comfort v. Lynn School Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 27-29 (CA1 2005) (Boudin, C.J., concurring). The Court's misuse of the three-tiered approach to Equal Protection analysis merely reconfirms my own view that there is only one such Clause in the Constitution. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (concurring opinion).4 </s> If we look at cases decided during the interim between Brown and Adarand, we can see how a rigid adherence to tiers of scrutiny obscures Brown's clear message. Perhaps the best example is provided by our approval of the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1967 upholding a state statute mandating racial integration in that State's school system. See School Comm. of Boston v. Board of Education, 352 Mass. 693, 227 N.E.2d 729.5 Rejecting arguments comparable to those that the plurality accepts today,6 that court noted: "It would be the height of irony if the racial imbalance act, enacted as it was with the laudable purpose of achieving equal educational opportunities, should, by prescribing school pupil allocations based on race, founder on unsuspected shoals in the Fourteenth Amendment." Id., at 698, 227 N.E. 2d, at 733 (footnote omitted). </s> Invoking our mandatory appellate jurisdiction,7 the Boston plaintiffs prosecuted an appeal in this Court. Our ruling on the merits simply stated that the appeal was "dismissed for want of a substantial federal question." School Comm. of Boston v. Board of Education, 389 U.S. 572 (1968) (per curiam). That decision not only expressed our appraisal of the merits of the appeal, but it constitutes a precedent that the Court overrules today. The subsequent statements by the unanimous Court in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971), by then-Justice Rehnquist in chambers in Bustop, Inc. v. Los Angeles Bd. of Ed., 439 U.S. 1380, 1383 (1978), and by the host of state court decisions cited by Justice Breyer, see post, 25-27,8 were fully consistent with that disposition. Unlike today's decision, they were also entirely loyal to Brown. </s> The Court has changed significantly since it decided School Comm. of Boston in 1968. It was then more faithful to Brown and more respectful of our precedent than it is today. It is my firm conviction that no Member of the Court that I joined in 1975 would have agreed with today's decision. </s> PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, PETITIONER </s> 05-908v. </s> SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 etal. on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit </s> CRYSTAL D. MEREDITH, custodial parent and next friend of JOSHUA RYAN McDONALD, PETITIONER </s> 05-915v. </s> JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION etal. on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit [June 28, 2007] </s> Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting. </s> These cases consider the longstanding efforts of two local school boards to integrate their public schools. The school board plans before us resemble many others adopted in the last 50 years by primary and secondary schools throughout the Nation. All of those plans represent local efforts to bring about the kind of racially integrated education that Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), long ago promised--efforts that this Court has repeatedly required, permitted, and encouraged local authorities to undertake. This Court has recognized that the public interests at stake in such cases are "compelling." We have approved of "narrowly tailored" plans that are no less race-conscious than the plans before us. And we have understood that the Constitution permits local communities to adopt desegregation plans even where it does not require them to do so. </s> The plurality pays inadequate attention to this law, to past opinions' rationales, their language, and the contexts in which they arise. As a result, it reverses course and reaches the wrong conclusion. In doing so, it distorts precedent, it misapplies the relevant constitutional principles, it announces legal rules that will obstruct efforts by state and local governments to deal effectively with the growing resegregation of public schools, it threatens to substitute for present calm a disruptive round of race-related litigation, and it undermines Brown's promise of integrated primary and secondary education that local communities have sought to make a reality. This cannot be justified in the name of the Equal Protection Clause. I Facts </s> The historical and factual context in which these cases arise is critical. In Brown, this Court held that the government's segregation of schoolchildren by race violates the Constitution's promise of equal protection. The Court emphasized that "education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments." 347 U.S., at 493. And it thereby set the Nation on a path toward pub-lic school integration. </s> In dozens of subsequent cases, this Court told school districts previously segregated by law what they must do at a minimum to comply with Brown's constitutional holding. The measures required by those cases often included race-conscious practices, such as mandatory busing and race-based restrictions on voluntary transfers. See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Ed. v. Penick, 443 U. S. 449, 455, n.3 (1979); Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile Cty., 402 U.S. 33, 37-38 (1971); Green v. School Bd. of New Kent Cty., 391 U. S. 430, 441-442 (1968). Beyond those minimum requirements, the Court left much of the determination of how to achieve integration to the judgment of local communities. Thus, in respect to race-conscious desegregation measures that the Constitution permitted, but did not require (measures similar to those at issue here), this Court unanimously stated: "School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to formulate and implement educational policy and might well conclude, for example, that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole. To do this as an educational policy is within the broad discretionary powers of school authorities." Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (emphasis added). As a result, different districts--some acting under court decree, some acting in order to avoid threatened lawsuits, some seeking to comply with federal administrative orders, some acting purely voluntarily, some acting after federal courts had dissolved earlier orders--adopted, modified, and experimented with hosts of different kinds of plans, including race-conscious plans, all with a similar objective: greater racial integration of public schools. See F. Welch & A. Light, New Evidence on School Desegregation v (1987) (hereinafter Welch) (prepared for the Commission on Civil Rights) (reviewing a sample of 125 school districts, constituting 20% of national public school enrollment, that had experimented with nearly 300 different plans over 18 years). The techniques that different districts have employed range "from voluntary transfer programs to mandatory reassignment." Id., at 21. And the design of particular plans has been "dictated by both the law and the specific needs of the district." Ibid. Overall these efforts brought about considerable racial integration. More recently, however, progress has stalled. Between 1968 and 1980, the number of black children attending a school where minority children constituted more than half of the school fell from 77% to 63% in the Nation (from 81% to 57% in the South) but then reversed direction by the year 2000, rising from 63% to 72% in the Nation (from 57% to 69% in the South). Similarly, between 1968 and 1980, the number of black children attending schools that were more than 90% minority fell from 64% to 33% in the Nation (from 78% to 23% in the South), but that too reversed direction, rising by the year 2000 from 33% to 37% in the Nation (from 23% to 31% in the South). As of 2002, almost 2.4 million students, or over 5% of all public school enrollment, attended schools with a white population of less than 1%. Of these, 2.3 million were black and Latino students, and only 72,000 were white. Today, more than one in six black children attend a school that is 99-100% minority. See Appendix A, infra. In light of the evident risk of a return to school systems that are in fact (though not in law) resegregated, many school districts have felt a need to maintain or to extend their integration efforts. </s> The upshot is that myriad school districts operating in myriad circumstances have devised myriad plans, often with race-conscious elements, all for the sake of eradicating earlier school segregation, bringing about integration, or preventing retrogression. Seattle and Louisville are two such districts, and the histories of their present plans set forth typical school integration stories. </s> I describe those histories at length in order to highlight three important features of these cases. First, the school districts' plans serve "compelling interests" and are "narrowly tailored" on any reasonable definition of those terms. Second, the distinction between de jure segregation (caused by school systems) and de facto segregation (caused, e.g., by housing patterns or generalized societal discrimination) is meaningless in the present context, thereby dooming the plurality's endeavor to find support for its views in that distinction. Third, real-world efforts to substitute racially diverse for racially segregated schools (however caused) are complex, to the point where the Constitution cannot plausibly be interpreted to rule out categorically all local efforts to use means that are "conscious" of the race of individuals. </s> In both Seattle and Louisville, the local school districts began with schools that were highly segregated in fact. In both cities plaintiffs filed lawsuits claiming unconstitutional segregation. In Louisville, a federal district court found that school segregation reflected pre-Brown state laws separating the races. In Seattle, the plaintiffs alleged that school segregation unconstitutionally reflected not only generalized societal discrimination and residential housing patterns, but also school board policies and actions that had helped to create, maintain, and aggravate racial segregation. In Louisville, a federal court entered a remedial decree. In Seattle, the parties settled after the school district pledged to undertake a desegregation plan. In both cities, the school boards adopted plans designed to achieve integration by bringing about more racially diverse schools. In each city the school board modified its plan several times in light of, for example, hostility to busing, the threat of resegregation, and the desirability of introducing greater student choice. And in each city, the school boards' plans have evolved over time in ways that progressively diminish the plans' use of explicit race-conscious criteria. </s> The histories that follow set forth these basic facts. They are based upon numerous sources, which for ease of exposition I have cataloged, along with their corresponding citations, at Appendix B, infra. A Seattle </s> 1. Segregation, 1945 to 1956. During and just after World War II, significant numbers of black Americans began to make Seattle their home. Few black residents lived outside the central section of the city. Most worked at unskilled jobs. Although black students made up about 3% of the total Seattle population in the mid-1950's, nearly all black children attended schools where a majority of the population was minority. Elementary schools in central Seattle were between 60% and 80% black; Garfield, the central district high school, was more than 50% minority; schools outside the central and southeastern sections of Seattle were virtually all white. 2. Preliminary Challenges, 1956 to 1969. In 1956, a memo for the Seattle School Board reported that school segregation reflected not only segregated housing patterns but also school board policies that permitted white students to transfer out of black schools while restricting the transfer of black students into white schools. In 1958, black parents whose children attended Harrison Elementary School (with a black student population of over 75%) wrote the Seattle board, complaining that the "'boundaries for the Harrison Elementary School were not set in accordance with the long-established standards of the School District ... but were arbitrarily set with an end to excluding colored children from McGilvra School, which is adjacent to the Harrison school district.'" </s> In 1963, at the insistence of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and other community groups, the school board adopted a new race-based transfer policy. The new policy added an explicitly racial criterion: If a place exists in a school, then, irrespective of other transfer criteria, a white student may transfer to a predominantly black school, and a black student may transfer to a predominantly white school. </s> At that time one high school, Garfield, was about two-thirds minority; eight high schools were virtually all white. In 1963, the transfer program's first year, 239 black students and 8 white students transferred. In 1969, about 2,200 (of 10,383 total) of the district's black students and about 400 of the district's white students took advantage of the plan. For the next decade, annual program transfers remained at approximately this level. </s> 3. The NAACP's First Legal Challenge and Seattle's Response, 1969 to 1977. In 1969 the NAACP filed a federal lawsuit against the school board, claiming that the board had "unlawfully and unconstitutionally" "establish[ed]" and "maintain[ed]" a system of "racially segregated public schools." The complaint said that 77% of black public elementary school students in Seattle attended 9 of the city's 86 elementary schools and that 23 of the remaining schools had no black students at all. Similarly, of the 1,461 black students enrolled in the 12 senior high schools in Seattle, 1,151 (or 78.8%) attended 3 senior high schools, and 900 (61.6%) attended a single school, Garfield. </s> The complaint charged that the school board had brought about this segregated system in part by "mak[ing] and enforc[ing]" certain "rules and regulations," in part by "drawing . . . boundary lines" and "executing school attendance policies" that would create and maintain "predominantly Negro or non-white schools," and in part by building schools "in such a manner as to restrict the Negro plaintiffs and the class they represent to predominantly negro or non-white schools." The complaint also charged that the board discriminated in assigning teachers. </s> The board responded to the lawsuit by introducing a plan that required race-based transfers and mandatory busing. The plan created three new middle schools at three school buildings in the predominantly white north end. It then created a "mixed" student body by assigning to those schools students who would otherwise attend predominantly white, or predominantly black, schools elsewhere. It used explicitly racial criteria in making these assignments (i.e., it deliberately assigned to the new middle schools black students, not white students, from the black schools and white students, not black students, from the white schools). And it used busing to transport the students to their new assignments. The plan provoked considerable local opposition. Opponents brought a lawsuit. But eventually a state court found that the mandatory busing was lawful. In 1976-1977, the plan involved the busing of about 500 middle school students (300 black students and 200 white students). Another 1,200 black students and 400 white students participated in the previously adopted voluntary transfer program. Thus about 2,000 students out of a total district population of about 60,000 students were involved in one or the other transfer program. At that time, about 20% or 12,000 of the district's students were black. And the board continued to describe 26 of its 112 schools as "segregated." </s> 4. The NAACP's Second Legal Challenge, 1977. In 1977, the NAACP filed another legal complaint, this time with the federal Department of Health, Education, and Welfare's Office for Civil Rights (OCR). The complaint alleged that the Seattle School Board had created or perpetuated unlawful racial segregation through, e.g., certain school-transfer criteria, a construction program that needlessly built new schools in white areas, district line-drawing criteria, the maintenance of inferior facilities at black schools, the use of explicit racial criteria in the assignment of teachers and other staff, and a general pattern of delay in respect to the implementation of promised desegregation efforts. </s> The OCR and the school board entered into a formal settlement agreement. The agreement required the board to implement what became known as the "Seattle Plan." </s> 5. The Seattle Plan: Mandatory Busing, 1978 to 1988. The board began to implement the Seattle Plan in 1978. This plan labeled "racially imbalanced" any school at which the percentage of black students exceeded by more than 20% the minority population of the school district as a whole. It applied that label to 26 schools, including 4 high schools--Cleveland (72.8% minority), Franklin (76.6% minority), Garfield (78.4% minority), and Rainier Beach (58.9% minority). The plan paired (or "triaded") "imbalanced" black schools with "imbalanced" white schools. It then placed some grades (say, third and fourth grades) at one school building and other grades (say, fifth and sixth grades) at the other school building. And it thereby required, for example, all fourth grade students from the previously black and previously white schools first to attend together what would now be a "mixed" fourth grade at one of the school buildings and then the next year to attend what would now be a "mixed" fifth grade at the other school building. </s> At the same time, the plan provided that a previous "black" school would remain about 50% black, while a previous "white" school would remain about two-thirds white. It was consequently necessary to decide with some care which students would attend the new "mixed" grade. For this purpose, administrators cataloged the racial makeup of each neighborhood housing block. The school district met its percentage goals by assigning to the new "mixed" school an appropriate number of "black" housing blocks and "white" housing blocks. At the same time, transport from house to school involved extensive busing, with about half of all students attending a school other than the one closest to their home. </s> The Seattle Plan achieved the school integration that it sought. Just prior to the plan's implementation, for example, 4 of Seattle's 11 high schools were "imbalanced," i.e., almost exclusively "black" or almost exclusively "white." By 1979, only two were out of "balance." By 1980 only Cleveland remained out of "balance" (as the board defined it) and that by a mere two students. </s> Nonetheless, the Seattle Plan, due to its busing, provoked serious opposition within the State. See generally Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 461-466 (1982). Thus, Washington state voters enacted an initiative that amended state law to require students to be assigned to the schools closest to their homes. Id., at 462. The Seattle School Board challenged the constitutionality of the initiative. Id., at 464. This Court then held that the initiative--which would have prevented the Seattle Plan from taking effect--violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 470. </s> 6. Student Choice, 1988 to 1998. By 1988, many white families had left the school district, and many Asian families had moved in. The public school population had fallen from about 100,000 to less than 50,000. The racial makeup of the school population amounted to 43% white, 24% black, and 23% Asian or Pacific Islander, with Hispanics and Native Americans making up the rest. The cost of busing, the harm that members of all racial communities feared that the Seattle Plan caused, the desire to attract white families back to the public schools, and the interest in providing greater school choice led the board to abandon busing and to substitute a new student assignment policy that resembles the plan now before us. </s> The new plan permitted each student to choose the school he or she wished to attend, subject to race-based constraints. In respect to high schools, for example, a student was given a list of a subset of schools, carefully selected by the board to balance racial distribution in the district by including neighborhood schools and schools in racially different neighborhoods elsewhere in the city. The student could then choose among those schools, indicating a first choice, and other choices the student found acceptable. In making an assignment to a particular high school, the district would give first preference to a student with a sibling already at the school. It gave second preference to a student whose race differed from a race that was "over-represented" at the school (i.e., a race that accounted for a higher percentage of the school population than of the total district population). It gave third preference to students residing in the neighborhood. It gave fourth preference to students who received child care in the neighborhood. In a typical year, say, 1995, about 20,000 potential high school students participated. About 68% received their first choice. Another 16% received an "acceptable" choice. A further 16% were assigned to a school they had not listed. </s> 7. The Current Plan, 1999 to the Present. In 1996, the school board adopted the present plan, which began in 1999. In doing so, it sought to deemphasize the use of racial criteria and to increase the likelihood that a student would receive an assignment at his first or second choice high school. The district retained a racial tiebreaker for oversubscribed schools, which takes effect only if the school's minority or majority enrollment falls outside of a 30% range centered on the minority/majority population ratio within the district. At the same time, all students were free subsequently to transfer from the school at which they were initially placed to a different school of their choice without regard to race. Thus, at worst, a student would have to spend one year at a high school he did not pick as a first or second choice. </s> The new plan worked roughly as expected for the two school years during which it was in effect (1999-2000 and 2000-2001). In the 2000-2001 school year, for example, with the racial tiebreaker, the entering ninth grade class at Franklin High School had a 60% minority population; without the racial tiebreaker that same class at Franklin would have had an almost 80% minority population. (We consider only the ninth grade since only students entering that class were subject to the tiebreaker, and because the plan was not in place long enough to change the composition of an entire school.) In the year 2005-2006, by which time the racial tiebreaker had not been used for several years, Franklin's overall minority enrollment had risen to 90%. During the period the tiebreaker applied, it typically affected about 300 students per year. Between 80% and 90% of all students received their first choice assignment; between 89% and 97% received their first or second choice assignment. Petitioner Parents Involved in Community Schools objected to Seattle's most recent plan under the State and Federal Constitutions. In due course, the Washington Supreme Court, the Federal District Court, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (sitting en banc) rejected the challenge and found Seattle's plan lawful. B Louisville </s> 1. Before the Lawsuit, 1954 to 1972. In 1956, two years after Brown made clear that Kentucky could no longer require racial segregation by law, the Louisville Board of Education created a geography-based student assignment plan designed to help achieve school integration. At the same time it adopted an open transfer policy under which approximately 3,000 of Louisville's 46,000 students applied for transfer. By 1972, however, the Louisville School District remained highly segregated. Approximately half the district's public school enrollment was black; about half was white. Fourteen of the district's nineteen non-vocational middle and high schools were close to totally black or totally white. Nineteen of the district's forty-six elementary schools were between 80% and 100% black. Twenty-one elementary schools were between roughly 90% and 100% white. </s> 2. Court-Imposed Guidelines and Busing, 1972 to 1991. In 1972, civil rights groups and parents, claiming unconstitutional segregation, sued the Louisville Board of Education in federal court. The original litigation eventually became a lawsuit against the Jefferson County School System, which in April 1975 absorbed Louisville's schools and combined them with those of the surrounding suburbs. (For ease of exposition, I shall still use "Louisville" to refer to what is now the combined districts.) After preliminary rulings and an eventual victory for the plaintiffs in the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the District Court in July 1975 entered an order requiring desegregation. </s> The order's requirements reflected a (newly enlarged) school district student population of about 135,000, approximately 20% of whom were black. The order required the school board to create and to maintain schools with student populations that ranged, for elementary schools, between 12% and 40% black, and for secondary schools (with one exception), between 12.5% and 35% black. The District Court also adopted a complex desegregation plan designed to achieve the order's targets. The plan required redrawing school attendance zones, closing 12 schools, and busing groups of students, selected by race and the first letter of their last names, to schools outside their immediate neighborhoods. The plan's initial busing requirements were extensive, involving the busing of 23,000 students and a transportation fleet that had to "operate from early in the morning until late in the evening." For typical students, the plan meant busing for several years (several more years for typical black students than for typical white students). The following notice, published in a Louisville newspaper in 1976, gives a sense of how the district's race-based busing plan operated in practice: </s> [Graphic omitted; see printed opinion] </s> Louisville Courier Journal, June 18, 1976 (reproduced in J. Wilkinson, From Brown to Bakke: The Supreme Court and School Integration 1954-1978, p. 176 (1979)). The District Court monitored implementation of the plan. In 1978, it found that the plan had brought all of Louisville's schools within its "'guidelines' for racial composition" for "at least a substantial portion of the [previous] three years." It removed the case from its active docket while stating that it expected the board "to continue to implement those portions of the desegregation order which are by their nature of a continuing effect." </s> By 1984, after several schools had fallen out of compliance with the order's racial percentages due to shifting demographics in the community, the school board revised its desegregation plan. In doing so, the board created a new racial "guideline," namely a "floating range of 10% above and 10% below the countywide average for the different grade levels." The board simultaneously redrew district boundaries so that middle school students could attend the same school for three years and high school students for four years. It added "magnet" programs at two high schools. And it adjusted its alphabet-based system for grouping and busing students. The board estimated that its new plan would lead to annual reassignment (with busing) of about 8,500 black students and about 8,000 white students. </s> 3. Student Choice and Project Renaissance, 1991 to 1996. By 1991, the board had concluded that assigning elementary school students to two or more schools during their elementary school years had proved educationally unsound and, if continued, would undermine Kentucky's newly adopted Education Reform Act. It consequently conducted a nearly year-long review of its plan. In doing so, it consulted widely with parents and other members of the local community, using public presentations, public meetings, and various other methods to obtain the public's input. At the conclusion of this review, the board adopted a new plan, called "Project Renaissance," that emphasized student choice. </s> Project Renaissance again revised the board's racial guidelines. It provided that each elementary school would have a black student population of between 15% and 50%; each middle and high school would have a black population and a white population that fell within a range, the boundaries of which were set at 15% above and 15% below the general student population percentages in the county at that grade level. The plan then drew new geographical school assignment zones designed to satisfy these guidelines; the district could reassign students if particular schools failed to meet the guidelines and was required to do so if a school repeatedly missed these targets. </s> In respect to elementary schools, the plan first drew a neighborhood line around each elementary school, and it then drew a second line around groups of elementary schools (called "clusters"). It initially assigned each student to his or her neighborhood school, but it permitted each student freely to transfer between elementary schools within each cluster provided that the transferring student (a) was black if transferring from a predominantly black school to a predominantly white school, or (b) was white if transferring from a predominantly white school to a predominantly black school. Students could also apply to attend magnet elementary schools or programs. </s> The plan required each middle school student to be assigned to his or her neighborhood school unless the student applied for, and was accepted by, a magnet middle school. The plan provided for "open" high school enrollment. Every 9th or 10th grader could apply to any high school in the system, and the high school would accept applicants according to set criteria--one of which consisted of the need to attain or remain in compliance with the plan's racial guidelines. Finally, the plan created two new magnet schools, one each at the elementary and middle school levels. </s> 4. The Current Plan: Project Renaissance Modified, 1996 to 2003. In 1995 and 1996, the Louisville School Board, with the help of a special "Planning Team," community meetings, and other official and unofficial study groups, monitored the effects of Project Renaissance and considered proposals for improvement. Consequently, in 1996, the board modified Project Renaissance, thereby creating the present plan. </s> At the time, the district's public school population was approximately 30% black. The plan consequently redrew the racial "guidelines," setting the boundaries at 15% to 50% black for all schools. It again redrew school assignment boundaries. And it expanded the transfer opportunities available to elementary and middle school pupils. The plan forbade transfers, however, if the transfer would lead to a school population outside the guideline range, i.e., if it would create a school where fewer than 15% or more than 50% of the students were black. </s> The plan also established "Parent Assistance Centers" to help parents and students navigate the school selection and assignment process. It pledged the use of other resources in order to "encourage all schools to achieve an African-American enrollment equivalent to the average district-wide African-American enrollment at the school's respective elementary, middle or high school level." And the plan continued use of magnet schools. </s> In 1999, several parents brought a lawsuit in federal court attacking the plan's use of racial guidelines at one of the district's magnet schools. They asked the court to dissolve the desegregation order and to hold the use of magnet school racial guidelines unconstitutional. The board opposed dissolution, arguing that "the old dual system" had left a "demographic imbalance" that "prevent[ed] dissolution." In 2000, after reviewing the present plan, the District Court dissolved the 1975 order. It wrote that there was "overwhelming evidence of the Board's good faith compliance with the desegregation Decree and its underlying purposes." It added that the Louisville School Board had "treated the ideal of an integrated system as much more than a legal obligation--they consider it a positive, desirable policy and an essential element of any well-rounded public school education." </s> The Court also found that the magnet programs available at the high school in question were "not available at other high schools" in the school district. It consequently held unconstitutional the use of race-based "targets" to govern admission to magnet schools. And it ordered the board not to control access to those scarce programs through the use of racial targets. 5. The Current Lawsuit, 2003 to the Present. Subsequent to the District Court's dissolution of the desegregation order (in 2000) the board simply continued to implement its 1996 plan as modified to reflect the court's magnet school determination. In 2003, the petitioner now before us, Crystal Meredith, brought this lawsuit challenging the plan's unmodified portions, i.e., those portions that dealt with ordinary, not magnet, schools. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected Meredith's challenge and held the unmodified aspects of the plan constitutional. C </s> The histories I have set forth describe the extensive and ongoing efforts of two school districts to bring about greater racial integration of their public schools. In both cases the efforts were in part remedial. Louisville began its integration efforts in earnest when a federal court in 1975 entered a school desegregation order. Seattle undertook its integration efforts in response to the filing of a federal lawsuit and as a result of its settlement of a segregation complaint filed with the federal OCR. </s> The plans in both Louisville and Seattle grow out of these earlier remedial efforts. Both districts faced problems that reflected initial periods of severe racial segregation, followed by such remedial efforts as busing, followed by evidence of resegregation, followed by a need to end busing and encourage the return of, e.g., suburban students through increased student choice. When formulating the plans under review, both districts drew upon their considerable experience with earlier plans, having revised their policies periodically in light of that experience. Both districts rethought their methods over time and explored a wide range of other means, including non-race-conscious policies. Both districts also considered elaborate studies and consulted widely within their communities. </s> Both districts sought greater racial integration for educational and democratic, as well as for remedial, reasons. Both sought to achieve these objectives while preserving their commitment to other educational goals, e.g., districtwide commitment to high quality public schools, increased pupil assignment to neighborhood schools, diminished use of busing, greater student choice, reduced risk of white flight, and so forth. Consequently, the present plans expand student choice; they limit the burdens (including busing) that earlier plans had imposed upon students and their families; and they use race-conscious criteria in limited and gradually diminishing ways. In particular, they use race-conscious criteria only to mark the outer bounds of broad population-related ranges. </s> The histories also make clear the futility of looking simply to whether earlier school segregation was de jure or de facto in order to draw firm lines separating the constitutionally permissible from the constitutionally forbidden use of "race-conscious" criteria. Justice Thomas suggests that it will be easy to identify de jure segregation because "[i]n most cases, there either will or will not have been a state constitutional amendment, state statute, local ordinance, or local administrative policy explicitly requiring separation of the races." Ante, at 6, n.4 (concurring opinion). But our precedent has recognized that de jure discrimination can be present even in the absence of racially explicit laws. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-374 (1886). </s> No one here disputes that Louisville's segregation was de jure. But what about Seattle's? Was it de facto? De jure? A mixture? Opinions differed. Or is it that a prior federal court had not adjudicated the matter? Does that make a difference? Is Seattle free on remand to say that its schools were de jure segregated, just as in 1956 a memo for the School Board admitted? The plurality does not seem confident as to the answer. Compare ante, at 12 (opinion of the Court) ("[T]he Seattle public schools have never shown that they were ever segregated by law" (emphasis added)), with ante at 29-30 (plurality opinion) (assuming "the Seattle school district was never segregated by law," but seeming to concede that a school district with de jure segregation need not be subject to a court order to be allowed to engage in race-based remedial measures). A court finding of de jure segregation cannot be the crucial variable. After all, a number of school districts in the South that the Government or private plaintiffs challenged as segregated by law voluntarily desegregated their schools without a court order--just as Seattle did. See, e.g., Coleman, Desegregation of the Public Schools in Kentucky--The Second Year After the Supreme Court's Decision, 25 J. Negro Educ. 254, 256, 261 (1956) (40 of Kentucky's 180 school districts began desegregation without court orders); Branton, Little Rock Revisited: Desegregation to Resegregation, 52 J. Negro Educ. 250, 251 (1983) (similar in Arkansas); Bullock & Rodgers, Coercion to Compliance: Southern School Districts and School Desegregation Guidelines, 38 J. Politics 987, 991 (1976) (similar in Georgia); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 40, n. 1 (1971) (Clarke County, Georgia). See also Letter from Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General, to John F. Kennedy, President (Jan. 24, 1963) (hereinafter Kennedy Report), available at http://www.gilderlehrman.org/search/collection_pdfs/05/63/0/05630.pdf (all Internet materials as visited June 26, 2007, and available in Clerk of Court's case file) (reporting successful efforts by the Government to induce voluntary desegregation). </s> Moreover, Louisville's history makes clear that a community under a court order to desegregate might submit a race-conscious remedial plan before the court dissolved the order, but with every intention of following that plan even after dissolution. How could such a plan be lawful the day before dissolution but then become unlawful the very next day? On what legal ground can the majority rest its contrary view? But see ante, at 12-13, 17, n. 12. </s> Are courts really to treat as merely de facto segregated those school districts that avoided a federal order by voluntarily complying with Brown's requirements? See id., at 12, 29-30. This Court has previously done just the opposite, permitting a race-conscious remedy without any kind of court decree. See McDaniel, supra, at 41. Because the Constitution emphatically does not forbid the use of race-conscious measures by districts in the South that voluntarily desegregated their schools, on what basis does the plurality claim that the law forbids Seattle to do the same? But see ante, at 29. </s> The histories also indicate the complexity of the tasks and the practical difficulties that local school boards face when they seek to achieve greater racial integration. The boards work in communities where demographic patterns change, where they must meet traditional learning goals, where they must attract and retain effective teachers, where they should (and will) take account of parents' views and maintain their commitment to public school education, where they must adapt to court intervention, where they must encourage voluntary student and parent action--where they will find that their own good faith, their knowledge, and their understanding of local circumstances are always necessary but often insufficient to solve the problems at hand. These facts and circumstances help explain why in this context, as to means, the law often leaves legislatures, city councils, school boards, and voters with a broad range of choice, thereby giving "different communities" the opportunity to "try different solutions to common problems and gravitate toward those that prove most successful or seem to them best to suit their individual needs." Comfort v. Lynn School Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 28 (CA1 2005) (Boudin, C.J., concurring) (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1061 (2005). </s> With this factual background in mind, I turn to the legal question: Does the United States Constitution prohibit these school boards from using race-conscious criteria in the limited ways at issue here? II The Legal Standard </s> A longstanding and unbroken line of legal authority tells us that the Equal Protection Clause permits local school boards to use race-conscious criteria to achieve positive race-related goals, even when the Constitution does not compel it. Because of its importance, I shall repeat what this Court said about the matter in Swann. Chief Justice Burger, on behalf of a unanimous Court in a case of exceptional importance, wrote: "School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to formulate and implement educational policy and might well conclude, for example, that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole. To do this as an educational policy is within the broad discretionary powers of school authorities." 402 U.S., at 16. </s> The statement was not a technical holding in the case. But the Court set forth in Swann a basic principle of constitutional law--a principle of law that has found "wide acceptance in the legal culture." Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428, 443 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); Mitchell v. United States, 526 U. S. 314, 330 (1999); id., at 331, 332 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing "'wide acceptance in the legal culture'" as "adequate reason not to overrule" prior cases). </s> Thus, in North Carolina Bd. of Ed. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971), this Court, citing Swann, restated the point. "[S]chool authorities," the Court said, "have wide discretion in formulating school policy, and . . . as a matter of educational policy school authorities may well conclude that some kind of racial balance in the schools is desirable quite apart from any constitutional requirements." Then-Justice Rehnquist echoed this view in Bustop, Inc. v. Los Angeles Bd. of Ed., 439 U.S. 1380, 1383 (1978) (opinion in chambers), making clear that he too believed that Swann's statement reflected settled law: "While I have the gravest doubts that [a state supreme court] was required by the United States Constitution to take the [desegregation] action that it has taken in this case, I have very little doubt that it was permitted by that Constitution to take such action." (Emphasis in original.) </s> These statements nowhere suggest that this freedom is limited to school districts where court-ordered desegregation measures are also in effect. Indeed, in McDaniel, a case decided the same day as Swann, a group of parents challenged a race-conscious student assignment plan that the Clarke County School Board had voluntarily adopted as a remedy without a court order (though under federal agency pressure--pressure Seattle also encountered). The plan required that each elementary school in the district maintain 20% to 40% enrollment of African-American students, corresponding to the racial composition of the district. See Barresi v. Browne, 226 Ga. 456, 456-459, 175 S.E. 2d 649, 650-651 (1970). This Court upheld the plan, see McDaniel, 402 U.S., at 41, rejecting the parents' argument that "a person may not be included or excluded solely because he is a Negro or because he is white." Brief for Respondents in McDaniel, O. T. 1970, No. 420, p.25. </s> Federal authorities had claimed--as the NAACP and the OCR did in Seattle--that Clarke County schools were segregated in law, not just in fact. The plurality's claim that Seattle was "never segregated by law" is simply not accurate. Compare ante, at 29, with supra, at 6-9. The plurality could validly claim that no court ever found that Seattle schools were segregated in law. But that is also true of the Clarke County schools in McDaniel. Unless we believe that the Constitution enforces one legal standard for the South and another for the North, this Court should grant Seattle the permission it granted Clarke County, Georgia. See McDaniel, 402 U.S., at 41 ("[S]teps will almost invariably require that students be assigned 'differently because of their race.' . . . Any other approach would freeze the status quo that is the very target of all desegregation processes."). </s> This Court has also held that school districts may be required by federal statute to undertake race-conscious desegregation efforts even when there is no likelihood that de jure segregation can be shown. In Board of Ed. of City School Dist. of New York v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130, 148-149 (1979), the Court concluded that a federal statute required school districts receiving certain federal funds to remedy faculty segregation, even though in this Court's view the racial disparities in the affected schools were purely de facto and would not have been actionable under the Equal Protection Clause. Not even the dissenters thought the race-conscious remedial program posed a constitutional problem. See id., at 152 (opinion of Stewart, J.). See also, e.g., Crawford v. Board of Ed. of Los Angeles, 458 U.S. 527, 535-536 (1982) ("[S]tate courts of California continue to have an obligation under state law to order segregated school districts to use voluntary desegregation techniques, whether or not there has been a finding of intentional segregation. . . . [S]chool districts themselves retain a state-law obligation to take reasonably feasible steps to desegregate, and they remain free to adopt reassignment and busing plans to effectuate desegregation" (emphasis added)); School Comm. of Boston v. Board of Education, 389 U. S. 572 (1968) (per curiam) (dismissing for want of a federal question a challenge to a voluntary statewide integration plan using express racial criteria). </s> Lower state and federal courts had considered the matter settled and uncontroversial even before this Court decided Swann. Indeed, in 1968, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected an equal protection challenge to a race-conscious state law seeking to undo de facto segregation: "To support [their] claim, the defendants heavily rely on three Federal cases, each of which held, no State law being involved, that a local school board does not have an affirmative constitutional duty to act to alleviate racial imbalance in the schools that it did not cause. However, the question as to whether the constitution requires a local school board, or a State, to act to undo de facto school segregation is simply not here concerned. The issue here is whether the constitution permits, rather than prohibits, voluntary State action aimed toward reducing and eventually eliminating de facto school segregation. </s> "State laws or administrative policies, directed toward the reduction and eventual elimination of de facto segregation of children in the schools and racial imbalance, have been approved by every high State court which has considered the issue. Similarly, the Federal courts which have considered the issue . . . have recognized that voluntary programs of local school authorities designed to alleviate de facto segregation and racial imbalance in the schools are not constitutionally forbidden." Tometz v. Board of Ed., Waukegan School Dist. No. 6, 39 Ill. 2d 593, 597-598, 237 N.E. 2d 498, 501 (1968) (citations omitted) (citing decisions from the high courts of Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, New Jersey, California, New York, and Connecticut, and from the Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits). </s> See also, e.g., Offerman v. Nitkowski, 378 F.2d 22, 24 (CA2 1967); Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Ed., 369 F.2d 55, 61 (CA6 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967); Springfield School Comm. v. Barksdale, 348 F.2d 261, 266 (CA1 1965); Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Chester School Dist., 427 Pa. 157, 164, 233 A.2d 290, 294 (1967); Booker v. Board of Ed. of Plainfield, Union Cty., 45 N.J. 161, 170, 212 A.2d 1, 5 (1965); Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 881-882, 382 P.2d 878, 881-882 (1963) (in bank). </s> I quote the Illinois Supreme Court at length to illustrate the prevailing legal assumption at the time Swann was decided. In this respect, Swann was not a sharp or unexpected departure from prior rulings; it reflected a consensus that had already emerged among state and lower federal courts. If there were doubts before Swann was decided, they did not survive this Court's decision. Numerous state and federal courts explicitly relied upon Swann's guidance for decades to follow. For instance, a Texas appeals court in 1986 rejected a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a voluntary integration plan by explaining: "[T]he absence of a court order to desegregate does not mean that a school board cannot exceed minimum requirements in order to promote school integration. School authorities are traditionally given broad discretionary powers to formulate and implement educational policy and may properly decide to ensure to their students the value of an integrated school experience." Citizens for Better Ed. v. Goose Creek Consol. Independent School Dist., 719 S.W. 2d 350, 352-353 (Ct. App. Tex. 1986) (citing Swann and North Carolina Bd. of Ed.), appeal dism'd for want of a substantial federal question, 484 U.S. 804 (1987). Similarly, in Zaslawsky v. Bd. of Ed. of Los Angeles City Unified School Dist., 610 F.2d 661, 662-664 (1979), the Ninth Circuit rejected a federal constitutional challenge to a school district's use of mandatory faculty transfers to ensure that each school's faculty makeup would fall within 10% of the districtwide racial composition. Like the Texas court, the Ninth Circuit relied upon Swann and North Carolina Bd. of Ed. to reject the argument that "a race-conscious plan is permissible only when there has been a judicial finding of de jure segregation." 610 F.2d, at 663-664. See also, e.g., Darville v. Dade County School Bd., 497 F.2d 1002, 1004-1006 (CA5 1974); State ex rel. Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Brooks, 80 Wash. 2d 121, 128-129, 492 P.2d 536, 541-542 (1972) (en banc), overruled on other grounds, Cole v. Webster, 103 Wash. 2d 280, 692 P.2d 799 (1984) (en banc); School Comm. of Springfield v. Board of Ed., 362 Mass. 417, 428-429 287 N.E. 2d 438, 447-448 (1972). These decisions illustrate well how lower courts understood and followed Swann's enunciation of the relevant legal principle. Courts are not alone in accepting as constitutionally valid the legal principle that Swann enunciated--i.e., that the government may voluntarily adopt race-conscious measures to improve conditions of race even when it is not under a constitutional obligation to do so. That principle has been accepted by every branch of government and is rooted in the history of the Equal Protection Clause itself. Thus, Congress has enacted numerous race-conscious statutes that illustrate that principle or rely upon its validity. See, e.g., 20 U. S. C. §6311(b)(2)(C)(v) (No Child Left Behind Act); §1067 et seq. (authorizing aid to minority institutions). In fact, without being exhaustive, I have counted 51 federal statutes that use racial classifications. I have counted well over 100 state statutes that similarly employ racial classifications. Presidential administrations for the past half-century have used and supported various race-conscious measures. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 10925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961) (President Kennedy); Exec. Order No. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965) (President Johnson); Sugrue, Breaking Through: The Troubled Origins of Affirmative Action in the Workplace, in Colorlines: Affirmative Action, Immigration, and Civil Rights Options for America 31 (Skretny ed. 2001) (describing President Nixon's lobbying for affirmative action plans, e.g., the Philadelphia Plan); White, Affirmative Action's Alamo: Gerald Ford Returns to Fight Once More for Michigan, Time, Aug. 23, 1999, p. 48 (reporting on President Ford's support for affirmative action); Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 1, 50 (2002) (describing President Carter's support for affirmation action). And during the same time, hundreds of local school districts have adopted student assignment plans that use race-conscious criteria. See Welch 83-91. </s> That Swann's legal statement should find such broad acceptance is not surprising. For Swann is predicated upon a well-established legal view of the Fourteenth Amendment. That view understands the basic objective of those who wrote the Equal Protection Clause as forbidding practices that lead to racial exclusion. The Amendment sought to bring into American society as full members those whom the Nation had previously held in slavery. See Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 71 (1872) ("[N]o one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose found in [all the Reconstruction amendments] . . . we mean the freedom of the slave race"); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 306 (1879) ("[The Fourteenth Amendment] is one of a series of constitutional provisions having a common purpose; namely, securing to a race recently emancipated . . . all the civil rights that the superior race enjoy"). </s> There is reason to believe that those who drafted an Amendment with this basic purpose in mind would have understood the legal and practical difference between the use of race-conscious criteria in defiance of that purpose, namely to keep the races apart, and the use of race-conscious criteria to further that purpose, namely to bring the races together. See generally R. Sears, A Utopian Experiment in Kentucky: Integration and Social Equality at Berea, 1866-1904 (1996) (describing federal funding, through the Freedman's Bureau, of race-conscious school integration programs). See also R. Fischer, The Segregation Struggle in Louisiana 1862-77, p. 51 (1974) (describing the use of race-conscious remedies); Harlan, Desegregation in New Orleans Public Schools During Reconstruction, 67 Am. Hist. Rev. 663, 664 (1962) (same); W. Vaughn, Schools for All: The Blacks and Public Education in the South, 1865-1877, pp. 111-116 (1974) (same). Although the Constitution almost always forbids the former, it is significantly more lenient in respect to the latter. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pe&nacute;a, 515 U.S. 200, 243 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). </s> Sometimes Members of this Court have disagreed about the degree of leniency that the Clause affords to programs designed to include. See Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U. S. 267, 274 (1986); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 507 (1980). But I can find no case in which this Court has followed Justice Thomas' "colorblind" approach. And I have found no case that otherwise repudiated this constitutional asymmetry between that which seeks to exclude and that which seeks to include members of minority races. </s> What does the plurality say in response? First, it seeks to distinguish Swann and other similar cases on the ground that those cases involved remedial plans in response to judicial findings of de jure segregation. As McDaniel and Harris show, that is historically untrue. See supra, at 22-24. Many school districts in the South adopted segregation remedies (to which Swann clearly applies) without any such federal order, see supra, at 19-20. See also Kennedy Report. Seattle's circumstances are not meaningfully different from those in, say, McDaniel, where this Court approved race-conscious remedies. Louisville's plan was created and initially adopted when a compulsory district court order was in place. And, in any event, the histories of Seattle and Louisville make clear that this distinction--between court-ordered and voluntary desegregation--seeks a line that sensibly cannot be drawn. </s> Second, the plurality downplays the importance of Swann and related cases by frequently describing their relevant statements as "dicta." These criticisms, however, miss the main point. Swann did not hide its understanding of the law in a corner of an obscure opinion or in a footnote, unread but by experts. It set forth its view prominently in an important opinion joined by all nine Justices, knowing that it would be read and followed throughout the Nation. The basic problem with the plurality's technical "dicta"-based response lies in its overly theoretical approach to case law, an approach that emphasizes rigid distinctions between holdings and dicta in a way that serves to mask the radical nature of today's decision. Law is not an exercise in mathematical logic. And statements of a legal rule set forth in a judicial opinion do not always divide neatly into "holdings" and "dicta." (Consider the legal "status" of Justice Powell's separate opinion in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).) The constitutional principle enunciated in Swann, reiterated in subsequent cases, and relied upon over many years, provides, and has widely been thought to provide, authoritative legal guidance. And if the plurality now chooses to reject that principle, it cannot adequately justify its retreat simply by affixing the label "dicta" to reasoning with which it disagrees. Rather, it must explain to the courts and to the Nation why it would abandon guidance set forth many years before, guidance that countless others have built upon over time, and which the law has continuously embodied. </s> Third, a more important response is the plurality's claim that later cases--in particular Johnson, Adarand, and Grutter--supplanted Swann. See ante, at 11-12, 31-32, n.16, 34-35 (citing Adarand, supra, at 227; Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003)). The plurality says that cases such as Swann and the others I have described all "were decided before this Court definitively determined that 'all racial classifications . . . must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.'" Ante, at 31, n.16 (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S., at 227). This Court in Adarand added that "such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests." Ibid. And the Court repeated this same statement in Grutter. See 539 U.S., at 326. </s> Several of these cases were significantly more restrictive than Swann in respect to the degree of leniency the Fourteenth Amendment grants to programs designed to include people of all races. See, e.g., Adarand, supra; Gratz, supra; Grutter, supra. But that legal circumstance cannot make a critical difference here for two separate reasons. </s> First, no case--not Adarand, Gratz, Grutter, or any other--has ever held that the test of "strict scrutiny" means that all racial classifications--no matter whether they seek to include or exclude--must in practice be treated the same. The Court did not say in Adarand or in Johnson or in Grutter that it was overturning Swann or its central constitutional principle. </s> Indeed, in its more recent opinions, the Court recognized that the "fundamental purpose" of strict scrutiny review is to "take relevant differences" between "fundamentally different situations . . . into account." Adarand, supra, at 228 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court made clear that "[s]trict scrutiny does not trea[t] dissimilar race-based decisions as though they were equally objectionable." Ibid. It added that the fact that a law "treats [a person] unequally because of his or her race . . . says nothing about the ultimate validity of any particular law." Id., at 229-230 (internal quotation marks omitted). And the Court, using the very phrase that Justice Marshall had used to describe strict scrutiny's application to any exclusionary use of racial criteria, sought to "dispel the notion that strict scrutiny" is as likely to condemn inclusive uses of "race-conscious" criteria as it is to invalidate exclusionary uses. That is, it is not in all circumstances "'strict in theory, but fatal in fact.'" Id., at 237 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S., at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment)). </s> The Court in Grutter elaborated: "Strict scrutiny is not 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact.' . . . Although all governmental uses of race are subject to strict scrutiny, not all are invalidated by it. . . . </s> "Context matters when reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 343-344 (1960) (admonishing that, 'in dealing with claims under broad provisions of the Constitution, which derive content by an interpretive process of inclusion and exclusion, it is imperative that generalizations, based on and qualified by the concrete situations that gave rise to them, must not be applied out of context in disregard of variant controlling facts'). . . . Not every decision influenced by race is equally objectionable, and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for carefully examining the importance and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the governmental decisionmaker for the use of race in that particular context." 539 U.S., at 326-327. </s> The Court's holding in Grutter demonstrates that the Court meant what it said, for the Court upheld an elite law school's race-conscious admissions program. </s> The upshot is that the cases to which the plurality refers, though all applying strict scrutiny, do not treat exclusive and inclusive uses the same. Rather, they apply the strict scrutiny test in a manner that is "fatal in fact" only to racial classifications that harmfully exclude; they apply the test in a manner that is not fatal in fact to racial classifications that seek to include. </s> The plurality cannot avoid this simple fact. See ante, at 34-36. Today's opinion reveals that the plurality would rewrite this Court's prior jurisprudence, at least in practical application, transforming the "strict scrutiny" test into a rule that is fatal in fact across the board. In doing so, the plurality parts company from this Court's prior cases, and it takes from local government the longstanding legal right to use race-conscious criteria for inclusive purposes in limited ways. </s> Second, as Grutter specified, "[c]ontext matters when reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause." 539 U.S., at 327 (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, 343-344 (1960)). And contexts differ dramatically one from the other. Governmental use of race-based criteria can arise in the context of, for example, census forms, research expenditures for diseases, assignments of police officers patrolling predominantly minority-race neighborhoods, efforts to desegregate racially segregated schools, policies that favor minorities when distributing goods or services in short supply, actions that create majority-minority electoral districts, peremptory strikes that remove potential jurors on the basis of race, and others. Given the significant differences among these contexts, it would be surprising if the law required an identically strict legal test for evaluating the constitutionality of race-based criteria as to each of them. </s> Here, the context is one in which school districts seek to advance or to maintain racial integration in primary and secondary schools. It is a context, as Swann makes clear, where history has required special administrative remedies. And it is a context in which the school boards' plans simply set race-conscious limits at the outer boundaries of a broad range. </s> This context is not a context that involves the use of race to decide who will receive goods or services that are normally distributed on the basis of merit and which are in short supply. It is not one in which race-conscious limits stigmatize or exclude; the limits at issue do not pit the races against each other or otherwise significantly exacerbate racial tensions. They do not impose burdens unfairly upon members of one race alone but instead seek benefits for members of all races alike. The context here is one of racial limits that seek, not to keep the races apart, but to bring them together. </s> The importance of these differences is clear once one compares the present circumstances with other cases where one or more of these negative features are present. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Brown, 347 U.S. 483; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pe&nacute;a, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Grutter, supra; Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005). </s> If one examines the context more specifically, one finds that the districts' plans reflect efforts to overcome a history of segregation, embody the results of broad experience and community consultation, seek to expand student choice while reducing the need for mandatory busing, and use race-conscious criteria in highly limited ways that diminish the use of race compared to preceding integration efforts. Compare Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 809-810 (CA1 1998) (Boudin, J., concurring), with Comfort, 418 F. 3d, at 28-29 (Boudin, C.J., concurring). They do not seek to award a scarce commodity on the basis of merit, for they are not magnet schools; rather, by design and in practice, they offer substantially equivalent academic programs and electives. Although some parents or children prefer some schools over others, school popularity has varied significantly over the years. In 2000, for example, Roosevelt was the most popular first choice high school in Seattle; in 2001, Ballard was the most popular; in 2000, West Seattle was one of the least popular; by 2003, it was one of the more popular. See Research, Evaluation and Assessment, Student Information Services Office, District Summaries 1999-2005, available at http: //www.seattleschools.org/area/siso/disprof/2005/DP05 all.pdf. In a word, the school plans under review do not involve the kind of race-based harm that has led this Court, in other contexts, to find the use of race-conscious criteria unconstitutional. </s> These and related considerations convinced one Ninth Circuit judge in the Seattle case to apply a standard of constitutionality review that is less than "strict," and to conclude that this Court's precedents do not require the contrary. See 426 F.3d 1162, 1193-1194 (2005) (Kozinski, J., concurring) ("That a student is denied the school of his choice may be disappointing, but it carries no racial stigma and says nothing at all about that individual's aptitude or ability"). That judge is not alone. Cf. Gratz, supra, at 301 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Adarand, supra, at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Carter, When Victims Happen To Be Black, 97 Yale L.J. 420, 433-434 (1988). </s> The view that a more lenient standard than "strict scrutiny" should apply in the present context would not imply abandonment of judicial efforts carefully to determine the need for race-conscious criteria and the criteria's tailoring in light of the need. And the present context requires a court to examine carefully the race-conscious program at issue. In doing so, a reviewing judge must be fully aware of the potential dangers and pitfalls that Justice Thomas and Justice Kennedy mention. See ante, at 11-12 (Thomas, J., concurring); ante, at 3, 17 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). </s> But unlike the plurality, such a judge would also be aware that a legislature or school administrators, ultimately accountable to the electorate, could nonetheless properly conclude that a racial classification sometimes serves a purpose important enough to overcome the risks they mention, for example, helping to end racial isolation or to achieve a diverse student body in public schools. Cf. ante, at 17-18 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). Where that is so, the judge would carefully examine the program's details to determine whether the use of race-conscious criteria is proportionate to the important ends it serves. </s> In my view, this contextual approach to scrutiny is altogether fitting. I believe that the law requires application here of a standard of review that is not "strict" in the traditional sense of that word, although it does require the careful review I have just described. See Gratz, supra, at 301 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Souter, J., dissenting); Adarand, supra, at 242-249 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting); 426 F.3d, at 1193-1194 (Kozinski, J., concurring). Apparently Justice Kennedy also agrees that strict scrutiny would not apply in respect to certain "race-conscious" school board policies. See ante, at 9 ("Executive and legislative branches, which for generations now have considered these types of policies and procedures, should be permitted to employ them with candor and with confidence that a constitutional violation does not occur whenever a decisionmaker considers the impact a given approach might have on students of different races"). </s> Nonetheless, in light of Grutter and other precedents, see, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S., at 290 (opinion of Powell, J.), I shall adopt the first alternative. I shall apply the version of strict scrutiny that those cases embody. I shall consequently ask whether the school boards in Seattle and Louisville adopted these plans to serve a "compelling governmental interest" and, if so, whether the plans are "narrowly tailored" to achieve that interest. If the plans survive this strict review, they would survive less exacting review a fortiori. Hence, I conclude that the plans before us pass both parts of the strict scrutiny test. Consequently I must conclude that the plans here are permitted under the Constitution. III Applying the Legal Standard A Compelling Interest </s> The principal interest advanced in these cases to justify the use of race-based criteria goes by various names. Sometimes a court refers to it as an interest in achieving racial "diversity." Other times a court, like the plurality here, refers to it as an interest in racial "balancing." I have used more general terms to signify that interest, describing it, for example, as an interest in promoting or preserving greater racial "integration" of public schools. By this term, I mean the school districts' interest in eliminating school-by-school racial isolation and increasing the degree to which racial mixture characterizes each of the district's schools and each individual student's public school experience. Regardless of its name, however, the interest at stake possesses three essential elements. First, there is a historical and remedial element: an interest in setting right the consequences of prior conditions of segregation. This refers back to a time when public schools were highly segregated, often as a result of legal or administrative policies that facilitated racial segregation in public schools. It is an interest in continuing to combat the remnants of segregation caused in whole or in part by these school-related policies, which have often affected not only schools, but also housing patterns, employment practices, economic conditions, and social attitudes. It is an interest in maintaining hard-won gains. And it has its roots in preventing what gradually may become the de facto resegregation of America's public schools. See Part I, supra, at 4; Appendix A, infra. See also ante, at 17 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) ("This Nation has a moral and ethical obligation to fulfill its historic commitment to creating an integrated society that ensures equal opportunity for all of its children"). </s> Second, there is an educational element: an interest in overcoming the adverse educational effects produced by and associated with highly segregated schools. Cf. Grutter, 539 U.S., at 345 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Studies suggest that children taken from those schools and placed in integrated settings often show positive academic gains. See, e.g., Powell, Living and Learning: Linking Housing and Education, in Pursuit of a Dream Deferred: Linking Housing and Education Policy 15, 35 (J. Powell, G. Kearney, & V. Kay eds. 2001) (hereinafter Powell); Hallinan, Diversity Effects on Student Outcomes: Social Science Evidence, 59 Ohio St. L.J. 733, 741-742 (1998) (hereinafter Hallinan). </s> Other studies reach different conclusions. See, e.g., D. Armor, Forced Justice (1995). See also ante, at 15-17 (Thomas, J., concurring). But the evidence supporting an educational interest in racially integrated schools is well established and strong enough to permit a democratically elected school board reasonably to determine that this interest is a compelling one. </s> Research suggests, for example, that black children from segregated educational environments significantly increase their achievement levels once they are placed in a more integrated setting. Indeed in Louisville itself the achievement gap between black and white elementary school students grew substantially smaller (by seven percentage points) after the integration plan was implemented in 1975. See Powell 35. Conversely, to take another example, evidence from a district in Norfolk, Virginia, shows that resegregated schools led to a decline in the achievement test scores of children of all races. Ibid. </s> One commentator, reviewing dozens of studies of the educational benefits of desegregated schooling, found that the studies have provided "remarkably consistent" results, showing that: (1) black students' educational achievement is improved in integrated schools as compared to racially isolated schools, (2) black students' educational achievement is improved in integrated classes, and (3) the earlier that black students are removed from racial isolation, the better their educational outcomes. See Hallinan 741-742. Multiple studies also indicate that black alumni of integrated schools are more likely to move into occupations traditionally closed to African-Americans, and to earn more money in those fields. See, e.g., Schofield, Review of Research on School Desegregation's Impact on Elementary and Secondary School Students, in Handbook of Research on Multicultural Education 597, 606-607 (J. Banks & C. Banks eds. 1995). Cf. W. Bowen & D. Bok, The Shape of the River 118 (1998) (hereinafter Bowen & Bok). </s> Third, there is a democratic element: an interest in producing an educational environment that reflects the "pluralistic society" in which our children will live. Swann, 402 U.S., at 16. It is an interest in helping our children learn to work and play together with children of different racial backgrounds. It is an interest in teaching children to engage in the kind of cooperation among Americans of all races that is necessary to make a land of three hundred million people one Nation. </s> Again, data support this insight. See, e.g., Hallinan 745; Quillian & Campbell, Beyond Black and White: The Present and Future of Multiracial Friendship Segregation, 68 Am. Sociological Rev. 540, 541 (2003) (hereinafter Quillian & Campbell); Dawkins & Braddock, The Continuing Significance of Desegregation: School Racial Composition and African American Inclusion in American Society, 63 J. Negro Ed. 394, 401-403 (1994) (hereinafter Dawkins & Braddock); Wells & Crain, Perpetuation Theory and the Long-Term Effects of School Desegregation, 64 Rev. Educational Research 531, 550 (1994) (hereinafter Wells & Crain). </s> There are again studies that offer contrary conclusions. See, e.g., Schofield, School Desegregation and Intergroup Relations, in 17 Review of Research in Education 356 (G. Grant ed. 1991). See also ante, at 22-23 (Thomas, J., concurring). Again, however, the evidence supporting a democratic interest in racially integrated schools is firmly established and sufficiently strong to permit a school board to determine, as this Court has itself often found, that this interest is compelling. </s> For example, one study documented that "black and white students in desegregated schools are less racially prejudiced than those in segregated schools," and that "interracial contact in desegregated schools leads to an increase in interracial sociability and friendship." Hallinan 745. See also Quillian & Campbell 541. Cf. Bowen & Bok 155. Other studies have found that both black and white students who attend integrated schools are more likely to work in desegregated companies after graduation than students who attended racially isolated schools. Dawkins & Braddock 401-403; Wells & Crain 550. Further research has shown that the desegregation of schools can help bring adult communities together by reducing segregated housing. Cities that have implemented successful school desegregation plans have witnessed increased interracial contact and neighborhoods that tend to become less racially segregated. Dawkins & Braddock 403. These effects not only reinforce the prior gains of integrated primary and secondary education; they also foresee a time when there is less need to use race-conscious criteria. </s> Moreover, this Court from Swann to Grutter has treated these civic effects as an important virtue of racially diverse education. See, e.g., Swann, supra, at 16; Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S., at 472-473. In Grutter, in the context of law school admissions, we found that these types of interests were, constitutionally speaking, "compelling." See 539 U.S., at 330 (recognizing that Michigan Law School's race-conscious admissions policy "promotes cross-racial understanding, helps to break down racial stereotypes, and enables [students] to better understand persons of different races," and pointing out that "the skills needed in today's increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints" (internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in original)). </s> In light of this Court's conclusions in Grutter, the "compelling" nature of these interests in the context of primary and secondary public education follows here a fortiori. Primary and secondary schools are where the education of this Nation's children begins, where each of us begins to absorb those values we carry with us to the end of our days. As Justice Marshall said, "unless our children begin to learn together, there is little hope that our people will ever learn to live together." Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717, 783 (1974) (dissenting opinion). </s> And it was Brown, after all, focusing upon primary and secondary schools, not Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), focusing on law schools, or McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Ed., 339 U.S. 637 (1950), focusing on graduate schools, that affected so deeply not only Americans but the world. R. Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America's Struggle for Equality, p. x (1975) (arguing that perhaps no other Supreme Court case has "affected more directly the minds, hearts, and daily lives of so many Americans"); Patterson, Brown v. Board of Education xxvii (2001) (identifying Brown as "the most eagerly awaited and dramatic judicial decision of modern times"). See also Parents Involved VII, 426 F.3d, at 1194 (Kozinski, J., concurring); Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. Chi. L.Rev. 935, 937 (1989) (calling Brown "the Supreme Court's greatest anti-discrimination decision"); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Brown, 347 U.S. 483; Dudziak, Brown as a Cold War Case, 91 J. Am. Hist. 32 (2004); A Great Decision, Hindustan Times (New Dehli, May 20, 1954), p.5; USA Takes Positive Step, West African Pilot (Lagos, May 22, 1954), p. 2 (stating that Brown is an acknowledgment that the "United States should set an example for all other nations by taking the lead in removing from its national life all signs and traces of racial intolerance, arrogance or discrimination"). Hence, I am not surprised that Justice Kennedy finds that, "a district may consider it a compelling interest to achieve a diverse student population," including a racially diverse population. Ante, at 17-18. </s> The compelling interest at issue here, then, includes an effort to eradicate the remnants, not of general "societal discrimination," ante, at 23 (plurality opinion), but of primary and secondary school segregation, see supra, at 7, 14; it includes an effort to create school environments that provide better educational opportunities for all children; it includes an effort to help create citizens better prepared to know, to understand, and to work with people of all races and backgrounds, thereby furthering the kind of democratic government our Constitution foresees. If an educational interest that combines these three elements is not "compelling," what is? </s> The majority acknowledges that in prior cases this Court has recognized at least two interests as compelling: an interest in "remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination," and an interest in "diversity in higher education." Ante, at 12, 13. But the plurality does not convincingly explain why those interests do not constitute a "compelling interest" here. How do the remedial interests here differ in kind from those at issue in the voluntary desegregation efforts that Attorney General Kennedy many years ago described in his letter to the President? Supra, at 19-20. How do the educational and civic interests differ in kind from those that underlie and justify the racial "diversity" that the law school sought in Grutter, where this Court found a compelling interest? </s> The plurality tries to draw a distinction by reference to the well-established conceptual difference between de jure segregation ("segregation by state action") and de facto segregation ("racial imbalance caused by other factors"). Ante, at 28. But that distinction concerns what the Constitution requires school boards to do, not what it permits them to do. Compare, e.g., Green, 391 U. S., at 437-438 ("School boards ... operating state-compelled dual systems" have an "affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch"), with, e.g., Milliken, 418 U. S., at 745 (the Constitution does not impose a duty to desegregate upon districts that have not been "shown to have committed any constitutional violation"). </s> The opinions cited by the plurality to justify its reliance upon the de jure/de facto distinction only address what remedial measures a school district may be constitutionally required to undertake. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 495 (1992). As to what is permitted, nothing in our equal protection law suggests that a State may right only those wrongs that it committed. No case of this Court has ever relied upon the de jure/de facto distinction in order to limit what a school district is voluntarily allowed to do. That is what is at issue here. And Swann, McDaniel, Crawford, North Carolina Bd. of Ed., Harris, and Bustop made one thing clear: significant as the difference between de jure and de facto segregation may be to the question of what a school district must do, that distinction is not germane to the question of what a school district may do. </s> Nor does any precedent indicate, as the plurality suggests with respect to Louisville, ante, at 29, that remedial interests vanish the day after a federal court declares that a district is "unitary." Of course, Louisville adopted those portions of the plan at issue here before a court declared Louisville "unitary." Moreover, in Freeman, this Court pointed out that in "one sense of the term, vestiges of past segregation by state decree do remain in our society and in our schools. Past wrongs to the black race, wrongs committed by the State and in its name, are a stubborn fact of history. And stubborn facts of history linger and persist." 503 U.S., at 495. See also ante, at 15 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). I do not understand why this Court's cases, which rest the significance of a "unitary" finding in part upon the wisdom and desirability of returning schools to local control, should deprive those local officials of legal permission to use means they once found necessary to combat persisting injustices. </s> For his part, Justice Thomas faults my citation of various studies supporting the view that school districts can find compelling educational and civic interests in integrating their public schools. See ante, at 15-17, 23 (concurring opinion). He is entitled of course to his own opinion as to which studies he finds convincing--although it bears mention that even the author of some of Justice Thomas' preferred studies has found some evidence linking integrated learning environments to increased academic achievement. Cf. ante, at 15-17 (opinion of Thomas, J.) (citing Armor & Rossell, Desegregation and Resegregation in the Public Schools, in Beyond the Color Line 239 (A. Thernstrom & S. Thernstrom eds. 2002); Brief for Armor etal. as Amici Curiae, with Rosen, Perhaps Not All Affirmative Action is Created Equal, N.Y. Times, June 11, 2006 (quoting David Armor as commenting "'[w]e did find the [racial] achievement gap changing significantly'" and acknowledging that he "'did find a modest association for math but not reading in terms of racial composition and achievement, but there's a big state variation'" (emphasis added)). If we are to insist upon unanimity in the social science literature before finding a compelling interest, we might never find one. I believe only that the Constitution allows democratically elected school boards to make up their own minds as to how best to include people of all races in one America. B Narrow Tailoring </s> I next ask whether the plans before us are "narrowly tailored" to achieve these "compelling" objectives. I shall not accept the school board's assurances on faith, cf. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 920 (1995), and I shall subject the "tailoring" of their plans to "rigorous judicial review." Grutter, 539 U.S., at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Several factors, taken together, nonetheless lead me to conclude that the boards' use of race-conscious criteria in these plans passes even the strictest "tailoring" test. First, the race-conscious criteria at issue only help set the outer bounds of broad ranges. Cf. id., at 390 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (expressing concern about "narrow fluctuation band[s]"). They constitute but one part of plans that depend primarily upon other, nonracial elements. To use race in this way is not to set a forbidden "quota." See id., at 335 ("Properly understood, a 'quota' is a program in which a certain fixed number or proportion of opportunities are 'reserved exclusively for certain minority groups'" (quoting Croson, 488 U.S., at 496)). </s> In fact, the defining feature of both plans is greater emphasis upon student choice. In Seattle, for example, in more than 80% of all cases, that choice alone determines which high schools Seattle's ninth graders will attend. After ninth grade, students can decide voluntarily to transfer to a preferred district high school (without any consideration of race-conscious criteria). Choice, therefore, is the "predominant factor" in these plans. Race is not. See Grutter, supra, at 393 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (allowing consideration of race only if it does "not become a predominant factor"). </s> Indeed, the race-conscious ranges at issue in these cases often have no effect, either because the particular school is not oversubscribed in the year in question, or because the racial makeup of the school falls within the broad range, or because the student is a transfer applicant or has a sibling at the school. In these respects, the broad ranges are less like a quota and more like the kinds of "useful starting points" that this Court has consistently found permissible, even when they set boundaries upon voluntary transfers, and even when they are based upon a community's general population. See, e.g., North Carolina Bd. of Ed. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971) (no "absolute prohibition against [the] use" of mathematical ratios as a "starting point"); Swann, 402 U.S., at 24-25 (approving the use of a ratio reflecting "the racial composition of the whole school system" as a "useful starting point," but not as an "inflexible requirement"). Cf. United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Ed., 395 U. S. 225, 232 (1969) (approving a lower court desegregation order that "provided that the [school] board must move toward a goal under which 'in each school the ratio of white to Negro faculty members is substantially the same as it is throughout the system,'" and "immediately" requiring "[t]he ratio of Negro to white teachers" in each school to be equal to "the ratio of Negro to white teachers in ... the system as a whole"). </s> Second, broad-range limits on voluntary school choice plans are less burdensome, and hence more narrowly tailored, see Grutter, supra, at 341, than other race-conscious restrictions this Court has previously approved. See, e.g., Swann, supra, at 26-27; Montgomery Co. Bd. of Ed., supra, at 232. Indeed, the plans before us are more narrowly tailored than the race-conscious admission plans that this Court approved in Grutter. Here, race becomes a factor only in a fraction of students' non-merit-based assignments--not in large numbers of students' merit-based applications. Moreover, the effect of applying race-conscious criteria here affects potentially disadvantaged students less severely, not more severely, than the criteria at issue in Grutter. Disappointed students are not rejected from a State's flagship graduate program; they simply attend a different one of the district's many public schools, which in aspiration and in fact are substantially equal. Cf. Wygant, 476 U.S., at 283. And, in Seattle, the disadvantaged student loses at most one year at the high school of his choice. One will search Grutter in vain for similarly persuasive evidence of narrow tailoring as the school districts have presented here. </s> Third, the manner in which the school boards developed these plans itself reflects "narrow tailoring." Each plan was devised to overcome a history of segregated public schools. Each plan embodies the results of local experience and community consultation. Each plan is the product of a process that has sought to enhance student choice, while diminishing the need for mandatory busing. And each plan's use of race-conscious elements is diminished compared to the use of race in preceding integration plans. </s> The school boards' widespread consultation, their experimentation with numerous other plans, indeed, the 40-year history that Part I sets forth, make clear that plans that are less explicitly race-based are unlikely to achieve the board's "compelling" objectives. The history of each school system reveals highly segregated schools, followed by remedial plans that involved forced busing, followed by efforts to attract or retain students through the use of plans that abandoned busing and replaced it with greater student choice. Both cities once tried to achieve more integrated schools by relying solely upon measures such as redrawn district boundaries, new school building construction, and unrestricted voluntary transfers. In neither city did these prior attempts prove sufficient to achieve the city's integration goals. See Parts I-A and I-B, supra, at 6-18. </s> Moreover, giving some degree of weight to a local school board's knowledge, expertise, and concerns in these particular matters is not inconsistent with rigorous judicial scrutiny. It simply recognizes that judges are not well suited to act as school administrators. Indeed, in the context of school desegregation, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of acknowledging that local school boards better understand their own communities and have a better knowledge of what in practice will best meet the educational needs of their pupils. See Milliken, 418 U. S., at 741-42 ("No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support for public schools and to quality of the educational process"). See also San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 49-50 (1973) (extolling local control for "the opportunity it offers for participation in the decisionmaking process that determines how . . . local tax dollars will be spent. Each locality is free to tailor local programs to local needs. Pluralism also affords some opportunity for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational excellence"); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) ("Judicial interposition in the operation of the public school system of the Nation raises problems requiring care and restraint. . . . By and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities"); Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 299 (1955) (Brown II) ("Full implementation of these constitutional principles may require solution of varied local school problems. School authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems; courts will have to consider whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the governing constitutional principles"). </s> Experience in Seattle and Louisville is consistent with experience elsewhere. In 1987, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights studied 125 large school districts seeking integration. It reported that most districts--92 of them, in fact--adopted desegregation policies that combined two or more highly race-conscious strategies, for example, rezoning or pairing. See Welch 83-91. </s> Having looked at dozens of amicus briefs, public reports, news stories, and the records in many of this Court's prior cases, which together span 50 years of desegregation history in school districts across the Nation, I have discovered many examples of districts that sought integration through explicitly race-conscious methods, including mandatory busing. Yet, I have found no example or model that would permit this Court to say to Seattle and to Louisville: "Here is an instance of a desegregation plan that is likely to achieve your objectives and also makes less use of race-conscious criteria than your plans." And, if the plurality cannot suggest such a model--and it cannot--then it seeks to impose a "narrow tailoring" requirement that in practice would never be met. </s> Indeed, if there is no such plan, or if such plans are purely imagined, it is understandable why, as the plurality notes, ante, at 27, Seattle school officials concentrated on diminishing the racial component of their districts' plan, but did not pursue eliminating that element entirely. For the plurality now to insist as it does, ante, at 27-28, that these school districts ought to have said so officially is either to ask for the superfluous (if they need only make explicit what is implicit) or to demand the impossible (if they must somehow provide more proof that there is no hypothetical other plan that could work as well as theirs). I am not aware of any case in which this Court has read the "narrow tailoring" test to impose such a requirement. Cf. People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Ed. School Dist. No. 205, 961 F.2d 1335, 1338 (CA7 1992) (Easterbrook, J.) ("Would it be necessary to adjudicate the obvious before adopting (or permitting the parties to agree on) a remedy . . . ?"). </s> The plurality also points to the school districts' use of numerical goals based upon the racial breakdown of the general school population, and it faults the districts for failing to prove that no other set of numbers will work. See ante, at 18-20. The plurality refers to no case in support of its demand. Nor is it likely to find such a case. After all, this Court has in many cases explicitly permitted districts to use target ratios based upon the district's underlying population. See, e.g., Swann, 402 U.S., at 24-25; North Carolina Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S., at 46; Montgomery County Bd. of Ed., 395 U.S., at 232. The reason is obvious: In Seattle, where the overall student population is 41% white, permitting 85% white enrollment at a single school would make it much more likely that other schools would have very few white students, whereas in Jefferson County, with a 60% white enrollment, one school with 85% white students would be less likely to skew enrollments elsewhere. </s> Moreover, there is research-based evidence supporting, for example, that a ratio no greater than 50% minority--which is Louisville's starting point, and as close as feasible to Seattle's starting point--is helpful in limiting the risk of "white flight." See Orfield, Metropolitan School Desegregation: Impacts on Metropolitan Society, in Pursuit of a Dream Deferred: Linking Housing and Education Policy 121, 125. Federal law also assumes that a similar target percentage will help avoid detrimental "minority group isolation." See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Title V, Part C, 115 Stat. 1806, 20 U.S.C. §7231 et seq. (2000 ed., Supp. IV); 34 CFR §§280.2, 280.4 (2006) (implementing regulations). What other numbers are the boards to use as a "starting point"? Are they to spend days, weeks, or months seeking independently to validate the use of ratios that this Court has repeatedly authorized in prior cases? Are they to draw numbers out of thin air? These districts have followed this Court's holdings and advice in "tailoring" their plans. That, too, strongly supports the lawfulness of their methods. </s> Nor could the school districts have accomplished their desired aims (e.g., avoiding forced busing, countering white flight, maintaining racial diversity) by other means. Nothing in the extensive history of desegregation efforts over the past 50 years gives the districts, or this Court, any reason to believe that another method is possible to accomplish these goals. Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy suggests that school boards: "may pursue the goal of bringing together students of diverse backgrounds and races through other means, including strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race." Ante, at 8. But, as to "strategic site selection," Seattle has built one new high school in the last 44 years (and that specialized school serves only 300 students). In fact, six of the Seattle high schools involved in this case were built by the 1920's; the other four were open by the early 1960's. See generally N. Thompson & C. Marr, Building for Learning: Seattle Public Schools Histories, 1862-2000 (2002). As to "drawing" neighborhood "attendance zones" on a racial basis, Louisville tried it, and it worked only when forced busing was also part of the plan. See supra, at 12-14. As to "allocating resources for special programs," Seattle and Louisville have both experimented with this; indeed, these programs are often referred to as "magnet schools," but the limited desegregation effect of these efforts extends at most to those few schools to which additional resources are granted. In addition, there is no evidence from the experience of these school districts that it will make any meaningful impact. See Brief for Respondents in No. 05-908, p. 42. As to "recruiting faculty" on the basis of race, both cities have tried, but only as one part of a broader program. As to "tracking enrollments, performance and other statistics by race," tracking reveals the problem; it does not cure it. Justice Kennedy sets forth two additional concerns related to "narrow tailoring." In respect to Louisville, he says first that officials stated (1) that kindergarten assignments are not subject to the race-conscious guidelines, and (2) that the child at issue here was denied permission to attend the kindergarten he wanted because of those guidelines. Both, he explains, cannot be true. He adds that this confusion illustrates that Louisville's assignment plan (or its explanation of it to this Court) is insufficiently precise in respect to "who makes the decisions," "oversight," "the precise circumstances in which an assignment decision" will be made; and "which of two similarly situated children will be subjected to a given race-based decision." Ante, at 4. </s> The record suggests, however, that the child in question was not assigned to the school he preferred because he missed the kindergarten application deadline. See App. in 05-915, p. 20. After he had enrolled and after the academic year had begun, he then applied to transfer to his preferred school after the kindergarten assignment deadline had passed, id., at 21, possibly causing school officials to treat his late request as an application to transfer to the first grade, in respect to which the guidelines apply. I am not certain just how the remainder of Justice Kennedy's concerns affect the lawfulness of the Louisville program, for they seem to be failures of explanation, not of administration. But Louisville should be able to answer the relevant questions on remand. </s> Justice Kennedy's second concern is directly related to the merits of Seattle's plan: Why does Seattle's plan group Asian-Americans, Hispanic-Americans, Native-Americans, and African-Americans together, treating all as similar minorities? Ante, at 6-7. The majority suggests that Seattle's classification system could permit a school to be labeled "diverse" with a 50% Asian-American and 50% white student body, and no African-American students, Hispanic students, or students of other ethnicity. Ante, at 6; ante, at 15-16 (opinion of the Court). </s> The 50/50 hypothetical has no support in the record here; it is conjured from the imagination. In fact, Seattle apparently began to treat these different minority groups alike in response to the federal Emergency School Aid Act's requirement that it do so. Siqueland 116-117. See also Hanawalt 31; Pub. L. 95-561, Tit. VI (1978) (prescribing percentage enrollment requirements for "minority" students); Siqueland 55 (discussing HEW definition of "minority"). Moreover, maintaining this federally mandated system of classification makes sense insofar as Seattle's experience indicates that the relevant circumstances in respect to each of these different minority groups are roughly similar, e.g., in terms of residential patterns, and call for roughly similar responses. This is confirmed by the fact that Seattle has been able to achieve a desirable degree of diversity without the greater emphasis on race that drawing fine lines among minority groups would require. Does the plurality's view of the Equal Protection Clause mean that courts must give no weight to such a board determination? Does it insist upon especially strong evidence supporting inclusion of multiple minority groups in an otherwise lawful government minority-assistance program? If so, its interpretation threatens to produce divisiveness among minority groups that is incompatible with the basic objectives of the Fourteenth Amendment. Regardless, the plurality cannot object that the constitutional defect is the individualized use of race and simultaneously object that not enough account of individuals' race has been taken. </s> Finally, I recognize that the Court seeks to distinguish Grutter from these cases by claiming that Grutter arose in "'the context of higher education.'" Ante, at 16. But that is not a meaningful legal distinction. I have explained why I do not believe the Constitution could possibly find "compelling" the provision of a racially diverse education for a 23-year-old law student but not for a 13-year-old high school pupil. See supra, at 46-48. And I have explained how the plans before us are more narrowly tailored than those in Grutter. See supra, at 45. I add that one cannot find a relevant distinction in the fact that these school districts did not examine the merits of applications "individual[ly]." See ante, at 13-15. The context here does not involve admission by merit; a child's academic, artistic, and athletic "merits" are not at all relevant to the child's placement. These are not affirmative action plans, and hence "individualized scrutiny" is simply beside the point. </s> The upshot is that these plans' specific features--(1) their limited and historically-diminishing use of race, (2) their strong reliance upon other non-race-conscious elements, (3) their history and the manner in which the districts developed and modified their approach, (4) the comparison with prior plans, and (5) the lack of reasonably evident alternatives--together show that the districts' plans are "narrowly tailored" to achieve their "compelling" goals. In sum, the districts' race-conscious plans satisfy "strict scrutiny" and are therefore lawful. IV Direct Precedent </s> Two additional precedents more directly related to the plans here at issue reinforce my conclusion. The first consists of the District Court determination in the Louisville case when it dissolved its desegregation order that there was "overwhelming evidence of the Board's good faith compliance with the desegregation Decree and its underlying purposes," indeed that the Board had "treated the ideal of an integrated system as much more than a legal obligation--they consider it a positive, desirable policy and an essential element of any well-rounded public school education." Hampton II, 102 F.Supp. 2d, at 370. When the court made this determination in 2000, it did so in the context of the Louisville desegregation plan that the board had adopted in 1996. That plan, which took effect before 1996, is the very plan that in all relevant respects is in effect now and is the subject of the present challenge. No one claims that (the relevant portion of) Louisville's plan was unlawful in 1996 when Louisville adopted it. To the contrary, there is every reason to believe that it represented part of an effort to implement the 1978 desegregation order. But if the plan was lawful when it was first adopted and if it was lawful the day before the District Court dissolved its order, how can the plurality now suggest that it became unlawful the following day? Is it conceivable that the Constitution, implemented through a court desegregation order, could permit (perhaps require) the district to make use of a race-conscious plan the day before the order was dissolved and then forbid the district to use the identical plan the day after? See id., at 380 ("The very analysis for dissolving desegregation decrees supports continued maintenance of a desegregated system as a compelling state interest"). The Equal Protection Clause is not incoherent. And federal courts would rightly hesitate to find unitary status if the consequences of the ruling were so dramatically disruptive. </s> Second, Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, is directly on point. That case involves the original Seattle Plan, a more heavily race-conscious predecessor of the very plan now before us. In Seattle School Dist. No. 1, this Court struck down a state referendum that effectively barred implementation of Seattle's desegregation plan and "burden[ed] all future attempts to integrate Washington schools in districts throughout the State." Id., at 462-463, 483. Because the referendum would have prohibited the adoption of a school-integration plan that involved mandatory busing, and because it would have imposed a special burden on school integration plans (plans that sought to integrate previously segregated schools), the Court found it unconstitutional. Id., at 483-487. </s> In reaching this conclusion, the Court did not directly address the constitutional merits of the underlying Seattle plan. But it explicitly cited Swann's statement that the Constitution permitted a local district to adopt such a plan. 458 U.S., at 472, n.15. It also cited to Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, approving of the limited use of race-conscious criteria in a university-admissions "affirmative action" case. 458 U.S., at 472, n. 15. In addition, the Court stated that "[a]ttending an ethnically diverse school," id., at 473, could help prepare "minority children for citizenship in our pluralistic society," hopefully "teaching members of the racial majority to live in harmony and mutual respect with children of minority heritage." Ibid. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). </s> It is difficult to believe that the Court that held unconstitutional a referendum that would have interfered with the implementation of this plan thought that the integration plan it sought to preserve was itself an unconstitutional plan. And if Seattle School Dist. No. 1 is premised upon the constitutionality of the original Seattle Plan, it is equally premised upon the constitutionality of the present plan, for the present plan is the Seattle Plan, modified only insofar as it places even less emphasis on race-conscious elements than its predecessors. </s> It is even more difficult to accept the plurality's contrary view, namely that the underlying plan was unconstitutional. If that is so, then all of Seattle's earlier (even more race-conscious) plans must also have been unconstitutional. That necessary implication of the plurality's position strikes the 13th chime of the clock. How could the plurality adopt a constitutional standard that would hold unconstitutional large numbers of race-conscious integration plans adopted by numerous school boards over the past 50 years while remaining true to this Court's desegregation precedent? V Consequences </s> The Founders meant the Constitution as a practical document that would transmit its basic values to future generations through principles that remained workable over time. Hence it is important to consider the potential consequences of the plurality's approach, as measured against the Constitution's objectives. To do so provides further reason to believe that the plurality's approach is legally unsound. For one thing, consider the effect of the plurality's views on the parties before us and on similar school districts throughout the Nation. Will Louisville and all similar school districts have to return to systems like Louisville's initial 1956 plan, which did not consider race at all? See supra, at 12. That initial 1956 plan proved ineffective. Sixteen years into the plan, 14 of 19 middle and high schools remained almost totally white or almost totally black. Ibid. </s> The districts' past and current plans are not unique. They resemble other plans, promulgated by hundreds of local school boards, which have attempted a variety of desegregation methods that have evolved over time in light of experience. A 1987 Civil Rights Commission Study of 125 school districts in the Nation demonstrated the breadth and variety of desegregation plans: "The [study] documents almost 300 desegregation plans that were implemented between 1961 and 1985. The degree of heterogeneity within these districts is immediately apparent. They are located in every region of the country and range in size from Las Cruces, New Mexico, with barely over 15,000 students attending 23 schools in 1968, to New York City, with more than one million students in 853 schools. The sample includes districts in urban areas of all sizes, suburbs (e.g., Arlington County, Virginia) and rural areas (e.g., Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, and Raleigh County, West Virginia). It contains 34 countywide districts with central cities (the 11 Florida districts fit this description, plus Clark County, Nevada and others) and a small number of consolidated districts (New Castle County, Delaware and Jefferson County, Kentucky). </s> "The districts also vary in their racial compositions and levels of segregation. Initial plans were implemented in Mobile, Alabama and Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, and in a number of other southern districts in the face of total racial segregation. At the other extreme, Santa Clara, California had a relatively even racial distribution prior to its 1979 desegregation plan. When the 1965 plan was designed for Harford County, Maryland, the district was 92 percent white. Compton, California, on the other hand, became over 99 percent black in the 1980s, while Buffalo, New York had a virtual 50-50 split between white and minority students prior to its 1977 plan. </s> "It is not surprising to find a large number of different desegregation strategies in a sample with this much variation." Welch 23 (footnotes omitted). A majority of these desegregation techniques explicitly considered a student's race. See id., at 24-28. Transfer plans, for example, allowed students to shift from a school in which they were in the racial majority to a school in which they would be in a racial minority. Some districts, such as Richmond, California, and Buffalo, New York, permitted only "one-way" transfers, in which only black students attending predominantly black schools were permitted to transfer to designated receiver schools. Id., at 25. Fifty-three of the 125 studied districts used transfers as a component of their plans. Id., at 83-91. At the state level, 46 States and Puerto Rico have adopted policies that encourage or require local school districts to enact interdistrict or intradistrict open choice plans. Eight of those States condition approval of transfers to another school or district on whether the transfer will produce increased racial integration. Eleven other States require local boards to deny transfers that are not in compliance with the local school board's desegregation plans. See Education Commission of the States, Open Enrollment: 50-State Report (2007), online at http://mb2.ecs.org/reports/Report.aspx?id=268. </s> Arkansas, for example, provides by statute that "[n]o student may transfer to a nonresident district where the percentage of enrollment for the student's race exceeds that percentage in the student's resident district." Ark. Code Ann. §6-18-206(f)(1), as amended 2007 Ark. Gen. Acts 552 (2007). An Ohio statute provides, in respect to student choice, that each school district must establish "[p]rocedures to ensure that an appropriate racial balance is maintained in the district schools." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3313.98(B)(2)(b)(iii) (Lexis Supp. 2006). Ohio adds that a "district may object to the enrollment of a native student in an adjacent or other district in order to maintain an appropriate racial balance." §3313.98 (F)(1)(a). </s> A Connecticut statute states that its student choice program will seek to "preserve racial and ethnic balance." Conn. Gen. Stat. §10-266aa(b)(2) (2007). Connecticut law requires each school district to submit racial group population figures to the State Board of Education. §10-226a. Another Connecticut regulation provides that "[a]ny school in which the Proportion for the School falls outside of a range from 25 percentage points less to 25 percentage points more than the Comparable Proportion for the School District, shall be determined to be racially imbalanced." Conn. Agencies Regs. §10-226e-3(b) (1999). A "racial imbalance" determination requires the district to submit a plan to correct the racial imbalance, which plan may include "mandatory pupil reassignment." §§10-226e-5(a) and (c)(4). </s> Interpreting that State's Constitution, the Connecticut Supreme Court has held legally inadequate the reliance by a local school district solely upon some of the techniques Justice Kennedy today recommends (e.g., reallocating resources, etc.). See Sheff v. O'Neill, 238 Conn. 1, 678 A.2d 1267 (1996). The State Supreme Court wrote: "Despite the initiatives undertaken by the defendants to alleviate the severe racial and ethnic disparities among school districts, and despite the fact that the defendants did not intend to create or maintain these disparities, the disparities that continue to burden the education of the plaintiffs infringe upon their fundamental state constitutional right to a substantially equal educational opportunity." Id., at 42, 678 A.2d, at 1289. </s> At a minimum, the plurality's views would threaten a surge of race-based litigation. Hundreds of state and federal statutes and regulations use racial classifications for educational or other purposes. See supra, at 27. In many such instances, the contentious force of legal challenges to these classifications, meritorious or not, would displace earlier calm. </s> The wide variety of different integration plans that school districts use throughout the Nation suggests that the problem of racial segregation in schools, including de facto segregation, is difficult to solve. The fact that many such plans have used explicitly racial criteria suggests that such criteria have an important, sometimes necessary, role to play. The fact that the controlling opinion would make a school district's use of such criteria often unlawful (and the plurality's "colorblind" view would make such use always unlawful) suggests that today's opinion will require setting aside the laws of several States and many local communities. </s> As I have pointed out, supra, at 4, de facto resegregation is on the rise. See Appendix A, infra. It is reasonable to conclude that such resegregation can create serious educational, social, and civic problems. See supra, at 37-45. Given the conditions in which school boards work to set policy, see supra, at 20-21, they may need all of the means presently at their disposal to combat those problems. Yet the plurality would deprive them of at least one tool that some districts now consider vital--the limited use of broad race-conscious student population ranges. </s> I use the words "may need" here deliberately. The plurality, or at least those who follow Justice Thomas' "'color-blind'" approach, see ante, at 26-27 (Thomas, J., concurring); Grutter, 539 U.S., at 353-354 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), may feel confident that, to end invidious discrimination, one must end all governmental use of race-conscious criteria including those with inclusive objectives. See ante, at 40-41 (plurality opinion); see also ante, at 26 (Thomas, J., concurring). By way of contrast, I do not claim to know how best to stop harmful discrimination; how best to create a society that includes all Americans; how best to overcome our serious problems of increasing de facto segregation, troubled inner city schooling, and poverty correlated with race. But, as a judge, I do know that the Constitution does not authorize judges to dictate solutions to these problems. Rather, the Constitution creates a democratic political system through which the people themselves must together find answers. And it is for them to debate how best to educate the Nation's children and how best to administer America's schools to achieve that aim. The Court should leave them to their work. And it is for them to decide, to quote the plurality's slogan, whether the best "way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race." Ante, at 40-41. See also Parents Involved VII, 426 F.3d, at 1222 (Bea, J., dissenting) ("The way to end racial discrimination is to stop discriminating by race"). That is why the Equal Protection Clause outlaws invidious discrimination, but does not similarly forbid all use of race-conscious criteria. </s> Until today, this Court understood the Constitution as affording the people, acting through their elected representatives, freedom to select the use of "race-conscious" criteria from among their available options. See Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U. S., at 237 ("[S]trict scrutiny" in this context is "[not] 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact'" (quoting Fullilove, 448 U. S., at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment))). Today, however, the Court restricts (and some Members would eliminate) that leeway. I fear the consequences of doing so for the law, for the schools, for the democratic process, and for America's efforts to create, out of its diversity, one Nation. VI Conclusions </s> To show that the school assignment plans here meet the requirements of the Constitution, I have written at exceptional length. But that length is necessary. I cannot refer to the history of the plans in these cases to justify the use of race-conscious criteria without describing that history in full. I cannot rely upon Swann's statement that the use of race-conscious limits is permissible without showing, rather than simply asserting, that the statement represents a constitutional principle firmly rooted in federal and state law. Nor can I explain my disagreement with the Court's holding and the plurality's opinion, without offering a detailed account of the arguments they propound and the consequences they risk. Thus, the opinion's reasoning is long. But its conclusion is short: The plans before us satisfy the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause. And it is the plurality's opinion, not this dissent that "fails to ground the result it would reach in law." Ante, at 28. </s> Four basic considerations have led me to this view. First, the histories of Louisville and Seattle reveal complex circumstances and a long tradition of conscientious efforts by local school boards to resist racial segregation in public schools. Segregation at the time of Brown gave way to expansive remedies that included busing, which in turn gave rise to fears of white flight and resegregation. For decades now, these school boards have considered and adopted and revised assignment plans that sought to rely less upon race, to emphasize greater student choice, and to improve the conditions of all schools for all students, no matter the color of their skin, no matter where they happen to reside. The plans under review--which are less burdensome, more egalitarian, and more effective than prior plans--continue in that tradition. And their history reveals school district goals whose remedial, educational, and democratic elements are inextricably intertwined each with the others. See Part I, supra, at 2-21. </s> Second, since this Court's decision in Brown, the law has consistently and unequivocally approved of both voluntary and compulsory race-conscious measures to combat segregated schools. The Equal Protection Clause, ratified following the Civil War, has always distinguished in practice between state action that excludes and thereby subordinates racial minorities and state action that seeks to bring together people of all races. From Swann to Grutter, this Court's decisions have emphasized this distinction, recognizing that the fate of race relations in this country depends upon unity among our children, "for unless our children begin to learn together, there is little hope that our people will ever learn to live together." Milliken, 418 U. S., at 783 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also C. Sumner, Equality Before the Law: Unconstitutionality of Separate Colored Schools in Massachusetts, in 2 The Works of Charles Sumner 327, 371 (1849) ("The law contemplates not only that all be taught, but that all shall be taught together"). See Part II, supra, at 21-37. Third, the plans before us, subjected to rigorous judicial review, are supported by compelling state interests and are narrowly tailored to accomplish those goals. Just as diversity in higher education was deemed compelling in Grutter, diversity in public primary and secondary schools--where there is even more to gain--must be, a fortiori, a compelling state interest. Even apart from Grutter, five Members of this Court agree that "avoiding racial isolation" and "achiev[ing] a diverse student population" remain today compelling interests. Ante, at 17-18 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). These interests combine remedial, educational, and democratic objectives. For the reasons discussed above, however, I disagree with Justice Kennedy that Seattle and Louisville have not done enough to demonstrate that their present plans are necessary to continue upon the path set by Brown. These plans are more "narrowly tailored" than the race-conscious law school admissions criteria at issue in Grutter. Hence, their lawfulness follows a fortiori from this Court's prior decisions. See Parts III-IV, supra, at 37-57. </s> Fourth, the plurality's approach risks serious harm to the law and for the Nation. Its view of the law rests either upon a denial of the distinction between exclusionary and inclusive use of race-conscious criteria in the context of the Equal Protection Clause, or upon such a rigid application of its "test" that the distinction loses practical significance. Consequently, the Court's decision today slows down and sets back the work of local school boards to bring about racially diverse schools. See Part V, supra, at 57-63. </s> Indeed, the consequences of the approach the Court takes today are serious. Yesterday, the plans under review were lawful. Today, they are not. Yesterday, the citizens of this Nation could look for guidance to this Court's unanimous pronouncements concerning desegregation. Today, they cannot. Yesterday, school boards had available to them a full range of means to combat segregated schools. Today, they do not. </s> The Court's decision undermines other basic institutional principles as well. What has happened to stare decisis? The history of the plans before us, their educational importance, their highly limited use of race--all these and more--make clear that the compelling interest here is stronger than in Grutter. The plans here are more narrowly tailored than the law school admissions program there at issue. Hence, applying Grutter's strict test, their lawfulness follows a fortiori. To hold to the contrary is to transform that test from "strict" to "fatal in fact"--the very opposite of what Grutter said. And what has happened to Swann? To McDaniel? To Crawford? To Harris? To School Committee of Boston? To Seattle School Dist. No. 1? After decades of vibrant life, they would all, under the plurality's logic, be written out of the law. </s> And what of respect for democratic local decisionmaking by States and school boards? For several decades this Court has rested its public school decisions upon Swann's basic view that the Constitution grants local school districts a significant degree of leeway where the inclusive use of race-conscious criteria is at issue. Now localities will have to cope with the difficult problems they face (including resegregation) deprived of one means they may find necessary. </s> And what of law's concern to diminish and peacefully settle conflict among the Nation's people? Instead of accommodating different good-faith visions of our country and our Constitution, today's holding upsets settled expectations, creates legal uncertainty, and threatens to produce considerable further litigation, aggravating race-related conflict. </s> And what of the long history and moral vision that the Fourteenth Amendment itself embodies? The plurality cites in support those who argued in Brown against segregation, and Justice Thomas likens the approach that I have taken to that of segregation's defenders. See ante, at 39-41 (plurality opinion) (comparing Jim Crow segregation to Seattle and Louisville's integration polices); ante, at 28-32 (Thomas, J., concurring). But segregation policies did not simply tell schoolchildren "where they could and could not go to school based on the color of their skin," ante, at 40 (plurality opinion); they perpetuated a caste system rooted in the institutions of slavery and 80 years of legalized subordination. The lesson of history, see ante, at 39 (plurality opinion), is not that efforts to continue racial segregation are constitutionally indistinguishable from efforts to achieve racial integration. Indeed, it is a cruel distortion of history to compare Topeka, Kansas, in the 1950's to Louisville and Seattle in the modern day--to equate the plight of Linda Brown (who was ordered to attend a Jim Crow school) to the circumstances of Joshua McDonald (whose request to transfer to a school closer to home was initially declined). This is not to deny that there is a cost in applying "a state-mandated racial label." Ante, at 17 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). But that cost does not approach, in degree or in kind, the terrible harms of slavery, the resulting caste system, and 80 years of legal racial segregation. *  *  * </s> Finally, what of the hope and promise of Brown? For much of this Nation's history, the races remained divided. It was not long ago that people of different races drank from separate fountains, rode on separate buses, and studied in separate schools. In this Court's finest hour, Brown v. Board of Education challenged this history and helped to change it. For Brown held out a promise. It was a promise embodied in three Amendments designed to make citizens of slaves. It was the promise of true racial equality--not as a matter of fine words on paper, but as a matter of everyday life in the Nation's cities and schools. It was about the nature of a democracy that must work for all Americans. It sought one law, one Nation, one people, not simply as a matter of legal principle but in terms of how we actually live. Not everyone welcomed this Court's decision in Brown. Three years after that decision was handed down, the Governor of Arkansas ordered state militia to block the doors of a white schoolhouse so that black children could not enter. The President of the United States dispatched the 101st Airborne Division to Little Rock, Arkansas, and federal troops were needed to enforce a desegregation decree. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1 (1958). Today, almost 50 years later, attitudes toward race in this Nation have changed dramatically. Many parents, white and black alike, want their children to attend schools with children of different races. Indeed, the very school districts that once spurned integration now strive for it. The long history of their efforts reveals the complexities and difficulties they have faced. And in light of those challenges, they have asked us not to take from their hands the instruments they have used to rid their schools of racial segregation, instruments that they believe are needed to overcome the problems of cities divided by race and poverty. The plurality would decline their modest request. </s> The plurality is wrong to do so. The last half-century has witnessed great strides toward racial equality, but we have not yet realized the promise of Brown. To invalidate the plans under review is to threaten the promise of Brown. The plurality's position, I fear, would break that promise. This is a decision that the Court and the Nation will come to regret. </s> I must dissent. </s> APPENDIXES TO OPINION OF Breyer,J. A Resegregation Trends </s> Percentage of Black Students in 90-100 Percent Nonwhite and Majority Nonwhite Public Schools by Region, 1950-1954 to 2000, Fall Enrollment </s> Region </s> 1950-1954 </s> 1960-1961 </s> 1968 </s> 1972 </s> 1976 </s> 1980 </s> 1989 </s> 1999 </s> 2000 </s> Percentage in 90-100% Nonwhite Schools </s> Northeast </s> -- </s> 40 </s> 42.7 </s> 46.9 </s> 51.4 </s> 48.7 </s> 49.8 </s> 50.2 </s> 51.2 </s> Border </s> 100 </s> 59 </s> 60.2 </s> 54.7 </s> 42.5 </s> 37.0 </s> 33.7 </s> 39.7 </s> 39.6 </s> South </s> 100 </s> 100 </s> 77.8 </s> 24.7 </s> 22.4 </s> 23.0 </s> 26.0 </s> 31.1 </s> 30.9 </s> Midwest </s> 53 </s> 56 </s> 58.0 </s> 57.4 </s> 51.1 </s> 43.6 </s> 40.1 </s> 45.0 </s> 46.3 </s> West </s> -- </s> 27 </s> 50.8 </s> 42.7 </s> 36.3 </s> 33.7 </s> 26.7 </s> 29.9 </s> 29.5 </s> U.S. </s> 64.3 </s> 38.7 </s> 35.9 </s> 33.2 </s> 33.8 </s> 37.4 </s> 37.4 </s> Percentage in 50-100% Nonwhite Schools </s> Northeast </s> -- </s> 62 </s> 66.8 </s> 69.9 </s> 72.5 </s> 79.9 </s> 75.4 </s> 77.5 </s> 78.3 </s> Border </s> 100 </s> 69 </s> 71.6 </s> 67.2 </s> 60.1 </s> 59.2 </s> 58.0 </s> 64.8 </s> 67.0 </s> South </s> 100 </s> 100 </s> 80.9 </s> 55.3 </s> 54.9 </s> 57.1 </s> 59.3 </s> 67.3 </s> 69.0 </s> Midwest </s> 78 </s> 80 </s> 77.3 </s> 75.3 </s> 70.3 </s> 69.5 </s> 69.4 </s> 67.9 </s> 73.3 </s> West </s> -- </s> 69 </s> 72.2 </s> 68.1 </s> 67.4 </s> 66.8 </s> 67.4 </s> 76.7 </s> 75.3 </s> U.S. </s> 76.6 </s> 63.6 </s> 62.4 </s> 62.9 </s> 64.9 </s> 70.1 </s> 71.6 Source: C. Clotfelter, After Brown: The Rise and Retreat of School Desegregation 56 (2004) (Table 2.1). </s> Changes in the Percentage of White Students in Schools Attended by the Average Black Student by State, 1970-2003 (includes States with 5% or greater enrollment of black students in 1970 and 1980) </s> % White </s> % White Students in School of Average Black Student </s> Change </s> 2003 </s> 1970 </s> 1980 </s> 1991 </s> 2003 </s> 1970-1980 </s> 1980-1991 </s> 1991-2003 </s> Alabama </s> 60 </s> 33 </s> 38 </s> 35 </s> 30 </s> 5 </s> -3 </s> -5 </s> Arkansas </s> 70 </s> 43 </s> 47 </s> 44 </s> 36 </s> 4 </s> -3 </s> -8 </s> California </s> 33 </s> 26 </s> 28 </s> 27 </s> 22 </s> 2 </s> -1 </s> -5 </s> Connecticut </s> 68 </s> 44 </s> 40 </s> 35 </s> 32 </s> -4 </s> -5 </s> -3 </s> Delaware </s> 57 </s> 47 </s> 69 </s> 65 </s> 49 </s> 22 </s> -4 </s> -16 </s> Florida </s> 51 </s> 43 </s> 51 </s> 43 </s> 34 </s> 8 </s> -8 </s> -9 </s> Georgia </s> 52 </s> 35 </s> 38 </s> 35 </s> 30 </s> 3 </s> -3 </s> -5 </s> Illinois </s> 57 </s> 15 </s> 19 </s> 20 </s> 19 </s> 4 </s> 1 </s> -1 </s> Indiana </s> 82 </s> 32 </s> 39 </s> 47 </s> 41 </s> 7 </s> 8 </s> -6 </s> Kansas </s> 76 </s> 52 </s> 59 </s> 58 </s> 51 </s> 7 </s> -1 </s> -7 </s> Kentucky </s> 87 </s> 49 </s> 74 </s> 42 </s> 65 </s> 25 </s> -2 </s> -7 </s> Louisiana </s> 48 </s> 31 </s> 33 </s> 32 </s> 27 </s> 2 </s> -1 </s> -5 </s> Maryland </s> 50 </s> 30 </s> 35 </s> 29 </s> 23 </s> 5 </s> -6 </s> -6 </s> Massachusetts </s> 75 </s> 48 </s> 50 </s> 45 </s> 38 </s> 2 </s> -5 </s> -7 </s> Michigan </s> 73 </s> 22 </s> 23 </s> 22 </s> 22 </s> 1 </s> -1 </s> 0 </s> Mississippi </s> 47 </s> 30 </s> 29 </s> 30 </s> 26 </s> -1 </s> 1 </s> -4 </s> Missouri </s> 78 </s> 21 </s> 34 </s> 40 </s> 33 </s> 13 </s> 6 </s> -7 </s> Nebraska </s> 80 </s> 33 </s> 66 </s> 62 </s> 49 </s> 33 </s> -4 </s> -13 </s> New Jersey </s> 58 </s> 32 </s> 26 </s> 26 </s> 25 </s> -6 </s> 0 </s> -1 </s> New York </s> 54 </s> 29 </s> 23 </s> 20 </s> 18 </s> -6 </s> -3 </s> -2 </s> Nevada </s> 51 </s> 56 </s> 68 </s> 62 </s> 38 </s> 12 </s> -6 </s> -24 </s> N. Carolina </s> 58 </s> 49 </s> 54 </s> 51 </s> 40 </s> 5 </s> -3 </s> -11 </s> Ohio </s> 79 </s> 28 </s> 43 </s> 41 </s> 32 </s> 15 </s> -2 </s> -9 </s> Oklahoma </s> 61 </s> 42 </s> 58 </s> 51 </s> 42 </s> 16 </s> -7 </s> -9 </s> Pennsylvania </s> 76 </s> 28 </s> 29 </s> 31 </s> 30 </s> 1 </s> 2 </s> -1 </s> S. Carolina </s> 54 </s> 41 </s> 43 </s> 42 </s> 39 </s> 2 </s> -1 </s> -3 </s> Tennessee </s> 73 </s> 29 </s> 38 </s> 36 </s> 32 </s> 9 </s> -2 </s> -4 </s> Texas </s> 39 </s> 31 </s> 35 </s> 35 </s> 27 </s> 4 </s> 0 </s> -8 </s> Virginia </s> 61 </s> 42 </s> 47 </s> 46 </s> 41 </s> 5 </s> -1 </s> -5 </s> Wisconsin </s> 79 </s> 26 </s> 45 </s> 39 </s> 29 </s> 19 </s> -6 </s> -10 Source: G. Orfield & C. Lee, Racial Transformation and the Changing Nature of Segregation 18 (Table 8) (Jan. 2006), (Civil Rights Project), online at http://www.civilrightspro ject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/Racial_Transformation.pdf. Percentage of White Students in Schools Attended by the Average Black Student, 1968-2000 </s> [Graphic omitted; see printed opinion] </s> Source: Modified from E. Frankenberg, C. Lee, & G. Orfield, A Multiracial Society with Segregated Schools: Are We Losing the Dream?, p. 30, fig. 5 (Jan. 2003), online at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg03/AreWeLosingtheDream.pdf (Frankenberg, Lee, & Orfield) (using U.S. Dept. of Education and National Center for Education Statistics Common Core data). Percentage of Students in Minority Schools by Race, 2000-2001 </s> [Graphic omitted; see printed opinion] </s> Source: Id., at 28, fig. 4. B Sources for Parts I-A and I-B </s> Part I-A: Seattle Section 1. Segregation </s> ¶1 C. Schmid & W. McVey, Growth and Distribution of Minority Races in Seattle, Washington, 3, 7-9 (1964); F. Hanawalt & R. Williams, The History of Desegregation in Seattle Public Schools, 1954-1981, pp.1-7 (1981) (hereinafter Hanawalt); Taylor, The Civil Rights Movement in the American West: Black Protest in Seattle, 1960-1970, 80 J. Negro Hist. 1, 2-3 (1995); A. Siqueland, Without A Court Order: The Desegregation of Seattle's Schools 10 (1981) (hereinafter Siqueland); D. Pieroth, Desegregating the Public Schools, Seattle, Washington, 1954-1968, p.6 (Dissertation Draft 1979) (hereinafter Pieroth). </s> Section 2. Preliminary Challenges, 1956 to 1969 </s> ¶1 Pieroth 32, 41; Hanawalt 4. </s> ¶2 Hanawalt 11-13. </s> ¶3 Id., at 5, 13, 27. </s> Section 3. The NAACP's First Legal Challenge and Seattle's Response, 1969 to 1977 </s> ¶1 Complaint in Adams v. Forbes Bottomly, Civ. No. 6704 (WD Wash., 1969), pp.10-11. </s> ¶2 Id., at 10, 14-15. </s> ¶3 Planning and Evaluation Dept., Seattle Public Schools, The Plan Adopted by the Seattle School Board to Desegregate Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Grade Pupils in the Garfield, Lincoln, and Roosevelt High School Districts by September, 1971, pp.6, 11 (on file with the University of Washington Library); see generally Siqueland 12-15; Hanawalt 18-20. </s> ¶4 Siqueland 5, 7, 21. </s> Section 4. The NAACP's Second Legal Challenge, 1977 </s> ¶1 Administrative Complaint in Seattle Branch, NAACP v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, pp.2-3 (OCR, Apr. 22, 1977) (OCR Complaint) (filed with Court as Exhibit in Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457); see generally Siqueland 23-24. </s> ¶2 Memorandum of Agreement between Seattle School District No. 1 of King Cty., Washington, and the OCR (June 9, 1978) (filed with the Court as Exh. A to Kiner Affidavit in Seattle School Dist. No. 1, supra. </s> Section 5. The Seattle Plan: Mandatory Busing, 1978 to 1988 </s> ¶1 See generally Seattle School Dist. No. 1, supra, at 461; Seattle Public Schools Desegregation Planning Office, Proposed Alternative Desegregation Plans: Options for Eliminating Racial Imbalance by the 1979-80 School Year (Sept. 1977) (filed with the Court as Exh. B to Roe Affidavit in Seattle School Dist. No. 1, supra); Hanawalt 36-38, 40; Siqueland 3, 184, Table 4. </s> ¶2 Id., at 151-152; Hanawalt 37-38; Seattle School Dist. No. 1, supra, at 461; Complaint and Motion to Dismiss or Affirm in Seattle School Dist. No. 1, supra. </s> ¶3 Seattle School Dist. No. 1, supra, at 461; Hanawalt 40. </s> ¶4 See generally Seattle School Dist. No. 1, supra. </s> Section 6. Student Choice, 1988 to 1998 </s> ¶1 L. Kohn, Priority Shift: The Fate of Mandatory Busing for School Desegregation in Seattle and the Nation 27-30, 32 (Mar. 1996). </s> ¶2 Id., at 32-34. </s> Section 7. The Current Plan, 1999 to the Present </s> ¶1 App. in No. 05-908, p.84a; Brief for Respondents in No. 05-908, pp.5-7; 426 F.3d 1162, 1169-1170 (CA9 2005) (en banc) (Parents Involved VII). </s> ¶2 App. in No. 05-908, at 39-42; Research, Evaluation and Assessment, Student Information Services Office, Seattle Public Schools Data Profile: DistrictSummary December 2005, online at http://www.seattleschools.org/ area/siso/disprof/2005/DP05all.pdf; Brief for Respondents in No. 05-908, at 9-10, 47; App. in No. 05-908, at 309a; School Board Report, School Choices and Assignments 2005-2006 School Year (Apr. 2005), online at http://www.seattleschools.org/area/facilties-plan/Choice/0506AppsChoicesBoardApril2005final.pdf. </s> ¶3 Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist., No. 1, 149 Wash. 2d 660, 72 P.3d 151 (2003); 137 F.Supp. 2d 1224 (2001); 426 F.3d 1162 (CA9 2005) (en banc) (Parents Involved VII). </s> Part I-B: Louisville </s> Section 1. Before the Lawsuit, 1954 to 1972 </s> ¶1 Hampton v. Jefferson Cty., Bd. of Ed., 72 F.Supp. 2d 753, 756, and nn.2, 4, 5 (WD Ky. 1999) (Hampton I). </s> Section 2. Court-Imposed Guidelines and Busing, 1972 to 1991 </s> ¶1 Hampton I, supra, at 757-758, 762; Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Ed. of Jefferson Cty., 489 F.2d 925 (CA6 1973), vacated and remanded, 418 U.S. 918 (1974), reinstated with modifications, 510 F.2d 1358 (CA6 1974) (per curiam); Judgment and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Ed., of Jefferson Cty., Nos. 7045 and 7291 (WD Ky., July 30, 1975) (1975 Judgment and Findings). </s> ¶2 Id., at 2, 3, and Attachment 1. </s> ¶3 Id., at 4-16. </s> ¶4 Memorandum Opinion and Order in Haycraft v. Board of Ed. of Jefferson Cty., Nos. 7045 and 7291, (WD Ky., June 16, 1978), pp.1, 2, 4, 18 (1978 Memo & Order). </s> ¶5 Memorandum Opinion and Order, Haycraft v. Board of Ed. of Jefferson Cty., Nos. 7045 and 7291 (WD Ky., Sept. 24, 1985), p.3; Memorandum from Donald W. Ingwerson, Superintendent, to the Board of Education, Jefferson Cty. Public School Dist., pp.1, 3, 5 (Apr. 4, 1984) (1984 Memorandum); Memorandum from Donald W. Ingwerson, Superintendent, to the Board of Education, Jefferson County Public School District, pp.4-5 (Dec. 19, 1991) (1991 Memorandum). </s> Section 3. Student Choice and Project Renaissance, 1991 to 1996 </s> ¶1 1991 Memorandum 1-4, 7-11 (Stipulated Exh. 72); Brief for Respondents in No. 05-915, P.12, n.13. </s> ¶2 1991 Memorandum 14-16. </s> ¶3 Id., at 11, 14-15. </s> ¶4 Id., at 15-16; Memorandum from Stephen W. Daeschner, Superintendent, to the Board of Education, Jefferson Cty. Public School Dist., p.2 (Aug. 6, 1996) (1996 Memorandum). </s> Section 4. The Current Plan: Project Renaissance Modified, 1996 to 2003 </s> ¶1 1996 Memorandum 1-4; Brief for Respondents in No. 05-915, at 12, and n.13. </s> ¶2 1996 Memorandum 4-7, and Attachment 2; Hampton I, supra, at 768. </s> ¶3 1996 Memorandum 5-8; Hampton I, supra, at 768, n.30. </s> ¶4 Hampton v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Ed., 102 F.Supp. 2d 358, 359, 363, 370, 377 (WD Ky. 2000) (Hampton II). </s> ¶5 Id., at 380-381. </s> Section 5. The Current Lawsuit, 2003 to the Present </s> ¶1 McFarland v. Jefferson Cty. Public Schools, 330 F.Supp. 2d 834 (WD Ky. 2004); McFarland v. Jefferson Cty. Public Schools, 416 F.3d 513 (2005); Memorandum from Stephen W. Daeschner, Superintendent, to the Board of Education, Jefferson Cty. Public School Dist., 3-4 (Apr. 2, 2001). </s> FOOTNOTESFootnote *Together with No. 05-915, Meredith, Custodial Parent and Next Friend of McDonald v. Jefferson County Bd. of Ed etal., on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. FOOTNOTESFootnote 1The plan was in effect from 1999-2002, for three school years. This litigation was commenced in July 2000, and the record in the District Court was closed before assignments for the 2001-2002 school year were made. See Brief for Respondents in No. 05-908, p.9, n. 9. We rely, as did the lower courts, largely on data from the 2000-2001 school year in evaluating the plan. See 426 F.3d 1162, 1169-1171 (CA9 2005) (en banc) (Parents Involved VII). Footnote 2The racial breakdown of this nonwhite group is approximately 23.8 percent Asian-American, 23.1 percent African-American, 10.3 percent Latino, and 2.8 percent Native-American. See 377 F.3d 949, 1005-1006 (CA9 2004) (Parents Involved VI) (Graber, J., dissenting). Footnote 3For the 2001-2002 school year, the deviation permitted from the desired racial composition was increased from 10 to 15 percent. App. in No. 05-908, p. 38a. The bulk of the data in the record was collected using the 10 percent band, see n. 1, supra. Footnote 4"No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const., Amdt. 14, §1. Footnote 5"No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race ... be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. §2000d. Footnote 6"The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting." Wash. Rev. Code §49.60.400(1) (2006). Footnote 7Middle and high school students are designated a single resides school and assigned to that school unless it is at the extremes of the racial guidelines. Students may also apply to a magnet school or program, or, at the high school level, take advantage of an open enrollment plan that allows ninth-grade students to apply for admission to any nonmagnet high school. App. in No. 05-915, pp. 39-41, 82-83. Footnote 8It is not clear why the racial guidelines were even applied to Joshua's transfer application--the guidelines supposedly do not apply at the kindergarten level. Id., at 43. Neither party disputes, however, that Joshua's transfer application was denied under the racial guidelines, and Meredith's objection is not that the guidelines were misapplied but rather that race was used at all. Footnote 9 Meredith joined a pending lawsuit filed by several other plaintiffs. See id., at 7-11. The other plaintiffs all challenged assignments to certain specialized schools, and the District Court found these assignments, which are no longer at issue in this case, unconstitutional. McFarland I, 330 F.Supp. 2d 834, 837, 864 (WD Ky. 2004). Footnote 10The districts point to dicta in a prior opinion in which the Court suggested that, while not constitutionally mandated, it would be constitutionally permissible for a school district to seek racially balanced schools as a matter of "educational policy." See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971). The districts also quote with approval an in-chambers opinion in which then-Justice Rehnquist made a suggestion to the same effect. See Bustop, Inc. v. Los Angeles Bd. of Ed., 439 U.S. 1380, 1383 (1978). The citations do not carry the significance the districts would ascribe to them. Swann, evaluating a school district engaged in court-ordered desegregation, had no occasion to consider whether a district's voluntary adoption of race-based assignments in the absence of a finding of prior de jure segregation was constitutionally permissible, an issue that was again expressly reserved in Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 472, n. 15 (1982). Bustop, addressing in the context of an emergency injunction application a busing plan imposed by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, is similarly unavailing. Then-Justice Rehnquist, in denying emergency relief, stressed that "equitable consideration[s]" counseled against preliminary relief. 439 U.S., at 1383. The propriety of preliminary relief and resolution of the merits are of course "significantly different" issues. University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 393 (1981). Footnote 11The way Seattle classifies its students bears this out. Upon enrolling their child with the district, parents are required to identify their child as a member of a particular racial group. If a parent identifies more than one race on the form, "[t]he application will not be accepted and, if necessary, the enrollment service person taking the application will indicate one box." App. in No. 05-908, at 303a. Footnote 12 </s> Jefferson County also argues that it would be incongruous to hold that what was constitutionally required of it one day--race-based assignments pursuant to the desegregation decree--can be constitutionally prohibited the next. But what was constitutionally required of the district prior to 2000 was the elimination of the vestiges of prior segregation--not racial proportionality in its own right. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494-496 (1992). Once those vestiges were eliminated, Jefferson County was on the same footing as any other school district, and its use of race must be justified on other grounds. Footnote 13 Data for the Seattle schools in the several years since this litigation was commenced further demonstrate the minimal role that the racial tiebreaker in fact played. At Ballard, in 2005-2006--when no class at the school was subject to the racial tiebreaker--the student body was 14.2 percent Asian-American, 9 percent African-American, 11.7 percent Latino, 62.3 percent Caucasian, and 2.8 percent Native-American. Reply Brief for Petitioner in No. 05-908, p. 7. In 2000-2001, when the racial tiebreaker was last used, Ballard's total enrollment was 17.5 percent Asian-American, 10.8 percent African-American, 10.7 percent Latino, 56.4 percent Caucasian, and 4.6 percent Native-American. App. in No. 05-908, at 283a. Franklin in 2005-2006 was 48.9 percent Asian-American, 33.5 percent African-American, 6.6 percent Latino, 10.2 percent Caucasian, and 0.8 percent Native-American. Reply Brief for Petitioner in No. 05-908, at 7. With the racial tiebreaker in 2000-2001, total enrollment was 36.8 percent Asian-American, 32.2 percent African-American, 5.2 percent Latino, 25.1 percent Caucasian, and 0.7 percent Native-American. App. in No. 05-908, at 284a. Nathan Hale's 2005-2006 enrollment was 17.3 percent Asian-American, 10.7 percent African-American, 8 percent Latino, 61.5 percent Caucasian, and 2.5 percent Native-American. Reply Brief for Petitioner in No. 05-908, at 7. In 2000-2001, with the racial tiebreaker, it was 17.9 percent Asian-American, 13.3 percent African-American, 7 percent Latino, 58.4 percent Caucasian, and 3.4 percent Native-American. App. in No. 05-908, at 286a. Footnote 14 </s> In contrast, Seattle's website formerly described "emphasizing individualism as opposed to a more collective ideology" as a form of "cultural racism," and currently states that the district has no intention "to hold onto unsuccessful concepts such as [a] ... colorblind mentality." Harrell, School Web Site Removed: Examples of Racism Sparked Controversy, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, June 2, 2006, pp. B1, B5. Compare Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law"). Footnote 15Justice Breyer makes much of the fact that in 1978 Seattle "settled" an NAACP complaint alleging illegal segregation with the federal Office for Civil Rights (OCR). See post, at 5, 8-9, 18, 23. The memorandum of agreement between Seattle and OCR, of course, contains no admission by Seattle that such segregation ever existed or was ongoing at the time of the agreement, and simply reflects a "desire to avoid the incovenience [sic] and expense of a formal OCR investigation," which OCR was obligated under law to initiate upon the filing of such a complaint. Memorandum of Agreement between Seattle School District No. 1 of King County, Washington, and the Office for Civil Rights, United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 2 (June 9, 1978); see also 45 CFR §80.7(c) (2006). Footnote 16In fact, all the cases Justice Breyer's dissent cites as evidence of the "prevailing legal assumption," see post, at 25-27, were decided before this Court definitively determined that "all racial classifications ... must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pe&nacute;a, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). Many proceeded under the now-rejected view that classifications seeking to benefit a disadvantaged racial group should be held to a lesser standard of review. See, e.g., Springfield School Comm. v. Barksdale, 348 F.2d 261, 266 (CA1 1965). Even if this purported distinction, which Justice Stevens would adopt, post, at 2, n.3 (dissenting opinion), had not been already rejected by this Court, the distinction has no relevance to these cases, in which students of all races are excluded from the schools they wish to attend based solely on the racial classifications. See, e.g., App. in No. 05-908, at 202a (noting that 89 nonwhite students were denied assignment to a particular school by operation of Seattle's racial tiebreaker). </s> Justice Stevens's reliance on School Comm. of Boston v. Board of Ed., 352 Mass. 693, 227 N.E. 2d 729 (1967), appeal dism'd, 389 U.S. 572 (1968) (per curiam), post, at 3-5, is inapposite for the same reason that many of the cases cited by Justice Breyer are inapposite; the case involved a Massachusetts law that required school districts to avoid racial imbalance in schools but did not specify how to achieve this goal--and certainly did not require express racial classifications as the means to do so. The law was upheld under rational-basis review, with the state court explicitly rejecting the suggestion--which is now plainly the law--that "racial group classifications bear a far heavier burden of justification." 352 Mass., at 700, 227 N.E. 2d, at 734 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The passage Justice Stevens quotes proves our point; all the quoted language says is that the school committee "shall prepare a plan to eliminate the imbalance." Id., at 695, 227 N.E. 2d, at 731; see post, at 4, n. 5. Nothing in the opinion approves use of racial classifications as the means to address the imbalance. The suggestion that our decision today is somehow inconsistent with our disposition of that appeal is belied by the fact that neither the lower courts, the respondent school districts, nor any of their 51 amici saw fit even to cite the case. We raise this fact not to argue that the dismissal should be afforded any different stare decisis effect, but rather simply to suggest that perhaps--for the reasons noted above--the dismissal does not mean what Justice Stevens believes it does. Footnote 17Justice Breyer also tries to downplay the impact of the racial assignments by stating that in Seattle "students can decide voluntarily to transfer to a preferred district high school (without any consideration of race-conscious criteria)." Post, at 46. This presumably refers to the district's decision to cease, for 2001-2002 school year assignments, applying the racial tiebreaker to students seeking to transfer to a different school after ninth grade. See App. in No. 05-908, at 137a-139a. There are obvious disincentives for students to transfer to a different school after a full quarter of their high school experience has passed, and the record sheds no light on how transfers to the oversubscribed high schools are handled. FOOTNOTESFootnote 1In this Court's paradigmatic segregation cases, there was a local ordinance, state statute, or state constitutional provision requiring racial separation. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners in Bolling v. Sharpe, O.T. 1952, No. 4, pp.28-30 (cataloging state laws requiring separation of the races); id., at App. A (listing "Statutory and Constitutional Provisions in the States Where Segregation in Education is Institutionalized"). Footnote 2The dissent refers repeatedly and reverently to "'integration.'" However, outside of the context of remediation for past de jure segregation, "integration" is simply racial balancing. See post, at 37. Therefore, the school districts' attempts to further "integrate" are properly thought of as little more than attempts to achieve a particular racial balance. Footnote 3The dissent's assertion that these plans are necessary for the school districts to maintain their "hard-won gains" reveals its conflation of segregation and racial imbalance. Post, at 38. For the dissent's purposes, the relevant hard-won gains are the present racial compositions in the individual schools in Seattle and Louisville. However, the actual hard-won gain in these cases is the elimination of the vestiges of the system of state-enforced racial separation that once existed in Louisville. To equate the achievement of a certain statistical mix in several schools with the elimination of the system of systematic de jure segregation trivializes the latter accomplishment. Nothing but an interest in classroom aesthetics and a hypersensitivity to elite sensibilities justifies the school districts' racial balancing programs. See Part II-B, infra. But "the principle of inherent equality that underlies and infuses our Constitution" required the disestablishment of de jure segregation. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pe&nacute;a, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Assessed in any objective manner, there is no comparison between the two. Footnote 4The dissent makes much of the supposed difficulty of determining whether prior segregation was de jure or de facto. See, e.g., post, at 19-20. That determination typically will not be nearly as difficult as the dissent makes it seem. In most cases, there either will or will not have been a state constitutional amendment, state statute, local ordinance, or local administrative policy explicitly requiring separation of the races. See, e.g., n.1, supra. And even if the determination is difficult, it is one the dissent acknowledges must be made to determine what remedies school districts are required to adopt. Post, at 43. Footnote 5This Court's opinion in McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971), fits comfortably within this framework. There, a Georgia school board voluntarily adopted a desegregation plan. At the time of Brown, v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), Georgia's Constitution required that "[s]eparate schools shall be provided for the white and colored races." Ga. Const., Art.VII, §1, ch. 2-6401 (1948). Given that state law had previously required the school board to maintain a dual school system, the county was obligated to take measures to remedy its prior de jure segregation. This Court recognized as much in its opinion, which stated that the school board had an "affirmative duty to disestablish the dual school system." McDaniel, supra, at 41. Footnote 6As I have explained elsewhere, the remedies this Court authorized lower courts to compel in early desegregation cases like Green and Swann were exceptional. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 124-125 (1995), (Thomas, J., concurring). Sustained resistance to Brown prompted the Court to authorize extraordinary race-conscious remedial measures (like compelled racial mixing) to turn the Constitution's dictate to desegregate into reality. 515 U.S., at 125 (Thomas, J., concurring). Even if these measures were appropriate as remedies in the face of widespread resistance to Brown's mandate, they are not forever insulated from constitutional scrutiny. Rather, "such powers should have been temporary and used only to overcome the widespread resistance to the dictates of the Constitution." 515 U.S., at 125 (Thomas, J., concurring). Footnote 7Though the dissent cites every manner of complaint, record material, and scholarly article relating to Seattle's race-based student assignment efforts, post, at 73-75, it cites no law or official policy that required separation of the races in Seattle's schools. Nevertheless, the dissent tries to cast doubt on the historical fact that the Seattle schools were never segregated by law by citing allegations that the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and other organizations made in court filings to the effect that Seattle's schools were once segregated by law. See post, at 7-9, 23. These allegations were never proved and were not even made in this case. Indeed, the record before us suggests the contrary. See App. in No. 05-908, pp.214a, 225a, 257a. Past allegations in another case provide no basis for resolving these cases. Footnote 8Contrary to the dissent's argument, post, at 44, the Louisville school district's interest in remedying its past de jure segregation did vanish the day the District Court found that Louisville had eliminated the vestiges of its historic de jure segregation. See Hampton v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Ed., 102 F.Supp. 2d 358, at 360 (WD Ky. 2000). If there were further remediation to be done, the District Court could not logically have reached the conclusion that Louisville "ha[d] eliminated the vestiges associated with the former policy of segregation and its pernicious effects." Ibid. Because Louisville could use race-based measures only as a remedy for past de jure segregation, it is not "incoherent," post, at 56, to say that race-based decisionmaking was allowed to Louisville one day--while it was still remedying--and forbidden to it the next--when remediation was finished. That seemingly odd turnaround is merely a result of the fact that the remediation of de jure segregation is a jealously guarded exception to the Equal Protection Clause's general rule against government race-based decisionmaking. Footnote 9The dissent's appeal to stare decisis, post, at 65, is particularly ironic in light of its apparent willingness to depart from these precedents, post, at 36-37. Footnote 10The idea that government racial classifications must be subjected to strict scrutiny did not originate in Adarand. As early as Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), this Court made clear that government action that "rest[s] solely upon distinctions drawn according to race" had to be "subjected to the 'most rigid scrutiny.'" Id., at 11 (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)); see also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (requiring a statute drawing a racial classification to be "necessary, and not merely rationally related, to accomplishment of a permissible state policy"); id., at 197 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("The necessity test ... should be equally applicable in a case involving state racial discrimination"). Footnote 11At least one of the academic articles the dissent cites to support this proposition fails to establish a causal connection between the supposed educational gains realized by black students and racial mixing. See Hallinan, Diversity Effects on Student Outcomes: Social Science Evidence, 59 Ohio St. L.J. 733 (1998). In the pages following the ones the dissent cites, the author of that article remarks that "the main reason white and minority students perform better academically in majority white schools is likely that these schools provide greater opportunities to learn. In other words, it is not desegregation per se that improves achievement, but rather the learning advantages some desegregated schools provide." Id., at 744. Evidence that race is a good proxy for other factors that might be correlated with educational benefits does not support a compelling interest in the use of race to achieve academic results. Footnote 12Of course, if the Seattle school board were truly committed to the notion that diversity leads directly to educational benefits, operating a school with such a high "nonwhite" enrollment would be a shocking dereliction of its duty to educate the students enrolled in that school. Footnote 13In fact, the available data from the Seattle school district appear to undercut the dissent's view. A comparison of the test results of the schools in the last year the racial balancing program operated to the results in the 2004-to-2005 school year (in which student assignments were race-neutral) does not indicate the decline in black achievement one would expect to find if black achievement were contingent upon a particular racial mix. See Washington State Report Card, online at http://reportcard.ospi.k12.wa.us/summary.aspx?schoolId= 1099&OrgType=4&reportLevel=School; http://reportcard.ospi.k12.wa.us/ summary.aspx?schoolId=1104&reportLevel=School&orgLinkId=1104&yrs=; http://reportcard.ospi.k12.wa.us/summary.aspx?schoolId=1061&report Level=School&orgLinkId=1061&yrs=; http://reportcard.ospi.k12.wa.us/ summary.aspx?schoolId=1043&reportLevel=School&orgLinkId=1043& yrs= (showing that reading scores went up, not down, when Seattle's race-based assignment program ended at Sealth High School, Ingraham High School, and Franklin High School--some of the schools most affected by the plan). Footnote 14The dissent accuses me of "feel[ing] confident that, to end invidious discrimination, one must end all governmental use of race-conscious criteria" and chastises me for not deferring to democratically elected majorities. See post, at 62. Regardless of what Justice Breyer's goals might be, this Court does not sit to "create a society that includes all Americans" or to solve the problems of "troubled inner city schooling." Ibid. We are not social engineers. The United States Constitution dictates that local governments cannot make decisions on the basis of race. Consequently, regardless of the perceived negative effects of racial imbalance, I will not defer to legislative majorities where the Constitution forbids it. </s> It should escape no one that behind Justice Breyer's veil of judicial modesty hides an inflated role for the Federal Judiciary. The dissent's approach confers on judges the power to say what sorts of discrimination are benign and which are invidious. Having made that determination (based on no objective measure that I can detect), a judge following the dissent's approach will set the level of scrutiny to achieve the desired result. Only then must the judge defer to a democratic majority. In my view, to defer to one's preferred result is not to defer at all. Footnote 15The notion that a "democratic" interest qualifies as a compelling interest (or constitutes a part of a compelling interest) is proposed for the first time in today's dissent and has little basis in the Constitution or our precedent, which has narrowly restricted the interests that qualify as compelling. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 351-354 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact the dissent's newly minted understanding of liberty. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics"). Footnote 16The dissent does not explain how its recognition of an interest in teaching racial understanding and cooperation here is consistent with the Court's rejection of a similar interest in Wygant. In Wygant, a school district justified its race-based teacher-layoff program in part on the theory that "minority teachers provided 'role models' for minority students and that a racially 'diverse' faculty would improve the education of all students." Grutter, supra, at 352 (opinion of Thomas, J.) (citing Brief for Respondents, O.T. 1984, No. 84-1340, pp. 27-28; 476 U.S., at 315 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). The Court rejected the interests asserted to justify the layoff program as insufficiently compelling. Wygant, 476 U.S., at 275-276 (plurality opinion); id., at 295 (White, J., concurring in judgment). If a school district has an interest in teaching racial understanding and cooperation, there is no logical reason why that interest should not extend to the composition of the teaching staff as well as the composition of the student body. The dissent's reliance on this interest is, therefore, inconsistent with Wygant. Footnote 17Outside the school context, this Court's cases reflect the fact that racial mixing does not always lead to harmony and understanding. In Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005), this Court considered a California prison policy that separated inmates racially. Id., at 525-528 (Thomas, J., dissenting). That policy was necessary because of "numerous incidents of racial violence." Id., at 502; id., at 532-534 (Thomas, J., dissenting). As a result of this Court's insistence on strict scrutiny of that policy, but see id., at 538-547, inmates in the California prisons were killed. See Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. ___, ___ (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (noting that two were killed and hundreds were injured in race rioting subsequent to this Court's decision in Johnson). Footnote 18After discussing the "democratic element," the dissent repeats its assertion that the social science evidence supporting that interest is "sufficiently strong to permit a school board to determine ... that this interest is compelling." Post, at 40. Again, though, the school boards have no say in deciding whether an interest is compelling. Strict scrutiny of race-based government decisionmaking is more searching than Chevron-style administrative review for reasonableness. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984). Footnote 19The dissent half-heartedly attacks the historical underpinnings of the color-blind Constitution. Post, at 28-29. I have no quarrel with the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment sought to bring former slaves into American society as full members. Post, at 28 (citing Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 71-72 (1873)). What the dissent fails to understand, however, is that the color-blind Constitution does not bar the government from taking measures to remedy past state-sponsored discrimination--indeed, it requires that such measures be taken in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Part I-B, supra. Race-based government measures during the 1860's and 1870's to remedy state-enforced slavery were therefore not inconsistent with the color-blind Constitution. Footnote 20See also Juris. Statement in Davis v. County School Board, O.T. 1952, No. 3, p.8 ("[W]e take the unqualified position that the Fourteenth Amendment has totally stripped the state of power to make race and color the basis for governmental action"); Tr. of Oral Arg. in Brown v. Board of Education, O.T. 1952, No. 1, p. 7 ("We have one fundamental contention which we will seek to develop in the course of this argument, and that contention is that no State has any authority under the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a factor in affording educational opportunities among its citizens"); Tr. of Oral Arg. in Briggs v. Elliott, O. T. 1953, No. 2, p. 50 ("[T]he state is deprived of any power to make any racial classifications in any governmental field"). Footnote 21See also Brief for Appellees in Davis v. County School Board, O.T. 1952, No. 3, p.1 ("[T]he Court is asked ... to outlaw the fixed policies of the several States which are based on local social conditions well known to the respective legislatures"); id., at 9 ("For this purpose, Virginia history and present Virginia conditions are important"); Tr. of Oral Arg. in Davis v. County School Board, O.T. 1952, No. 3, p. 57 ("[T]he historical background that exists, certainly in this Virginia situation, with all the strife and the history that we have shown in this record, shows a basis, a real basis, for the classification that has been made"); id., at 69 (describing the potential abolition of segregation as "contrary to the customs, the traditions and the mores of what we might claim to be a great people, established through generations, who themselves are fiercely and irrevocably dedicated to the preservation of the white and colored races"). Accord, post, at 68 ("Today, almost 50 years later, attitudes toward race in this Nation have changed dramatically. Many parents, white and black alike, want their children to attend schools with children of different races. Indeed, the very school districts that once spurned integration now strive for it. The long history of their efforts reveals the complexities and difficulties they have faced"); post, at 21 (emphasizing the importance of "local circumstances" and encouraging different localities to "try different solutions to common problems and gravitate toward those that prove most successful or seem to them best to suit their individual needs" (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); post, at 48 (emphasizing the school districts' "40-year history" during which both school districts have tried numerous approaches "to achieve more integrated schools"); post, at 63 ("[T]he histories of Louisville and Seattle reveal complex circumstances and a long tradition of conscientious efforts by local school boards"). Footnote 22See also Brief for Appellees in Brown v. Board of Education, O.T. 1952, No. 1, p.29 ("'It is universally held, therefore, that each state shall determine for itself, subject to the observance of the fundamental rights and liberties guaranteed by the federal Constitution, how it shall exercise the police power .... And in no field is this right of the several states more clearly recognized than in that of public education'" (quoting Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F.Supp. 529, 532 (SC 1951))); Brief for Appellees in Briggs v. Elliott, O.T. 1952, No. 2, p.7 ("Local self-government in local affairs is essential to the peace and happiness of each locality and to the strength and stability of our whole federal system. Nowhere is this more profoundly true than in the field of education"); Tr. of Oral Arg. in Briggs v. Elliott, O.T. 1952, No. 2, pp.54-55 ("What is the great national and federal policy on this matter? Is it not a fact that the very strength and fiber of our federal system is local self-government in those matters for which local action is competent? Is it not of all the activities of government the one which most nearly approaches the hearts and minds of people, the question of the education of their young? Is it not the height of wisdom that the manner in which that shall be conducted should be left to those most immediately affected by it, and that the wishes of the parents, both white and colored, should be ascertained before their children are forced into what may be an unwelcome contact?"). Accord, post, at 48 ("[L]ocal school boards better understand their own communities and have a better knowledge of what in practice will best meet the educational needs of their pupils"); post, at 66 ("[W]hat of respect for democratic local decisionmaking by States and school boards?"); ibid. (explaining "that the Constitution grants local school districts a significant degree of leeway"). Footnote 23See also Reply Brief for Appellees in Davis v. County School Board, O.T. 1953, No. 3, p.17 ("The Court is ... dealing with thousands of local school districts and schools. Is each to be the subject of litigation in the District Courts?"); Brief for Kansas on Reargument in Brown v. Board of Education, O.T. 1953, No. 1, p. 51 ("The delicate nature of the problem of segregation and the paramount interest of the State of Kansas in preserving the internal peace and tranquility of its people indicates that this is a question which can best be solved on the local level, at least until Congress declares otherwise"). Accord, post, at 61 ("At a minimum, the plurality's views would threaten a surge of race-based litigation. Hundreds of state and federal statutes and regulations use racial classifications for educational or other purposes.... In many such instances, the contentious force of legal challenges to these classifications, meritorious or not, would displace earlier calm"); post, at 65 ("Indeed, the consequences of the approach the Court takes today are serious. Yesterday, the plans under review were lawful. Today, they are not"); post, at 66 (predicting "further litigation, aggravating race-related conflict"). Footnote 24See also Statement of Appellees Opposing Jurisdiction and Motion to Dismiss or Affirm in Davis v. County School Board, O.T. 1952, No. 3, p.5 ("[I]t would be difficult to find from any field of law a legal principle more repeatedly and conclusively decided than the one sought to be raised by appellants"); Brief for Appellees in Davis v. County School Board, O.T. 1953, No. 3, p.46-47 ("If this case were to be decided solely on the basis of precedent, this brief could have been much more limited. There is ample precedent in the decisions of this Court to uphold school segregation"); Brief for Petitioners in Gebhart v. Belton, O.T. 1952, No. 5, p.27 ("Respondents ask this Court to upset a long established and well settled principle recognized by numerous state Legislatures, and Courts, both state and federal, over a long period of years"); Tr. of Oral Arg. in Briggs v. Elliott, O.T. 1953, No. 2, p. 79 ("But be that doctrine what it may, somewhere, sometime to every principle comes a moment of repose when it has been so often announced, so confidently relied upon, so long continued, that it passes the limits of judicial discretion and disturbance.... We relied on the fact that this Court had not once but seven times, I think it is, pronounced in favor of the separate but equal doctrine. We relied on the fact that the courts of last appeal of some sixteen or eighteen States have passed upon the validity of the separate but equal doctrine vis-a-vis the Fourteenth Amendment. We relied on the fact that Congress has continuously since 1862 segregated its schools in the District of Columbia"); Brief for Appellees in Briggs v. Elliott, O.T. 1952, No. 2, App. D (collecting citations of state and federal cases "[w]hich [e]nunciate the [p]rinciple that [s]tate [l]aws [p]roviding for [r]acial [s]egregation in the [p]ublic [s]chools do not [c]onflict with the Fourteenth Amendment"). Accord, post, at 22 ("[T]he Court set forth in Swann a basic principle of constitutional law--a principle of law that has found wide acceptance in the legal culture" (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); post, at 25 ("Lower state and federal courts had considered the matter settled and uncontroversial even before this Court decided Swann"); post, at 26 ("Numerous state and federal courts explicitly relied upon Swann's guidance for decades to follow"); post, at 27 (stating "how lower courts understood and followed Swann's enunciation of the relevant legal principle"); post, at 30 ("The constitutional principle enunciated in Swann, reiterated in subsequent cases, and relied upon over many years, provides, and has widely been thought to provide, authoritative legal guidance"); post, at 61 ("[T]oday's opinion will require setting aside the laws of several States and many local communities"); post, at 66 ("And what has happened to Swann? To McDaniel? To Crawford? To Harris? To School Committee of Boston? To Seattle School Dist. No. 1? After decades of vibrant life, they would all, under the plurality's logic, be written out of the law"). Footnote 25Compare Brief for Appellees in Davis v. County School Board, O.T. 1952, No. 3, p.16-17 ("'It is by such practical considerations based on experience rather than by theoretical inconsistencies that the question of equal protection is to be answered'" (quoting Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 110 (1949))); Brief for Appellees on Reargument in Davis v. County School Board, O.T. 1953, No. 3, p. 76 ("The question is a practical one for them to solve; it is not subject to solution in the theoretical realm of abstract principles"); Tr. of Oral Arg. in Davis v. County School Board, O.T. 1953, No. 4, p.86 ("[Y]ou cannot talk about this problem just in a vacuum in the manner of a law school discussion"), with post, at 57 ("The Founders meant the Constitution as a practical document"). Footnote 26Compare Brief for Kansas on Reargument in Brown v. Board of Education, O.T. 1953, No. 1, p.57 ("[T]he people of Kansas . . . are abandoning the policy of segregation whenever local conditions and local attitudes make it feasible"), Brief for Appellees on Reargument in Davis v. County School Board, O.T. 1953, No. 3, p. 76 ("As time passes, it may well be that segregation will end"), with post, at 19 ("[T]hey use race-conscious criteria in limited and gradually diminishing ways"); post, at 48 ("[E]ach plan's use of race-conscious elements is diminished compared to the use of race in preceding integration plans"); post, at 55 (describing the "historically-diminishing use of race" in the school districts). Footnote 27It is no answer to say that these cases can be distinguished from Brown because Brown involved invidious racial classifications whereas the racial classifications here are benign. See post, at 62. How does one tell when a racial classification is invidious? The segregationists in Brown argued that their racial classifications were benign, not invidious. See Tr. of Oral Arg. in Briggs v. Elliott, O.T. 1953, No. 2, p. 83 ("It [South Carolina] is confident of its good faith and intention to produce equality for all of its children of whatever race or color. It is convinced that the happiness, the progress and the welfare of these children is best promoted in segregated schools"); Brief for Appellees on Reargument in Davis v. County School Board, O.T. 1953, No. 3, p.82-83 ("Our many hours of research and investigation have led only to confirmation of our view that segregation by race in Virginia's public schools at this time not only does not offend the Constitution of the United States but serves to provide a better education for living for the children of both races"); Tr. of Oral Arg. in Davis v. County School Board, O.T. 1952, No. 3, p. 71 ("[T]o make such a transition, would undo what we have been doing, and which we propose to continue to do for the uplift and advancement of the education of both races. It would stop this march of progress, this onward sweep"). It is the height of arrogance for Members of this Court to assert blindly that their motives are better than others. Footnote 28See also id., at 8-9 ("It has been urged that [these state laws and policies] derive validity as a consequence of a long duration supported and made possible by a long line of judicial decisions, including expressions in some of the decisions of this Court. At the same time, it is urged that these laws are valid as a matter of constitutionally permissible social experimentation by the States. On the matter of stare decisis, I submit that the duration of the challenged practice, while it is persuasive, is not controlling.... As a matter of social experimentation, the laws in question must satisfy the requirements of the Constitution. While this Court has permitted the States to legislate or otherwise officially act experimentally in the social and economic fields, it has always recognized and held that this power is subject to the limitations of the Constitution, and that the tests of the Constitution must be met"); Reply Brief for Appellants in Briggs v. Elliott, O.T. 1953, No. 2, pp.18-19 ("The truth of the matter is that this is an attempt to place local mores and customs above the high equalitarian principles of our Government as set forth in our Constitution and particularly the Fourteenth Amendment. This entire contention is tantamount to saying that the vindication and enjoyment of constitutional rights recognized by this Court as present and personal can be postponed whenever such postponement is claimed to be socially desirable"). Footnote 29The dissent does not face the complicated questions attending its proposed standard. For example, where does the dissent's principle stop? Can the government force racial mixing against the will of those being mixed? Can the government force black families to relocate to white neighborhoods in the name if bringing the races together? What about historically black colleges, which have "established traditions and programs that might disproportionately appeal to one race or another"? United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 749 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring). The dissent does not and cannot answer these questions because the contours of the distinction it propounds rest entirely in the eye of the beholder. Footnote 30Justice Breyer's good intentions, which I do not doubt, have the shelf life of Justice Breyer's tenure. Unlike the dissenters, I am unwilling to delegate my constitutional responsibilities to local school boards and allow them to experiment with race-based decisionmaking on the assumption that their intentions will forever remain as good as Justice Breyer's. See The Federalist No. 51, p. 349 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) ("If men were angels, no government would be necessary"). Indeed, the racial theories endorsed by the Seattle school board should cause the dissenters to question whether local school boards should be entrusted with the power to make decisions on the basis of race. The Seattle school district's Website formerly contained the following definition of "cultural racism": "Those aspects of society that overtly and covertly attribute value and normality to white people and whiteness, and devalue, stereotype, and label people of color as 'other,' different, less than, or render them invisible. Examples of these norms include defining white skin tones as nude or flesh colored, having a future time orientation, emphasizing individualism as opposed to a more collective ideology, defining one form of English as standard . . .." See Harrell, School Web Site Removed: Examples of Racism Sparked Controversy, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, June 2, 2006, p. B1. After the site was removed, the district offered the comforting clarification that the site was not intended "'to hold onto unsuccessful concepts such as melting pot or colorblind mentality.'" Ibid.; see also ante, at 22, n.15 (plurality opinion). </s> More recently, the school district sent a delegation of high school students to a "White Privilege Conference." See Equity and Race Relations White Privilege Conference, https://www.seattleschools. org/area/equityandrace/whiteprivilegeconference.xml. One conference participant described "white privilege" as "an invisible package of unearned assets which I can count on cashing in each day, but about which I was meant to remain oblivious. White Privilege is like an invisible weightless knapsack of special provisions, maps, passports, codebooks, visas, clothes, tools, and blank checks." See White Privilege Conference, Questions and Answers, http://www.uccs.edu/~wpc/ faqs.htm; see generally Westneat, School District's Obsessed with Race, Seattle Times, Apr. 1, 2007, p. B1 (describing racial issues in Seattle schools). FOOTNOTESFootnote 1Le Lys Rouge (The Red Lily) 95 (W. Stephens transl. 6th ed. 1922). Footnote 2See, e.g., J. Wilkinson, From Brown to Bakke 11 (1979) ("Everyone understands that Brown v. Board of Education helped deliver the Negro from over three centuries of legal bondage"); Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 Yale L.J. 421, 424-425 ("History, too, tells us that segregation was imposed on one race by the other race; consent was not invited or required. Segregation in the South grew up and is kept going because and only because the white race has wanted it that way--an incontrovertible fact which itself hardly consorts with equality"). Footnote 3I have long adhered to the view that a decision to exclude a member of a minority because of his race is fundamentally different from a decision to include a member of a minority for that reason. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pe&nacute;a, 515 U.S. 200, 243, 248, n.6 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 316 (1986) (same). This distinction is critically important in the context of education. While the focus of our opinions is often on the benefits that minority schoolchildren receive from an integrated education, see, e.g., ante, at 15 (Thomas, J., concurring), children of all races benefit from integrated classrooms and playgrounds, see Wygant, 476 U.S., at 316 ("[T]he fact that persons of different races do, indeed, have differently colored skin, may give rise to a belief that there is some significant difference between such persons. The inclusion of minority teachers in the educational process inevitably tends to dispel that illusion whereas their exclusion could only tend to foster it"). Footnote 4The Chief Justice twice cites my dissent in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). See ante, at 12, 23. In that case, I stressed the importance of confining a remedy for past wrongdoing to the members of the injured class. See 448 U.S., at 539. The present cases, unlike Fullilove but like our decision in Wygant, 476 U.S. 267, require us to "ask whether the Board[s'] actions[s] advanc[e] the public interest in educating children for the future," id., at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). See ibid. ("In my opinion, it is not necessary to find that the Board of Education has been guilty of racial discrimination in the past to support the conclusion that it has a legitimate interest in employing more black teachers in the future"). See also Adarand, 515 U.S., at 261-262 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("This program, then, if in part a remedy for past discrimination, is most importantly a forward-looking response to practical problems faced by minority subcontractors"). Footnote 5The Chief Justice states that the Massachusetts racial imbalance Act did not require express classifications. See ante, at 31-32, n.16. This is incorrect. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court expressly stated: </s> "The racial imbalance act requires the school committee of every municipality annually to submit statistics showing the percentage of nonwhite pupils in all public schools and in each school. Whenever the board finds that racial imbalance exists in a public school, it shall give written notice to the appropriate school committee, which shall prepare a plan to eliminate imbalance and file a copy with the board. 'The term "racial imbalance" refers to a ratio between nonwhite and other students in public schools which is sharply out of balance with the racial composition of the society in which nonwhite children study, serve and work. For the purpose of this section, racial imbalance shall be deemed to exist when the per cent of nonwhite students in any public school is in excess of fifty per cent of the total number of students in such school.'" 352 Mass., at 695, 227 N.E. 2d, at 731. Footnote 6Compare ante, at 39 ("It was not the inequality of the facilities but the fact of legally separating children on the basis of race on which the Court relied to find a constitutional violation in 1954"), with Juris. Statement in School Comm. of Boston v. Board of Education, O.T. 1967, No. 67-759, p.11 ("It is implicit in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, that color or race is a constitutionally impermissible standard for the assignment of school children to public schools. We construe Brown as endorsing Mr. Justice Harlan's classical statement in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 539: 'Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens'"). Footnote 7In 1968 our mandatory jurisdiction was defined by the provision of the 1948 Judicial Code then codified at 28 U.S.C. §1257, see 62 Stat. 929; that provision was repealed in 1988, see 102 Stat. 662. Footnote 8For example, prior to our decision in School Comm. of Boston, the Illinois Supreme Court had issued an unpublished opinion holding unconstitutional a similar statute aimed at eliminating racial imbalance in public schools. See Juris. Statement in School Comm. of Boston v. Board of Education, O.T. 1967, No. 67-759, at 9 ("Unlike the Massachusetts Court, the Illinois Supreme Court has recently held its law to eliminate racial imbalance unconstitutional on the ground that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"); ibid., n.1. However, shortly after we dismissed the Massachusetts suit for want of a substantial federal question, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed course and upheld its statute in the published decision that Justice Breyer extensively quotes in his dissent. See Tometz v. Board of Ed., Waukegan School Dist. No. 6, 39 Ill. 2d 593, 237 N.E. 2d 498 (1968). In so doing, the Illinois Supreme Court acted in explicit reliance on our decision in School Comm. of Boston. See 39 Ill. 2d, at 599-600, 237 N.E. 2d, at 502 ("Too, the United States Supreme Court on January 15, 1968, dismissed an appeal in School Committee of Boston v. Board of Education, (Mass. 1967) 227 N.E. 2d 729, which challenged the statute providing for elimination of racial imbalance in public schools 'for want of a substantial federal question.' 389 U.S. 572").

United States Supreme Court EX PARTE FAHEY(1947) No. 133 Argued: Decided: June 23, 1947 </s> Mr. Oscar H. Davis, of Washington, D.C., for petitioners on support of the motion for leave to file. Messrs. Welburn Mayock, of Los Angeles, Cal., and Charles K. Chapman, of Long Beach, Cal., for respondent Peirson M. Hall, Judge, in opposition thereto. [ Ex parte Fahey 332 U.S. 258 (1947) ] </s> [332 U.S. 258 , 259] </s> Mr. Justice JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court. This petition by John H. Fahey, individually and as Federal Home Loan Bank Commissioner, and A. V. Amman, individually and as Conservator for the Long Beach Federal Savings and Loan Association, invokes the original jurisdiction of this Court. They ask leave to file petition fr a writ o f 'mandamus and/or prohibition and/or injunction' against Judge Peirson M. Hall of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California to vacate his order allowing fees to counsel in Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 , to prohibit any further allowance therein, and to enjoin any payments heretofore allowed. While an appeal in the principal case was pending in this Court, application was made by various counsel for the plaintiffs and associated interests therein for allowance of fees aggregating some $125,000. The District Court allowed counsel for plaintiffs $50,000 as a partial payment on account of services, but withheld action on other applications. Certain costs and expenses of the plaintiffs in the amount of $17,295.13 were also ordered reimbursed. The petition involves serious questions of law and of fact. Whether, because of the pendency of the appeal and the stay order granted therein, the District Court had power to entertain the application, whether before the final outcome of the case could be known an allowance was premature, whether the source of the fund on deposit with the court was so related to the services as to be subject to disbursement for their compensation, and whether one judge can make allowances in a case before a three-judge court, are, with other questions, much contested. We do not decide any question as to the merits. Mandamus, prohibition and injunction against judges are drastic and extraordinary remedies. We do not doubt </s> [332 U.S. 258 , 260] </s> power in a proper case to issue such writs. But they have the unfortunate consequence of making the judge a litigant, obliged to obtain personal counsel or to leave his defense to one of the litigants before him. These remedies should be resorted to only where appeal is a clearly inadequate remedy. We are unwilling to utilize them as a substitute for appeal. As extraordinary remedies, they are reserved for really extraordinary causes. We find nothing in this case to warrant their use. An allowance of $ 50,000 will hardly destroy a twenty-six million dollar association during the time it would take to prosecute an appeal. The status of one of the applicants in the principal case is now settled so that he has standing to take all authorized appeals. We hold that the applicants' grievance is one to be pursued by appeal at the proper time and to the appropriate court, rather than by resort to our original jurisdiction for extraordinary writs. The petition is denied. Petition denied.

United States Supreme Court OREGON v. MITCHELL(1970) No. 43 Argued: October 19, 1970Decided: December 21, 1970 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 44, Orig., Texas v. Mitchell, Attorney General, No. 46, Orig., United States v. Arizona, and No. 47, Orig., United States v. Idaho, also on bills of complaint. </s> These original actions involve the constitutionality of three provisions of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 which (1) lower the minimum age of voters in both state and federal elections from 21 to 18, (2) bar the use of literacy tests (and similar voting eligibility requirements) for a five-year period in state and federal elections in any area where such tests are not already proscribed by the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and (3) forbid States from disqualifying voters in presidential and vice-presidential elections for failure to meet state residency requirements and provide uniform national rules for absentee voting in such elections. Held: (1) The 18-year-old minimum-age requirement of the Voting Rights Act Amendments is valid for national elections. (2) That requirement is not valid for state and local elections. (3) The literacy test provision is valid. (4) The residency and absentee balloting provisions are valid. Pp. 117-296. </s> Relief granted in part and denied in part. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK concluded that: </s> 1. Congress has the authority to permit 18-year-old citizens to vote in national elections, under Art. I, 4, Art. II, 1, and the Necessary and Proper Clause, of the Constitution since those provisions fully empower Congress to make or alter regulations in national elections, to supervise such elections, and to set the qualifications for voters therein. Pp. 117, 119-124. </s> 2. But under Art I, 2, the States have the power to set qualifications to vote in state and local elections, and the whole Constitution reserves that power to the States except as it has been curtailed by specific constitutional amendments. No amendment (including the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the other Civil War Amendments) authorizes Congress' attempt to lower the voting age in state and local elections. Pp. 118, 124-131. [400 U.S. 112, 113] </s> 3. The literacy test ban is constitutional under the Enforcement Clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, in view of the evidence of racial discrimination that Congress found in various parts of the Nation: racial discrimination resulting from literacy tests, the educational inequality stemming from the "separate but equal" rule, and other racially discriminatory practices. Pp. 118, 131-134. </s> 4. The provisions forbidding States from disqualifying voters in national elections for presidential and vice-presidential electors because they have not met state residency requirements and establishing absentee balloting rules are valid under Congress' broad powers to regulate federal elections and maintain a national government. * Pp. 118, 134. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS concluded that: * </s> 1. The authority of Congress to fix at 18 the minimum age for the civil right of voting in national elections derives from the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the power to "enforce" granted by 5 of that Amendment. Congress had an adequate basis for concluding that 18-year-olds are mature enough to vote and that to deprive them of the franchise would be a denial of equal protection. Pp. 135-144. </s> 3. The bar against a State's denying the right to vote in any federal, state, or local election because of a literacy test is sustainable as appropriate legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, Congress having concluded that such tests have been used to discriminate against the voting rights of minority groups and that the tests are not necessary to ensure that voters be well informed. Pp. 144-147. </s> 4. The right to vote in national elections is a privilege and immunity of national citizenship and the congressional judgment to ban durational residency requirements in presidential and vice-presidential elections is a manifestly permissible means of enforcing that privilege and immunity under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 147-150. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN concluded that: * </s> 2. The Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to restrict the authority of the States to allocate their political power as they see [400 U.S. 112, 114] fit and neither that Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution authorizes Congress to set voter qualifications in state or local elections. Pp. 154-213. </s> 3. The literacy requirement can be deemed an appropriate means of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment since Congress could have determined that racial prejudice is prevalent throughout the Nation and that literacy tests unduly lend themselves to discriminatory application. Pp. 216-217. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL concluded that: ** </s> 1. Congress has the power to forbid the disenfranchisement in national elections of persons over the age of 18 because of their age, in order to enforce the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There was ample evidence to support Congress' conclusion that the exclusion of citizens 18 to 21 years of age from the franchise is unnecessary to promote any legitimate interest the States may have in assuring intelligent and responsible voting. Pp. 239-281. </s> 3. The congressional determination that a nationwide ban on literacy tests was necessary to prevent racial discrimination in voting is amply supported by the legislative record, and the proscription of literacy tests is well within the power of Congress granted by 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. Pp. 231-236. </s> 4. There is adequate constitutional basis for the residency provisions of the Act in 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as there is ample justification for the congressional findings that durational residence requirements abridge the right of free interstate migration and that such requirements are not reasonably related to any compelling state interests. Pp. 236-239. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concluded that: ** </s> 2. Congress has no power to confer the right to vote in state or local elections on citizens from the ages of 18 to 21 since under the Constitution only the States have the power to set voting qualifications. Pp. 293-296. </s> 3. The literacy test ban is constitutional under the Enforcement Clause of the Fifteenth Amendment. Pp. 282-284. </s> 4. The residency provisions of the Act are constitutional because Congress, while it does not have general authority to establish qualifications for voting in congressional or presidential elections, [400 U.S. 112, 115] does have the power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to protect the privileges of United States citizenship, including the freedom to travel and to change one's residence. Pp. 285-292. </s> BLACK, J., delivered an opinion announcing the judgments of the Court and expressing his own view of the cases. DOUGLAS, J., filed a separate opinion, post, p. 135. HARLAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 152. BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ., filed an opinion dissenting from the judgments in part and concurring in the judgments in part, post, p. 229. STEWART, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which BURGER, C. J., and BLACKMUN, J., joined, post, p. 281. </s> Lee Johnson, Attorney General of Oregon, argued the cause for plaintiff in No. 43, Orig. With him on the briefs were Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, Deputy Attorney General, Jacob B. Tanzer, Solicitor General, and Al J. Laue and Thomas H. Denney, Assistant Attorneys General. Charles Alan Wright argued the cause for plaintiff in No. 44, Orig. With him on the brief were Crawford C. Martin, Attorney General of Texas, Nola White, First Assistant Attorney General, Alfred Walker, Executive Assistant Attorney General, and J. C. Davis, W. O. Shultz II, and John Reeves, Assistant Attorneys General. </s> Solicitor General Griswold argued the cause for defendant in Nos. 43, Orig., and 44, Orig., and for the United States in Nos. 46, Orig., and 47, Orig. With him on the briefs were Attorney General Mitchell, pro se, Assistant Attorney General Leonard, Peter L. Strauss, and Samuel Huntington. </s> Gary K. Nelson, Attorney General of Arizona, and John M. McGowan II, Special Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause and filed a brief for defendant in No. 46, Orig. Robert M. Robson, Attorney General of Idaho, argued the cause for defendant in No. 47, Orig. With him on the brief was Richard H. Greener, Assistant Attorney General. [400 U.S. 112, 116] </s> Brief of amicus curiae in all cases was filed by A. F. Summer, Attorney General, Delos Burks, First Assistant Attorney General, William A. Allain, Assistant Attorney General, and Charles B. Henley for the State of Mississippi. Briefs of amici curiae in Nos. 43, Orig., 46, Orig., and 47, Orig., were filed by Melvin L. Wulf for the American Civil Liberties Union, and by John R. Cosgrove for Citizens for Lowering the Voting Age et al. Brief of amicus curiae in Nos. 43, Orig., and 46, Orig., was filed by William A. Dobrovir, Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., David Rubin, Stephen I. Schlossberg, John A. Fillion, Nathaniel R. Jones, Clarence Mitchell, and J. Francis Pohlhaus for the Youth Franchise Coalition et al. Briefs of amici curiae in No. 43, Orig., were filed by Joseph A. Califano, Jr., and Clifford L. Alexander for the Democratic National Committee, and by Messrs. Jones, Mitchell, and Pohlhaus for the Department of Armed Services and Veterans Affairs of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Brief of amicus curiae for the State of Indiana in support of plaintiff in No. 44, Orig., was filed by Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Richard C. Johnson, Chief Deputy Attorney General, and William F. Thompson, Assistant Attorney General, joined by the Attorneys General for their respective States, as follows: Joe Purcell of Arkansas, Robert M. Robson of Idaho, Jack P. F. Gremillion of Louisiana, Clarence A. H. Meyer of Nebraska, Warren B. Rudman of New Hampshire, Robert Morgan of North Carolina, Helgi Johanneson of North Dakota, Paul W. Brown of Ohio, Gordon Mydland of South Dakota, Vernon B. Romney of Utah, Slade Gorton of Washington, Chauncey H. Browning, Jr., of West Virginia, and James E. Barrett of Wyoming. Brief of amicus curiae in No. 47, Orig., was filed by Andrew P. Miller, Attorney General, and Anthony F. Troy and Walter A. McFarlane, Assistant Attorneys General, for the Commonwealth of Virginia. [400 U.S. 112, 117] </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK, announcing the judgments of the Court in an opinion expressing his own view of the cases. </s> In these suits certain States resist compliance with the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314, because they believe that the Act takes away from them powers reserved to the States by the Constitution to control their own elections. 1 By its terms the Act does three things. First: It lowers the minimum age of voters in both state and federal elections from 21 to 18. Second: Based upon a finding by Congress that literacy tests have been used to discriminate against voters on account of their color, the Act enforces the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments by barring the use of such tests in all elections, state and national, for a five-year period. Third: The Act forbids States from disqualifying voters in national elections for presidential and vice-presidential electors because they have not met state residency requirements. </s> For the reasons set out in Part I of this opinion, I believe Congress can fix the age of voters in national elections, such as congressional, senatorial, vice-presidential [400 U.S. 112, 118] and presidential elections, but cannot set the voting age in state and local elections. For reasons expressed in separate opinions, my Brothers DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL join me in concluding that Congress can enfranchise 18-year-old citizens in national elections, but dissent from the judgment that Congress cannot extend the franchise to 18-year-old citizens in state and local elections. For reasons expressed in separate opinions, my Brothers THE CHIEF JUSTICE, HARLAN, STEWART, and BLACKMUN join me in concluding that Congress cannot interfere with the age for voters set by the States for state and local elections. They, however, dissent from the judgment that Congress can control voter qualifications in federal elections. In summary, it is the judgment of the Court that the 18-year-old vote provisions of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 are constitutional and enforceable insofar as they pertain to federal elections and unconstitutional and unenforceable insofar as they pertain to state and local elections. </s> For the reasons set out in Part II of this opinion, I believe that Congress, in the exercise of its power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, can prohibit the use of literacy tests or other devices used to discriminate against voters on account of their race in both state and federal elections. For reasons expressed in separate opinions, all of my Brethren join me in this judgment. Therefore the literacy-test provisions of the Act are upheld. </s> For the reasons set out in Part III of this opinion, I believe Congress can set residency requirements and provide for absentee balloting in elections for presidential and vice-presidential electors. For reasons expressed in separate opinions, my Brothers THE CHIEF JUSTICE, DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN concur in this judgment. My Brother [400 U.S. 112, 119] HARLAN, for the reasons stated in his separate opinion, considers that the residency provisions of the statute are unconstitutional. Therefore the residency and absentee balloting provisions of the Act are upheld. </s> Let judgments be entered accordingly. </s> I </s> The Framers of our Constitution provided in Art. I, 2, that members of the House of Representatives should be elected by the people and that the voters for Representatives should have "the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature." Senators were originally to be elected by the state legislatures, but under the Seventeenth Amendment Senators are also elected by the people, and voters for Senators have the same qualifications as voters for Representatives. In the very beginning the responsibility of the States for setting the qualifications of voters in congressional elections was made subject to the power of Congress to make or alter such regulations if it deemed it advisable to do so. 2 This was done in Art. I, 4, of the Constitution which provides: </s> "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be [400 U.S. 112, 120] prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators." (Emphasis supplied.) </s> Moreover, the power of Congress to make election regulations in national elections is augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819). In United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), where the Court upheld congressional power to regulate party primaries, Mr. Justice Stone speaking [400 U.S. 112, 121] for the Court construed the interrelation of these clauses of the Constitution, stating: </s> "While, in a loose sense, the right to vote for representatives in Congress is sometimes spoken of as a right derived from the states . . . this statement is true only in the sense that the states are authorized by the Constitution, to legislate on the subject as provided by 2 of Art. I, to the extent that Congress has not restricted state action by the exercise of its powers to regulate elections under 4 and its more general power under Article I, 8, clause 18 of the Constitution `to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers.'" 313 U.S. at 315. </s> See also Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487 (1902); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58 (1900). </s> The breadth of power granted to Congress to make or alter election regulations in national elections, including the qualifications of voters, is demonstrated by the fact that the Framers of the Constitution and the state legislatures which ratified it intended to grant to Congress the power to lay out or alter the boundaries of the congressional districts. In the ratifying conventions speakers "argued that the power given Congress in Art. I, 4, was meant to be used to vindicate the people's right to equality of representation in the House," Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 16 (1964), and that Congress would "`most probably . . . lay the state off into districts.'" And in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), no Justice of this Court doubted Congress' power to rearrange the congressional districts according to population; the fight in that case revolved about the judicial power to compel redistricting. [400 U.S. 112, 122] </s> Surely no voter qualification was more important to the Framers than the geographical qualification embodied in the concept of congressional districts. The Framers expected Congress to use this power to eradicate "rotten boroughs," 3 and Congress has in fact used its power to prevent States from electing all Congressmen at large. 4 There can be no doubt that the power to alter congressional district lines is vastly more significant in its effect than the power to permit 18-year-old citizens to go to the polls and vote in all federal elections. </s> Any doubt about the powers of Congress to regulate congressional elections, including the age and other qualifications of the voters, should be dispelled by the opinion of this Court in Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932). There, Chief Justice Hughes writing for a unanimous Court discussed the scope of congressional power under 4 at some length. He said: </s> "The subject matter is the `times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives.' It cannot be doubted that these comprehensive words embrace authority to provide a complete code for congressional elections, not only as to times and places, but in relation to notices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication of election returns; in short, to enact the numerous requirements as to procedure and safeguards which experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right involved. . . . </s> "This view is confirmed by the second clause of Article I, section 4, which provides that `the Congress [400 U.S. 112, 123] may at any time by law make or alter such regulations,' with the single exception stated. The phrase `such regulations' plainly refers to regulations of the same general character that the legislature of the State is authorized to prescribe with respect to congressional elections. In exercising this power, the Congress may supplement these state regulations or may substitute its own. . . . It `has a general supervisory power over the whole subject.'" Id., at 366-367. </s> In short, the Constitution allotted to the States the power to make laws regarding national elections, but provided that if Congress became dissatisfied with the state laws, Congress could alter them. 5 A newly created national government could hardly have been expected to survive without the ultimate power to rule itself and to fill its offices under its own laws. The Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 now before this Court [400 U.S. 112, 124] evidence dissatisfaction of Congress with the voting age set by many of the States for national elections. I would hold, as have a long line of decisions in this Court, that Congress has ultimate supervisory power over congressional elections. 6 Similarly, it is the prerogative of Congress to oversee the conduct of presidential and vice-presidential elections and to set the qualifications for voters for electors for those offices. It cannot be seriously contended that Congress has less power over the conduct of presidential elections than it has over congressional elections. 7 </s> On the other hand, the Constitution was also intended to preserve to the States the power that even the Colonies had to establish and maintain their own separate and independent governments, except insofar as the Constitution itself commands otherwise. My Brother HARLAN has persuasively demonstrated that the Framers of the Constitution intended the States to keep for themselves, [400 U.S. 112, 125] as provided in the Tenth Amendment, 8 the power to regulate elections. My major disagreement with my Brother HARLAN is that, while I agree as to the States' power to regulate the elections of their own officials, I believe, contrary to his view, that Congress has the final authority over federal elections. No function is more essential to the separate and independent existence of the States and their governments than the power to determine within the limits of the Constitution the qualifications of their own voters for state, county, and municipal offices and the nature of their own machinery for filling local public offices. Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904); Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162 (1875). Moreover, Art. I, 2, 9 is a clear indication that the Framers intended the States to determine the qualifications of their own voters for state offices, because those qualifications were adopted for federal offices unless Congress directs otherwise under Art. I, 4. It is a plain fact of history that the Framers never imagined that the national Congress would set the qualifications for voters in every election from President to local constable or village alderman. It is obvious that the whole Constitution reserves to the States the power to set voter qualifications in state and local elections, except to the limited extent that the people through constitutional amendments have specifically narrowed the powers of the States. Amendments Fourteen, Fifteen, Nineteen, and Twenty-four, each of which has assumed that the States had general supervisory power [400 U.S. 112, 126] over state elections, are examples of express limitations on the power of the States to govern themselves. And the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was never intended to destroy the States' power to govern themselves, making the Nineteenth and Twenty-fourth Amendments superfluous. My Brother BRENNAN's opinion, if carried to its logical conclusion, would, under the guise of insuring equal protection, blot out all state power, leaving the 50 States as little more than impotent figureheads. In interpreting what the Fourteenth Amendment means, the Equal Protection Clause should not be stretched to nullify the States' powers over elections which they had before the Constitution was adopted and which they have retained throughout our history. </s> Of course, the original design of the Founding Fathers was altered by the Civil War Amendments and various other amendments to the Constitution. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments have expressly authorized Congress to "enforce" the limited prohibitions of those amendments by "appropriate legislation." The Solicitor General contends in these cases that Congress can set the age qualifications for voters in state elections under its power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. </s> Above all else, the framers of the Civil War Amendments intended to deny to the States the power to discriminate against persons on account of their race. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 71-72 (1873). While this Court has recognized that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in some instances protects against discriminations [400 U.S. 112, 127] other than those on account of race, 10 see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50 (1970); see also Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilots, 330 U.S. 552 (1947), and cases cited therein, it cannot be successfully argued that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to strip the States of their power, carefully preserved in the original Constitution, to govern themselves. The Fourteenth Amendment was surely not intended to make every discrimination between groups of people a constitutional denial of equal protection. Nor was the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to permit Congress to prohibit every discrimination between groups of people. On the other hand, the Civil War Amendments were unquestionably designed to condemn and forbid every distinction, however trifling, on account of race. </s> To fulfill their goal of ending racial discrimination and to prevent direct or indirect state legislative encroachment on the rights guaranteed by the amendments, the Framers gave Congress power to enforce each of the Civil War Amendments. These enforcement powers are broad. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968), the Court held that 2 of the Thirteenth [400 U.S. 112, 128] Amendment "clothed `Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.'" In construing 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has stated: </s> "It is not said the judicial power of the general government shall extend to enforcing the prohibitions and to protecting the rights and immunities guaranteed. It is not said that branch of the government shall be authorized to declare void any action of a State in violation of the prohibitions. It is the power of Congress which has been enlarged." Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880). (Emphasis added in part.) </s> And in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (BLACK, J., dissenting on other grounds), the Court upheld the literacy test ban of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437, under Congress' Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power. </s> As broad as the congressional enforcement power is, it is not unlimited. Specifically, there are at least three limitations upon Congress' power to enforce the guarantees of the Civil War Amendments. First, Congress may not by legislation repeal other provisions of the Constitution. Second, the power granted to Congress was not intended to strip the States of their power to govern themselves or to convert our national government of enumerated powers into a central government of unrestrained authority over every inch of the whole Nation. Third, Congress may only "enforce" the provisions of the amendments and may do so only by "appropriate legislation." Congress has no power under the enforcement sections to undercut the amendments' guarantees of personal equality and freedom from discrimination, see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n. [400 U.S. 112, 129] 10 (1966), or to undermine those protections of the Bill of Rights which we have held the Fourteenth Amendment made applicable to the States. 11 </s> Of course, we have upheld congressional legislation under the Enforcement Clauses in some cases where Congress has interfered with state regulation of the local electoral process. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, supra, the Court upheld a statute which outlawed New York's requirement of literacy in English as a prerequisite to voting as this requirement was applied to Puerto Ricans with certain educational qualifications. The New York statute overridden by Congress applied to all elections. And in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra (BLACK, J., dissenting on other grounds), the Court upheld the literacy test ban of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. That Act proscribed the use of the literacy test in all elections in certain areas. But division of power between state and national governments, like every provision of the Constitution, was expressly qualified by the Civil War Amendments' ban on racial discrimination. Where Congress attempts to remedy racial discrimination under its enforcement powers, its authority is enhanced by the avowed intention of the framers of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. Cf. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (BLACK, J., dissenting). [400 U.S. 112, 130] </s> In enacting the 18-year-old vote provisions of the Act now before the Court. Congress made no legislative findings that the 21-year-old vote requirement was used by the States to disenfranchise voters on account of race. I seriously doubt that such a finding, if made, could be supported by substantial evidence. Since Congress has attempted to invade an area preserved to the States by the Constitution without a foundation for enforcing the Civil War Amendments' ban on racial discrimination, I would hold that Congress has exceeded its powers in attempting to lower the voting age in state and local elections. On the other hand, where Congress legislates in a domain not exclusively reserved by the Constitution to the States, its enforcement power need not be tied so closely to the goal of eliminating discrimination on account of race. </s> To invalidate part of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, however, does not mean that the entire Act must fall or that the constitutional part of the 18-year-old vote provision cannot be given effect. In passing the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Congress recognized that the limits of its power under the Enforcement Clauses were largely undetermined, and therefore included a broad severability provision: </s> "If any provision of this Act or the application of any provision thereof to any person or circumstance is judicially determined to be invalid, the remainder of this Act or the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected by such determination." 84 Stat. 318. </s> In this case, it is the judgment of the Court that Title III, lowering the voting age to 18, is invalid as applied to voters in state and local elections. It is also the judgment of the Court that Title III is valid with respect to national elections. We would fail to follow the [400 U.S. 112, 131] express will of Congress in interpreting its own statute if we refused to sever these two distinct aspects of Title III. Moreover, it is a longstanding canon of statutory construction that legislative enactments are to be enforced to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the Constitution, particularly where the valid portion of the statute does not depend upon the invalid part. See, e. g., Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941); Marsh v. Buck, 313 U.S. 406 (1941). Here, of course, the enforcement of the 18-year-old vote in national elections is in no way dependent upon its enforcement in state and local elections. </s> II </s> In Title I of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 Congress extended the provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 which ban the use of literacy tests in certain States upon the finding of certain conditions by the United States Attorney General. The Court upheld the provisions of the 1965 Act over my partial dissent in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, and Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969). The constitutionality of Title I is not raised by any of the parties to these suits. 12 </s> In Title II of the Amendments Congress prohibited until August 6, 1975, the use of any test or device resembling a literacy test in any national, state, or local election [400 U.S. 112, 132] in any area of the United States where such test is not already proscribed by the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The State of Arizona maintains that Title II cannot be enforced to the extent that it is inconsistent with Arizona's literacy test requirement, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 16-101.A.4, 16-101.A.5 (1956). I would hold that the literacy test ban of the 1970 Amendments is constitutional under the Enforcement Clause of the Fifteenth Amendment and that it supersedes Arizona's conflicting statutes under the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution. </s> In enacting the literacy test ban of Title II Congress had before it a long history of the discriminatory use of literacy tests to disfranchise voters on account of their race. Congress could have found that as late as the summer of 1968, the percentage registration of nonwhite voters in seven Southern States was substantially below the percentage registration of white voters. 13 Moreover, Congress had before it striking evidence to show that the provisions of the 1965 Act had had in the span of four years a remarkable impact on minority group voter registration. 14 Congress also had evidence to show that voter registration in areas with large Spanish-American populations was consistently below the state and national averages. In Arizona, for example, only two counties out of eight with Spanish surname populations in excess of 15% showed a voter registration equal to the state-wide average. 15 Arizona also has a serious problem of deficient voter registration among Indians. Congressional [400 U.S. 112, 133] concern over the use of a literacy test to disfranchise Puerto Ricans in New York State is already a matter of record in this Court. Katzenbach v. Morgan, supra. And as to the Nation as a whole, Congress had before it statistics which demonstrate that voter registration and voter participation are consistently greater in States without literacy tests. 16 </s> Congress also had before it this country's history of discriminatory educational opportunities in both the North and the South. The children who were denied an equivalent education by the "separate but equal" rule of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), are now old enough to vote. There is substantial, if not overwhelming, evidence from which Congress could have concluded that it is a denial of equal protection to condition the political participation of children educated in a dual school system upon their educational achievement. Moreover, the history of this legislation suggests that concern with educational inequality was perhaps uppermost in the minds of the congressmen who sponsored the Act. The hearings are filled with references to educational inequality. Faced with this and other evidence that literacy tests reduce voter participation in a discriminatory manner not only in the South but throughout the Nation, Congress was supported by substantial evidence in concluding that a nationwide ban on literacy tests was appropriate to enforce the Civil War amendments. </s> Finally, there is yet another reason for upholding the literacy test provisions of this Act. In imposing a nationwide ban on literacy tests, Congress has recognized a national problem for what it is - a serious national dilemma that touches every corner of our land. [400 U.S. 112, 134] In this legislation Congress has recognized that discrimination on account of color and racial origin is not confined to the South, but exists in various parts of the country. Congress has decided that the way to solve the problems of racial discrimination is to deal with nationwide discrimination with nationwide legislation. Compare South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, and Gaston County v. United States, supra. </s> III </s> In Title II of the Voting Rights Act Amendments Congress also provided that in presidential and vice-presidential elections, no voter could be denied his right to cast a ballot because he had not lived in the jurisdiction long enough to meet its residency requirements. Furthermore, Congress provided uniform national rules for absentee voting in presidential and vice-presidential elections. In enacting these regulations Congress was attempting to insure a fully effective voice to all citizens in national elections. What I said in Part I of this opinion applies with equal force here. Acting under its broad authority to create and maintain a national government, Congress unquestionably has power under the Constitution to regulate federal elections. The Framers of our Constitution were vitally concerned with setting up a national government that could survive. Essential to the survival and to the growth of our national government is its power to fill its elective offices and to insure that the officials who fill those offices are as responsive as possible to the will of the people whom they represent. </s> IV </s> Our judgments today give the Federal Government the power the Framers conferred upon it, that is, the final control of the elections of its own officers. Our judgments also save for the States the power to control state and [400 U.S. 112, 135] local elections which the Constitution originally reserved to them and which no subsequent amendment has taken from them. 17 The generalities of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were not designed or adopted to render the States impotent to set voter qualifications in elections for their own local officials and agents in the absence of some specific constitutional limitations. </s> [Footnote * [NOTE: A numbered category that is used for MR. JUSTICE BLACK's opinion is not repeated below where the opinion being headnoted does not concur or concur in the result with respect to the point involved in that category.] </s> [Footnote ** See note, supra, at 113. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 In Nos. 43, Orig., and 44, Orig., Oregon and Texas, respectively, invoke the original jurisdiction of this Court to sue the United States Attorney General seeking an injunction against the enforcement of Title III (18-year-old vote) of the Act. In No. 46, Orig., the United States invokes our original jurisdiction seeking to enjoin Arizona from enforcing its laws to the extent that they conflict with the Act, and directing the officials of Arizona to comply with the provisions of Title II (nationwide literacy test ban), 201, 84 Stat. 315, and Title III (18-year-old vote), 301, 302, 84 Stat. 318, of the Act. In No. 47, Orig., the United States invokes our original jurisdiction seeking to enjoin Idaho from enforcing its laws to the extent that they conflict with Title II (abolition of residency requirements in presidential and vice-presidential elections), 202, 84 Stat. 316, and Title III (18-year-old vote) of the Act. No question has been raised concerning the standing of the parties or the jurisdiction of this Court. </s> [Footnote 2 Article I, 4, was a compromise between those delegates to the Constitutional Convention who wanted the States to have final authority over the election of all state and federal officers and those who wanted Congress to make laws governing national elections, 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 280-292 (1st ed. 1833). The contemporary interpretation of this compromise reveals that those who favored national authority over national elections prevailed. Six States included in their resolutions of ratification the recommendation that a constitutional amendment be adopted to curtail the power of the Federal Government to regulate national elections. Such an amendment was never adopted. A majority of the delegates to the Massachusetts ratifying convention [400 U.S. 112, 120] must have assumed that Art. I, 4, gave very broad powers to Congress. Otherwise that convention would not have recommended an amendment providing: "That Congress do not exercise the powers vested in them by the 4th section of the 1st article, but in cases where a state shall neglect or refuse to make the regulations therein mentioned, or shall make regulations subversive of the rights of the people to a free and equal representation in Congress, agreeably to the Constitution." 2 J. Elliot's Debates on the Federal Constitution 177 (1876). The speech of Mr. Cabot, one delegate to the Massachusetts convention, who argued that Art. I, 4, was "to be as highly prized as any in the Constitution," expressed a view of the breadth of that section which must have been shared by most of his colleagues: "[I]f the state legislatures are suffered to regulate conclusively the elections of the democratic branch, they may . . . finally annihilate that control of the general government, which the people ought always to have . . . ." Id., at 26. And Cabot was supported by Mr. Parsons, who added: "They might make an unequal and partial division of the states into districts for the election of representatives, or they might even disqualify one third of the electors. Without these powers in Congress, the people can have no remedy; but the 4th section provides a remedy, a controlling power in a legislature, composed of senators and representatives of twelve states, without the influence of our commotions and factions, who will hear impartially, and preserve and restore to the people their equal and sacred rights of election." Id., at 27. </s> [Footnote 3 See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 14 -16 (1964). </s> [Footnote 4 See, e. g., Act of Aug. 8, 1911, 37 Stat. 13. </s> [Footnote 5 My Brother STEWART has cited the debates of the Constitutional Convention to show that Ellsworth, Mason, Madison, and Franklin successfully opposed granting Congress the power to regulate federal elections, including the qualifications of voters, in the original Constitution. I read the history of our Constitution differently. Mr. Madison, for example, explained Art. I, 4, to the Virginia ratifying convention as follows: "[I]t was thought that the regulation of time, place, and manner, of electing the representatives, should be uniform throughout the continent. Some States might regulate the elections on the principles of equality, and others might regulate them otherwise. This diversity would be obviously unjust. . . . Should the people of any state by any means be deprived of the right of suffrage, it was judged proper that it should be remedied by the general government." 3 J. Elliot's Debates on the Federal Constitution 367 (1876). And Mr. Mason, who was supposedly successful in opposing a broad grant of power to Congress to regulate federal elections, still found it necessary to support an unsuccessful Virginia proposal to curb the power of Congress under Art. I, 4. Id., at 403. </s> [Footnote 6 See, e. g., Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). </s> [Footnote 7 With reference to the selection of the President and Vice President, Art. II, 1, provides: "Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress . . . ." But this Court in Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934), upheld the power of Congress to regulate certain aspects of elections for presidential and vice-presidential electors, specifically rejecting a construction of Art. II, 1, that would have curtailed the power of Congress to regulate such elections. Finally, and most important, inherent in the very concept of a supreme national government with national officers is a residual power in Congress to insure that those officers represent their national constituency as responsively as possible. This power arises from the nature of our constitutional system of government and from the Necessary and Proper Clause. </s> [Footnote 8 "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. Const., Amdt. X. </s> [Footnote 9 "The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature." </s> [Footnote 10 My Brother BRENNAN relies upon Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); and Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970). These typical equal protection cases in which I joined are not relevant or material to our decision in the cases before us. The establishment of voter age qualifications is a matter of legislative judgment which cannot be properly decided under the Equal Protection Clause. The crucial question here is not who is denied equal protection, but, rather, which political body, state or federal, is empowered to fix the minimum age of voters. The Framers intended the States to make the voting age decision in all elections with the provision that Congress could override state judgments concerning the qualifications of voters in federal elections. </s> [Footnote 11 See: the First Amendment, e. g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); the Fourth Amendment, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); the Fifth Amendment, Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); the Sixth Amendment, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); and the Eighth Amendment, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). </s> [Footnote 12 Yuma County, Arizona, is presently subject to the literacy-test ban of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 pursuant to a determination of the Attorney General under 4 (a) of the 1965 Act. I do not understand Arizona to contest the application of the 1965 Act or its extension to that county. Arizona "does not question" Congress' authority to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments "when Congress possesses a `special legislative competence'"; and cites South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), and Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), with approval. Answer and Brief for Arizona, No. 46, Orig., O. T. 1970. </s> [Footnote 13 Hearings on H. R. 4249, H. R. 5538, and Similar Proposals before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 3, p. 14 (1969). </s> [Footnote 14 Id., at 93. </s> [Footnote 15 Hearings on S. 818, S. 2456, S. 2507, and Title IV of S. 2029 before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., 406 (1969-1970). </s> [Footnote 16 Id., at 401. </s> [Footnote 17 That these views are not novel is demonstrated by Mr. Justice Story in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, vol. 2, pp. 284-285 (1st ed. 1833): "There is, too, in the nature of such a provision [Art. I, 4], something incongruous, if not absurd. What would be said of a clause introduced into the national constitution to regulate the state elections of the members of the state legislatures? It would be deemed a most unwarrantable transfer of power, indicating a premeditated design to destroy the state governments. It would be deemed so flagrant a violation of principle, as to require no comment. It would be said, and justly, that the state governments ought to possess the power of self-existence and self-organization, independent of the pleasure of the national government. Why does not the same reasoning apply to the national government? What reason is there to suppose, that the state governments will be more true to the Union, than the national government will be to the state governments?" (Emphasis added.) (Footnote omitted.) </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS. </s> I dissent from the judgments of the Court insofar as they declare 302 of the Voting Rights Act, 84 Stat. 318, unconstitutional as applied to state elections and concur in the judgments as they affect federal elections, but for different reasons. I rely on the Equal Protection Clause and on the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. </s> I </s> The grant of the franchise to 18-year-olds by Congress is in my view valid across the board. [400 U.S. 112, 136] </s> I suppose that in 1920, when the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified giving women the right to vote, it was assumed by most constitutional experts that there was no relief by way of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, the Court held in the 1874 Term that a State could constitutionally restrict the franchise to men. While the Fourteenth Amendment was relied upon, the thrust of the opinion was directed at the Privileges and Immunities Clause with a subsidiary reference to the Due Process Clause. It was much later, indeed not until the 1961 Term - nearly a century after the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted - that discrimination against voters on grounds other than race was struck down. </s> The first case in which this Court struck down a statute under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 , decided in the 1879 Term. 1 In the 1961 Term we squarely held that the manner of apportionment of members of a state legislature raised a justiciable question under the Equal Protection Clause, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 . That case was followed by numerous others, e. g.: that one person could not be given twice or 10 times the voting power of another person in a statewide election merely because he lived in a rural area or [400 U.S. 112, 137] in the smallest rural county; 2 that the principle of equality applied to both House of a bicameral legislature; 3 that political parties receive protection under the Equal Protection Clause just as voters do. 4 </s> The reapportionment cases, however, are not quite in point here, though they are the target of my Brother HARLAN'S dissent. His painstaking review of the history of the Equal Protection Clause leads him to conclude that "political" rights are not protected though "civil" rights are protected. The problem of what questions are "political" has been a recurring issue in this Court from the beginning, and we recently reviewed them all in Baker v. Carr, supra, and in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 . Baker v. Carr was a reapportionment case and Powell v. McCormack involved the exclusion from the House of Representatives of a Congressman. The issue of "political" question versus "justiciable" question was argued pro and con in those cases; and my Brother HARLAN stated in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S., at 330 et seq., and on related occasions (Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 382 ; Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 20 ; Reynolds v. [400 U.S. 112, 138] Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589 ) his views on the constitutional dimensions of the "political" question in the setting of the reapportionment problem. </s> Those cases involved the question whether legislatures must be so structured as to reflect with approximate equality the voice of every voter. The ultimate question was whether, absent a proper apportionment by the legislature, a federal court could itself make an apportionment. That kind of problem raised issues irrelevant here. Reapportionment, as our experience shows, presented a tangle of partisan politics in which geography, economics, urban life, rural constituencies, and numerous other nonlegal factors play varying roles. The competency of courts to deal with them was challenged. Yet we held the issues were justiciable. None of those so-called "political" questions are involved here. </s> This case, so far as equal protection is concerned, is no whit different from a controversy over a state law that disqualifies women from certain types of employment, Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 , or that imposes a heavier punishment on one class of offender than on another whose crime is not intrinsically different. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 . The right to vote is, of course, different in one respect from the other rights in the economic, social, or political field which, as indicated in the Appendix to this opinion, are under the Equal Protection Clause. The right to vote is a civil right deeply embedded in the Constitution. Article I, 2, provides that the House is composed of members "chosen . . . by the People" and the electors "shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature." The Seventeenth Amendment states that Senators shall be "elected by the people." The Fifteenth Amendment speaks of the "right of citizens of the United States to vote" - not only in federal [400 U.S. 112, 139] but in state elections. The Court in Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 665 , stated: </s> "This new constitutional right was mainly designed for citizens of African descent. The principle, however, that the protection of the exercise of this right is within the power of Congress, is as necessary to the right of other citizens to vote as to the colored citizen, and to the right to vote in general as to the right to be protected against discrimination." </s> It was in that tradition that we said in Reynolds v. Sims, supra, at 555, "The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government." </s> This "right to choose, secured by the Constitution," United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 , is a civil right of the highest order. Voting concerns "political" matters; but the right is not "political" in the constitutional sense. Interference with it has given rise to a long and consistent line of decisions by the Court; and the claim has always been upheld as justiciable. 5 Whatever distinction may have been made, following the Civil War, between "civil" and "political" rights, has passed into history. In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 , we stated: "Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change." That statement is in harmony with my view of the Fourteenth Amendment, as expressed by my Brother BRENNAN: "We must therefore conclude that its framers understood their Amendment to be a broadly worded injunction capable of being interpreted [400 U.S. 112, 140] by future generations in accordance with the vision and needs of those generations." Post, at 278. Hence the history of the Fourteenth Amendment tendered by my Brother HARLAN is irrelevant to the present problem. </s> Since the right is civil and not "political," it is protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which in turn, by 5 of that Amendment, can be "enforced" by Congress. </s> In Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 , we held that Texas could not bar a person, otherwise qualified, from voting merely because he was a member of the armed services. Occupation, we held, when used to bar a person from voting, was that invidious discrimination which the Equal Protection Clause condemns. In Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 , we held that a State could not deny the vote to residents of a federal enclave when it treated them as residents for many other purposes. In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S., at 666 , we held a State could not in harmony with the Equal Protection Clause keep a person from voting in state elections because of "the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee." In Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. 621 , we held that a person could not be barred from voting in school board elections merely because he was a bachelor. So far as the Equal Protection Clause was concerned, we said that the line between those qualified to vote and those not qualified turns on whether those excluded have "a distinct and direct interest in the school meeting decisions." Id., at 632. In Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 , we held that a state law which gave only "property taxpayers" the right to vote on the issuance of revenue bonds of a municipal utility system violated equal protection as "the benefits and burdens of the bond issue fall indiscriminately on property owner and nonproperty owner alike." Id., at 705. And only on June 23, 1970, we held in Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 , that [400 U.S. 112, 141] it violates equal protection to restrict those who may vote on general obligation bonds to real property taxpayers. We looked to see if there was any "compelling state interest" in the voting restrictions. We held that "nonproperty owners" are not "substantially less interested in the issuance of these securities than are property owners," id., at 212, and that presumptively "when all citizens are affected in important ways by a governmental decision subject to a referendum, the Constitution does not permit weighted voting or the exclusion of otherwise qualified citizens from the franchise." 6 Id., at 209. And as recently as November 9, 1970, we summarily affirmed a district court decision (310 F. Supp. 1172) on the basis of Kolodziejski. Parish School Board of St. Charles v. Stewart, post, p. 884, where Louisiana gave a vote on municipal bond issues only to "property taxpayers." </s> The powers granted Congress by 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to "enforce" the Equal Protection Clause are "the same broad powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. I, 8, cl. 18." Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 . As we stated in that case, "Correctly viewed, 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id., at 651. </s> Congress might well conclude that a reduction in the voting age from 21 to 18 was needed in the interest of equal protection. The Act itself brands the denial of [400 U.S. 112, 142] the franchise to 18-year-olds as "a particularly unfair treatment of such citizens in view of the national defense responsibilities imposed" on them. 301 (a) (1), Voting Rights Act, 84 Stat. 318. The fact that only males are drafted while the vote extends to females as well is not relevant, for the female component of these families or prospective families is also caught up in war and hit hard by it. Congress might well believe that men and women alike should share the fateful decision. </s> It is said, why draw the line at 18? Why not 17? Congress can draw lines and I see no reason why it cannot conclude that 18-year-olds have that degree of maturity which entitles them to the franchise. They are "generally considered by American law to be mature enough to contract, to marry, to drive an automobile, to own a gun, and to be responsible for criminal behavior as an adult." 7 Moreover, we are advised that under state laws, mandatory school attendance does not, as a matter of practice, extend beyond the age of 18. On any of these items the States, of course, have leeway to raise or lower the age requirements. But voting is "a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society," Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 -562. Where "fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined." Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 . There we were speaking of state restrictions on those rights. Here we are dealing with the right of Congress to "enforce" the principles of equality enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment. The right to "enforce" granted by 5 of that Amendment is, as noted, parallel with the Necessary and Proper Clause whose reach Chief Justice Marshall described in McCulloch v. [400 U.S. 112, 143] Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." </s> Equality of voting by all who are deemed mature enough to vote is certainly consistent "with the letter and spirit of the constitution." Much is made of the fact that Art. I, 4, of the Constitution 8 gave Congress only the power to regulate the "Manner of holding Elections," not the power to fix qualifications for voting in elections. But the Civil War Amendments - the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth - made vast inroads on the power of the States. Equal protection became a standard for state action and Congress was given authority to "enforce" it. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 647 . The manner of enforcement involves discretion; but that discretion is largely entrusted to the Congress, not to the courts. If racial discrimination were the only concern of the Equal Protection Clause, then across-the-board voting regulations set by the States would be of no concern to Congress. But it is much too late in history to make that claim, as the cases listed in the Appendix to this opinion show. Moreover, election inequalities created by state laws and based on factors other than race may violate the Equal Protection Clause, as we have held over and over again. The reach of 5 to "enforce" equal protection by eliminating election inequalities would seem quite broad. Certainly there is [400 U.S. 112, 144] not a word of limitation in 5 which would restrict its applicability to matters of race alone. And if, as stated in McCulloch v. Maryland, the measure of the power of Congress is whether the remedy is consistent "with the letter and spirit of the constitution," we should have no difficulty here. We said in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 : "The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing - one person, one vote." </s> It is a reasoned judgment that those who have such a large "stake" in modern elections as 18-year-olds, whether in times of war or peace, should have political equality. As was made plain in the dissent in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 566 (whose reasoning was approved in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379 ), the Equal Protection Clause does service to protect the right to vote in federal as well as in state elections. </s> I would sustain the choice which Congress has made. </s> II </s> I likewise find the objections that Arizona and Idaho make to the literacy and residence requirements of the 1970 Act to be insubstantial. </s> Literacy. We held in Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board, 360 U.S. 45 , that a State could apply a literacy test in selecting qualified voters provided the test is not "discriminatory" and does not contravene "any restriction that Congress, acting pursuant to its constitutional powers, has imposed." Id., at 51. The question in these cases is whether Congress has the power under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to bar literacy tests in all federal, state, or local elections. </s> Section 201 bars a State from denying the right to vote in any federal, state, or local election because of "any [400 U.S. 112, 145] test or device" which is defined, inter alia, to include literacy. 9 We traveled most of the distance needed to sustain this Act in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 , where we upheld the constitutionality of an earlier Act which prohibited the application of English literacy tests to persons educated in Puerto Rico. The power of Congress in 5 to "enforce" the Equal Protection Clause was sufficiently broad, we held, to enable it to abolish voting requirements which might pass muster under the Equal Protection Clause, absent an Act of Congress. Id., at 648-651. </s> The question, we said, was whether the Act of Congress was "appropriate legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause": </s> "It was well within congressional authority to say that this need of the Puerto Rican minority for the vote warranted federal intrusion upon any state interests served by the English literacy requirement. It was for Congress, as the branch that made this judgment, to assess and weigh the various conflicting considerations - the risk or pervasiveness of the discrimination in governmental services, the effectiveness of eliminating the state restriction on the right to vote as a means of dealing with the evil, the adequacy or availability of alternative remedies, and the nature and significance of the state interests that would be affected by the nullification of the English literacy requirement as applied to residents who have successfully completed [400 U.S. 112, 146] the sixth grade in a Puerto Rican school. It is not for us to review the congressional resolution of these factors. It is enough that we be able to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did." Id., at 653. </s> We also held that the Act might be sustained as an attack on the English language test as a device to discriminate. Id., at 654. And we went on to say that Congress might have concluded that "as a means of furthering the intelligent exercise of the franchise, an ability to read or understand Spanish is as effective as ability to read English for those to whom Spanish-language newspapers and Spanish-language radio and television programs are available to inform them of election issues and governmental affairs." Id., at 655. </s> We took a further step toward sustaining the present type of law in Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 . That decision involved a provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 which suspended the use of any "test or device," including literacy, as a prerequisite to registration in a State which was found by the Attorney General and the Director of the Census to have used it in any election on November 1, 1964, and in which less than 50% of the residents of voting age were registered or had voted. 10 Gaston County, North Carolina, was so classified and its literacy test was thereupon suspended. In a suit to remove the ban we sustained it. We noted that Congress had concluded that "the County deprived its black residents of equal educational opportunities, which in turn deprived them of an equal chance to pass the literacy test." Id., at 291. Congress, it was argued, should have employed a formula based on educational disparities between the races or one based on [400 U.S. 112, 147] literacy rates. Id., at 292. But the choice of appropriate remedies is for Congress and the range of available ones is wide. It was not a defect in the formula that some literate Negroes would be turned out by Negro schools. </s> "It is only reasonable to infer that among black children compelled to endure a segregated and inferior education, fewer will achieve any given degree of literacy than will their better-educated white contemporaries. And on the Government's showing, it was certainly proper to infer that Gaston County's inferior Negro schools provided many of its Negro residents with a subliterate education, and gave many others little inducement to enter or remain in school." Id., at 295-296. </s> By like reasoning Congress in the present legislation need not make findings as to the incidence of literacy. It can rely on the fact that most States do not have literacy tests; that the tests have been used at times as a discriminatory weapon against some minorities, not only Negroes but Americans of Mexican ancestry, and American Indians; that radio and television have made it possible for a person to be well informed even though he may not be able to read and write. We know from the legislative history that these and other desiderata influenced Congress in the choice it made in the present legislation; and we certainly cannot say that the means used were inappropriate. </s> Residence. The residency requirements of 202 relate only to elections for President and Vice President. Section 202 abolishes durational residency 11 and provides [400 U.S. 112, 148] for absentee voting provided that registration may be required 30 days prior to the election. The effect of 202 is to reduce all state durational residency requirements to 30 days. </s> In presidential elections no parochial interests of the State, county, or city are involved. Congress found that a durational residency requirement "in some instances has the impermissible purpose or effect of denying citizens the right to vote." 202 (a) (4). It found in 202 (a) (3) that a durational residency requirement denies citizens their privileges and immunities. 12 </s> The Seventeenth Amendment states that Senators shall be "elected by the people." Article I, 2, provides [400 U.S. 112, 149] that the House shall be chosen "by the People of the several States." The right to vote for national officers is a privilege and immunity of national citizenship. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 ; In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 534 ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 ; Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 ; United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 . 13 </s> [400 U.S. 112, 150] </s> The Fourteenth Amendment provides that: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." Durational residency laws of the States had such effect, says Congress. The "choice of means" to protect such a privilege presents "a question primarily addressed to the judgment of Congress." Burroughs v. United States, supra, at 547. The relevance of the means which Congress adopts to the condition sought to be remedied, the degree of their necessity, and the extent of their efficacy are all matters for Congress. Id., at 548. </s> The judgment which Congress has made respecting the ban of durational residency in presidential elections is plainly a permissible one in its efforts under 5 to "enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment. </s> APPENDIX TO OPINION OF DOUGLAS, J. </s> Cases which have struck down state statutes under the Equal Protection Clause other than statutes which discriminate on the basis of race. </s> STATUTES WHICH DISCRIMINATED AGAINST CERTAIN BUSINESSES </s> Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 ; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Vosburg, 238 U.S. 56 (railroad must pay attorney fees if it loses suit, but other businesses need not). Kentucky Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exchange, 262 U.S. 544 ; Power Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490 (burdens placed upon out-of-state corporations in litigation). </s> STATUTES WHICH FAVORED CERTAIN BUSINESSES </s> Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (exemption from state antitrust law for agricultural goods); Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (act exempting certain motor vehicles from insurance requirements); Mayflower [400 U.S. 112, 151] Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266 (act allowing certain milk dealers to sell at lower than the regulated price); Hartford Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459 (statute permitting mutual, but not stock, insurance companies to act through salaried representatives), and Morey v. Dowd, 354 U.S. 457 (American Express exempted from licensing requirements applied to "currency exchanges"). </s> TAXING STATUTES STRUCK DOWN </s> Concordia Ins. Co. v. Illinois, 292 U.S. 535 ; Iowa-Des Moines Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 ; Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board, 284 U.S. 23 ; Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389 ; Louisville Gas Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32 ; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494 ; Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 ; Sioux City Bridge v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441 ; F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 ; and Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400 . </s> TREATMENT OF CONVICTED CRIMINALS </s> Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (statute requiring unsuccessful criminal appellants who were in jail to pay cost of trial transcript); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (statute denying convict a sanity hearing before a jury prior to civil commitment); and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (sterilization of some convicts). </s> INDIGENTS </s> Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (Rule of Criminal Procedure which did not provide counsel for appeal to indigents); and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (denial of welfare benefits based on residency requirement). </s> LEGITIMACY </s> Glona v. American Guarantee Co., 391 U.S. 73 (mother denied right to sue for wrongful death of illegitimate [400 U.S. 112, 152] child); and Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (illegitimate children denied recovery for wrongful death of mother). </s> ALIENS </s> Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (statute limiting the number of aliens that could be employed to 20%); and Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (denial of fishing rights to aliens ineligible for citizenship). </s> [Footnote 1 Strauder was tried for murder. He had sought removal to federal courts on the ground that "by virtue of the laws of the State of West Virginia no colored man was eligible to be a member of the grand jury or to serve on a petite jury in the State." Id., at 304. He was convicted of murder and the West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. This Court held the West Virginia statute limiting jury duty to whites only unconstitutional: "We do not say that within the limits from which it is not excluded by the amendment a State may not prescribe the qualifications of its jurors, and in so doing make discriminations. . . . [The aim of the Fourteenth Amendment] was against discrimination because of race or color." 100 U.S., at 310 . </s> [Footnote 2 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 ; Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 ; Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 ; Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 ; Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 ; Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 ; Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50 . </s> [Footnote 3 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 ; WMCA v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 ; Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 . </s> [Footnote 4 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 . We also held in federal elections that the command of Art. I, 2, of the Constitution that representatives be chosen "by the People of the several States" means that "as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's," Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7 -8, and that that meant "vote-diluting discrimination" could not be accomplished "through the device of districts containing widely varied numbers of inhabitants." Id., at 8; Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 ; Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 ; Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 . </s> [Footnote 5 Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 ; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 ; Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 ; United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 ; Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 ; United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 ; United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 . </s> [Footnote 6 We noted that general obligation bonds may be satisfied not from real property taxes but from revenues from other local taxes paid by nonowners of property as well as those who own realty. Moreover, we noted that property taxes paid initially by property owners are often passed on to tenants or customers. 399 U.S., at 209 -211. </s> [Footnote 7 Engdahl, Constitutionality of the Voting Age Statute, 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 36 (1970). </s> [Footnote 8 Article I, 4, provides: "1. The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators. "2. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day." </s> [Footnote 9 Section 201 (b) defines "test or device" as "any requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting (1) demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter, (2) demonstrate any educational achievement or his knowledge of any particular subject, (3) possess good moral character, or (4) prove his qualifications by the voucher of registered voters or members of any other class." 84 Stat. 315. </s> [Footnote 10 The constitutionality of that procedure has been sustained in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 . </s> [Footnote 11 This Court upheld durational residency requirements as applied in presidential and vice-presidential elections absent an Act of Congress. See Drueding v. Devlin, 234 F. Supp. 721 (Md. 1964), aff'd, 380 U.S. 125 . Subsequently we vacated as moot a case presenting the same question. Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 . The district courts have been faced with the issue of durational residency requirements as they would be applied to congressional elections. Two have concluded the requirement is constitutional. Howe v. Brown, 319 F. Supp. 862 (ND Ohio 1970); Cocanower v. Marston, 318 F. Supp. 402 (Ariz. 1970). Additionally, one other court has refused a preliminary injunction in a case presenting the issue. Piliavin v. Hoel, 320 F. Supp. 66 (WD Wis. 1970). Some district courts, however, believe that Drueding cannot stand (absent an Act of Congress) after Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 ; Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. 621 ; Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 , and Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 . Accordingly they have held durational residency requirements for congressional elections (and by implication presidential elections) violate the Equal Protection Clause. See Burg v. Canniffe, 315 F. Supp. 380 (Mass. 1970); Blumstein v. Ellington, ___ F. Supp. ___ (MD Tenn. 1970); Hadnott v. Amos, 320 F. Supp. 107 (MD Ala. 1970); Bufford v. Holton, 319 F. Supp. 843 (ED Va. 1970). In none of these cases was an Act of Congress involved. </s> [Footnote 12 Article IV, 2, of the Constitution provides: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." The Fourteenth Amendment provides in 1 that: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." </s> [Footnote 13 The cases relied on by my Brother HARLAN, post, at 214, are not to the contrary. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 7 , states: "The right to become a candidate for state office, like the right to vote for the election of state officers . . . is a right or privilege of state citizenship." (Emphasis added.) Arguably Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, is to the contrary, but to the extent its dicta indicated otherwise, it was limited in Ex parte Yarbrough. Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 , overruled by Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 , involved a poll tax applied in both federal and state elections; it erroneously cited Yarbrough for the proposition voting is not a privilege and immunity of national citizenship. Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 , involved durational residency requirements, but expressly reserved the question of their application to presidential and vice-presidential elections. Our holdings concerning privileges and immunities of national citizenship were analyzed less than five years ago by my Brother HARLAN. After referring to Ex parte Yarbrough, and United States v. Classic, he stated that those cases "are essentially concerned with the vindication of important relationships with the Federal Government - voting in federal elections, involvement in federal law enforcement, communicating with the Federal Government." United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 772 (separate opinion) (emphasis added). Contrary to the suggestion of my Brother HARLAN, post, at 213, we need not rely on the power of Congress to declare the meaning of 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. This court had determined that voting for national officers is a privilege and immunity of national citizenship. No congressional declaration was necessary. Congressional power under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is, as stated, buttressed by congressional power under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Thus even if the durational residency requirements do not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Congress can determine that it is necessary and proper to abolish them in national elections to effectuate and further the purpose of 1 as it has been declared by this Court. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part. </s> From the standpoint of this Court's decisions during an era of judicial constitutional revision in the field of the suffrage, ushered in eight years ago by Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), I would find it difficult not to sustain all three aspects of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314, here challenged. From the standpoint of the bedrock of the constitutional structure of this Nation, these cases bring us to a crossroad that is marked with a formidable "Stop" sign. That sign compels us to pause before we allow those decisions to carry us to the point of sanctioning Congress' decision to alter state-determined voter qualifications by simple legislation, and to consider whether sound doctrine does not in truth require us to hold that one or more of the changes which Congress has thus sought to make can be accomplished only by constitutional amendment. </s> The four cases require determination of the validity of the Voting Rights Act Amendments in three respects. In Nos. 43, Orig., and 44, Orig., Oregon and Texas have sought to enjoin the enforcement of 302 of the Act as applied to lower the voting age in those States from 21 to 18. 1 </s> [400 U.S. 112, 153] </s> In Nos. 46, Orig., and 47, Orig., the United States seeks a declaration of the validity of the Act and an injunction requiring Arizona and Idaho to conform their laws to it. The Act would lower the voting age in each State from 21 to 18. It would suspend until August 6, 1975, the Arizona literacy test, which requires that applicants for registration be able to read the United States Constitution in English and write their names. It would require Idaho to make several changes in its laws governing residency, registration, and absentee voting in presidential elections. Among the more substantial changes, Idaho's present 60-day state residency requirement will in effect be lowered to 30-days; its 30-day county residency requirement for intrastate migrants will be abolished; Idaho will have to permit voting by citizens of other States formerly domiciled in Idaho who emigrated too recently to register in their new homes; and it must permit absentee registration and voting by persons who have lived in Idaho for less than six months. The relevant provisions of the Act and of the constitutions and laws of the four States are set out in an Appendix to this opinion. </s> Each of the States contests the power of Congress to enact the provisions of the Act involved in its suit. 2 The Government places primary reliance on the power of Congress under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the provisions of that Amendment by appropriate [400 U.S. 112, 154] legislation. For reasons to follow, I am of the opinion that the Fourteenth Amendment was never intended to restrict the authority of the States to allocate their political power as they see fit and therefore that it does not authorize Congress to set voter qualifications, in either state or federal elections. I find no other source of congressional power to lower the voting age as fixed by state laws, or to alter state laws on residency, registration, and absentee voting, with respect to either state or federal elections. The suspension of Arizona's literacy requirement, however, can be deemed an appropriate means of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment, and I would sustain it on that basis. </s> I </s> It is fitting to begin with a quotation from one of the leading members of the 39th Congress, which proposed the Fourteenth Amendment to the States in 1866: </s> "Every Constitution embodies the principles of its framers. It is a transcript of their minds. If its meaning in any place is open to doubt, or if words are used which seem to have no fixed signification, we cannot err if we turn to the framers; and their authority increases in proportion to the evidence which they have left on the question." Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 677 (1866) (Sen. Sumner). </s> Believing this view to be undoubtedly sound, I turn to the circumstances in which the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted for enlightenment on the intended reach of its provisions. This, for me, necessary undertaking has unavoidably led to an opinion of more than ordinary length. Except for those who are willing to close their eyes to constitutional history in making constitutional interpretations or who read such history with a preconceived determination to attain a particular constitutional [400 U.S. 112, 155] goal, I think that the history of the Fourteenth Amendment makes it clear beyond any reasonable doubt that no part of the legislation now under review can be upheld as a legitimate exercise of congressional power under that Amendment. </s> A. Historical Setting 3 </s> The point of departure for considering the purpose and effect of the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to the suffrage should be, I thin, the pre-existing provisions of the Constitution. Article I, 2, provided that in determining the number of Representatives to which a State was entitled, only three-fifths of the slave population should be counted. 4 The section also provided that the qualifications of voters for such Representatives should be the same as those established by the States for electors of the most numerous branch of their respective legislatures. Article I, 4, provided that, subject to congressional veto, the States might prescribe the times, places, and manner of holding elections for Representatives. Article II, 1, provided that the States might direct the manner of choosing electors for President and Vice President, except that Congress might fix a uniform time for the choice. 5 Nothing in the original [400 U.S. 112, 156] Constitution controlled the way States might allocate their political power except for the guarantee of a Republican Form of Government, which appears in Art. IV, 4. 6 No relevant changes in the constitutional structure were made until after the Civil War. </s> At the close of that war, there were some four million freed slaves in the South, none of whom were permitted to vote. The white population of the Confederacy had been overwhelmingly sympathetic with the rebellion. Since there was only a comparative handful of persons in these States who were neither former slaves nor Confederate sympathizers, the place where the political power should be lodged was a most vexing question. In a series of proclamations in the summer of 1865, President Andrew Johnson had laid the groundwork for the States to be controlled by the white populations which had held power before the war, eliminating only the leading rebels and those unwilling to sign a loyalty oath. 7 The Radicals, on the other hand, were ardently in favor of Negro suffrage as essential to prevent resurgent rebellion, requisite to protect the freedmen, and necessary to ensure continued Radical control of the government. This ardor cooled as it ran into northern racial prejudice. At that time, only six States - Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New York - permitted Negroes to vote, and New York imposed special property and residency requirements on Negro voters. 8 In referenda late that year, enfranchising proposals [400 U.S. 112, 157] were roundly beaten in Connecticut, Wisconsin, Minnesota, the Territory of Colorado, and the District of Columbia. Gillette, supra, n. 3, at 25-26. Such popular rebuffs led the Radicals to pull in their horns and hope for a protracted process of reconstruction during which the North could be educated to the advisability of Negro suffrage, at least for the South. In the meantime, of course, it would be essential to bar southern representation in Congress lest a combination of southerners and Democrats obtain control of the government and frustrate Radical goals. </s> The problem of congressional representation was acute. With the freeing of the slaves, the Three-Fifths Compromise ceased to have any effect. While predictions of the precise effect of the change varied with the person doing the calculating, the consensus was that the South would be entitled to at least 15 new members of Congress, and, of course, a like number of new presidential electors. The Radicals had other rallying cries which they kept before the public in the summer of 1865, but one author gives this description of the mood as Congress convened: 9 </s> "Of all the movements influencing the Fourteenth Amendment which developed prior to the first session of the Thirty-ninth Congress, that for Negro suffrage was the most outstanding. The volume of private and public comment indicates that it was viewed as an issue of prime importance. The cry for a changed basis of representation was, in reality, subsidiary to this, and was meant by Radicals to secure in another way what Negro suffrage might accomplish for them: removal of the danger of Democratic dominance as a consequence of Southern restoration. The danger of possible repudiation of the national obligations, and assumption of the rebel [400 U.S. 112, 158] debt, was invariably presented to show the need for Negro suffrage or a new basis of representation. Sentiment for disqualification of ex-Confederates, though a natural growth, well suited such purposes. The movement to guarantee civil rights, sponsored originally by the more conservative Republicans, received emphasis from Radicals only when state elections indicated that suffrage would not serve as a party platform." </s> When Congress met, the Radicals, led by Thaddeus Stevens, were successful in obtaining agreement for a Joint Committee on Reconstruction, composed of 15 members, to "inquire into the condition of the States which formed the so-called confederate States of America, and report whether they, or any of them, are entitled to be represented in either House of Congress . . . ." Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 30, 46 (1865) (hereafter Globe). </s> All papers relating to representation of the Southern States were to be referred to the Committee of Fifteen without debate. The result, which many had not foreseen, was to assert congressional control over Reconstruction and at the same time to put the congressional power in the hands of a largely Radical secret committee. </s> The Joint Committee began work with the beginning of 1866, and in due course reported a joint resolution, H. R. 51, to amend the Constitution. The proposal would have based representation and direct taxes on population, with a proviso that </s> "whenever the elective franchise shall be denied or abridged in any State on account of race or color, all persons of such race or color shall be excluded from the basis of representation." Globe 351. </s> The result, if the Southern States did not provide for Negro suffrage, would be a decrease in southern representation [400 U.S. 112, 159] in Congress and the electoral college by some 24 seats from their pre-war position instead of an increase of 15. The House, although somewhat balky, approved the measure after lengthy debate. Globe 538. The Senate proved more intractable. An odd combination of Democrats, moderate Republicans, and extreme Radicals combined to defeat the measure, with the Radicals basing their opposition largely on the fear that the proviso would be read to authorize racial voter qualifications and thus prevent Congress from enfranchising the freedmen under powers assertedly granted by other clauses of the Constitution. See, e. g., Globe 673-687 (Sen. Sumner). </s> At about this same time the Civil Rights Bill and the Second Freedmen's Bureau Bill were being debated. Both bills provided a list of rights secured, not including voting. 10 Senator Trumbull, who reported the Civil Rights Bill on behalf of the Senate Judiciary Committee, stated: "I do not want to bring up the question of negro suffrage in the bill." Globe 606. His House counterpart exhibited the same reluctance. Globe 1162 (Cong. Wilson of Iowa). Despite considerable uncertainty as to the constitutionality of the measures, both ultimately passed. In the midst of the Senate debates on the basis of representation, President Johnson vetoed the Freedmen's Bureau Bill, primarily on constitutional grounds. This veto, which was narrowly sustained, was followed shortly by the President's bitter attack on Radical Reconstruction in his Washington's Birthday speech. These two actions, which were followed a month later by the veto of the Civil Rights Bill, removed any lingering hopes among the Radicals that Johnson would support them in a thoroughgoing plan of reconstruction. By the same token they increased the Radicals' need for an [400 U.S. 112, 160] articulated plan of their own to be put before the country in the upcoming elections as an alternative to the course the President was taking. </s> The second major product of the Reconstruction Committee, before the resolution which became the Fourteenth Amendment, was a proposal to add an equal rights provision to the Constitution. This measure, H. R. 63, which foreshadowed 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, read as follows: </s> "The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property." Globe 1034. </s> It was reported by Congressman Bingham of Ohio, who later opposed the Civil Rights Bill because he believed it unconstitutional. Globe 1292-1293. The amendment immediately ran into serious opposition in the House and the subject was dropped. 11 </s> Such was the background of the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress, at loggerheads with the President over Reconstruction, had not come up with a plan of its own after six months of deliberations; both friends and foes prodded it to develop an alternative. The Reconstruction Committee had been unable to produce anything which could even get through Congress, much less obtain the adherence of three-fourths of the States. The Radicals, committed to Negro suffrage, were confronted with widespread public opposition to that goal and the necessity for a reconstruction plan that could do service as a party platform in the elections that fall. The language [400 U.S. 112, 161] of the Fourteenth Amendment must be read with awareness that it was designed in response to this situation. </s> B. The Language of the Amendment and Reconstruction Measures </s> Sections 1 and 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment as originally reported read as follows: 12 </s> "SEC. 1. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. </s> "SEC. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But whenever, [400 U.S. 112, 162] in any State, the elective franchise shall be denied to any portion of its male citizens not less than twenty-one years of age, or in any way abridged except for participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of representation in such State shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens not less than twenty-one years of age." Globe 2286. </s> In the historical context, no one could have understood this language as anything other than an abandonment of the principle of Negro suffrage, for which the Radicals had been so eager. By the same token, the language could hardly have been understood as affecting the provisions of the Constitution placing voting qualifications in the hands of the States. Section 1 must have been seen as little more than a constitutionalization of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, concededly one of the primary goals of that portion of the Amendment. 13 </s> While these conclusions may, I think, be confidently asserted, it is not so easy to explain just how contemporary observers would have construed the three clauses of 1 to reach this result. 14 No doubt in the case of [400 U.S. 112, 163] many congressmen it simply never occurred to them that the States' longstanding plenary control over voter qualifications would be affected without explicit language to that effect. And since no speaker during the debates on the Fourteenth Amendment pursued the contention that 1 would be construed to include the franchise, those who took the opposite view rarely explained how they arrived at their conclusions. </s> In attempting to unravel what was seldom articulated, the appropriate starting point is the fact that the framers of the Amendment expected the most significant portion of 1 to be the clause prohibiting state laws "which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." These privileges were no doubt understood to include the ones set out in the first section of the Civil Rights Act. To be prohibited by law from enjoying these rights would hardly be consistent with full membership in a civil society. </s> The same is not necessarily true with respect to prohibitions on participation in the political process. Many members of Congress accepted the jurisprudence of the day, in which the rights of man fell into three categories: natural, civil, and political. The privileges of citizens, being "civil" rights, were distinct from the rights arising from governmental organization, which were political in character. 15 Others no doubt relied on [400 U.S. 112, 164] the experience under the similar language of Art. IV, 2, which had never been held to guarantee the right to vote. The remarks of Senator Howard of Michigan, who as spokesman for the Joint Committee explained in greater detail than most why the Amendment did not reach the suffrage, contain something of each view. See Globe 2766, quoted infra, at 187; nn. 56 and 57, infra; cf. Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 256 (1898) (dictum). </s> Since the Privileges and Immunities Clause was expected to be the primary source of substantive protection, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses were relegated to a secondary role, as the debates and other contemporary materials make clear. 16 Those clauses, which appear on their face to correspond with the latter portion of 1 of the Civil Rights Act, see n. 13, supra, and to be primarily concerned with person and property, would not have been expected to enfranchise the freedmen if the Privileges and Immunities Clause did not. </s> Other members of Congress no doubt saw 2 of the proposed Amendment as the Committee's resolution of the related problems of suffrage and representation. Since that section did not provide for enfranchisement, but simply reduced representation for disfranchisement, any doubts about the effect of the broad language of 1 were removed. Congressman Bingham, who was primarily responsible for the language of 1, [400 U.S. 112, 165] stated this view. Globe 2542, quoted infra, at 185. Finally, characterization of the Amendment by such figures as Stevens and Bingham in the House and Howard in the Senate, not contested by the Democrats except in passing remarks, was no doubt simply accepted by many members of Congress; they, repeating it, gave further force to the interpretation, with the result that, as will appear below, not one speaker in the debates on the Fourteenth Amendment unambiguously stated that it would affect state voter qualifications, and only three, all opponents of the measure, can fairly be characterized as raising the possibility. 17 Further evidence of this original understanding can be found in later events. </s> The 39th Congress, which proposed the Fourteenth Amendment, also enacted the first Reconstruction Act, c. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867). This Act required, as a condition precedent to readmission of the Southern States, that they adopt constitutions providing that the elective franchise should be enjoyed by all male citizens over the age of 21 who had been residents for more than one year and were not disfranchised for treason or common-law felony; even so, no State would be readmitted until a legislature elected under the new Constitution had ratified the proposed Fourteenth Amendment and that Amendment had become part of the Constitution. </s> The next development came when the ratification drive in the North stalled. After a year had passed during which only one Northern State had ratified the proposed Fourteenth Amendment, Arkansas was readmitted to the Union by the Act of June 22, 1868, 15 [400 U.S. 112, 166] Stat. 72. This readmission was based on the "fundamental condition" that the state constitution should not be amended to restrict the franchise, except with reference to residency requirements. Three days later the Act of June 25, 1868, 15 Stat. 73, held out a promise of similar treatment to North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida if they would ratify the Fourteenth Amendment. By happy coincidence, the assent of those six States was just sufficient to complete the ratification process. It can hardly be suggested, therefore, that the "fundamental condition" was exacted from them as a measure of caution lest the Fourteenth Amendment fail of ratification. </s> The 40th Congress, not content with enfranchisement in the South, proposed the Fifteenth Amendment to extend the suffrage to northern Negroes. See Gillette, supra, n. 3, at 46. This fact alone is evidence that they did not understand the Fourteenth Amendment to have accomplished such a result. Less well known is the fact that the 40th Congress considered and very nearly adopted a proposed amendment which would have expressly prohibited not only discriminatory voter qualifications but discriminatory qualifications for office as well. Each House passed such a measure by the required two-thirds margin. Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 3d Sess., 1318, 1428 (1869). A conference committee, composed of Senators Stewart and Conkling and Representatives Boutwell, Bingham, and Logan, struck out the officeholding provision, id., at 1563, 1593, and with Inauguration Day only a week away, both Houses accepted the conference report. Id., at 1564, 1641. See generally Gillette 58-77. While the reasons for these actions are unclear, it is unlikely that they were provoked by the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment covered the field; such a rationale seemingly would have made the enfranchising provision itself unnecessary. [400 U.S. 112, 167] </s> The 41st Congress readmitted the remaining three States of the Confederacy. The admitting act in each case recited good-faith ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and imposed the fundamental conditions that the States should not restrict the elective franchise 18 and "[t]hat it shall never be lawful for the said State to deprive any citizen of the United States, on account of his race, color, or previous condition of servitude, of the right to hold office under the constitution and laws of said State." Act of Jan. 26, 1870, c. 10, 16 Stat. 62, 63 (Virginia); Act of Feb. 23, 1870, c. 19, 16 Stat. 67, 68 (Mississippi); Act of Mar. 30, 1870, c. 39, 16 Stat. 80, 81 (Texas). </s> These materials demonstrate not only that 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is susceptible of an interpretation that it does not reach suffrage qualifications, but that this is the interpretation given by the immediately succeeding Congresses. Such an interpretation is the most reasonable reading of the section in view of the background against which it was proposed and adopted, particularly the doubts about the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act, the prejudice in the North against any recognition of the principle of Negro suffrage, and the basic constitutional structure of leaving suffrage qualifications with the States. 19 If any further clarification were [400 U.S. 112, 168] needed, one would have thought it provided by the second section of the same Amendment, which specifically contemplated that the right to vote would be denied or abridged by the States on racial or other grounds. As a unanimous Court once asked, "Why this, if it was not in the power of the [state] legislature to deny the right of suffrage to some male inhabitants?" Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 174 (1875). </s> The Government suggests that the list of protected qualifications in 2 is "no more than descriptive of voting laws as they then stood." Brief for the United States, Nos. 46, Orig., and 47, Orig., 75. This is wholly inaccurate. Aside from racial restrictions, all States had residency requirements and many had literacy, property, or taxation qualifications. On the other hand, several of the Western States permitted aliens to vote if they had satisfied certain residency requirements and had declared [400 U.S. 112, 169] their intention to become citizens. 20 It hardly seems necessary to observe that the politicians who framed the Fourteenth Amendment were familiar with the makeup of the electorate. In any event, the congressional debates contain such proof in ample measure. 21 </s> Assuming, then, that 2 represents a deliberate selection of the voting qualifications to be penalized, what is the point of it? The Government notes that "it was intended - although it has never been used - to provide a remedy against exclusion of the newly freed slaves from the vote." Brief for the Defendant, Nos. 43, Orig., and 44, Orig., 20. Undoubtedly this was the primary purpose. But the framers of the Amendment, with their attention thus focused on racial voting qualifications, could hardly have been unaware of 1. If they understood that section to forbid such qualifications, the simple means of penalizing this conduct would have been to impose a reduction of representation for voting discrimination in violation of 1. Their adoption instead of the awkward phrasing of 2 is therefore significant. </s> To be sure, one might argue that 2 is simply a rhetorical flourish, and that the qualifications listed there are merely the ones which the framers deemed to be consistent with the alleged prohibition of 1. This argument is not only unreasonable on its face and untenable in light of the historical record; it is fatal to the validity of the reduction of the voting age in 302 of the Act before us. </s> The only sensible explanation of 2, therefore, is that the racial voter qualifications it was designed to penalize [400 U.S. 112, 170] were understood to be permitted by 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Amendment was a halfway measure, adopted to deprive the South of representation until it should enfranchise the freedmen, but to have no practical effect in the North. It was politically acceptable precisely because of its regional consequences and its avoidance of an explicit recognition of the principle of Negro suffrage. As my Brother BLACK states: "[I]t cannot be successfully argued that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to strip the States of their power, carefully preserved in the original Constitution, to govern themselves." Ante, at 127. The detailed historical materials make this unmistakably clear. </s> C. The Joint Committee </s> The first place to look for the understanding of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment is the Journal of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction. 22 The exact sequence of the actions of this Committee presumably had little or no effect on the members of Congress who were not on the Committee, for the Committee attempted to keep its deliberations secret, 23 and the Journal itself was lost for nearly 20 years. 24 Nevertheless the Journal, although only a record of proposals and votes, illustrates the thoughts of those leading figures of Congress who were members and participated in the drafting of the Amendment. </s> Two features emerge from such a review with startling clarity. First, the Committee regularly rejected explicitly [400 U.S. 112, 171] enfranchising proposals in favor of plans which would postpone enfranchisement, leave it to congressional discretion, or abandon it altogether. Second, the abandonment of Negro suffrage as a goal exactly corresponded with the adoption of provisions to reduce representation for discriminatory restrictions on the ballot. </s> This correspondence was present from the start. Five plans were proposed to deal with representation. One would have prohibited racial qualifications for voters and based representation on the whole number of citizens in the State; the other four proposals contained no enfranchising provision but in various ways would have reduced representation for States where the vote was racially restricted. Kendrick 41-44. A subcommittee reduced the five proposals to two, one prohibiting discrimination and the other reducing representation where it was present. On Stevens' motion the latter alternative was accepted by a vote of 11 to 3, Kendrick 51; with minor changes it was subsequently reported as H. R. 51. </s> The subcommittee also proposed that whichever provision on the basis of representation was adopted, the Congress should be empowered to legislate to secure all citizens "the same political rights and privileges" and also "equal protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property." Kendrick 51. After the Committee reported H. R. 51, it turned to consideration of this proposal. At a meeting attended by only 10 members, a motion to strike out the clause authorizing Congress to legislate for equal political rights and privileges lost by a vote of six to four. Kendrick 57. At a subsequent meeting, however, Bingham had the subcommittee proposal replaced with another which did not mention political rights and privileges, but was otherwise quite similar. Kendrick 61; see the opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, and MR. JUSTICE [400 U.S. 112, 172] MARSHALL, post, at 258-259, for the text of the two provisions. The Committee reported the substitute as H. R. 63. In the House so much concern was expressed over the centralization of power the amendment would work - a few said it would even authorize Congress to regulate the suffrage - that the matter was dropped. Post, at 260. </s> The Fourteenth Amendment had as its most direct antecedent a proposal drafted by Robert Dale Owen, who was not a member of Congress, and presented to the Joint Committee by Stevens. 25 Originally the plan provided for mandatory enfranchisement in 1876 and for reduction of representation until that date. Kendrick 82-84. However, Stevens was pressured by various congressional delegations who wanted nothing to do with Negro suffrage, even at a remove of 10 years. 26 He therefore successfully moved to strike out the enfranchising provision and correspondingly to abolish the 10-year limitation on reduction of representation for racial discrimination. The motion carried by a vote of 12 to 2. Kendrick 101. </s> Bingham was then successful in replacing 1 of Owen's proposal, which read: </s> "No discrimination shall be made by any State, or by the United States, as to the civil rights of persons, because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude" </s> with the following now-familiar language: </s> "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive [400 U.S. 112, 173] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Kendrick 106. </s> The summary style of the Journal leaves unclear the reasons for the change. However, Bingham himself had rather consistently voted against proposals for direct and immediate enfranchisement, 27 and on the face of things it seems unlikely that the other members of the Joint Committee understood his provision to be an enfranchising proposal. 28 That they did not so understand is [400 U.S. 112, 174] demonstrated by the speeches in the debates on the floor. 29 </s> Before I examine those debates, a word of explanation is in order. For obvious reasons, the discussions of voter qualifications in the 39th Congress and among the public were cast primarily in terms of racial disqualifications. This does not detract from their utility as guides to interpretation. When an individual speaker said that the Amendment would not result in the enfranchisement of Negroes, he must have taken one of two views: either the Amendment did not reach voter qualifications at all; or it set standards limiting state restrictions on the ballot, but those standards did not prohibit racial discrimination. I have already set out some of the reasons which lead me to conclude that the former interpretation is correct, and that it is the understanding [400 U.S. 112, 175] shared by the framers of the Amendment, as well as by almost all of the opponents. The mere statement of the latter position appears to me to be a complete refutation of it. Even on its wholly unsupportable assumptions (1) that certain framers of the Amendment contemplated that the privileges and immunities of citizens included the vote, (2) that they intended to permit state laws to abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens whenever it was rational to do so, and (3) that they agreed on the rationality of prohibiting the freed slaves from voting, this remarkable theory still fails to explain why they understood the Amendment to permit racial voting qualifications in the free States of the North. </s> D. In Congress </s> On May 8, 1866, Thaddeus Stevens led off debate on H. R. 127, the Joint Resolution proposing the Fourteenth Amendment. After explaining the delay of the Joint Committee in coming up with a plan of reconstruction, he apologized for his proposal in advance: </s> "This proposition is not all that the committee desired. It falls far short of my wishes, but it fulfills my hopes. I believe it is all that can be obtained in the present state of public opinion. Not only Congress but the several States are to be consulted. Upon a careful survey of the whole ground, we did not believe that nineteen of the loyal States could be induced to ratify any proposition more stringent than this." Globe 2459. </s> In the climate of the times, Stevens could hardly have been understood as referring to anything other than the failure of the measure to make some provision for the enfranchisement of the freedmen. However, lest any mistake be made, he recounted the history of the Committee's prior effort in the field of representation and suffrage, [400 U.S. 112, 176] H. R. 51, which "would surely have secured the enfranchisement of every citizen at no distant period." That measure was dead, "slaughtered by a puerile and pedantic criticism," and "unless this (less efficient, I admit) shall pass, its death has postponed the protection of the colored race perhaps for ages." Ibid. </s> With this explanation made, Stevens turned to a section-by-section study of the proposed resolution. The results to be achieved by 1, as he saw it, would be equal punishment for crime, equal entitlement to the benefits of "[w]hatever law protects the white man," equal means of redress, and equal competence to testify. Ibid. If he thought the section provided equal access to the polls, despite his immediately preceding apology for the fact that it did not, his failure to mention that application is remarkable. 30 </s> Turning then to 2, Stevens again discussed racial qualification for voting. He explained the section as follows: </s> "If any State shall exclude any of her adult male citizens from the elective franchise, or abridge that right, she shall forfeit her right to representation in the same proportion. The effect of this provision will be either to compel the States to grant universal suffrage or so to shear them of their power as to keep them forever in a hopeless minority in the national Government, both legislative and executive." Ibid. </s> Stevens recognized that it might take several years for the coercive effect of the Amendment to result in Negro suffrage, but since this would give time for education and enlightenment of the freedmen, "That short delay would [400 U.S. 112, 177] not be injurious." Ibid. He did not indicate that he believed it would be unconstitutional. He admitted that 2 was not so good as the proposal which had been defeated in the Senate, for that, by reducing representation by all the members of a race if any one was discriminated against, would have hastened full enfranchisement. Section 2 allowed proportional credit. "But it is a short step forward. The large stride which we in vain proposed is dead . . . ." Globe 2460. </s> I have dealt at length with Stevens' remarks because of his prominent position in the House and in the Joint Committee. The remaining remarks, except for Bingham's summation, can be treated in more summary fashion. Of the supporters of the Amendment, Garfield of Ohio, 31 Kelley of Pennsylvania, 32 Boutwell of Massachusetts (a member of the Joint Committee), 33 </s> [400 U.S. 112, 178] Eliot of Massachusetts, 34 Beaman of Michigan, 35 and Farnsworth of Illinois, 36 expressed their regret that the Amendment did not prohibit restrictions on the franchise. As the quotations set out in the margin indicate, the absence of such a prohibition was generally attributed to prejudice in the Congress, in the States, or both, to such an extent that an enfranchising amendment could not pass. This corresponds with the first part of Stevens' introductory speech. [400 U.S. 112, 179] </s> Other supporters of the Amendment obviously based their remarks on their understanding that it did not affect state laws imposing discriminatory voting qualifications, but did not indicate that the omission was a drawback in their view. In this group were Thayer of Pennsylvania, 37 Broomall of Pennsylvania, 38 Raymond of New York, 39 McKee of Kentucky, 40 Miller of Pennsylvania, 41 </s> [400 U.S. 112, 180] Banks of Massachusetts, 42 and Eckley of Ohio. 43 </s> The remaining members of the House who supported the Fourteenth Amendment either did not speak at all or did not address themselves to the suffrage issue in any very clear terms. Those in the latter group who gave speeches on the proposed Amendment included [400 U.S. 112, 181] Spalding of Ohio, 44 Longyear of Michigan, 45 and Shellabarger of Ohio. 46 The remaining Republican members of the Joint Committee - Washburne of Illinois, Morrill of Vermont, Conkling of New York, and Blow of Missouri - did not participate in the debates over the Amendment. </s> In the opposition to the Amendment were only the handful of Democrats. Even they, with one seeming exception, did not assert that the Amendment was applicable to suffrage, although they would have been expected to do so if they thought such a reading plausible. Finck of Ohio and Shanklin of Kentucky did not even [400 U.S. 112, 182] mention Negro suffrage in their attacks on the Amendment, although Finck discussed the reasons why the Southern States could not be expected to ratify it, Globe 2460-2462, and Shanklin characterized the Amendment as "tyrannical and oppressive." Globe 2501. Eldridge of Wisconsin 47 and Randall of Pennsylvania 48 affirmatively indicated their understanding that with the Amendment the Radicals had at least temporarily abandoned their crusade for Negro suffrage, as did Finck when the measure returned from the Senate with amendments. 49 </s> The other two Democrats to participate in the three days of debate on H. R. 127, Boyer of Pennsylvania and Rogers of New Jersey, have been a source of great comfort to those who set out to prove that the history of the Fourteenth Amendment is inconclusive on this issue. Each, in the course of a lengthy speech, included a sentence which, taken out of context, can be read to indicate a fear that 1 might prohibit racial restrictions on the ballot. Boyer said, "The first section embodies the principles of the civil rights bill, and is intended to secure ultimately, and to some extent indirectly, [400 U.S. 112, 183] the political equality of the negro race." Globe 2467. Rogers, commenting on the uncertain scope of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, observed: "The right to vote is a privilege." Globe 2538. </s> While these two statements are perhaps innocuous enough to be left alone, it is noteworthy that each speaker had earlier in the session delivered a tirade against the principle of Negro suffrage; 50 if either seriously believed that the Fourteenth Amendment might enfranchise the freedmen, he was unusually calm about the fact. That they did not seriously interpret the Amendment in this way is indicated as well by other portions of their speeches. 51 </s> [400 U.S. 112, 184] </s> Two other opponents of the Fourteenth Amendment, Phelps of Maryland and Niblack of Indiana, made statements which have been adduced to show that there was no consensus on the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to suffrage laws. Phelps voiced his sentiments on May 5, three days before the beginning of debate. 52 In the course of a speech urging a soft policy on reconstruction, he expressed the fear that the Amendment would authorize Congress to define the privileges of citizens to include the suffrage - or indeed that it might have that effect proprio vigore. Globe 2398. Phelps did not repeat this sentiment after he was contradicted by speaker after speaker during the debates proper; indeed, he did not take part in the debates at all, but simply voted against the Amendment, along with most of his Democratic colleagues. Globe 2545. 53 </s> As for Niblack, on the first day of debate he made the following remarks: </s> "I give notice that I will offer the following amendment if I shall have the opportunity: [400 U.S. 112, 185] </s> "`Add to the fifth section as follows: </s> "`Provided, That nothing contained in this article shall be so construed as to authorize Congress to regulate or control the elective franchise within any State, or to abridge or restrict the power of any State to regulate or control the same within its own jurisdiction, except as in the third section hereof prescribed.'" Globe 2465. </s> Like Phelps, Niblack found it unnecessary to participate in the debates. He was not heard from again until the vote on the call for the previous question. As Garfield ascertained at the time, the only opportunity to amend H. R. 127 would arise if the demand was voted down. Niblack voted to sustain it. Globe 2545. </s> Debate in the House was substantially concluded by Bingham, the man primarily responsible for the language of 1. Without equivocation, he stated: </s> "The amendment does not give, as the second section shows, the power to Congress of regulating suffrage in the several States. </s> "The second section excludes the conclusion that by the first section suffrage is subjected to congressional law; save, indeed, with this exception, that as the right in the people of each State to a republican government and to choose their Representatives in Congress is of the guarantees of the Constitution, by this amendment a remedy might be given directly for a case supposed by Madison, where treason might change a State government from a republican to a despotic government, and thereby deny suffrage to the people." Globe 2542. </s> Stevens then arose briefly in rebuttal. He attacked Bingham for saying in another portion of his speech that the disqualification provisions of 3 were unenforceable. He did not contradict - or even refer to - Bingham's [400 U.S. 112, 186] interpretation of 1 and 2. Globe 2544. The vote was taken and the resolution passed immediately thereafter. Globe 2545. </s> To say that Stevens did not contradict Bingham is to minimize the force of the record. Not once, during the three days of debate, did any supporter of the Amendment criticize or correct any of the Republicans or Democrats who observed that the Amendment left the ballot "exclusively under the control of the States." Globe 2542 (Bingham). This fact is tacitly admitted even by those who find the debates "inconclusive." The only contrary authority they can find in the debates is the pale remarks of the four Democrats already discussed. 54 </s> In the Senate, which did not have a gag rule, matters proceeded at a more leisurely pace. The introductory speech would normally have been given by Senator Fessenden of Maine, the Chairman of the Joint Committee on behalf of the Senate, but he was still weak with illness and unable to deliver a lengthy speech. The duty of presenting the views of the Joint Committee therefore devolved on Senator Howard of Michigan. 55 </s> [400 U.S. 112, 187] </s> Howard minced no words. He stated that </s> "the first section of the proposed amendment does not give to either of these classes the right of voting. The right of suffrage is not, in law, one of the privileges or immunities thus secured by the Constitution. It is merely the creature of law. It has always been regarded in this country as the result of positive local law, not regarded as one of those fundamental rights lying at the basis of all society and without which a people cannot exist except as slaves, subject to a depotism [sic]. Globe 2766. </s> "The second section leaves the right to regulate the elective franchise still with the States, and does not meddle with that right." Ibid. Howard stated that while he personally would have preferred to see the freedmen enfranchised, the Committee was confronted with the necessity of proposing an amendment which could be ratified. </s> "The committee were of opinion that the States are not yet prepared to sanction so fundamental a change as would be the concession of the right of suffrage to the colored race. We may as well state it plainly and fairly, so that there shall be no misunderstanding on the subject. It was our opinion that three fourths of the States of this Union could not be induced to vote to grant the right of suffrage, even in any degree or under any restriction, to the colored race." Ibid. </s> Howard's forthright attempt to prevent misunderstanding was completely successful insofar as the Senate was concerned; at least, no one has yet discovered a remark during the Senate debates on the proposed Fourteenth Amendment which indicates any contrary impression. 56 </s> [400 U.S. 112, 188] For some, however, time has muddied the clarity with which he spoke. 57 </s> The Senate, like the House, made frequent reference to the fact that the proposed amendment would not result in the enfranchisement of the freedmen. The supporters [400 U.S. 112, 189] who expressed their regret at the fact were Wade of Ohio, 58 Poland of Vermont, 59 Stewart of Nevada, 60 Howe of Wisconsin, 61 Henderson of Missouri, 62 </s> [400 U.S. 112, 190] and Yates of Illinois. 63 The remarks of Senator Sherman of Ohio, whose support for the amendment was lukewarm, see Globe 2986, seem to have been based on the common interpretation. 64 </s> Doolittle of Wisconsin, whose support for the President resulted in his virtually being read out of the Republican Party, proposed to base representation on adult male voters. Globe 2942. In a discussion with Senator Grimes of Iowa, a member of the Joint Committee, about the desirability of this change, Doolittle defended himself by pointing out that: "Your amendment proposes to [400 U.S. 112, 191] allow the States to say who shall vote." Globe 2943. Grimes did not respond. Among the Democrats, no different view was expressed. Those whose remarks are informative are Hendricks of Indiana, 65 Cowan of Pennsylvania, 66 Davis of Kentucky, 67 and Johnson of Maryland. 68 </s> Senator Howard, who had opened debate, made the last remarks in favor of the Amendment. He said: </s> "We know very well that the States retain the power, which they have always possessed, of regulating the right of suffrage in the States. It is the theory of the Constitution itself. That right has never been taken from them; no endeavor has ever been made to take it from them; and the theory of this whole amendment is, to leave the power of regulating the suffrage with the people or Legislatures of the States, and not to assume to regulate [400 U.S. 112, 192] it by any clause of the Constitution of the United States." Globe 3039. </s> Shortly thereafter the Amendment was approved. Globe 3041-3042. </s> In the House, there was a brief discussion of the Senate amendments and the measure generally, chiefly by the Democrats. Stevens then concluded the debate as he had begun it, expressing his regret that the Amendment would not enfranchise the freedmen. 69 The House accepted the Senate changes and sent the measure to the States. Globe 3149. </s> E. Collateral Evidence of Congressional Intent </s> It has been suggested that despite this evidence of congressional understanding, which seems to me overwhelming, the history is nonetheless inconclusive. Primary reliance is placed on debates over H. R. 51, the Joint Committee's first effort in the field of the basis of representation. In these debates, some of the more extreme Radicals, typified by Senator Sumner of Massachusetts, suggested that Congress had power to interfere with state voter qualifications at least to the extent of enfranchising the freedmen. This power was said to exist in a variety of constitutional provisions, including Art. I, 2, Art. I, 4, the war power, the power over territories, the guarantee of a republican form of government, and 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment. Those who held this view expressed concern lest the Committee's proposal be read to authorize the States to discriminate on racial grounds and stated that they could not vote for the measure if such was the correct construction. They were sometimes comforted by supporters [400 U.S. 112, 193] of the committee proposal, who assured them that there would be no such effect. From these statements, and the fact that some of those who took the extreme view ultimately did vote for the proposed Fourteenth Amendment, it is sought to construct a counter-argument: if H. R. 51, properly interpreted, would not have precluded congressional exercise of power otherwise existing under the constitutional provisions referred to, then 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, properly interpreted, does not preclude the exercise of congressional power under 1 and 5 of that Amendment. </s> This argument, however, is even logically fallacious, and quite understandably none of the opinions filed today place much reliance on it. I do not maintain that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment took away with one hand what they had given with the other, but simply that the Amendment must be construed as a whole, and that for the reasons already given, supra, at 167-170, the inclusion of 2 demonstrates that the framers never intended to confer the power which my Brethren seek to find in 1 and 5. Bingham, for one, distinguished between these two positions. When it was suggested in the debates over H. R. 51 that the proviso would remove pre-existing congressional power over voting qualifications, Bingham made the response quoted by my colleagues. Globe 431-432; see post, at 276-277. When it was observed during the debates over the proposed Fourteenth Amendment that 2 demonstrated that the Amendment did not reach state control over voting qualifications, Bingham was the one making the observation. Globe 2542, quoted supra, at 185. As Bingham seems to have recognized, the sort of argument he made in connection with H. R. 51 is beside the point with respect to the Fourteenth Amendment. </s> In any event, even disregarding its analytical difficulties, the argument is based on blatant factual shortcomings. All but one of the speakers on whose statements [400 U.S. 112, 194] primary reliance is placed stated, either during the debates on the Fourteenth Amendment or subsequently, that the Amendment did not enfranchise the freedmen. 70 </s> Finally, some of those determined to sustain the legislation now before us rely on speeches made between two and three years after Congress had sent the proposed Amendment to the States. Boutwell and Stevens in the House, and Sumner in the Senate, argued that the Fifteenth [400 U.S. 112, 195] Amendment or enfranchising legislation was unnecessary because the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited racial discrimination in voter qualifications. Each had earlier expressed the opposite position. 71 Their subsequent attempts to achieve by assertion what they had not had the votes to achieve by constitutional processes can hardly be entitled to weight. </s> F. Ratification </s> State materials relating to the ratification process are not very revealing. For the most part only gubernatorial messages and committee reports have survived. 72 So far as my examination of these materials reveals, while the opponents of the Amendment were divided [400 U.S. 112, 196] and sometimes equivocal on whether it might be construed to require enfranchisement, 73 the supporters of the Amendment in the States approached the congressional proponents in the unanimity of their interpretation. I have discovered only one brief passage in support of the Amendment which appears to be based on the assumption that it would result in enfranchisement. 74 These remarks, in the message of the Governor of Illinois, had to compete in the minds of the legislators with the viewpoint of the Chicago Tribune. This Radical journal repeatedly criticized the Amendment's lack of an enfranchising provision, and at one time it even expressed the hope that the South would refuse to ratify the Amendment so that the North would turn to enfranchisement of the freedmen as the only means of reconstruction. June 25, 1866, quoted in James 177. In all the other States I have examined, where the materials are sufficiently full for the understanding of a supporter of the Amendment to appear, his understanding [400 U.S. 112, 197] has been that enfranchisement would not result. 75 </s> The scanty official materials can be supplemented by other sources. There was a congressional election in the fall of the year the Fourteenth Amendment went to the States. The Radicals ran on the Amendment as their reconstruction program, attempting to force voters to choose between their plan and that of President Johnson. From the campaign speeches and from newspaper reactions, we can get some further idea of the understanding of the States. </s> The tone of the campaign was set by the formal report of the Joint Committee, which Fessenden openly stated he had composed as a partisan document. James 147. Indeed, it was not even submitted to Congress until the day the Senate approved the measure, and then only in manuscript form. Globe 3038. On the delicate issue of Negro suffrage, the report read as follows: 76 </s> "Doubts were entertained whether Congress had power, even under the amended Constitution, to prescribe the qualifications of voters in a State, or could act directly on the subject. It was doubtful, in the opinion of your committee, whether the States would consent to surrender a power they had always exercised, and to which they were attached. As the best if not the only method of surmounting the difficulty, and as eminently just and proper in itself, your committee came to the conclusion that political power should be possessed in all the States exactly in proportion as the right of suffrage should be granted, without distinction of color or race. [400 U.S. 112, 198] This it was thought would leave the whole question with the people of each State, holding out to all the advantage of increased political power as an inducement to allow all to participate in its exercise. Such a provision would be in its nature gentle and persuasive, and would lead, it was hoped, at no distant day, to an equal participation of all, without distinction, in all the rights and privileges of citizenship, thus affording a full and adequate protection to all classes of citizens, since all would have, through the ballot-box, the power of self-protection. </s> "Holding these views, your committee prepared an amendment to the Constitution to carry out this idea, and submitted the same to Congress. Unfortunately, as we think, it did not receive the necessary constitutional support in the Senate, and therefore could not be proposed for adoption by the States. The principle involved in that amendment is, however, believed to be sound, and your committee have again proposed it in another form, hoping that it may receive the approbation of Congress." </s> Newspapers expressed the same view of the reach of the Amendment. Even while deliberations were underway, predictions that Congress would come up with a plan involving enfranchisement of the freedmen had gradually ceased. James 91. When the Amendment was released to the press, Andrew Johnson was reported as seeing in it a "practical abandonment of the negro suffrage issue." Cincinnati Daily Commercial, April 30, 1866, quoted in James 117. The New York Herald had reported editorially that the Amendment reflected an abandonment of the Radical push for Negro suffrage and acceptance of Johnson's position that control over suffrage rested exclusively with the States. May 1, 1866, reported in James 119. The Nation, a Radical organ, [400 U.S. 112, 199] attributed the absence of any provision on Negro suffrage to "sheer want of confidence in the public." 2 Nation 545 (May 1, 1866), quoted in James 120. The Chicago Tribune, another Radical organ, complained that 1 was objectionable as "surplusage," May 5, 1866, quoted in James 123, and later in the same month criticized the measure for "postponing, and not settling" the matter of equal political rights for Negroes. May 31, 1866, quoted in James 146. As deliberations continued, the reporting went on in the same vein. The New York Times reported that with elections approaching, "No one now talks or dreams of forcing Negro suffrage upon the Southern States." June 6, 1866. The Cincinnati Daily Commercial and the Boston Daily Journal for June 7, 1866, commented on the Radicals' abandonment of Negro suffrage. James 145. </s> Much the same picture emerges from the campaign speeches. Although an occasional Democrat expressed the fear that the Amendment would or might result in political equality, 77 the supporters of the Amendment denied such effects without exception that I have discovered. Among the leading congressional figures who stated in campaign speeches that the Amendment did not prohibit racial voting qualifications were Senators Howe, Lane, Sherman, Sumner, and Trumbull, and Congressmen Bingham, Delano, Schenck, and Stevens. See James 159-168, 173, 178; Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5, 70-78 (1949). </s> As was pointed out above, all but a handful of Northern States prohibited blacks from voting at all, [400 U.S. 112, 200] and opposition to a change was intense. Between 1865 and 1869 referenda on the issue rejected impartial Negro suffrage in Colorado Territory, Connecticut, Wisconsin, Minnesota (twice), the District of Columbia, Nebraska Territory, Kansas, Ohio, Michigan, Missouri, and New York. Only Iowa and Minnesota accepted it, and that on the day Grant was elected to the Presidency. 78 It is inconceivable that those States, in that climate, could have ratified the Amendment with the expectation that it would require them to permit their black citizens to vote. </s> Small wonder, then, that in early 1869 substantially the same group of men who three years earlier had proposed the Fourteenth Amendment felt it necessary to make further modifications in the Constitution if state suffrage laws were to be controlled even to the minimal degree of prohibiting qualifications which on their face discriminated on the basis of race. If the consequences for our federal system were not so serious, the contention that the history is "inconclusive" would be undeserving of attention. And, with all respect, the transparent failure of attempts to cast doubt on the original understanding is simply further evidence of the force of the historical record. </s> II </s> The history of the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to suffrage qualifications is remarkably free of the problems which bedevil most attempts to find a reliable guide to present decision in the pages of the past. Instead, there is virtually unanimous agreement, clearly and repeatedly expressed, that 1 of the Amendment did not reach discriminatory voter qualifications. In this rather remarkable situation, the issue of the bearing of the historical understanding on constitutional interpretation squarely arises. [400 U.S. 112, 201] </s> I must confess to complete astonishment at the position of some of my Brethren that the history of the Fourteenth Amendment has become irrelevant. Ante, at 139-140. In the six years since I first set out much of this history, 79 I have seen no justification for such a result which appears to me at all adequate. With matters in this posture, I need do no more by way of justifying my reliance on these materials than sketch the familiar outlines of our constitutional system. </s> When the Constitution with its original Amendments came into being, the States delegated some of their sovereign powers to the Federal Government, surrendered other powers, and expressly retained all powers not delegated or surrendered. Amdt. X. The power to set state voting qualifications was neither surrendered nor delegated, except to the extent that the guarantee of a republican form of government 80 may be thought to require a certain minimum distribution of political power. The power to set qualifications for voters for national office, created by the Constitution, was expressly committed to the States by Art. I, 2, and Art. II, 1. 81 By Art. V, States may be deprived of their retained powers only with the concurrence of two-thirds of each House of Congress and three-fourths of the States. No one asserts that the power to set voting qualifications was taken from the States or subjected to federal control by any Amendment before the Fourteenth. The historical evidence makes it plain that the Congress and the States proposing and ratifying that Amendment affirmatively understood that they were not limiting state power over voting qualifications. The [400 U.S. 112, 202] existence of the power therefore survived the amending process, and, except as it has been limited by the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-fourth Amendments, it still exists today. 82 Indeed, the very fact that constitutional amendments were deemed necessary to bring about federal abolition of state restrictions on voting by reason of race (Amdt. XV), sex (Amdt. XIX), and, even with respect to federal elections, the failure to pay state poll taxes (Amdt. XXIV), is itself forceful evidence of the common understanding in 1869, 1919, and 1962, respectively, that the Fourteenth Amendment did not empower Congress to legislate in these respects. </s> It must be recognized, of course, that the amending process is not the only way in which constitutional understanding alters with time. The judiciary has long been entrusted with the task of applying the Constitution in changing circumstances, and as conditions change the Constitution in a sense changes as well. But when the Court gives the language of the Constitution an [400 U.S. 112, 203] unforeseen application, it does so, whether explicitly or implicitly, in the name of some underlying purpose of the Framers. 83 This is necessarily so; the federal judiciary, which by express constitutional provision is appointed for life, and therefore cannot be held responsible by the electorate, has no inherent general authority to establish the norms for the rest of society. It is limited to elaboration and application of the precepts ordained in the Constitution by the political representatives of the people. When the Court disregards the express intent and understanding of the Framers, it has invaded the realm of the political process to which the amending power was committed, and it has violated the constitutional structure which it is its highest duty to protect. 84 </s> [400 U.S. 112, 204] </s> As the Court is not justified in substituting its own views of wise policy for the commands of the Constitution, still less is it justified in allowing Congress to disregard those commands as the Court understands them. Although Congress' expression of the view that it does have power to alter state suffrage qualifications is entitled to the most respectful consideration by the judiciary, coming as it does from a coordinate branch of government, 85 this cannot displace the duty of this Court to make an independent determination whether Congress has exceeded its powers. The reason for this goes beyond Marshall's assertion that: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). 86 It inheres in the structure of the [400 U.S. 112, 205] constitutional system itself. Congress is subject to none of the institutional restraints imposed on judicial decisionmaking; it is controlled only by the political process. In Article V, the Framers expressed the view that the political restraints on Congress alone were an insufficient control over the process of constitution making. The concurrence of two-thirds of each House and of three-fourths of the States was needed for the political check to be adequate. To allow a simple majority of Congress to have final say on matters of constitutional interpretation is therefore fundamentally out of keeping with the constitutional structure. Nor is that structure adequately protected by a requirement that the judiciary be able to perceive a basis for the congressional interpretation, the only restriction laid down in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). </s> It is suggested that the proper basis for the doctrine enunciated in Morgan lies in the relative factfinding competence of Court, Congress, and state legislatures. Post, at 246-249. In this view, as I understand it, since Congress is at least as well qualified as a state legislature to determine factual issues, and far better qualified than this Court, where a dispute is basically factual in nature the congressional finding of fact should control, subject only to review by this Court for reasonableness. </s> In the first place, this argument has little or no force as applied to the issue whether the Fourteenth Amendment covers voter qualifications. Indeed, I do not understand the adherents of Morgan to maintain the contrary. [400 U.S. 112, 206] But even on the assumption that the Fourteenth Amendment does place a limit on the sorts of voter qualifications which a State may adopt, I still do not see any real force in the reasoning. </s> When my Brothers refer to "complex factual questions," post, at 248, they call to mind disputes about primary, objective facts dealing with such issues as the number of persons between the ages of 18 and 21, the extent of their education, and so forth. The briefs of the four States in these cases take no issue with respect to any of the facts of this nature presented to Congress and relied on by my Brothers DOUGLAS, ante, at 141-143, and BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, post, at 243-246, 279-280. Except for one or two matters of dubious relevance, these facts are not subject to rational dispute. The disagreement in these cases revolves around the evaluation of this largely uncontested factual material. 87 On the assumption that maturity and experience are relevant to intelligent and responsible exercise of the elective franchise, are the immaturity and inexperience of the average 18-, 19-, or 20-year-old sufficiently serious to justify denying such a person a direct voice in decisions affecting his or her life? Whether or not this judgment is characterized as "factual," it calls for striking a balance between incommensurate interests. Where the balance is to be struck depends ultimately on the values and the perspective of the decisionmaker. It is a matter as to which men of good will can and do reasonably differ. </s> I fully agree that judgments of the sort involved here are beyond the institutional competence and constitutional [400 U.S. 112, 207] authority of the judiciary. See, e. g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266 -330 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. 621, 634 -641 (1969) (STEWART, J., dissenting). They are pre-eminently matters for legislative discretion, with judicial review, if it exists at all, narrowly limited. But the same reasons which in my view would require the judiciary to sustain a reasonable state resolution of the issue also require Congress to abstain from entering the picture. </s> Judicial deference is based, not on relative factfinding competence, but on due regard for the decision of the body constitutionally appointed to decide. Establishment of voting qualifications is a matter for state legislatures. Assuming any authority at all, only when the Court can say with some confidence that the legislature has demonstrably erred in adjusting the competing interests is it justified in striking down the legislative judgment. This order of things is more efficient and more congenial to our system and, in my judgment, much more likely to achieve satisfactory results than one in which the Court has a free hand to replace state legislative judgments with its own. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). </s> The same considerations apply, and with almost equal force, to Congress' displacement of state decisions with its own ideas of wise policy. The sole distinction between Congress and the Court in this regard is that Congress, being an elective body, presumptively has popular authority for the value judgment it makes. But since the state legislature has a like authority, this distinction between Congress and the judiciary falls short of justifying a congressional veto on the state judgment. The perspectives and values of national legislators on the issue of voting qualifications are likely to differ from those of state legislators, but I see no reason [400 U.S. 112, 208] a priori to prefer those of the national figures, whose collective decision, applying nationwide, is necessarily less able to take account of peculiar local conditions. Whether one agrees with this judgment or not, it is the one expressed by the Framers in leaving voter qualifications to the States. The Supremacy Clause does not, as my colleagues seem to argue, represent a judgment that federal decisions are superior to those of the States whenever the two may differ. </s> To be sure, my colleagues do not expressly say that Congress or this Court is empowered by the Constitution to substitute its own judgment for those of the States. However, before sustaining a state judgment they require a "clear showing that the burden imposed is necessary to protect a compelling and substantial governmental interest." 88 Post, at 238; see post, at 247 n. 30. I should think that if the state interest were truly "compelling" and "substantial," and a clear showing could be made that the voter qualification was "necessary" to its preservation, no reasonable person would think the qualification undesirable. Equivalently, if my colleagues or a majority of Congress deem a given voting qualification undesirable as a matter of policy, they must consider that the state interests involved are not "compelling" or "substantial" or that they can be adequately protected in other ways. It follows that my colleagues must be prepared to hold invalid as a matter [400 U.S. 112, 209] of federal constitutional law all state voting qualifications which they deem unwise, as well as all such qualifications which Congress reasonably deems unwise. For this reason, I find their argument subject to the same objection as if it explicitly acknowledged such a conclusion. </s> It seems to me that the notion of deference to congressional interpretation of the Constitution, which the Court promulgated in Morgan, is directly related to this higher standard of constitutionality which the Court intimated in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), and brought to fruition in Kramer. When the scope of federal review of state determinations became so broad as to be judicially unmanageable, it was natural for the Court to seek assistance from the national legislature. If the federal role were restricted to its traditional and appropriate scope, review for the sort of "plain error" which is variously described as "arbitrary and capricious," "irrational," or "invidious," there would be no call for the Court to defer to a congressional judgment on this score that it did not find convincing. Whether a state judgment has so exceeded the bounds of reason as to authorize federal intervention is not a matter as to which the political process is intrinsically likely to produce a sounder or more acceptable result. It is a matter of the delicate adjustment of the federal system. In this area, to rely on Congress would make that body a judge in its own cause. The role of final arbiter belongs to this Court. </s> III </s> Since I cannot agree that the Fourteenth Amendment empowered Congress, or the federal judiciary, to control voter qualifications. I turn to other asserted sources of congressional power. My Brother BLACK would find that such power exists with respect to federal elections by [400 U.S. 112, 210] virtue of Art. I, 4, and seemingly other considerations that he finds implicit in federal authority. </s> The constitutional provisions controlling the regulation of congressional elections are the following: </s> Art. I, 2: "the Electors [for Representatives] in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature." </s> Art. I, 4: "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators." </s> Amdt. XVII: "The electors [for Senators] in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures." </s> It is difficult to see how words could be clearer in stating what Congress can control and what it cannot control. Surely nothing in these provisions lends itself to the view that voting qualifications in federal elections are to be set by Congress. The reason for the scheme is not hard to find. In the Constitutional Convention, Madison expressed the view that: "The qualifications of electors and elected were fundamental articles in a Republican Govt. and ought to be fixed by the Constitution. If the Legislature could regulate those of either, it can by degrees subvert the Constitution." 2 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 249-250 (1911). He explained further in The Federalist No. 52, p. 326 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961): </s> "To have reduced the different qualifications in the different States to one uniform rule would probably have been as dissatisfactory to some of the [400 U.S. 112, 211] States as it would have been difficult to the convention. The provision made by the convention appears, therefore, to be the best that lay within their option. It must be satisfactory to every State, because it is conformable to the standard already established, or which may be established, by the State itself. It will be safe to the United States because, being fixed by the State constitutions, it is not alterable by the State governments, and it cannot be feared that the people of the States will alter this part of their constitutions in such a manner as to abridge the rights secured to them by the federal Constitution." </s> See also Federalist No. 60, p. 371 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (Hamilton), quoted in the opinion of MR. JUSTICE STEWART, post, at 290, which is to the same effect. </s> As to presidential elections, the Constitution provides: </s> "Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors . . . ." Art. II, 1, cl. 2. </s> "The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States." Art. II, 1, cl. 4. </s> Even the power to control the "Manner" of holding elections, given with respect to congressional elections by Art. I, 4, is absent with respect to the selection of presidential electors. 89 And, of course, the fact that it was deemed necessary to provide separately for congressional [400 U.S. 112, 212] power to regulate the time of choosing presidential electors and the President himself demonstrates that the power over "Times, Places and Manner" given by Art. I, 4, does not refer to presidential elections, but only to the elections for Congressmen. Any shadow of a justification for congressional power with respect to congressional elections therefore disappears utterly in presidential elections. </s> IV </s> With these major contentions resolved, it is convenient to consider the three sections of the Act individually to determine whether they can be supported by any other basis of congressional power. </s> A. Voting Age </s> The only constitutional basis advanced in support of the lowering of the voting age is the power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, a power found in 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. For the reasons already given, it cannot be said that the statutory provision is valid as declaratory of the meaning of that clause. Its validity therefore must rest on congressional power to lower the voting age as a means of preventing invidious discrimination that is within the purview of that clause. </s> The history of the Fourteenth Amendment may well foreclose the possibility that 5 empowers Congress to enfranchise a class of citizens so that they may protect themselves against discrimination forbidden by the first section, but it is unnecessary for me to explore that question. For I think it fair to say that the suggestion that members of the age group between 18 and 21 are threatened with unconstitutional discrimination, or that any hypothetical discrimination is likely to be affected by lowering the voting age, is little short of fanciful. I see no justification for stretching to find any such possibility [400 U.S. 112, 213] when all the evidence indicates that Congress - led on by recent decisions of this Court - thought simply that 18-year-olds were fairly entitled to the vote and that Congress could give it to them by legislation. 90 </s> I therefore conclude, for these and other reasons given in this opinion, that in 302 of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 Congress exceeded its delegated powers. </s> B. Residency </s> For reasons already stated, neither the power to regulate voting qualifications in presidential elections, asserted by my Brother BLACK, nor the power to declare the meaning of 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, relied on by my Brother DOUGLAS, can support 202 of the Act. It would also be frivolous to contend that requiring States to allow new arrivals to vote in presidential elections is an appropriate means of preventing local discrimination against them in other respects, or of forestalling violations of the Fifteenth Amendment. The remaining grounds relied on are the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, 2, 91 and the right to travel across state lines. </s> While the right of qualified electors to cast their ballots and to have their votes counted was held to be a privilege of citizenship in Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884), and United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), these decisions were careful to observe that it [400 U.S. 112, 214] remained with the States to determine the class of qualified voters. It was federal law, acting on this state-defined class, which turned the right to vote into a privilege of national citizenship. As the Court has consistently held, the Privileges and Immunities Clauses do not react on the mere status of citizenship to enfranchise any citizen whom an otherwise valid state law does not allow to vote. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 170-175 (1875); Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632 (1904); Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937); cf. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 6 -7 (1944). Minors, felons, insane persons, and persons who have not satisfied residency requirements are among those citizens who are not allowed to vote in most States. 92 The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV of the Constitution is a direct descendent of Art. IV of the Articles of Confederation: </s> "The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States . . . ." </s> It is inconceivable that these words when used in the Articles could have been understood to abolish state durational residency requirements. 93 There is not a [400 U.S. 112, 215] vestige of evidence that any further extent was envisioned for them when they were carried over into the Constitution. And, as I have shown, when they were substantially repeated in 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment it was affirmatively understood that they did not include the right to vote. The Privileges and Immunities Clause is therefore unavailing to sustain any portion of 202. </s> The right to travel across state lines, see United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 -758 (1966), and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969), is likewise insufficient to require Idaho to conform its laws to the requirements of 202. MR. JUSTICE STEWART justifies 202 solely on the power under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 1 which he deems the basis for the right to travel. Post, at 285-287. I find it impossible to square the position that 5 authorizes Congress to abolish state voting qualifications based on residency with the position that it does not authorize Congress to abolish such qualifications based on race. Since the historical record compels me to accept the latter position, I must reject the former. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL do not anchor the right of interstate travel to any specific constitutional provision. Post, at 237-238. Past decisions to which they refer have relied on the two Privileges and Immunities Clauses, just discussed, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the Commerce Clause. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S., at 630 n. 8; id., at 663-671 (dissenting opinion). The Fifth Amendment is wholly inapplicable to state laws; and surely the Commerce Clause cannot be seriously relied on to sustain the Act here challenged. With no specific clause of the Constitution [400 U.S. 112, 216] empowering Congress to enact 202, I fail to see how that nebulous judicial construct, the right to travel, can do so. </s> C. Literacy </s> The remaining provision of the Voting Rights Act Amendments involved in these cases is the five-year suspension of Arizona's requirement that registrants be able to read the Constitution in English and to write their names. Although the issue is not free from difficulty, I am of the opinion that this provision can be sustained as a valid means of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment. </s> Despite the lack of evidence of specific instances of discriminatory application or effect, Congress could have determined that racial prejudice is prevalent throughout the Nation, and that literacy tests unduly lend themselves to discriminatory application, either conscious or unconscious. 94 This danger of violation of 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment was sufficient to authorize the exercise of congressional power under 2. </s> Whether to engage in a more particularized inquiry into the extent and effects of discrimination, either as a condition precedent or as a condition subsequent to suspension of literacy tests, was a choice for Congress to make. 95 The fact that the suspension is only for five years will require Congress to re-evaluate at the close of that period. While a less sweeping approach [400 U.S. 112, 217] in this delicate area might well have been appropriate, the choice which Congress made was within the range of the reasonable. 96 I therefore agree that 201 of the Act is a valid exercise of congressional power to the extent it is involved in this case. I express no view about its validity as applied to suspend tests such as educational qualifications, which do not lend themselves so readily to discriminatory application or effect. </s> For the reasons expressed in this opinion, I would grant the relief requested in Nos. 43, Orig., and 44, Orig. I would dismiss the complaint in No. 47, Orig., for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. In No. 46, Orig., I would grant declaratory relief with respect to the validity of 201 of the Voting Rights Act Amendments as applied to Arizona's current literacy test; I would deny relief in all other respects, with leave to reapply to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona for injunctive relief in the event it proves necessary, which I am confident it will not. </s> V </s> In conclusion I add the following. The consideration that has troubled me most in deciding that the 18-year-old and residency provisions of this legislation should be held unconstitutional is whether I ought to regard the doctrine of stare decisis as preventing me from arriving at that result. For as I indicated at the outset of this opinion, were I to continue to consider myself constricted by recent past decisions holding that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reaches [400 U.S. 112, 218] state electoral processes, I would, particularly perforce of the decisions cited in n. 84, supra, be led to cast my vote with those of my Brethren who are of the opinion that the lowering of the voting age and the abolition of state residency requirements in presidential elections are within the ordinary legislative power of Congress. </s> After much reflection I have reached the conclusion that I ought not to allow stare decisis to stand in the way of casting my vote in accordance with what I am deeply convinced the Constitution demands. In the annals of this Court few developments in the march of events have so imperatively called upon us to take a fresh hard look at past decisions, which could well be mustered in support of such developments, as do the legislative lowering of the voting age and, albeit to a lesser extent, the elimination of state residential requirements in presidential elections. Concluding, as I have, that such decisions cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny, I think it my duty to depart from them, rather than to lend my support to perpetuating their constitutional error in the name of stare decisis. </s> In taking this position, I feel fortified by the evident malaise among the members of the Court with those decisions. Despite them, a majority of the Court holds that this congressional attempt to lower the voting age by simple legislation is unconstitutional, insofar as it relates to state elections. Despite them, four members of the Court take the same view of this legislation with respect to federal elections as well; and the fifth member of the Court who considers the legislation constitutionally infirm as regards state elections relies not at all on any of those decisions in reaching the opposite conclusion in federal elections. And of the eight members of the Court who vote to uphold the residential provision of the statute, [400 U.S. 112, 219] only four appear to rely upon any of those decisions in reaching that result. </s> In these circumstances I am satisfied that I am free to decide these cases unshackled by a line of decisions which I have felt from the start entailed a basic departure from sound constitutional principle. </s> APPENDIX TO OPINION OF HARLAN, J. </s> VOTING RIGHTS ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970, PUB. L. 91-285, 84 STAT. 314 </s> TITLE II - SUPPLEMENTAL PROVISIONS </s> APPLICATION OF PROHIBITION TO OTHER STATES </s> SEC. 201. (a) Prior to August 6, 1975, no citizen shall be denied, because of his failure to comply with any test or device, the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election conducted in any State or political subdivision of a State as to which the provisions of section 4 (a) of this Act are not in effect by reason of determinations made under section 4 (b) of this Act. </s> (b) As used in this section, the term "test or device" means any requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting (1) demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter, (2) demonstrate any educational achievement or his knowledge of any particular subject, (3) possess good moral character, or (4) prove his qualifications by the voucher of registered voters or members of any other class. </s> RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR VOTING </s> SEC. 202. (a) The Congress hereby finds that the imposition and application of the durational residency requirement as a precondition to voting for the offices of President and Vice President, and the lack of sufficient [400 U.S. 112, 220] opportunities for absentee registration and absentee balloting in presidential elections - </s> (1) denies or abridges the inherent constitutional right of citizens to vote for their President and Vice President; </s> (2) denies or abridges the inherent constitutional right of citizens to enjoy their free movement across State lines; </s> (3) denies or abridges the privileges and immunities guaranteed to the citizens of each State under article IV, section 2, clause 1, of the Constitution; </s> (4) in some instances has the impermissible purpose or effect of denying citizens the right to vote for such officers because of the way they may vote; </s> (5) has the effect of denying to citizens the equality of civil rights, and due process and equal protection of the laws that are guaranteed to them under the fourteenth amendment; and </s> (6) does not bear a reasonable relationship to any compelling State interest in the conduct of presidential elections. </s> (b) Upon the basis of these findings, Congress declares that in order to secure and protect the above-stated rights of citizens under the Constitution, to enable citizens to better obtain the enjoyment of such rights, and to enforce the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment, it is necessary (1) to completely abolish the durational residency requirement as a precondition to voting for President and Vice President, and (2) to establish nationwide, uniform standards relative to absentee registration and absentee balloting in presidential elections. </s> (c) No citizen of the United States who is otherwise qualified to vote in any election for President and Vice President shall be denied the right to vote for electors for President and Vice President, or for President and Vice President, in such election because of the failure of such citizen to comply with any durational residency [400 U.S. 112, 221] requirement of such State or political subdivision; nor shall any citizen of the United States be denied the right to vote for electors for President and Vice President, or for President and Vice President, in such election because of the failure of such citizen to be physically present in such State or political subdivision at the time of such election, if such citizen shall have complied with the requirements prescribed by the law of such State or political subdivision providing for the casting of absentee ballots in such election. </s> (d) For the purposes of this section, each State shall provide by law for the registration or other means of qualification of all duly qualified residents of such State who apply, not later than thirty days immediately prior to any presidential election, for registration or qualification to vote for the choice of electors for President and Vice President or for President and Vice President in such election; and each State shall provide by law for the casting of absentee ballots for the choice of electors for President and Vice President, or for President and Vice President, by all duly qualified residents of such State who may be absent from their election district or unit in such State on the day such election is held and who have applied therefore not later than seven days immediately prior to such election and have returned such ballots to the appropriate election official of such State not later than the time of closing of the polls in such State on the day of such election. </s> (e) If any citizen of the United States who is otherwise qualified to vote in any State or political subdivision in any election for President and Vice President has begun residence in such State or political subdivision after the thirtieth day next preceding such election and, for that reason, does not satisfy the registration requirements of such State or political subdivision he shall be allowed to vote for the choice of electors for President and Vice [400 U.S. 112, 222] President, or for President and Vice President, in such election, (1) in person in the State or political subdivision in which he resided immediately prior to his removal if he had satisfied, as of the date of his change of residence, the requirements to vote in that State or political subdivision, or (2) by absentee ballot in the State or political subdivision in which he resided immediately prior to his removal if he satisfies, but for his nonresident status and the reason for his absence, the requirements for absentee voting in that State or political subdivision. </s> (f) No citizen of the United States who is otherwise qualified to vote by absentee ballot in any State or political subdivision in any election for President and Vice President shall be denied the right to vote for the choice of electors for President and Vice President, or for President and Vice President, in such election because of any requirement of registration that does not include a provision for absentee registration. </s> (g) Nothing in this section shall prevent any State or political subdivision from adopting less restrictive voting practices than those that are prescribed herein. </s> SEPARABILITY </s> SEC. 205. If any provision of this Act or the application of any provision thereof to any person or circumstance is judicially determined to be invalid, the remainder of this Act or the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected by such determination. </s> TITLE III - REDUCING VOTING AGE TO EIGHTEEN IN FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL ELECTIONS </s> DECLARATION AND FINDINGS </s> SEC. 301. (a) The Congress finds and declares that the imposition and application of the requirement that a [400 U.S. 112, 223] citizen be twenty-one years of age as a precondition to voting in any primary or in any election - </s> (1) denies and abridges the inherent constitutional rights of citizens eighteen years of age but not yet twenty-one years of age to vote - a particularly unfair treatment of such citizens in view of the national defense responsibilities imposed upon such citizens; </s> (2) has the effect of denying to citizens eighteen years of age but not yet twenty-one years of age the due process and equal protection of the laws that are guaranteed to them under the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution; and </s> (3) does not bear a reasonable relationship to any compelling State interest. </s> (b) In order to secure the constitutional rights set forth in subsection (a), the Congress declares that it is necessary to prohibit the denial of the right to vote to citizens of the United States eighteen years of age or over. </s> PROHIBITION </s> SEC. 302. Except as required by the Constitution, no citizen of the United States who is otherwise qualified to vote in any State or political subdivision in any primary or in any election shall be denied the right to vote in any such primary or election on account of age if such citizen is eighteen years of age or older. </s> EFFECTIVE DATE </s> SEC. 305. The provisions of title III shall take effect with respect to any primary or election held on or after January 1, 1971. </s> ARIZONA CONSTITUTION </s> Art. 7, 2. No person shall be entitled to vote at any general election, or for any office that now is, or hereafter may be, elective by the people, or upon any question [400 U.S. 112, 224] which may be submitted to a vote of the people, unless such person be a citizen of the United States of the age of twenty-one years or over, and shall have resided in the State one year immediately preceding such election, provided that qualifications for voters at a general election for the purpose of electing presidential electors shall be as prescribed by law. The word "citizen" shall include persons of the male and female sex. </s> ARIZONA REVISED STATUTES ANNOTATED </s> 16-101. Qualifications of elector </s> A. Every resident of the state is qualified to become an elector and may register to vote at all elections authorized by law if he: </s> 1. Is a citizen of the United States. </s> 2. Will be twenty-one years or more of age prior to the regular general election next following his registration. </s> 3. Will have been a resident of the state one year and of the county in which he claims the right to vote thirty days next preceding the election. </s> 4. Is able to read the constitution of the United States in the English language in a manner showing that he is neither prompted nor reciting from memory, unless prevented from so doing by physical disability. </s> 5. Is able to write his name, unless prevented from so doing by physical disability. </s> B. At an election held between the date of registration and the next regular general election, the elector is eligible to vote if at the date of the intervening election he is twenty-one years of age and has been a resident of the state one year and the county thirty days. </s> C. A person convicted of treason or a felony, unless restored to civil rights, or an idiot, insane person or person under guardianship is not qualified to register. As amended, Laws 1970, c. 151, 1. [400 U.S. 112, 225] </s> 16-107. Closing of registrations </s> A. No elector shall be registered to vote between five o'clock p. m. of the day which is two months preceding the date of the next primary election and seven o'clock p. m. of the day of the primary election. </s> B. No elector shall be registered to vote between five o'clock p. m. of the eighth Monday preceding a general election and seven o'clock p. m. of the day thereof. As amended, Laws 1958, c. 48, 1; Laws 1970, c. 151, 5. </s> IDAHO CONSTITUTION </s> Art. 6, 2. Qualifications of electors. - Except as in this article otherwise provided, every male or female citizen of the United States, twenty-one years old, who has actually resided in this state or territory for six months, and in the country where he or she offers to vote, thirty days next preceding the day of election, if registered as provided by law, is a qualified elector; provided however, that every citizen of the United States, twenty-one years old, who has actually resided in this state for sixty days next preceding the day of election, if registered as required by law, is a qualified elector for the sole purpose of voting for presidential electors; and until otherwise provided by the legislature, women who have the qualifications prescribed in this article may continue to hold such school offices and vote at such school elections as provided by the laws of Idaho territory. </s> IDAHO CODE </s> Sec. 34-401. Qualifications of voters. - Every person over the age of twenty-one (21) years, possessing the qualifications following, shall be entitled to vote at all elections: He shall be a citizen of the United States and shall have resided in this state six (6) months immediately preceding the election at which he offers to vote, [400 U.S. 112, 226] and in the county thirty (30) days: provided, that no person shall be permitted to vote at any county seat election who has not resided in the county six (6) months, and in the precinct ninety (90) days, where he offers to vote; nor shall any person be permitted to vote at any election for the division of the county, or striking off from any county any part thereof, who has not the qualifications provided for in section 3, article 18, of the constitution; nor shall any person be denied the right to vote at any school district election, nor to hold any school district office on account of sex. </s> 34-408. Eligibility of new residents to vote. - Each citizen of the United States who, immediately prior to his removal to this state, was a citizen of another state and who has been a resident of this state for sixty (60) days next preceding the day of election but for less than the six (6) month period of required residence for voting prior to a presidential election, is entitled to vote for presidential and vice-presidential electors at that election, but for no other offices, if </s> (1) he otherwise possesses the substantive qualifications to vote in this state, except the requirement of residence and registration, and </s> (2) he complies with the provisions of this act. </s> 34-409. Application for presidential ballot by new residents. - A person desiring to qualify under this act in order to vote for presidential and vice-presidential electors shall be considered as registered within the meaning of this act if on or before ten (10) days prior to the date of the general election, he shall make an application in the form of an affidavit executed in duplicate in the presence of the county auditor, substantially as follows . . . . </s> 34-413. Voting by new residents. - (1) The applicant, upon receiving the ballot for presidential and vice-presidential electors shall mark forthwith the ballot in the [400 U.S. 112, 227] presence of the county auditor, but in a manner that the official cannot know how the ballot is marked. He shall then fold the ballot in the county auditor's presence so as to conceal the markings, and deposit and seal it in an envelope furnished by the county auditor. </s> 34-1101. Absent voting authorized. - Any qualified elector of the state of Idaho who is absent or expects to be absent from the election precinct in which he resides on the day of holding any election under any of the laws of this state in which an official ballot is required, or who is within the election precinct and is, or will be, unable, because of physical disability, or because of blindness, to go to the voting place, and if registration is required for such election, who is duly registered therefor, may vote at any such election, as hereinafter provided. </s> 34-1105. Return of ballot. - On marking such ballot or ballots such absent or disabled or blind elector shall refold same as theretofore folded and shall inclose the same in said official envelope and seal said envelope securely and mail by registered or certified mail or deliver it in person to the officer who issued same; provided, that an absentee ballot must be received by the issuing officer by 12:00 o'clock noon on the day of the election before such ballot may be counted. Said ballot or ballots shall be so marked, folded and sealed by said voter in private and secretly. Provided, that whenever the disability or blindness makes it necessary that the voter shall be assisted in marking his ballot, such voter may have the assistance of any person of his choice in marking his ballot. </s> OREGON CONSTITUTION </s> Art. II, 2. Qualifications of electors. (1) Every citizen of the United States is entitled to vote in all elections not otherwise provided for by this Constitution if such citizen: </s> (a) Is 21 years of age or older . . . . [400 U.S. 112, 228] </s> TEXAS CONSTITUTION </s> Art. 6, 1. Classes of persons not allowed to vote </s> Section 1. The following classes of persons shall not be allowed to vote in this State, to wit: </s> First: Persons under twenty-one (21) years of age. </s> Second: Idiots and lunatics. </s> Third: All paupers supported by any county. </s> Fourth: All persons convicted of any felony, subject to such exceptions as the Legislature may make. </s> 2. Qualified elector; registration; absentee voting </s> Sec. 2. Every person subject to none of the foregoing disqualifications who shall have attained the age of twenty-one (21) years and who shall be a citizen of the United States and who shall have resided in this State one (1) year next preceding an election and the last six (6) months within the district or county in which such person offers to vote, shall be deemed a qualified elector; provided, however, that before offering to vote at an election a voter shall have registered annually, but such requirement for registration shall not be considered a qualification of an elector within the meaning of the term "qualified elector" as used in any other Article of this Constitution in respect to any matter except qualification and eligibility to vote at an election. Any legislation enacted in anticipation of the adoption of this Amendment shall not be invalid because of its anticipatory nature. The Legislature may authorize absentee voting. And this provision of the Constitution shall be self-enacting without the necessity of further legislation. </s> TEXAS ELECTION CODE </s> Article 5.01. Classes of persons not qualified to vote </s> The following classes of persons shall not be allowed to vote in this state: </s> 1. Persons under twenty-one years of age. </s> 2. Idiots and lunatics. [400 U.S. 112, 229] </s> 3. All paupers supported by the county. </s> 4. All persons convicted of any felony except those restored to full citizenship and right of suffrage or pardoned. </s> Art. 5.02. Qualification and requirements for voting </s> Every person subject to none of the foregoing disqualifications who shall have attained the age of twenty-one years and who shall be a citizen of the United States and who shall have resided in this state one year next preceding an election and the last six months within the district or county in which such person offers to vote, and who shall have registered as a voter, shall be deemed a qualified elector. No person shall be permitted to vote unless he has registered in accordance with the provisions of this code. The provisions of this section, as modified by Sections 35 and 39 of this code, shall apply to all elections, including general, special, and primary elections, whether held by the state, by a county, municipality, or other political subdivision of the state, or by a political party. </s> [Footnote 1 The Attorney General of the United States, a citizen of New York, is named as defendant. The jurisdictional basis alleged is Art. III, 2, which gives this Court original jurisdiction over controversies [400 U.S. 112, 153] between a State and a citizen of another State. We held a similar suit justiciable and otherwise within our original jurisdiction in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 307 (1966). The parties have not asked us to re-examine the validity of that ruling, and since the Court has not undertaken to do so, I am content to sustain jurisdiction on the authority of that decision. </s> [Footnote 2 In response to inquiries from the Attorney General, Arizona, Oregon, and Texas indicated willingness to abide by 202 of the Act, governing residency, registration, and absentee voting in presidential elections and to conform conflicting state laws. </s> [Footnote 3 The account in the text is largely drawn from J. James, The Framing of the Fourteenth Amendment (1956) (hereafter James), and to some extent from W. Gillette, The Right To Vote: Politics and the Passage of the Fifteenth Amendment (1969) (hereafter Gillette), and B. Kendrick, The Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction (1914) (hereafter Kendrick), as well. </s> [Footnote 4 "Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons." </s> [Footnote 5 See infra, at 209-212, for the text of these provisions, and for discussion of the contention that they empower Congress to set qualifications of voters in federal elections. </s> [Footnote 6 "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government." </s> [Footnote 7 E. g., Proclamation of May 29, 1865, 13 Stat. 760 (North Carolina). </s> [Footnote 8 The texts of the state constitutions are most readily available in F. Thorpe, The Federal and State Constitutions (1909). The qualifications imposed by the various States three years later, when the Fifteenth Amendment was proposed, are presented in tabular form in Hearings on the Voting Rights Bill, S. 1564, before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 128-129 (1965). </s> [Footnote 9 James 33. </s> [Footnote 10 See Globe 209 (Freedmen's Bureau Bill); Globe 211 (Civil Rights Bill). </s> [Footnote 11 While formally further consideration was postponed until a date in April, six weeks off, Globe 1095, it was generally understood that "April means indefinitely." 2 Nation 289 (Mar. 1. 1866), quoted in James 87. </s> [Footnote 12 The only change made in 1 was the addition of the Citizenship Clause by the Senate. Globe 3041. The primary change made in 2 was to condition reduction of representation on denial or abridgment of the right to vote in certain named elections, rather than to speak generally of denial or abridgment of "the elective franchise." Ibid. That section now reads: "Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State." </s> [Footnote 13 Section 1 of that Act provided in part that "all persons . . . shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding." Act of Apr. 9, 1866, 1, 14 Stat. 27. </s> [Footnote 14 In this connection, Professor Fairman's admonition of 20 years ago is even more forceful than it was when he wrote: "We know so much more about the constitutional law of the Fourteenth Amendment than the men who adopted it that we should [400 U.S. 112, 163] remind ourselves not to be surprised to find them vague where we want them to prove sharp. Eighty years of adjudication has taught us distinctions and subtleties where the men of 1866 did not even perceive the need for analysis." Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5, 9 (1949). </s> [Footnote 15 See, e. g., Globe 599 (Sen. Trumbull); Globe 1117 (Cong. Wilson of Iowa, quoting Kent's Commentaries and Bouvier's Law Dictionary); Globe 1152 (Cong. Thayer). There were some, however, who considered the distinction either nonexistent or too uncertain to be [400 U.S. 112, 164] a basis for legislation. E. g., Globe 477 (Sen. Saulsbury); Globe 1157 (Cong. Thornton); Globe 1292-1293 (Cong. Bingham). It hardly seems necessary to point out that the jurisprudential concept of "political" as opposed to "civil" or "natural" rights bears no relation to that class of nonjusticiable issues perhaps inappropriately known as "political questions." See the opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, ante, at 137-140. </s> [Footnote 16 See generally Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5 (1949), especially at 8-9. </s> [Footnote 17 The remarks of these three Democrats, Niblack, Boyer, and Rogers, are discussed infra, at 182-185. Also discussed there are the remarks of a fourth Democratic Representative, Phelps, which were delivered before the start of debate on the proposed Fourteenth Amendment. </s> [Footnote 18 While this provision might seem useless in light of the Fifteenth Amendment, it was doubtless intended to prohibit the imposition of property or literacy qualifications which, even though fairly applied, would have the effect of disfranchising most of the Negroes. The Radicals had sought to prohibit such qualifications in the Fifteenth Amendment, but were unsuccessful. See Gillette 53, 56-62, 69-72, 76. </s> [Footnote 19 While the history indicates that the supporters of the Fourteenth Amendment would have been surprised at the suggestion that the Amendment brought qualifications for state office under federal supervision, officeholding was not the focus of attention during the consideration of the Amendment. Moreover, state [400 U.S. 112, 168] power to set voter qualifications, unlike state power to set qualifications for office, is explicitly recognized not only in the original Constitution but in 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment itself. Whether these distinctions are sufficient to justify testing state qualifications for office by the Fourteenth Amendment is a matter not presented by these cases. Where the state action has a racial basis, see Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964), I am not prepared to assume that the Fifteenth Amendment provides no protection. Despite the statement in the opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, post, at 252, I would find it surprising if a State could undercut the right to vote by taking steps to ensure that all candidates are unpalatable to voters of a certain race. Although an explicit provision on officeholding was deleted from the proposed Fifteenth Amendment at the eleventh hour, the idea that the right to vote without more implies the right to be voted for was specifically referred to by supporters of the Fifteenth Amendment in both Houses of Congress. See Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 3d Sess., 1425-1426 (1869) (Cong. Boutwell); id., at 1426 (Cong. Butler); id., at 1629 (Sen. Sawyer). </s> [Footnote 20 Hearings, supra, n. 8, at 128-129. </s> [Footnote 21 See, e. g., Globe 141-142 (Cong. Blaine); Globe 2766-2767 (Sen. Howard); Globe 2769-2770 (Sens. Wade and Wilson); Globe 3033 (Sen. Henderson). </s> [Footnote 22 The Journal is reprinted in Kendrick, supra, n. 3, at 37-129. </s> [Footnote 23 The attempts were not altogether successful. See James 108-109. </s> [Footnote 24 See generally Kendrick 18-22. For reasons to be developed below, infra, at 197, the report of the Joint Committee, H. R. Rep. No. 30, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866), is less useful as an indication of the understanding of the Committee and the Congress than as an indication of the understanding of the ratifying States. </s> [Footnote 25 Owen's account of the Fourteenth Amendment is given in Political Results from the Varioloid, 35 Atlantic Monthly 660 (June 1875). </s> [Footnote 26 See James 109-112; Gillette 24; Owen, supra, n. 25, at 666. </s> [Footnote 27 See the votes on Steven's motion to select the alternative which reduced representation rather than that which prohibited racial restrictions on the ballot, Kendrick 52; Boutwell's motion to condition readmission of Tennessee on that State's agreement not to discriminate in its voter qualifications, Kendrick 70; Stevens' motion to strike out the provision of the Owen plan enfranchising Negroes after 1876, Kendrick 101; and the motion to condition readmission of Tennessee and Arkansas on their having provided impartial male suffrage, as well as on conforming their laws and constitutions to the requirements of the proposed amendment (which included Bingham's provision when this motion was made), Kendrick 109. Bingham was not, however, wholly opposed to Negro suffrage. As chairman of the subcommittee, he reported the equal-rights provision which would have empowered Congress to provide for equal political rights and privileges, Kendrick 56, although he was the one who subsequently had that replaced with the first equal-rights provision reported to Congress. Kendrick 61. As already noted, the substitute contained substantially identical language, but omitted reference to political rights and privileges. Bingham also voted for Owen's plan, which would have enfranchised Negroes in 1876, when it was first presented. Kendrick 85. In February 1867 he moved to condition readmission of the Southern States on impartial male suffrage as well as on the States' ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment and conforming their laws thereto. Kendrick 123. </s> [Footnote 28 While any guess as to the motives of Bingham and the other members of the committee is sheer speculation, it is not necessarily true that they believed they were replacing specific language with [400 U.S. 112, 174] general. The author of the original plan, for one, seems to have taken the opposite view. He gave the following characterization of 1 some years later: "A declaration who is a citizen: unnecessary, if we had given suffrage to the negro; since there could be no possible doubt that an elector, native-born, is a citizen of the United States. Also a specification of the particular civil rights to be assured: out of place, I think, in a constitutional amendment, though necessary and proper in a civil rights bill." Owen, supra, n. 25, at 666 (emphasis added). </s> [Footnote 29 The proceedings of the Joint Committee are examined in greater detail in the opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL. Post, at 257-263. I agree with their apparent conclusion that the Journal sheds little light on the contemporary construction of the Fourteenth Amendment. One is left to do what he can with the two facts noted at the outset of this section: that of the plans considered by the Joint Committee, all provided either for reduction of representation or for enfranchisement while none provided for both at the same time; and that the Committee consistently rejected provisions to enfranchise the freedmen, with the conceivable exception of a plan which was defeated in the House largely because of the scope of the powers it transferred from the States to the Federal Government. </s> [Footnote 30 Unless, of course, one adopts a "conspiracy theory" of the history of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus far no one has (quite) done so in this context. </s> [Footnote 31 "I regret more than I shall be able to tell this House that we have not found the situation [sic] of affairs in this country such, and the public virtue such that we might come out on the plain, unanswerable proposition that every adult intelligent citizen of the United States, unconvicted of crime, shall enjoy the right of suffrage." Globe 2462. </s> [Footnote 32 "I shall, Mr. Speaker, vote for this amendment; not because I approve it. Could I have controlled the report of the committee of fifteen, it would have proposed to give the right of suffrage to every loyal man in the country." Globe 2469. "So far as I am individually concerned, I object to the amendment as a whole, because it does not go far enough and propose to at once enfranchise every loyal man in the country." Ibid. </s> [Footnote 33 "The proposition in the matter of suffrage falls short of what I desire, but so far as it goes it tends to the equalization of the inequality at present existing; and while I demand and shall continue to demand the franchise for all loyal male citizens of this country - and I cannot but admit the possibility that ultimately those eleven States may be restored to representative power without the right of franchise being conferred upon the colored people - I should feel myself doubly humiliated and disgraced, and criminal even, if I hesitated to do what I can for a proposition which equalizes representation." Globe 2508. </s> [Footnote 34 "The second section, Mr. Speaker, is, in my judgment, as nearly correct as it can be without being fully, in full measure, right. But one thing is right, and that is secured by the amendment. Manifestly no State should have its basis of national representation enlarged by reason of a portion of citizens within its borders to which the elective franchise is denied. If political power shall be lost because of such denial, not imposed because of participation in rebellion or other crime, it is to be hoped that political interests may work in the line of justice, and that the end will be the impartial enfranchisement of all citizens not disqualified by crime. Whether that end shall be attained or not, this will be secured: that the measure of political power of any State shall be determined by that portion of its citizens which can speak and act at the polls, and shall not be enlarged because of the residence within the State of portions of its citizens denied the right of franchise. So much for the second section of the amendment. It is not all that I wish and would demand; but odious inequalities are removed by it and representation will be equalized, and the political rights of all citizens will under its operation be, as we believe, ultimately recognized and admitted." Globe 2511. </s> [Footnote 35 "I did hope to see the rights of the freedom completely established . . . . I did hope . . . that we should have the manhood and magnanimity to declare that men who have wielded the sword in defense of their country are fit to be intrusted with the ballot. But I am convinced that my expectations, hitherto fondly cherished, are doomed to some disappointment." Globe 2537. </s> [Footnote 36 "This is a step in the right direction; and although I should prefer to see incorporated into the Constitution a guarantee of universal suffrage, as we cannot get the required two thirds for that, I cordially support this proposition as the next best." Globe 2540. </s> [Footnote 37 [If the freed slaves had been added] to the thinking, voting men of the southern States, it would be just and proper that that addition should be represented in this body. But we all know that such is not the case. In those States themselves the late slaves do not enter into the basis of local representation. . . . "Would it not be a most unprecedented thing that when this population are not permitted where they reside to enter into the basis of representation in their own State, we should receive it as an element of representation here . . . ." Globe 2464. </s> [Footnote 38 "The second proposition is, in short, to limit the representation of the several States as those States themselves shall limit suffrage. . . . ". . . And why not? If the negroes of the South are not to be counted as a political element in the government of the South in the States, why should they be counted as a political element in the government of the country in the Union? If they are not to be counted as against the southern people themselves, why should they be counted as against us?" Globe 2498. </s> [Footnote 39 H. R. 51 "deprived [the southern States] of all inducement for [the] gradual admission [of the freemen] to the right of suffrage, inasmuch as it exacted universal suffrage as the only condition upon which they should be counted in the basis of representation at all. . . . I voted against a proposition which seemed to me so unjust and so injurious, not only to the whites of the southern States, but to the colored race itself. Well, sir, that amendment was rejected in the Senate, and the proposition, as embodied in the committee's report, comes before us in a very different form. It is now proposed to base representation upon suffrage, upon the number of voters, instead of upon the aggregate population in every State of the Union. And as I believe that to be essentially just, and likely to remedy the unequal representation of which complaint is so justly made, I shall give it my vote." Globe 2502. Later, in discussion of 3, which at that time would have [400 U.S. 112, 180] disfranchised certain rebels in federal elections, Raymond remarked that the effect would be to allow "one fifth, one eighth, or one tenth, as the case may be, of the people of these southern States to elect members from those States, to hold seats upon this floor." Ibid. It is obvious that the possibility of Negroes' voting in these elections did not cross his mind. </s> [Footnote 40 "But this House is not prepared to enfranchise all men; the nation, perhaps, is not prepared for it to-day; the colored race are not prepared for it, probably, and I am sure the rebels are unfit for it; and as Congress has not the moral courage to vote for it, then put in this provision which cuts off the traitor from all political power in the nation, and then we have secured to the loyal men that control which they so richly deserve." Globe 2505. </s> [Footnote 41 "This amendment will settle the complication in regard to suffrage and representation, leaving each State to regulate that for itself, so that it will be for it to decide whether or not it shall have a representation for all its male citizens not less than twenty-one years of age." Globe 2510. </s> [Footnote 42 "I have no doubt that the Government of the United States has full power to extend the elective franchise to the colored population of the insurgent States. I mean authority; I said power. I have no doubt that the Government of the United States has authority to do this under the Constitution; but I do not think they have the power. The distinction I make between authority and power is this: we have, in the nature of our Government, the right to do it; but the public opinion of the country is such at this precise moment as to make it impossible we should do it. It was therefore most wise on the part of the committee on reconstruction to waive this matter in deference to public opinion." Globe 2532. </s> [Footnote 43 "If South Carolina persists in withholding the ballot from the colored man, then let her take the alternative we offer, of confining her to the white basis of representation . . . ." Globe 2535. </s> [Footnote 44 Spalding's speeches are given at Globe 2509-2510. His only remarks addressed to 1 and 2 read: "As to the first measure proposed, a person may read it five hundred years hence without gathering from it any idea that this rebellion ever existed. The same may be said of the second proposition, for it only proposes that, the bondsmen being made free, the apportionment of Representatives in Congress shall be based upon the whole number of persons who exercise the elective franchise, instead of the population." Globe 2509. A month later, in the debate over the Amendment when it had returned from the Senate, Spalding expressed his views more clearly: "I say, as an individual, that I would more cheerfully give my vote if that provision allowed all men of proper age whom we have made free to join in the exercise of the right of suffrage in this country. But if I cannot obtain all that I wish, I will go heartily to secure all we can obtain." Globe 3146. </s> [Footnote 45 Longyear's speech is published at Globe 2536-2537. He did not in terms address himself to any section except the third. However, it is not difficult to read his statement that the proposals of the Joint Committee disappointed "the expectations of the people" and his personal hopes as having reference to the absence of any provision on suffrage. </s> [Footnote 46 Shellabarger spoke only briefly, and this in connection with the disfranchising section. In the course of his remarks he expressed the view that congressional power to regulate voter qualifications in federal elections was granted by Art. I, 4. Globe 2512. </s> [Footnote 47 "Why is it that the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. STEVENS] gives up universal suffrage? Why is it that he and other gentlemen give up universal confiscation? Why is it that other gentlemen give up universal butchery of that people? It is a compromise of what they call principle for the purpose of saving their party in the next fall election." Globe 2506. </s> [Footnote 48 "Gentlemen here admit that they desire [federal control over suffrage], but that the weak kneed of their party are not equal to the issue. Your purpose is the same, and but for that timidity you would now ingraft negro suffrage upon our Constitution and force it on the entire people of this Union." Globe 2530. </s> [Footnote 49 "While this [second] section admits the right of the States thus to exclude negroes from voting, it says to them, if you do so exclude them they shall also be excluded from all representation; and you shall suffer the penalty by loss of representation." Globe 3145. </s> [Footnote 50 Boyer's speech was made in opposition to a proposal to enfranchise Negroes in the District of Columbia. He then thought Negro suffrage a "monstrous proposition," Globe 176, which was incompatible with "the broad general principle that this is, and of right ought to be, a white man's Government." Globe 175. One of Rogers' harangues on the subject came in connection with the same bill. There he spoke of "the monstrous doctrine of political equality of the negro race with the white at the ballot-box," Globe 198, and launched into an attack remarkable for its vitriol. </s> [Footnote 51 Boyer viewed 3, which at that time would have prohibited voluntary participants in the rebellion from voting in federal elections, as "the most objectionable of all the parts," Globe 2467, as it would disfranchise nine-tenths of the voting population of the South for more than four years. The second section he found objectionable as designed "to reduce the number of southern representatives in Congress and in the Electoral College; and also to operate as a standing inducement to negro suffrage." Globe 2467. These remarks indicate no awareness that the first section would increase the number of voters in the Southern States and also render any "inducement" to Negro suffrage unnecessary. Rogers later in his speech asserted: "The committee dare not submit the broad proposition to the people of the United States of negro suffrage. They dare not to-day pass the negro suffrage bill which passed this House in the Senate of the United States because, as I have heard one honorable and leading man on the Republican side of the House say, it would [400 U.S. 112, 184] sink into oblivion the party that would advocate before the American people the equal right of the negro with the white man to suffrage." Globe 2538. When H. R. 127 was returned by the Senate with amendments, Rogers addressed the House and stated that when the records of the Joint Committee were made public, it would be revealed that the Committee at first agreed to recommend universal Negro suffrage, but reconsidered because of the force of public opinion. Globe App. 230. Rogers was himself a member of the Joint Committee, and he presumably was referring to the acceptance and then rejection of Owen's plan for enfranchisement in 1876. </s> [Footnote 52 The Amendment, however, had been released to the press on April 28. James 115. </s> [Footnote 53 It is not amiss to point out that whatever force Phelps' and Rogers' interpretations may have in the face of the contrary authority, even they foresaw no danger from the Equal Protection Clause as a source of federal power over the suffrage. </s> [Footnote 54 Like my colleagues, post, at 264, I find it difficult to understand what Bingham meant when he said that "the exercise of the elective franchise, though it be one of the privileges of a citizen of the Republic, is exclusively under the control of the States." Globe 2542. However, I do not find this mysterious sentence to mean that the exercise of the elective franchise is exclusively under the control of the States and Congress, nor do I find it to dilute the force of his explicit statements quoted above that 1 did not reach the right to vote. The general statements by Bingham and Stevens to the effect that the Amendment was designed to achieve equality before the law, or would be effectuated by legislation in part, likewise do not weaken the force of the statements specifically addressed to the suffrage question quoted above. </s> [Footnote 55 Fessenden, however, was present in the Senate and participated in the discussion. See Globe 2763, 2769, 2770. He was therefore in a position to correct any gross misinterpretation of his views or of those of the Committee. </s> [Footnote 56 My colleagues, post,at 264, point to Howard's reference to Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (No. 3230) (CCED Pa. 1825), in order to "gather some intimation of what probably will be the opinion of the judiciary" on the scope of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 1. Globe 2765. As the text indicates, Howard rejected Justice Washington's lengthy dictum insofar as it said that the protected privileges and immunities included "the elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the State in which it is to be exercised." No other Senator quoted or referred to this portion of Washington's opinion during the debates over the proposed Fourteenth Amendment. Corfield, which held that New Jersey could constitutionally restrict access to her oyster beds to her own residents, was the leading authority on privileges and immunities in the mind of the 39th Congress, but it was not the only one. Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535 (Md. 1797) (Samuel Chase, J.), and Abbot v. Bayley, 6 Pick. 89 (Mass. 1827) (Parker, C. J.), were also cited. See Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5, 12-15 (1949). Both specifically stated that the privileges and immunities protected by Art. IV, 2, did not include the right of suffrage or the right to hold office. </s> [Footnote 57 Howard was a very clear-spoken man. When it was suggested, during the debates over the Fifteenth Amendment, that the freedmen were entitled to the ballot by virtue of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, he recalled his role in the framing of that Amendment and said: "I feel constrained to say here now that this is the first time it ever occurred to me that the right to vote was to be derived from the fourteenth article. I think such a construction cannot be maintained." Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 3d Sess., 1003 (1869). He then referred to the debates, 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the fact that "[n]obody ever supposed that the right of voting or of holding office was guaranteed by that second section of the fourth article of the old Constitution" to bolster his construction of 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ibid. </s> [Footnote 58 "I think our friends, the colored people of the South, should not be excluded from the right of voting, and they shall not be if my vote and the votes of a sufficient number who agree with me in Congress shall be able to carry it. I do not agree in this particular with the Senator from Michigan [Mr. Howard]. He yields to the provision in the committee's resolution on the subject reluctantly, because he does not believe three fourths of the States can be got to ratify that proposition which is right and just in itself. My own opinion is that if you go down to the very foundation of justice, so far from weakening yourself with the people, you will strengthen yourself immensely by it; but I know that it is not the opinion of many here, and I suppose we must accommodate ourselves to the will of majorities, and if we cannot do all we would, do all we can. I propose for myself to contend for all I can get in the right direction, and finally to go with those who will give us anything that is beneficial." Globe 2769. </s> [Footnote 59 "I should be much better satisfied if the right of suffrage had been given at once to the more intelligent of ["the colored people of the South"] and such as had served in our Army. . . . Believing that this amendment probably goes as far in favor of suffrage to the negro as is practicable to accomplish now, and hoping it may in the end accomplish all I desire in this respect, I shall vote for its adoption, although I should be glad to go further." Globe 2963-2964. </s> [Footnote 60 "It declares that all men are entitled to life, liberty, and property, and imposes upon the Government the duty of discharging these solemn obligations, but fails to adopt the easy and direct means for the attainment of the results proposed. It refuses the aid of four million people in maintaining the Government of the people. . . . [But] it furnishes a conclusive argument in favor of universal amnesty and impartial suffrage. . . . The utter impossibility of a final solution of the difficulties by the means proposed will cause the North to clamor for suffrage." Globe 2964. </s> [Footnote 61 "I am sorry to have to put that clause [ 2] into our Constitution, as I am sorry for the necessity which calls upon us to put the preceding clause into the Constitution. I wish there was no community and no State in the United States that was not [400 U.S. 112, 190] prepared to say with my friend from Nevada [Mr. Stewart] that all men may be represented in the Congress of the United States and shall be represented and shall choose their own representatives. That is the better doctrine; that is the true doctrine. I would much prefer, myself, to unite with the people of the United States in saying that hereafter no man shall be excluded from the right to vote, than to unite with them in saying that hereafter some men may be excluded from the right of representation." Globe App. 219. </s> [Footnote 62 Henderson, who had offered a direct enfranchising provision as an alternative to the Committee's first effort in the field of representation, see Globe App. 115, stated that he now recognized that "the country is not yet prepared" to share political power with Negroes, and he supported the Committee plan. Globe 3035. </s> [Footnote 63 "[A]lthough we do not obtain suffrage now, it is not far off, because the grasping desire of the South for office, that old desire to rule and reign over this Government and control its destinies, will at a very early day hasten the enfranchisement of the loyal blacks." Globe 3038. </s> [Footnote 64 "There is no reason why the white citizens of South Carolina should vote the political power of a class of people whom they say are entirely unfit to vote for themselves. If there is any portion of the people of this country who are unfit to vote for themselves, their neighbors ought not to vote for them." Globe 2986. There was no indication that Sherman considered South Carolina's disqualification on racial grounds any more improper than Massachusetts' limitations of the franchise to men, which he mentioned in the next breath. </s> [Footnote 65 "If you think the negro ought to have the right of voting; if you are in favor of it, and intend it shall be given, why do you not in plain words confer it upon them? It is much fairer than to seek it by indirection, and the people will distinctly understand you when you propose such a change of the Constitution." Globe 2939. </s> [Footnote 66 "What is to be the operation of this amendment? Just this: your whip is held over Pennsylvania, and you say to her that she must either allow her negroes to vote or have one member of Congress less." Globe 2987. </s> [Footnote 67 "[The second section's] true meaning was intended to be difficult to be reached, but when understood it is a measure which shrinks from the responsibility of openly forcing negro suffrage upon the late slave States, but attempts by a great penalty to coerce them to accept it." Globe App. 240. </s> [Footnote 68 "It says that each of the southern States, and, of course, each other State in the Union, has a right to regulate for itself the franchise, and that consequently, as far as the Government of the United States is concerned, if the black man is not permitted the right to the franchise, it will be a wrong (if a wrong) which the Government of the United States will be impotent to redress." Globe 3027. Johnson was the only Democratic Senator on the Joint Committee. </s> [Footnote 69 "With [the rebel States'] enlarged basis of representation, and exclusion of the loyal men of color from the ballot-box, I see no hope of safety unless in the prescription of proper enabling acts, which shall do justice to the freedmen and enjoin enfranchisement as a condition-precedent." Globe 3148. </s> [Footnote 70 Kelly: see Globe 2469, quoted at n. 32, supra. Farnsworth: see Globe 2540, quoted at n. 36, supra. Eliot: see Globe 2511, quoted at n. 34, supra. Higby: see Globe 3978 (debate over readmission of Tennessee despite all-white electorate). Bingham: see Globe 2542, quoted supra, at 185; see also Globe 3979 (debate over readmission of Tennessee). Stevens: see Globe 2459-2460, quoted supra, at 175-177; Globe 3148, quoted at n. 69, supra. Raymond: see Globe 2502, quoted at n. 39 supra. Ashley: see Globe 2882. Summer: see n. 71, infra. Fessenden: see H. R. Rep. No. 30, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., XIII-XIV (1866), quoted infra, at 197-198. Yates: see Globe 3038, quoted at n. 63, supra. Stewart: see Globe 2964, quoted at n. 60, supra. Wade: see Globe 2769, quoted at n. 58, supra. The exception is Senator Wilson of Massachusetts, who did not address himself to this issue. However, he participated in the debates, see Globe 2770, 2986-2987, and was therefore in a position to express disagreement with the interpretation uniformly offered in the Senate. Secondary reliance is placed on Shellabarger, Cook, Boutwell, Julian, and Lawrence of Ohio. These Representatives, with the exception of Boutwell, see n. 33, supra, did not participate significantly in the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment. The substance of their earlier remarks is that Congress had some power, usually by way of the Guarantee Clause, see n. 6, supra, to oversee state voter qualifications. Shellabarger also relied on Art. I, 4, see n. 46, supra; infra, at 210; Julian relied on the Thirteenth Amendment; and Boutwell looked to the Declaration of Independence. The relevance of these views to the scope of 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is not apparent. </s> [Footnote 71 Stevens: see Globe 2459-2460, quoted supra, at 175-177; Globe 3148, quoted at n. 69, supra; James 163 (campaign speech in fall of 1866). Boutwell: see Globe 2508, quoted at n. 33, supra; Globe 3976 (debate over readmission of Tennessee). Sumner did not actually participate in the debates on H. R. 127. However, after the caucus of Republican Senators had agreed on the form of the Amendment, Sumner gave notice that he intended to move to amend the bill accompanying the proposed Amendment. This bill, S. 292, provided that any Confederate State might be readmitted to representation in Congress once the proposed Amendment had become part of the Constitution and the particular State should have ratified it and modified its constitution and laws in conformity therewith. The bill is reprinted in H. R. Rep. No. 30, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., V-VI, and in Kendrick 117-119. Summer's amendment would have provided that a State might be readmitted when it should have ratified the Fourteenth Amendment and modified its constitution and laws in conformity therewith "and shall have further provided that there shall be no denial of the elective franchise to citizens of the United States because of race or color, and that all persons shall be equal before the law." Globe 2869 (emphasis added). Sumner also referred to Negro suffrage as unfinished business in speeches that fall. James 173, 178. </s> [Footnote 72 For citations to the state materials, see Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5, 84-132 (1949). </s> [Footnote 73 Fear that the Amendment would reach voting was expressed in Brevier Legis. Rep. [Indiana] 45-46, 80, 88-89 (1867); Tenn. H. R. J. 38 (Extra Sess. 1866); Fla. S. J. 102 (1866); N.C. S. J. 96-97 (1866-1867); S. C. H. R. J. 34 (1866); and Tex. S. J. 422-423 (1866). The last four States rejected the proposed Amendment. Opponents of the Amendment stated or assumed that it would not reach voting qualifications in Ark. H. R. J. 288-289 (1866); Fla. S. J. 8-9 (1866); Report of the Joint Committee on Federal Relations, Md. H. R. Doc. MM, p. 15 (Mar. 18, 1867); Mass. H. R. Doc. No. 149, pp. 7-9, 16-17 (1867); and Wis. S. J. 102-103 (1867). Fla. H. R. J. 76-78 (1866); Ind. H. R. J. 102-103 (1867); and N. H. S. J. 71-72 (1866) are equivocal. </s> [Footnote 74 "Are not all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction, rightfully citizens of the United States and of each State, and justly entitled to all the political and civil rights citizenship confers? and should any State possess the power to divest them of these great rights except for treason or other infamous crime?" Ill. H. R. J. 40 (1867). </s> [Footnote 75 Ind. H. R. J. 47-48 (1867); Kan. S. J. 45 (1867); Maine S. J. 23 (1867); Mass. H. R. Doc. No. 149, pp. 25-26 (1867); Nev. S. J. App. 9 (1867); Vt. S. J. 28 (1866); W. Va. S. J. 19 (1867); Wis. Assembly J. 33 (1867). </s> [Footnote 76 H. R. Rep. No. 30, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., XIII-XIV (1866). </s> [Footnote 77 I have found references to only two such speeches, one by Senator Hendricks and the other by one George M. Morgan, a candidate for Congress in Ohio. Cincinnati Daily Commercial, Aug. 9, 1866, p. 1, col. 4, quoted in Fairman, supra, n. 14, at 72; Cincinnati Daily Commercial, Aug. 23, 1866, p. 2, col. 3, quoted in Fairman, supra, at 75. </s> [Footnote 78 See Gillette, supra, n. 3, at 25-27. </s> [Footnote 79 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589 (1964) (dissenting opinion). </s> [Footnote 80 Art. IV, 4. See n. 6, supra, for the text. </s> [Footnote 81 The contention that Congress has power to override state judgments as to qualifications for voting in federal elections is discussed infra, at 209-212. </s> [Footnote 82 Amdt. XV: "Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. "Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." Amdt. XIX: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex. "Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." Amdt. XXIV: "Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax. "Sec. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." </s> [Footnote 83 See, e. g., Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966): "Our conclusion, like that in Reynolds v. Sims, [377 U.S. 533 (1964),] is founded not on what we think governmental policy should be, but on what the Equal Protection Clause requires." </s> [Footnote 84 Most of the cases in which this Court has used the Equal Protection Clause to strike down state voter qualifications have been decided since 1965. Eight such cases have been decided by opinion. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970); Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970). Other cases have been summarily disposed of. In none of these cases did the Court advert to the argument based on the historical understanding. Before 1965, although this Court had occasionally entertained on the merits challenges to state voter qualifications under the Equal Protection Clause, only two cases had sustained the challenges. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927), held that a Texas statute limiting participation in the Democratic Party primary to whites violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932), held that Texas did not avoid the reach of the Herndon [400 U.S. 112, 204] decision by transferring to the party's executive committee the power to set qualifications for participation in the primary. In neither of the Nixon cases was the history of the Fourteenth Amendment suggested to the Court. Both cases were argued on the assumption that racial prohibitions on voting in state general elections would violate the Fourteenth as well as the Fifteenth Amendment. This potential line of decisions proved abortive when United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), laid the groundwork for holding that participation in party primaries was included within the "right . . . to vote" protected by the Fifteenth Amendment. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 614 n. 72 (1964) (dissenting opinion). The Nixon opinions were not relied on by the Court in the subsequent white-primary cases, Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), and Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), and they were not even referred to in the recent cases on voter qualifications cited above. </s> [Footnote 85 In this particular instance the other two branches of the Government have in fact expressed conflicting views as to the validity of Title III of the Act, the voting-age provision. See H. R. Doc. No. 91-326 (1970). </s> [Footnote 86 In fact, however, I do not understand how the doctrine of deference to rational constitutional interpretation by Congress, espoused by the majority in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), is consistent with this statement of Chief Justice Marshall or [400 U.S. 112, 205] with our reaffirmation of it in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958): "[Marbury] declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system." </s> [Footnote 87 Contrast Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580 (1935), relied on by my colleagues. In that case the crucial factual issue, on which the record was silent, was whether casualty insurance companies not incorporated in Indiana "generally keep their funds and maintain their business offices, and their agencies for the settlement of claims, outside the state." 294 U.S., at 585 . </s> [Footnote 88 It might well be asked why this standard is not equally applicable to the congressional expansion of the franchise before us. Lowering of voter qualifications dilutes the voting power of those who could meet the higher standard, and it has been held that "the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (footnote omitted). Interference with state control over qualifications for voting in presidential elections in order to encourage interstate migration appears particularly vulnerable to analysis in terms of compelling federal interests. </s> [Footnote 89 Although MR. JUSTICE BLACK rests his decision in part on the assumption that the selection of presidential electors is a "federal" election, the Court held in In re Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379 (1890), and repeated in Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 224 -225 (1952), that presidential electors act by authority of the States and are not federal officials. </s> [Footnote 90 At the time these suits were filed only two of the 50 States, Georgia and Kentucky, allowed 18-year-olds to vote, and only two other States, Hawaii and Alaska, set the voting age below 21. In subsequent referenda, voters in 10 States declined to lower the voting age; five States lowered the voting age to 19 or 20; and Alaska lowered the age from 19 to 18. See the Washington Post, Nov. 5, 1970, p. A13, col. 5. </s> [Footnote 91 "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." </s> [Footnote 92 At the time the Constitution was adopted, additional restrictions based on payment of taxes and ownership of property, as well as creed and sex, were imposed, making the proposition even clearer. </s> [Footnote 93 See Art. II: "Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled." </s> [Footnote 94 The legislative history of the Voting Rights Act Amendments contain sufficient evidence to this effect, if any be needed. </s> [Footnote 95 Cf. 4 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 438, which suspended literacy tests only in areas falling within a coverage formula and allowed reinstatement of the tests upon judicial determination that during the preceding five years no tests had been used with discriminatory purpose or effect. 42 U.S.C. 1973b (a) (1964 ed., Supp. V), amended by Pub. L. No. 91-285 3, 84 Stat. 315. </s> [Footnote 96 I assume that reasonableness is the applicable standard, notwithstanding the fact that the instant legislation is challenged on the ground that it improperly dilutes the votes of literate Arizona citizens. But see Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); n. 88, supra. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL dissent from the judgments insofar as they declare 302 unconstitutional as applied to state and local elections, and concur in the judgments in all other respects, for the following reasons. </s> These cases draw into question the power and judgment of Congress in enacting Titles II and III of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 314. The State of Arizona challenges the power of Congress to impose a nationwide ban, until August 6, 1975, on the use of literacy and certain other tests to limit the franchise in any election. The State of Idaho takes issue with the asserted congressional power to find that the imposition of a durational residence requirement to deny the right to vote in elections for President and Vice President imposes a burden upon the right of free interstate [400 U.S. 112, 230] migration that is not necessary to further a compelling state interest. 1 Finally, the States of Oregon, Texas, Arizona, and Idaho would have us strike down as unreasonable and beyond congressional power the findings, embodied in 301 (a) of the Amendments, that denying the vote to otherwise qualified persons 18 to 21 years of age, while granting it to those 21 years of age and older, violates the Equal Protection Clause and is, in any event, not reasonably related to any compelling state interest. 2 In Nos. 43, Orig., and 44, Orig., Oregon and Texas have invoked our original jurisdiction under Art. III, 2, of the Constitution to restrain the Attorney General of the United States, a citizen of New York, from enforcing the 18-year-old voting provisions of the Amendments. [400 U.S. 112, 231] South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 307 (1966). In Nos. 46, Orig., and 47, Orig., the United States seeks orders enjoining Arizona from enforcing age and literacy limitations on the franchise, 3 and enjoining Idaho from enforcing age, residence, and absentee voting limitations, 4 insofar as those limitations are inconsistent with the 1970 Amendments. Original jurisdiction, again, is founded upon Art. III, 2, of the Constitution. See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 22 (1947). Since, in our view, congressional power to enact the challenged Amendments is found in the enforcement clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and since we may easily perceive a rational basis for the congressional judgments underlying each of them, we would deny relief in Nos. 43, Orig., and 44, Orig., and issue the requested orders in Nos. 46, Orig., and 47, Orig. </s> I </s> The Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 438, 42 U.S.C. 1973 et seq. (1964 ed., Supp. V), proscribed the use of any "test or device," 5 including literacy tests, in States [400 U.S. 112, 232] or their political subdivisions that fell within a coverage formula set forth in 4 (b) of the 1965 Act. 42 U.S.C. 1973b (a), (b) (1964 ed., Supp. V). Although we had previously concluded that literacy tests, fairly administered, violate neither the Fourteenth nor the Fifteenth Amendment, Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board, 360 U.S. 45 (1959), we nevertheless upheld their selective proscription by Congress. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). Canvassing the "voluminous" legislative history of the 1965 Act, we found ample basis for a legislative conclusion that such a proscription was necessary to combat the "insidious and pervasive evil" of racial discrimination with regard to voting. Id., at 308-315. Accordingly, we held the proscription to be well within the power of Congress granted by 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. Id., at 327-334. Three years later, in Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969), we sustained application of the ban on literacy tests to a county where there was no evidence that the test itself was discriminatory or that - at least since 1962 6 - it had been administered in a discriminatory manner. Notwithstanding this fact, we noted that the record did contain substantial evidence that in years past, "Gaston County [had] systematically deprived its black citizens of the educational opportunities it granted to its white citizens." Id., at 297. Since this "in turn deprived them of an equal chance to pass the literacy test," id., at 291, even impartial administration of an impartial test would inevitably result in just the discrimination that Congress [400 U.S. 112, 233] and the Fifteenth Amendment had sought to proscribe. Id., at 296-297; see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S., at 308 , 333-334. </s> No challenge is made in the present cases either to the 1965 Act or to the five-year extension of its ban on "tests or devices" embodied in Title I of the 1970 Amendments. Arizona does, however, challenge 201 of the Amendments, which extends (until August 6, 1975) the 1965 Act's selective ban on the use of "tests or devices" to all States and political subdivisions in which it is not already in force by virtue of the 1965 Act. In substance, Arizona argues that it is and has been providing education of equal quality for all its citizens; that its literacy test is both fair and fairly administered; and that there is no evidence in the legislative record upon which Congress could have relied to reach a contrary conclusion. It urges that to the extent that any citizens of Arizona have been denied the right to vote because of illiteracy resulting from discriminatory governmental practices, the unlawful discrimination has been by governments other than the State of Arizona or its political subdivisions. Arizona, it suggests, should not have its laws overridden to cure discrimination on the part of governmental bodies elsewhere in the country. </s> We need not question Arizona's assertions as to the nondiscriminatory character, past and present, of its educational system. Congressional power to remedy the evils resulting from state-sponsored racial discrimination does not end when the subject of that discrimination removes himself from the jurisdiction in which the injury occurred. "The Constitution was framed under the dominion of a political philosophy less parochial in range. It was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division." Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 , [400 U.S. 112, 234] 523 (1935); see Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173 -176 (1941). In upholding the suspension of literacy tests as applied to Gaston County under the 1965 Act, we could see "no legal significance" in the possibility that adult residents of the county might have received their education "in other counties or States also maintaining segregated and unequal school systems." Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S., at 293 n. 9. 7 </s> The legislative history of the 1970 Amendments contains substantial information upon which Congress could have based a finding that the use of literacy tests in Arizona and in other States where their use was not proscribed by the 1965 Act has the effect of denying the vote to racial minorities whose illiteracy is the consequence of a previous, governmentally sponsored denial of equal educational opportunity. The Attorney General of Arizona told the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights that many older Indians in the State were "never privileged to attend a formal school." 8 Extensive testimony before both Houses indicated that racial minorities have long received inferior educational opportunities throughout the United States. 9 And interstate [400 U.S. 112, 235] migration of such persons, particularly of Negroes from the Southern States, has long been a matter of common knowledge. 10 </s> Moreover, Congress was given testimony explicitly relating the denial of educational opportunity to inability to pass literacy tests in States not covered by the formula contained in the 1965 Act. The United States Commission on Civil Rights reported a survey of the Northern and Western States which concluded that literacy tests have a negative impact upon voter registration which "falls most heavily on blacks and persons of Spanish surname." 11 With regard specifically to Arizona, the Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council testified that a greater percentage of Navajos are registered in New Mexico, which has no literacy test, than in Arizona. 12 </s> In short, there is no question but that Congress could legitimately have concluded that the use of literacy tests anywhere within the United States has the inevitable effect of denying the vote to members of racial minorities whose inability to pass such tests is the direct consequence of previous governmental discrimination in education. Almost five years ago, we found in 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment an ample grant of legislative power for Congress to decree a selective proscription of such tests in certain portions of the country. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S., at 327 -334. We have since held that power ample to cover the proscription of fair literacy tests, fairly administered, which [400 U.S. 112, 236] nevertheless operate to disenfranchise racial minorities because of previous governmental discrimination against them in education. Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S., at 287 , 289-293. Five years of experience with the 1965 Act persuaded Congress that a nationwide ban on literacy and other potentially discriminatory tests was necessary to prevent racial discrimination in voting throughout the country. That conclusion is amply supported in the legislative record and 201 of the 1970 Amendments is accordingly well within the scope of congressional power. </s> II </s> Section 202 of the 1970 Amendments abolishes all durational state residence requirements restricting the right to vote in presidential elections. In their place, Congress has undertaken to prescribe a uniform nationwide system of registration and absentee voting designed to allow all otherwise qualified persons to vote in such elections regardless of the length of time they have lived in a particular jurisdiction. 13 The States are required to keep open their registration rolls for presidential elections until 30 days preceding the election. 202 (d). Persons who have changed their residence within 30 days of the election are, if otherwise qualified, entitled to vote either in person or by absentee ballot in the State of their previous residence, 202 (e), and the States are compelled to permit the casting of absentee ballots by all properly qualified persons who have made application not less than seven days prior to the election, and returned the ballot to the appropriate officials not later than the closing of polls on election day. 202 (b), (d). Provision must also be made by the States to allow absentee registration. 202 (f). [400 U.S. 112, 237] </s> Idaho challenges the power of Congress to enact such legislation insofar as it conflicts with Idaho's statutory and constitutional provisions regarding durational residence requirements for voting; regarding absentee voting; and regarding absentee registration. 14 The State's argument in brief is that the Constitution has left to the States the power to set qualifications for voters in both state and federal elections, subject only to certain explicit limitations such as, for example, those imposed by the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-fourth Amendments. Admitting that unreasonable residence requirements may not withstand judicial scrutiny, Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965), Idaho urges that its 60-day residence requirement is necessary for protection against fraud, and for administrative purposes. In consequence, 202 of the 1970 Amendments is said to be of no weight against these compelling state interests. </s> Whether or not the Constitution vests Congress with particular power to set qualifications for voting in strictly federal elections, 15 we believe there is an adequate constitutional basis for 202 in 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. For more than a century, this Court has recognized the constitutional right of all citizens to unhindered interstate travel and settlement. Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 492 (1849) (Taney, C. J.); Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 43-44 (1868); Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180 (1869); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 -758 (1966); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 -631, 634 (1969). From whatever constitutional provision this right may be said to flow, 16 both its existence [400 U.S. 112, 238] and its fundamental importance to our Federal Union have long been established beyond question. </s> By definition, the imposition of a durational residence requirement operates to penalize those persons, and only those persons, who have exercised their constitutional right of interstate migration. Of course, governmental action that has the incidental effect of burdening the exercise of a constitutional right is not ipso facto unconstitutional. But in such a case, governmental action may withstand constitutional scrutiny only upon a clear showing that the burden imposed is necessary to protect a compelling and substantial governmental interest. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S., at 634 ; United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582 -583 (1968); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 -409 (1963). And once it be determined that a burden has been placed upon a constitutional right, the onus of demonstrating that no less intrusive means will adequately protect compelling state interests is upon the party seeking to justify the burden. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 -526 (1958). </s> In the present case, Congress has explicitly found both that the imposition of durational residence requirements abridges the right of free interstate migration and that such requirements are not reasonably related to any compelling state interests. 1970 Amendments, 202 (a) (2), (6). The latter finding was made with full cognizance of the possibility of fraud and administrative difficulty. Senator Goldwater, testifying at Senate hearings on the bill, pointed out that 40 States presently allow registration until 30 days or less prior to the election. 17 Idaho itself allows registration by those desiring to vote as new residents in presidential elections within 10 days of balloting. Idaho Code 34-409 (1963). And Idaho's assertion of the administrative unfeasibility [400 U.S. 112, 239] of maintaining separate registration lists for fully qualified voters and for those qualified only for presidential balloting is difficult to credit in light of the fact that the Idaho Constitution, Art. 6, 2, itself sets separate qualifications for voting in general and in presidential elections. The provisions for absentee voting, as Senator Goldwater pointed out on the floor of the Senate, were likewise "drawn from the proven practice of the States themselves." 18 Thirty-seven States allow application within a week of the election, and 40 permit the marked ballot to be returned no election day. 19 Finally, Idaho has provided no evidence beyond the mere assertion that the scheme of 202 is inadequate to protect against fraud. But the only kind of fraud asserted is the possibility of dual voting, and Idaho has provided no explanation why the 30-day period between the closing of new registrations and the date of election would not provide, in light of modern communications, adequate time to insure against such frauds. Accordingly, we find ample justification for the congressional conclusion that 202 is a reasonable means for eliminating an unnecessary burden on the right of interstate migration. United States v. Guest, supra. </s> III </s> The final question presented by these cases is the propriety of Title III of the 1970 Amendments, which [400 U.S. 112, 240] forbids the States from disenfranchising persons over the age of 18 because of their age. Congress was of the view that this prohibition, embodied in 302 of the Amendments, was necessary among other reasons in order to enforce the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 301 (a) (2), (b). The States involved in the present litigation question the assertion of congressional power to make that judgment. </s> It is important at the outset to recognize what is not involved in these cases. We are not faced with an assertion of congressional power to regulate any and all aspects of state and federal elections, or even to make general rules for the determination of voter qualifications. Nor are we faced with the assertion that Congress is possessed of plenary power to set minimum ages for voting throughout the States. Every State in the Union has conceded by statute that citizens 21 years of age and over are capable of intelligent and responsible exercise of the right to vote. The single, narrow question presented by these cases is whether Congress was empowered to conclude, as it did, that citizens 18 to 21 years of age are not substantially less able. </s> We believe there is serious question whether a statute granting the franchise to citizens 21 and over while denying it to those between the ages of 18 and 21 could, in any event, withstand present scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Regardless of the answer to this question, however, it is clear to us that proper regard for the special function of Congress in making determinations of legislative fact compels this Court to respect those determinations unless they are contradicted by evidence far stronger than anything that has been adduced in these cases. We would uphold 302 as a valid exercise of congressional power under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. [400 U.S. 112, 241] </s> A </s> All parties to these cases are agreed that the States are given power, under the Constitution, to determine the qualifications for voting in state elections. Art. I, 2; Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board, 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965). But it is now settled that exercise of this power, like all other exercises of state power, is subject to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Carrington v. Rash, supra; Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970). Although it once was thought that equal protection required only that a given legislative classification, once made, be evenly applied, see Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 71 -72 (1887), for more than 70 years we have consistently held that the classifications embodied in a state statute must also meet the requirements of equal protection. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155 (1897); see McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 189 -191 (1964), and cases cited. </s> The right to vote has long been recognized as a "fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968). "Any unjustified discrimination in determining who may participate in political affairs . . . undermines the legitimacy of representative government." Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S., at 626 . Consequently, when exclusions from the franchise are challenged as violating the Equal Protection Clause, judicial scrutiny is not confined to the question whether the exclusion may reasonably be thought to further a permissible interest of the State. [400 U.S. 112, 242] Cf. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 583 -584 (1935). "A more exacting standard obtains." Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S., at 633 . In such cases, "the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest." Id., at 627; Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 704 (1969). </s> In the present cases, the States justify exclusion of 18- to 21-year-olds from the voting rolls solely on the basis of the States' interests in promoting intelligent and responsible exercise of the franchise. 20 There is no reason to question the legitimacy and importance of these interests. But standards of intelligence and responsibility, however defined, may permissibly be applied only to the means whereby a prospective voter determines how to exercise his choice, and not to the actual choice itself. Were it otherwise, such standards could all too easily serve as mere epithets designed to cloak the exclusion of a class of voters simply because of the way they might vote. Cf. Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S., at 422 -423. Such a state purpose is, of course, constitutionally impressible. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S., at 94 . We must, therefore, examine with particular care the asserted connection between age limitations and the admittedly laudable state purpose to further intelligent and responsible voting. </s> We do not lack a starting point for this inquiry. Although the question has never been squarely presented, we have in the past indicated that age is a factor not necessarily irrelevant to qualifications for voting. Lassiter [400 U.S. 112, 243] v. Northampton Election Board, 360 U.S., at 51 ; Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S., at 625 -626. But recognition that age is not in all circumstances a "capricious or irrelevant factor," Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S., at 668 , does not insure the validity of the particular limitation involved here. Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S., at 425 -426. Every State in the Union has concluded for itself that citizens 21 years of age and over are capable of responsible and intelligent voting. Accepting this judgment, there remains the question whether citizens 18 to 21 years of age may fairly be said to be less able. </s> State practice itself in other areas casts doubt upon any such proposition. Each of the 50 States has provided special mechanisms for dealing with persons who are deemed insufficiently mature and intelligent to understand, and to conform their behavior to, the criminal laws of the State. 21 Forty-nine of the States have concluded that, in this regard, 18-year-olds are invariably to be dealt with according to precisely the same standards prescribed for their elders. 22 This at the very least is evidence of a nearly unanimous legislative judgment on the part of the States themselves that differences in maturity and intelligence between 18-year-olds and persons 21 years of age and over are too trivial to warrant specialized treatment for any of the former class in the critically important matter of criminal responsibility. 23 Similarly, [400 U.S. 112, 244] every State permits 18-year-olds to marry, and 39 States do not require parental consent for such persons of one or both sexes. 24 State statutory practice in other areas follows along these lines, albeit not as consistently. 25 </s> Uniform state practice in the field of education points the same way. No State in the Union requires attendance at school beyond the age of 18. Of course, many 18-year-olds continue their education to 21 and beyond. But no 18-year-old who does not do so will be disenfranchised thereby once he reaches the age of 21. 26 </s> [400 U.S. 112, 245] Whether or not a State could in any circumstances condition exercise of the franchise upon educational achievements beyond the level reached by 18-year-olds today, there is no question but that no State purports to do so. Accordingly, that 18-year-olds as a class may be less educated than some of their elders 27 cannot justify restriction of the franchise, for the States themselves have determined that this incremental education is irrelevant to voting qualifications. And finally, we have been cited to no material whatsoever that would support the proposition that intelligence, as opposed to educational attainment, increases between the ages of 18 and 21. </s> One final point remains. No State seeking to uphold its denial of the franchise to 18-year-olds has adduced anything beyond the mere difference in age. We have already indicated that the relevance of this difference is contradicted by nearly uniform state practice in other areas. But perhaps more important is the uniform experience of those States - Georgia since 1943, and Kentucky since 1955 - that have permitted 18-year-olds to vote. 28 We have not been directed to a word of testimony or other evidence that would indicate either that 18-year-olds in those States have voted any less intelligently and responsibly than their elders, or that there is any reasonable ground for belief that 18-year-olds in other States are less able than those in Georgia and Kentucky. On the other hand, every person who spoke to the issue in either the House or Senate was agreed that 18-year-olds [400 U.S. 112, 246] in both States were at least as interested, able, and responsible in voting as were their elders. 29 </s> In short, we are faced with an admitted restriction upon the franchise, supported only by bare assertions and long practice, in the face of strong indications that the States themselves do not credit the factual propositions upon which the restriction is asserted to rest. But there is no reason for us to decide whether, in a proper case, we would be compelled to hold this restriction a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. For as our decisions have long made clear, the question we face today is not one of judicial power under the Equal Protection Clause. The question is the scope of congressional power under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. To that question we now turn. </s> B </s> As we have often indicated, questions of constitutional power frequently turn in the last analysis on questions of fact. This is particularly the case when an assertion of state power is challenged under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For although equal protection requires that all persons "under like circumstances and conditions" be treated alike, Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S., at 71 , such a formulation merely raises, but does not answer the question whether a legislative classification has resulted in different treatment of persons who are in fact "under like circumstances and conditions." </s> Legislatures, as well as courts, are bound by the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 -20 (1958). When a state legislative classification is subjected to judicial challenge as violating the Equal Protection Clause, it comes before the [400 U.S. 112, 247] courts cloaked by the presumption that the legislature has, as it should, acted within constitutional limitations. Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilots, 330 U.S. 552, 556 , 563-564 (1947); see Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S., at 627 -628. Accordingly, "[a] statutory discrimination will not be set aside as the denial of equal protection of the laws if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S., at 584 . </s> But, as we have consistently held, this limitation on judicial review of state legislative classifications is a limitation stemming, not from the Fourteenth Amendment itself, but from the nature of judicial review. It is simply a "salutary principle of judicial decision," Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, supra, at 584, one of the "self-imposed restraints intended to protect [the Court] and the state against irresponsible exercise of [the Court's] unappealable power." Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 282 (1947). The nature of the judicial process makes it an inappropriate forum for the determination [400 U.S. 112, 248] of complex factual questions of the kind so often involved in constitutional adjudication. Courts, therefore, will overturn a legislative determination of a factual question only if the legislature's finding is so clearly wrong that it may be characterized as "arbitrary," "irrational," or "unreasonable." Communist Party v. Control Board, 367 U.S. 1, 94 -95 (1961); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 -154 (1938); Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S., at 583 -584. </s> Limitations stemming from the nature of the judicial process, however, have no application to Congress. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." Should Congress, pursuant to that power, undertake an investigation in order to determine whether the factual basis necessary to support a state legislative discrimination actually exists, it need not stop once it determines that some reasonable men could believe the factual basis exists. Section 5 empowers Congress to make its own determination on the matter. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 654 -656 (1966). It should hardly be necessary to add that if the asserted factual basis necessary to support a given state discrimination does not exist, 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment vests Congress with power to remove the discrimination by appropriate means. Id., at 656-657; Fay v. New York, 332 U.S., at 282 -283; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 -348 (1880). </s> The scope of our review in such matters has been established by a long line of consistent decisions. "It is not for the courts to re-examine the validity of these legislative findings and reject them." Communist Party v. Control Board, 367 U.S., at 94 . "[W]here we find that the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory [400 U.S. 112, 249] scheme necessary . . . our investigation is at an end." Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 303-304 (1964); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S., at 653 ; see Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 529 (1954). 31 </s> This scheme is consistent with our prior decisions in related areas. The core of dispute over the constitutionality of Title III of the 1970 Amendments is a conflict between state and federal legislative determinations of the factual issues upon which depends decision of a federal constitutional question - the legitimacy, under the Equal Protection Clause, of state discrimination against persons between the ages of 18 and 21. Our cases have repeatedly emphasized that, when state and federal claims come into conflict, the primacy of federal power requires that the federal finding of fact control. See England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415 -417 (1964); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 311 -312 (1963); Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397, 406-407 (1872); cf. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 119 (1941). The Supremacy Clause requires an identical result when the conflict is one of legislative, not judicial, findings. </s> Finally, it is no answer to say that Title III intrudes upon a domain reserved to the States - the power to set qualifications for voting. It is no longer open to question that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to this, as to any other, exercise of state power. Kramer v. [400 U.S. 112, 250] Union School District, supra, and cases cited. As we said in answer to a similar contention almost a century ago, "the Constitution now expressly gives authority for congressional interference and compulsion in the cases embraced within the Fourteenth Amendment. It is but a limited authority, true, extending only to a single class of cases; but within its limits it is complete." Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S., at 347 -348. </s> C </s> Our Brother HARLAN has set out in some detail the historical evidence that persuades him that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not believe that the Equal Protection Clause, either through judicial action or through congressional enforcement under 5 of the Amendment, could operate to enfranchise Negroes in States that denied them the vote. Ante, at 154-200. From this he has concluded "that the Fourteenth Amendment was never intended to restrict the authority of the States to allocate their political power as they see fit and therefore that it does not authorize Congress to set voter qualifications, in either state or federal elections." Ante, at 154. This conclusion, if accepted, would seem to require as a corollary that although States may not, under the Fifteenth Amendment, discriminate against Negro voters, they are free so far as the Federal Constitution is concerned to discriminate against Negro or unpopular candidates in any way they desire. Not surprisingly, our Brother HARLAN'S thesis is explicitly disavowed by all the States party to the present litigation, 32 and has been presented to us only in the briefs amici [400 U.S. 112, 251] curiae of Virginia and, perhaps, Mississippi. 33 We could not accept this thesis even if it were supported by historical evidence far stronger than anything adduced here today. But in our view, our Brother HARLAN'S historical analysis is flawed by his ascription of 20th-century meanings to the words of 19th-century legislators. In consequence, his analysis imposes an artificial simplicity upon a complex era, and presents, as universal, beliefs that were held by merely one of several groups competing for political power. We can accept neither his judicial conclusion nor his historical premise that the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment left it within the power of the States to deny the vote to Negro citizens. </s> It is clear that the language of the Fourteenth Amendment, which forbids a State to "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," applies on its face to all assertions of state power, however made. More than 40 years ago, this Court faced for the first time the question whether a State could deny Negroes the right to vote in primary elections. Writing for a unanimous Court, Mr. Justice Holmes observed tartly that "[w]e find it unnecessary to consider the Fifteenth Amendment, because it seems to us hard to imagine a more direct and obvious infringement of the Fourteenth." Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 -541 (1927); see Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 83 , 87-89 (1932) (Cardozo, J.); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964); cf. Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20, 35 -36 (1907). If the broad language of the Equal Protection Clause were to be read as nevertheless allowing the States to deny equal political rights to any citizens they see fit to exclude from the political process, [400 U.S. 112, 252] far more is involved than merely shifting the doctrinal basis of such cases as Nixon v. Herndon from the Fourteenth to the Fifteenth Amendment. For the Fifteenth Amendment applies only to voting, not to the holding of public office; in consequence, our Brother HARLAN'S view would appear to leave the States free to encourage citizens to cast their votes solely on the basis of race (a practice found to violate the Fourteenth Amendment in Anderson v. Martin, supra), or even presumably to deny Negro citizens the right to run for office at all. 34 We cannot believe that the Equal Protection Clause would permit such discrimination. </s> In any event, it seems to us, the historical record will not bear the weight our Brother HARLAN has placed upon it. His examination of the historical background of the Fourteenth Amendment leads him to conclude that it is "clear beyond any reasonable doubt that no part of the legislation now under review can be upheld as a legitimate exercise of congressional power under that Amendment," ante, at 155, because the Amendment was not intended "to restrict the authority of the States to allocate their political power as they see fit." Ante, at 154. Our own reading of the historical background, on the other hand, results in a somewhat imperfect picture of an era of constitutional confusion, confusion that the Amendment did little to resolve. As the leading constitutional historian of the Civil War has observed, constitutional law was characterized during the war years by "a noticeable lack of legal precision" and by "[a] tendency toward irregularity . . . in legislation, and in legal interpretation." J. Randall, Constitutional Problems under Lincoln [400 U.S. 112, 253] 515-516 (rev. ed. 1951). Nor would the postwar period of Reconstruction be substantially different. </s> For several decades prior to the Civil War, constitutional interpretation had been a pressing concern of the Nation's leading statesmen and lawyers, whose attention focused especially on the nature of the relationship of the States to the Federal Government. The onset of the Civil War served only to raise new problems upon which the original Constitution offered, at best, only peripheral guidance. The greatest problem of all, perhaps, was the character of the civil conflict - whether it was to be treated as a rebellion, as a war with a belligerent state, or as some combination of the two. Another issue concerned the scope of federal power to emancipate the slaves; even President Lincoln doubted whether his Emancipation Proclamation would be operative when the war had ended and his special war powers had expired. This particular issue was resolved by the Thirteenth Amendment, but that Amendment only raised new issues, for some men doubted the validity of even a constitutional change upon such a fundamental matter as slavery, particularly while the status of the eleven Confederate States remained unsettled. See id., at 12-24, 59-73, 342-404. </s> The end of the war did not bring an end to difficult constitutional questions. Two perplexing problems remained. The one was the relation of the former Confederate States to the Federal Government; the other was the relation of the former slaves to the white citizens of the Nation. Both were intimately related to the politics of the day, an understanding of which is essential since the Fourteenth Amendment was presented to the Nation as the Republican Party's solution for these problems. See J. James, The Framing of the Fourteenth Amendment 169-173 (1956) (hereafter James). [400 U.S. 112, 254] </s> The starting point must be the key fact that, as of 1860, the Republicans were very much the Nation's minority party. Lincoln had won the Presidency that year with less than 40% of the popular vote, while the Republicans had secured control of Congress only when southern Democrats had left Washington following the secession of their States. The compromise in the original Constitution, by which only three-fifths of the slaves in Southern States were computed in determining representation in the House of Representatives and votes in the electoral college also was a matter of critical importance in 1865; with slavery abolished, southern and hence Democratic power in the House and in the electoral college would increase. The Republicans had calculated this matter rather carefully; as the Chicago Tribune had demonstrated as early as the summer of 1865, the increased southern delegation would need only 29 readily obtainable Democratic votes from the North in order to dominate the House. See James 21-23. But Republicans had no intention of permitting such a Democratic resurgence to occur; in their view, as one Republican Senator observed, Republicans would be "faithless" to their "trust," if they allowed "men who have thus proven themselves faithless" to recover "the very political power which they have hitherto used for the destruction of this Government." Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (hereafter Globe) 2918 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Willey). Whether one looks upon such sentiments as a grasp for partisan political power or as an idealistic determination that the gains of the Civil War not be surrendered, the central fact remains that Republicans found it essential to bar or at least to delay the return of all-white southern delegations to Congress. </s> Temporarily, they proposed to do so by refusing to seat Congressmen from the seceded States. They usually justified their refusal on constitutional grounds, [400 U.S. 112, 255] presenting a variety of theories as to how the former Confederate States had forfeited their rights by secession. See generally E. McKitrick, Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction 93-119 (1960). But exclusion of southern representatives could not be a permanent solution; a better solution seemed to be to elect at least some Republican representatives from the South by enfranchising the only class that could be expected to vote Republican in large numbers - the freedmen. </s> According to the census of 1860, Negroes had constituted some 4,200,000 of the total population of 12,200,000 in the 15 slave States. In two States - Mississippi and South Carolina - Negroes were a substantial majority of the population, while in several other States the population was at least 40% Negro. Thus, Negro suffrage would probably result in a number of Negro and presumably Republican representatives from the South. The difficulty was with the means of bringing Negro suffrage about. Some, including Chief Justice Chase, looked back toward the Emancipation Proclamation and contended that Negro suffrage could be achieved, at least in the South, by means of a presidential proclamation. See James 5-7; 1 W. Fleming, Documentary History of Reconstruction 142 (1906). Others thought congressional legislation the appropriate vehicle for granting the suffrage, see James 13, 52-53; Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, The "Right" to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 Supreme Court Review 33, 49-51, while still others argued for a constitutional amendment. See Cincinnati Daily Commercial, Sept. 19, 1865, in James 11-12 (reporting speech of Cong. Bingham). Disagreement over means, however, was but a minor obstacle in the path of equal suffrage; racial prejudice in the North was a far more significant one. Only five New England States and New York permitted any Negroes to vote [400 U.S. 112, 256] as of 1866, see Van Alstyne, supra, at 70, and extension of the suffrage was rejected by voters in 17 of 19 popular referenda held on the subject between 1865 and 1868. Moreover, Republicans suffered some severe election set-backs in 1867 on account of their support of Negro suffrage. See W. Gillette, The Right to Vote 25-27, 32-38 (1969). </s> Meeting in the winter and spring of 1866 and facing elections in the fall of the same year, the Republicans in Congress thus faced a difficult dilemma: they desperately needed Negro suffrage in order to prevent total Democratic resurgence in the South, yet they feared that by pressing for suffrage they might create a reaction among northern white voters that would lead to massive Democratic electoral gains in the North. Their task was thus to frame a policy that would prevent total southern Democratic resurgence and that simultaneously would serve as a platform upon which Republicans could go before their northern constituents in the fall. What ultimately emerged as the policy and political platform of the Republican Party was the Fourteenth Amendment. 35 </s> As finally adopted, relevant portions of the Fourteenth Amendment read as follows: </s> Sec. 1. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." [400 U.S. 112, 257] </s> Sec. 2. "Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers . . . . But when the right to vote at any election . . . is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State." </s> Sec. 5. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." </s> The key provision on the suffrage question was, of course, 2, which was to have the effect of reducing the representation of any State which did not permit Negroes to vote. Section 1 also began, however, as a provision aimed at securing equality of "political rights and privileges" - a fact hardly surprising in view of Republican concern with the question. In their earliest versions in the Joint Congressional Committee on Reconstruction, which framed the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 and 2 read as follows: </s> "[Sec. 1.] Congress shall have power to make all laws necessary and proper to secure to all citizens of the United States, in every State, the same political rights and privileges; and to all persons in every State equal protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property." B. Kendrick, The Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction 51 (1914) (hereafter Kendrick). </s> "[Sec. 2.] Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States, which [400 U.S. 112, 258] may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers of persons, deducting therefrom all of any race or color, whose members or any of them are denied any of the civil or political rights or privileges." Id., at 43. </s> The question that must now be pursued is whether 1 of the Amendment ever lost its original connection with the suffrage question. </s> It became evident at an early date that the Joint Committee did not wish to make congressional power over the suffrage more explicit than did the language of the original version of the future 1. Six days after that section had been proposed by a subcommittee, the full committee refused to adopt an amendment offered by Senator Howard to make the section refer expressly to "political and elective rights and privileges," id., at 55 (emphasis added), and refused as well to substitute for the language: </s> "Congress shall have power to make all laws necessary and proper to secure to all citizens of the United States in each State the same political rights and privileges; and to all persons in every State equal protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property." </s> the following language offered by Congressman Boutwell: </s> "Congress shall have power to abolish any distinction in the exercise of the elective franchise in any State, which by law, regulation or usage may exist therein." Id., at 54-55. </s> The committee did agree, however, to return the proposal to a special subcommittee, chaired by Congressman John A. Bingham, which at the next meeting of the full committee reported back the following language: </s> "Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure all [400 U.S. 112, 259] persons in every state full protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property; and to all citizens of the United States in any State the same immunities and also equal political rights and privileges." Id., at 56. </s> This language, it seems clear, did not change the meaning of the section as originally proposed, but the next change in language, proposed several days later by Bingham, arguably did. Bingham moved the following substitute: </s> "The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each state all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states (Art. 4, Sec. 2); and to all persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty and property (5th Amendment)." Id., at 61. </s> This substitute was accepted by a committee vote of 7-6. </s> No record of the committee's debates has been preserved, and thus one can only guess whether Bingham's substitute was intended to change the meaning of the original proposal. The breakdown of the committee vote suggests, however, that no change in meaning was intended. The substitute was supported by men of all political views, ranging from Senator Howard and Congressman Boutwell, radicals who had earlier sought to make the section's coverage of suffrage explicit, to Congressman Rogers, a Democrat. Similarly, among the six voting against the substitute were a radical, Stevens; a moderate, Fessenden; and a Democrat, Grider. Id., at 61. Thus, while one might continue to argue that Bingham meant his substitute to do away with congressional power to legislate for the preservation of equal rights of suffrage, one can, with at least equal plausibility, [400 U.S. 112, 260] contend that Bingham sought to do no more than substitute for his earlier specific language more general language which had already appeared elsewhere in the Constitution. 36 </s> Bingham's proposed amendment to the Constitution, as modified, was next submitted to the House of Representatives, where Republicans joined Democrats in attacking it. Republican Representative Hale of New York, for example, thought the amendment "in effect a provision under which all State legislation, in its codes of civil and criminal jurisprudence and procedure, affecting the individual citizen, may be overridden," Globe 1063, while Representative Davis, also a New York Republican, thought it would give Congress power to establish "perfect political equality between the colored and the white race of the South." Id., at 1085. Meanwhile, the New York Times, edited by conservative Republican Congressman Henry J. Raymond, wondered if the proposed Amendment was "simply a preliminary to the enactment of negro suffrage." Feb. 19, 1866. Even the Amendment's supporters recognized that it would confer extensive power upon the Federal Government; Representative Kelley, a Pennsylvania radical, who supported the Amendment, concluded, after a lengthy discussion of the right of suffrage, that "the proposed amendment . . . [was] intended to secure it." Globe 1063. Its proponents, however, could not secure the necessary support for the Amendment in the House and thus were compelled to postpone the matter until a later date, when they failed to bring it again to the floor. Kendrick 215. </s> Meanwhile, the Joint Committee had returned to work and had begun to consider the direct antecedent of the Fourteenth Amendment, a proposal by Robert Dale [400 U.S. 112, 261] Owen which Representative Stevens had placed before the committee. Its relevant provisions were as follows: </s> "Section 1. No discrimination shall be made by any state, nor by the United States, as to the civil rights of persons because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. </s> "Sec. 2. From and after the fourth day of July, in the year one thousand eight hundred and seventy-six, no discrimination shall be made by any state, nor by the United States, as to the enjoyment by classes of persons of the right of suffrage, because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. </s> "Sec. 3. Until the fourth day of July, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-six, no class of persons, as to the right of any of whom to suffrage discrimination shall be made by any state, because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, shall be included in the basis of representation. </s> . . . . . </s> "Sec. 5. Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." Id., at 83-84. </s> Congressman Bingham had not, however, given up on his own favorite proposal, and he immediately moved to add the following new section to the Amendment: </s> "Sec. 5. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id., at 87. </s> His motion was adopted on a 10-to-2 party-line vote, but its adoption was only the beginning of some intricate and inexplicable maneuvering. Four days later, Senator [400 U.S. 112, 262] Williams, an Oregon radical, moved to delete Bingham's section, and his motion was carried by a vote of 7 to 5, with radicals Howard and Boutwell and Democrats Grider and Johnson voting for the motion and Stevens, Bingham, and Democrat Rogers voting against. Bingham then moved to submit his proposal as a separate amendment, but he was supported by only the three Democrats on the committee. The committee then agreed to submit the Owen proposal to Congress with only slight modifications, but postponed the submission until after one further meeting to be held three days hence. Id., at 98-100. </s> At this meeting, the proposed Fourteenth Amendment was substantially rewritten. First, the committee, by a vote of 12 to 2, deleted 2, which had barred States from making racial discriminations in the enjoyment of the right of suffrage after 1876, and conformed 3, so as to insure that it would remain in effect after 1876. After making numerous other changes, the committee then concluded its deliberations by replacing Owen's ban in 1 on discrimination "as to civil rights" with Bingham's now familiar language. Here the vote was 10 to 3, with the majority again containing a full spectrum of political views. Id., at 100-106. The reasons for the rewriting are not entirely clear. The only known explanation was given by Owen in 1875, when he wrote an article recalling a contemporary conversation with Stevens. Stevens had reportedly explained that the committee's original decisions had "got noised abroad," and that, as a result, several state delegations had held caucuses which decided that the explicit references to "negro suffrage, in any shape, ought to be excluded from the platform . . . ." Quoted in id., at 302. Thus, the provision for suffrage after 1876 had to be eliminated, but Stevens did not explain why Bingham's version of 1 was then substituted [400 U.S. 112, 263] for Owen's version. Perhaps the changes in 1 of the Amendment were thought by the committee to be mere linguistic improvements which did not substantially modify Owen's meaning and which did not extend its coverage to political as distinguished from civil rights. But, at the very least the committee must have realized that it was substituting for Owen's rather specific language Bingham's far more elastic language - language that, as one scholar has noted, is far more "capable of growth" and "receptive to `latitudinarian' construction." Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 61, 63 (1955). It is, moreover, at least equally plausible that the committee meant to substitute for Owen's narrow provision dealing solely with civil rights a broader provision that had originated and been understood only two months earlier as protecting equality in the right of suffrage as well as equality of civil rights. </s> The purpose of 1 in relation to the suffrage emerges out of the debates on the floor of Congress with an equal obscurity. In the search for meaning one must begin, of course, with the statements of leading men in Congress, such as Bingham and Howard. Bingham, for one, stated without apparent equivocation that "[t]he amendment does not give . . . the power to Congress of regulating suffrage in the several States." Globe 2542. Similarly, Senator Howard, after noting that the Amendment would accord to Negroes the same protection in their fundamental rights as the law gave to whites, explicitly cautioned that "the first section of the proposed amendment does not give to either of these classes the right of voting." Globe 2766. 37 But such statements are not [400 U.S. 112, 264] as unambiguous as they initially appear to be. Thus, Howard, with that "lack of legal precision" typical of the period, stated that the right of suffrage was not one of the privileges and immunities protected by the Constitution, Globe 2766, immediately after he had read into the record an excerpt from the case of Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (No. 3230) (CCED Pa. 1825), an excerpt which listed the elective franchise as among the privileges and immunities. Globe 2765. Bingham was equally ambiguous, for he too thought that the elective franchise was a constitutionally protected privilege and immunity. Globe 2542. Indeed, at one point in the debates, Bingham made what is for us a completely incongruous statement: </s> "To be sure we all agree, and the great body of the people of this country agree, and the committee thus far in reporting measures of reconstruction agree, that the exercise of the elective franchise, though it be one of the privileges of a citizen of the Republic, is exclusively under the control of the States." Globe 2542. </s> Bingham seemed to say in one breath first, that the franchise was a constitutionally protected privilege in support of which Congress under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment could legislate and then, in the next breath, that the franchise was exclusively under the control of the States. </s> Bingham's words make little sense to modern ears; yet, when they were uttered, his words must have made some sense, at least to Bingham and probably to many of his listeners. The search for their meaning probably [400 U.S. 112, 265] ought to begin with Art. IV, 2 - the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the original Constitution. In the minds of members of the 39th Congress, the leading case to construe that clause was Corfield v. Coryell, supra, which had listed among a citizen's privileges and immunities "the elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the state in which it is to be exercised." 6 F. Cas., at 552. Here again is the same apparent ambiguity that later occurred in Bingham's thought - that the franchise is a federally protected right, but only to the extent it is regulated and established by state law. The ambiguity was, however, only apparent and not real, for the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the original Constitution served a peculiar function; it did not create absolute rights but only placed a noncitizen of a State "upon a perfect equality with its own citizens" as to those fundamental rights already created by state law. Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 407 (1857). Accord, id., at 584 (dissenting opinion). The Privileges and Immunities Clause, that is, was a sort of equal protection clause adopted for the benefit of out-of-state citizens; 38 it required, for example, that if a State gave its own citizens a right to enter into a lawful business, it could not arbitrarily deny the same right to out-of-state citizens solely because they came from out of State. See Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 430 (1871). Thus, what Bingham may have meant in indicating that the franchise was included within the scope of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment while remaining entirely under the control of the States was that, although the States would be free in general to confer the franchise upon whomever they chose, Congress would have power [400 U.S. 112, 266] to bar them from racial or other arbitrary discriminations in making their choices. In short, the Privileges and Immunities Clause might for Bingham have meant the same as the Equal Protection Clause; as he later explained in a campaign speech, 1 was nothing but "a simple, strong, plain declaration that equal laws and equal and exact justice shall hereafter be secured within every State of this Union . . . ." Cincinnati Daily Commercial, Aug. 27, 1866, quoted in James 160. </s> One way, then, to reconcile the seemingly incongruous statements of Bingham is to read him as understanding that, while the Fourteenth Amendment did not take from the States nor grant to Congress plenary power to regulate the suffrage, it did give Congress power to invalidate discriminatory state legislation. In his words, the Amendment took "from no State any right which hitherto pertained to the several States of the Union, but it impose[d] a limitation upon the States to correct their abuses of power." Ibid. Others had a similar understanding. Thus, for Charles Summer, "Equality of political rights . . . [did] not involve necessarily what is sometimes called the `regulation' of the suffrage by the National Government, although this would be best . . . [but] simply require[d] the abolition of any discrimination among citizens, inconsistent with Equal Rights." C. Summer, Are We a Nation? 34 (1867). Or, as Stevens explained in presenting the Amendment to the House, it merely allowed "Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States, so far that the law which operates upon one man shall operate equally upon all." Globe 2459 (emphasis in original). Clearest of all, perhaps was Thomas M. Cooley in the 1871 edition of his Constitutional Limitations, where he wrote: </s> "This amendment of the Constitution does not concentrate power in the general government for [400 U.S. 112, 267] any purpose of police government within the States; its object is to preclude legislation by any State which shall `abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,' or `deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,' or `deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws'; and Congress is empowered to pass all laws necessary to render such unconstitutional State legislation ineffectual." T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 294 (2d ed. 1871). </s> There is also other evidence that at least some members of Congress and of the electorate believed that 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress power to invalidate discriminatory state regulations of the suffrage. Thus, Congressman Rogers, a Democrat who had served on the Joint Committee, agreed with Bingham and Howard that "[t]he right to vote is a privilege," Globe 2538, while Congressman Boyer, another Democrat, feared that 1 was "intended to secure ultimately, and to some extent indirectly, the political equality of the negro race." Globe 2467. A third Democrat, Congressman Niblack, thought the section sufficiently ambiguous to warn that he might, although in fact he never did, offer the following addition to it: </s> "Provided, That nothing contained in this article shall be so construed as to authorize Congress to regulate or control the elective franchise within any State, or to abridge or restrict the power of any State to regulate or control the same within its own jurisdiction, except as in the third section hereof prescribed." Globe 2465. </s> Republicans also alluded on occasion to their belief that the Amendment might give Congress power to prevent discrimination in regard to the suffrage. Radical [400 U.S. 112, 268] Senator Stewart, for example, while unhappy that the Amendment did not directly confer suffrage, nevertheless could "support this plan" because it did "not preclude Congress from adopting other means by a two-thirds vote, 39 when experience shall have demonstrated, as it certainly will, the necessity for a change of policy. In fact it furnishes a conclusive argument in favor of universal amnesty and impartial suffrage." Globe 2964. Likewise, the more conservative Congressman Raymond of New York supported the first section because he thought Congress should have the power to legislate on behalf of equal rights "in courts and elsewhere," Globe 2513, after the radical Congressman Wilson of Iowa had informed him that, "if we give a reasonable construction to the term `elsewhere,' we may include in that the jury-box and the ballot-box." Globe 2505. Congressman Stevens, meanwhile, was informing Congress that "if this amendment prevails you must legislate to carry out many parts of it," Globe 2544, and was looking forward to "further legislation; in enabling acts or other provisions," Globe 3148, while even the Joint Committee submitted the Amendment to the Nation "in the hope that its imperfections may be cured, and its deficiencies supplied, by legislative wisdom . . . ." Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, H. R. Rep. No. 30, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., xxi (1866). Nor did the radical Republican press disagree; as the Lansing State Republican argued in its editorial columns, even "[i]f impartial suffrage, the real vital question of the whole struggle . . . [was] postponed through the mulish obstinacy of Andrew Johnson," "freedom" would "triumph by the adoption of the proposed [400 U.S. 112, 269] amendment," which would be followed by "equal rights to all . . . ." July 11, 1866. And, of course, once the Amendment had been ratified, Republicans in Congress began to make speeches in favor of legislation which would implement the Amendment by guaranteeing equal suffrage. See, e. g., Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 1966-1967 (1868) (remarks of Cong. Stevens); 3d Sess., 1008 (1869) (remarks of Sen. Sumner). </s> Of course, few of the above statements taken from congressional debates, campaign speeches, and the press were made with such clarity and precision that we can know with certainty that its framers intended the Fourteenth Amendment to function as we think they did. But clarity and precision are not to be expected in an age when men are confronting new problems for which old concepts do not provide ready solutions. As we have seen, the 1860's were such an age, and the men who formulated the Fourteenth Amendment were facing an especially perplexing problem - that of creating federal mechanisms to insure the fairness of state action without in the process destroying the reserved powers of the States. It would, indeed, be surprising if the men who first faced this difficult problem were possessed of such foresight that they could debate its solution with complete clarity and consistency and with uniformity of views. There is, in short, every reason to believe that different men reconciled in different and often imprecise ways the Fourteenth Amendment's broad guarantee of equal rights and the statements of some of its framers that it did not give Congress power to legislate upon the suffrage. </s> Some men, for example, might have reconciled the broad guarantee and the narrow language by concluding that Negroes were not yet ready to exercise the franchise and hence that a State would not act arbitrarily [400 U.S. 112, 270] in denying it to them while granting it to whites. As the debates make clear, proponents of the Amendment did not understand the Equal Protection Clause to forbid States to distinguish among persons where justification for distinctions appeared. See, e. g., Globe 1064 (Congressman Stevens). At the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, the overwhelming majority of Negro residents of the United States were former slaves living in the Southern States. Most of them were illiterate and uneducated. Except for those few who had been kidnaped by slave traders after reaching adulthood, they had no prior experience with the responsibilities of citizenship. Given this state of affairs, it would hardly be surprising if some of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment felt that the Equal Protection Clause would not forbid the States from classifying Negroes as a group to be denied the right to vote. Equal protection has never been thought to require identical treatment of all persons in all respects. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S., at 583 -584, and cases cited. It requires only that the State provide adequate justification for treating one group differently from another. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). Entirely aside from any concepts of racial inequality that may have been held by some members of Congress at that time, it seems clear that many members had serious reservations about the ability of the majority of Negroes, after centuries of slavery, to cast an intelligent and responsible vote. See, for example, the debates over a proposal to enfranchise Negroes in the District of Columbia in Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., 2140-2141, 2239-2243, 2248 (1864). Of course, we would not now hold that even the situation existing in 1866 would justify wholesale exclusion of Negroes from the franchise: our decisions have consistently held that a particular group may not be denied the right to vote merely [400 U.S. 112, 271] because many, or even most, of its members could properly be excluded. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S., at 93 -96; Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S., at 632 -633; Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S., at 424 -426; cf. Tussman & TenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341, 351-352 (1949). But mere administrative convenience was once thought to be sufficient justification for an overly broad legislative classification, so long at least as the resultant discrimination could be justified as to a majority of the class affected. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 218 -222 (1923); cf. Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilots, 330 U.S. 552 (1947). Rejection of this approach has been the result of a judicial development that could hardly have been known to the framers of the Amendment. Cf. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 114 -115 (1966). </s> Of course, many Americans in the 1860's rejected imputations that Negroes were unready for the franchise and thus concluded that distinctions between the races in regard to the franchise would constitute denials of equal protection. Congressman Stevens, for one, had no doubt that to allow a State to deny the franchise to Negroes would be to allow it "to discriminate among the same class." Globe 2460. And Negroes, of course, indignantly rejected such imputations, arguing that "[w]e are not all so illiterate as you suppose" and that "even if we were, our instincts have proved better than that `educated class,' whose `little learning' prompted them to attempt the impossible thing of destroying this great Republic . . . ." Letter to the Editor, New York Times, Nov. 4, 1866. </s> Among the men who refused to regard Negroes as ill prepared for the exercise of the franchise, there may have been some who did not understand the subtle distinctions of constitutional lawyers such as Bingham and who thus [400 U.S. 112, 272] accepted at face value assurances that the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress no power over the suffrage. As a result, at least three identifiable groups may have existed within the Republican majorities that enacted and ratified the Amendment - those who thought that Congress would have power to insure to Negroes the same right to suffrage as the States gave to whites, those who thought that Congress would not have such power since Negroes and whites constituted distinct and dissimilar classes for voting purposes, and those who thought Congress would possess no power at all over the suffrage. Perhaps all three such groups did not exist in 1866 in Congress and in the Nation at large, but surely the evidence is not clear "beyond any reasonable doubt" that the only existent group was the last one, consisting of men who, despite the broad language of 1 and the hints by speakers of its applicability to the suffrage, simply assumed without developing any analytical framework in support of their assumption that the section would not be so applied. </s> The evidence, in sum, plausibly suggests that the men who framed the Fourteenth Amendment possessed differing views as to the limits of its applicability but that they papered over their differences because those differences were not always fully apparent and because they could not foresee with precision how their amendment would operate in the future. Moreover, political considerations militated against clarification of issues and in favor of compromise. Much of the North, as already noted, opposed Negro suffrage, and many Republicans in Congress had to seek re-election from constituencies where racial prejudice remained rampant. Republicans in the forthcoming elections thus found it convenient to speak differently before different constituencies; as the Republican state chairman of Ohio wrote, in northern counties of the State "some of our Speakers have openly [400 U.S. 112, 273] advocated impartial suffrage, while in other places it was thought necessary, not only to repudiate it but to oppose it." Letter from B. R. Cowan to S. P. Chase, Oct. 12, 1866, quoted in James 168. Similarly, Senator Wilson of Massachusetts, when accused shortly after the 1866 elections of misrepresenting the issues of the campaign in Delaware by saying nothing of Negro suffrage, replied that since he had been "in a State where not much progress had been made, I acted somewhat on the scriptural principle of giving `milk to babes.'" Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2d Sess., 42. Apparently Congressman Ashley of Ohio acted upon similar principles, for when he was asked after the House had initially approved the Amendment whether Congress had "power to confer the right of suffrage upon negroes in the States," he responded, </s> "Well, sir, I do not intend to put myself on record against the right of Congress to do that. I am not prepared now to argue the point with my colleague; but I will say to him that when the time comes for the American Congress to take action on the question, I will be ready to speak. I will not say now whether I would vote for or against such a proposition." Globe 2882. </s> Thus, precise legal analysis and clarity of thought were both intellectually difficult and politically unwise. What Republicans needed, in the words of Wendell Phillips, the former abolitionist leader, was "a party trick to tide over the elections and save time," after which they could "float back into Congress, able to pass an act that shall give the ballot to the negro and initiate an amendment to the Constitution which shall secure it to him." Speech of Wendell Phillips, July 4, 1866, quoted in A. Harris, A Review of the Political Conflict in America 437 (1876). Similarly, the New York Times, edited by Congressman Henry J. Raymond, a conservative Republican who [400 U.S. 112, 274] ultimately would support the Amendment, observed that "all the excitement that had been raised about constitutional amendments . . . has been simply dust thrown in the eyes of the public to cover the approach to the grand fundamental, indispensable principle of universal negro suffrage . . . ." April 27, 1866, quoted in Harris, supra, at 433. </s> Not surprisingly, the product of such political needs was an Amendment which contemporaries saw was vague and imprecise. Democratic Senator Hendricks, for example, protested that he had "not heard any Senator accurately define, what are the rights and immunities of citizenship," Globe 3039, while Congressman Boyer, another Democrat, found the first section "objectionable also in its phraseology, being open to ambiguity and admitting of conflicting constructions." Globe 2467. Republicans, too, were aware of the Amendment's vagueness. Thus, when he presented the Amendment to the Senate, Senator Howard noted that "[i]t would be a curious question to solve what are the privileges and immunities of citizens" and proposed not to consider the question at length, since "[i]t would be a somewhat barren discussion." Instead, like the pre-Civil War Supreme Court, 40 he "very modestly declined to go into a definition of them, leaving questions arising under the clause to be discussed and adjudicated when they should happen practically to arise." Globe 2765. </s> Thus, the historical evidence does not point to a single, clear-cut conclusion that contemporaries viewed the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment as an explicit abandonment of the radical goal of equal suffrage for Negroes. Rather the evidence suggests an alternative hypothesis: that the Amendment was framed by men who possessed differing views on the great question of the [400 U.S. 112, 275] suffrage and who, partly in order to formulate some program of government and partly out of political expediency, papered over their differences with the broad, elastic language of 1 and left to future interpreters of their Amendment the task of resolving in accordance with future vision and future needs the issues that they left unresolved. Such a hypothesis strikes us as far more consistent with the turbulent character of the times than one resting upon a belief that the broad language of the Equal Protection Clause contained a hidden limitation upon its operation that would prevent it from applying to state action regulating rights that could be characterized as "political." 41 </s> Nor is such a hypothesis inconsistent with the subsequent enactment of the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-fourth Amendments. Those who submitted the Fifteenth Amendment to the States for ratification could well have desired that any prohibition against racial discrimination in voting stand upon a firmer foundation than mere legislative action capable of repeal 42 or the vagaries of judicial decision. 43 Or they could merely have concluded that, whatever might be the case with other rights, the right to vote was too important to allow disenfranchisement of any person for no better reason [400 U.S. 112, 276] than that others of the same race might not be qualified. At least some of the supporters of the Nineteenth Amendment believed that sex discrimination in voting was itself proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection. 57 Cong. Rec. 3053 (1919). And finally, the Twenty-fourth Amendment was not proposed to the States until this Court had held, in Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937), 44 that state laws requiring payment of a poll tax as a pre-requisite to voting did not ipso facto violate the Equal Protection Clause. Accordingly, we see no reason that the mere enactment of these amendments can be thought to imply that their proponents believed the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to state allocations of political power. At a dubious best, these amendments may be read as implying that their proponents felt particular state allocations of power a proper exercise of power under the Equal Protection Clause. </s> Nor do we find persuasive our Brother HARLAN'S argument that 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended as an exclusive remedy for state restrictions on the franchise, and that therefore any such restrictions are permissible under 1. As Congressman Bingham emphatically told the House, when the same argument was made by Congressman Bromwell, </s> "there has not been such a construction, in my opinion, of a law which imposes only a penalty, for centuries, if ever, in any country where the common law obtains. The construction insisted upon by the gentleman amounts to this, that a law which inflicts a penalty or works a forfeiture for doing an act, by implication authorizes the act to be done for doing which the penalty is inflicted. There [400 U.S. 112, 277] cannot be such a construction of the proviso. It is a penalty. It says in terms that if any of the States of the United States shall disobey the Constitution . . . as a penalty such State shall lose political power in this House . . . . </s> . . . . . </s> "You place upon your statute-book a law punishing the crime of murder with death. You do not thereby, by implication, say that anybody may, of right, commit murder. You but pass a penal law. You do not prohibit murder in the Constitution; you guaranty life in the Constitution. You do not prohibit the abuse of power by the majority in the Constitution in express terms, but you guaranty the equal right of all free male citizens of full age to elect Representatives; and by the proviso you inflict a penalty upon a State which denies or abridges that right on account of race or color. In doing that we are not to be told that we confer a power to override the express guarantees of the Constitution. We propose the penalty in aid of the guarantee, not in avoidance of it." Globe 431-432. </s> See Van Alstyne, supra, at 48-68. </s> It may be conceivable that 2 was intended to be the sole remedy available when a State deprived its citizens of their right to vote, but it is at least equally plausible that congressional legislation pursuant to 1 and 5 was thought by the framers of the Amendment to be another potential remedy. Section 2, in such a scheme, is hardly superfluous: it was of critical importance in assuring that, should the Southern States deny the franchise to Negroes, the Congress called upon to remedy that discrimination would not be controlled by the beneficiaries of discrimination themselves. And it could, of course, have been expected to provide at least a limited remedy [400 U.S. 112, 278] in the event that both Congress and the courts took no action under 1. Neither logic nor historical evidence compellingly suggests that 2 was intended to be more than a remedy supplementary, and in some conceivable circumstances indispensable, to other congressional and judicial remedies available under 1 and 5. See generally Van Alstyne, supra. </s> The historical record left by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, because it is a product of differing and conflicting political pressures and conceptions of federalism, is thus too vague and imprecise to provide us with sure guidance in deciding the pending cases. We must therefore conclude that its framers understood their Amendment to be a broadly worded injunction capable of being interpreted by future generations in accordance with the vision and needs of those generations. We would be remiss in our duty if, in an attempt to find certainty amidst uncertainty, we were to misread the historical record and cease to interpret the Amendment as this Court has always interpreted it. </s> D </s> There remains only the question whether Congress could rationally have concluded that denial of the franchise to citizens between the ages of 18 and 21 was unnecessary to promote any legitimate interests of the States in assuring intelligent and responsible voting. There is no need to set out the legislative history of Title III at any great length here. 45 Proposals to lower the voting age to 18 had been before Congress at several times since 1942. 46 The Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional [400 U.S. 112, 279] Amendments conducted extensive hearings on the matter in 1968 and again in 1970, 47 and the question was discussed at some length on the floor of both the House and the Senate. </s> Congress was aware, of course, of the facts and state practices already discussed. 48 It was aware of the opinion of many historians that choice of the age of 21 as the age of maturity was an outgrowth of medieval requirements of time for military training and development of a physique adequate to bear heavy armor. 49 It knew that whereas only six percent of 18-year-olds in 1900 had completed high school, 81 percent have done so today. 50 Congress was aware that 18-year-olds today make up a not insubstantial proportion of the adult work force; 51 and it was entitled to draw upon its experience in supervising the federal establishment to determine the competence and responsibility with which 18-year-olds perform their assigned tasks. As Congress recognized, its judgment that 18-year-olds are capable of voting is consistent with its practice of entrusting them with the heavy responsibilities of military service. See 301 (a) (1) of the Amendments. 52 Finally, Congress was presented [400 U.S. 112, 280] with evidence that the age of social and biological maturity in modern society has been consistently decreasing. Dr. Margaret Mead, an anthropologist, testified that in the past century, the "age of physical maturity has been dropping and has dropped over 3 years." 53 Many Senators and Representatives, including several involved in national campaigns, testified from personal experience that 18-year-olds of today appeared at least as mature and intelligent as 21-year-olds in the Congressmen's youth. 54 </s> Finally, and perhaps most important, Congress had before it information on the experience of two States, Georgia and Kentucky, which have allowed 18-year-olds to vote since 1943 and 1955, respectively. Every elected Representative from those States who spoke to the issue agreed that, as Senator Talmadge stated, "young people [in these States] have made the sophisticated decisions and have assumed the mature responsibilities of voting. Their performance has exceeded the greatest hopes and expectations." 55 </s> In sum, Congress had ample evidence upon which it could have based the conclusion that exclusion of citizens 18 to 21 years of age from the franchise is wholly unnecessary to promote any legitimate interest the States may have in assuring intelligent and responsible voting. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S., at 653 -656. If discrimination is unnecessary to promote any legitimate state interest, it is plainly unconstitutional [400 U.S. 112, 281] under the Equal Protection Clause, and Congress has ample power to forbid it under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. We would uphold 302 of the 1970 Amendments as a legitimate exercise of congressional power. </s> [Footnote 1 Section 202 (a) of the Amendments embodies a congressional finding that "the imposition and application of the durational residency requirement as a precondition to voting for the offices of President and Vice President, and the lack of sufficient opportunities for absentee registration and absentee balloting in presidential elections - . . . . . "(2) denies or abridges the inherent constitutional right of citizens to enjoy their free movement across State lines; . . . . . "(6) does not bear a reasonable relationship to any compelling State interest in the conduct of presidential elections." </s> [Footnote 2 Section 301 (a) of the Amendments provides: "The Congress finds and declares that the imposition and application of the requirement that a citizen be twenty-one years of age as a precondition to voting in any primary or in any election - "(1) denies and abridges the inherent constitutional rights of citizens eighteen years of age but not yet twenty-one years of age to vote - a particularly unfair treatment of such citizens in view of the national defense responsibilities imposed upon such citizens; "(2) has the effect of denying to citizens eighteen years of age but not yet twenty-one years of age the due process and equal protection of the laws that are guaranteed to them under the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution; and "(3) does not bear a reasonable relationship to any compelling State interest." </s> [Footnote 3 Arizona Constitution, Art. 7, 2, limits the franchise to those 21 years of age and older. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 16-101 (Supp. 1970) requires voters to be able to read the Federal Constitution (in English), and to write their names. </s> [Footnote 4 Idaho Constitution, Art. 6, 2, requires all voters to be 21 years of age or older, and requires 60 days' residence within the State as a precondition to voting in presidential elections. Idaho Code 34-408 (1963) further requires that 60-day residents have been citizens of another State prior to their removal to Idaho. Provisions for absentee balloting are contained in id., 34-1101 to 34-1125. </s> [Footnote 5 Section 4 (c) of the 1965 Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973b (c) (1964 ed., Supp. V), defines a "test or device" as "any requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting (1) demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter, (2) demonstrate any educational achievement or his knowledge of any particular subject, (3) possess good moral character, or (4) prove his qualifications by the voucher of registered voters or members of any other class." </s> [Footnote 6 Gaston County was a suit by the county under 4 (a) of the 1965 Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973b (a) (1964 ed., Supp. V), to reinstate the county's literacy test. The county would have been entitled to do so upon demonstration that, for the preceding five years, no "test or device" had been there used for the purpose or with the effect of abridging the right to vote on account of race or color. </s> [Footnote 7 We there reserved only the question of the application of the 1965 Act to suspend literacy tests "in the face of racially disparate educational or literacy achievements for which a government bore no responsibility." 395 U.S., at 293 n. 8 (emphasis supplied). </s> [Footnote 8 Hearings on Amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., 675 (1969-1970) (hereafter Senate Hearings). Schooling of Indians has for some time been the responsibility of the Federal Government. See Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission, 380 U.S. 685, 690 -691 (1965). </s> [Footnote 9 E. g., Senate Hearings 185-187; Hearings on the Voting Rights Act Extension before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 3, pp. 55-57, 223-225 (1969) (hereafter House Hearings). </s> [Footnote 10 For example, 1960 census data indicate that from 1955 to 1960, 4,388 blacks moved from Southern States to Arizona, 74,804 to California, and 74,821 to New York. Table 100 in 1 1960 Census of Population, pts. 4, 6, and 34. </s> [Footnote 11 Senate Hearings 399; see id., at 400-407. </s> [Footnote 12 Senate Hearings 678. Tribal Chairman Nakai viewed Arizona's literacy test as the primary cause of this disparity. </s> [Footnote 13 The States are permitted, should they desire, to adopt practices less restrictive than those prescribed by the 1970 Amendments. 202 (g). </s> [Footnote 14 See n. 4, supra. </s> [Footnote 15 See the opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, ante, at 148-150. </s> [Footnote 16 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S., at 630 and n. 8; United States v. Guest, 383 U.S., at 757 -758. </s> [Footnote 17 Senate Hearings 282. </s> [Footnote 18 116 Cong. Rec. 6991. </s> [Footnote 19 Ibid. Idaho Code 34-1101, 34-1102, 34-1103 appear to allow application to be made at any time. Id., 34-1121 allows application up to five days before the election for persons in United States service. The ballot may be returned any time prior to noon on election day, id., 34-1105 (Supp. 1969). Finally, effective January 1, 1971, applications may be made up to 5 p. m. the day before the election. Id., 34-1002 (Supp. 1970). In such circumstances, the argument of administrative impossibility from the viewpoint of Idaho seems almost chimerical. </s> [Footnote 20 Idaho, in addition, claims that its interest in setting qualifications for voters in its own elections serves, without more, as a compelling state interest sufficient to justify the challenged exclusion. But there is no state interest in the mere exercise of power; the power must be exercised for some reason. The only reason asserted by Idaho for the exercise of its power is that already mentioned - promotion of intelligent and responsible voting. </s> [Footnote 21 116 Cong. Rec. 6970 (Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service survey). </s> [Footnote 22 Ibid. </s> [Footnote 23 Nor does the California statute, Cal. Welf. & Inst'ns Code 602 (1966), necessarily evidence a contrary conclusion. California permits its juvenile court to waive jurisdiction of persons over the age of 16 to the regular criminal courts, and state practice appears to be that very few if any felony defendants over the age of 18 are ever tried as juveniles. R. Boches & J. Goldfarb, California Juvenile Court Practice 35-36 (1968). This may well indicate that the California [400 U.S. 112, 244] statute reflects merely a legislative conclusion that the slight burden of waiver hearings is outweighed by the possibility, however slight, that a very few individuals between the ages of 18 and 21 might in fact be more appropriately treated as juveniles. </s> [Footnote 24 116 Cong. Rec. 6970. </s> [Footnote 25 For example, in California any woman 18 years old may marry without parental consent, and any man of that age may marry with the consent of one parent. Cal. Civ. Code 4101 (1970). Any married person who has attained the age of 18 is treated in precisely the same way as all persons of the age of 21 and over with regard to all provisions of the Civil Code, Probate Code, and Code of Civil Procedure, as well as for the purposes of making contracts or entering into any agreement regarding property or his estate. Cal. Civ. Code 25 (Supp. 1970). The State Labor Department treats males of the age of 18 and over as adults. Cal. Labor Code 1172, 3077 (1955). Persons of the age of 18 and over may serve civil process in the State. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 410 (Supp. 1970). </s> [Footnote 26 Some States, of course, do attempt to condition exercise of the franchise upon the ability to pass a literacy test. Presumably some 18-year-old illiterates will be literate at 21. But in light of the fact that 81 percent of the disenfranchised class are high school graduates, it would seem that the number of 18-year-old illiterates who are literate three years later is vanishingly small. See Hearings on S. J. Res. 147 and Others before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 133 (1970) (Sen. Goldwater). Of course, for reasons that apply as well to 18-year-olds as to others, we have today upheld a nationwide suspension of all literacy tests. Ante, at 118. But in any event, that some 18-year-olds may be illiterate is hardly sufficient reason for disenfranchising the entire class. See Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S., at 632 -633. </s> [Footnote 27 Eighteen-year-olds as a class are better educated than some of their elders. The median number of school years completed by 18- and 19-year-olds two years ago was 12.2; it was 8.8 for persons 65 to 74. Bureau of the Census, Educational Attainment, table 1 (Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 182) (1969). </s> [Footnote 28 Hawaii and Alaska have, since their admission to the Union in 1959, allowed the vote to 19-year-olds (Alaska) and 20-year-olds (Hawaii). </s> [Footnote 29 See, e. g., 116 Cong. Rec. 6433-6434 (Sen. Cook), 6929-6930 (Sens. Talmadge and Ervin); Senate Hearings 343 (Gov. Maddox). </s> [Footnote 30 The state of facts necessary to justify a legislative discrimination will of course vary with the nature of the discrimination involved. When we have been faced with statutes involving nothing more than state regulation of business practices, we have often found mere administrative convenience sufficient to justify the discrimination. E. g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487 , 488-489 (1955). But when a discrimination has the effect of denying or inhibiting the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights, we have required that it be not merely convenient, but necessary. Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S., at 627 ; Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S., at 96 ; see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582 -583 (1968). And we have required as well that it be necessary to promote not merely a constitutionally permissible state interest, but a state interest of substantial importance. Kramer v. Union School District, supra; Carrington v. Rash, supra; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 -490 (1960); see United States v. O'Brien, supra. </s> [Footnote 31 As we emphasized in Katzenbach v. Morgan, supra, " 5 does not grant Congress power to . . . enact `statutes so as in effect to dilute equal protection and due process decisions of this Court.'" 384 U.S., at 651 n. 10. As indicated above, a decision of this Court striking down a state statute expresses, among other things, our conclusion that the legislative findings upon which the statute is based are so far wrong as to be unreasonable. Unless Congress were to unearth new evidence in its investigation, its identical findings on the identical issue would be no more reasonable than those of the state legislature. </s> [Footnote 32 Brief for the State of Oregon 10-13; Brief for the State of Texas 10-12; Brief for the State of Arizona 19; Brief for the State of Idaho 22, 28-30. </s> [Footnote 33 Brief amicus curiae for the Commonwealth of Virginia 13-22; see Brief amicus curiae for the State of Mississippi 7-11. </s> [Footnote 34 Indeed, since the First Amendment is applicable to the States only through the Fourteenth, our Brother HARLAN'S view would appear to allow a State to exclude any unpopular group from the political process solely upon the basis of its political opinions. </s> [Footnote 35 Republicans explicitly looked upon the Fourteenth Amendment as a political platform. See 2 F. Fessenden, Life and Public Services of William Pitt Fessenden 62 (1907); B. Kendrick, The Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction 302 (1914). See also infra, at 262. </s> [Footnote 36 The language appears earlier in Art. IV, 2. </s> [Footnote 37 As the statements of Bingham and Howard in the text indicate, the framers of the Amendment were not always clear whether they understood it merely as a grant of power to Congress or whether they thought, in addition, that it would confer power upon the [400 U.S. 112, 264] courts, which the courts would use to achieve equality of rights. Since 5 is clear in its grant of power to Congress and we have consistently held that the Amendment grants power to the courts, this issue is of academic interest only. </s> [Footnote 38 According to Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180 (1869), the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Art. 4, 2, secured to citizens "in other States the equal protection of their laws." </s> [Footnote 39 Senator Stewart's statement regarding the two-thirds requirement appears to refer to 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires such a majority for legislation granting amnesty to former Confederate leaders. </s> [Footnote 40 This Court had taken such an approach in Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 591 (1856). </s> [Footnote 41 Ironically, the same distinction between "political" and other rights was drawn by this Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 545 -546 (1896). But the Court there concluded, directly contrary to our Brother HARLAN'S position, that the Fourteenth Amendment applied to "political" rights and to those rights only. </s> [Footnote 42 As Thaddeus Stevens had pointed out in urging passage of the Fourteenth Amendment despite the fact that, he felt, some of its guarantees could be enforced by mere legislative enactment, "a law is repealable by a majority." Globe 2459. </s> [Footnote 43 Radical disenchantment with decisions of this Court had led, prior to the Fifteenth Amendment, to the Act of March 27, 1868, 15 Stat. 44, withdrawing our appellate jurisdiction over certain habeas corpus cases. See Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 508, 514-515 (1869). </s> [Footnote 44 Breedlove has been overruled by Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966). </s> [Footnote 45 For a full collection of the relevant materials, see Note, Legislative History of Title III of the Voting Rights Act of 1970, 8 Harv. J. Legis. 123 (1970). </s> [Footnote 46 See 88 Cong. Rec. 8312, 8316 (1942). </s> [Footnote 47 Hearings on S. J. Res. 8, 14, and 78 before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); Hearings on S. J. Res. 147 and Others before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (hereafter 1970 Hearings). </s> [Footnote 48 Supra, at 242-246. </s> [Footnote 49 See 116 Cong. Rec. 6955; James, The Age of Majority, 4 Am. J. Legal Hist. 22 (1960); Report of the Committee on the Age of Majority Presented to the English Parliament 21 (1967). </s> [Footnote 50 116 Cong. Rec. 6435. </s> [Footnote 51 16 Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, table A-3 (June 1970). </s> [Footnote 52 See also Senate Hearings 323 (Sen. Kennedy), 116 Cong. Rec. 5950-5951 (Sen. Mansfield); 6433 (Sen. Cook). See generally Note, supra, n. 45, at 134-148. </s> [Footnote 53 1970 Hearings at 223. Dr. W. Walter Menninger, a psychiatrist, and Dr. S. I. Hayakawa agreed. Id., at 23, 36. </s> [Footnote 54 E. g., 116 Cong. Rec. 5950-5951 (Sen. Mansfield); 6433-6434 (Sen. Cook); 6434-6437 (Sen. Goldwater); 6929-6930 (Sen. Talmadge, joined by Sen. Ervin); 6950-6951 (Sen. Tydings). </s> [Footnote 55 116 Cong. Rec. 6929. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. </s> In these cases we deal with the constitutional validity of three provisions of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970. Congress undertook in these provisions: (a) to abolish for a five-year period all literacy tests and similar voting eligibility requirements imposed by any State in the Union ( 201); (b) to remove the restrictions imposed by state durational residency requirements upon voters in presidential elections ( 202); and (c) to reduce the voting age to a minimum of 18 years for all voters in all elections throughout the Nation ( 302). The Court today upholds 201's nationwide literacy test ban and 202's elimination of state durational residency restrictions in presidential elections. Section 302's extension of the franchise to 18-year-old voters is (by virtue of the opinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACK announcing the judgments of the Court) upheld as applied to federal elections. I agree with the Court in sustaining the congressional ban on state literacy tests, for substantially the same reasons relied upon by MR. JUSTICE BLACK. I also agree that the action of Congress in removing the restrictions of state residency requirements in presidential elections is constitutionally valid, but I base this judgment upon grounds quite different from those relied upon by MR. JUSTICE BLACK. And, finally, I disagree with the Court's conclusion that Congress could constitutionally reduce the voting [400 U.S. 112, 282] age to 18 for federal elections, since I am convinced that Congress was wholly without constitutional power to alter - for the purpose of any elections - the voting age qualifications now determined by the several States. </s> Before turning to a discussion of my views, it seems appropriate to state that we are not called upon in these cases to evaluate or appraise the wisdom of abolishing literacy tests, of altering state residency requirements, or of reducing the voting age to 18. Whatever we may think as citizens, our single duty as judges is to determine whether the legislation before us was within the constitutional power of Congress to enact. I find it necessary to state so elementary a proposition only because certain of the separate opinions filed today contain many pages devoted to a demonstration of how beneficent are the goals of this legislation, particularly the extension of the electoral franchise to young men and women of 18. A casual reader could easily get the impression that what we are being asked in these cases is whether or not we think allowing people 18 years old to vote is a good idea. Nothing could be wider of the mark. My Brothers to the contrary, there is no question here as to the "judgment" of Congress; there are questions only of Congress' constitutional power. </s> I </s> I concur in Part II of MR. JUSTICE BLACK'S opinion, which holds that the literacy test ban of 201 of the 1970 Amendments is constitutional under the Enforcement Clause of the Fifteenth Amendment. Our decisions establish that the Fifteenth Amendment "nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination. It hits onerous procedural requirements which effectively handicap exercise of the franchise by the colored race although the abstract right to vote may remain unrestricted as to race." Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 ; [400 U.S. 112, 283] cf. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 . Because literacy and illiteracy are seemingly neutral with respect to race, creed, color, and sex, we upheld a literacy requirement against a claim that it was invalid on its face under the Fifteenth Amendment. Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board, 360 U.S. 45 . But in Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 , we made it clear that Congress has ample authority under 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment to determine that literacy requirements work unfairly against Negroes in practice because they handicap those Negroes who have been deprived of the educational opportunities available to white citizens. We construed the 1965 Voting Rights Act in light of the report of the Senate Judiciary Committee which said, "[T]he educational differences between whites and Negroes in the areas to be covered by the prohibitions - differences which are reflected in the record before the committee - would mean that equal application of the tests would abridge 15th amendment rights." S. Rep. No. 162, pt. 3, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 16. See also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 -315. </s> Congress has now undertaken to extend the ban on literacy tests to the whole Nation. I see no constitutional impediment to its doing so. Nationwide application reduces the danger that federal intervention will be perceived as unreasonable discrimination against particular States or particular regions of the country. This in turn increases the likelihood of voluntary compliance with the letter and spirit of federal law. Nationwide application facilitates the free movement of citizens from one State to another, since it eliminates the prospect that a change in residence will mean the loss of a federally protected right. Nationwide application avoids the often difficult task of drawing a line between those States where a problem is pressing enough to warrant federal intervention and those where it is not. Such a [400 U.S. 112, 284] line may well appear discriminatory to those who think themselves on the wrong side of it. Moreover the application of the line to particular States can entail a substantial burden on administrative and judicial machinery and a diversion of enforcement resources. Finally, nationwide application may be reasonably thought appropriate when Congress acts against an evil such as racial discrimination which in varying degrees manifests itself in every part of the country. A remedy for racial discrimination which applies in all the States underlines an awareness that the problem is a national one and reflects a national commitment to its solution. </s> Because the justification for extending the ban on literacy tests to the entire Nation need not turn on whether literacy tests unfairly discriminate against Negroes in every State in the Union, Congress was not required to make state-by-state findings concerning either the equality of educational opportunity or actual impact of literacy requirements on the Negro citizen's access to the ballot box. In the interests of uniformity, Congress may paint with a much broader brush than may this Court, which must confine itself to the judicial function of deciding individual cases and controversies upon individual records. Cf. Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board, supra. The findings that Congress made when it enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 would have supported a nationwide ban on literacy tests. Instead, at that time "Congress chose to limit its attention to the geographic areas where immediate action seemed necessary." South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S., at 328 . Experience gained under the 1965 Act has now led Congress to conclude that it should go the whole distance. This approach to the problem is a rational one; consequently it is within the constitutional power of Congress under 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. [400 U.S. 112, 285] </s> II </s> Section 202 added by the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 is a comprehensive provision aimed at insuring that a citizen will not be deprived of the opportunity to vote for the offices of President and Vice President because of a change of residence. Those who take up a new residence more than 30 days before a presidential election are guaranteed the right to register and vote in the State to which they have moved notwithstanding any durational residency requirement imposed by state law, provided, of course, that they are otherwise qualified to vote. Those who take up a new residence less than 30 days before a presidential election are guaranteed the right to vote, either in person or by absentee ballot, in the State from which they have moved, provided that they satisfied, as of the date of their change of residence, the requirements to vote in that State. </s> A </s> Congress, in my view, has the power under the Constitution to eradicate political and civil disabilities that arise by operation of state law following a change in residence from one State to another. Freedom to travel from State to State - freedom to enter and abide in any State in the Union - is a privilege of United States citizenship. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 ; United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 -760; Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39 ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 ; Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or [400 U.S. 112, 286] immunities of citizens of the United States . . . ." In discussing the privileges of citizens of the United States within the meaning of 1, Mr. Justice Miller wrote for the Court in the Slaughter-House Cases: </s> "One of these privileges is conferred by the very article under consideration. It is that a citizen of the United States can, of his own volition, become a citizen of any State of the Union by a bona fide residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that State." 16 Wall. 36, 80. </s> Although 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment confers on Congress the "power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article," this Court has sustained the power of Congress to protect and facilitate the exercise of privileges of United States citizenship without reference to 5. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S., at 757 -760; United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 ; Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 . These cases and others establish that Congress brings to the protection and facilitation of the exercise of privileges of United States citizenship all of its power under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Consequently, as against the reserved power of the States, it is enough that the end to which Congress has acted be one legitimately within its power and that there be a rational basis for the measures chosen to achieve that end. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421. </s> In the light of these considerations, 202 presents no difficulty. Congress could rationally conclude that the imposition of durational residency requirements unreasonably burdens and sanctions the privilege of taking up residence in another State. The objective of 202 is clearly a legitimate one. Federal action is required if the privilege to change residence is not to be undercut by parochial local sanctions. No State could undertake [400 U.S. 112, 287] to guarantee this privilege to its citizens. At most a single State could take steps to resolve that its own laws would not unreasonably discriminate against the newly arrived resident. Even this resolve might not remain firm in the face of discriminations perceived as unfair against those of its own citizens who moved to other States. Thus, the problem could not be wholly solved by a single State, or even by several States, since every State of new residence and every State of prior residence would have a necessary role to play. In the absence of a unanimous interstate compact, the problem could only be solved by Congress. Quite clearly, then, Congress has acted to protect a constitutional privilege that finds its protection in the Federal Government and is national in character. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall., at 79. </s> B </s> But even though general constitutional power clearly exists, Congress may not overstep the letter or spirit of any constitutional restriction in the exercise of that power. For example, Congress clearly has power to regulate interstate commerce, but it may not, in the exercise of that power, impinge upon the guarantees of the Bill of Rights. I have concluded that, while 202 applies only to presidential elections, nothing in the Constitution prevents Congress from protecting those who have moved from one State to another from disenfranchisement in any federal election, whether congressional or presidential. </s> The Constitution withholds from Congress any general authority to change by legislation the qualifications for voters in federal elections. The meaning of the applicable constitutional provisions is perfectly plain. Article I, 2, and the Seventeenth Amendment prescribe the qualifications for voters in elections to choose Senators and Representatives: they "shall have the Qualifications [400 U.S. 112, 288] requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature." The Constitution thus adopts as the federal standard the standard which each State has chosen for itself. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 663 ; Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58, 64 . Accordingly, a state law that purported to establish distinct qualifications for congressional elections would be invalid as repugnant to Art. I, 2, and the Seventeenth Amendment. By the same token, it cannot be gainsaid that federal legislation that had no objective other than to alter the qualifications to vote in congressional elections would be invalid for the same reasons. What the Constitution has fixed may not be changed except by constitutional amendment. </s> Contrary to the submission of my Brother BLACK, Art. I, 4, does not create in the Federal Legislature the power to alter the constitutionally established qualifications to vote in congressional elections. That section provides that the legislatures in each State shall prescribe the "Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives," but reserves in Congress the power to "make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of causing Senators." The "manner" of holding elections can hardly be read to mean the qualifications for voters, when it is remembered that 2 of the same Art. I explicitly speaks of the "qualifications" for voters in elections to choose Representatives. It is plain, in short, that when the Framers meant qualifications they said "qualifications." That word does not appear in Art. I, 4. Moreover, 4 does not give Congress the power to do anything that a State might not have done, and, as pointed out above, no State may establish distinct qualifications for congressional elections. The States, of course, are free to pass such laws as are necessary to assure fair elections. Congressional power under 4 is equally broad with respect to congressional [400 U.S. 112, 289] elections. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 . But the States are not free to prescribe qualifications for voters in federal elections which differ from those prescribed for the most numerous branch of the state legislature. And the power of Congress to do so cannot, therefore, be found in Art. I, 4. </s> This view is confirmed by extrinsic evidence of the intent of the Framers of the Constitution. An early draft of the Constitution provided that the States should fix the qualifications of voters in congressional elections subject to the proviso that these qualifications might "at any Time be altered and superseded by the Legislature of the United States." 1 The records of the Committee on Detail show that it was decided to strike the provision granting to Congress the authority to set voting qualifications and to add in its stead a clause making the qualifications "the same from Time to Time as those of the Electors, in the several States, of the most numerous Branch of their own Legislatures." 2 The proposed draft reported by the Committee on Detail to the Convention included the following: </s> "The qualifications of the electors shall be the same, from time to time, as those of the electors in the several States, of the most numerous branch of their own legislatures." Art. IV, 1. </s> "The times and places and manner of holding the elections of the members of each House shall be prescribed by the Legislature of each State; but their provisions concerning them may, at any time, be altered by the Legislature of the United States." 3 Art. VI, 1. [400 U.S. 112, 290] </s> On August 7, Gouverneur Morris moved to strike the last clause of the proposed Art. IV, 1, and either to provide a freehold limitation on suffrage or to add a clause permitting Congress to alter the electoral qualifications. 4 This motion was opposed by Oliver Ellsworth, George Mason, James Madison, and Benjamin Franklin. Ellsworth protested that the proposal favored aristocracy. If the legislature could alter qualifications, it could disqualify a great proportion of the electorate. 5 Mason voiced a similar objection. "A power to alter the qualifications would be a dangerous power in the hands of the Legislature." 6 To the same effect Madison said: </s> "The right of suffrage is certainly one of the fundamental articles of republican Government, and ought not to be left to be regulated by the Legislature." 7 </s> The proposed motion was defeated by a seven-to-one vote, 8 and no substantive change in Art. I, 2, was proposed or made thereafter. </s> Thus, Alexander Hamilton accurately reported the intent of the Convention when he wrote in The Federalist No. 60 that the authority of the national government "would be expressly restricted to the regulation of the times, the places, and the manner of elections. The qualifications of the persons who may choose or be chosen, as has been remarked upon other occasions, are defined and fixed in the Constitution, and are unalterable by the legislature [i. e., Congress]." (Emphasis in original.) </s> Different provisions of the Constitution govern the selection of the President and the Vice President. Article [400 U.S. 112, 291] II and the Twelfth Amendment provide for election by electors. Article II specifies that each State shall appoint electors "in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct." Because the Constitution does not require the popular election of members of the electoral college, it does not specify the qualifications that voters must have when the selection of electors is by popular election. This is left to the States in the exercise of their power to "direct" the manner of choosing presidential electors. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 . When electors are chosen by popular election, the Federal Government has the power to assure that such elections are orderly and free from corruption. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 . But in Burroughs the Court noted of the Act under review: "Neither in purpose nor in effect does it interfere with the power of a state to appoint electors or the manner in which their appointment shall be made." 290 U.S., at 544 . The Court quoted with approval the following passage from Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 : "[T]he importance to the general government of having the actual election - the voting for those members - free from force and fraud is not diminished by the circumstance that the qualification of the voter is determined by the law of the State where he votes." 290 U.S., at 546 . And in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 , the Court was careful to point out that it is the "right of qualified voters within a state to cast their ballots and have them counted" which is a privilege of United States citizenship amenable to congressional protection. Id., at 315 (emphasis added). See also Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (No. 3230) (CCED Pa.). </s> The issue, then, is whether, despite the intentional withholding from the Federal Government of a general authority to establish qualifications to vote in either congressional or presidential elections, there exists [400 U.S. 112, 292] congressional power to do so when Congress acts with the objective of protecting a citizen's privilege to move his residence from one State to another. Although the matter is not entirely free from doubt, I am persuaded that the constitutional provisions discussed above are not sufficient to prevent Congress from protecting a person who exercises his constitutional right to enter and abide in any State in the Union from losing his opportunity to vote, when Congress may protect the right of interstate travel from other less fundamental disabilities. The power of the States with regard to the franchise is subject to the power of the Federal Government to vindicate the unconditional personal rights secured to the citizen by the Federal Constitution. Williams v. Rhodes, supra; cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, supra. The power that Congress has exercised in enacting 202 is not a general power to prescribe qualifications for voters in either federal or state elections. It is confined to federal action against a particular problem clearly within the purview of congressional authority. Finally, the power to facilitate the citizen's exercise of his constitutional privilege to change residence is one that cannot be left for exercise by the individual States without seriously diminishing the level of protection available. As I have sought to show above, federal action is required if this privilege is to be effectively maintained. We should strive to avoid an interpretation of the Constitution that would withhold from Congress the power to legislate for the protection of those constitutional rights that the States are unable effectively to secure. For all these reasons, I conclude that it was within the power of Congress to enact 202. 9 </s> [400 U.S. 112, 293] </s> III </s> Section 302 added by the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 undertakes to enfranchise in all federal, state, and local elections those citizens 18 years of age or older who are now denied the right to vote by state law because they have not reached the age of 21. Although it was found necessary to amend the Constitution in order to confer a federal right to vote upon Negroes 10 and upon females, 11 the Government asserts that a federal right to vote can be conferred upon people between 18 and 21 years of age simply by this Act of Congress. Our decision in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 , it is said, established the power of Congress, under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, to nullify state laws requiring voters to be 21 years of age or older if Congress could rationally have concluded that such laws are not supported by a "compelling state interest." </s> In my view, neither the Morgan case, nor any other case upon which the Government relies, establishes such congressional power, even assuming that all those cases 12 were rightly decided. MR. JUSTICE BLACK is surely [400 U.S. 112, 294] correct when he writes, "It is a plain fact of history that the Framers never imagined that the national Congress would set the qualifications for voters in every election from President to local constable or village alderman. It is obvious that the whole Constitution reserves to the States the power to set voter qualifications in state and local elections, except to the limited extent that the people through constitutional amendments have specifically narrowed the powers of the States." Ante, at 125. For the reasons that I have set out in Part II of this opinion, it is equally plain to me that the Constitution just as completely withholds from Congress the power to alter by legislation qualifications for voters in federal elections, in view of the explicit provisions of Article I, Article II, and the Seventeenth Amendment. </s> To be sure, recent decisions have established that state action regulating suffrage is not immune from the impact of the Equal Protection Clause. 13 But we have been careful in those decisions to note the undoubted power of a State to establish a qualification for voting based on age. See, e. g., Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. 621, 625 ; Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board, 360 U.S., at 51 . Indeed, none of the opinions filed today suggest that the States have anything but a constitutionally unimpeachable interest in establishing some age qualification as such. Yet to test the power to establish an age qualification by the "compelling interest" standard is really to deny a State any choice at all, because no State could demonstrate a "compelling interest" in drawing the line with respect to age at one point rather than another. Obviously, the power to establish an age qualification must carry with it the power to choose [400 U.S. 112, 295] 21 as a reasonable voting age, as the vast majority of the States have done. 14 </s> Katzenbach v. Morgan, supra, does not hold that Congress has the power to determine what are and what are not "compelling state interests" for equal protection purposes. In Morgan the Court considered the power of Congress to enact a statute whose principal effect was to enfranchise Puerto Ricans who had moved to New York after receiving their education in Spanish-language Puerto Rican schools and who were denied the right to vote in New York because they were unable to read or write English. The Court upheld the statute on two grounds: that Congress could conclude that enhancing the political power of the Puerto Rican community by conferring the right to vote was an appropriate means of remedying discriminatory treatment in public services; and that Congress could conclude that the New York statute was tainted by the impermissible purpose of denying the right to vote to Puerto Ricans, [400 U.S. 112, 296] an undoubted invidious discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. Both of these decisional grounds were farreaching. The Court's opinion made clear that Congress could impose on the States a remedy for the denial of equal protection that elaborated upon the direct command of the Constitution, and that it could override state laws on the ground that they were in fact used as instruments of invidious discrimination even though a court in an individual lawsuit might not have reached that factual conclusion. Cf. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 . </s> But it is necessary to go much further to sustain 302. The state laws that it invalidates do not invidiously discriminate against any discrete and insular minority. Unlike the statute considered in Morgan, 302 is valid only if Congress has the power not only to provide the means of eradicating situations that amount to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, but also to determine as a matter of substantive constitutional law what situations fall within the ambit of the clause, and what state interests are "compelling." I concurred in MR. JUSTICE HARLAN'S dissent in Morgan. That case, as I now read it, gave congressional power under 5 the furthest possible legitimate reach. Yet to sustain the constitutionality of 302 would require an enormous extension of that decision's rationale. I cannot but conclude that 302 was beyond the constitutional power of Congress to enact. </s> [Footnote 1 2 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 153 (1911). </s> [Footnote 2 Id., at 164. </s> [Footnote 3 Id., at 178-179. </s> [Footnote 4 Id., at 201, 207. </s> [Footnote 5 Id., at 201. </s> [Footnote 6 Id., at 202. </s> [Footnote 7 Id., at 203. </s> [Footnote 8 Id., at 206. </s> [Footnote 9 Whether a particular State's durational residency requirement for voters may violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment presents questions that are for me quite different from those attending the constitutionality of 202. See Howe v. Brown, [400 U.S. 112, 293] 319 F. Supp. 862 (ND Ohio 1970); Cocanower v. Marston, 318 F. Supp. 402 (Ariz. 1970); Burg v. Canniffe, 315 F. Supp. 380 (Mass. 1970); Blumstein v. Ellington, ___ F. Supp. ___ (MD Tenn. 1970); Hadnott v. Amos, 320 F. Supp. 107 (MD Ala. 1970); Bufford v. Holton, 319 F. Supp. 843 (ED Va. 1970); Lester v. Board of Elections, 319 F. Supp. 505 (DC 1970). </s> [Footnote 10 U.S. Const., Amdt. XV. </s> [Footnote 11 U.S. Const., Amdt. XIX; see also Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162. </s> [Footnote 12 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970); Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970). </s> [Footnote 13 See, e. g., cases cited supra, n. 12. </s> [Footnote 14 If the Government is correct in its submission that a particular age requirement must meet the "compelling interest" standard, then, of course, a substantial question would exist whether a 21-year-old voter qualification is constitutional even in the absence of congressional action, as my Brothers point out. Ante, at 241-246. Yet it is inconceivable to me that this Court would ever hold that the denial of the vote to those between the ages of 18 and 21 constitutes such an invidious discrimination as to be a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The establishment of an age qualification is not state action aimed at any discrete and insular minority. Cf. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4. Moreover, so long as a State does not set the voting age higher than 21, the reasonableness of its choice is confirmed by the very Fourteenth Amendment upon which the Government relies. Section 2 of that Amendment provides for sanctions when the right to vote "is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States . . . ." (Emphasis added.) </s> [400 U.S. 112, 297]

United States Supreme Court NLRB v. UNITED INSURANCE CO.(1968) No. 178 Argued: Decided: March 6, 1968 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 179, Insurance Workers International Union, AFL-CIO v. National Labor Relations Board et al., also on certiorari to the same court. </s> Petitioner insurance workers union seeks to represent respondent insurance company's "debit agents." The company refused to recognize the union, claiming that the agents were independent contractors rather than employees. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in the ensuing unfair labor practice proceeding determined under the common law of agency that the agents were employees. It found that the agents do not operate their own independent businesses, but perform functions that are an essential part of the company's normal operations; are trained by company supervisory personnel; do business in the company's name and ordinarily sell only the company's policies; operate under terms and conditions established and changed unilaterally by the company; account for funds under strict company procedures; receive the benefit of the company's vacation plan and group insurance and pension fund; and have a permanent working arrangement under which they may continue with the company as long as their performance is satisfactory. The Court of Appeals refused to enforce the NLRB's order. Held: The NLRB's determination that the agents were company employees and not independent contractors represented a choice between two fairly conflicting views, and its order should have been enforced by the Court of Appeals. Pp. 256-260. </s> 371 F.2d 316, reversed. </s> Dominick L. Manoli argued the cause for the National Labor Relations Board, petitioner in No. 178 and respondent in No. 179. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Arnold Ordman and Norton J. Come. [390 U.S. 254, 255] </s> Isaac N. Groner argued the cause and filed a brief for the Insurance Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, petitioner in No. 179 and respondent in No. 178. </s> Bernard G. Segal argued the cause for the United Insurance Co. of America, respondent in both cases. With him on the brief were Samuel D. Slade and Herbert G. Keene, Jr. </s> Shayle P. Fox filed a brief for the American Retail Federation, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> In its insurance operations respondent United Insurance Company uses "debit agents" whose primary functions are collecting premiums from policyholders, preventing the lapsing of policies, and selling such new insurance as time allows. The Insurance Workers International Union, having won a certification election, seeks to represent the debit agents, and the question before us is whether these agents are "employees" who are protected by the National Labor Relations Act or "independent contractors" who are expressly exempted from the Act. 1 Respondent company refused to recognize the Union, claiming that its debit agents were independent contractors rather than employees. In the ensuing unfair labor practice proceeding the National Labor Relations Board held that these agents were employees and ordered the company to bargain collectively with the Union. 154 N. L. R. B. 38. On appeal the Court of Appeals found that the debit agents were independent contractors and refused to enforce the Board's order. 371 F.2d 316 (C. A. 7th Cir.). The importance of the question in the context involved to the administration of the [390 U.S. 254, 256] National Labor Relations Act prompted us to grant the petitions of the Board and the Union for certiorari. 389 U.S. 815 . </s> At the outset the critical issue is what standard or standards should be applied in differentiating "employee" from "independent contractor" as those terms are used in the Act. Initially this Court held in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 , that "Whether . . . the term `employee' includes [particular] workers . . . must be answered primarily from the history, terms and purposes of the legislation." 322 U.S., at 124 . Thus the standard was one of economic and policy considerations within the labor field. Congressional reaction to this construction of the Act was adverse and Congress passed an amendment specifically excluding "any individual having the status of an independent contractor" from the definition of "employee" contained in 2 (3) of the Act. The obvious purpose of this amendment was to have the Board and the courts apply general agency principles in distinguishing between employees and independent contractors under the Act. 2 And both petitioners and respondents agree that the proper standard here is the law of agency. Thus there is no doubt that we should apply the common-law agency test here in distinguishing an employee from an independent contractor. </s> Since agency principles are to be applied, some factual background showing the relationship between the debit agents and respondent company is necessary. These basic facts are stated in the Board's opinion and will be very briefly summarized here. Respondent has district offices in most States which are run by a manager who usually has several assistant managers under him. [390 U.S. 254, 257] Each assistant manager has a staff of four or five debit agents, and the total number of such agents connected with respondent company is approximately 3,300. New agents are hired by district managers, after interviews; they need have no prior experience and are assigned to a district office under the supervision of an assistant district manager. Once he is hired, a debit agent is issued a debit book which contains the names and addresses of the company's existing policyholders in a relatively concentrated geographic area. This book is company property and must be returned to the company upon termination of the agent's service. The main job of the debit agents is to collect premiums from the policyholders listed in this book. They also try to prevent the lapsing of policies and sell new insurance when time allows. The company compensates the agents as agreed to in the "Agent's Commission Plan" under which the agent retains 20% of his weekly premium collections on industrial insurance and 10% from holders of ordinary life, and 50% of the first year's premiums on new ordinary life insurance sold by him. The company plan also provides for bonuses and other fringe benefits for the debit agents, including a vacation-with-pay plan and participation in a group insurance and profit-sharing plan. At the beginning of an agent's service an assistant district manager accompanies the new agent on his rounds to acquaint him with his customers and show him the approved collection and selling techniques. The agent is also supplied with a company "Rate Book," which the agent is expected to follow, containing detailed instructions on how to perform many of his duties. An agent must turn in his collected premiums to the district office once a week and also file a weekly report. At this time the agent usually attends staff meetings for the discussion of the latest company sales techniques, company directives, etc. Complaints against an agent are investigated [390 U.S. 254, 258] by the manager or assistant manager, and, if well founded, the manager talks with the agent to "set him straight." Agents who have poor production records, or who fail to maintain their accounts properly or to follow company rules, are "cautioned." The district manager submits a weekly report to the home office, specifying, among other things, the agents whose records are below average; the amounts of their debits; their collection percentages, arrears, and production; and what action the district manager has taken to remedy the production "letdown." If improvement does not follow, the company asks such agents to "resign," or exercises its rights under the "Agent's Commission Plan" to fire them "at any time." </s> There are innumerable situations which arise in the common law where it is difficult to say whether a particular individual is an employee or an independent contractor, 3 and these cases present such a situation. On the one hand these debit agents perform their work primarily away from the company's offices and fix their own hours of work and work days; and clearly they are not as obviously employees as are production workers in a factory. On the other hand, however, they do not have the independence, nor are they allowed the initiative and decision-making authority, normally associated with an independent contractor. In such a situation as this there is no shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied to find the answer, but all of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive. What is important is that the total factual context is assessed in light of the pertinent common-law agency principles. When this is done, the decisive factors in these cases become the following: [390 U.S. 254, 259] the agents do not operate their own independent businesses, but perform functions that are an essential part of the company's normal operations; they need not have any prior training or experience, but are trained by company supervisory personnel; they do business in the company's name with considerable assistance and guidance from the company and its managerial personnel and ordinarily sell only the company's policies; the "Agent's Commission Plan" that contains the terms and conditions under which they operate is promulgated and changed unilaterally by the company; the agents account to the company for the funds they collect under an elaborate and regular reporting procedure; the agents receive the benefits of the company's vacation plan and group insurance and pension fund; and the agents have a permanent working arrangement with the company under which they may continue as long as their performance is satisfactory. Probably the best summation of what these factors mean in the reality of the actual working relationship was given by the chairman of the board of respondent company in a letter to debit agents about the time this unfair labor practice proceeding arose: </s> "if any agent believes he has the power to make his own rules and plan of handling the company's business, then that agent should hand in his resignation at once, and if we learn that said agent is not going to operate in accordance with the company's plan, then the company will be forced to make the agents final [sic]. </s> "The company is going to have its business managed in your district the same as all other company districts in the many states where said offices are located. The other company officials and I have managed the United Insurance Company of America's [390 U.S. 254, 260] operations for over 45 years very successfully, and we are going to continue the same successful plan of operation, and we will not allow anyone to interfere with us and our successful plan." </s> The Board examined all of these facts and found that they showed the debit agents to be employees. This was not a purely factual finding by the Board, but involved the application of law to facts - what do the facts establish under the common law of agency: employee or independent contractor? It should also be pointed out that such a determination of pure agency law involved no special administrative expertise that a court does not possess. On the other hand, the Board's determination was a judgment made after a hearing with witnesses and oral argument had been held and on the basis of written briefs. Such a determination should not be set aside just because a court would, as an original matter, decide the case the other way. As we said in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 , "Nor does it [the requirement for canvassing the whole record] mean that even as to matters not requiring expertise a court may displace the Board's choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo." 340 U.S., at 488 . Here the least that can be said for the Board's decision is that it made a choice between two fairly conflicting views, and under these circumstances the Court of Appeals should have enforced the Board's order. It was error to refuse to do so. </s> Reversed. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq.), protects an "employee" only and specifically excludes "any individual having the status of an independent contractor." ( 2 (3).) </s> [Footnote 2 See 93 Cong. Rec. 6441-6442, 2 Leg. Hist. of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, p. 1537. See also H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 18, 1 Leg. Hist., 1947, p. 309; H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 32-33, 1 Leg. Hist., 1947, pp. 536-537. </s> [Footnote 3 See annotated cases in 55 A. L. R. 289 et seq. and 61 A. L. R. 218 et seq. </s> [390 U.S. 254, 261]

United States Supreme Court BLESSING, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC SECURITY v. FREESTONE et al.(1997) No. 95-1441 Argued: January 6, 1997Decided: April 21, 1997 </s> </s> Respondents, five Arizona mothers whose children are eligible for state child support services under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against petitioner, the director of the state child support agency, claiming, among other things, that they properly applied for child support services; that, despite their good faith efforts to cooperate, the agency never took adequate steps to obtain child support payments for them; that these omissions were largely attributable to staff shortages and other structural defects in the State's program; and that these systemic failures violated their individual rights under Title IV-D to have all mandated services delivered in substantial compliance with the title and its implementing regulations. They requested broad relief, including a declaratory judgment that the Arizona program's operation violates Title IV-D provisions creating rights in them that are enforceable through a §1983 action, and an injunction requiring the director to achieve substantial compliance with Title IV-D throughout all programmatic operations. The District Court granted summary judgment for petitioner, but the Ninth Circuit reversed. Without distinguishing among the numerous provisions of the complex Title IV-D program or the many rights those provisions might have created, the latter court held that respondents had an enforceable individual right to have the State achieve "substantial compliance" with Title IV-D. It also disagreed with the District Court's conclusion that Congress had foreclosed private Title IV-D enforcement actions by authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) to audit and cut off funds to States whose programs do not substantially comply with Title IV-D's requirements. </s> Held: Title IV-D does not give individuals a federal right to force a state agency to substantially comply with Title IV-D. Pp. 9-18. </s> (a) A plaintiff seeking §1983 redress must assert the violation of a federal right, not merely of federal law. Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 . Three principal factors determine whether a statutory provision creates a privately enforceable right: (1) whether the plaintiff is an intended beneficiary of the statute; (2) whether the plaintiff's asserted interests are not so vague and amorphous as to be beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce; and (3) whether the statute imposes a binding obligation on the State. See, e.g., Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assn., 496 U.S. 498, 509 . Even if a plaintiff demonstrates such a right, however, there is only a rebuttable presumption that it is enforceable under §1983. Dismissal is proper if Congress specifically foreclosed a §1983 remedy, Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1005 , n. 9, 1003, either expressly, by forbidding recourse to §1983 in the statute itself, or impliedly, by creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual §1983 enforcement, Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 133 . Pp. 9-10. </s> (b) Respondents have not established that Title IV-D gives them individually enforceable federal rights. In prior cases, the Court has been able to determine whether or not a statute created such rights because the plaintiffs articulated, and lower courts evaluated, well defined claims. See, e.g., Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418, 430 . Here, respondents have not identified with particularity the rights they claim, and the Ninth Circuit has not engaged in the requisite methodical inquiry. That court erred in apparently holding that individuals have an enforceable right to "substantial compliance" with Title IV-D in all respects. The statutory "substantial compliance" requirement, see, e.g., 42 U. S. C. A. §609(a)(8) (Nov. 1996 Supp.), does not give rise to individual rights; it was not intended to benefit individual children and custodial parents, but is simply a yardstick for the Secretary to measure the systemwide performance of a State's Title IV-D program, allowing her to increase the frequency of audits and reduce the State's federal grant upon a finding of substantial noncompliance. The Court of Appeals also erred in taking a blanket approach to determining whether Title IV-D creates rights: It is readily apparent that many of the provisions of that multifaceted statutory scheme, including its "substantial compliance" standard and data processing, staffing, and organizational requirements, do not fit any of the traditional criteria for identifying statutory rights. Although this Court does not foreclose the possibility that some Title IV-D provisions give rise to individual rights, the Ninth Circuit did not separate out the particular rights itbelieved arise from the statutory scheme, the complaint is less than clear in this regard, and it is not certain whether respondents sought any relief more specific than a declaration that their "rights" were being violated and an injunction forcing petitioner to "substantially comply" with all of Title IV-D's provisions. This defect is best addressed by sending the case back for the District Court to construe the complaint in the first instance, in order to determine exactly what rights, considered in their most concrete, specific form, respondents are asserting. Only by manageably breaking down the complaint into specific allegations can the District Court proceed to determine whether any specific claim asserts an individual federal right. Pp. 10-15. </s> (c) Petitioner's argument that Title IV-D's remedial scheme is sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude §1983 suits is rejected. Petitioner does not claim that any Title IV-D provision expressly curtails §1983 actions, and she has failed to make the difficult showing that allowing such actions to go forward in these circumstances would be inconsistent with Congress' carefully tailored scheme. That scheme is far more limited than those at issue in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U.S. 1 , and Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 , the only cases in which the Court has found preclusion; in particular, Title IV-D contains no private remedy--either judicial or administrative--through which aggrieved persons can seek redress. The only way that Title IV-D assures that States live up to their child support plans is through the Secretary's oversight, but the Secretary's limited powers to audit and cut federal funding are not comprehensive enough to foreclose §1983 liability. Pp. 15-18. </s> 68 F. 3d 1141, vacated and remanded. </s> O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Scalia, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Kennedy, J., joined. </s> NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. </s> U.S. Supreme Court </s> No. 95-1441 </s> LINDA J. BLESSING, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC SECURITY, PETITIONER v. CATHY FREE STONE, etc., et al. </s> on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit [April 21, 1997] </s> Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case concerns a lawsuit brought by five mothers in Arizona whose children are eligible to receive child support services from the State pursuant to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, as added, 88 Stat. 2351 and as amended, 42 U. S. C. A. §§651-669b (Nov. 1996 Supp.). These custodial parents sued the director of Arizona's child support agency under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that they had an enforceable individual right to have the State's program achieve "substantial compliance" with the requirements of Title IV-D. Without distinguishing among the numerous provisions of this complex program, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that respondents had such a right. We disagree that the statutory scheme can be analyzed so generally, and hold that Title IV-D does not give individuals a federal right to force a state agency to substantially comply with Title IV-D. Accordingly, we vacate and remand with instructions to remand to the District Court. </s> This controversy concerns an interlocking set of cooperative federal state welfare programs. Arizona participates in the federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, which provides subsistence welfare benefits to needy families. Social Security Act, Title IV-A, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617. To qualify for federal AFDC funds, the State must certify that it will operate a child support enforcement program that conforms with the numerous requirements set forth in Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. A. §§651-669b (Nov. 1996 Supp.), 1 and will do so pursuant to a detailed plan that has been approved by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary). §602(a)(2); see also §652(a)(3). The Federal Government underwrites roughly two thirds of the cost of the State's child support efforts. §655(a). But the State must do more than simply collect overdue support payments; it must also establish a comprehensive system to establish paternity, locate absent parents, and help families obtain support orders. §§651, 654. </s> A State must provide these services free of charge to AFDC recipients and, when requested, for a nominal fee to children and custodial parents who are not receiving AFDC payments. §§651, 654(4). AFDC recipients must assign their child support rights to the State and fully cooperate with the State's efforts to establish paternity and obtain support payments. Although the State may keep most of the support payments that it collects on behalf of AFDC families in order to offset the costs of providing welfare benefits, until recently it only had todistribute the first $50 of each payment to the family. 42 U.S.C. § 657(b)(1). The amended version of Title IV-D replaces this $50 pass through with more generous distributions to families once they leave welfare. 42 U. S. C. A. §657(a)(2) (Nov. 1996 Supp.). Non AFDC recipients who request the State's aid are entitled to have all collected funds passed through. §657(a)(3). In all cases, the State must distribute the family's share of collected support payments within two business days after receipt. §654b(c)(1). </s> The structure of each State's Title IV-D agency, like the services it provides, must conform to federal guidelines. For example, States must create separate units to administer the plan, §654(3), and to disburse collected funds, §654(27), each of which must be staffed at levels set by the Secretary, 45 CFR § 303.20 (1995). If a State delegates its disbursement function to local governments, it must reward the most efficient local agencies with a share of federal incentive payments. 42 U. S. C. A. §654(22) (Nov. 1996 Supp.). To maintain detailed records of all pending cases, as well as to generate the various reports required by federal authorities, States must set up computer systems that meet numerous federal specifications. §654a. Finally, in addition to setting up this administrative framework, each participating State must enact laws designed to streamline paternity and child support actions. §§654(20), 666. </s> To oversee this complex federal state enterprise, Congress created the Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). This agency is charged with auditing the States' compliance with their federally approved plans. Audits must occur at least once every three years, or more often if a State's performance falls below certain standards. §652(a)(4). If a State does not "substantially comply" with the requirements of Title IV-D, the Secretary is authorized to penalize the Stateby reducing its AFDC grant by up to five percent. §609(a)(8). The Secretary has interpreted "substantial compliance" as: (a) full compliance with requirements that services be offered statewide and that certain recipients be notified monthly of the support collected, as well as with reporting, recordkeeping, and accounting rules; (b) 90 percent compliance with case opening and case closure criteria; and (c) 75 percent compliance with most remaining program requirements. 45 CFR § 305.20 (1995). The Secretary may suspend a penalty if the State implements an adequate corrective action plan, and if the program achieves "substantial compliance," she may rescind the penalty entirely. 42 U. S. C. A. §609(c) (Nov. 1996 Supp.). </s> Arizona's record of enforcing child support obligations is less than stellar, particularly compared with those of other States. In a 1992 report, Arizona's Auditor General chronicled many of the State's problems. In the 1989-1990 fiscal year, Arizona failed to collect enough child support payments and federal incentives to cover the administrative costs of its Title IV-D program--1 of only 10 States to fall below that target. Arizona Auditor General, A Performance Audit of the Arizona Department of Economic Security 2 (1992). The Auditor General also pointed out that the cost effectiveness of Arizona's support enforcement efforts had been "minimal." For every dollar spent on enforcement, the State collected barely two dollars--almost half the nationwide average. Ibid. In 1992, nearly three quarters of Arizona's 275,000 child support cases were still in the earliest stages of the enforcement process. In 42 percent of all cases, paternity had yet to be established. In a further 29 percent, the absent parent had been identified but his or her whereabouts were unknown. Id., at 12. Overall, the Auditor General found thatArizona "obtains regular child support payments for fewer than five percent of the parents it serves." Id., at 9. </s> Federal audits by OCSE have also identified shortcomings in Arizona's child support system. In several reviews of the State's performance from 1984 to 1989, the Secretary found that Arizona had not substantially complied with significant program requirements, and she repeatedly penalized the State one percent of its AFDC grant. The State developed a corrective action plan after each failed audit, which prompted the Secretary to suspend and--in every instance but one--waive the one percent reduction in Arizona's AFDC funding. 2 </s> Respondents are five Arizona mothers (some of whom receive AFDC benefits) whose children are eligible for Title IV-D child support services. They filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona against the Director of the Arizona Department of Economic Security, the state agency charged with providing child support services under TitleIV-D. In a lengthy complaint, respondents claimed that they had properly applied for child support services but that, despite their good faith efforts to cooperate, the agency never took adequate steps to obtain child support payments from the fathers of their children. These omissions, respondents contended, were largely attributable to structural defects in the State's child support efforts: staff shortages, high caseloads, unmanageable backlogs, and deficiencies in the State's accounting methods and recordkeeping. App. 11, 14-16. Respondents sought to represent a class of all children and custodial parents residing in Arizona who are or will be entitled to Title IV-D services. </s> Respondents claimed that the State's systemic failures violated their federal rights under Title IV-D. Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983 they asked the District Court to grant them the following broad relief: </s> "Enter a declaratory judgment determining that operation of the Arizona Title IV-D program violates controlling, substantive provisions of federal law creating rights in plaintiffs and the class enforceable through an action permitted by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. </s> "Grant permanent (and as necessary and appropriate, interlocutory) injunctions prohibiting continued adherence to the aforesaid pattern and practices and requiring affirmative measures sufficient to achieve as well as sustain substantial compliance with federal law, throughout all programmatic operations at issue." App. 42. </s> The Director immediately moved to dismiss the complaint on several grounds, arguing primarily that Title IV-D creates no individual rights enforceable under §1983. The District Court treated this motion as one for summary judgment and ruled in favor of the Director. Relying primarily on a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Carelli v. Howser, 923 F. 2d 1208(1991), the District Court held that Congress had foreclosed private actions to enforce Title IV-D by authorizing the Secretary to audit and cut off funds to States with programs that do not substantially comply with Title IV-D's requirements. </s> A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 68 F. 3d 1141 (1995). The majority identified the three principal factors this Court has used to determine whether a statute creates a privately enforceable right: whether the plaintiff is one of the "intended beneficiaries of the statute," whether the plaintiffs' asserted interests are not so " `vague and amorphous' as to be `beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce,' " and whether the statute imposes a binding obligation on the State. Id., at 1147 (quoting Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assn., 496 U.S. 498, 509 (1990)). Title IV-D, the Court of Appeals held, satisfied each of these criteria. First, "needy families with children" were the intended beneficiaries of Title IV-D. 68 F. 3d, at 1150. Second, the majority held that the "plaintiffs' asserted interest is not vague or amorphous, and it is sufficiently concrete to be judicially enforceable" because whether a State delivers the services required by Title IV-D "to the degree required by law is judicially ascertainable." Id., at 1149-1150. Finally, the Court of Appeals stated that the statute imposes binding obligations because a State must satisfy each of the requirements spelled out in Title IV-D in order to receive AFDC funding. Although the majority acknowledged that the requirement that a State remain in "substantial compliance" with its plan might seem ambiguous when divorced from context, the majority believed that the "highly detailed requirements" of the statute and its implementing regulations adequately notified the State of the extent of its duties. Id., at 1148. Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted that "the statute . . . sets forth detailed criteria for measuringcompliance with the statute," for example generally requiring States to establish paternity in a given percentage of all cases. Id., at 1149 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 652(g)). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded that respondents could sue petitioner under §1983 to bring Arizona's child support enforcement program into substantial compliance with federal law. 68 F. 3d, at 1150. </s> The Court of Appeals also disagreed with the District Court's conclusion that Congress had implicitly foreclosed an individual remedy under §1983 for violations of Title IV-D. The majority noted that Title IV-D includes no provisions for judicial enforcement that might supplant the §1983 remedy. 68 F. 3d, at 1153. Instead, the law simply gave the Secretary administrative oversight powers that were virtually indiscernible from those we had found insufficient to displace §1983 liability in Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418 (1987). The majority expressed no opinion as to the appropriateness of either injunctive or declaratory relief, and left that question for the District Court to answer in the first instance. 68 F. 3d, at 1156. </s> Judge Kleinfeld dissented, arguing that Congress placed the power to enforce Title IV-D exclusively in the hands of the Secretary. He contended that the " `substantial compliance' standard does not `unambiguously confer' enforceable rights on any individual." Id., at 1157. At most, Title IV-D called upon States "to try pretty hard, and do a pretty good job, of enforcing child support, and come up with a plan to try harder if the Secretary thinks they have not been trying hard enough." Ibid. </s> We granted certiorari to resolve disagreement among the courts of appeals as to whether individuals may suestate officials under §1983 for violations of Title IV-D. 3 </s> Section 1983 imposes liability on anyone who, under color of state law, deprives a person "of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." We have held that this provision safeguards certain rights conferred by federal statutes. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). In order to seek redress through §1983, however, a plaintiff must assert the violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law. Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989). We have traditionally looked at three factors when determining whether a particular statutory provision gives rise to a federal right. First, Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff. Wright, 479 U.S., at 430 . Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right assertedly protected by the statute is not so "vague and amorphous" that its enforcement would strain judicial competence. Id., at 431-432. Third, the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States. In other words, the provision giving rise to the asserted right must be couched in mandatory rather than precatory terms. Wilder, supra, at 510-511; see also Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (discussing whether Congress created obligations giving rise to an implied cause of action). </s> Even if a plaintiff demonstrates that a federal statute creates an individual right, there is only a rebuttable presumption that the right is enforceable under §1983. Because our inquiry focuses on congressional intent, dismissal is proper if Congress "specifically foreclosed a remedy under §1983." Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1005 , n. 9 (1984). Congress may do so expressly, by forbidding recourse to §1983 in the statute itself, or impliedly, by creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under §1983. Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 133 (1994). </s> With these principles in mind, we turn first to the question whether respondents have established that Title IV-D gives them federal rights. </s> In their complaint, respondents argued that federal law granted them "individual rights to all mandated services delivered in substantial compliance with Title IV-D and its implementing regulations." App. 41. They sought a broad injunction requiring the director of Arizona's child support agency to achieve "substantial compliance . . . throughout all programmatic operations." Id., at 42. Attributing the deficiencies in the State'sprogram primarily to staff shortages and other structural defects, respondents essentially invited the District Court to oversee every aspect of Arizona's Title IV-D program. </s> Without distinguishing among the numerous rights that might have been created by this federally funded welfare program, the Court of Appeals agreed in sweeping terms that "Title IV-D creates enforceable rights in families in need of Title IV-D services." 68 F. 3d, at 1150. The Court of Appeals did not specify exactly which "rights" it was purporting to recognize, but it apparently believed that federal law gave respondents the right to have the State substantially comply with Title IV-D in all respects. We disagree. </s> As an initial matter, the lower court's holding that Title IV-D "creates enforceable rights" paints with too broad a brush. It was incumbent upon respondents to identify with particularity the rights they claimed, since it is impossible to determine whether Title IV-D, as an undifferentiated whole, gives rise to undefined "rights." Only when the complaint is broken down into manageable analytic bites can a court ascertain whether each separate claim satisfies the various criteria we have set forth for determining whether a federal statute creates rights. See, e.g., Golden State, supra, at 106 (asking whether the "provision in question" was designed to benefit the plaintiff). </s> In prior cases, we have been able to determine whether or not a statute created a given right because the plaintiffs articulated, and lower courts evaluated, well defined claims. In Wright, for example, we held that tenants of public housing projects had a right to have their utility costs included within a rental payment that did not exceed 30 percent of their income. We did not ask whether the federal housing legislation generally gave rise to rights; rather, we focused our analysis on a specific statutory provision limiting "rent" to 30 percent of a tenant's income. 479 U.S., at 430 . Similarly, inWilder, we held that health care providers had an enforceable right to reimbursement at "reasonable and adequate rates" as required by a particular provision in the Medicaid statute. 496 U.S., at 511 -512. And in Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992), where we held that Title IV-E of the Social Security Act did not give the plaintiffs the right that they asserted, we again analyzed the claim in very specific terms: whether children had a right to have state authorities undertake "reasonable efforts to prevent removal of children from their homes and to facilitate reunification of families where removal had occurred." Id., at at 352 (footnote omitted). Finally, in Livadas v. Bradshaw, supra, at 134, we discerned in the structure of the National Labor Relations Act the very specific right of employees "to complete the collective bargaining process and agree to an arbitration clause." See id., at 133, n. 27 (explaining that whether a claim founded on the NLRA is cognizable under §1983 may depend on whether the claim stems from abridgment of a "protected individual interest"). We did not simply ask whether the NLRA created unspecified "rights." </s> The Court of Appeals did not engage in such a methodical inquiry. As best we can tell, the Court of Appeals seemed to think that respondents had a right to require the director of Arizona's child support agency to bring the State's program into substantial compliance with Title IV-D. But the requirement that a State operate its child support program in "substantial compliance" with Title IV-D was not intended to benefit individual children and custodial parents, and therefore it does not constitute a federal right. Far from creating an individual entitlement to services, the standard is simply a yardstick for the Secretary to measure the systemwide performance of a State's Title IV-D program. Thus, the Secretary must look to the aggregate services provided by the State, not to whether the needs of anyparticular person have been satisfied. A State substantially complies with Title IV-D when it provides most mandated services (such as enforcement of support obligations) in only 75 percent of the cases reviewed during the federal audit period. 45 CFR § 305.20(a) (3)(iii) (1995). States must aim to establish paternity in 90 percent of all eligible cases, but may satisfy considerably lower targets so long as their efforts are steadily improving. 42 U.S.C. § 652(g). It is clear, then, that even when a State is in "substantial compliance" with Title IV-D, any individual plaintiff might still be among the 10 or 25 percent of persons whose needs ultimately go unmet. Moreover, even upon a finding of substantial noncompliance, the Secretary can merely reduce the State's AFDC grant by up to five percent; she cannot, by force of her own authority, command the State to take any particular action or to provide any services to certain individuals. In short, the substantial compliance standard is designed simply to trigger penalty provisions that increase the frequency of audits and reduce the State's AFDC grant by a maximum of five percent. As such, it does not give rise to individual rights. </s> The Court of Appeals erred not only in finding that individuals have an enforceable right to substantial compliance, but also in taking a blanket approach to determining whether Title IV-D creates rights. It is readily apparent that many other provisions of that multifaceted statutory scheme do not fit our traditional three criteria for identifying statutory rights. To begin with, many provisions, like the "substantial compliance" standard, are designed only to guide the State in structuring its systemwide efforts at enforcing support obligations. These provisions may ultimately benefit individuals who are eligible for Title IV-D services, but only indirectly. For example, Title IV-D lays out detailed requirements for the State's data processing </s> system. Among other things, this system must sort information into standardized data elements specified by the Secretary; transmit information electronically to the State's AFDC system to monitor family eligibility for financial assistance; maintain the data necessary to meet federal reporting requirements; and provide for the electronic transfer of funds for purposes of income withholding and interstate collections. 42 U. S. C. A. §654a (Nov. 1996 Supp.); 45 CFR § 307.10 (1995). Obviously, these complex standards do not give rise to individualized rights to computer services. They are simply intended to improve the overall efficiency of the States' child support enforcement scheme. </s> The same reasoning applies to the staffing levels of the state agency, which respondents seem to claim are inadequate. App. 11 (Complaint ¶39) (alleging that delays in case processing are attributable to "extraordinary staff shortages, inordinately high caseloads and unmanageable backlogs"). Title IV-D generally requires each participating State to establish a separate child support enforcement unit "which meets such staffing and organizational requirements as the Secretary may by regulation prescribe." 42 U.S.C. § 654(3). The regulations, in turn, simply provide that each level of the State's organization must have "sufficient staff" to fulfill specified functions. These mandates do not, however, give rise to federal rights. For one thing, the link between increased staffing and the services provided to any particular individual is far too tenuous to support the notion that Congress meant to give each and every Arizonan who is eligible for Title IV-D the right to have the State Department of Economic Security staffed at a "sufficient" level. Furthermore, neither the statute nor the regulation gives any guidance as to how large a staff would be "sufficient." Cf. Suter, 503 U.S., at 360 (finding requirement of "reasonable efforts" unenforceable where there was "[n]o further statutory guidance . . . asto how `reasonable efforts' are to be measured"). Enforcement of such an undefined standard would certainly "strain judicial competence." Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S., at 132 . </s> We do not foreclose the possibility that some provisions of Title IV-D give rise to individual rights. The lower court did not separate out the particular rights it believed arise from the statutory scheme, and we think the complaint is less than clear in this regard. For example, respondent Madrid alleged that the state agency managed to collect some support payments from her ex husband but failed to pass through the first $50 of each payment, to which she was purportedly entitled under the pre 1996 version of §657(b)(1). App. 13 (Complaint ¶48). Although §657 may give her a federal right to receive a specified portion of the money collected on her behalf by Arizona, she did not explicitly request such relief in the complaint. </s> In any event, it is not at all apparent that respondents sought any relief more specific than a declaration that their "rights" were being violated and an injunction forcing Arizona's child support agency to "substantially comply" with all of the provisions of Title IV-D. We think that this defect is best addressed by sending the case back for the District Court to construe the complaint in the first instance, in order to determine exactly what rights, considered in their most concrete, specific form, respondents are asserting. Only by manageably breaking down the complaint into specific allegations can the District Court proceed to determine whether any specific claim asserts an individual federal right. </s> Because we leave open the possibility that Title IV-D may give rise to some individually enforceable rights, we pause to consider petitioner's final argument that no remand is warranted because the statute contains "aremedial scheme that is `sufficiently comprehensive . . . to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under §1983.' " Wilder, 496 U.S., at 521 (quoting Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981)). Because petitioner does not claim that any provision of Title IV-D expressly curtails §1983 actions, she must make the difficult showing that allowing §1983 actions to go forward in these circumstances "would be inconsistent with Congress' carefully tailored scheme." Golden State, 493 U.S., at 107 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). </s> Only twice have we found a remedial scheme sufficiently comprehensive to supplant §1983: in Sea Clammers, supra, and Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984). In Sea Clammers, we focused on the "unusually elaborate enforcement provisions" of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, which placed at the disposal of the Environmental Protection Agency a panoply of enforcement options, including noncompliance orders, civil suits, and criminal penalties. 453 U.S., at 13 . We emphasized that several provisions of the Act authorized private persons to initiate enforcement actions. Id., at 14, 20. We found it "hard to believe that Congress intended to preserve the §1983 right of action when it created so many specific statutory remedies, including the two citizen suit provisions." Id., at 20. Likewise, in Smith, the review scheme in the Education of the Handicapped Act permitted aggrieved individuals to invoke "carefully tailored" local administrative procedures followed by federal judicial review. 468 U.S., at 1009 . We reasoned that Congress could not possibly have wanted parents to skip these procedures and go straight to court by way of §1983, since that would have "render[ed] superfluous most of the detailed procedural protections outlined in the statute." Id., at 1011. </s> We have also stressed that a plaintiff's ability toinvoke §1983 cannot be defeated simply by "[t]he availability of administrative mechanisms to protect the plaintiff's interests." Golden State, supra, at 106. Thus, in Wright, we rejected the argument that the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development's "generalized powers" to audit local public housing authorities, to enforce annual contributions contracts, and to cut off federal funding demonstrated a congressional intention to prevent public housing tenants from using §1983 to enforce their rights under the federal Housing Act. 479 U.S., at 428 . We reached much the same conclusion in Wilder, where the Secretary of Health and Human Services had power to reject state Medicaid plans or to withhold federal funding to States whose plans did not comply with federal law. 496 U.S., at 521 . Even though in both cases these oversight powers were accompanied by limited state grievance procedures for individuals, we found that §1983 was still available. Wright, supra, at 427-428; Wilder, supra, at 523. </s> The enforcement scheme that Congress created in Title IV-D is far more limited than those in Sea Clammers and Smith. Unlike the federal programs at issue in those cases, Title IV-D contains no private remedy-- either judicial or administrative--through which aggrieved persons can seek redress. The only way that Title IV-D assures that States live up to their child support plans is through the Secretary's oversight. The Secretary can audit only for "substantial compliance" on a programmatic basis. Furthermore, up to 25 percent of eligible children and custodial parents can go without most of the services enumerated in Title IV-D before the Secretary can trim a State's AFDC grant. These limited powers to audit and cut federal funding closely resemble those powers at issue in Wilder and Wright. Although counsel for the Secretary suggested at oral argument that the Secretary "has the same right under a contract as any other party to seek specific performance," Tr. ofOral Arg. 49, this possibility was not developed in the briefs. Even assuming the Secretary's authority to sue for specific performance, Title IV-D's administrative enforcement arsenal would not compare to those in Sea Clammers and Smith, especially if, as the Government further contended, see id., at 49-50, no private actor would have standing to force the Secretary to bring suit for specific performance. To the extent that Title IV-D may give rise to individual rights, therefore, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the Secretary's oversight powers are not comprehensive enough to close the door on §1983 liability. 68 F. 3d, at 1151-1156. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to remand to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> U.S. Supreme Court </s> No. 95-1441 </s> LINDA J. BLESSING, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC SECURITY, PETITIONER v. CATHY FREE STONE, etc., et al. </s> on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit [April 21, 1977] </s> Justice Scalia , with whom Justice Kennedy joins, I agree with the Court that under the test set forth in Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418, 423 (1987), and Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assn., 496 U.S. 498, 509 (1990), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not permit individual beneficiaries of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, as added, 88 Stat. 2351, and as amended, 42 U. S. C. A. §§651-669b (Supp. 1997), to bring suit challenging a State's failure to achieve "substantial compliance" with the requirements of Title IV-D. That conclusion makes it unnecessary to reach the question whether §1983 ever authorizes the beneficiaries of a federal state funding and spending agreement--such as Title IV-D--to bring suit. </s> As we explained in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), such an agreement is "in the nature of a contract," id., at 17: The State promises to provide certain services to private individuals, in exchange for which the Federal Government promises to give the State funds. In contract law, when such an arrangement is made (A promises to pay B money, in exchange for which B promises to provideservices to C), the person who receives the benefit of the exchange of promises between the two others (C) is called a third party beneficiary. Until relatively recent times, the third party beneficiary was generally regarded as a stranger to the contract, and could not sue upon it; that is to say, if, in the example given above, B broke his promise and did not provide services to C, the only person who could enforce the promise in court was the other party to the contract, A. See 1 W. Story, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts 549-550 (4th ed. 1856). This appears to have been the law at the time §1983 was enacted. See Brief for Council of State Governments et al. as Amici Curiae 10-11, and n. 6 (citing sources). If so, the ability of persons in respondents' situation to compel a State to make good on its promise to the Federal Government was not a "righ[t] . . . secured by the . . . laws" under §1983. While it is of course true that newly enacted laws are automatically embraced within §1983, it does not follow that the question of what rights those new laws (or, for that matter, old laws) secure is to be determined according to modern notions rather than according to the understanding of §1983 when it was enacted. Allowing third party beneficiaries of commitments to the Federal Government to sue is certainly a vast expansion. </s> It must be acknowledged that Wright and Wilder permitted beneficiaries of federal state contracts to sue under §1983, but the argument set forth above was not raised. I am not prepared without further consideration to reject the possibility that third party beneficiary suits simply do not lie. I join the Court's opinion because, in ruling against respondents under the Wright/Wilder test, it leaves that possibility open. </s> Footnotes </s> [Footnote 1 After the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, Congress amended Title IV-D in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105. Except where otherwise noted, we refer to the amended version of Title IV-D throughout this opinion. </s> [Footnote 2 For the deficiencies in Arizona's child support enforcement system, see principally OCSE, Audit Division Report No. AZ-85%PR, Program Results Audit of the State of Arizona Child Support Enforcement Program, October 1, 1984 September 30, 1985 (June 25, 1987); OCSE, Audit Division Report No. AZ-86%PR/PM, Program Results/Performance Measurements Audit, State of Arizona, Child Support Enforcement Program, October 1, 1985 September 30, 1986 (June 9, 1989); OCSE, Audit Division Report No. AZ-90%AA, Comprehensive Annual Audit, State of Arizona (Sept. 30, 1991) (covering calendar year 1989). Arizona eventually achieved substantial compliance in each category found deficient in these audits, although not always in a timely manner. See, e.g., Letter from Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Assistant Secretary for Children and Families, Dept. of HHS, to Linda Moore Cannon, Director, Arizona Dept. of Economic Security (Mar. 2, 1992) (reducing Arizona's AFDC funding by one percent for the period between July 1, 1988, and December 31, 1988, due to the State's failure to implement its Parent Locator Service in conformity with its corrective action plan). </s> [Footnote 3 Compare Wehunt v. Ledbetter, 875 F. 2d 1558 (CA11 1989) (holding that Title IV-D was not enacted for the especial benefit of AFDC families, and so it does not create enforceable rights under §1983), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990) with Carelli v. Howser, 923 F. 2d 1208 (CA6 1991) (holding that Title IV-D creates rights that are enforceable under §1983, but that the Secretary of Health and Human Service's oversight power forecloses a §1983 remedy) and with Albiston v. Maine Comm'r of Human Servs., 7 F. 3d 258 (CA1 1993) (holding that AFDC recipients have an enforceable right to prompt disbursement of their child support payments under Title IV-D) and with Howe v. Ellenbecker, 8 F. 3d 1258 (CA8 1993) (holding that Title IV-D creates rights that are enforceable under §1983), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1005 (1994). Petitioners make two further arguments in their briefs on the merits. They first contend that the Eleventh Amendment strips federal courts of jurisdiction over a §1983 cause of action against state officials to enforce Title IV-D. Next, they ask us to overrule Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980), where we held that §1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal statutes. We decline to address these questions which were neither raised nor decided below, and were not presented in the petition for certiorari. This Court's Rule 14.1(a).

United States Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. CHESAPEAKE & O. R. CO.(1956) No. 19 Argued: October 15, 1956Decided: December 3, 1956 </s> The respondent railroad sued the United States in the District Court under the Tucker Act to recover a sum allegedly due for certain transportation of military supplies, the United States having paid the export rate rather than the higher domestic rate. The goods had been shipped via respondent railroad to an Atlantic port for export; that exportation had been frustrated by wartime developments; they were stored domestically; and later shipped from a Pacific port to a different foreign country. The District Court gave judgment for the respondent, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. On review here, held: </s> 1. On the record in this case, this Court cannot say whether the issue of tariff construction should have been referred to the Interstate Commerce Commission. Pp. 80-81. </s> 2. The question of tariff construction should be determined by the Court of Appeals upon a full record, which would include consideration of the factors shown by the record in the earlier case on which it relied, but which is not before this Court. P. 81. </s> 3. Referral to the Interstate Commerce Commission of the question of tariff construction is not barred by the two-year limitation contained in 16 (3) of the Interstate Commerce Act. United States v. Western Pacific R. Co., ante, p. 59. P. 81. </s> 224 F.2d 443, reversed and remanded. </s> Morton Hollander argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Doub and Melvin Richter. </s> Meade T. Spicer, Jr. argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. [352 U.S. 77, 78] </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case presents questions similar to those involved in United States v. Western Pacific R. Co., ante, p. 59, decided today. </s> In 1941 and 1942 the Government shipped from Pontiac, Michigan, to Newport News, Virginia, over the respondent's lines, various military supplies destined for China, via the port of Rangoon, Burma. This intended exportation was frustrated by the fall of Rangoon to Japanese military forces on March 8, 1942. The Government therefore took possession of the shipments at Newport News, reshipped them about three months later to storage centers in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and more than a year later again reshipped some of the goods to various points on the Pacific Coast, whence they were exported to Calcutta, India. Had the original purpose of a shipment to China been accomplished, the export rate provided in Item 23030 of Tariff No. 218-M 1 would have applied to the transportation between Pontiac and Newport News. However, when that shipment was frustrated, the respondent billed the Government at the higher [352 U.S. 77, 79] domestic rate. 2 The Government paid these bills as rendered, but subsequently, on post-audit by the General Accounting Office, readjusted the charges to the lower export rate, deducting the difference from subsequent bills of the carrier for other transportation services. 3 Thereafter the respondent sued the United States in the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia under the Tucker Act 4 to recover the amount of these deductions. The District Court gave judgment for the respondent, 5 the Court of Appeals affirmed, 6 and we granted certiorari. 7 </s> The Court of Appeals, following its earlier decision in United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 215 F.2d 213, held "that the intention to export to China was abandoned and that the movement which began at Pontiac, Michigan, as an export was converted by the shipper into a domestic shipment"; hence the domestic rate applied. It further held that the District Court had properly denied the Government's request for a referral to the Interstate Commerce Commission of the question whether the domestic rate, if applied to these shipments, would be reasonable. As to this the Court of Appeals said that the "question was not the reasonableness of rates, which everyone conceded to be reasonable, but which rate was applicable to the shipment under the circumstances of the case, a question which the court was competent to decide." Therefore, it concluded that there were no "administrative questions" for the Commission to determine. Further, without questioning the timeliness of the [352 U.S. 77, 80] respondent's suit under the Tucker Act, 8 the Court of Appeals held that in any event referral to the Commission of the question of the reasonableness of the domestic tariff as applied to these shipments was barred by the two-year statute of limitations of the Interstate Commerce Act. 9 </s> Unlike the Court of Claims in United States v. Western Pacific R. Co., supra, the Court of Appeals, correctly we think, regarded the questions of whether the domestic tariff applied to these shipments, and whether it was reasonable if so applied, as simply two ways of stating the same underlying problem. Hence we face the same question as the one we have dealt with in the Western Pacific case, supra, namely: does the issue of tariff construction, which the Court of Appeals regarded as one for the court, involve such acquaintance with rate-making and transportation factors as to make the issue initially one for the Interstate Commerce Commission, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction? In this instance we cannot say positively whether or not there should have been a referral to the Commission. The Government, treating the issues of "construction" and "reasonableness" as separable, did not question the Court of Appeals' holding that the domestic tariff applied, but argued only that the tariff was unreasonable as applied to these shipments. The parties, therefore, have not briefed or argued the factors making for or against the application of the domestic rather than the export tariff. Consequently, we do not know what kinds of factors are involved, and we therefore cannot say on this record whether the issue of tariff construction [352 U.S. 77, 81] should have been referred to the Commission. We think this question should be determined by the Court of Appeals upon a full record, which would no doubt include consideration of the factors shown by the record in the earlier case which it followed here, 10 and which is not before us. 11 For the reasons given in our opinion in the Western Pacific case, supra, we hold that referral to the Commission would not be barred by the 16 (3) statute of limitations. </s> We shall therefore reverse the judgment below and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion and with our opinion in United States v. Western Pacific R. Co., supra, decided this day. </s> It is so ordered. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS dissents from a reference of these matters to the Interstate Commerce Commission, since he is of the view that the principles of Great Northern R. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285 , are applicable here. </s> MR. JUSTICE REED and MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 "APPLICATION OF EXPORT RATES TO NORTH ATLANTIC SEABOARD PORTS OF EXPORT </s> "The rates named in this tariff, or as same may be amended, and designated as `Export Rates' will apply only on traffic which does not leave the possession of the carrier, delivered by the Atlantic Port Terminal carriers direct to the steamer or steamer's dock upon arrival at the port or after storage or transit has been accorded by the port carrier at the port under tariffs which permit the application of the export rates, and also on traffic delivered to the party entitled to receive it at the carrier's seaboard stations to which export rates apply, which traffic is handled direct from carriers' stations to steamship docks and on which required proof of exportation is given. (C. F. A. Inf. 8179, 13607)" </s> [Footnote 2 Central Freight Association, Freight Tariff No. 490-A. </s> [Footnote 3 This procedure was authorized by 322 of the Transportation Act of September 18, 1940, 54 Stat. 955, 49 U.S.C. 66. </s> [Footnote 4 28 U.S.C. 1346 (a) (2). </s> [Footnote 5 The District Court filed no written opinion. It rendered a short oral opinion which appears at pages 40-41 of the record. </s> [Footnote 6 224 F.2d 443. </s> [Footnote 7 350 U.S. 953 . </s> [Footnote 8 The respondent's cause of action accrued no later than the summer of 1946, when the Government deducted the difference between the domestic rate and the export rate. The respondent filed its suit on March 10, 1952. On the assumption that the Tucker Act applies (see our opinion in the Western Pacific case, ante, p. 59, at pp. 70-71), the suit was timely brought. </s> [Footnote 9 24 Stat. 384, as amended, 49 U.S.C. 16 (3). </s> [Footnote 10 215 F.2d 213. </s> [Footnote 11 The Government suggests that in comparable situations the Commission has decided that the export rate should apply. See C. B. Fox Co. v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R. Co., 246 I. C. C. 561; River Petroleum Corp. v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 258 I. C. C. 1; Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 258 I. C. C. 422; Products-From-Sweden, Inc. v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 263 I. C. C. 760. Respondent, in turn, cites California Texas Oil Co. v. Bessemer & Lake Erie R. Co., 264 I. C. C. 147; Pacific Chemical & Fertilizer Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 268 I. C. C. 468; and War Materials Reparations Cases, 294 I. C. C. 5. We express no opinion as to the effect of these decisions, for we think their relevancy to the situation at hand should be left to the Court of Appeals in the first instance. See our opinion in the Western Pacific case, ante, p. 59. </s> [352 U.S. 77, 82]

United States Supreme Court ZADVYDAS v. DAVIS et al.(2001) No. 99-7791 Argued: February 21, 2001Decided: June 28, 2001 </s> After a final removal order is entered, an alien ordered removed is held in custody during a 90-day removal period. If the alien is not removed in those 90 days, the post-removal-period detention statute authorizes further detention or supervised release, subject to administrative review. Kestutis Zadvydas, petitioner in No. 99-7791--a resident alien born, apparently of Lithuanian parents, in a German displaced persons camp--was ordered deported based on his criminal record. Germany and Lithuania refused to accept him because he was not a citizen of their countries; efforts to send him to his wife's native country also failed. When he remained in custody after the removal period expired, he filed a habeas action under 28 U.S.C. §2241. The District Court granted the writ, reasoning that, because the Government would never remove him, his confinement would be permanent, in violation of the Constitution. In reversing, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Zadvydas' detention did not violate the Constitution because eventual deportation was not impossible, good faith efforts to remove him continued, and his detention was subject to administrative review. Kim Ho Ma, respondent in No. 00-38, is a resident alien born in Cambodia who was ordered removed based on his aggravated felony conviction. When he remained in custody after the removal period expired, he filed a §2241 habeas petition. In ordering his release, the District Court held that the Constitution forbids post-removal-period detention unless there is a realistic chance that an alien will be removed, and that no such chance existed here because Cambodia has no repatriation treaty with the United States. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that detention was not authorized for more than a reasonable time beyond the 90-day period, and that, given the lack of a repatriation agreement, that time had expired. </s> Held: </s> 1.Section 2241 habeas proceedings are available as a forum for statutory and constitutional challenges to post-removal-period detention. Statutory changes in the immigration law left habeas untouched as the basic method for obtaining review of continued custody after a deportation order becomes final, and none of the statutory provisions limiting judicial review of removal decisions applies here. Pp. 6-8. </s> 2.The post-removal-period detention statute, read in light of the Constitution's demands, implicitly limits an alien's detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien's removal from the United States, and does not permit indefinite detention. Pp. 8-19. </s> (a)A statute permitting indefinite detention would raise serious constitutional questions. Freedom from imprisonment lies at the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. Government detention violates the Clause unless it is ordered in a criminal proceeding with adequate procedural safeguards or a special justification outweighs the individual's liberty interest. The instant proceedings are civil and assumed to be nonpunitive, and the Government proffers no sufficiently strong justification for indefinite civil detention under this statute. The first justification--preventing flight--is weak or nonexistent where removal seems a remote possibility. Preventive detention based on the second justification--protecting the community--has been upheld only when limited to specially dangerous individuals and subject to strong procedural protections. When preventive detention is potentially indefinite, this dangerousness rationale must also be accompanied by some other special circumstance, such as mental illness, that helps to create the danger. The civil confinement here is potentially permanent, and once the flight risk justification evaporates, the only special circumstance is the alien's removable status, which bears no relation to dangerousness. Moreover, the sole procedural protections here are found in administrative proceedings, where the alien bears the burden of proving he is not dangerous, without (according to the Government) significant later judicial review. The Constitution may well preclude granting an administrative body unreviewable authority to make determinations implicating fundamental rights. Pp.8-12. </s> (b)Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206--in which an alien was indefinitely detained as he attempted to reenter the country--does not support the Government's argument that alien status itself can justify indefinite detention. Once an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all persons within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent. Nor do cases holding that, because Congress has plenary power to create immigration law, the Judicial Branch must defer to Executive and Legislative Branch decisionmaking in that area help the Government, because that power is subject to constitutional limits. Finally, the aliens' liberty interest is not diminished by their lack of a legal right to live at large, for the choice at issue here is between imprisonment and supervision under release conditions that may not be violated and their liberty interest is strong enough to raise a serious constitutional problem with indefinite detention. Pp. 12-16. </s> (c)Despite the constitutional problem here, if this Court were to find a clear congressional intent to grant the Attorney General the power to indefinitely detain an alien ordered removed, the Court would be required to give it effect. But this Court finds no clear indication of such intent. The statute's use of "may" is ambiguous and does not necessarily suggest unlimited discretion. Similar related statutes requiring detention of criminal aliens during removal proceedings and the removal period do not show that Congress authorized indefinite detention here. Finally, nothing in the statute's legislative history clearly demonstrates a congressional intent to authorize indefinite, perhaps permanent, detention. Pp. 16-19. </s> 3.The application of the "reasonable time" limitation is subject to federal-court review. The basic federal habeas statute grants the federal courts authority to determine whether post-removal-period detention is pursuant to statutory authority. In answering that question, the court must ask whether the detention exceeds a period reasonably necessary to secure removal. It should measure reasonableness primarily in terms of the statute's purpose of assuring the alien's presence at the moment of removal. Thus, if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized. If it is foreseeable, the court should consider the risk of the alien's committing further crimes as a factor potentially justifying continued confinement. Without abdicating their responsibility to review the detention's lawfulness, the courts can take appropriate account of such matters as the Executive Branch's greater immigration-related expertise, the Immigration and Naturalization Service's administrative needs and concerns, and the Nation's need to speak with one voice on immigration. In order to limit the occasions when courts will need to make the difficult judgments called for by the recognition of this necessary Executive leeway, it is practically necessary to recognize a presumptively reasonable period of detention. It is unlikely that Congress believed that all reasonably foreseeable removals could be accomplished in 90 days, but there is reason to believe that it doubted the constitutionality of more than six months' detention. Thus, for the sake of uniform administration in the federal courts, six months is the appropriate period. After the 6-month period, once an alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must furnish evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. Pp. 19-22. </s> 4.The standard that the Fifth Circuit applied in holding Zadvydas' continued detention lawful seems to require an alien seeking release to show the absence of any prospect of removal--no matter how unlikely or unforeseeable--and thus demands more than the statute can bear. The Ninth Circuit's conclusion that Ma should be released may have rested solely upon the absence of a repatriation agreement without giving due weight to the likelihood of successful future negotiations. P. 22. </s> 185 F.3d 279 and 208 F.3d 815, vacated and remanded. </s> Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined. Kennedy, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C.J., joined, and in which Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined as to Part I. </s> KESTUTIS ZADVYDAS, PETITIONER </s> 99-7791v. </s> CHRISTINE G. DAVIS and IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE </s> on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit </s> JOHN D. ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL, etal., PETITIONERS </s> 00-38v. </s> KIM HO MA </s> on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit </s> [June 28, 2001] </s> Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> When an alien has been found to be unlawfully present in the United States and a final order of removal has been entered, the Government ordinarily secures the alien's removal during a subsequent 90-day statutory "removal period," during which time the alien normally is held in custody. </s> A special statute authorizes further detention if the Government fails to remove the alien during those 90 days. It says: </s> "An alien ordered removed [1] who is inadmissible ... [2] [or] removable [as a result of violations of status requirements or entry conditions, violations of criminal law, or reasons of security or foreign policy] or [3] who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be detained beyond the removal period and, if released, shall be subject to [certain] terms of supervision ...." 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(6) (1994 ed., Supp. V). </s> In these cases, we must decide whether this post-removal-period statute authorizes the Attorney General to detain a removable alien indefinitely beyond the removal period or only for a period reasonably necessary to secure the alien's removal. We deal here with aliens who were admitted to the United States but subsequently ordered removed. Aliens who have not yet gained initial admission to this country would present a very different question. See infra, at 12-14. Based on our conclusion that indefinite detention of aliens in the former category would raise serious constitutional concerns, we construe the statute to contain an implicit "reasonable time" limitation, the application of which is subject to federal court review. </s> I </s> A </s> The post-removal-period detention statute is one of a related set of statutes and regulations that govern detention during and after removal proceedings. While removal proceedings are in progress, most aliens may be released on bond or paroled. 66 Stat. 204, as added and amended, 110 Stat. 3009-585, 8 U.S.C. §§1226(a)(2), (c) (1994 ed., Supp. V). After entry of a final removal order and during the 90-day removal period, however, aliens must be held in custody. §1231(a)(2). Subsequently, as the post-removal-period statute provides, the Government "may" continue to detain an alien who still remains here or release that alien under supervision. §1231(a)(6). </s> Related Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) regulations add that the INS District Director will initially review the alien's records to decide whether further detention or release under supervision is warranted after the 90-day removal period expires. 8 CFR §§241.4(c)(1), (h), (k)(1)(i) (2001). If the decision is to detain, then an INS panel will review the matter further, at the expiration of a 3-month period or soon thereafter. §241.4(k)(2)(ii). And the panel will decide, on the basis of records and a possible personal interview, between still further detention or release under supervision. §241.4(i). In making this decision, the panel will consider, for example, the alien's disciplinary record, criminal record, mental health reports, evidence of rehabilitation, history of flight, prior immigration history, and favorable factors such as family ties. §241.4(f). To authorize release, the panel must find that the alien is not likely to be violent, to pose a threat to the community, to flee if released, or to violate the conditions of release. §241.4(e). And the alien must demonstrate "to the satisfaction of the Attorney General" that he will pose no danger or risk of flight. §241.4(d)(1). If the panel decides against release, it must review the matter again within a year, and can review it earlier if conditions change. §§241.4(k)(2)(iii), (v). </s> B </s> 1 </s> We consider two separate instances of detention. The first concerns Kestutis Zadvydas, a resident alien who was born, apparently of Lithuanian parents, in a displaced persons camp in Germany in 1948. When he was eight years old, Zadvydas immigrated to the United States with his parents and other family members, and he has lived here ever since. </s> Zadvydas has a long criminal record, involving drug crimes, attempted robbery, attempted burglary, and theft. He has a history of flight, from both criminal and deportation proceedings. Most recently, he was convicted of possessing, with intent to distribute, cocaine; sentenced to 16 years' imprisonment; released on parole after two years; taken into INS custody; and, in 1994, ordered deported to Germany. See 8 U.S.C. §1251(a)(2) (1988 ed., Supp. V) (delineating crimes that make alien deportable). </s> In 1994, Germany told the INS that it would not accept Zadvydas because he was not a German citizen. Shortly thereafter, Lithuania refused to accept Zadvydas because he was neither a Lithuanian citizen nor a permanent resident. In 1996, the INS asked the Dominican Republic (Zadvydas' wife's country) to accept him, but this effort proved unsuccessful. In 1998, Lithuania rejected, as inadequately documented, Zadvydas' effort to obtain Lithuanian citizenship based on his parents' citizenship; Zadvydas' reapplication is apparently still pending. </s> The INS kept Zadvydas in custody after expiration of the removal period. In September 1995, Zadvydas filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §2241 challenging his continued detention. In October 1997, a Federal District Court granted that writ and ordered him released under supervision. Zadvydas v. Caplinger, 986 F.Supp. 1011, 1027-1028 (ED La.). In its view, the Government would never succeed in its efforts to remove Zadvydas from the United States, leading to his permanent confinement, contrary to the Constitution. Id., at 1027. </s> The Fifth Circuit reversed this decision. Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279 (1999). It concluded that Zadvydas' detention did not violate the Constitution because eventual deportation was not "impossible," good faith efforts to remove him from the United States continued, and his detention was subject to periodic administrative review. Id., at 294, 297. The Fifth Circuit stayed its mandate pending potential review in this Court. </s> 2 </s> The second case is that of Kim Ho Ma. Ma was born in Cambodia in 1977. When he was two, his family fled, taking him to refugee camps in Thailand and the Philippines and eventually to the United States, where he has lived as a resident alien since the age of seven. In 1995, at age 17, Ma was involved in a gang-related shooting, convicted of manslaughter, and sentenced to 38 months' imprisonment. He served two years, after which he was released into INS custody. </s> In light of his conviction of an "aggravated felony," Ma was ordered removed. See 8 U.S.C. §§1101(a)(43)(F) (defining certain violent crimes as aggravated felonies), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (1994 ed., Supp. IV) (aliens convicted of aggravated felonies are deportable). The 90-day removal period expired in early 1999, but the INS continued to keep Ma in custody, because, in light of his former gang membership, the nature of his crime, and his planned participation in a prison hunger strike, it was "unable to conclude that Mr. Ma would remain nonviolent and not violate the conditions of release." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 00-38, p. 87a. </s> In 1999 Ma filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §2241. A panel of five judges in the Federal District Court for the Western District of Washington, considering Ma's and about 100 similar cases together, issued a joint order holding that the Constitution forbids post-removal-period detention unless there is "a realistic chance that [the] alien will be deported" (thereby permitting classification of the detention as "in aid of deportation"). Binh Phan v. Reno, 56 F.Supp. 2d 1149, 1156 (1999). The District Court then held an evidentiary hearing, decided that there was no "realistic chance" that Cambodia (which has no repatriation treaty with the United States) would accept Ma, and ordered Ma released. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 00-38, at 60a-61a. </s> The Ninth Circuit affirmed Ma's release. Kim Ho Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (2000). It concluded, based in part on constitutional concerns, that the statute did not authorize detention for more than a "reasonable time" beyond the 90-day period authorized for removal. Id., at 818. And, given the lack of a repatriation agreement with Cambodia, that time had expired upon passage of the 90 days. Id., at 830-831. </s> 3 </s> Zadvydas asked us to review the decision of the Fifth Circuit authorizing his continued detention. The Government asked us to review the decision of the Ninth Circuit forbidding Ma's continued detention. We granted writs in both cases, agreeing to consider both statutory and related constitutional questions. See also Duy Dac Ho v. Greene, 204 F.3d 1045, 1060 (CA10 2000) (upholding Attorney General's statutory and constitutional authority to detain alien indefinitely). We consolidated the two cases for argument; and we now decide them together. </s> II </s> We note at the outset that the primary federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. §2241, confers jurisdiction upon the federal courts to hear these cases. See §2241(c)(3) (authorizing any person to claim in federal court that he or she is being held "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws ... of the United States"). Before 1952, the federal courts considered challenges to the lawfulness of immigration-related detention, including challenges to the validity of a deportation order, in habeas proceedings. See Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 230, 235-236 (1953). Beginning in 1952, an alternative method for review of deportation orders, namely actions brought in federal district court under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), became available. See Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51-52 (1955). And in 1961 Congress replaced district court APA review with initial deportation order review in courts of appeals. See Act of Sept. 26, 1961, §5, 75 Stat. 651 (formerly codified at 8 U.S.C. §1105a(a)) (repealed 1996). The 1961 Act specified that federal habeas courts were also available to hear statutory and constitutional challenges to deportation (and exclusion) orders. See 8 U.S.C. §§1105a(a)(10), (b) (repealed 1996). These statutory changes left habeas untouched as the basic method for obtaining review of continued custody after a deportation order had become final. See Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206, 212, 215-216 (1968) (holding that §1105a(a) applied only to challenges to determinations made during deportation proceedings and motions to reopen those proceedings). </s> More recently, Congress has enacted several statutory provisions that limit the circumstances in which judicial review of deportation decisions is available. But none applies here. One provision, 8 U.S.C. §1231(h) (1994 ed., Supp. V), simply forbids courts to construe that section "to create any ... procedural right or benefit that is legally enforceable"; it does not deprive an alien of the right to rely on 28 U.S.C. §2241 to challenge detention that is without statutory authority. </s> Another provision, 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (1994 ed., Supp. V), says that "no court shall have jurisdiction to review" decisions "specified ... to be in the discretion of the Attorney General." The aliens here, however, do not seek review of the Attorney General's exercise of discretion; rather, they challenge the extent of the Attorney General's authority under the post-removal-period detention statute. And the extent of that authority is not a matter of discretion. See also, e.g., §1226(e) (applicable to certain detention-related decisions in period preceding entry of final removal order); §1231(a)(4)(D) (applicable to assertion of causes or claims under §1231(a)(4), which is not at issue here); §§1252(a)(1), (a)(2)(C) (applicable to judicial review of "final order[s] of removal"); §1252(g) (applicable to decisions "to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders"). </s> We conclude that §2241 habeas corpus proceedings remain available as a forum for statutory and constitutional challenges to post-removal-period detention. And we turn to the merits of the aliens' claims. </s> III </s> The post-removal-period detention statute applies to certain categories of aliens who have been ordered removed, namely inadmissible aliens, criminal aliens, aliens who have violated their nonimmigrant status conditions, and aliens removable for certain national security or foreign relations reasons, as well as any alien "who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal." 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(6) (1994 ed., Supp. V); see also 8 CFR §241.4(a) (2001). It says that an alien who falls into one of these categories "may be detained beyond the removal period and, if released, shall be subject to [certain] terms of supervision." 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(6) (1994 ed., Supp. V). </s> The Government argues that the statute means what it literally says. It sets no "limit on the length of time beyond the removal period that an alien who falls within one of the Section 1231(a)(6) categories may be detained." Brief for Petitioners in No. 00-38, p. 22. Hence, "whether to continue to detain such an alien and, if so, in what circumstances and for how long" is up to the Attorney General, not up to the courts. Ibid. </s> "[I]t is a cardinal principle" of statutory interpretation, however, that when an Act of Congress raises "a serious doubt" as to its constitutionality, "this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided." Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932); see also United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994); United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916); cf. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 238 (1998) (construction of statute that avoids invalidation best reflects congressional will). We have read significant limitations into other immigration statutes in order to avoid their constitutional invalidation. See United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 195, 202 (1957) (construing a grant of authority to the Attorney General to ask aliens whatever questions he "deem[s] fit and proper" as limited to questions "reasonably calculated to keep the Attorney General advised regarding the continued availability for departure of aliens whose deportation is overdue"). For similar reasons, we read an implicit limitation into the statute before us. In our view, the statute, read in light of the Constitution's demands, limits an alien's post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien's removal from the United States. It does not permit indefinite detention. </s> A </s> A statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious constitutional problem. The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause forbids the Government to "depriv[e]" any "person ... of ... liberty . . . without due process of law." Freedom from imprisonment--from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint--lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). And this Court has said that government detention violates that Clause unless the detention is ordered in a criminal proceeding with adequate procedural protections, see United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987), or, in certain special and "narrow" non-punitive "circumstances," Foucha, supra, at 80, where a special justification, such as harm-threatening mental illness, outweighs the "individual's constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint." Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997).The proceedings at issue here are civil, not criminal, and we assume that they are nonpunitive in purpose and effect. There is no sufficiently strong special justification here for indefinite civil detention--at least as administered under this statute. The statute, says the Government, has two regulatory goals: "ensuring the appearance of aliens at future immigration proceedings" and "[p]reventing danger to the community." Brief for Respondents in No. 99-7791, p. 24. But by definition the first justification--preventing flight--is weak or nonexistent where removal seems a remote possibility at best. As this Court said in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), where detention's goal is no longer practically attainable, detention no longer "bear[s] [a] reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual [was] committed." Id., at 738. </s> The second justification--protecting the community--does not necessarily diminish in force over time. But we have upheld preventive detention based on dangerousness only when limited to specially dangerous individuals and subject to strong procedural protections. Compare Hendricks, supra, at 368 (upholding scheme that imposes detention upon "a small segment of particularly dangerous individuals" and provides "strict procedural safeguards") and Salerno, supra, at 747, 750-752 (in upholding pretrial detention, stressing "stringent time limitations," the fact that detention is reserved for the "most serious of crimes," the requirement of proof of dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence, and the presence of judicial safeguards), with Foucha, supra, at 81-83 (striking down insanity-related detention system that placed burden on detainee to prove nondangerousness). In cases in which preventive detention is of potentially indefinite duration, we have also demanded that the dangerousness rationale be accompanied by some other special circumstance, such as mental illness, that helps to create the danger. See Hendricks, supra, at 358, 368. </s> The civil confinement here at issue is not limited, but potentially permanent. Cf. Salerno, supra, at 747 (noting that "maximum length of pretrial detention is limited" by "stringent" requirements); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545-546 (1952) (upholding temporary detention of alien during deportation proceeding while noting that "problem of ... unusual delay" was not present). The provision authorizing detention does not apply narrowly to "a small segment of particularly dangerous individuals," Hendricks, supra, at 368, say suspected terrorists, but broadly to aliens ordered removed for many and various reasons, including tourist visa violations. See 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(6) (1994 ed., Supp. V) (referencing §1227(a)(1)(C)); cf. Hendricks, 521 U.S., at 357-358 (only individuals with "past sexually violent behavior and a present mental condition that creates a likelihood of such conduct in the future" may be detained). And, once the flight risk justification evaporates, the only special circumstance present is the alien's removable status itself, which bears no relation to a detainee's dangerousness. Cf. id., at 358; Foucha, supra, at 82. </s> Moreover, the sole procedural protections available to the alien are found in administrative proceedings, where the alien bears the burden of proving he is not dangerous, without (in the Government's view) significant later judicial review. Compare 8 CFR §241.4(d)(1) (2001) (imposing burden of proving nondangerousness upon alien) with Foucha, supra, at 82 (striking down insanity-related detention for that very reason). This Court has suggested, however, that the Constitution may well preclude granting "an administrative body the unreviewable authority to make determinations implicating fundamental rights." Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Institution at Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 450 (1985) (O'Connor, J.); see also Crowell, 465 U.S. 367, 393 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 595-597 (1931) (Brandeis, J.). The serious constitutional problem arising out of a statute that, in these circumstances, permits an indefinite, perhaps permanent, deprivation of human liberty without any such protection is obvious. </s> The Government argues that, from a constitutional perspective, alien status itself can justify indefinite detention, and points to Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953), as support. That case involved a once lawfully admitted alien who left the United States, returned after a trip abroad, was refused admission, and was left on Ellis Island, indefinitely detained there because the Government could not find another country to accept him. The Court held that Mezei's detention did not violate the Constitution. Id., at 215-216. </s> Although Mezei, like the present cases, involves indefinite detention, it differs from the present cases in a critical respect. As the Court emphasized, the alien's extended departure from the United States required him to seek entry into this country once again. His presence on Ellis Island did not count as entry into the United States. Hence, he was "treated," for constitutional purposes, "as if stopped at the border." Id., at 213, 215. And that made all the difference. </s> The distinction between an alien who has effected an entry into the United States and one who has never entered runs throughout immigration law. See Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925) (despite nine years' presence in the United States, an "excluded" alien "was still in theory of law at the boundary line and had gained no foothold in the United States"); Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 188-190 (1958) (alien "paroled" into the United States pending admissibility had not effected an "entry"). It is well established that certain constitutional protections available to persons inside the United States are unavailable to aliens outside of our geographic borders. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990) (Fifth Amendment's protections do not extend to aliens outside the territorial boundaries); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784 (1950) (same). But once an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all "persons" within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596-598, and n. 5 (1953); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886); cf. Mezei, supra, at 212 ("[A]liens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law"). Indeed, this Court has held that the Due Process Clause protects an alien subject to a final order of deportation, see Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896), though the nature of that protection may vary depending upon status and circumstance, see Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32-34 (1982); Johnson, supra, at 770. </s> In Wong Wing, supra, the Court held unconstitutional a statute that imposed a year of hard labor upon aliens subject to a final deportation order. That case concerned substantive protections for aliens who had been ordered removed, not procedural protections for aliens whose removability was being determined. Compare post, at 2-3 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Court held that punitive measures could not be imposed upon aliens ordered removed because "all persons within the territory of the United States are entitled to the protection" of the Constitution. 163 U.S., at 238 (citing Yick Wo, supra, at 369 (holding that equal protection guarantee applies to Chinese aliens)); see also Witkovich, 353 U.S., at 199, 201 (construing statute which applied to aliens ordered deported in order to avoid substantive constitutional problems). And contrary to Justice Scalia's characterization, see post, at 2-4, in Mezei itself, both this Court's rejection of Mezei's challenge to the procedures by which he was deemed excludable and its rejection of his challenge to continued detention rested upon a basic territorial distinction. See Mezei, supra, at 215 (holding that Mezei's presence on Ellis Island was not "considered a landing" and did "not affec[t]" his legal or constitutional status (internal quotation marks omitted)). </s> In light of this critical distinction between Mezei and the present cases, Mezei does not offer the Government significant support, and we need not consider the aliens' claim that subsequent developments have undermined Mezei's legal authority. See Brief for Petitioner in No. 99-7791, p.23; Brief for Respondent in No. 00-38, pp.16-17; Brief for Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights as Amicus Curiae in No. 00-38, pp.15-20. Nor are we aware of any other authority that would support Justice Kennedy's limitation of due process protection for removable aliens to freedom from detention that is arbitrary or capricious. See post, at 14-18 (dissenting opinion). </s> The Government also looks for support to cases holding that Congress has "plenary power" to create immigration law, and that the judicial branch must defer to executive and legislative branch decisionmaking in that area. Brief for Respondents in No. 99-7791, at17, 20 (citing Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-589 (1952)). But that power is subject to important constitutional limitations. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941-942 (1983) (Congress must choose "a constitutionally permissible means of implementing" that power); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889) (congressional authority limited "by the Constitution itself and considerations of public policy and justice which control, more or less, the conduct of all civilized nations"). In these cases, we focus upon those limitations. In doing so, we nowhere deny the right of Congress to remove aliens, to subject them to supervision with conditions when released from detention, or to incarcerate them where appropriate for violations of those conditions. See 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(3) (1994 ed., Supp. V) (granting authority to Attorney General to prescribe regulations governing supervision of aliens not removed within 90 days); §1253 (imposing penalties for failure to comply with release conditions). The question before us is not one of "`confer[ring] on those admitted the right to remain against the national will'" or "`sufferance of aliens'" who should be removed. Post, at 2 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Mezei, 345 U.S., at 222-223 (Jackson, J., dissenting)). Rather, the issue we address is whether aliens that the Government finds itself unable to remove are to be condemned to an indefinite term of imprisonment within the United States. </s> Nor do the cases before us require us to consider the political branches' authority to control entry into the United States. Hence we leave no "unprotected spot in the Nation's armor." Kwong Hai Chew, supra, at 602. Neither do we consider terrorism or other special circumstances where special arguments might be made for forms of preventive detention and for heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of national security. The sole foreign policy consideration the Government mentions here is the concern lest courts interfere with "sensitive" repatriation negotiations. Brief for Respondents in No. 99-7791, at21. But neither the Government nor the dissents explain how a habeas court's efforts to determine the likelihood of repatriation, if handled with appropriate sensitivity, could make a significant difference in this respect. See infra, at 18-19. </s> Finally, the Government argues that, whatever liberty interest the aliens possess, it is "greatly diminished" by their lack of a legal right to "liv[e] at large in this country." Brief for Respondents in No. 99-7791, at 47; see also post, at 2-3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing right at issue as "right of release into this country"). The choice, however, is not between imprisonment and the alien "living at large." Brief for Respondents in No. 99-7791, at 47. It is between imprisonment and supervision under release conditions that may not be violated. See supra, at 14 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§1231(a)(3), 1253 (1994 ed., Supp. V)); 8 CFR §241.5 (2001) (establishing conditions of release after removal period). And, for the reasons we have set forth, we believe that an alien's liberty interest is, at the least, strong enough to raise a serious question as to whether, irrespective of the procedures used, cf. post, at 18-21 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), the Constitution permits detention that is indefinite and potentially permanent. </s> B </s> Despite this constitutional problem, if "Congress has made its intent" in the statute "clear, `we must give effect to that intent.'" Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 336 (2000) (quoting Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 215 (1962)). We cannot find here, however, any clear indication of congressional intent to grant the Attorney General the power to hold indefinitely in confinement an alien ordered removed. And that is so whether protecting the community from dangerous aliens is a primary or (as we believe) secondary statutory purpose. Cf. post, at 4, 5-6 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). After all, the provision is part of a statute that has as its basic purpose effectuating an alien's removal. Why should we assume that Con-gress saw the alien's dangerousness as unrelated to this purpose? </s> The Government points to the statute's word "may." But while "may" suggests discretion, it does not necessarily suggest unlimited discretion. In that respect the word "may" is ambiguous. Indeed, if Congress had meant to authorize long-term detention of unremovable aliens, it certainly could have spoken in clearer terms. Compare 8 U.S.C. §1537(b)(2)(C) (1994 ed., Supp. V) ("If no country is willing to receive" a terrorist alien ordered removed, "the Attorney General may, notwithstanding any other provision of law, retain the alien in custody" and must review the detention determination every six months).The Government points to similar related statutes that require detention of criminal aliens during removal proceedings and the removal period, and argues that these show that mandatory detention is the rule while discretionary release is the narrow exception. See Brief for Petitioners in No. 00-38, at26-28 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§1226(c), 1231(a)(2)). But the statute before us applies not only to terrorists and criminals, but also to ordinary visa violators, see supra, at 11; and, more importantly, post-removal-period detention, unlike detention pending a determination of removability or during the subsequent 90-day removal period, has no obvious termination point. </s> The Government also points to the statute's history. That history catalogs a series of changes, from an initial period (before 1952) when lower courts had interpreted statutory silence, Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, §§19, 20, 39 Stat. 889, 890, to mean that deportation-related detention must end within a reasonable time, Spector v. Landon, 209 F.2d 481, 482 (CA9 1954) (collecting cases); United States ex rel. Doukas v. Wiley, 160 F.2d 92, 95 (CA7 1947); United States ex rel. Ross v. Wallis, 279 F. 401, 403-404 (CA2 1922), to a period (from the early 1950's through the late 1980's) when the statutes permitted, but did not require, post-deportation-order detention for up to six months, Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, §242(c), 66 Stat. 210, 8 U.S.C. §§1252(c),(d) (1982 ed.); Witkovich, 353 U.S., at 198, to more recent statutes that have at times mandated and at other times permitted the post-deportation-order detention of aliens falling into certain categories such as aggravated felons, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, §7343(a), 102 Stat. 4470, 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2) (mandating detention); Immigration Act of 1990, §504(a), 104 Stat. 5049-5050, 8 U.S.C. §§1252(a)(2)(A), (B) (permitting release under certain circumstances); Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Naturalization Amendments of 1991, §306(a)(4), 105 Stat. 1751, 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(B) (same). </s> In early 1996, Congress explicitly expanded the group of aliens subject to mandatory detention, eliminating provisions that permitted release of criminal aliens who had at one time been lawfully admitted to the United States. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, §439(c), 110 Stat. 1277. And later that year Congress enacted the present law, which liberalizes pre-existing law by shortening the removal period from six months to 90 days, mandates detention of certain criminal aliens during the removal proceedings and for the subsequent 90-day removal period, and adds the post-removal-period provision here at issue. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Div. C, §§303, 305, 110 Stat. 3009-585, 3009-598 to 3009-599; 8 U.S.C. §§1226(c), 1231(a) (1994 ed., Supp. V). </s> We have found nothing in the history of these statutes that clearly demonstrates a congressional intent to authorize indefinite, perhaps permanent, detention. Consequently, interpreting the statute to avoid a serious constitutional threat, we conclude that, once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute. See 1 E. Coke, Institutes *70b ("Cessante ratione legis cessat ipse lex") (the rationale of a legal rule no longer being applicable, that rule itself no longer applies). </s> IV </s> The Government seems to argue that, even under our interpretation of the statute, a federal habeas court would have to accept the Government's view about whether the implicit statutory limitation is satisfied in a particular case, conducting little or no independent review of the matter. In our view, that is not so. Whether a set of particular circumstances amounts to detention within, or beyond, a period reasonably necessary to secure removal is determinative of whether the detention is, or is not, pursuant to statutory authority. The basic federal habeas corpus statute grants the federal courts authority to answer that question. See 28 U.S.C. §2241(c)(3) (granting courts authority to determine whether detention is "in violation of the ... laws ... of the United States"). In doing so the courts carry out what this Court has described as the "historic purpose of the writ," namely "to relieve detention by executive authorities without judicial trial." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 533 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in result). </s> In answering that basic question, the habeas court must ask whether the detention in question exceeds a period reasonably necessary to secure removal. It should measure reasonableness primarily in terms of the statute's basic purpose, namely assuring the alien's presence at the moment of removal. Thus, if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute. In that case, of course, the alien's release may and should be conditioned on any of the various forms of supervised release that are appropriate in the circumstances, and the alien may no doubt be returned to custody upon a violation of those conditions. See supra, at 14 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§1231(a)(3), 1253 (1994 ed., Supp. V); 8 CFR §241.5 (2001)). And if removal is reasonably foreseeable, the habeas court should consider the risk of the alien's committing further crimes as a factor potentially justifying confinement within that reasonable removal period. See supra, at 10-11. </s> We recognize, as the Government points out, that review must take appropriate account of the greater immigration-related expertise of the Executive Branch, of the serious administrative needs and concerns inherent in the necessarily extensive INS efforts to enforce this complex statute, and the Nation's need to "speak with one voice" in immigration matters. Brief for Respondents in No. 99-7791, at19. But we believe that courts can take appropriate account of such matters without abdicating their legal responsibility to review the lawfulness of an alien's continued detention. </s> Ordinary principles of judicial review in this area recognize primary Executive Branch responsibility. They counsel judges to give expert agencies decisionmaking leeway in matters that invoke their expertise. See Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 651-652 (1990). They recognize Executive Branch primacy in foreign policy matters. See Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 196 (1983). And they consequently require courts to listen with care when the Government's foreign policy judgments, including, for example, the status of repatriation negotiations, are at issue, and to grant the Government appropriate leeway when its judgments rest upon foreign policy expertise. </s> We realize that recognizing this necessary Executive leeway will often call for difficult judgments. In order to limit the occasions when courts will need to make them, we think it practically necessary to recognize some presumptively reasonable period of detention. We have adopted similar presumptions in other contexts to guide lower court determinations. See Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 379-380 (1966) (plurality opinion) (adopting rule, based on definition of "petty offense" in United States Code, that right to jury trial extends to all cases in which sentence of six months or greater is imposed); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56-58 (1991) (O'Connor, J.) (adopting presumption, based on lower court estimate of time needed to process arrestee, that 48-hour delay in probable cause hearing after arrest is reasonable, hence constitutionally permissible). </s> While an argument can be made for confining any presumption to 90 days, we doubt that when Congress shortened the removal period to 90 days in 1996 it believed that all reasonably foreseeable removals could be accomplished in that time. We do have reason to believe, however, that Congress previously doubted the constitutionality of detention for more than six months. See Juris. Statement of United States in United States v. Witkovich, O. T. 1956, No. 295, pp. 8-9. Consequently, for the sake of uniform administration in the federal courts, we recognize that period. After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. And for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior post-removal confinement grows, what counts as the "reasonably foreseeable future" conversely would have to shrink. This 6-month presumption, of course, does not mean that every alien not removed must be released after six months. To the contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. </s> V </s> The Fifth Circuit held Zadvydas' continued detention lawful as long as "good faith efforts to effectuate ... deportation continue" and Zadvydas failed to show that deportation will prove "impossible." 185 F.3d, at 294, 297. But this standard would seem to require an alien seeking release to show the absence of any prospect of removal--no matter how unlikely or unforeseeable--which demands more than our reading of the statute can bear. The Ninth Circuit held that the Government was required to release Ma from detention because there was no reasonable likelihood of his removal in the foreseeable future. 208 F.3d, at 831. But its conclusion may have rested solely upon the "absence" of an "extant or pending" repatriation agreement without giving due weight to the likelihood of successful future negotiations. See id., at 831, and n. 30. Consequently, we vacate the decisions below and remand both cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> KESTUTIS ZADVYDAS, PETITIONER </s> 99-7791v. </s> CHRISTINE G. DAVIS and IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE </s> on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit </s> JOHN D. ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL, etal., PETITIONERS </s> 00-38v. </s> KIM HO MA </s> on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit </s> [June 28, 2001] </s> Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, dissenting. </s> I join Part I of Justice Kennedy's dissent, which establishes the Attorney General's clear statutory authority to detain criminal aliens with no specified time limit. I write separately because I do not believe that, as Justice Kennedy suggests in Part II of his opinion, there may be some situations in which the courts can order release. I believe that in both Zadvydas v. Davis, No. 99-7791, and Ashcroft v. Ma, No. 00-38, a "careful description" of the substantive right claimed, Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), suffices categorically to refute its existence. A criminal alien under final order of removal who allegedly will not be accepted by any other country in the reasonably foreseeable future claims a constitutional right of supervised release into the United States. This claim can be repackaged as freedom from "physical restraint" or freedom from "indefinite detention," ante, at 9, but it is at bottom a claimed right of release into this country by an individual who concededly has no legal right to be here. There is no such constitutional right. </s> Like a criminal alien under final order of removal, an inadmissible alien at the border has no right to be in the United States. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889). In Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953), we upheld potentially indefinite detention of such an inadmissible alien whom the Government was unable to return anywhere else. We said that "we [did] not think that respondent's continued exclusion deprives him of any statutory or constitutional right." Id., at 215. While four members of the Court thought that Mezei deserved greater procedural protections (the Attorney General had refused to divulge any information as to why Mezei was being detained, id., at 209), no Justice asserted that Mezei had a substantive constitutional right to release into this country. And Justice Jackson's dissent, joined by Justice Frankfurter, affirmatively asserted the opposite, with no contradiction from the Court: "Due process does not invest any alien with a right to enter the United States, nor confer on those admitted the right to remain against the national will. Nothing in the Constitution requires admission or sufferance of aliens hostile to our scheme of government." Id., at 222-223 (emphasis added). Insofar as a claimed legal right to release into this country is concerned, an alien under final order of removal stands on an equal footing with an inadmissible alien at the threshold of entry: He has no such right. </s> The Court expressly declines to apply or overrule Mezei, ante, at 14, but attempts to distinguish it--or, I should rather say, to obscure it in a legal fog. First, the Court claims that "[t]he distinction between an alien who has effected an entry into the United States and one who has never entered runs throughout immigration law." Ante, at 13. True enough, but only where that distinction makes perfect sense: with regard to the question of what procedures are necessary to prevent entry, as opposed to what procedures are necessary to eject a person already in the United States. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) ("Our cases have frequently suggested that a continuously present resident alien is entitled to a fair hearing when threatened with deportation" (emphasis added)). The Court's citation of Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896), for the proposition that we have "held that the Due Process Clause protects an alien subject to a final order of deportation," ante, at 13, is arguably relevant. That case at least involved aliens under final order of deportation.* But all it held is that they could not be subjected to the punishment of hard labor without a judicial trial. I am sure they cannot be tortured, as well--but neither prohibition has anything to do with their right to be released into the United States. Nor does Wong Wing show that the rights of detained aliens subject to final order of deportation are different from the rights of aliens arrested and detained at the border--unless the Court believes that the detained alien in Mezei could have been set to hard labor. </s> Mezei thus stands unexplained and undistinguished by the Court's opinion. We are offered no justification why an alien under a valid and final order of removal--which has totally extinguished whatever right to presence in this country he possessed--has any greater due process right to be released into the country than an alien at the border seeking entry. Congress undoubtedly thought that both groups of aliens--inadmissible aliens at the threshold and criminal aliens under final order of removal--could be constitutionally detained on the same terms, since it provided the authority to detain both groups in the very same statutory provision, see 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(6). Because I believe Mezei controls these cases, and, like the Court, I also see no reason to reconsider Mezei, I find no constitutional impediment to the discretion Congress gave to the Attorney General. Justice Kennedy's dissent explains the clarity of the detention provision, and I see no obstacle to following the statute's plain meaning. </s> KESTUTIS ZADVYDAS, PETITIONER </s> 99-7791v. </s> CHRISTINE G. DAVIS and IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE </s> on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit </s> JOHN D. ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL, etal., PETITIONERS </s> 00-38v. </s> KIM HO MA </s> on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit </s> [June 28, 2001] </s> Justice Kennedy, with whom The Chief Justice joins, and with whom Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas join as to Part I, dissenting. </s> The Court says its duty is to avoid a constitutional question. It deems the duty performed by interpreting a statute in obvious disregard of congressional intent; curing the resulting gap by writing a statutory amendment of its own; committing its own grave constitutional error by arrogating to the Judicial Branch the power to summon high officers of the Executive to assess their progress in conducting some of the Nation's most sensitive negotiations with foreign powers; and then likely releasing into our general population at least hundreds of removable or inadmissible aliens who have been found by fairprocedures to be flight risks, dangers to the community, or both. Far from avoiding a constitutional question, the Court's ruling causes systemic dislocation in the balance of powers, thus raising serious constitutional concerns not just for the cases at hand but for the Court's own view of its proper authority. Any supposed respect the Court seeks in not reaching the constitutional question isoutweighed by the intrusive and erroneous exercise of its own powers. In the guise of judicial restraint the Court ought not to intrude upon the other branches. The constitutional question the statute presents, it must be acknowledged, may be a significant one in some later case; but it ought not to drive us to an incorrect interpretation of the statute. The Court having reached the wrong result for the wrong reason, this respectful dissent is required. </s> I </s> The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §1101 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V), is straightforward enough. It provides: </s> "An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under section 1182 of this title, removable under section 1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4) of this title or who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be detained beyond the removal period and, if released, shall be subject to the terms of supervision in paragraph (3)." 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(6) (1994 ed., Supp V). </s> By this statute, Congress confers upon the Attorney General discretion to detain an alien ordered removed. It gives express authorization to detain "beyond the removal period." Ibid. The class of removed aliens detainable under the section includes aliens who were inadmissible and aliens subject to final orders of removal, provided they are a risk to the community or likely to flee. The issue to be determined is whether the authorization to detain beyond the removal period is subject to the implied,nontextual limitation that the detention be no longer than reasonably necessary to effect removal to another country. The majority invokes the canon of constitutional doubt to read that implied term into the statute. One can accept the premise that a substantial constitutional question is presented by the prospect of lengthy, even unending, detention in some instances; but the statutory construction the Court adopts should be rejected in any event. The interpretation has no basis in the language or structure of the INA and in fact contradicts and defeats the purpose set forth in the express terms of the statutory text. </s> The Court, it is submitted, misunderstands the principle of constitutional avoidance which it seeks to invoke. The majority gives a brief bow to the rule that courts must respect the intention of Congress, ante, at 16, but then waltzes away from any analysis of the language, structure, or purpose of the statute. Its analysis is not consistent with our precedents explaining the limits of the constitutional doubt rule. The rule allows courts to choose among constructions which are "fairly possible," Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932), not to "`press statutory construction to the point of disingenuous evasion even to avoid a constitutional question,'" Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 60 (1997) (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 57, n.9 (1996)). Were a court to find two interpretations of equal plausibility, it should choose the construction that avoids confronting a constitutional question. The majority's reading of the statutory authorization to "detai[n] beyond the removal period," however, is not plausible. An interpretation which defeats the stated congressional purpose does not suffice to invoke the constitutional doubt rule, for it is "plainly contrary to the intent of Congress." United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994). The majority announces it will reject the Government's argument "that the statute means what it literally says," ante, at 8, but then declines to offer any other acceptable textual interpretation. The majority does not demonstrate an ambiguity in the delegation of the detention power to the Attorney General. It simply amends the statute to impose a time limit tied to the progress of negotiations to effect the aliens' removal. The statute cannot be so construed. The requirement the majority reads into the law simply bears no relation to the text; and in fact it defeats the statutory purpose anddesign. </s> Other provisions in §1231 itself do link the requirement of a reasonable time period to the removal process. See, e.g., §1231(c)(1)(A) (providing that an alien who arrives at a port of entry "shall be removed immediately on a vessel or aircraft" unless "it is impracticable" to do so "within a reasonable time" (emphasis added)); §1231(c)(3)(A)(ii)(II) (requiring the "owner of a vessel or aircraft bringing an alien to the United States [to] pay the costs of detaining and maintaining the alien ... for the period of time reasonably necessary for the owner to arrange for repatriation" (emphasis added)). That Congress chose to impose the limitation in these sections and not in §1231(a)(6) is evidence of its intent to measure the detention period by other standards. When Congress has made express provisions for the contingency that repatriation might be difficult or prolonged in other portions of the statute, it should be presumed that its omission of the same contingency in the detention section was purposeful. Indeed, the reasonable time limits in the provisions just mentioned simply excuse the duty of early removal. They do not mandate release. An alien within one of these categories, say, a ship stowaway, would be subject as well to detention beyond the removal period under §1231(a)(6), if the statute is read as written. Under the majority's view, however, it appears the alien must be released in six months even if presenting a real danger to the community. </s> The 6-month period invented by the Court, even when modified by its sliding standard of reasonableness for certain repatriation negotiations, see ante, at 21, makes the statutory purpose to protect the community ineffective. The risk to the community exists whether or not the repatriation negotiations have some end in sight; in fact, when the negotiations end, the risk may be greater. The authority to detain beyond the removal period is to protect the community, not to negotiate the aliens' return. The risk to the community survives repatriation negotiations. To a more limited, but still significant, extent, so does the concern with flight. It is a fact of international diplomacy that governments and their policies change; and if repatriation efforts can be revived, the Attorney General has an interest in ensuring the alien can report so the removal process can begin again. </s> Congress, moreover, was well aware of the difficulties confronting aliens who are removable but who cannot be repatriated. It made special provisions allowing them to be employed, a privilege denied to other deportable aliens. See §1231(a)(7) (providing an "alien [who] cannot be removed due to the refusal of all countries designated by the alien or under this section to receive the alien" still remains eligible for employment in the United States). Congress' decision to ameliorate the condition of aliens subject to a final order of removal who cannot be repatriated, but who need not be detained, illustrates a balance in the statutory design. Yet the Court renders the other side of the balance meaningless. The risk to the community posed by a removable alien is a function of a variety of circumstances, circumstances that do not diminish just because the alien cannot be deported within some foreseeable time. Those circumstances include the seriousness of the alien's past offenses, his or her efforts at rehabilitation, and some indication from the alien that, given the real prospect of detention, the alien will conform his or her conduct. This is the purpose for the periodic review of detention status provided for by the regulations. See 8 CFR §241.4 (2001). The Court's amendment of the statute reads out of the provision the congressional decision that dangerousness alone is a sufficient basis for detention, see ante, at 19 (citing 1 E. Coke, Institutes *70b), and reads out as well any meaningful structure for supervisedrelease. </s> The majority is correct to observe that in United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194 (1957), the Court "read significant limitations into" a statute, ante, at 9, but that does not permit us to avoid the proper reading of the enactment now before us. In Witkovich, the Court construed former §1252(d), which required an alien under a final order of deportation "to give information under oath...as the Attorney General may deem fit and proper." 353 U.S., at 195. The Court held that although the plain language "appears to confer upon the Attorney General unbounded authority to require whatever information he deems desirable of aliens whose deportation has not been effected within six months," id., at 199, the constitutional doubt this interpretation would raise meant the language would be construed as limited to the provision of information "reasonably calculated to keep the Attorney General advised regarding the continued availability for departure of aliens whose deportation is overdue," id., at 202. In Witkovich the interpretation of the text was in aid of the statutory purpose; in the instant cases the interpretation nullifies the statutory purpose. Here the statute by its own terms permits the Attorney General to consider factors the Court now makes irrelevant. </s> The majority's unanchored interpretation ignores another indication that the Attorney General's detention discretion was not limited to this truncated period. Section 1231(a)(6) permits continued detention not only of removable aliens but also of inadmissible aliens, for instance those stopped at the border before entry. Congress provides for detention of both categories within the same statutory grant of authority. Accepting the majority's interpretation, then, there are two possibilities, neither of which is sustainable. On the one hand, it may be that the majority's rule applies to both categories of aliens, in which case we are asked to assume that Congress intended to restrict the discretion it could confer upon the Attorney General so that all inadmissible aliens must be allowed into our community within six months. On the other hand, the majority's logic might be that inadmissible and removable aliens can be treated differently. Yet it is not a plausible construction of §1231(a)(6) to imply a time limit as to one class but not to another. The text does not admit of this possibility. As a result, it is difficult to see why "[a]liens who have not yet gained initial admission to this country would present a very different question." Ante, at 2. </s> Congress' power to detain aliens in connection with removal or exclusion, the Court has said, is part of the Legislature's considerable authority over immigration matters. See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896) ("Proceedings to exclude or expel would be vain if those accused could not be held in custody pending the inquiry into their true character, and while arrangements were being made for their deportation"). It is reasonable to assume, then, and it is the proper interpretation of the INA and §1231(a)(6), that when Congress provided for detention "beyond the removal period," it exercised its considerable power over immigration and delegated to the Attorney General the discretion to detain inadmissible and other removable aliens for as long as they are determined to be either a flight risk or a danger to the Nation. </s> The majority's interpretation, moreover, defeats the very repatriation goal in which it professes such interest. The Court rushes to substitute a judicial judgment for the Executive's discretion and authority. As the Government represents to us, judicial orders requiring release of removable aliens, even on a temporary basis, have the potential to undermine the obvious necessity that the Nation speak with one voice on immigration and foreign affairs matters. Brief for Respondents in No. 99-7791, p. 49. The result of the Court's rule is that, by refusing to accept repatriation of their own nationals, other countries can effect the release of these individuals back into the American community. Ibid. If their own nationals are now at large in the United States, the nation of origin may ignore or disclaim responsibility to accept their return. Ibid. The interference with sensitive foreign relations becomes even more acute where hostility or tension characterizes the relationship, for other countries can use the fact of judicially mandated release to their strategic advantage, refusing the return of their nationals to force dangerous aliens upon us. One of the more alarming aspects of the Court's new venture into foreign affairs management is the suggestion that the district court can expand or contract the reasonable period of detention based on its own assessment of the course of negotiations with foreign powers. The Court says it will allow the Executive to perform its duties on its own for six months; after that, foreign relations go into judicially supervised receivership. </s> The cases which the Court relies upon to support the imposition of presumptions are inapposite. The rule announced in Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966)--"that sentences exceeding six months for criminal contempt may not be imposed by federal courts absent a jury trial"--was based on the definition of a "petty offense" that was still operable in the United States Code, and was proper "under the peculiar power of the federal courts to revise sentences in contempt cases." Id., at 380. The majority can point to no similar statutory or judicial source for its authority to create its own time-based rule in these cases. It cites only an observation in a brief filed by the Government in United States v. Witkovich, O. T. 1956, No. 295, pp.8-9, see ante, at 21, relying, in turn, on doubts expressed in a 1952 Senate Report concerning detention for longer than six months under an Act with standards different, and far less precise, than those applicable here. In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991), our reasonableness presumption for delays of less than 48 hours between an arrest and a probable cause hearing was, as the majority recognizes, ante, at 21, based on the "Court of Appeals' determination of the time required to complete those procedures." 500 U.S., at 57. Here, as far as we know, the 6-month period bears no particular relationship to how long it now takes to deport any group of aliens, or, for that matter, how long it took in the past to remove. Zadvydas' case itself demonstrates that the repatriation process may often take years to negotiate, involving difficult issues of establishing citizenship and the like. See Brief for Petitioner in No. 99-7791, pp.17-20. </s> It is to be expected that from time to time a foreign power will adopt a truculent stance with respect to the United States and other nations. Yet the Court by its time limit, or presumptive time limit, goes far to undercut the position of the Executive in repatriation negotiations, thus ill serving the interest of all foreign nationals of the country concerned. Law-abiding aliens might wish to return to their home country, for instance, but the strained relationship caused by the difficult repatriation talks might prove to be a substantial obstacle for these aliens as well. </s> In addition to weakening the hand of our Government, court ordered release cannot help but encourage dilatory and obstructive tactics by aliens who, emboldened by the Court's new rule, have good reason not to cooperate by making their own repatriation or transfer seem foreseeable. An alien ordered deported also has less incentive to cooperate or to facilitate expeditious removal when he has been released, even on a supervised basis, than does an alien held at an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) detention facility. Neither the alien nor his family would find any urgency in assisting with a petition to other countries to accept the alien back if the alien could simply remain in the United States indefinitely. </s> The risk to the community posed by the mandatory release of aliens who are dangerous or a flight risk is far from insubstantial; the motivation to protect the citizenry from aliens determined to be dangerous is central to the immigration power itself. The Government cites statistical studies showing high recidivism rates for released aliens. One Government Accounting Office study cited by Congress in floor debates on the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 1214, put the figure as high as 77 percent. 142 Cong. Rec. 7972 (1996); Brief for Respondents in No. 99-7791, at27, n.13. It seems evident a criminal record accumulated by an admitted alien during his or her time in the United States is likely to be a better indicator of risk than factors relied upon during the INS's initial decision to admit or exclude. Aliens ordered deported as the result of having committed a felony have proved to be dangerous. </s> Any suggestion that aliens who have completed prison terms no longer present a danger simply does not accord with the reality that a significant risk may still exist, as determined by the many factors set forth in the regulations. See 8 CFR §241.4(f) (2001). Underworld and terrorist links are subtle and may be overseas, beyond our jurisdiction to impose felony charges. Furthermore, the majority's rationale seems to apply to an alien who flees prosecution or escapes from custody in some other country. The fact an alien can be deemed inadmissible because of fraud at the time of entry does not necessarily distinguish his or her case from an alien whose entry was legal. Consider, for example, a fugitive alien who enters by fraud or stealth and resides here for five years with significant ties to the community, though still presenting a danger; contrast him with an alien who entered lawfully but a month later committed an act making him removable. Why the Court's rationale should apply to the second alien but not the first is not apparent. </s> The majority cannot come to terms with these distinctions under its own rationale. The rule the majority creates permits consideration of nothing more than the reasonable foreseeability of removal. See ante, at 19-20. That standard is not only without sound basis in the statutory structure, but also is not susceptible to customary judicial inquiry. Cf. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) ("The judiciary is not well positioned to shoulder primary responsibility for assessing the likelihood and importance of such diplomatic repercussions"). The majority does say that the release of terrorists or other "special circumstances" might justify "heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of national security." Ante, at 15-16. Here the Court appears to rely on an assessment of risk, but this is the very premise it finds inadequate to sustain the natural reading of the statute. The Court ought not to reject a rationale in order to deny power to the Attorney General and then invoke the same rationale to save its own analysis. </s> This rule of startling breadth invites potentially perverse results. Because other nations may refuse to admit aliens who have committed certain crimes--see, e.g., Brief for Petitioner in No. 99-7791, at19 ("Lithuanian law precludes granting of citizenship to persons who, before coming to Lithuania, have been sentenced in another state to imprisonment for a deliberate crime for which criminal liability is imposed by the laws of the Republic of Lithuania" (citations and internal quotation marks omitted))--often the aliens who have committed the most serious crimes will be those who may be released immediately under the majority's rule. An example is presented in the case of Saroeut Ourk, a Cambodian alien determined to be removable and held pending deportation. See Ourk v. INS, No. 00-35645 (CA9, Sept. 18, 2000), cert. pending, No. 00-987. Ourk was convicted of rape by use of drugs in conjunction with the kidnaping of a 13-year-old girl; after serving 18 months of his prison term, he was released on parole but was returned to custody twice more for parole violations. Pet. for Cert. in No. 00-987, pp.4-5. When he was ordered deported and transferred to the custody of the INS, it is no surprise the INS determined he was both a flight risk and a danger to the community. Yet the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded, based on its earlier decision in Kim Ho Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (2000), that Ourk could no longer be held pending deportation, since removal to Cambodia was not reasonably foreseeable. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 00-987, pp. 3a-4a. See also Phetsany v. INS, No. 00-16286 (CA9, Sept. 18, 2000), cert. pending, No. 00-986 (requiring release of a native and citizen of Laos convicted of attempted, premeditated murder); Mounsaveng v. INS, No. 00-15309 (CA9, Aug. 11, 2000), cert. pending, No. 00-751 (releasing a citizen of Laos convicted of rape of a 15-year-old girl and reckless endangerment for involvement in a fight in which gunshots were fired); Lim v. Reno, No. 99-36191 (CA9, Aug. 14, 2000), cert. pending, No. 00-777 (releasing a Cambodian convicted of rape and robbery); Phuong Phuc Le v. INS, No. 00-16095 (CA9, Sept. 18, 2000), cert. pending, No. 00-1001 (releasing a Vietnamese citizen convicted of voluntary manslaughter in a crime involving the attempted murder of two other persons). Today's result will ensure these dangerous individuals, and hundreds more like them, will remain free while the Executive Branch tries to secure their removal. By contrast, aliens who violate mere tourist visa requirements, ante, at 11, can in the typical case be held pending deportation on grounds that a minor offender is more likely to be removed. There is no reason to suppose Congress intended this odd result. </s> The majority's rule is not limited to aliens once lawfully admitted. Today's result may well mandate the release of those aliens who first gained entry illegally or by fraud, and, indeed, is broad enough to require even that inadmissible and excludable aliens detained at the border be set free in our community. In Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 238 F.3d 704, 725 (CA6 2001), for example, Rosales, a Cuban citizen, arrived in this country during the 1980 Mariel boatlift. Id., at 707. Upon arrival in the United States, Rosales was released into the custody of a relative under the Attorney General's authority to parole illegal aliens, see 8 U.S.C. §1182(d)(5)(A), and there he committed multiple crimes for which he was convicted and imprisoned. 238 F.3d, at 707-708. While serving a sentence for burglary and grand larceny, Rosales escaped from prison, another of the offenses for which he ultimately served time. Id., at 708. The INS eventually revoked Rosales' immigration parole, ordered him deported, and held him pending deportation, subject to periodic consideration for parole under the Cuban Review Plan. See 8 CFR §212.12(g)(2) (2001). In reasoning remarkably similar to the majority's, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the indefinite detention of Rosales violated Fifth Amendment due process rights, because "the government offered ... no credible proof that there is any possibility that Cuba may accept Rosales's return anytime in the foreseeable future." 238 F.3d, at 725. This result--that Mariel Cubans and other illegal, inadmissible aliens will be released notwithstanding their criminal history and obvious flight risk--would seem a necessary consequence of the majority's construction of the statute. </s> The majority's confidence that the Judiciary will handle these matters "with appropriate sensitivity," ante, at 16, 20, allows no meaningful category to confine or explain its own sweeping rule, provides no justification for wresting this sovereign power away from the political branches in the first place, and has no support in judicially manageable standards for deciding the foreseeability of removal. </s> It is curious that the majority would approve of continued detention beyond the 90-day period, or, for that matter, during the 90-day period, where deportation is not reasonably foreseeable. If the INS cannot detain an alien because he is dangerous, it would seem irrelevant to the Constitution or to the majority's presumption that the INS has detained the alien for only a little while. The reason detention is permitted at all is that a removable alien does not have the same liberty interest as a citizen does. The Court cannot bring itself to acknowledge this established proposition. Likewise, it is far from evident under the majority's theory why the INS can condition and supervise the release of aliens who are not removable in the reasonably foreseeable future, or why "the alien may no doubt be returned to custody upon a violation of those conditions." Id., at 20. It is true that threat of revocation of supervised release is necessary to make the supervised release itself effective, a fact even counsel for Zadvydas acknowledged. Brief for Petitioner in No. 99-7791, at20-21. If that is so, however, the whole foundation for the Court's position collapses. </s> The Court today assumes a role in foreign relations which is unprecedented, unfortunate, and unwise. Its misstep results in part from a misunderstanding of the liberty interests these aliens retain, an issue next to be discussed. </s> II </s> The aliens' claims are substantial; their plight is real. They face continued detention, perhaps for life, unless it is shown they no longer present a flight risk or a danger to the community. In a later case the specific circumstances of a detention may present a substantial constitutional question. That is not a reason, however, for framing a rule which ignores the law governing alien status. </s> As persons within our jurisdiction, the aliens are entitled to the protection of the Due Process Clause. Liberty under the Due Process Clause includes protection against unlawful or arbitrary personal restraint or detention. The liberty rights of the aliens before us here are subject to limitations and conditions not applicable to citizens, however. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) ("In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens"). No party to this proceeding contests the initial premise that the aliens have been determined to be removable after a fair hearing under lawful and proper procedures. Section 1229a sets forth the proceedings required for deciding the inadmissibility or removability of an alien, including a hearing before an immigration judge, at which the INS carries "the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that ... the alien is deportable." 8 U.S.C. §1229a(c)(3)(A); see also Berenyi v. District Director, INS, 385 U.S. 630, 636 (1967) ("When the Government seeks to ... deport a resident alien and send him from our shores, it carries the heavy burden of proving its case by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence" (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted)). Aliens ordered removed pursuant to these procedures are given notice of their right to appeal the decision, 8 U.S.C. §1229a(c)(4), may move the immigration judge to reconsider, §1229a(c)(5), can seek discretionary cancellation of removal, §1229b, and can obtain habeas review of the Attorney General's decision not to consider waiver of deportation. See INS v. St. Cyr, ante, at __ (2001) (slip op., at 24). As a result, aliens like Zadvydas and Ma do not arrive at their removable status without thorough, substantial procedural safeguards. </s> The majority likely is correct to say that the distinction between an alien who entered the United States, as these aliens did, and one who has not, "runs throughout immigration law." Ante, at 13. The distinction is not so clear as it might seem, however, and I doubt it will suffice to confine the rationale adopted by the majority. The case which often comes to mind when one tests the distinction is Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953), where the Court considered the situation of an alien denied entry and detained on Ellis Island. The detention had no foreseeable end, for though Mezei was inadmissible to the United States it seemed no other country would have him. Id., at 209. The case presented a line-drawing problem, asking whether the alien was in our country; or whether his situation was the same as if he were still on foreign shores; or whether he fell in a legal category somewhere in between, though if this were true, it still would not be clear how to resolve the case. The Court held the alien had no right to a hearing to secure his release. Id., at 212-213. (Approximately 17 months after this Court denied Mezei relief, the Attorney General released him on parole. It appears Mezei never returned to INS custody, though he was not admitted to the United States as a citizen or lawful permanent resident. See Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons From the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U.Pa. L.Rev. 933, 979-984 (1995)). </s> Here the majority says the earlier presence of these aliens in the United States distinguishes the cases from Mezei. For reasons given here it is submitted the majority is incorrect in its major conclusions in all events, so even if it were assumed these aliens are in a class with more rights than Mezei, it makes no difference. For purposes of this dissent it is not necessary to rely upon Mezei. </s> That said, it must be made clear these aliens are in a position far different from aliens with a lawful right to remain here. They are removable, and their rights must be defined in accordance with that status. The due process analysis must begin with a "careful description of the asserted right." Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993). We have "long held that an alien seeking initial admission to the United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his application, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative." Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982). The same is true for those aliens like Zadvydas and Ma, who face a final order of removal. When an alien is removable, he or she has no right under the basic immigration laws to remain in this country. The removal orders reflect the determination that the aliens' ties to this community are insufficient to justify their continued presence in the United States. An alien's admission to this country is conditioned upon compliance with our laws, and removal is the consequence of a breach of that understanding. </s> It is true the Court has accorded more procedural protections to those aliens admitted to the country than those stopped at the border, observing that "a continuously present alien is entitled to a fair hearing when threatened with deportation." Ibid.; Mezei, supra, at 212 ("[A]liens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law.... But an alien on the threshold of initial entry stands on a different footing: `Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned'" (quoting United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950))). Removable and excludable aliens are situated differently before an order of removal is entered; the removable alien, by virtue of his continued presence here, possesses an interest in remaining, while the excludable alien seeks only the privilege of entry. </s> Still, both removable and inadmissible aliens are entitled to be free from detention that is arbitrary or capricious. Where detention is incident to removal, the detention cannot be justified as punishment nor can the confinement or its conditions be designed in order to punish. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896). This accords with international views on detention of refugees and asylum seekers. See Report of the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U. N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/4 (Dec. 28, 1999); United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating to the Detention on Asylum-Seekers (Feb. 10, 1999). It is neither arbitrary nor capricious to detain the aliens when necessary to avoid the risk of flight or danger to the community. </s> Whether a due process right is denied when removable aliens who are flight risks or dangers to the community are detained turns, then, not on the substantive right to be free, but on whether there are adequate procedures to review their cases, allowing persons once subject to detention to show that through rehabilitation, new appreciation of their responsibilities, or under other standards, they no longer present special risks or danger if put at large. The procedures to determine and to review the status-required detention go far toward this objective. </s> By regulations, promulgated after notice and comment, the Attorney General has given structure to the discretion delegated by the INA in order to ensure fairness and regularity in INS detention decisions. First, the INS provides for an initial postcustody review, before the expiration of the 90-day removal period, at which a district director conducts a record review. 8 CFR §241.4 (2001). The alien is entitled to present any relevant information in support of release, and the district director has the discretion to interview the alien for a personal evaluation. §241.4(h)(1). At the end of the 90-day period, the alien, if held in custody, is transferred to a postorder detention unit at INS headquarters, which in the ordinary course will conduct an initial custody review within three months of the transfer. §241.4(k)(2)(ii). If the INS determines the alien should remain in detention, a two-member panel of INS officers interviews the alien and makes a recommendation to INS headquarters. §§241.4(i)(1)-(3). The regulations provide an extensive, nonexhaustive list of factors that should be considered in the recommendation to release or further detain. Those include: "[t]he nature and number of disciplinary infractions"; "the detainee's criminal conduct and criminal convictions, including consideration of the nature and severity of the alien's convictions, sentences imposed and time actually served, probation and criminal parole history, evidence of recidivism, and other criminal history"; "psychiatric and psychological reports pertaining to the detainee's mental health"; "[e]vidence of rehabilitation"; "[f]avorable factors, including ties to the United States such as the number of close relatives"; "[p]rior immigration violations and history"; "[t]he likelihood that the alien is a significant flight risk or may abscond to avoid removal, including history of escapes"; and any other probative information. §241.4(f). Another review must occur within one year, with mandatory evaluations each year thereafter; if the alien requests, the INS has the discretion to grant more frequent reviews. §241.4(k)(2)(iii). The INS must provide the alien 30-days advance, written notice of custody reviews; and it must afford the alien an opportunity to submit any relevant materials for consideration. §241.4(i)(3)(ii). The alien may be assisted by a representative of his choice during the review, §§241.4(i)(3)(i), (ii), and the INS must provide the alien with a copy of its decision, including a brief statement of the reasons for any continued detention, §241.4(d). </s> In this context the proper analysis can be informed by our cases involving parole-eligibility or parole-revocation determinations. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), for example, we held some amount of process was due an individual whose parole was revoked, for "the liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty." Id., at 482; see also Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987). We rejected in Morrissey the suggestion that the State could justify parole revocation "without some informal procedural guarantees," 408 U.S., at 483, but "[g]iven the previous conviction and the proper imposition of conditions," we recognized that "the State has an overwhelming interest in being able to return the individual to imprisonment without the burden of a new adversary criminal trial." Ibid. We held the review process need not include a judicial officer or formal court proceeding, but could be conducted by a neutral administrative official. Id., at 486. </s> While the majority expresses some concern that the regulations place the burden on the alien to show he is no longer dangerous, that question could be adjudicated in a later case raising the issue. It should be noted the procedural protection here is real, not illusory; and the criteria for obtaining release are far from insurmountable. Statistics show that between February 1999 and mid-November 2000 some 6,200 aliens were provided custody reviews before expiration of the 90-day removal period, and of those aliens about 3,380 were released. 65 Fed. Reg. 80285 (2000); Reply Brief for Petitioners in No. 00-38, p.15. As a result, although the alien carries the burden to prove detention is no longer justified, there is no showing this is an unreasonable burden. </s> Like the parolee in Morrissey, who was aware of the conditions of his release, the aliens in the instant cases have notice, constructive or actual, that the INA imposes as a consequence of the commission of certain crimes not only deportation but also the possibility of continued detention in cases where deportation is not immediately feasible. And like the prisoner in Board of Pardons v. Allen, who sought federal-court review of the discretionary decision denying him parole eligibility, removable aliens held pending deportation have a due process liberty right to have the INS conduct the review procedures in place. See 482 U.S., at 381. Were the INS, in an arbitrary or categorical manner, to deny an alien access to the administrative processes in place to review continued detention, habeas jurisdiction would lie to redress the due process violation caused by the denial of the mandated procedures under 8 CFR §241.4 (2001). </s> This is not the posture of the instant cases, however. Neither Zadvydas nor Ma argues that the Attorney General has applied the procedures in an improper manner; they challenge only the Attorney General's authority to detain at all where removal is no longer foreseeable. The Government has conceded that habeas jurisdiction is available under 28 U.S.C. §2241 to review an alien's challenge to detention following entry of a final order of deportation, Brief for Respondents in No. 99-7791, at9-10, n.7; Tr. of Oral Arg. 59, although it does not detail what the nature of the habeas review would be. As a result, we need not decide today whether, and to what extent, a habeas court could review the Attorney General's determination that a detained alien continues to be dangerous or a flight risk. Given the undeniable deprivation of liberty caused by the detention, there might be substantial questions concerning the severity necessary for there to be a community risk; the adequacy of judicial review in specific cases where it is alleged there is no justification for concluding an alien is dangerous or a flight risk; and other issues. These matters are not presented to us here. </s> In all events, if judicial review is to be available, the inquiry required by the majority focuses on the wrong factors. Concepts of flight risk or future dangerousness are manageable legal categories. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992). The majority instead would have the Judiciary review the status of repatriation negotiations, which, one would have thought, are the paradigmatic examples of nonjusticiable inquiry. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S, at 425. The inquiry would require the Executive Branch to surrender its primacy in foreign affairs and submit reports to the courts respecting its ongoing negotiations in the international sphere. High officials of the Department of State could be called on to testify as to the status of these negotiations. The Court finds this to be a more manageable, more appropriate role for the Judiciary than to review a single, discrete case deciding whether there were fair procedures and adequate judicial safeguards to determine whether an alien is dangerous to the community so that long-term detention is justified. The Court's rule is a serious misconception of the proper judicial function, and it is not what Congress enacted. </s> For these reasons, the Court should reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. I dissent. </s> FOOTNOTES Footnote * </s> Together with No. 00-38, Ashcroft, Attorney General, etal. v. Kim Ho Ma, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. </s> FOOTNOTES Footnote * </s> The Court also cites Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982), as oblique support for the claim that the due process protection afforded aliens under final order of removal "may vary depending upon status and circumstance." Ante, at 13. But that case is entirely inapt because it did not involve an alien subject to a final order of deportation. The Court also cites Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950), ante, at 13, but that case is doubly irrelevant: because it dealt not with deportation but with the military's detention of enemy aliens outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, and because it rejected habeas corpus jurisdiction anyway.

United States Supreme Court PEACOCK v. THOMAS(1996) No. 94-1453 Argued: November 6, 1995Decided: February 21, 1996 </s> Page I </s> Respondent Thomas filed an Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) class action against his former employer, Tru-Tech, Inc., and petitioner Peacock, a Tru-Tech officer and shareholder, alleging that they had breached their fiduciary duties to the class in administering Tru-Tech's pension benefits plan, and seeking benefits due under the plan. The District Court entered a money judgment against Tru-Tech upon finding that it had breached its fiduciary duties, but ruled that Peacock was not a fiduciary. Thomas did not execute the judgment while the case was on appeal and, during that time, Peacock settled many of Tru-Tech's accounts with favored creditors, including himself. After the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment and attempts to collect it from Tru-Tech proved unsuccessful, Thomas sued Peacock in federal court, asserting, inter alia, a claim for "Piercing the Corporate Veil Under ERISA and Applicable Federal Law." The District Court ultimately agreed to pierce the corporate veil and entered judgment against Peacock in the amount of the judgment against Tru-Tech. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the District Court properly exercised ancillary jurisdiction over Thomas' suit. </s> Held: </s> The District Court lacked jurisdiction over Thomas' subsequent suit. Pp. 3-10. </s> (a) Neither ERISA's jurisdictional provision, 29 U.S.C. 1132(e)(1), nor 28 U.S.C. 1331 supplied the District Court with subject-matter jurisdiction over this suit. The Court rejects Thomas' suggestion that the suit arose under 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(3), which authorizes civil actions for "appropriate equitable relief . . . to redress [any] violations . . . of [ERISA] or the terms of [an ERISA] plan." Because Thomas' complaint in this lawsuit alleged no such Page II violations, he failed to allege a claim for equitable relief. Even if ERISA permits a plaintiff to pierce the corporate veil, such piercing is not itself an independent ERISA cause of action and cannot independently support federal jurisdiction. The District Court erred in finding that he had properly stated such a claim, since ERISA does not provide for imposing liability for an extant ERISA judgment against a third party. Pp. 3-4. </s> (b) Federal courts do not possess ancillary jurisdiction over new actions in which a federal judgment creditor seeks to impose liability for a money judgment on a person not otherwise liable for the judgment. Although ancillary jurisdiction may be exercised (1) to permit disposition by a single court of factually interdependent claims, and (2) to enable a court to function successfully by effectuating its decrees, Thomas has not carried his burden of demonstrating that this suit falls within either category. First, because a federal court sitting in a subsequent lawsuit involving claims with no independent basis for jurisdiction lacks the threshold jurisdictional power that exists when ancillary claims are asserted in the same proceeding as the claims conferring federal jurisdiction, claims alleged to be factually interdependent with and, hence, ancillary to claims brought in the earlier suit will not support federal jurisdiction over the subsequent suit. In any event, there is insufficient factual or logical interdependence between the claims raised in Thomas' first and second suits. Second, cases in which this Court has approved the exercise of ancillary enforcement jurisdiction over attachment, garnishment, and other supplementary proceedings involving third parties are inapposite. This case is governed by H. C. Cook Co. v. Beecher, 217 U.S. 497, in which the Court refused to authorize the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in a subsequent lawsuit to impose an obligation to pay an existing federal judgment on a person not already liable for that judgment. As long as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sufficiently protect a judgment creditor's ability to execute on a judgment, ancillary jurisdiction should not be exercised over proceedings, such as the present, that are new actions based on different theories of relief than the prior decree. Pp. 4-10. </s> 39 F.3d 493, reversed. </s> THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. </s> [ PEACOCK v. THOMAS, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 1] </s> JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case presents the issue whether federal courts possess ancillary jurisdiction over new actions in which a federal judgment creditor seeks to impose liability for a money judgment on a person not otherwise liable for the judgment. We hold that they do not. </s> I </s> Respondent Jack L. Thomas is a former employee of Tru-Tech, Inc. In 1987, Thomas filed an ERISA class action in federal court against Tru-Tech and petitioner D. Grant Peacock, an officer and shareholder of Tru-Tech, for benefits due under the corporation's pension benefits plan. Thomas alleged primarily that Tru-Tech and Peacock breached their fiduciary duties to the class in administering the plan. The District Court found that Tru-Tech had breached its fiduciary duties, but ruled that Peacock was not a fiduciary. On November 28, 1988, the District Court entered judgment in the amount of $187,628.93 against Tru-Tech only. Thomas v. Tru-Tech, Inc., No. 87-2243-3 (D. S. C.). On April 3, 1990, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Judgt. order reported at, 900 F.2d 256. Thomas did not execute the judgment while the case was on appeal and, during that time, Peacock settled </s> [ PEACOCK v. THOMAS, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 2] </s> many of Tru-Tech's accounts with favored creditors, including himself. </s> After the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, Thomas unsuccessfully attempted to collect the judgment from Tru-Tech. Thomas then sued Peacock in federal court, claiming that Peacock had entered into a civil conspiracy to siphon assets from Tru-Tech to prevent satisfaction of the ERISA judgment. 1 Thomas also claimed that Peacock fraudulently conveyed Tru-Tech's assets in violation of South Carolina and Pennsylvania law. Thomas later amended his complaint to assert a claim for "Piercing the Corporate Veil Under ERISA and Applicable Federal Law." App. 49. The District Court ultimately agreed to pierce the corporate veil and entered judgment against Peacock in the amount of $187,628.93 - the precise amount of the judgment against Tru-Tech - plus interest and fees, notwithstanding the fact that Peacock's alleged fraudulent transfers totalled no more than $80,000. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the District Court properly exercised ancillary jurisdiction over Thomas' suit. 39 F.3d 493 (CA4 1994). We granted certiorari to determine whether the District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction and to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals. 2 514 U.S. ___ (1995). We now reverse. </s> [ PEACOCK v. THOMAS, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 3] </s> II </s> Thomas relies on the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 832, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., as the source of federal jurisdiction for this suit. The District Court did not expressly rule on subject matter jurisdiction, but found that Thomas had properly stated a claim under ERISA for piercing the corporate veil. We disagree. We are not aware of, and Thomas does not point to, any provision of ERISA that provides for imposing liability for an extant ERISA judgment against a third party. See Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 833 (1988) ("ERISA does not provide an enforcement mechanism for collecting judgments . . ."). </s> We reject Thomas' suggestion, not made in the District Court, that this subsequent suit arose under 502(a)(3) of ERISA, which authorizes civil actions for "appropriate equitable relief" to redress violations of ERISA or the terms of an ERISA plan. 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(3). Thomas' complaint in this lawsuit alleged no violation of ERISA or of the plan. The wrongdoing alleged in the complaint occurred in 1989 and 1990, some four to five years after Tru-Tech's ERISA plan was terminated, and Thomas did not - indeed, could not - allege that Peacock was a fiduciary to the terminated plan. 3 Thomas further concedes that Peacock's alleged wrongdoing "did not occur with respect to the administration or operation of the plan." Brief for Respondent 11. Under the circumstances, we think Thomas failed to allege a claim under 502(a)(3) for equitable relief. Section 502(a)(3) "does not, after all, authorize `appropriate equitable relief' at large, but only `appropriate equitable relief' for the purpose of `redress[ing any] violations or . . . enforc[ing] any </s> [ PEACOCK v. THOMAS, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 4] </s> provisions' of ERISA or an ERISA plan." Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. ___, ___ (1993) (slip op., at 5) (emphasis and modifications in original). </s> Moreover, Thomas' veil-piercing claim does not state a cause of action under ERISA and cannot independently support federal jurisdiction. Even if ERISA permits a plaintiff to pierce the corporate veil to reach a defendant not otherwise subject to suit under ERISA, Thomas could invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts only by independently alleging a violation of an ERISA provision or term of the plan. 4 Piercing the corporate veil is not itself an independent ERISA cause of action, "but rather is a means of imposing liability on an underlying cause of action." 1 C. Keating & G. O'Gradney, Fletcher Cyclopedia of Law of Private Corporations 41, p. 603 (perm. ed. 1990). Because Thomas alleged no "underlying" violation of any provision of ERISA or an ERISA plan, neither ERISA's jurisdictional provision, 29 U.S.C. 1132(e)(1), nor 28 U.S.C. 1331 supplied the District Court with subject matter jurisdiction over this suit. </s> III </s> Thomas also contends that this lawsuit is ancillary to the original ERISA suit. 5 We have recognized that a federal court may exercise ancillary jurisdiction "(1) to </s> [ PEACOCK v. THOMAS, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 5] </s> permit disposition by a single court of claims that are, in varying respects and degrees, factually interdependent; and (2) to enable a court to function successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. ___, ___ (1994) (slip op., at 4-5) (citations omitted). Thomas has not carried his burden of demonstrating that this suit falls within either category. See id., at ___ (slip op., at 2) (burden rests on party asserting jurisdiction). </s> A </s> "[A]ncillary jurisdiction typically involves claims by a defending party haled into court against his will, or by another person whose rights might be irretrievably lost unless he could assert them in an ongoing action in a federal court." Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 376 (1978). Ancillary jurisdiction may extend to claims having a factual and logical dependence on "the primary lawsuit," ibid., but that primary lawsuit must contain an independent basis for federal jurisdiction. The court must have jurisdiction over a case or controversy before it may assert jurisdiction over ancillary claims. See Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). In a subsequent lawsuit involving claims with no independent basis for jurisdiction, a federal court lacks the threshold jurisdictional power that exists when ancillary claims are asserted in the same proceeding as the claims conferring federal jurisdiction. See Kokkonen, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 6); H. C. Cook Co. v. Beecher, 217 U.S. 497, 498-499 (1910). Consequently, claims alleged to be factually interdependent with and, hence, ancillary to claims brought in an earlier federal lawsuit will not support federal jurisdiction over a subsequent lawsuit. The basis of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction is the practical need "to protect legal rights or effectively to resolve an </s> [ PEACOCK v. THOMAS, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 6] </s> entire, logically entwined lawsuit." Kroger, 437 U.S., at 377 . But once judgment was entered in the original ERISA suit, the ability to resolve simultaneously factually intertwined issues vanished. As in Kroger, "neither the convenience of litigants nor considerations of judicial economy" can justify the extension of ancillary jurisdiction over Thomas' claims in this subsequent proceeding. Ibid. </s> In any event, there is insufficient factual dependence between the claims raised in Thomas' first and second suits to justify the extension of ancillary jurisdiction. Thomas' factual allegations in this suit are independent from those asserted in the ERISA suit, which involved Peacock's and Tru-Tech's status as plan fiduciaries and their alleged wrongdoing in the administration of the plan. The facts relevant to this complaint are limited to allegations that Peacock shielded Tru-Tech's assets from the ERISA judgment long after Tru-Tech's plan had been terminated. The claims in these cases have little or no factual or logical interdependence, and, under these circumstances, no greater efficiencies would be created by the exercise of federal jurisdiction over them. See Kokkonen, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 5). </s> B </s> The focus of Thomas' argument is that his suit to extend liability for payment of the ERISA judgment from Tru-Tech to Peacock fell under the District Court's ancillary enforcement jurisdiction. We have reserved the use of ancillary jurisdiction in subsequent proceedings for the exercise of a federal court's inherent power to enforce its judgments. Without jurisdiction to enforce a judgment entered by a federal court, "the judicial power would be incomplete and entirely inadequate to the purposes for which it was conferred by the Constitution." Riggs v. Johnson County, 6 Wall. 166, 187 (1868). In defining that power, we have approved the exercise of </s> [ PEACOCK v. THOMAS, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 7] </s> ancillary jurisdiction over a broad range of supplementary proceedings involving third parties to assist in the protection and enforcement of federal judgments - including attachment, mandamus, garnishment, and the prejudgment avoidance of fraudulent conveyances. See, e.g., Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 834 , n. 10 (1988) (garnishment); Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, S. A., 339 U.S. 684, 690 -692 (1950) (prejudgment attachment of property); Dewey v. West Fairmont Gas Coal Co., 123 U.S. 329, 332-333 (1887) (prejudgment voidance of fraudulent transfers); Labette County Comm'rs v. United States ex rel. Moulton, 112 U.S. 217, 221-225 (1884) (mandamus to compel public officials in their official capacity to levy tax to enforce judgment against township); Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U.S. 276, 282-285 (1884) (prejudgment dispute over attached property); Riggs, supra, at 187-188 (mandamus to compel public officials in their official capacity to levy tax to enforce judgment against county). 6 </s> [ PEACOCK v. THOMAS, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 8] </s> Our recognition of these supplementary proceedings has not, however, extended beyond attempts to execute, or to guarantee eventual executability of, a federal judgment. We have never authorized the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in a subsequent lawsuit to impose an obligation to pay an existing federal judgment on a person not already liable for that judgment. Indeed, we rejected an attempt to do so in H. C. Cook Co. v. Beecher, 217 U.S. 497 (1910). In Beecher, the plaintiff obtained a judgment in federal court against a corporation that had infringed its patent. When the plaintiff could not collect on the judgment, it sued the individual directors of the defendant corporation, alleging that, during the pendency of the original suit, they had authorized continuing sales of the infringing product and knowingly permitted the corporation to become insolvent. We agreed with the Circuit Court's characterization of the suit as "an attempt to make the defendants answerable for the judgment already obtained" and affirmed the court's decision that the suit was not "ancillary to the judgment in the former suit." Id., at 498-499. Beecher governs this case and persuades us that Thomas' attempt to make Peacock answerable for the ERISA judgment is not ancillary to that judgment. </s> Labette County Comm'rs and Riggs are not to the contrary. In those cases, we permitted a judgment creditor to mandamus county officials to force them to levy a tax for payment of an existing judgment. Labette County Comm'rs, supra, at 221-225; Riggs, supra, at 187-188. The order in each case merely required compliance with the existing judgment by the persons with authority to comply. We did not authorize the shifting of liability for payment of the judgment from the judgment debtor to </s> [ PEACOCK v. THOMAS, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 9] </s> the county officials, as Thomas attempts to do here. </s> In determining the reach of the federal courts' ancillary jurisdiction, we have cautioned against the exercise of jurisdiction over proceedings that are "entirely new and original," Krippendorf v. Hyde, supra, at 285 (quoting Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co., 2 Wall. 609, 633 (1865)), or where "the relief [sought is] of a different kind or on a different principle" than that of the prior decree. Dugas v. American Surety Co., 300 U.S. 414, 428 (1937). These principles suggest that ancillary jurisdiction could not properly be exercised in this case. This action is founded not only upon different facts than the ERISA suit, but also upon entirely new theories of liability. In this suit, Thomas alleged civil conspiracy and fraudulent transfer of Tru-Tech's assets, but, as we have noted, no substantive ERISA violation. The alleged wrongdoing in this case occurred after the ERISA judgment was entered, and Thomas' claims - civil conspiracy, fraudulent conveyance, and "veil-piercing" - all involved new theories of liability not asserted in the ERISA suit. Other than the existence of the ERISA judgment itself, this suit has little connection to the ERISA case. This is a new action based on theories of relief that did not exist, and could not have existed, at the time the court entered judgment in the ERISA case. </s> Ancillary enforcement jurisdiction is, at its core, a creature of necessity. See Kokkonen, 511 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 5-6); Riggs, 6 Wall., at 187. When a party has obtained a valid federal judgment, only extraordinary circumstances, if any, can justify ancillary jurisdiction over a subsequent suit like this. To protect and aid the collection of a federal judgment, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide fast and effective mechanisms for execution. 7 In the event a stay is </s> [ PEACOCK v. THOMAS, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 10] </s> entered pending appeal, the Rules require the district court to ensure that the judgment creditor's position is secured, ordinarily by a supersedeas bond. 8 The Rules cannot guarantee payment of every federal judgment. But as long as they protect a judgment creditor's ability to execute on a judgment, the district court's authority is adequately preserved, and ancillary jurisdiction is not justified over a new lawsuit to impose liability for a judgment on a third party. Contrary to Thomas' suggestion otherwise, we think these procedural safeguards are sufficient to prevent wholesale fraud upon the district courts of the United States. </s> IV </s> For these reasons, we hold that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over Thomas' subsequent suit. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is </s> Reversed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Peacock's attorney was also named as a defendant in the suit, but the District Court rejected the claim against him. </s> [Footnote 2 Compare Thomas v. Peacock, 39 F.3d 493 (CA4 1994), Argento v. Melrose Park, 838 F.2d 1483 (CA7 1988), Skevofilax v. Quigley, 810 F.2d 378 (CA3) (en banc), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 (1987), and Blackburn Truck Lines, Inc. v. Francis, 723 F.2d 730 (CA9 1984), with Sandlin v. Corporate Interiors Inc., 972 F.2d 1212 (CA10 1992), and Berry v. McLemore, 795 F.2d 452 (CA5 1986). </s> [Footnote 3 The District Court in the original ERISA suit ruled that Peacock was not a fiduciary to Tru-Tech's plan. </s> [Footnote 4 This case is not at all like Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349 (1944), cited by Thomas' amici, in which the receiver of a federal bank, having obtained a judgment against the bank, then sued the bank's shareholders to hold them liable for the judgment. In Anderson, federal jurisdiction was founded upon a federal law, 12 U.S.C. 63, 64 (repealed), which specifically made shareholders of an undercapitalized federal bank liable up to the par value of their stock, regardless of the amount actually invested. </s> [Footnote 5 Congress codified much of the common-law doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction as part of "supplemental jurisdiction" in 28 U.S.C. 1367. </s> [Footnote 6 The United States, as amicus curiae for Thomas, suggests that the proceeding below was jurisdictionally indistinguishable from Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, S. A., 339 U.S. 684 (1950), Dewey v. West Fairmont Gas Coal Co., 123 U.S. 329 (1887), Labette County Comm'rs v. United States ex rel. Moulton, 112 U.S. 217 (1884), and Riggs v. Johnson County, 6 Wall. 166 (1868), because it was intended merely as a supplemental bill to preserve and force payment of the ERISA judgment by voiding fraudulent transfers of Tru-Tech's assets. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 9-18. We decline to address this argument, because, even if Thomas could have sought to force payment by mandamus or to void postjudgment transfers, neither Thomas nor the courts below characterized this suit that way. Indeed, Thomas expressly rejects that characterization of his lawsuit. Brief for Respondent 4 ("This action . . . is not one to collect a judgment, but one to establish liability on the part of the Petitioner") (emphasis in original); see id., at 11. In any event, the United States agrees that the alleged fraudulent transfers totalled no more </s> [ PEACOCK v. THOMAS, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 8] </s> than $80,000, far less than the judgment actually imposed on Peacock. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 3. </s> [Footnote 7 Rule 69(a), for instance, permits judgment creditors to use any </s> [ PEACOCK v. THOMAS, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 10] </s> execution method consistent with the practice and procedure of the state in which the district court sits. Rule 62(a) further protects judgment creditors by permitting execution on a judgment at any time more than 10 days after the judgment is entered. </s> [Footnote 8 The district court may only stay execution of the judgment pending the disposition of certain posttrial motions or appeal if the court provides for the security of the judgment creditor. Rule 62(b) (stay pending post-trial motions "on such conditions for the security of the adverse party as are proper"); Rule 62(d) (stay pending appeal "by giving a supersedeas bond"). </s> [ PEACOCK v. THOMAS, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 1] </s> JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. </s> The conflict between the views of the judges on the Court of Appeals and the District Court, on the one hand, and those of my eight colleagues, on the other, demonstrates that this is not an easy case. I believe its outcome should be determined by a proper application of the principle, first announced by Chief Justice Marshall, that a federal court's jurisdiction "is not exhausted by the rendition of its judgment, but continues until that judgment shall be satisfied." Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 23 (1825). In my opinion that jurisdiction encompasses a claim by a judgment creditor that a party in control of the judgment debtor has fraudulently exercised that control to defeat satisfaction of the judgment. </s> In substance the Court so held in Riggs v. Johnson County, 6 Wall. 166 (1868), and in Labette County Comm'rs v. United States ex rel. Moulton, 112 U.S. 217 (1884). In each of those cases a judgment against the county was unsatisfied because the county commissioners refused to levy a tax to raise the funds needed to pay the judgment, and in each this Court held that the federal court had jurisdiction to compel the commissioners to take the action necessary to enable the county to satisfy the judgment. It is true, as the Court notes </s> [ PEACOCK v. THOMAS, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 2] </s> today, that the "order in each case merely required compliance with the existing judgment by the persons with authority to comply." Ante, at 8. But the Court fails to explain why the District Court would not have had jurisdiction to enter a comparable order in this case - one that would have directed petitioner to restore to the judgment debtor the assets that he allegedly transferred to himself to prevent satisfaction of the judgment. * </s> It is true that the order that was actually entered against petitioner did more than that - it ordered him to satisfy the original judgment in full, rather than merely to restore the fraudulent transfers. For that reason, I agree that the relief was excessive and should be modified. Nevertheless, the Court's central holding that the District Court had no power to grant any relief against petitioner is inconsistent with Riggs and Labette. </s> I am also persuaded that the Court's reliance on H. C. </s> [ PEACOCK v. THOMAS, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 3] </s> Cook Co. v. Beecher, 217 U.S. 497 (1910), is misplaced. The theory of the complaint against the directors of the judgment debtor in that case was that they were "joint trespassers," equally liable for the patent infringement. That theory was comparable to the claim against this petitioner that was asserted and rejected in the original ERISA action. It depended on proof that the directors' prejudgment conduct should subject them to the same liability as the judgment debtor. See id., at 498. What is at issue now, however, is whether petitioner's postjudgment conduct which frustrated satisfaction of the judgment was subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the court that entered that judgment. To that question Beecher does not speak. </s> In sum, I am persuaded that it is the reasoning in Riggs and Labette, rather than Beecher, that should resolve the jurisdictional issue. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. </s> [Footnote * Both the Court of Appeals and the District Court acknowledged that respondent brought this action to preserve the initial ERISA judgment. See Thomas v. Peacock, 39 F.3d 493, 502 (CA4 1994) (describing action as "an equitable attempt to satisfy a previous judgment entered against a fiduciary"); Civ. Action No. 7:91-3843-21 (D. S. C., Jun. 24, 1992), p. 5, App. to Pet. for Cert. 57a ("[T]he present action is an attempt to satisfy a former judgment properly rendered by the District Court"). Petitioner recognized the same. See Brief for Appellant in No. 92-2524 (CA4), p. 15 ("Plaintiff has . . . consistently characterized this lawsuit as an action for the collection of a judgment"). Although one passage in respondent's brief to this Court suggests that the suit was not a collection action, it is clear that respondent meant only to rebut the notion that the proceeding was wholly independent of the earlier suit. The remainder of the brief confirms the lower courts' understanding of the nature of the action, see Brief for Respondent 17-24, and respondent expressly stated the same at oral argument. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 26-27 (agreeing with the District Court's statement that the action before it was "an attempt to satisfy the former judgment"). Page I

United States Supreme Court AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSN. v. GARFINKEL(1989) No. 87-2127 Argued: March 20, 1989Decided: April 18, 1989 </s> Standard Form 189, devised by appellee Director of the Information Security Oversight Office (DISOO), and Form 4193, created by appellee Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), forbade certain Executive Branch employees to reveal classified or "classifiable" information to persons not authorized to receive such information, making clear that if they did so they could lose their security clearances, their jobs, or both. The DISOO, but not the DCI, defined the term "classifiable." Although 630 of the Continuing Resolution for fiscal year 1988 prohibited the expenditure of that year's funds for the implementation or enforcement of, inter alia, the forms, both forms continued to be used. Appellant American Foreign Service Association and others filed suit in the District Court challenging the use of the forms on the ground that they violated 630, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that would, among other things, direct appellees to notify all employees who signed either form after the effective date of 630 that the agreements were void and that their terms could not be enforced during fiscal year 1988. The lawsuit was consolidated with other suits seeking to enjoin the forms' use on the ground, inter alia, that the term "classifiable" was so vague and overbroad that it inhibited employees' speech in violation of the First Amendment. The District Court assumed that the Executive Branch's actions since 630's enactment did not comply with the section's requirements but granted summary judgment in favor of appellees on the ground that 630 was an unconstitutional interference with the President's authority to protect the national security. While the court's judgment was pending review in this Court, the District Court ruled on the constitutional challenge in the cases consolidated with appellants' suit. It concluded that the term "classifiable" is unconstitutionally vague, but that the DISOO's definition would remedy the vagueness. It also ordered appellees to notify employees either that this definition was in force or that no penalties would be imposed for the disclosure of "classifiable" information. Thereafter, appellees deleted the word "classifiable" from the forms, replacing it with the [490 U.S. 153, 154] DISOO's definition, and gave individualized notice of this change to current employees. </s> Held: </s> 1. The controversy is moot as to current employees who have been notified that the term "classifiable" no longer controls their disclosure of information. P. 159. </s> 2. The case is remanded to the District Court for it to address in the first instance: (1) with respect to appellants' request for individualized notice to former employees, whether individualized notice is required by 630 and whether appellants' complaint can be read to request such notice for former employees; (2) with respect to appellants' argument that the DISOO's definition of "classified" does not comply with 630, whether appellants should be allowed to amend their complaint to take into account this new definition; and (3) with respect to appellants' argument that the forms do not comply with the 630 provisions dealing with disclosure of classified information to Congress, whether this part of the case is ripe for decision, since no instance in which an employee has sought to disclose information to Congress and was prohibited from doing so has been brought to this Court's attention. Pp. 159-161. </s> 3. On remand, the District Court should decide first whether the controversy is sufficiently live and concrete to be adjudicated and whether it is an appropriate case for equitable relief, and then decide whether the statute and forms are susceptible of a reconciling interpretation. Only if they are not should the court turn to the constitutional question whether 630 impermissibly intruded upon the Executive Branch's authority over national security information. Pp. 161-162. </s> 688 F. Supp. 671, vacated and remanded. </s> Patti A. Goldman argued the cause for appellants. With her on the briefs were Alan B. Morrison, Paul Alan Levy, and Susan Z. Holik. </s> Edwin S. Kneedler argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Assistant Attorney General Bolton, Deputy Solicitor General Merrill, Barbara L. Herwig, and Freddi Lipstein. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union by Kate Martin, Gary M. Stern, Steven R. Shapiro, and John A. Powell; for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al. by Robert M. Weinberg, Walter [490 U.S. 153, 155] Kamiat, Laurence Gold, George Kaufmann, Mark Roth, and Charles A. Hobbie; and for the Government Accountability Project et al. by Joseph B. Kennedy. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the United States Senate by Michael Davidson, Ken U. Benjamin, Jr., and Morgan J. Frankel; and for the Speaker and Leadership Group of the United States House of Representatives by Steven R. Ross and Charles Tiefer. [490 U.S. 153, 155] </s> PER CURIAM. </s> As a condition of obtaining access to classified information, employees in the Executive Branch are required to sign "nondisclosure agreements" that detail the employees' obligation of confidentiality and provide for penalties in the event of unauthorized disclosure. Two such nondisclosure forms are at issue in this case. One, Standard Form 189, was devised by the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office (DISOO) (now appellee Garfinkel); the other, Form 4193, was created by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) (now appellee Webster). Both of these forms forbade employees to reveal classified or "classifiable" information to persons not authorized to receive such information, App. 15, 19, and made clear that employees who disclosed information in violation of these agreements could lose their security clearances, their jobs, or both. Id., at 16, 21. Neither form defined the term "classifiable." The DISOO eventually promulgated a regulation that defined the term "classifiable" in Form 189 to include only unmarked classified information or unclassified information that was "in the process of a classification determination." Under this regulation, moreover, an employee would violate the nondisclosure agreement by disclosing unclassified information only if that employee "knows, or reasonably should know, that such information is in the process of a classification determination and requires interim protection." 52 Fed. Reg. 48367 (1987). For those employees who signed Form 4193, however, the DCI did not attempt to define "classifiable." More than half of the Federal Government's [490 U.S. 153, 156] civilian and military employees have signed either Form 189 or 4193. Brief for Appellants 5. </s> Section 630 of the Continuing Resolution for Fiscal Year 1988, Pub. L. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329-432, enacted by Congress in 1987, prohibited the expenditure of funds in fiscal year 1988 for the implementation or enforcement of Form 189, Form 4193, or any other form that violated one of its five subsections. * In response to this statute, appellee Garfinkel ordered agencies to cease using Form 189, but several agencies nevertheless required approximately 43,000 employees to sign the form after 630 was enacted. Brief for Appellants 10. The DCI, in contrast, continued to require employees to sign Form 4193, but attached a paragraph to the form stating that the nondisclosure agreement would [490 U.S. 153, 157] "be implemented and enforced in a manner consistent with" the statute of which 630 was a part. App. 26-27. Three months after 630 became law, the DCI replaced Form 4193 with Form 4355, which eliminated the term "classifiable." National Federation of Federal Employees v. United States, 688 F. Supp. 671, 680, n. 11 (DC 1988). </s> Appellant American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) and several Members of Congress brought the present lawsuit challenging appellees' use of Forms 189 and 4193 on the ground that they violated 630. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief that would (1) bar appellees from requiring employees to execute or sign Form 4193 during fiscal year 1988; (2) compel appellees to treat any Form 4193 agreement signed after December 22, 1987 (the effective date of 630), as void; and (3) direct appellees to notify all employees who signed Form 189 or 4193 after December 22, 1987, that these agreements were void and that the terms of such forms signed before that date could not be enforced in fiscal year 1988. App. 10. This lawsuit was consolidated with two other cases, brought by the National Federation of Federal Employees and the American Federation of Government Employees, which sought to enjoin the use of Forms 189 and 4193 because, among other things, they violated 630 and because the term "classifiable" was so vague and overbroad that it inhibited employees' speech in violation of the First Amendment. </s> The District Court for the District of Columbia concluded that appellant AFSA had standing to challenge the nondisclosure forms on behalf of its members, but that the Members of Congress lacked standing to challenge the use of the forms. 688 F. Supp., at 678-682. The court then assumed that "the Executive's actions since enactment of section 630 do not comply with the requirements of that legislation," id., at 683, and n. 16, because the DCI had continued to require employees to sign Form 4193 for three months after enactment of 630 despite 630's specific prohibition on the use of that [490 U.S. 153, 158] form. Acknowledging that, during that time, the DCI had added a paragraph to Form 4193 stating that the agreement would be enforced in a manner consistent with 630, the District Court nevertheless concluded that this action was not "`true to the congressional mandate from which it derives authority,'" id., at 683-684, n. 16, quoting Farmers Union Central Exchange, Inc. v. FERC, 236 U.S. App. D.C. 203, 217, 734 F.2d 1486, 1500 (1984), and that review of the Executive's action under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706, "likely" would show that the Executive's action was contrary to law, 688 F. Supp., at 684, n. 16. Having thus skirted the statutory question whether the Executive Branch's implementation of Forms 189 and 4193 violated 630, the court proceeded to address appellees' argument that the lawsuit should be dismissed because 630 was an unconstitutional interference with the President's authority to protect the national security. Concluding that 630 "impermissibly restricts the President's power to fulfill obligations imposed upon him by his express constitutional powers and the role of the Executive in foreign relations," id., at 685, the court entered summary judgment in favor of appellees. </s> Appellants took a direct appeal from the District Court's judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1252, and we noted probable jurisdiction, 488 U.S. 923 (1988). In spite of the importance of the constitutional question whether 630 impermissibly intrudes upon the Executive's authority to regulate the disclosure of national security information - indeed, partly because of it - we remand this case to the District Court without expressing an opinion on that issue. </s> Events occurring since the District Court issued its ruling place this case in a light far different from the one in which that court considered it. Since issuing the decision that we now review, the District Court has ruled on the constitutional challenge presented by the cases with which the present one was consolidated, and has decided that the unadorned [490 U.S. 153, 159] term "classifiable" used in Forms 189 and 4193 is unconstitutionally vague. See National Federation of Federal Employees v. United States, 695 F. Supp. 1196, 1201-1203 (DC 1988). The court further held that the DISOO's definition of the term "classifiable," see supra, at 155, would remedy this vagueness, and ordered appellees to notify employees either that this definition was in force or that no penalties would be imposed for the disclosure of "classifiable" information. 695 F. Supp., at 1203-1204. Appellees thereafter deleted the word "classifiable" - a primary focus of appellants' challenge to Forms 189 and 4193 - from all nondisclosure forms, and replaced it with the definition given in the DISOO's regulation. They also furnished individualized notice of this change to employees who signed either Form 189 or Form 4193. 53 Fed. Reg. 38278 (1988); Motion to Affirm 13. According to appellants, however, appellees have notified only current employees of the refinement of the term "classifiable"; former employees, who signed Form 189 or 4193 but have left the employment of the Federal Government, have not received such notice. Brief for Appellants 15. The controversy as it exists today is, in short, quite different from the one that the District Court considered. </s> Indeed, appellees urge us to hold the case moot to the extent that it challenges the use of the term "classifiable" in Forms 189 and 4193. Brief for Appellees 31-32. As to current employees who have been notified that the term "classifiable" no longer controls their disclosure of information, the controversy is indeed moot. Appellants emphasize, however, that former employees have not been informed of the switch in terminology; as to them, the controversy whether they should have received notice of this change remains alive. Brief for Appellants 20. We decline to decide the merits of appellants' request for individualized notice to these employees, however, because the questions whether individual notice is required by 630 and whether appellants' complaint can be read to request such notice for former employees, see [490 U.S. 153, 160] Brief for Appellees 32, n. 24 (arguing that it cannot be so read), are questions best addressed in the first instance by the District Court. </s> A second reason why we remand this case for further proceedings rather than ordering it dismissed is that appellants argue that the definition of "classified information" now supplied by the DISOO, 53 Fed. Reg. 38279 (1988) (to be codified in 32 CFR 2003.20(h)(3)), does not comply with 630. They contend that the DISOO's definition prohibits disclosure of information that an employee reasonably should have known was classified, whereas subsection (1) of 630 refers only to information that is "known by the employee" to be classified or in the process of being classified. Brief for Appellants 19-20. In contrast, appellees and the Senate as amicus argue that there is no inconsistency between 630(1) and this new definition. Brief for Appellees 39-41; Brief for United States Senate as Amicus Curiae 17-18. It appears that, in order to press this issue, appellants would be forced to amend their complaint in order to take into account the new definition of the term "classified." Brief for Appellees 41. Because the decision whether to allow this amendment is one for the District Court, and because appellants' argument raises a question of statutory interpretation not touched upon by the District Court, we leave these matters for that court to decide in the first instance. </s> In addition, there remains a question whether the forms comply with subsections (3), (4), and (5) of 630, dealing with disclosure of classified information to Congress. Both appellants and appellees apparently agree that these subsections simply preserve pre-existing rights, rights guaranteed by other statutes and constitutional provisions. Brief for Appellants 38-40; Brief for Appellees 48. The only relief appellants request with respect to this portion of the case is notice to employees informing them that Forms 189 and 4193 did not alter those pre-existing rights. Brief for Appellants 38. No actual instance in which an employee sought [490 U.S. 153, 161] to disclose information to Congress, and was prohibited from doing so, has been brought to our attention. There thus exists a substantial possibility that this last portion of the case is not ripe for decision, and this is exactly the argument pressed by several amici. Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae 28-48; Brief for Speaker and Leadership Group of House of Representatives as Amicus Curiae 12-16; Brief for United States Senate as Amicus Curiae 15-21. We are not, however, disposed to decide for ourselves whether this is so. Since the District Court analyzed the interaction between 630 and the Executive Branch's nondisclosure policy only in abbreviated fashion, we do not have the benefit of a lower court's interpretation of the statute and of Executive policy to help us decide whether the case is ready for decision or, if it is, to guide our own resolution of the merits. Again, therefore, we return these questions to the District Court to allow it to sort them out in the first instance. </s> Because part of the controversy has become moot but other parts of it may retain vitality, we vacate the judgment below and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. See, e. g., United States Dept. of Treasury v. Galioto, 477 U.S. 556, 560 (1986); United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39 -40 (1950). In doing so, we emphasize that the District Court should not pronounce upon the relative constitutional authority of Congress and the Executive Branch unless it finds it imperative to do so. Particularly where, as here, a case implicates the fundamental relationship between the Branches, courts should be extremely careful not to issue unnecessary constitutional rulings. On remand, the District Court should decide first whether the controversy is sufficiently live and concrete to be adjudicated and whether it is an appropriate case for equitable relief, and then decide whether the statute and forms are susceptible of a reconciling interpretation; if they are not, the court may turn to the constitutional question [490 U.S. 153, 162] whether 630 impermissibly intrudes upon the Executive Branch's authority over national security information. See, e. g., Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345 -356 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549 (1947); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 459 (1988). </s> The judgment of the District Court for the District of Columbia is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> [Footnote * Section 630 provides: "No funds appropriated in this or any other Act for fiscal year 1988 may be used to implement or enforce the agreements in Standard Forms 189 and 4193 of the Government or any other nondisclosure policy, form or agreement if such policy, form or agreement: "(1) concerns information other than that specifically marked as classified; or, unmarked but known by the employee to be classified; or, unclassified but known by the employee to be in the process of a classification determination; "(2) contains the term `classifiable'; "(3) directly or indirectly obstructs, by requirement of prior written authorization, limitation of authorized disclosure, or otherwise, the right of any individual to petition or communicate with Members of Congress in a secure manner as provided by the rules and procedures of the Congress; "(4) interferes with the right of the Congress to obtain executive branch information in a secure manner as provided by the rules and procedures of the Congress; "(5) imposes any obligations or invokes any remedies inconsistent with statutory law; Provided, That nothing in this section shall affect the enforcement of those aspects of such nondisclosure policy, form or agreement that do not fall within subsections (1)-(5) of this section." Section 630 applied only to fiscal year 1988; however, 619 of the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act, 1989, Pub. L. 100-440, 102 Stat. 1756, includes restrictions on expenditures of funds during fiscal year 1989 that are identical to those contained in 630. </s> [490 U.S. 153, 163]

United States Supreme Court HAMILTON v. ALABAMA(1961) No. 32 Argued: October 17, 1961Decided: November 13, 1961 </s> In Alabama arraignment is a critical stage in a criminal proceeding, because only then may the defense of insanity be pleaded and pleas in abatement or motions challenging the composition of the grand jury be made. Petitioner was arraigned without counsel in Alabama for a capital offense, to which he pleaded not guilty, and subsequently he was convicted and sentenced to death. Held: Absence of counsel for petitioner at the time of his arraignment violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 52-55. </s> 271 Ala. 88, 122 So.2d 602, reversed. </s> Constance B. Motley argued the cause for petitioner. On the brief were Orzell Billingsley, Jr., Peter A. Hall, Thurgood Marshall, Jack Greenberg and James M. Nabrit III. </s> George D. Mentz, Assistant Attorney General of Alabama, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs were MacDonald Gallion, Attorney General, and James W. Webb and John G. Bookout, Assistant Attorneys General. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This is a capital case, petitioner having been sentenced to death on a count of an indictment charging breaking and entering a dwelling at night with intent to ravish. 1 Petitioner appealed, claiming he had been denied counsel at the time of arraignment. The Alabama Supreme Court, although stating that the right to counsel under the State and Federal Constitutions included the right to [368 U.S. 52, 53] counsel at the time of arraignment, did not reach the merits of the claim because to do so would require impeaching the minute entries at the trial, 2 which may not be done in Alabama on an appeal. 270 Ala. 184, 116 So 2d 906. When petitioner sought certiorari here, Alabama responded saying that his remedy to attack the judgment with extrinsic evidence was by way of coram nobis. We denied certiorari. 363 U.S. 852 . </s> Petitioner thereupon proceeded by way of coram nobis in the Alabama courts. The Supreme Court of Alabama, while recognizing that petitioner had a right under state law, 15 Ala. Code 318, to be represented by counsel at the time of his arraignment, denied relief because there was no showing or effort to show that petitioner was "disadvantaged in any way by the absence of counsel 3 when he interposed his plea of not guilty." 271 Ala. 88, 93, 122 So.2d 602, 607. The case is here on certiorari. 364 U.S. 931 . </s> Arraignment under Alabama law is a critical stage in a criminal proceeding. It is then that the defense of insanity must be pleaded (15 Ala. Code 423). or the opportunity is lost. Morrell v. State, 136 Ala. 44, 34 So. 208. Thereafter that plea may not be made except in the discretion of the trial judge, and his refusal to accept it is "not revisable" on appeal. Rohn v. State, 186 Ala. 5, 8, 65 So. 42, 43. Cf. Garrett v. State, 248 Ala. 612, 614-615, 29 So.2d 8, 9. Pleas in abatement must also be made at the time of arraignment. 15 Ala. Code 279. It is then [368 U.S. 52, 54] that motions to quash based on systematic exclusion of one race from grand juries (Reeves v. State, 264 Ala. 476, 88 So.2d 561), or on the ground that the grand jury was otherwise improperly drawn (Whitehead v. State, 206 Ala. 288, 90 So. 351), must be made. </s> Whatever may be the function and importance of arraignment in other jurisdictions, 4 we have said enough to show that in Alabama it is a critical stage in a criminal proceeding. What happens there may affect the whole trial. Available defenses may be as irretrievably lost, if not then and there asserted, as they are when an accused represented by counsel waives a right for strategic purposes. Cf. Canizio v. New York, 327 U.S. 82, 85 -86. In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 , the Court said that an accused in a capital case "requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence." The guiding hand of counsel is needed at the trial "lest the unwary concede that which only bewilderment or ignorance could justify or pay a penalty which is greater than the law of the State exacts for the [368 U.S. 52, 55] offense which they in fact and in law committed." Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485, 489 . But the same pitfalls or like ones face an accused in Alabama who is arraigned without having counsel at his side. When one pleads to a capital charge without benefit of counsel, we do not stop to determine whether prejudice resulted. Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 475 -476; House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 45 -46; Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 442 . In this case, as in those, the degree of prejudice can never be known. Only the presence of counsel could have enabled this accused to know all the defenses available to him and to plead intelligently. </s> Reversed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Another count charged breaking and entering with intent to steal. </s> [Footnote 2 The minute entries indicated that petitioner had counsel at the arraignment. </s> [Footnote 3 Petitioner was first indicted for burglary and when arraigned had counsel present. Later, the present indictment, relating to the same incident, was returned. His counsel, who had been appointed, was advised that petitioner would be re-arraigned. But no lawyer appeared at this arraignment and we read the Alabama Supreme Court opinion to mean that the earlier appointment did not carry over. </s> [Footnote 4 Arraignment has differing consequences in the various jurisdictions. Under federal law an arraignment is a sine qua non to the trial itself - the preliminary stage where the accused is informed of the indictment and pleads to it, thereby formulating the issue to be tried. Crain v. United States, 162 U.S. 625, 644 ; Rules 10 and 11, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. That view has led some States to hold that arraignment is the first step in a trial (at least in case of felonies) at which the accused is entitled to an attorney. People v. Kurant, 331 Ill. 470, 163 N. E. 411. </s> In other States arraignment is not "a part of the trial" but "a mere formal preliminary step to an answer or plea." Ex parte Jeffcoat, 109 Fla. 207, 210, 146 So. 827, 828. </s> An arraignment normally, however, affords an opportunity of the accused to plead, as a condition precedent to a trial. Fowler v. State, 155 Tex. Cr. R. 35, 230 S. W. 2d 810. N. J. Rules of Practice, Rule 8:4-2. </s> [368 U.S. 52, 56]

United States Supreme Court COLONY, INC., v. COMMISSIONER(1958) No. 306 Argued: April 3, 1958Decided: June 9, 1958 </s> Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, the Commissioner assessed deficiencies in a taxpayer's income taxes within an extended period provided in waivers executed by the taxpayer more than three but less than five years after the returns were filed. There was no claim that the returns were fraudulent or that the taxpayer had inaccurately reported its gross receipts. Instead, the deficiencies were based upon the Commissioner's determination that the taxpayer had understated the gross profits on sales of certain lots of land for residential purposes as a result of having erroneously included in their cost certain unallowable items of development expense. This resulted in an understatement of the taxpayer's gross income by more than 25% of the amount reported. Held: The five-year period of limitations prescribed in 275 (c) for cases in which the taxpayer "omits from gross income an amount properly includible therein" which exceeds 25% of the gross income reported is not applicable, and the assessment was barred by the three-year limitation of 275 (a). Pp. 29-38. </s> (a) In 275 (c), the words "omits from gross income an amount properly includible therein" refers to situations in which specific items of income are left out of the computation of gross income, and they do not apply to errors in the computation of gross income resulting from a mistaken overstatement of the cost of property sold. Pp. 32-33. </s> (b) The legislative history of 275 (c) supports this conclusion. Pp. 33-35. </s> (c) In enacting 275 (c), Congress was not concerned with the mere size of an error in reporting gross income but with a restricted type of situation where the taxpayer's failure to report some items of taxable income put the Commissioner at a special disadvantage in detecting errors. Pp. 36-38. </s> 244 F.2d 75, reversed. [357 U.S. 28, 29] </s> A. Robert Doll argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were B. H. Barnett and Richard C. Oldham. </s> Joseph F. Goetten argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Rice and Grant W. Wiprud. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The sole question in this case is whether assessments by the Commissioner of two asserted tax deficiencies were barred by the three-year statute of limitations provided in the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. </s> Under the 1939 Code the general statute of limitations governing the assessment of federal income tax deficiencies is fixed at three years from the date on which the taxpayer filed his return, 275 (a), 53 Stat. 86, except in cases involving a fraudulent return or failure to file a return, where a tax may be assessed at any time. 276 (a), 53 Stat. 87. A special five-year period of limitations is provided when a taxpayer, even though acting in good faith, "omits from gross income an amount properly includible therein which is in excess of 25 per centum of the amount of gross income stated in the return . . . ." 275 (c), 53 Stat. 86. In either case the period of limitation may be extended by a written waiver executed by the taxpayer within the statutory or any extended period of limitation. 276 (b), 53 Stat. 87. 1 </s> [357 U.S. 28, 30] </s> The Commissioner assessed deficiencies in the taxpayer's income taxes for each of the fiscal years ending October 31, 1946, and 1947, within the extended period provided in waivers which were executed by the taxpayer more than three but less than five years after the returns were filed. There was no claim that the taxpayer had inaccurately reported its gross receipts. Instead, the deficiencies were based upon the Commissioner's determination that the taxpayer had understated the gross profits on the sales of certain lots of land for residential purposes as a result of having overstated the "basis" of such lots by erroneously including in their cost certain unallowable items of development expense. There was no claim that the returns were fraudulent. </s> The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner. It held that substantial portions of the development costs were properly disallowed, and that these errors by the taxpayer [357 U.S. 28, 31] had resulted in the understatement of the taxpayer's total gross income by 77.2% and 30.7%, respectively, of the amounts reported for the taxable years 1946 and 1947. In addition, the Tax Court held that in these circumstances the five-year period of limitation provided for in 275 (c) was applicable. It took the view that the statutory language, "omits from gross income an amount properly includible therein," embraced not merely the omission from a return of an item of income received by or accruing to a taxpayer, but also an understatement of gross income resulting from a taxpayer's miscalculation of profits through the erroneous inclusion of an excessive item of cost. 26 T. C. 30. On the taxpayer's appeal to the Court of Appeals the only question raised was whether the three-year or the five-year statute of limitations governed the assessment of these deficiencies. Adhering to its earlier decision in Reis v. Commissioner, 142 F.2d 900, the Court of Appeals affirmed. 244 F.2d 75. We granted certiorari because this decision conflicted with rulings in other Courts of Appeals on the same issue, 2 and [357 U.S. 28, 32] because the question as to the proper scope of 275 (c), although resolved for the future by 6501 (e) (1) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, p. 37, infra, remains one of substantial importance in the administration of the income tax laws for earlier taxable years. 355 U.S. 811 . </s> In determining the correct interpretation of 275 (c) we start with the critical statutory language, "omits from gross income an amount properly includible therein." The Commissioner states that the draftsman's use of the word "amount" (instead of, for example, "item") suggests a concentration on the quantitative aspect of the error - that is, whether or not gross income was understated by as much as 25%. This view is somewhat reinforced if, in reading the above-quoted phrase, one touches lightly on the word "omits" and bears down hard on the words "gross income," for where a cost item is overstated, as in the case before us, gross income is affected to the same degree as when a gross-receipt item of the same amount is completely omitted from a tax return. </s> On the other hand, the taxpayer contends that the Commissioner's reading fails to take full account of the word "omits," which Congress selected when it could have chosen another verb such as "reduces" or "understates," either of which would have pointed significantly in the Commissioner's direction. The taxpayer also points out that normally "statutory words are presumed to be used in their ordinary and usual sense, and with the meaning commonly attributable to them." DeGanay v. Lederer, 250 U.S. 376, 381 . "Omit" is defined in Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1939) as "To leave out or unmentioned; not to insert, include, or name," [357 U.S. 28, 33] and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has elsewhere similarly defined the word. Ewald v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 750, 753. Relying on this definition, the taxpayer says that the statute is limited to situations in which specific receipts or accruals of income items are left out of the computation of gross income. For reasons stated below we agree with the taxpayer's position. </s> Although we are inclined to think that the statute on its face lends itself more plausibly to the taxpayer's interpretation, it cannot be said that the language is unambiguous. In these circumstances we turn to the legislative history of 275 (c). We find in that history persuasive evidence that Congress was addressing itself to the specific situation where a taxpayer actually omitted some income receipt or accrual in his computation of gross income, and not more generally to errors in that computation arising from other causes. </s> Section 275 (c) first appeared in the Revenue Act of 1934. 48 Stat. 680. As introduced in the House the bill simply added the gross-income provision to 276 of the Revenue Act of 1932, 47 Stat. 169, relating to fraudulent returns and cases where no return had been filed, and carried with it no period of limitations. The intended coverage of the proposed provision was stated in a Report of a House Ways and Means Subcommittee as follows: </s> "Section 276 provides for the assessment of the tax without regard to the statute of limitations in case of a failure to file a return or in case of a false or fraudulent return with intent to evade tax. </s> "Your subcommittee is of the opinion that the limitation period on assessment should also not apply to certain cases where the taxpayer has understated his gross income on his return by a large amount, even though fraud with intent to evade tax cannot be established. It is, therefore, recommended that [357 U.S. 28, 34] the statute of limitations shall not apply where the taxpayer has failed to disclose in his return an amount of gross income in excess of 25 percent of the amount of the gross income stated in the return. The Government should not be penalized when a taxpayer is so negligent as to leave out items of such magnitude from his return." Hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 139. </s> This purpose of the proposal was related to the full Committee in the following colloquy between Congressman Cooper of Tennessee, speaking for the Subcommittee, and Mr. Roswell Magill, representing the Treasury: </s> "Mr. COOPER. What we really had in mind was just this kind of a situation: Assume that a taxpayer left out, say, a million dollars; he just forgot it. We felt that whenever we found that he did that we ought to get the money on it, the tax on it. </s> "Mr. MAGILL. I will not argue against you on that score. </s> "Mr. COOPER. In other words, if a man is so negligent and so forgetful, or whatever the reason is, that he overlooks an item amounting to as much as 25 percent of his gross income, that we simply ought to have the opportunity of getting the tax on that amount of money." House Hearings, supra, at 149. </s> The full Committee revealed the same attitude in its report: </s> "It is not believed that taxpayers who are so negligent as to leave out of their returns items of such magnitude should be accorded the privilege of pleading the bar of the statute." H. R. Rep. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 35. [357 U.S. 28, 35] </s> The Senate Finance Committee approved of the intended coverage and language of the bill, except that it believed the statute of limitations should not be kept open indefinitely in the case of an honest but negligent taxpayer. Its report stated: </s> ". . . Your committee is in general accord with the policy expressed in this section of the House bill. However, it is believed that in the case of a taxpayer who makes an honest mistake, it would be unfair to keep the statute open indefinitely. For instance, a case might arise where a taxpayer failed to report a dividend because he was erroneously advised by the officers of the corporation that it was paid out of capital or he might report as income for one year an item of income which properly belonged in another year. Accordingly, your committee has provided for a 5-year statute in such cases." S. Rep. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 43-44. </s> Except for embodying the five-year period of limitation, 275 (c), as passed, reflects no change in the original basic objective underlying its enactment. </s> As rebutting these persuasive indications that Congress merely had in mind failures to report particular income receipts and accruals, and did not intend the five-year limitation to apply whenever gross income was understated, the Commissioner stresses the occasional use of the phrase "understates gross income" in the legislative materials. The force of this contention is much diluted, however, when it is observed that wherever this general language is found its intended meaning is immediately illuminated by the use of such phrases as "failed to disclose" or "to leave out" items of income. See Uptegrove Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 204 F.2d 570, 572. [357 U.S. 28, 36] </s> The Commissioner also suggests that in enacting 275 (c) Congress was primarily concerned with providing for a longer period of limitations where returns contained relatively large errors adversely affecting the Treasury, and that effect can be given this purpose only by adopting the Government's broad construction of the statute. But this theory does not persuade us. For if the mere size of the error had been the principal concern of Congress, one might have expected to find the statute cast in terms of errors in the total tax due or in total taxable net income. We have been unable to find any solid support for the Government's theory in the legislative history. Instead, as the excerpts set out above illustrate, this history shows to our satisfaction that the Congress intended an exception to the usual three-year statute of limitations only in the restricted type of situation already described. </s> We think that in enacting 275 (c) Congress manifested no broader purpose than to give the Commissioner an additional two years to investigate tax returns in cases where, because of a taxpayer's omission to report some taxable item, the Commissioner is at a special disadvantage in detecting errors. In such instances the return on its face provides no clue to the existence of the omitted item. On the other hand, when, as here, the understatement of a tax arises from an error in reporting an item disclosed on the face of the return the Commissioner is at no such disadvantage. And this would seem to be so whether the error be one affecting "gross income" or one, such as overstated deductions, affecting other parts of the return. To accept the Commissioner's interpretation and to impose a five-year limitation when such errors affect "gross income," but a three-year limitation when they do not, not only would be to read 275 (c) more broadly than is justified by the evident reason for its enactment, but also to create a patent incongruity in the [357 U.S. 28, 37] tax law. See Uptegrove Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, supra, at 573. </s> Finally, our construction of 275 (c) accords with the interpretations in the more recent decisions of four different Courts of Appeals. See note 2, supra. The force of the reasoning in these opinions was recognized by the Court of Appeals in the present case, which indicated that it might have agreed with those courts had the matter been res nova in its circuit. 244 F.2d, at 76. And without doing more than noting the speculative debate between the parties as to whether Congress manifested an intention to clarify or to change the 1939 Code, we observe that the conclusion we reach is in harmony with the unambiguous language of 6501 (e) (1) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 3 </s> [357 U.S. 28, 38] </s> We hold that both tax assessments before us were barred by the statute of limitations. </s> Reversed. </s> THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE BLACK would follow the interpretation consistently given 275 (c) by the Tax Court for many years and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this case. See cases cited in note 2 of the Court's opinion. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The pertinent provisions of the 1939 Code are: "SEC. 275. PERIOD OF LIMITATION UPON ASSESSMENT AND COLLECTION. "Except as provided in section 276 - "(a) GENERAL RULE. - The amount of income taxes imposed by this chapter shall be assessed within three years after the return was filed, and no proceeding in court without assessment for the collection [357 U.S. 28, 30] of such taxes shall be begun after the expiration of such period. . . . . . "(c) OMISSION FROM GROSS INCOME. - If the taxpayer omits from gross income an amount properly includible therein which is in excess of 25 per centum of the amount of gross income stated in the return, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time within 5 years after the return was filed. . . . . . "SEC. 276. SAME - EXCEPTIONS. "(a) FALSE RETURN OR NO RETURN. - In the case of a false or fraudulent return with intent to evade tax or of a failure to file a return the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time. "(b) WAIVER. - Where before the expiration of the time prescribed in section 275 for the assessment of the tax, both the Commissioner and the taxpayer have consented in writing to its assessment after such time, the tax may be assessed at any time prior to the expiration of the period agreed upon. The period so agreed upon may be extended by subsequent agreements in writing made before the expiration of the period previously agreed upon." </s> [Footnote 2 In conflict with this case are decisions in four different Courts of Appeals. Uptegrove Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 204 F.2d 570 (C. A. 3d Cir.); Deakman-Wells Co. v. Commissioner, 213 F.2d 894 (C. A. 3d Cir.); Slaff v. Commissioner, 220 F.2d 65 (C. A. 9th Cir.); Davis v. Hightower, 230 F.2d 549 (C. A. 5th Cir.); Goodenow v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 20 (C. A. 8th Cir.). The Court of Claims has also held to the contrary of the present case. Lazarus v. Commissioner, 136 Ct. Cl. 283, 142 F. Supp. 897. Three Courts of Appeals decisions antedating Uptegrove Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, supra, provided support for the Government's construction of 275 (c). Foster's Estate v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 405 (C. A. 5th Cir.); Ketcham v. Commissioner, 142 F.2d 996 (C. A. 2d Cir.); O'Bryan v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 456 (C. A. 9th Cir.). But neither Foster's Estate nor O'Bryan can be regarded as the controlling authority within their respective circuits in view of the more recent decisions in Davis v. Hightower, supra, and Slaff v. Commissioner, supra. Ketcham is distinguishable on its facts. The Sixth Circuit has consistently maintained its current position. [357 U.S. 28, 32] The Tax Court has also regularly upheld the Commissioner. E. g., American Liberty Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 1 T. C. 386; Estate of Gibbs v. Commissioner, 21 T. C. 443. </s> [Footnote 3 "SEC. 6501. LIMITATIONS ON ASSESSMENT AND COLLECTION. . . . . . "(e) OMISSION FROM GROSS INCOME. - Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) - "(1) INCOME TAXES. - In the case of any tax imposed by subtitle A - "(A) GENERAL RULE. - If the taxpayer omits from gross income an amount properly includible therein which is in excess of 25 percent of the amount of gross income stated in the return, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time within 6 years after the return was filed. For purposes of this subparagraph - "(i) In the case of a trade or business, the term "gross income" means the total of the amounts received or accrued from the sale of goods or services (if such amounts are required to be shown on the return) prior to diminution by the cost of such sales or services; and "(ii) In determining the amount omitted from gross income, there shall not be taken into account any amount which is omitted from gross income stated in the return if such amount is disclosed in the return, or in a statement attached to the return, in a manner adequate to apprise the Secretary or his delegate of the nature and amount of such item." 68A Stat. 803, 804-805. </s> [357 U.S. 28, 39]

United States Supreme Court MISSOURI v. BLAIR(1987) No. 85-303 Argued: November 12, 1986Decided: March 25, 1987 </s> Certiorari dismissed. Reported below: 691 S. W. 2d 259. </s> Albert A. Riederer argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were William L. Webster, Attorney General of Missouri, Philip M. Koppe, Assistant Attorney General, and Robert Frager. </s> Joseph H. Locascio argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. * </s> PER CURIAM. </s> The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted. </s> [Footnote * Larry W. Yackle, Charles S. Sims, and Burt Neuborne filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. </s> [480 U.S. 698, 699]

United States Supreme Court UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE v. ELLIOTT(1986) No. 85-588 Argued: April 21, 1986Decided: July 7, 1986 </s> When petitioner University of Tennessee informed respondent, a black employee, that he would be discharged for inadequate work performance and misconduct on the job, he requested an administrative hearing. Prior to the commencement of the administrative proceedings, respondent filed suit in Federal District Court against the University and others (also petitioners), alleging that his proposed discharge was racially motivated and seeking relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Reconstruction civil rights statutes. The court allowed the administrative proceedings to go forward, resulting in a ruling by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) (affirmed by a University Vice President on appeal) that respondent's proposed discharge was not racially motivated. Instead of seeking state-court review of the administrative proceedings, respondent returned to the District Court, which granted summary judgment for petitioners on the ground that the ALJ's ruling was entitled to preclusive effect. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that respondent's Title VII claim was governed by Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461 , which held that final state-court judgments are entitled to full faith and credit in Title VII actions, but indicated that unreviewed determinations by state agencies do not preclude trial de novo in federal court on Title VII claims. As regards respondent's claims under the other civil rights statutes, the court held that 28 U.S.C. 1738, which accords a state-court judgment the same full faith and credit in federal courts as it would have in the State's courts, does not require that federal courts be bound by the unreviewed findings of state administrative agencies. The court also declined to fashion a federal common law of preclusion. </s> Held: </s> 1. Title 28 U.S.C. 1738 is not applicable to the unreviewed state administrative factfinding at issue here. However, federal common-law rules of preclusion have been frequently fashioned in the absence of a governing statute. Because 1738 antedates the development of administrative agencies it does not represent a congressional determination that state administrative agency decisions should not be given preclusive effect. Pp. 794-795. [478 U.S. 788, 789] </s> 2. The Court of Appeals correctly held that Congress did not intend unreviewed state administrative proceedings to have preclusive effect on Title VII claims, and thus a federal common-law rule of preclusion would not be appropriate. The analysis in Kremer, supra, and Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 , of the language and legislative history of Title VII supports this conclusion. Pp. 795-796. </s> 3. However, when a state agency acting in a judicial capacity resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, federal courts in actions under the Reconstruction civil rights statutes must give the agency's factfinding the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in the State's courts (a matter for resolution on remand here). In enacting those statutes, Congress did not intend to create an exception to general rules of preclusion, or to foreclose the adaptation of those rules to such subsequent developments as the use of administrative adjudication. Giving preclusive effect in federal courts to the factfindings of state administrative bodies acting in a judicial capacity serves both the value of enforcing repose, which underlies general principles of collateral estoppel, and the value of federalism. Pp. 796-799. </s> 766 F.2d 982, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. </s> WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, and in Parts I, II, and III of which BRENNAN, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which BRENNAN and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 799. MARSHALL, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. </s> Beauchamp E. Brogan argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Alan M. Parker, Catherine S. Mizell, G. Ray Bratton, N. Richard Glassman, John Barry Burgess, Tommy Coley, pro se, and W. J. Michael Cody, Attorney General of Tennessee. </s> Ronald L. Ellis argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Julius LeVonne Chambers, Eric Schnapper, Judith Reed, and Richard H. Dinkins. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Kansas et al. by Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas, and David D. Plinsky, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows, Charles A. Graddick of Alabama, Robert K. Corbin of Arizona, Joseph I. Lieberman of Connecticut. Jim [478 U.S. 788, 790] Smith of Florida, Richard Opper of Guam, Corinne Watanabe of Hawaii, James T. Jones of Idaho, Neil F. Hartigan of Illinios, Linley E. Pearson of Indiana, William J. Guste, Jr., of Louisiana, James E. Tierney of Maine, Stephen H. Sachs of Maryland, Francis X. Bellotti of Massachusetts, Edward L. Pittman of Mississippi, William L. Webster of Missouri, Robert M. Spire of Nebraska, W. Cary Edwards of New Jersey, Lacy H. Thornburg of North Carolina, Michael Turpen of Oklahoma, LeRoy S. Zimmerman of Pennsylvania, David L. Wilkinson of Utah, Michael Dunston of The Virgin Islands, Bronson C. La Follette of Wisconsin, and A. G. McClintock of Wyoming; and for the Equal Employment Advisory Council by Robert E. Williams and Douglas S. McDowell. Solicitor General Fried, Deputy Solicitor General Kuhl, Johnny J. Butler, Gwendolyn Young Reams, Vella M. Fink, and Mark S. Flynn filed a brief for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as amicus curiae urging affirmance. [478 U.S. 788, 790] </s> JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> A state Administrative Law Judge determined that petitioner University of Tennessee (hereafter petitioner or University) was not motivated by racial prejudice in seeking to discharge respondent. The question presented is whether this finding is entitled to preclusive effect in federal court, where respondent has raised discrimination claims under various civil rights laws, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. 1983. </s> I </s> In 1981, petitioner informed respondent, a black employee of the University's Agricultural Extension Service, that he would be discharged for inadequate work performance and misconduct on the job. Respondent requested a hearing under the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, Tenn. Code Ann. 4-5-101 et seq. (1985), to contest his proposed termination. Prior to the start of the hearing, respondent also filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, alleging that his proposed discharge was racially motivated and seeking relief under Title VII and other civil rights statutes, including [478 U.S. 788, 791] 42 U.S.C. 1983. 1 The relief sought included damages, an injunction prohibiting respondent's discharge, and classwide relief from alleged patterns of discrimination by petitioner. </s> The District Court initially entered a temporary restraining order prohibiting the University from taking any job action against respondent, but later lifted this order and permitted the state administrative proceeding to go forward. App. to Pet. for Cert. A27. There followed a hearing at which an administrative assistant to the University's Vice President for Agriculture presided as an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The focus of the hearing was on 10 particular charges that the University gave as grounds for respondent's discharge. Respondent denied these charges, which he contended were motivated by racial prejudice, and also argued that the University's subjecting him to the charges violated his rights under the Constitution, Title VII, and other federal statutes. The ALJ held that he lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate respondent's federal civil rights claims, but did allow respondent to present, as an affirmative defense, evidence that the charges against him were actually motivated by racial prejudice and hence not a proper basis for his proposed discharge. Id., at A44-45. </s> After hearing extensive evidence, 2 the ALJ found that the University had proved some but not all of the charges against respondent, and that the charges were not racially motivated. Id., at A177-179. Concluding that the proposed discharge of respondent was too severe a penalty, the ALJ ordered him transferred to a new assignment with supervisors other than those with whom he had experienced conflicts. Id., at A179-181. Respondent appealed to the University's [478 U.S. 788, 792] Vice President for Agriculture, who affirmed the ALJ's ruling. Id., at A33-35. The Vice President stated that his review of the record persuaded him that the proposed discharge of respondent had not been racially motivated. Id., at A34. </s> Respondent did not seek review of these administrative proceedings in the Tennessee courts; instead, he returned to federal court to pursue his civil rights claims. There, petitioner moved for summary judgment on the ground that respondent's suit was an improper collateral attack on the ALJ's ruling, which petitioner contended was entitled to preclusive effect. The District Court agreed, holding that the civil rights statutes on which respondent relied "were not intended to afford the plaintiff a means of relitigating what plaintiff has heretofore litigated over a five-month period." Id., at A32. </s> Respondent appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which reversed the District Court's judgment. 766 F.2d 982 (1985). As regards respondent's Title VII claim, the Court of Appeals looked for guidance to our decision in Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982). 3 While Kremer teaches that final state-court judgments are entitled to full faith and credit in Title VII actions, it indicates that unreviewed determinations by state agencies stand on a different footing. The [478 U.S. 788, 793] Sixth Circuit found the following passage from Kremer directly on point: </s> "EEOC review [pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b)] of discrimination charges previously rejected by state agencies would be pointless if the federal courts were bound by such agency decisions. Batiste v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 503 F.2d 447, 450, n. 1 (CA7 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 928 (1975). Nor is it plausible to suggest that Congress intended federal courts to be bound further by state administrative decisions than by decisions of the EEOC. Since it is settled that decisions by the EEOC do not preclude a trial de novo in federal court, it is clear that unreviewed administrative determinations by state agencies also should not preclude such review even if such a decision were to be afforded preclusive effect in a State's own courts. Garner v. Giarrusso, 571 F.2d 1330 (CA5 1978), Batiste v. Furnco Constr. Corp., supra; Cooper v. Philip Morris, Inc., 464 F.2d 9 (CA6 1972); Voutsis v. Union Carbide Corp., 452 F.2d 889 (CA2 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918 (1972)." Id., at 470, n. 7. </s> The court accordingly held that res judicata did not foreclose a trial de novo on respondent's Title VII claim. </s> The Sixth Circuit found the question of applying preclusion principles to respondent's claims under 1983 and other civil rights statutes a more difficult question. It held that 28 U.S.C. 1738, 4 which concerns the preclusive effect of "judicial [478 U.S. 788, 794] proceedings of any [state] court," does not require that federal courts be bound by the unreviewed findings of state administrative agencies. The court also declined to fashion a federal common law of preclusion, declaring that "[a]t least implicit in the legislative history of section 1983 is the recognition that state determination of issues relevant to constitutional adjudication is not an adequate substitute for full access to federal court." 766 F.2d, at 992. The court recognized that a similar argument for denying res judicata effect to state-court judgments in subsequent 1983 actions was rejected in Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980), and Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education, 465 U.S. 75 (1984), but distinguished those cases as based on the explicit command of 1738. </s> We granted certiorari to consider petitioner's contention that the Sixth Circuit erred in holding that state administrative factfinding is never entitled to preclusive effect in actions under Title VII or the Reconstruction civil rights statutes. 474 U.S. 1004 (1985). </s> II </s> Title 28 U.S.C. 1738 governs the preclusive effect to be given the judgments and records of state courts, and is not applicable to the unreviewed state administrative factfinding at issue in this case. However, we have frequently fashioned federal common-law rules of preclusion in the absence of a governing statute. See e. g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc., v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938); Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 289 -291 (1906). Although 1738 is a governing statute with [478 U.S. 788, 795] regard to the judgments and records of state courts, because 1738 antedates the development of administrative agencies it clearly does not represent a congressional determination that the decisions of state administrative agencies should not be given preclusive effect. Accordingly, we will consider whether a rule of preclusion is appropriate, first with respect to respondent's Title VII claim, and next with respect to his claims under the Constitution and the Reconstruction civil rights statutes. </s> III </s> Under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), in investigating discrimination charges, must give "substantial weight to final findings and orders made by State or local authorities in proceedings commenced under State or local [employment discrimination] law." As we noted in Kremer, 456 U.S., at 470 , n. 7, it would make little sense for Congress to write such a provision if state agency findings were entitled to preclusive effect in Title VII actions in federal court. </s> Moreover, our decision in Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976), strongly supports respondent's contention that Congress intended one in his position to have a trial de novo on his Title VII claim. In Chandler, we held that a federal employee whose discrimination claim was rejected by her employing agency after an administrative hearing was entitled to a trial de novo in federal court on her Title VII claim. After reviewing in considerable detail the language of Title VII and the history of the 1972 amendments to the statute, we concluded: </s> "The legislative history of the 1972 amendments reinforces the plain meaning of the statute and confirms that Congress intended to accord federal employees the same right to a trial de novo [following administrative proceedings] as is enjoyed by private-sector employees and employees of state governments and political subdivisions [478 U.S. 788, 796] under the amended Civil Rights Act of 1964." Id., at 848. </s> Like the plaintiff in Chandler, the respondent in this case pursued his Title VII action following an administrative proceeding at which the employing agency rejected a discrimination claim. It would be contrary to the rationale of Chandler to apply res judicata to deny respondent a trial de novo on his Title VII claim. </s> Invoking the presumption against implied repeal, petitioner distinguishes Chandler as involving a federal agency determination not entitled to full faith and credit under 1738. Reply Brief for Petitioners 16. This argument is based on the erroneous premise that 1738 applies to state administrative proceedings. See Part II, supra. The question actually before us is whether a common-law rule of preclusion would be consistent with Congress' intent in enacting Title VII. On the basis of our analysis in Kremer and Chandler of the language and legislative history of Title VII, we conclude that the Sixth Circuit correctly held that Congress did not intend unreviewed state administrative proceedings to have preclusive effect on Title VII claims. 5 </s> IV </s> This Court has held that 1738 requires that state-court judgments be given both issue and claim preclusive effect in subsequent actions under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Allen v. McCurry, supra (issue preclusion); Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education, supra (claim preclusion). Those decisions are not controlling in this case, where 1738 does not apply; nonetheless, they support the view that Congress, [478 U.S. 788, 797] in enacting the Reconstruction civil rights statutes, did not intend to create an exception to general rules of preclusion. As we stated in Allen: </s> "[N]othing in the language of 1983 remotely expresses any congressional intent to contravene the common-law rules of preclusion or to repeal the express statutory requirements of the predecessor of 28 U.S.C. 1738. . . . </s> "Moreover, the legislative history of 1983 does not in any clear way suggest that Congress intended to repeal or restrict the traditional doctrines of preclusion." 449 U.S., at 97-98. </s> The Court's discussion in Allen suggests that it would have reached the same result even in the absence of 1738. We also see no reason to suppose that Congress, in enacting the Reconstruction civil rights statutes, wished to foreclose the adaptation of traditional principles of preclusion to such subsequent developments as the burgeoning use of administrative adjudication in the 20th century. </s> We have previously recognized that it is sound policy to apply principles of issue preclusion to the factfinding of administrative bodies acting in a judicial capacity. In a unanimous decision in United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966), we held that the factfinding of the Advisory Board of Contract Appeals was binding in a subsequent action in the Court of Claims involving a contract dispute between the same parties. We explained: </s> "Although the decision here rests upon the agreement of the parties as modified by the Wunderlich Act, we note that the result we reach is harmonious with general principles of collateral estoppel. Occasionally courts have used language to the effect that res judicata principles do not apply to administrative proceedings, but such language is certainly too broad. When an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves [478 U.S. 788, 798] disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose." Id., at 421-422 (1966) (footnotes omitted). </s> Thus, Utah Construction, which we subsequently approved in Kremer v. Chemical Construction Co., 456 U.S., at 484 -485, n. 26, teaches that giving preclusive effect to administrative factfinding serves the value underlying general principles of collateral estoppel: enforcing repose. 6 This value, which encompasses both the parties' interest in avoiding the cost and vexation of repetitive litigation and the public's interest in conserving judicial resources, Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S., at 94 , is equally implicated whether factfinding is done by a federal or state agency. </s> Having federal courts give preclusive effect to the factfinding of state administrative tribunals also serves the value of federalism. Significantly, all of the opinions in Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980), express the view that the Full Faith and Credit Clause compels the States to give preclusive effect to the factfindings of an administrative tribunal in a sister State. Id., at 281 (opinion of [478 U.S. 788, 799] STEVENS, J.); 287-289 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment); 291-292 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). The Full Faith and Credit Clause is of course not binding on federal courts, but we can certainly look to the policies underlying the Clause in fashioning federal common-law rules of preclusion. "Perhaps the major purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is to act as a nationally unifying force," id., at 289 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment), and this purpose is served by giving preclusive effect to state administrative factfinding rather than leaving the courts of a second forum, state or federal, free to reach conflicting results. 7 Accordingly, we hold that when a state agency "acting in a judicial capacity . . . resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate," Utah Construction & Mining Co., supra, at 422, federal courts must give the agency's factfinding the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in the State's courts. 8 </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Respondent's complaint also included claims under 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1985, 1986, and 1988, as well as the First, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments. App. 17. </s> [Footnote 2 The hearing continued intermittently for more than five months, involved more than 100 witnesses and 150 exhibits, and generated over 5,000 pages of transcript. App. to Pet. for Cert. A27. </s> [Footnote 3 In Kremer an employee filed a Title VII discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 referred the case to the New York State Division of Human Rights, the agency charged with administering the State's employment discrimination laws. The state agency rejected the employee's discrimination claim, a judgment that was affirmed both at the agency appellate level and by a reviewing state court. The employee then brought a Title VII action, in which the employer raised a res judicata defense. This Court held that under 28 U.S.C. 1738 the state court's judgment affirming the state agency's finding of no discrimination was entitled to preclusive effect in the employee's Title VII action. </s> [Footnote 4 Title 28 U.S.C. 1738 provides in pertinent part: "The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any . . . State, Territory or Possession [of the United States], or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts within the United States and its Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the court that the said attestation is in proper form. "Such . . . records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the [478 U.S. 788, 794] United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken." </s> [Footnote 5 The fact that respondent requested the administrative hearing rather than being compelled to participate in it does not weigh in favor of preclusion. "[T]he legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and federal statutes." Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48 (1974) (footnote omitted). </s> [Footnote 6 As one respected authority on administrative law has observed: "The law of res judicata, much more than most other segments of law, has rhyme, reason, and rhythm - something in common with good poetry. Its inner logic is rather satisfying. It consists entirely of an elaboration of the obvious principle that a controversy should be resolved once, not more than once. The principle is as much needed for administrative decisions as for judicial decisions. To the extent that administrative adjudications resemble courts' decisions - a very great extent - the law worked out for courts does and should apply to agencies." 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 21.9, p. 78 (2d ed. 1983). The Restatement (Second) of Judgments 83, p. 269 (1982), reaches a similar conclusion: "Where an administrative forum has the essential procedural characteristics of a court, . . . its determinations should be accorded the same finality that is accorded the judgment of a court. The importance of bringing a legal controversy to conclusion is generally no less when the tribunal is an administrative tribunal than when it is a court." </s> [Footnote 7 Congress of course may decide, as it did in enacting Title VII, that other values outweigh the policy of according finality to state administrative factfinding. See Part III, supra. </s> [Footnote 8 Respondent argues against preclusion on the grounds that the administrative hearing in this case did not satisfy the standard set out in Utah Construction & Mining Co., Brief for Respondent 39-76, and that the ALJ's factfinding would not be given preclusive effect in the Tennessee courts, id., at 99-105. These contentions were not passed upon below, and we leave them for resolution on remand. </s> JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. </s> An administrative assistant to the Vice President for Agriculture of the University of Tennessee conducted a hearing [478 U.S. 788, 800] and determined that respondent's proposed discharge was not racially motivated. The Court today correctly holds that 28 U.S.C. 1738 does not require that this determination by an administrative assistant be given full faith and credit in subsequent federal litigation. The Court also correctly refuses to fashion a federal common-law rule of preclusion that would bar respondent from litigating his claim against the University under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. I agree with these conclusions and therefore join Parts I, II, and III of the Court's opinion. </s> In Part IV of its opinion, however, the Court concludes that the findings of the administrative assistant may bar respondent's claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and other of the Reconstruction-era Civil Rights Acts. Although its reading of the legislative history of the 1964 Civil Rights Act persuades the Court that it should not interpose a judicially created bar to the cause of action authorized by that statute, it creates such a bar to claims authorized by the earlier Civil Rights Acts without even mentioning the concerns that prompted their enactment. As a consequence, the Court's analysis is incomplete and ultimately unconvincing. </s> Preclusion of claims brought under the post-Civil War Acts does not advance the objectives typically associated with finality or federalism. In the employment setting which concerns us here, precluding civil rights claims based on the Reconstruction-era statutes fails to conserve the resources of either the litigants or the courts, because the complainant's companion Title VII claim will still go to federal court under today's decision. 1 Nor does preclusion show respect for [478 U.S. 788, 801] state administrative determinations, because litigants apprised of this decision will presumably forgo state administrative determinations for the same reason they currently forgo state judicial review of those determinations - to protect their entitlement to a federal forum. Cf. Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 532 -533 (1982) (POWELL, J., joined by BURGER, C. J., dissenting) (intimating that litigation of unreviewed state administrative determinations in federal court is necessary to encourage exhaustion of state administrative remedies); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 136 (1981) (BRENNAN, J., joined by MARSHALL, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., concurring in judgment) (same); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 524 , n. 2 (1977) (BURGER, C. J., dissenting) (same). </s> In support of its view that preclusion is required, the Court relies on an analogy to its construction of the Wunderlich Act in United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966). In my opinion, that analogy is seriously flawed. In Utah Construction, the Court held that in a dispute arising under a Government contract, factual findings by the Board of Contract Appeals were binding on the Court of Claims. In support of its dictum that the holding was "harmonious with general principles of collateral estoppel," id., at 421, the Court relied on the fact that Congress had [478 U.S. 788, 802] plainly intended the administrative findings in such proceedings to be conclusive. 2 </s> The relevant federal statute in this case is the 1871 Civil Rights Act, not the Wunderlich Act. Needless to say, there is nothing in the legislative history of the post-Civil War legislation remotely suggesting that Congress intended to give binding effect to unreviewed rulings by state administrators in litigation arising under that statute. Quite the contrary, as we explained in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961): </s> "It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a federal right in federal courts [478 U.S. 788, 803] because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state agencies." </s> See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238 -239, 242 (1972). Cf. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 338 (1983). Due respect for the intent of the Congress that enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871, as revealed in the voluminous legislative history of that Act, should preclude the Court from creating a judge-made rule that bars access to the express legislative remedy enacted by Congress. </s> Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from Part IV of the Court's opinion. </s> [Footnote 1 "The difficulties that will be encountered with this schizophrenic approach [ruling that state administrative findings may establish preclusion as to the claims under these Civil Rights Acts, at the same time as the same issues are relitigated as to the Title VII claim] are obvious. A way out of these difficulties remains to be found. As to any issues that must be retried, with perhaps inconsistent results, it may prove better simply to retry the issues as to all statutory claims. Application of preclusion as to part of the case saves no effort, does not prevent the risk of inconsistent [478 U.S. 788, 801] findings, and may distort the process of finding the issues. The opportunity for repose is substantially weakened by the remaining exposure to liability. Insistence on preclusion in these circumstances has little value, and more risk than it may be worth." 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure 4471, p. 169 (Supp. 1985). Moreover, in this case, and presumably in many other cases as well, even the 1983 claim may be litigated in federal court, at least to the extent of determining whether the complainant was afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate before the state administrative tribunal. See ante, at 799, n. 8. </s> [Footnote 2 The Court quoted with approval the following excerpt from the dissenting opinion of Judge Davis in the Court of Claims: "`This is the same general policy which nourishes the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The court is reluctant, however, to apply that principle to these administrative findings because of the nature and genesis of the boards. The Wunderlich Act, as applied in Bianchi, should dispel these doubts. The Supreme Court made it plain that Congress intended the boards (and like administrative representatives) to be the fact-finders within their contract area of competence, just as the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and the National Labor Relations Board are the fact-finders for other purposes. In the light of Bianchi's evaluation of the statutory policy, we should not squint to give a crabbed reading to the board's authority where it has stayed within its sphere, but should accept it as the primary fact-finding tribunal whose factual determinations (in disputes under the contract) must be received, if valid, in the same way as those of other courts or of the independent administrative agencies. Under the more modern view, the findings of the latter, at least when acting in an adjudicatory capacity, are considered final, even in a suit not directly related to the administrative proceeding, unless there is some good reason for a new judicial inquiry into the same facts. See Davis, Administrative Law 566 (1951); Fairmont Aluminum Co. v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 622, 627 (4th Cir., 1955). The only reasons the majority now offers for a judicial re-trial of factual questions already determined by valid board findings are the same policy considerations which Congress and the Supreme Court have already discarded in the Wunderlich Act and the Bianchi opinion. [Utah Construction & Mining Co. v. United States,] 168 Ct. Cl. [522,] 541-542, 339 F.2d [606,] 618 1964..'" See 384 U.S., at 421 , n. 18. </s> [478 U.S. 788, 804]

United States Supreme Court MATHEWS v. WEBER(1976) No. 74-850 Argued: November 4, 1975Decided: January 14, 1976 </s> In addition to authorizing United States magistrates to perform certain specified statutory functions, the Federal Magistrates Act (Act) authorizes district courts to assign to magistrates "such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States." 28 U.S.C. 636 (b). Pursuant to that provision, the District Court adopted General Order No. 104-D, which, inter alia, requires initial reference to a magistrate of actions to review administrative determinations regarding entitlement to Social Security benefits, including Medicare. Respondent challenged the final determination of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare that respondent was not entitled to claimed Medicare benefits. Under 42 U.S.C. 405 (g) a district court can review such a determination only on the basis of the pleadings and administrative record, and the court is bound by the Secretary's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence. The case was assigned to a District Judge and at the same time referred to a Magistrate to "prepare a proposed written order or decision, together with proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law where necessary or appropriate" for consideration by the District Judge after the Magistrate had reviewed the record and heard the parties' arguments. Contending that the reference to the Magistrate under the District Court's general order violated Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 53 (b) and was not authorized by the Act, the Secretary moved to vacate the order of reference. The District Court refused to vacate the reference order. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: In the context of this case, the preliminary-review function assigned to the Magistrate was one of the "additional duties" that the Act contemplates magistrates are to perform. Pp. 266-275. </s> (a) Section 636 (b) was enacted to permit district courts to increase the scope of responsibilities that magistrates can undertake upon reference, as part of its plan "to establish a system [423 U.S. 261, 262] capable of increasing the overall efficiency of the Federal judiciary." But Congress also intended that in such references the district judge retain ultimate responsibility for decisionmaking. Pp. 266-270. </s> (b) In this type of case the magistrate helps the court focus on the relevant portions of what might be a voluminous record and move directly to any substantial legal arguments, by putting before the court a preliminary evaluation of the evidence in the record. Although substantially assisting the court, the magistrate performs only a preliminary review of a closed administrative record, and any recommendation to the court is confined to whether or not substantial evidence supports the Secretary's decision. The final determination remains with the judge, who has discretion to review the record anew. Pp. 270-272. </s> (c) The order of reference here does not constitute the magistrate a special master and there is no conflict with the requirement of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 53 (b) that "reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule," made in nonjury cases "only upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires it." The magistrate here acts in an advisory role as a magistrate, not as a master; the judge is free to accept or reject the magistrate's recommendation in whole or in part, whereas under Rule 53 (e) the court must accept a special master's finding of fact if it is not clearly erroneous. La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 , distinguished. Pp. 272-275. </s> 503 F.2d 1049, affirmed. </s> BURGER, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all Members joined, except STEVENS, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. </s> Michael Kimmel argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Friedman, Gerald P. Norton, and Morton Hollander. On the reply brief was Solicitor General Bork. </s> Peter D. Ehrenhaft, by invitation of the Court, 421 U.S. 985 , argued the cause and filed a brief as amicus curiae in support of the judgment below. [423 U.S. 261, 263] </s> MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The question presented in this case is whether the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. 631 et seq., permits a United States district court to refer all Social Security benefit cases to United States magistrates for preliminary review of the administrative record, oral argument, and preparation of a recommended decision as to whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the administrative determination - all subject to an independent decision, on the record, by the district judge who may, in his discretion, hear the whole matter anew. </s> (1) </s> Respondent Weber brought this action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California to challenge the final determination of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare that he was not entitled to reimbursement under the Medicare provisions of the Social Security Act, as added, 79 Stat. 291, and amended, 42 U.S.C. 1395 et seq., for medical payments he made on behalf of his wife. Such a suit for judicial review is authorized by 205 (g) of the Federal Magistrates Act, as added, 53 Stat. 1370, and amended, 42 U.S.C. 405 (g), and governed by its standards. The court may consider only the pleadings and administrative record, and must accept the Secretary's findings of fact so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. </s> When respondent's complaint was filed, the Clerk of the court pursuant to court rule assigned the case to a named District Judge, and simultaneously referred it to a United States Magistrate with directions "to notice and conduct such factual hearings and legal argument as may be appropriate" and to "prepare a proposed written order or decision, together with proposed findings of fact and [423 U.S. 261, 264] conclusions of law where necessary or appropriate" for consideration by the District Judge. The Clerk took these steps pursuant to General Order No. 104-D of the District Court, which requires initial reference to a magistrate in seven categories of review of administrative cases, 1 including actions filed under 42 U.S.C. 405 (g). [423 U.S. 261, 265] The parties may object to the magistrate's recommendations. After acting on any objections the magistrate is to forward the entire file to the district judge to whom the case is assigned for decision; the district judge "will calendar the matter for oral argument before him if he deems it necessary or appropriate." </s> The Secretary moved to vacate the order of reference, arguing (1) that referral under a general order of this type violated Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 53 (b) and (2) that such referral was not authorized by the Federal Magistrates Act. The Secretary also argued that the reference was of doubtful constitutionality and in contravention of the judicial review provisions of the Social Security Act, arguments that he has expressly declined to make in this Court. The District Court refused to vacate the order of reference, but certified the reference question for appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1292 (b). </s> The Court of Appeals affirmed. 503 F.2d 1049 (CA9 1974). That court stressed the limited and preliminary nature of the inquiry in review actions brought under 42 U.S.C. 405 (g), the limited scope of the Magistrate's role on reference, and the fact that final authority for decision remained with the District Judge. "Were the broad provisions of General Order No. 104-D . . . before us, the Secretary might have grounds to complain. As applied, the rule is not vulnerable to the attack here mounted." 503 F.2d, at 1051. The Court of Appeals thus reached a decision squarely in conflict with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Ingram v. Richardson, 471 F.2d 1268 (1972). We granted certiorari, 420 U.S. 989 (1975), 2 and we affirm. [423 U.S. 261, 266] </s> (2) </s> After several years of study, the Congress in 1968 enacted the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. 631 et seq. The Act abolished the office of United States commissioner, and sought to "reform the first echelon of the Federal judiciary into an effective component of a modern scheme of justice by establishing a system of U.S. magistrates." S. Rep. No. 371, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1967) (hereafter Senate Report). In order to improve the former system and to attract the most competent men and women to the office, the Act in essence made the position analogous to the career service, replacing the fee system of compensation with substantial salaries; the Act also gave both full- and part-time magistrates a definite term of office, and required that wherever possible the district courts appoint only members of the bar to serve as magistrates. Magistrates took over most of the duties of the commissioners, and the Act gave them new authority to try a broad range of misdemeanors with the consent of the parties. </s> Title 28 U.S.C. 636 (b) outlines a procedure by which the district courts may call upon magistrates to perform other functions, in both civil and criminal cases. It provides: </s> "Any district court of the United States, by the concurrence of a majority of all the judges of such district court, may establish rules pursuant to which any full-time United States magistrate, or, where there is no full-time magistrate reasonably available, any part-time magistrate specially designated by the court, may be assigned within the territorial jurisdiction of such court such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. The additional duties authorized by rule may include, but are not restricted to - [423 U.S. 261, 267] </s> "(1) service as a special master in an appropriate civil action, pursuant to the applicable provisions of this title and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States district courts; </s> "(2) assistance to a district judge in the conduct of pretrial or discovery proceedings in civil or criminal actions; and </s> "(3) preliminary review of applications for post-trial relief made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses, and submission of a report and recommendations to facilitate the decision of the district judge having jurisdiction over the case as to whether there should be a hearing." </s> The three examples 636 (b) sets out are, as the statute itself states, not exclusive. The Senate sponsor of the legislation, Senator Tydings, testified in the House hearings: </s> "The Magistrate[s] Act specifies these three areas because they came up in our hearings and we thought they were areas in which the district courts might be able to benefit from the magistrate's services. We did not limit the courts to the areas mentioned. Nor did we require that they use the magistrates for additional functions at all. </s> "We hope and think that innovative, imaginative judges who want to clean up their caseload backlog will utilize the U.S. magistrates in these areas and perhaps even come up with new areas to increase the efficiency of their courts." Hearings on the Federal Magistrates Act before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 81 (1968) (hereafter House Hearings). </s> See also Hearings on the Federal Magistrates Act before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th [423 U.S. 261, 268] Cong., 2d Sess., and 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 14, 27 (1966 and 1967) (hereafter Senate Hearings). </s> Section 636 (b) was included to "permit . . . the U.S. district courts to assign magistrates, as officers of the courts, a variety of functions . . . presently performable only by the judges themselves." Senate Report 12. In enacting this section and in expanding the criminal jurisdiction conferred upon magistrates, Congress hoped by "increasing the scope of the responsibilities that can be discharged by that office, . . . to establish a system capable of increasing the overall efficiency of the Federal judiciary . . . ." Id., at 11. </s> The Act grew from Congress' recognition that a multitude of new statutes and regulations had created an avalanche of additional work for the district courts which could be performed only by multiplying the number of judges or giving judges additional assistance. The Secretary argues that Congress intended the transfer to magistrates of simply the irksome, ministerial tasks; respondent 3 urges that Congress intended magistrates to take on a wide range of substantive judicial duties and advisory functions. We need not accept the characterization of the federal magistrate as either a "para-judge," as respondent would have it, or a "supernotary," as the Secretary argues, in order to resolve this case; finding the best analogy to this new office is not particularly important. Congress had a number of precedents for this new officer before it: British masters, justices of peace, and magistrates; our own traditional special masters in equity; and pretrial examiners. 4 The [423 U.S. 261, 269] office Congress created drew on all prior experience. What is important is that the congressional anticipation is becoming a reality; in fiscal 1975, for example, the 500 full- or part-time United States magistrates disposed of 255,061 matters, most of which would otherwise have occupied district judges. These included 36,766 civil proceedings, 537 of which were Social Security review cases. Annual Report of the Director, Administrative Office of the United States Courts VIII-4 (1975). See also Sussman, The Fourth Tier in the Federal Judicial System: The United States Magistrate, 56 Chicago Bar Record 134 (1974); Geffen, Practice Before the United States Magistrate, 47 L. A. Bar Bull. 462 (1972); Doyle, Implementing the Federal Magistrates Act, 39 J. Kan. Bar Assn. 25 (1970). </s> Congress manifested concern as well as enthusiasm, however, in considering the Act. Several witnesses, including the Director of the Administrative Office and representatives of the Justice Department, expressed some fear that Congress might improperly delegate to magistrates duties reserved by the Constitution to Article III judges. Senate Hearings 107-128, 241n; House Hearings 123-128. 5 The hearings and committee [423 U.S. 261, 270] reports indicate that in 636 (b) Congress met this problem in two ways. First, Congress restricted the range of matters that may be referred to a magistrate to those where referral is "not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States . . . ." Second, Congress limited the magistrate's role in cases referred to him under 636 (b). The Act's sponsors made it quite clear that the magistrate acts "under the supervision of the district judges" when he accepts a referral, and that authority for making final decisions remains at all times with the district judge. Senate Report 12. "[A] district judge would retain ultimate responsibility for decision making in every instance in which a magistrate might exercise additional duties jurisdiction." House Hearings 73 (testimony of Sen. Tydings). See also id., at 127 (testimony of Asst. Deputy Atty. Gen. Finley). </s> (3) </s> We need not define the full reach of a magistrate's authority under the Act, or reach the broad provisions of General Order No. 104-D, in order to decide this case. Under the part of the order at issue the magistrates perform a limited function which falls well within the range of duties Congress empowered the district courts to assign to them. The magistrate is directed to conduct a preliminary review of a closed administrative record - closed because under 205 (g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 405 (g), neither party may put any additional evidence before the district court. The magistrate gives only a recommendation to the judge, and only on the single, narrow issue: is there in the record substantial evidence to support the Secretary's decision? 6 The magistrate may do no more than propose [423 U.S. 261, 271] a recommendation, and neither 636 (b) nor the General Order gives such recommendation presumptive weight. The district judge is free to follow it or wholly to ignore it, or, if he is not satisfied, he may conduct the review in whole or in part anew. The authority - and the responsibility - to make an informed, final determination, we emphasize, remains with the judge. </s> The magistrate's limited role in this type of case nonetheless substantially assists the district judge in the performance of his judicial function, and benefits both him and the parties. A magistrate's review helps focus the court's attention on the relevant portions of what may be a voluminous record, from a point of view as neutral as that of an Article III judge. Review also helps the court move directly to those legal arguments made by the parties that find some support in the record. Finally, the magistrate's report puts before the district judge a preliminary evaluation of the cumulative effect of the evidence in the record, to which the parties may address argument, and in this way narrows the dispute. Each step of the process takes place with the full participation of the parties. They know precisely what recommendations the judge is receiving and may frame their arguments accordingly. </s> We conclude that in the context of this case the preliminary-review function assigned to the magistrate, and [423 U.S. 261, 272] at issue here, is one of the "additional duties" that the statute contemplates magistrates are to perform. 7 </s> (4) </s> The Secretary argues that the magistrate, in taking this reference, functions as a special master. From this premise, the Secretary asks us to hold that a general rule requiring automatic reference in a category of cases does not comply with the mandate of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 53 (b) that "reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule," made in nonjury cases "only upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires it." He also argues that, for similar reasons, the reference here is [423 U.S. 261, 273] not permissible under our decision in La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957). 8 </s> Section 636 (b) expressly provides that a district court may, in an appropriate case and in accordance with Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 53, call upon a magistrate to act as a special master. But the statute also is clear that not every reference, for whatever purpose, is to be characterized as a reference to a special master. It treats references to the magistrate acting as master quite separately in subsection (1), indicating by its structure that other references are of a different sort. Moreover, Rule 53 (e) provides that, in nonjury cases referred to a master, the court shall accept any finding of fact that is not clearly erroneous. Under the reference in this case, however, the judge remains free to give the magistrate's recommendation whatever weight the judge decides it merits. It cannot be said, therefore, that the magistrate acts as a special master in the sense that either Rule 53 or the Federal Magistrates Act uses that term. The order of reference at issue does not constitute the magistrate a special master. </s> The Secretary argues that the magistrate will be a master in fact because the judge will accept automatically the recommendation made in every case. Nothing [423 U.S. 261, 274] in the record or within the scope of permissible judicial notice supports this argument; nor does common observation of the performance of United States judges remotely lend the slightest credence to such an extravagant assertion. We express no opinion with respect to either the wisdom or the validity of automatic referral in other types of cases; only the narrow portion of General Order No. 104-D that led to reference of this particular case is before us today. In this narrow range of cases, reference promotes more focused, and so more careful, decisionmaking by the district judge. We categorically reject the suggestion that judges will accept, uncritically, recommendations of magistrates. </s> Our decision in La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., supra, does not call for a different result. In La Buy, the District Judge on his own motion referred to a special master two complex, protracted antitrust cases on the eve of trial. The cases had been pending before him for several years, he had heard pretrial motions, and he was familiar with the issues involved. The master, a member of the bar, was to hear and decide the entire case, subject to review by the District Judge under the "clearly erroneous" test. The judge cited the problems attendant to docket congestion to satisfy Rule 53's requirement that a reference to a special master be justified by "exceptional circumstances." The Court held that on these facts reference was not permissible and affirmed the Court of Appeals' supervisory prohibition. </s> La Buy, although nearly two decades past, is the most recent of our cases dealing with special masters, and our decision today does not erode it. 9 The Magistrate here acted in his capacity as magistrate, not as a special [423 U.S. 261, 275] master, under a reference authorized by an Act passed 10 years after La Buy was decided. Other factors distinguish this case from La Buy as well. The issues here are as simple as they were complex in La Buy, and the District Judge had not yet invested any time in familiarizing himself with the case. The reference in this case will result in a recommendation that carries only such weight as its merit commands and the sound discretion of the judge warrants. We are persuaded that the important premises from which the La Buy decision proceeded are not threatened here. </s> Finally, our decision in Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461 (1974), does not bear on this case. The Secretary has abandoned any claim that the statute giving the District Court jurisdiction of the case in the first instance, 42 U.S.C. 405 (g), precludes reference to a magistrate. It was the Court's reading of the habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. 2243, that formed the basis for the holding in Wingo v. Wedding. </s> Affirmed. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 General Order No. 104-D provides for reference in the following types of review of administrative cases: "(A) Actions to review administrative determinations re entitlement to benefits under the Social Security Act and related statutes, including but not limited to actions filed under 42 U.S.C. 405 (g). "(B) Actions filed by the United States or a carrier to review, implement or restrain orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission re freight overcharges, including but not limited to actions under 28 U.S.C. 1336 and 49 U.S.C. 304a. "(C) Actions, whether in the form of judicial review, habeas corpus or otherwise, for review of orders and other actions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Included, but not by way of limitation, are actions involving deportation orders, denial of preference classification visas and denial of petitions to adjust status. "(D) Actions for review of adjudications by the Civil Service Commission, or the various departments or agencies, involving personnel actions such as wrongful discharge, reductions in force, transfers, retirements, etc. "(E) Actions for review of an order of any branch or establishment of the military service denying discharge of petitioner from the military, whether such actions are brought in the form of petitions for judicial review, habeas corpus or actions for declaratory relief and injunction. "(F) Actions filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 923 (f) (3) to review administrative decisions denying applications for licenses to engage in business as a firearms or ammunition importer, manufacturer or dealer. "(G) Actions to review administrative decisions by the Department of Labor denying applications for alien employment certification required pursuant to the provisions of 8 U.S.C. 1182 (a) (14)." The petition for certiorari raises only the issue of the propriety of the part of subsection (A) of the General Order that authorizes [423 U.S. 261, 265] reference of cases brought under 42 U.S.C. 405 (g), and we intimate no opinion on the validity of its other provisions. </s> [Footnote 2 Because respondent has declined to appear, we invited an amicus curiae to support the decision of the Court of Appeals. 421 U.S. 985 (1975). </s> [Footnote 3 For convenience, the position taken by amicus in support of the Court of Appeals' judgment will be referred to as the position of respondent. </s> [Footnote 4 The administration of the Act also profits from the British analogy. See Institute of Judicial Administration, Report of the [423 U.S. 261, 269] Committee to Study the Role of Masters in the English Judicial System (Federal Judicial Center 1974). </s> [Footnote 5 Some courts have manifested a like concern. See TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d 348 (CA7 1972); Reed v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 459 F.2d 121 (CA1 1972). But cf. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973). See also Note, Masters and Magistrates in the Federal Courts, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 779 (1975); Comment, An Adjudicative Role for Federal Magistrates in Civil Cases, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 584 (1973). Because we limit our consideration of the Act and General Order No. 104-D to the particular reference presented by this case, we need not deal with these broad constitutional issues. Petitioner expressly declines to rely on any constitutional argument. </s> [Footnote 6 Ordinarily, the parties will agree as to the legal standard, leaving as the sole issue whether the Secretary's determination is supported [423 U.S. 261, 271] by substantial evidence. In some cases, the magistrate may preliminarily resolve issues of law before making a recommendation; in some few cases, the recommendation may turn wholly upon an issue of law. The parties have not suggested that cases in either of these subcategories raise issues of statutory interpretation that require separate treatment, and we do not reach them on this record. Experience with the magistrate's role under the Act may well lead to the conclusion that sound judicial administration calls for sending directly to the district judge those cases that turn solely upon issues of law. </s> [Footnote 7 Though we do not rely upon subsequently expressed congressional views, the Congress plainly considers claims such as respondent brought in the District Court as matters that could appropriately be referred for preliminary review to a magistrate. In considering magistrates' salaries in 1972, a Senate subcommittee noted: "Magistrates are judicial officers of the Federal district courts. . . . They may also be authorized to screen prisoner petitions, hold pretrial conferences in civil and criminal cases, hear certain preliminary motions, review social security appeals, review Narcotics Addict Rehabilitation Act matters, and serve as special masters. In short, they render valuable assistance to the judges of the district courts, thereby freeing the time of those judges for the actual trial of cases." S. Rep. No. 92-1065, p. 3 (1972) (emphasis added). The Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the statutory body that supervises the administrative aspects of the Act pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 604 (d) (1), reads the Act in the same way. It has distributed a "checklist" of magistrate duties that includes review of Social Security appeals brought under 42 U.S.C. 405 (g). Judicial Conference of the United States, Committee on the Administration of the Federal Magistrates System, Duties Which Might Be Assigned to U.S. Magistrates (Mar. 14, 1975). The Administrative Office first noted in its 1972 report that district courts were assigning Social Security appeals to magistrates under the 1968 Act. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Annual Report of the Director VI-8 (1972). </s> [Footnote 8 These arguments persuaded the Court of Appeals in Ingram v. Richardson, 471 F.2d 1268 (CA6 1972). Other federal courts to consider the issue reached a contrary result. Yascavage v. Weinberger, 379 F. Supp. 1297 (MD Pa. 1974); Bell v. Weinberger, 378 F. Supp. 198 (ND Ga. 1974); Murphy v. Weinberger [Oct. 1966-Dec. 1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Unempl. Ins. Rep. § 17,608 (Conn. 1974). Several courts have relied upon these arguments to one extent or another in disapproving references that involved a broader grant of authority to the magistrate. See, e. g., Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 507 F.2d 1378 (CA7 1974); TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d 348 (CA7 1972); Reed v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 459 F.2d 121 (CA1 1972). </s> [Footnote 9 See generally Kaufman, Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 Col. L. Rev. 452 (1958); CAB v. Carefree Travel, Inc., 513 F.2d 375 (CA2 1975). </s> [423 U.S. 261, 276]

United States Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO.(1989) No. 88-1474 Argued: November 1, 1989Decided: December 11, 1989 </s> In 1970 and 1971, Goodyear Tyre and Rubber Company (Great Britain) Limited (Goodyear G. B.), a wholly owned subsidiary of Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company (Goodyear), a domestic corporation, filed income tax returns in, and paid taxes to, the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. It also distributed dividends to Goodyear, its sole shareholder, which Goodyear reported on its federal tax return. Thereafter Goodyear sought an indirect credit for a portion of the foreign taxes paid by Goodyear G. B. as permitted by 902 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code), 26 U.S.C. 902 (1970 ed.), which limits a domestic parent corporation's credit to the amount of tax paid by the subsidiary attributable to the dividend issued. The credit is calculated by multiplying the total foreign tax paid by that portion of the subsidiary's after-tax "accumulated profits" that is actually issued to the domestic parent in the form of a taxable dividend. After Goodyear G. B. carried back a net loss reported on its 1973 British tax return to offset portions of its 1970 and 1971 income, British taxing authorities recalculated its 1970 and 1971 income and tax liability, and the company received a refund for those years. Pursuant to 905(c) of the Code - which permits redetermination of the foreign tax credit whenever any tax paid is refunded - the Commissioner of Internal Revenue recalculated the indirect tax credit available to Goodyear for 1970 and 1971 by lowering the foreign taxes paid to reflect the refund. However, he refused to lower accumulated profits for those years to reflect the British tax authorities' redetermination because, applying United States tax principles, Goodyear G. B.'s loss would not have been allowable had the company been a domestic corporation filing a federal tax return. Thus, the Commission assessed, and Goodyear paid, tax deficiencies for 1970 and 1971. Goodyear subsequently sought a refund in the Claims Court, which rejected Goodyear's claim that foreign tax law principles govern the calculation of "accumulated profits" in 902's tax credit, finding instead that the purposes underlying 902 favored calculation of "accumulated profits" in accordance with United States tax concepts. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the "plain meaning" of 902 required that "accumulated profits" be determined under foreign law. It also held that the congressional [493 U.S. 132, 133] purpose underlying 902 to eliminate international double taxation would be defeated if a foreign subsidiary's taxes, but not its "accumulated profits," were calculated under foreign law. </s> Held: </s> "Accumulated profits," as that term appears in 902's indirect tax credit, are to be calculated in accordance with domestic tax principles. Pp. 138-145. </s> (a) Section 902's text does not resolve how "accumulated profits" are to be calculated, since it relates such profits both to the foreign tax paid by the subsidiary, calculated in accordance with foreign law, and to the dividend issued by the subsidiary, calculated in accordance with domestic law. Pp. 138-139. </s> (b) No definitional approach to "accumulated profits" uniformly and unqualifiedly satisfies the indirect credit's dual congressional purposes, as clearly demonstrated by the credit's history, of protecting a domestic parent from double taxation of its income and treating foreign branches and foreign subsidiaries alike in terms of the tax credits they generate for their domestic companies. Goodyear correctly claims that calculating such profits according to domestic tax principles can result in situations in which 902's statutory goal of avoiding double taxation will be disserved. However, as the Government contends, defining the profits in terms of foreign tax principles can unfairly advantage domestic companies that operate through foreign subsidiaries over those that operate through unincorporated branches. Pp. 139-143. </s> (c) The Government's interpretation of "accumulated profits" is more faithful to congressional intent. The risk of double taxation is less substantial than the risk of unequal treatment. Goodyear offers no basis for its suggestion that double taxation - which can result only when a dividend is sourced to a year in which domestic tax concepts recognize little or no income and yet a subsidiary pays substantial foreign tax - commonly occurs. On the other hand, Goodyear's approach leads to unequal tax treatment of subsidiaries and branches whenever the foreign taxing authority calculates income more or less generously than the United States, a result that is difficult to square with the express congressional purpose of ensuring tax parity between corporations that operate through foreign subsidiaries and those that operate through foreign branches. The Government's approach is also supported by administrative interpretations of 902 and by the statutory canon that tax provisions should generally be read to incorporate domestic tax concepts absent a clear congressional expression that foreign concepts control, Biddle v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 573, 578 . Pp. 143-145. </s> 856 F.2d 170, reversed and remanded. </s> MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. [493 U.S. 132, 134] </s> Alan I. Horowitz argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Peterson, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, and Robert S. Pomerance. </s> Barring Coughlin argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Stephen L. Buescher and Deborah Z. Read. * </s> [Footnote * William H. Allen, John B. Jones, Jr., Frances M. Horner, Robert T. Cole, and Gilbert W. Rubloff filed a brief for the National Foreign Trade Council, Inc., as amicus curiae urging affirmance. </s> Dennis I. Meyer, C. David Swenson, Leonard B. Terr, and Thomas A. O'Donnell filed a brief for Vulcan Materials Co. as amicus curiae. </s> JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> In this case, we must decide whether "accumulated profits" in the indirect tax credit provision of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. 902 (1970 ed.), are to be measured in accordance with United States or foreign tax principles. We conclude that "accumulated profits" are to be measured in accordance with United States principles. </s> I </s> Goodyear Tyre and Rubber Company (Great Britain) Limited (Goodyear G. B.) is a wholly owned subsidiary of Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company (Goodyear), a domestic corporation. Goodyear brought this suit seeking a refund of federal income taxes collected for the years 1970 and 1971. During those years, Goodyear G. B. filed income tax returns in, and paid taxes to, the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. Goodyear G. B. also distributed dividends to Goodyear, its sole shareholder. Goodyear reported these dividends on its federal tax return, as required by 26 U.S.C. 301, 316 (1970 ed.). Goodyear thereafter sought credit for a portion of the foreign taxes paid by Goodyear G. B. in the amount specified in 902. 1 </s> [493 U.S. 132, 135] </s> Section 902 provides a parent of a foreign subsidiary with an "indirect" or "deemed paid" credit on its domestic income tax return to reflect foreign taxes paid by its subsidiary. The credit protects domestic corporations that operate through foreign subsidiaries from double taxation of the same income: taxation first by the foreign jurisdiction, when the income is earned by the subsidiary, and second by the United States, when the income is received as a dividend by the parent. In some circumstances, a foreign subsidiary may choose to distribute only a portion of its available profit as a dividend to its domestic parent. For that reason, a domestic parent cannot automatically claim credit for all foreign taxes paid by its subsidiary: 902 limits a domestic parent's credit to the amount of tax paid by the subsidiary attributable to the dividend issued. The foreign tax deemed paid by the domestic parent is calculated by multiplying the total foreign tax paid (T) by that portion of the subsidiary's after-tax accumulated profits (AP-T) that is actually issued to the domestic parent in the form of a taxable dividend (D). 2 </s> [493 U.S. 132, 136] </s> In 1973, Goodyear G. B. reported a net loss on its British tax return and carried back that loss to offset substantial portions of its 1970 and 1971 income. Based on the 1973 carried-back losses, British taxing authorities recalculated Goodyear G. B.'s income and tax liability for the years 1970 and 1971. Goodyear G. B. thereafter received a refund of a substantial portion of its 1970 and 1971 foreign tax payments. </s> In response to the refunds, and pursuant to 905(c) of the Code which permits redetermination of the foreign tax credit whenever "any tax paid is refunded in whole or in part," the Commissioner of Internal Revenue recalculated the indirect tax credit available to Goodyear for the tax years 1970 and 1971. The Commissioner lowered the foreign taxes paid (T) to reflect the refund. He refused, however, to lower accumulated profits (AP) for those years to reflect British tax authorities' redetermination of Goodyear G. B.'s income. The deductions that created, for British tax purposes, the 1973 loss would not have been allowable in the computation of United States income tax if Goodyear G. B. had been a United States corporation filing a United States return. See App. 19-29 (Stipulation of Facts). In the Commissioner's view, accumulated profits are to be calculated in accordance with United States tax principles; accordingly, the Commissioner regarded Goodyear G. B.'s 1970 and 1971 accumulated profits as unaffected by the deductions allowed under British law. </s> In view of the reduced amount of Goodyear's tax deemed paid, the Commissioner assessed substantial tax deficiencies for the tax years 1970 and 1971. Goodyear paid the deficiencies and, following the IRS' denial of its administrative refund claim, brought this action in the United States Claims Court, averring that foreign tax law principles govern the calculation of "accumulated profits" in 902's tax credit. Calculating "accumulated profits" in accordance with British tax law principles, Goodyear maintained that Goodyear G. B.'s after-tax accumulated profits for 1970 and 1971 were [493 U.S. 132, 137] insufficient to cover the dividends paid in those years. In such a circumstance, 902 requires that, for the purpose of computing the indirect credit, the excess of the dividend be deemed paid out of the after-tax accumulated profits of the preceding year. If in that year the remaining portion of the dividend exceeds the after-tax accumulated profits, the remainder of the dividend is allocated or "sourced" to the next most recent year, until the dividend is exhausted. 3 Thus, Goodyear argued that the dividends it received from Goodyear G. B. in 1970 and 1971 should have been sourced to prior tax years, 1968 and 1969, until Goodyear G. B.'s after-tax accumulated profits covered the dividends. Through this sourcing mechanism, Goodyear would, in computing its domestic tax liability for the dividends issued by Goodyear G. B., receive credit for a portion of the foreign taxes paid by Goodyear G. B. in 1968 and 1969. Because Goodyear G. B. paid substantial foreign taxes in those tax years, allocation of the dividend to those years would yield a tax deemed paid by Goodyear in excess of 1 million, over four times greater than the tax the Commissioner deemed paid. If the term "accumulated profits" is defined in accordance with domestic tax principles, as the Commissioner advocated, the dividends issued in 1970 and 1971 are fully exhausted by the accumulated profits of those years, resulting in a tax deemed paid of 247, 124. </s> The Claims Court rejected Goodyear's claim. 14 Cl. Ct. 23 (1987). Viewing the statutory definition of "accumulated profits" in 902(c)(1)(A) as inconclusive, id., at 28-29, the court turned to the purposes underlying 902 and found that they favored calculation of "accumulated profits" in accordance with United States tax concepts, id., at 29-31. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed. 856 F.2d 170 (1988). The court held that the "plain meaning" of 902 "requires [accumulated profits] to be determined under [493 U.S. 132, 138] foreign law." Id., at 172. The court also held that the fundamental congressional purpose underlying 902, "`elimination of international double taxation,'" ibid. (quoting H. H. Robertson Co. v. Commissioner, 59 T. C. 53, 74 (1972), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1399 (CA3 1974)), would be defeated if the taxes paid by a foreign subsidiary, but not its accumulated profits, were calculated in terms of foreign law. 856 F.2d, at 172. </s> The Court of Appeals' decision has important consequences for the calculation of the indirect tax credit of domestic parents that have received dividends from their subsidiaries abroad. To clarify the operation of the 902 credit in the tax years to which it applies, 4 we granted certiorari, 490 U.S. 1045 (1989), and now reverse. </s> II </s> Our starting point, as in all cases involving statutory interpretation, "must be the language employed by Congress." Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979). We find that the text of 902 does not resolve whether "accumulated profits" are to be calculated in accordance with foreign or domestic tax concepts. </s> It is true, as the Court of Appeals emphasized, that 902 (a)(1) and 902(c)(1)(A) link "accumulated profits" to the foreign tax imposed on the subsidiary. The link is forged by describing the foreign tax as that tax imposed "on or with respect to" accumulated profits. The provisions also, however, [493 U.S. 132, 139] link "accumulated profits" to "dividends" by describing "accumulated profits" as the pool from which the "dividends" are issued. Section 316(a), in turn, makes clear that domestic principles control whether a payment is a "dividend" subject to domestic tax. On the basis of this link, a leading treatise has concluded that "[a]ccumulated profits of the foreign corporation . . . are, in general, equated with earnings and profits of the foreign corporation and are determined in accordance with domestic law principles." B. Bittker & J. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders § 17.11, p. 17-44 (5th ed. 1987) ("Adoption of these principles has the virtue of correlating the denominator of the 902 computation with the definition of dividends (the numerator), thus avoiding the possible distortions that could arise if different definitional approaches were used for the numerator and denominator of the 902 fraction"). Because 902 relates "accumulated profits" both to the foreign tax paid by the subsidiary, calculated in accordance with foreign law, and to the dividend issued by the subsidiary, calculated in accordance with domestic law, we are unpersuaded that the statutory language is dispositive. We must therefore look beyond the statute's language to the legislative history, purposes, and operation of the indirect tax credit. </s> III </s> A </s> The history of the indirect credit clearly demonstrates that the credit was intended to protect a domestic parent from double taxation of its income. Congress first established the indirect tax credit in 240(c) of the Revenue Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 1082, permitting a domestic parent to receive a credit for a portion of the foreign taxes paid by its subsidiary during the year in which the subsidiary issued a dividend to the parent. This Court subsequently described the purpose of 240 (c) as protection against double taxation. American Chicle [493 U.S. 132, 140] Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 450, 452 (1942); see also Bittker & Eustice, supra, at § 17.11, p. 17-40. </s> The legislative history of the indirect credit also clearly reflects an intent to equalize treatment between domestic corporations that operate through foreign subsidiaries and those that operate through unincorporated foreign branches. In 238(e) of the Revenue Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 259, Congress amended 240(c) to permit a domestic corporation to claim credit for taxes its subsidiary paid in years other than those in which the dividend was issued. Prior to the amendment, a domestic corporation could not receive credit for foreign taxes paid on distributed income if its subsidiary issued the dividend out of income earned in prior years, see 316 U.S., at 453 , because 240(c) limited the credit to taxes paid by the subsidiary "during the taxable year" in which the dividend was issued. The amendment corrected this deficiency by relating the credit to the accumulated profits out of which the dividends were paid. </s> In defending the amended version of the indirect credit, one sponsor described the purpose of the credit as securing, for domestic corporations that receive income in the form of dividends from foreign subsidiaries, the same sort of deduction available to domestic corporations that receive income from foreign branches. 61 Cong. Rec. 7184 (1921). 5 This goal of equalized treatment is reflected as well in testimony regarding the amendment before the Senate Committee on Finance, in which a spokesperson for the Department of the Treasury described the proposal as intended "to give this American corporation about the same credit as if conducting [493 U.S. 132, 141] a branch." Hearings on H. R. 8245 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, p. 389 (1921). More recently, the Senate Report on the 1962 amendments to the indirect credit confirms Congress' intent to treat foreign branches and foreign subsidiaries alike in terms of the tax credits they generate for their domestic companies. See S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 66-67 (1962). 6 </s> B </s> Given these purposes, we now turn to the operation of the indirect tax credit. Goodyear contends that the failure to calculate accumulated profits in terms of foreign law subjects domestic corporations that receive dividends from their foreign subsidiaries to double taxation. This undesirable result occurs, in Goodyear's view, because calculation of accumulated profits in accordance with domestic principles may disconnect the relationship in 902's formula between accumulated profits and the foreign tax paid by the subsidiary. A subsidiary incurs foreign tax liability in proportion to its foreign defined income. To recover foreign taxes paid by its subsidiary, a domestic parent's dividend must be allocated or [493 U.S. 132, 142] sourced to years in which its subsidiary paid foreign tax. If, however, accumulated profits are defined in domestic terms, the dividends of a domestic parent may be allocated to years in which the subsidiary paid little or no tax. In such a scenario, the parent may not be credited with foreign taxes paid by its subsidiary. To avoid this mismatching of accumulated profits and foreign tax, Goodyear contends that accumulated profits should be determined in accordance with the same principles that govern the imposition of the tax: those found in foreign law. </s> The Government contests Goodyear's characterization of this case as one of "double taxation." In the Government's view, the dividends received by Goodyear should not be allocated to prior years because to do so would permit Goodyear to avoid taxation altogether on domestically defined income that its subsidiary earned in 1970 and 1971. Under domestic rules, Goodyear G. B. earned sufficient income in 1970 and 1971 to cover the dividends it issued to Goodyear in those years. That British taxing authorities recognized little income in those years should not, in the Government's view, prevent the United States from recognizing the substantial income attributable to those years under domestic rules. According to the Government, the foreign tax paid in 1968 and 1969 by Goodyear G. B. - the years to which Goodyear seeks to source its dividends - relates to income that Goodyear G. B. chose not to distribute during those years as dividends to Goodyear. To credit Goodyear with taxes paid on undistributed income, the Government concludes, would be inequitable because it would provide domestic parents that operate through foreign subsidiaries favorable treatment vis-a-vis domestic corporations that use foreign branches. </s> Goodyear attempts to avoid the force of the Government's analysis by exploring hypothetical situations in which the calculation of accumulated profits in accordance with domestic rules presents a more plausible claim of double taxation than does this case. For example, if a subsidiary earns an equal [493 U.S. 132, 143] amount of income under foreign and domestic rules, but those rules regard the income as being earned in different years, the domestic parent would be credited with a lower portion of the tax paid by the subsidiary if domestic timing rules govern. This result appears anomalous because the same credit should be available where foreign and domestic tax principles recognize equal amounts of income and the amount of tax paid remains constant. The effect of the divergence in foreign and domestic tax principles is particularly clear when a subsidiary pays a substantial foreign tax in a given year and the amount of income recognized under domestic rules in that year is zero. In such a circumstance, none of the tax paid by the subsidiary can be credited to the parent because a dividend cannot be sourced to a year in which there are no accumulated profits. </s> Goodyear's hypotheticals persuade us that if accumulated profits are calculated according to domestic tax principles, situations can arise in which 902's statutory goal of avoiding double taxation will be disserved. Equally persuasive, however, is the Government's claim that defining accumulated profits in terms of foreign tax principles can unfairly advantage domestic parents that operate through foreign subsidiaries over companies operating through unincorporated branches. Thus, no definitional approach to "accumulated profits" uniformly and unqualifiedly satisfies the dual purposes underlying the indirect credit. </s> C </s> We nonetheless believe that the Government's interpretation of "accumulated profits" is more faithful to congressional intent. Our view is informed first and most significantly by our assessment that the risk of double taxation outlined by Goodyear is less substantial than the risk of unequal treatment cited by the Government. Defining "accumulated profits" in accordance with domestic tax concepts results in double taxation only when a dividend is sourced to a year in [493 U.S. 132, 144] which domestic tax concepts recognize little or no income and yet a subsidiary pays substantial foreign tax. Goodyear offers no basis for the suggestion that such mismatching commonly occurs. </s> Goodyear's approach, on the other hand, leads to unequal tax treatment of subsidiaries and branches whenever the foreign taxing authority calculates income more or less generously than the United States. A domestic corporation must pay tax on all income of a foreign branch that is recognized under domestic law. Under Goodyear's interpretation, a domestic corporation may in some cases receive credit for taxes paid on income that, under domestic rules, the parent never received. This result is difficult to square with the express congressional purpose of ensuring tax parity between domestic corporations that operate through foreign subsidiaries and those that operate through foreign branches. </s> The Government's approach is also supported by administrative interpretations of 902. In defining the credits available against foreign tax under the predecessor to 902, the Commissioner stated that "[i]t is important in establishing the amount of the accumulated profits that it be based as a fundamental principle upon all income of the foreign corporation available for distribution to its shareholders whether such profits be taxable by the foreign country or not." I. T. 2676, XII-1 Cum. Bull. 48, 50 (1933) (emphasis added). The Commissioner's approach requires a domestic assessment of income for the purposes of calculating accumulated profits. The Commissioner's position is reflected as well in a formal regulation promulgated by the Treasury in 1965, Treas. Reg. 1.902-3(c)(1), 26 CFR 1.902-3(c)(1) (1972), which defines "accumulated profits" under 902(a)(1) as "the sum of [t]he earnings and profits of [the foreign subsidiary] for such year, and [t]he foreign income taxes imposed on or with respect to the gains, profits, and income to which such earnings and profits are attributable." Defining a subsidiary's "accumulated profits" as its "earnings and profits" reflects an intent [493 U.S. 132, 145] to calculate accumulated profits according to domestic principles, because "earnings and profits" in this context is a domestic tax concept. </s> Lastly, we find support for the Government's position in the statutory canon adopted in Biddle v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 573, 578 (1938), that tax provisions should generally be read to incorporate domestic tax concepts absent a clear congressional expression that foreign concepts control. This canon has particularly strong application here where a contrary interpretation would leave an important statutory goal regarding equal tax treatment of foreign subsidiaries and foreign branches to the varying tax policies of foreign tax authorities. </s> IV </s> "Accumulated profits," as that term appears in 902's indirect tax credit, should be calculated in accordance with domestic tax principles. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Section 902(a) provides: [493 U.S. 132, 135] </s> "For purposes of this subpart, a domestic corporation which owns at least 10 percent of the voting stock of a foreign corporation from which it receives dividends in any taxable year shall - </s> "(1) to the extent such dividends are paid by such foreign corporation out of accumulated profits (as defined in subsection (c)(1)(A)) of a year for which such foreign corporation is not a less developed country corporation, be deemed to have paid the same proportion of any income, war profits, or excess profits taxes paid or deemed to be paid by such foreign corporation to any foreign country or to any possession of the United States on or with respect to such accumulated profits, which the amount of such dividends (determined without regard to section 78) bears to the amount of such accumulated profits in excess of such income, war profits, and excess profits taxes (other than those deemed paid). . . ." 26 U.S.C. 902 (1970 ed.). </s> [Footnote 2 The formula for calculating the 902 credit is as follows: </s> ( Dividends (D) ) (________________________) Credit = Foreign Taxes Paid (T) x (Accumulated Profits (AP)) (minus Foreign Taxes (T) ) </s> [Footnote 3 The operation of this sourcing principle is described in General Foods Corp. v. Commissioner, 4 T. C. 209, 215 (1944). </s> [Footnote 4 Calculation of the indirect credit for tax years beginning after 1986 is governed by the amended version of 902 established by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 2528, 26 U.S.C. 902 (1982 ed., Supp. V). The amended version substantially overhauls the method of calculating the credit and removes the controversy regarding the definition of "accumulated profits." The current version of 902(c)(1) replaces "accumulated profits" with "undistributed earnings," which are defined as the "earnings and profits of the foreign corporation (computed in accordance with sections 964 and 986)." Section 964(a) in turn provides that "the earnings and profits of any foreign corporation . . . shall be determined according to rules substantially similar to those applicable to domestic corporations." 26 U.S.C. 964(a) (1982 ed.). </s> [Footnote 5 Senator Smoot stated: </s> "[A] foreign subsidiary is much like a foreign branch of an American corporation. If the American corporation owned a foreign branch, it would include the earnings or profits of such branch in its total income, but it would also be entitled to deduct from the tax based upon such income any income or profits taxes paid to foreign countries by the branch in question. Without special legislation, however, no credit can be obtained where the branch is incorporated under foreign laws." </s> [Footnote 6 The 1962 amendment addresses a tax preference that results if a domestic parent is credited with foreign taxes paid on subsidiary income that is used to satisfy the subsidiary's foreign tax obligations. In such a circumstance, the parent receives credit for taxes paid on undistributed income. This Court sought to eliminate this tax advantage in American Chicle Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 450, 452 (1942), by including in the 902 credit only those taxes paid on a subsidiary's after-tax income. The 1962 amendment addressed the problem differently, permitting a domestic parent to include all foreign taxes paid in its 902 calculation but also requiring the parent to treat such taxes as a deemed dividend from its subsidiary. The amendment thus requires domestic parents to "gross up" the dividend income they receive by the amount of the foreign taxes attributable to such income. See S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 69 (1962). The Senate Report, describing the purpose of the amendment as removing an "unjustified tax advantage" for domestic parents, illustrates how foreign subsidiaries and foreign branches are treated unequally absent the "grossing up" requirement, even under the American Chicle rule. S. Rep. No. 1881, supra, at 66-67. </s> [493 U.S. 132, 146]

United States Supreme Court AVERY v. MIDLAND COUNTY(1968) No. 39 Argued: November 14, 1967Decided: April 1, 1968 </s> The Midland County, Texas, Commissioners Court is the governing body for that county, and like other such bodies is established by the State's Constitution and statutes. It consists of five members - a County Judge, elected at large from the entire county, and four commissioners, one elected from each of the four districts (precincts) into which the county is divided. Commissioners courts exercise broad governmental functions in the counties including the setting of tax rates, equalization of assessments, issuance of bonds, and allocation of funds; and they have wide discretion over expenditures. One district of Midland County, which includes almost all the City of Midland, had a population of 67,906, according to 1963 estimates. The others, all rural areas, had populations respectively, of about 852; 414; and 828. In this action challenging the County's districting petitioner alleged that the gross disparity in population distribution among the four districts violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Three of the four commissioners testified at trial that population was not a major factor in the districting process. The trial court ruled for petitioner that each district under the State's constitutional apportionment standard should have "substantially the same number of people." An intermediate appellate court reversed. The State Supreme Court reversed that judgment, holding that under the Federal and State Constitutions the districting scheme was impermissible "for the reasons stated by the trial court." It held, however, that the work actually done by the County Commissioners "disproportionately concerns the rural areas" and that such factors as "number of qualified voters, land areas, geography, miles of county roads, and taxable values" could justify apportionment otherwise than on a basis of substantially equal populations. Held: Local units with general governmental powers over an entire geographic area may not, consistently with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, be apportioned among single-member districts of substantially unequal population. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Pp. 478-486. [390 U.S. 474, 475] </s> (a) The Equal Protection Clause reaches the exercise of state power, whether exercised by the State or a political subdivision. P. 479. </s> (b) Although the state legislature may itself be properly apportioned the Fourteenth Amendment requires that citizens not be denied equal representation in political subdivisions which also have broad policy-making functions. P. 481. </s> (c) The commissioners court performs some functions normally thought of as "legislative," and others typically characterized in other terms; but, regardless of the labels, this body has the power to make a large number of decisions having a broad impact on all the citizens of the county. Pp. 482-483. </s> (d) Though the Midland County Commissioners may concentrate their attention on rural roads, their decisions also affect citizens in the City of Midland. P. 484. </s> 406 S. W. 2d 422, vacated and remanded. </s> Lyndon L. Olson argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. </s> W. B. Browder, Jr., and F. H. Pannill argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. </s> Francis X. Beytagh, Jr., by special leave of Court, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Spritzer and Assistant Attorney General Doar. </s> Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General, and Daniel M. Cohen and Robert W. Imrie, Assistant Attorneys General, filed a brief for the State of New York, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Petitioner, a taxpayer and voter in Midland County, Texas, sought a determination by this Court that the Texas Supreme Court erred in concluding that selection of the Midland County Commissioners Court from single-member districts of substantially unequal population did [390 U.S. 474, 476] not necessarily violate the Fourteenth Amendment. We granted review, 388 U.S. 905 (1967), because application of the one man, one vote principle of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), to units of local government is of broad public importance. We hold that petitioner, as a resident of Midland County, has a right to a vote for the Commissioners Court of substantially equal weight to the vote of every other resident. </s> Midland County has a population of about 70,000. The Commissioners Court is composed of five members. One, the County Judge, is elected at large from the entire county, and in practice casts a vote only to break a tie. The other four are Commissioners chosen from districts. The population of those districts, according to the 1963 estimates that were relied upon when this case was tried, was respectively 67,906; 852; 414; and 828. This vast imbalance resulted from placing in a single district virtually the entire city of Midland, Midland County's only urban center, in which 95% of the county's population resides. </s> The Commissioners Court is assigned by the Texas Constitution and by various statutory enactments with a variety of functions. According to the commentary to Vernon's Texas Statutes, the court: </s> "is the general governing body of the county. It establishes a courthouse and jail, appoints numerous minor officials such as the county health officer, fills vacancies in the county offices, lets contracts in the name of the county, builds roads and bridges, administers the county's public welfare services, performs numerous duties in regard to elections, sets the county tax rate, issues bonds, adopts the county budget, and serves as a board of equalization for tax assessments." 1 </s> [390 U.S. 474, 477] </s> The court is also authorized, among other responsibilities, to build and run a hospital, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 4492 (1966), an airport, id., Art. 2351 (1964), and libraries, id., Art. 1677 (1962). It fixes boundaries of school districts within the county, id., Art. 2766 (1965), may establish a regional public housing authority, id., Art. 1269k, 23a (1963), and determines the districts for election of its own members, Tex. Const., Art. V, 18. </s> Petitioner sued the Commissioners Court and its members in the Midland County District Court, alleging that the disparity in district population violated the Fourteenth Amendment and that he had standing as a resident, taxpayer, and voter in the district with the largest population. Three of the four commissioners testified at the trial, all telling the court (as indeed the population statistics for the established districts demonstrated) that population was not a major factor in the districting process. The trial court ruled for petitioner. It made no explicit reference to the Fourteenth Amendment, but said the apportionment plan in effect was not "for the convenience of the people," the apportionment standard established by Art. V, 18, of the Texas Constitution. The court ordered the defendant commissioners to adopt a new plan in which each precinct would have "substantially the same number of people." </s> The Texas Court of Civil Appeals reversed the judgment of the District Court and entered judgment for the respondents, 397 S. W. 2d 919 (1965). It held that neither federal nor state law created a requirement that Texas county commissioners courts be districted according to population. [390 U.S. 474, 478] </s> The Texas Supreme Court reversed the Court of Civil Appeals, 406 S. W. 2d 422 (1966). It held that under "the requirements of the Texas and the United States Constitutions" the present districting scheme was impermissible "for the reasons stated by the trial court." 406 S. W. 2d, at 425. However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court's conclusion that precincts must have substantially equal populations, stating that such factors as "number of qualified voters, land areas, geography, miles of county roads and taxable values" could be considered. 406 S. W. 2d, at 428. It also decreed that no Texas courts could redistrict the Commissioners Court. "This is the responsibility of the commissioners court and is to be accomplished within the constitutional boundaries we have sought to delineate." 406 S. W. 2d, at 428-429. 2 </s> In Reynolds v. Sims, supra, the Equal Protection Clause was applied to the apportionment of state legislatures. Every qualified resident, Reynolds determined, has the right to a ballot for election of state legislators of equal weight to the vote of every other resident, and that right is infringed when legislators are elected from districts of substantially unequal population. The question now before us is whether the Fourteenth Amendment likewise forbids the election of local government officials from districts of disparate population. As has [390 U.S. 474, 479] almost every court which has addressed itself to this question, 3 we hold that it does. 4 </s> The Equal Protection Clause reaches the exercise of state power however manifested, whether exercised directly or through subdivisions of the State. </s> "Thus the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to all action of the State denying [390 U.S. 474, 480] equal protection of the laws; whatever the agency of the State taking the action . . . ." Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958). </s> Although the forms and functions of local government and the relationships among the various units are matters of state concern, it is now beyond question that a State's political subdivisions must comply with the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 The actions of local government are the actions of the State. A city, town, or county may no more deny the equal protection of the laws than it may abridge freedom of speech, establish an official religion, arrest without probable cause, or deny due process of law. </s> When the State apportions its legislature, it must have due regard for the Equal Protection Clause. Similarly, when the State delegates lawmaking power to local government and provides for the election of local officials from districts specified by statute, ordinance, or local charter, it must insure that those qualified to vote have the right to an equally effective voice in the election process. If voters residing in oversize districts are denied their constitutional right to participate in the election of state legislators, precisely the same kind of deprivation occurs when the members of a city council, school board, or county governing board are elected from districts of substantially unequal population. If the five senators representing a city in the state legislature may not be elected from districts ranging in size from 50,000 to 500,000, neither is it permissible to elect the members of the city council from those same districts. In either case, the votes of some residents have greater weight [390 U.S. 474, 481] than those of others; in both cases the equal protection of the laws has been denied. </s> That the state legislature may itself be properly apportioned does not exempt subdivisions from the Fourteenth Amendment. While state legislatures exercise extensive power over their constituents and over the various units of local government, the States universally leave much policy and decisionmaking to their governmental subdivisions. Legislators enact many laws but do not attempt to reach those countless matters of local concern necessarily left wholly or partly to those who govern at the local level. What is more, in providing for the governments of their cities, counties, towns, and districts, the States characteristically provide for representative government - for decisionmaking at the local level by representatives elected by the people. And, not infrequently, the delegation of power to local units is contained in constitutional provisions for local home rule which are immune from legislative interference. In a word, institutions of local government have always been a major aspect of our system, and their responsible and responsive operation is today of increasing importance to the quality of life of more and more of our citizens. We therefore see little difference, in terms of the application of the Equal Protection Clause and of the principles of Reynolds v. Sims, between the exercise of state power through legislatures and its exercise by elected officials in the cities, towns, and counties. 6 </s> [390 U.S. 474, 482] </s> We are urged to permit unequal districts for the Midland County Commissioners Court on the ground that the court's functions are not sufficiently "legislative." The parties have devoted much effort to urging that alternative labels - "administrative" versus "legislative" - be applied to the Commissioners Court. As the brief description of the court's functions above amply demonstrates, this unit of local government cannot easily be classified in the neat categories favored by civics texts. The Texas commissioners courts are assigned some tasks which would normally be thought of as "legislative," others typically assigned to "executive" or "administrative" departments, and still others which are "judicial." In this regard Midland County's Commissioners Court is representative of most of the general governing bodies of American cities, counties, towns, and villages. 7 One knowledgeable commentator has written of "the states' varied, pragmatic approach in establishing governments." R. Wood, in Politics and Government in the United States 891-892 (A. Westin ed. 1965). That approach has [390 U.S. 474, 483] produced a staggering number of governmental units - the preliminary calculation by the Bureau of the Census for 1967 is that there are 81,304 "units of government" in the United States 8 - and an even more staggering diversity. Nonetheless, while special-purpose organizations abound and in many States the allocation of functions among units results in instances of overlap and vacuum, virtually every American lives within what he and his neighbors regard as a unit of local government with general responsibility and power for local affairs. In many cases citizens reside within and are subject to two such governments, a city and a county. </s> The Midland County Commissioners Court is such a unit. While the Texas Supreme Court found that the Commissioners Court's legislative functions are "negligible," 406 S. W. 2d, at 426, the court does have power to make a large number of decisions having a broad range of impacts on all the citizens of the county. It sets a tax rate, equalizes assessments, and issues bonds. It then prepares and adopts a budget for allocating the county's funds, and is given by statute a wide range of discretion in choosing the subjects on which to spend. In adopting the budget the court makes both long-term judgments about the way Midland County should develop - whether industry should be solicited, roads improved, recreation facilities built, and land set aside for schools - and immediate choices among competing needs. </s> The Texas Supreme Court concluded that the work actually done by the Commissioners Court "disproportionately concern[s] the rural areas," 406 S. W. 2d, at 428. Were the Commissioners Court a special-purpose unit of government assigned the performance of functions [390 U.S. 474, 484] affecting definable groups of constituents more than other constituents, we would have to confront the question whether such a body may be apportioned in ways which give greater influence to the citizens most affected by the organization's functions. That question, however, is not presented by this case, for while Midland County authorities may concentrate their attention on rural roads, the relevant fact is that the powers of the Commissioners Court include the authority to make a substantial number of decisions that affect all citizens, whether they reside inside or outside the city limits of Midland. The Commissioners maintain buildings, administer welfare services, and determine school districts both inside and outside the city. The taxes imposed by the court fall equally on all property in the county. Indeed, it may not be mere coincidence that a body apportioned with three of its four voting members chosen by residents of the rural area surrounding the city devotes most of its attention to the problems of that area, while paying for its expenditures with a tax imposed equally on city residents and those who live outside the city. And we might point out that a decision not to exercise a function within the court's power - a decision, for example, not to build an airport or a library, or not to participate in the federal food stamp program - is just as much a decision affecting all citizens of the county as an affirmative decision. </s> The Equal Protection Clause does not, of course, require that the State never distinguish between citizens, but only that the distinctions that are made not be arbitrary or invidious. The conclusion of Reynolds v. Sims was that bases other than population were not acceptable grounds for distinguishing among citizens when determining the size of districts used to elect members of state legislatures. We hold today only that the Constitution [390 U.S. 474, 485] permits no substantial variation from equal population in drawing districts for units of local government having general governmental powers over the entire geographic area served by the body. </s> This Court is aware of the immense pressures facing units of local government, and of the greatly varying problems with which they must deal. The Constitution does not require that a uniform straitjacket bind citizens in devising mechanisms of local government suitable for local needs and efficient in solving local problems. Last Term, for example, the Court upheld a procedure for choosing a school board that placed the selection with school boards of component districts even though the component boards had equal votes and served unequal populations. Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105 (1967). The Court rested on the administrative nature of the area school board's functions and the essentially appointive form of the scheme employed. In Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967), the Court permitted Virginia Beach to choose its legislative body by a scheme that included at-large voting for candidates, some of whom had to be residents of particular districts, even though the residence districts varied widely in population. </s> The Sailors and Dusch cases demonstrate that the Constitution and this Court are not roadblocks in the path of innovation, experiment, and development among units of local government. We will not bar what Professor Wood has called "the emergence of a new ideology and structure of public bodies, equipped with new capacities and motivations . . . ." R. Wood, 1400 Governments, at 175 (1961). Our decision today is only that the Constitution imposes one ground rule for the development of arrangements of local government: a requirement that units with general governmental powers over an entire [390 U.S. 474, 486] geographic area not be apportioned among single-member districts of substantially unequal population. </s> The judgment below is vacated and the case is remanded for disposition not inconsistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Interpretive Commentary, Vernon's Ann. Tex. Const., Art. V, 18 (1955). See also W. Benton, Texas: Its Government and [390 U.S. 474, 477] Politics 360-370 (1966); Municipal and County Government (J. Claunch ed. 1961); C. McCleskey, The Government and Politics of Texas (1966). </s> [Footnote 2 The Texas Supreme Court determined that neither the State nor the Federal Constitution requires that population be the sole basis for apportioning the Midland County Commissioners Court. There is therefore no independent state ground for the refusal to award the relief requested by petitioner. And since the Supreme Court opinion contemplated no further proceedings in the lower Texas courts, a "final judgment" that population does not govern the apportionment of the Commissioners Court is before us. See Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555 (1963); Construction Laborers v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1963); Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120 (1945). </s> [Footnote 3 Cases in which the highest state courts applied the principles of Reynold v. Sims to units of local government include Miller v. Board of Supervisors, 63 Cal. 2d 343, 405 P.2d 857, 46 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1965); Montgomery County Council v. Garrott, 243 Md. 634, 222 A. 2d 164 (1966); Hanlon v. Towey, 274 Minn. 187, 142 N. W. 2d 741 (1966); Armentrout v. Schooler, 409 S. W. 2d 138 (Mo. 1966); Seaman v. Fedourich, 16 N. Y. 2d 94, 209 N. E. 2d 778, 262 N. Y. S. 2d 444 (1965); Bailey v. Jones, 81 S. D. 617, 139 N. W. 2d 385 (1966); State ex rel. Sonneborn v. Sylvester, 26 Wis. 2d 43, 132 N. W. 2d 249 (1965). Newbold v. Osser, 425 Pa. 478, 230 A. 2d 54 (1967), seemed to assume application of Reynolds. In opposition to these cases are only the decision of the Texas Supreme Court in the case before us and Brouwer v. Bronkema, 377 Mich. 616, 141 N. W. 2d 98 (1966), in which the eight justices of the Michigan Supreme Court divided evenly on the question. Among the many federal court cases applying Reynolds v. Sims to local government are Hyden v. Baker, 286 F. Supp. 475 (D.C. M. D. Tenn. 1968); Martinolich v. Dean, 256 F. Supp. 612 (D.C. S. D. Miss. 1966); Strickland v. Burns, 256 F. Supp. 824 (D.C. M. D. Tenn. 1966); Ellis v. Mayor of Baltimore, 234 F. Supp. 945 (D.C. Md. 1964), affirmed and remanded, 352 F.2d 123 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1965). </s> [Footnote 4 A precedent frequently cited in opposition to this conclusion is Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors, 43 So.2d 514 (La. Ct. App. 1949), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 339 U.S. 940 (1950). Petitioner points out that the Equal Protection Clause was not invoked in Tedesco, where the districting of the New Orleans City Council was challenged under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. A more realistic answer is that Tedesco, decided 12 years before Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), has been severely undermined by Baker and the succeeding apportionment cases. See, among the great many cases so concluding, Delozier v. Tyrone Area School Bd., 247 F. Supp. 30 (D.C. W. D. Pa. 1965). </s> [Footnote 5 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958); see, e. g., See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). </s> [Footnote 6 Inequitable apportionment of local governing bodies offends the Constitution even if adopted by a properly apportioned legislature representing the majority of the State's citizens. The majority of a State - by constitutional provision, by referendum, or through accurately apportioned representatives - can no more place a minority in oversize districts without depriving that minority of equal protection of the laws than they can deprive the minority of the ballot altogether, or impose upon them a tax rate in excess of that [390 U.S. 474, 482] to be paid by equally situated members of the majority. Government - National, State, and local - must grant to each citizen the equal protection of its laws, which includes an equal opportunity to influence the election of lawmakers, no matter how large the majority wishing to deprive other citizens of equal treatment or how small the minority who object to their mistreatment. Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964), stands as a square adjudication by this Court of these principles. </s> [Footnote 7 Midland County is apparently untypical in choosing the members of its local governing body from districts. "On the basis of available figures, coupled with rough estimates from samplings made of the situations in various States, it appears that only about 25 percent of . . . local government governing boards are elected, in whole or in part, from districts or, while at large, under schemes including district residence requirements." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 22, n. 31, filed in Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105 (1967), and the other 1966 Term local reapportionment cases. </s> [Footnote 8 U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments 1967, Governmental Units in 1967, at 1 (prelim. rept. Oct. 1967). </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting. </s> I could not disagree more with this decision, which wholly disregards statutory limitations upon the appellate jurisdiction of this Court in state cases and again betrays such insensitivity to the appropriate dividing lines between the judicial and political functions under our constitutional system. </s> I. </s> I believe that this Court lacks jurisdiction over this case because, properly analyzed, the Texas judgment must be seen either to rest on an adequate state ground or to be wanting in "finality." The history of the Texas proceedings, as related in the Court's opinion, ante, at 477-478, clearly reveals that the decision of the Texas Supreme Court disallowing the present county apportionment scheme rests upon a state as well as a federal ground. The state ground - Art. V, 18, of the Texas Constitution - was clearly adequate to support the result. This should suffice to defeat the exercise of this Court's jurisdiction. See, e. g., Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194 ; Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 -126. </s> Nor does this Court have jurisdiction to review the Texas Supreme Court's statement that in reapportioning the county in the future the county commissioners may take into account factors other than population. That [390 U.S. 474, 487] holding obviously does not amount to a "[f]inal judgment" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1257. 1 The traditional test of finality of state court judgments has been whether the judgment leaves more than a ministerial act to be done. See, e. g., Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 345 U.S. 379, 382 ; Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 68 . It is clear that the acts which must be performed in order to bring about a new apportionment of Midland County are very far from ministerial in character, and conceivably might even result in satisfying petitioner's demands without further litigation. For example, since the statement of the Texas Supreme Court regarding nonpopulation factors was merely advisory and not mandatory, the county commissioners might choose to reapportion the county solely on the basis of population, thus leaving petitioner with nothing about which to complain. Since the requirement of finality is an unwaivable condition of this Court's jurisdiction, see, e. g., Market St. R. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 324 U.S. 548, 551 , I consider that this case is not properly before us. </s> On these scores, I would dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. </s> II. </s> On the merits, which I reach only because the Court has done so, I consider this decision, which extends the state apportionment rule of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 , to an estimated 80,000 units of local government throughout the land, both unjustifiable and ill-advised. </s> I continue to think that these adventures of the Court in the realm of political science are beyond its constitutional powers, for reasons set forth at length in my dissenting opinion in Reynolds, 377 U.S., at 589 et seq. [390 U.S. 474, 488] However, now that the Court has decided otherwise, judicial self-discipline requires me to follow the political dogma now constitutionally embedded in consequence of that decision. I am not foreclosed, however, from remonstrating against the extension of that decision to new areas of government. At the present juncture I content myself with stating two propositions which, in my view, stand strongly against what is done today. The first is that the "practical necessities" which have been thought by some to justify the profound break with history that was made in 1962 by this Court's decision in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 , 2 are not present here. The second is that notwithstanding Reynolds the "one man, one vote" ideology does not provide an acceptable formula for structuring local governmental units. </s> A. </s> The argument most generally heard for justifying the entry of the federal courts into the field of state legislative apportionment is that since state legislatures had widely failed to correct serious malapportionments in their own structure, and since no other means of redress had proved available through the political process, this Court was entitled to step into the picture. 3 While I continue to reject that thesis as furnishing an excuse for the federal judiciary's straying outside its proper constitutional role, and while I continue to believe that it bodes ill for the country and the entire federal judicial system if this Court does not firmly set its face against this loose [390 U.S. 474, 489] and short-sighted point of view, the important thing for present purposes is that no such justification can be brought to bear in this instance. </s> No claim is made in this case that avenues of political redress are not open to correct any malapportionment in elective local governmental units, and it is difficult to envisage how such a situation could arise. Local governments are creatures of the States, and they may be reformed either by the state legislatures, which are now required to be apportioned according to Reynolds, or by amendment of state constitutions. 4 In these circumstances, the argument of practical necessity has no force. The Court, then, should withhold its hand until such a supposed necessity does arise, before intruding itself into the business of restructuring local governments across the country. </s> There is another reason why the Court should at least wait for a suitable period before applying the Reynolds dogma to local governments. The administrative feasibility of judicial application of the "one man, one vote" rule to the apportionment even of state legislatures has not yet been demonstrated. A number of significant administrative questions remain unanswered, 5 and the burden on the federal courts has been substantial. When [390 U.S. 474, 490] this has thus far been the outcome of applying the rule to 50 state legislatures, it seems most unwise at this time to extend it to some 80,000 units of local government, whose bewildering variety is sure to multiply the problems which have already arisen and to cast further burdens, of imponderable dimension, on the federal courts. I am frankly astonished at the ease with which the Court has proceeded to fasten upon the entire country at its lowest political levels the strong arm of the federal judiciary, let alone a particular political ideology which has been the subject of wide debate and differences from the beginnings of our Nation. 6 </s> B. </s> There are also convincing functional reasons why the Reynolds rule should not apply to local governmental units at all. The effect of Reynolds was to read a long debated political theory - that the only permissible basis for the selection of state legislators is election by majority vote within areas which are themselves equal in population - into the United States Constitution, thereby foreclosing the States from experimenting with legislatures rationally formed in other ways. Even assuming that this result could be justified on the state level, because of the substantial identity in form and function of the state legislatures, and because of the asserted practical necessities for federal judicial interference referred to above, the "one man, one vote" theory is surely a hazardous generalization on the local level. As has been noted previously, no "practical necessity" has been asserted to justify application of the rule to local governments. More important, the greater and more varied range of functions performed by local governmental units implies that flexibility in the form of their structure is [390 U.S. 474, 491] even more important than at the state level, and that by depriving local governments of this needed adaptability the Court's holding may indeed defeat the very goals of Reynolds. </s> The present case affords one example of why the "one man, one vote" rule is especially inappropriate for local governmental units. The Texas Supreme Court held as a matter of Texas law: </s> "Theoretically, the commissioners court is the governing body of the county and the commissioners represent all the residents, both urban and rural, of the county. But developments during the years have greatly narrowed the scope of the functions of the commissioners court and limited its major responsibilities to the nonurban areas of the county. It has come to pass that the city government . . . is the major concern of the city dwellers and the administration of the affairs of the county is the major concern of the rural dwellers." 406 S. W. 2d 422, 428. </s> Despite the specialized role of the commissioners court, the majority has undertaken to bring it within the ambit of Reynolds simply by classifying it as "a unit of local government with general responsibility and power for local affairs." See ante, at 483. Although this approach is intended to afford "equal protection" to all voters in Midland County, it would seem that it in fact discriminates against the county's rural inhabitants. The commissioners court, as found by the Texas Supreme Court, performs more functions in the area of the county outside Midland City than it does within the city limits. Therefore, each rural resident has a greater interest in its activities than each city dweller. Yet under the majority's formula the urban residents are to have a dominant voice in the county government, precisely proportional to their numbers, and little or no allowance may be made [390 U.S. 474, 492] for the greater stake of the rural inhabitants in the county government. </s> This problem is not a trivial one and is not confined to Midland County. It stems from the fact that local governments, unlike state governments, are often specialized in function. 7 Application of the Reynolds rule to such local governments prevents the adoption of apportionments which take into account the effect of this specialization, and therefore may result in a denial of equal treatment to those upon whom the exercise of the special powers has unequal impact. Under today's decision, the only apparent alternative is to classify the governmental unit as other than "general" in power and responsibility, thereby, presumably, avoiding application of the Reynolds rule. Neither outcome satisfies Reynolds' avowed purpose: to assure "equality" to all voters. The result also deprives localities of the desirable option of establishing slightly specialized, elective units of government, such as Texas' county commissioners court, and varying the size of the constituencies so as rationally to favor those whom the government affects most. The majority has chosen explicitly to deny local governments this alternative by rejecting even the solution of the Texas Supreme Court, which held that the present county apportionment was impermissible but would have allowed the new apportionment to reflect factors related to the special functions of the county commissioners court, such as "land areas, geography, miles of county roads and taxable values," 406 S. W. 2d, at 428, as well as population. </s> Despite the majority's declaration that it is not imposing a "straitjacket" on local governmental units, see ante, at 485, its solution is likely to have other undesirable [390 U.S. 474, 493] "freezing" effects on local government. One readily foreseeable example is in the crucial field of metropolitan government. A common pattern of development in the Nation's urban areas has been for the less affluent citizens to migrate to or remain within the central city, while the more wealthy move to the suburbs and come into the city only to work. 8 The result has been to impose a relatively heavier tax burden upon city taxpayers and to fragmentize governmental services in the metropolitan area. 9 An oft-proposed solution to these problems has been the institution of an integrated government encompassing the entire metropolitan area. 10 In many instances, the suburbs may be included in such a metropolitan unit only by majority vote of the voters in each suburb. 11 As a practical matter, the suburbanites often will be reluctant to join the metropolitan government unless they receive a share in the government proportional to the benefits they bring with them and not [390 U.S. 474, 494] merely to their numbers. 12 The city dwellers may be ready to concede this much, in return for the ability to tax the suburbs. Under the majority's pronouncements, however, this rational compromise would be forbidden: the metropolitan government must be apportioned solely on the basis of population if it is a "general" government. </s> These functional considerations reinforce my belief that the "one man, one vote" rule, which possesses the simplistic defects inherent in any judicially imposed solution of a complex social problem, 13 is entirely inappropriate for determining the form of the country's local governments. </s> No better demonstration of this proposition could have been made than that afforded by the admirable analysis contained in the dissenting opinion of my Brother FORTAS. But, with respect, my Brother's projected solution of the matter is no less unsatisfactory. For it would bid fair to plunge this Court into an avalanche of local reapportionment cases with no firmer constitutional anchors than its own notions of what constitutes "equal protection" in any given instance. </s> With deference, I think that the only sure-footed way of avoiding, on the one hand, the inequities inherent in today's decision, and on the other, the morass of pitfalls that would follow from my Brother FORTAS' approach, is for this Court to decline to extend the constitutional experiment of Reynolds, and to leave the structuring of local governmental units to the political process where it belongs. </s> [Footnote 1 28 U.S.C. 1257 provides: "Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows . . . ." </s> [Footnote 2 The magnitude of this break was irrefutably demonstrated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion in Baker, 369 U.S., at 266 , 300-323. </s> [Footnote 3 See the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Clark in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 251 , 258-259; Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote - One Vote, One Value, 1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 68-70. </s> [Footnote 4 See, e. g., United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, State Constitutional and Statutory Restrictions Upon the Structural, Functional, and Personnel Powers of Local Government 23-61 (1962); Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment Decisions on Counties and Other Forms of Municipal Government, 65 Col. L. Rev. 21, 23, n. 9 (1965). </s> [Footnote 5 One such question is the extent to which an apportionment may take into account population changes which occur between decennial censuses. Cf. Lucas v. Rhodes, 389 U.S. 212 (dissenting opinion of this writer). Another is the degree of population variation which is constitutionally permissible. See Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 ; cf. Rockefeller v. Wells, 389 U.S. 421 (dissenting opinion of this writer). </s> [Footnote 6 See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266 , 300-324. </s> [Footnote 7 See generally W. Anderson & E. Weidner, State and Local Government 85-103 (1951). </s> [Footnote 8 See, e. g., W. Anderson & E. Weidner, supra, at 171-174; United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations for use of House Committee on Government Operations, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., Governmental Structure, Organization, and Planning in Metropolitan Areas 7 (Comm. Print 1961). </s> [Footnote 9 See, e. g., United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Alternative Approaches to Governmental Reorganization in Metropolitan Areas 8-9 (1962); United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations for use of House Committee on Government Operations, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., Governmental Structure, Organization, and Planning in Metropolitan Areas 15-16 (Comm. Print 1961). </s> [Footnote 10 See, e. g., W. Anderson & E. Weidner, supra, at 174-179; United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Alternative Approaches to Governmental Reorganization in Metropolitan Areas (1962). </s> [Footnote 11 See, e. g., United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, State Constitutional and Statutory Restrictions Upon the Structural, Functional, and Personnel Powers of Local Government 38, 44-53 (1962). </s> [Footnote 12 See Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment Decisions on Counties and Other Forms of Municipal Government, 65 Col. L. Rev. 21, 37 and n. 67 (1965); cf. United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Factors Affecting Voter Reactions to Governmental Reorganization in Metropolitan Areas 26-27 (1962). </s> [Footnote 13 Cf. H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process 662-669 (tent. ed. 1958). [390 U.S. 474, 495] </s> MR. JUSTICE FORTAS, dissenting. </s> I would dismiss the writ in this case as improvidently granted. The Texas Supreme Court held the districting scheme unlawful under the Texas Constitution. It ordered redistricting. In this difficult and delicate area I would await the result of the redistricting so that we may pass upon the final product of Texas' exercise of its governmental powers, in terms of our constitutional responsibility, and not upon a scheme which Texas itself has invalidated. 1 </s> The Court's opinion argues (ante, at 478, n. 2) that the Texas Supreme Court's order is a final judgment because it contemplates no further proceedings in the Texas courts, although it holds the present districting unlawful and requires the Commissioners Court to redistrict. I do not reach this point. </s> The Court acts now to superimpose its own formula because it disagrees with the standard for redistricting that the Texas Supreme Court states. That standard directed redistricting on the basis of the "number of qualified voters, land areas, geography, miles of county roads and taxable values." 406 S. W. 2d 422, 428. This standard may or may not produce a result which this Court or I would find constitutionally acceptable. We cannot know in advance how the melange of factors stated by the Texas court would emerge from the mixing machine of the Texas authorities who would deal with the problem. It is clear that the extreme imbalance now prevailing would be eliminated, because the Texas Supreme Court has held it unconstitutional. It might be [390 U.S. 474, 496] that the substitute finally worked out would be such that a majority of this Court would not reject it as a denial of equal protection of the laws. After all, at the last Term of this Court, we accepted as passing the scrutiny of the Constitution, the less-than-mathematically perfect plans in Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967), and Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105 (1967). </s> The Court, however, now plunges to adjudication of the case of Midland County, Texas, in midstream, apparently because it rejects any result that might emerge which deviates from the literal thrust of one man, one vote. Since it now adopts this simplistic approach, apparently the majority believes that it might as well say so and save Texas the labor of devising an answer. </s> I am in fundamental disagreement. I believe, as I shall discuss, that in the circumstances of this case equal protection of the laws may be achieved - and perhaps can only be achieved - by a system which takes into account a complex of values and factors, and not merely the arithmetic simplicity of one equals one. Dusch and Sailors were wisely and prudently decided. They reflect a reasoned, conservative, empirical approach to the intricate problem of applying constitutional principle to the complexities of local government. I know of no reason why we now abandon this reasonable and moderate approach to the problem of local suffrage and adopt an absolute and inflexible formula which is potentially destructive of important political and social values. There is no reason why we should insist that there is and can be only one rule for voters in local governmental units - that districts for units of local government must be drawn solely on the basis of population. I believe there are powerful reasons why, while insisting upon reasonable regard for the population-suffrage ratio, we should reject a rigid, theoretical, and authoritarian approach to the [390 U.S. 474, 497] problems of local government. In this complex and involved area, we should be careful and conservative in our application of constitutional imperatives, for they are powerful. </s> Constitutional commandments are not surgical instruments. They have a tendency to hack deeply - to amputate. And while I have no doubt that, with the growth of suburbia and exurbia, the problem of allocating local government functions and benefits urgently requires attention, I am persuaded that it does not call for the hatchet of one man, one vote. It is our duty to insist upon due regard for the value of the individual vote but not to ignore realities or to bypass the alternatives that legislative alternation might provide. </s> I. </s> I agree that application of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, decreed by this Court in the case of state legislatures, cannot stop at that point. Of course local governmental units are subject to the commands of the Equal Protection Clause. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958). That much is easy. The difficult question, and the one which the Court slights, is: What does the Equal Protection Clause demand with regard to local governmental units? </s> Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), stands for the general proposition that the debasement of the right to vote through malapportionment is offensive to the Equal Protection Clause. It holds that where the allegedly debased vote relates to the State Legislature, a judicial remedy is available to adjudicate a claim of such debasement, and that, subject to some permissible deviation, the remedy is to require reapportionment on a population basis. Although the Court's opinion carefully emphasizes the appropriateness of allowing latitude to meet local and special conditions, 377 U.S., at 577 -581, its insistence [390 U.S. 474, 498] upon the need for general correspondence of voting rights to population has come to be called the one man, one vote rule. 2 </s> This rule is appropriate to the selection of members of a State Legislature. The people of a State are similarly affected by the action of the State Legislature. Its functions are comprehensive and pervasive. They are not specially concentrated upon the needs of particular parts of the State or any separate group of citizens. As the Court in Reynolds said, each citizen stands in "the same relation" to the State Legislature. Accordingly, variations from substantial population equality in elections for the State Legislature take away from the individual voter the equality which the Constitution mandates. They amount to a debasement of the citizen's vote and of his citizenship. 3 </s> But the same cannot be said of all local governmental units, and certainly not of the unit involved in this case. [390 U.S. 474, 499] Midland County's Commissioners Court has special functions - directed primarily to its rural area and rural population. Its powers are limited and specialized, in light of its missions. Residents of Midland County do not by any means have the same rights and interests at stake in the election of the Commissioners. Equal protection of their rights may certainly take into account the reality of the rights and interests of the various segments of the voting population. It does not require that they all be treated alike, regardless of the stark difference in the impact of the Commissioners Court upon them. "Equal protection" relates to the substance of citizens' rights and interests. It demands protection adapted to substance; it does not insist upon, or even permit, prescription by arbitrary formula which wrongly assumes that the interests of all citizens in the elected body are the same. </s> In my judgment, the Court departs from Reynolds when it holds, broadly and generally, that "the Fourteenth Amendment . . . forbids the election of local government officials from districts of disparate population." Ante, at 478. This holding, literally applied as the Court commands, completely ignores the complexities of local government in the United States - complexities which, Reynolds itself states, demand latitude of prescription. The simplicity of the Court's ruling today does not comport with the lack of simplicity which characterizes the miscellany which constitutes our local governments. </s> II. </s> As of the beginning of 1967, there were 81,253 units of local government in the United States. This figure includes 3,049 county governments, 18,051 municipal governments, 17,107 township governments, 21,782 school [390 U.S. 474, 500] districts, and 21,264 other special districts. 4 These units vary greatly in powers, structure, and function. The citizen is usually subject to several local governments with overlapping jurisdiction. </s> The Court in this case concedes that in a "special purpose unit of government," the rights of certain constituents may be more affected than the rights of others. It implies that the one man, one vote rule may not apply in such cases. See ante, at 483-484. But it says that we do not here have to confront the implications of such a situation. I do not agree. </s> I submit that the problem presented by many, perhaps most, county governments (and by Midland County in particular) is precisely the same as those arising from special-purpose units. The functions of many county governing boards, no less than the governing bodies of special-purpose units, have only slight impact on some of their constituents and a vast and direct impact on others. They affect different citizens residing within their geographical jurisdictions in drastically different ways. 5 </s> Study of county government leaves one with two clear impressions: that the variations from unit to unit are great; and that the role and structure of county government are currently in a state of flux. 6 County governments [390 U.S. 474, 501] differ in every significant way: number of constituents, area governed, 7 number of competing or overlapping government units within the county, 8 form, and means of selection of the governing board, 9 services provided, 10 the number and functions of independent county officials, 11 and sources of revenue. 12 </s> Some generalizations can be made about county governments. First, most counties today perform certain basic functions delegated by the State: assessment of property, collection of property taxes, recording of deeds and other documents, maintenance of rural roads, poor relief, law enforcement, and the administration of electoral and judicial functions. Some counties have begun to do more, especially by the assumption of municipal and policy-making functions. 13 But most counties still act largely as administrative instrumentalities of the State. 14 </s> Second, "[t]he absence of a single chief executive and diffusion of responsibility among numerous independently elected officials are general characteristics of county [390 U.S. 474, 502] government in the United States." 15 Those who have written on the subject have invariably pointed to the extensive powers exercised within the geographical region of the county by officials elected on a countywide basis and by special districts organized to perform specific tasks. Often these independent officials and organs perform crucial functions of great importance to all the people within the county. 16 </s> These generalizations apply with particular force in this case. The population of Midland County is chiefly in a single urban area. 17 That urban area has its own municipal government which, because of home rule, 18 has relative autonomy and authority to deal with urban problems. In contrast, the Midland County government, like county governments generally, acts primarily as an administrative arm of the State. It provides a convenient agency for the State to collect taxes, hold elections, administer judicial and peace-keeping functions, improve roads, and perform other functions which are the ordinary duties of the State. The powers of the Commissioners Court, which is the governing body of Midland County, are strictly limited by statute and constitutional provision. 19 Although a mere listing of [390 U.S. 474, 503] these authorizing statutes and constitutional provisions would seem to indicate that the Commissioners Court has significant and general power, this impression is somewhat illusory because very often the provisions which grant the power also circumscribe its exercise with detailed limitations. </s> For example, the petitioner cites Art. VIII, 9, of the Texas Constitution and Article 2352 of the Texas Civil Statutes as granting the Commissioners Court authority to levy taxes. Yet, at the time this suit was tried, Art. VIII, 9, provided that no county could levy a tax in excess of 80 on $100 property valuation. And Article 2352 allocated that 80 among the four "constitutional purposes" mentioned in Art. VIII, 9 (not more than 25 for general county purposes, not more than 15 for the jury fund, not more than 15 for roads and bridges, and not more than 25 for permanent improvements). 20 </s> Another example is the authority to issue bonds. It is true, as the majority notes, that the Commissioners Court does have this authority. Yet Title 22 of the Texas Civil Statutes sets up a detailed code concerning how and for what purposes bonds may be issued. Significantly, Article 701 provides that county bonds "shall never be issued for any purpose" unless the bond issue [390 U.S. 474, 504] has been submitted to the qualified property-taxpaying voters of the county. </s> More important than the statutory and constitutional limitations, the limited power and function of the Commissioners Court are reflected in what it actually does. The record and briefs do not give a complete picture of the workings of the Commissioners Court. But it is apparent that the Commissioners are primarily concerned with rural affairs, and more particularly with rural roads. One Commissioner testified below that the largest item in the county budget was for roads and bridges. 21 And, according to that Commissioner, the county does not maintain streets within the City of Midland. The Commissioners seem quite content to let the city council handle city affairs. "The thing about it is, the city of Midland has the city council and the mayor to run its business, . . . and we have a whole county to run . . . ." </s> As the Texas Supreme Court stated: </s> "Theoretically, the commissioners court is the governing body of the county and the commissioners represent all the residents, both urban and rural, of the county. But developments during the years have greatly narrowed the scope of the functions of the commissioners court and limited its major responsibilities to the nonurban areas of the county. It has come to pass that the city government with its legislative, executive and judicial branches, is the major concern of the city dwellers and the administration of the affairs of the county is the major concern of the rural dwellers." 406 S. W. 2d, at 428. </s> Moreover, even with regard to those areas specifically delegated to the county government by statute or constitutional provision, the Commissioners Court sometimes [390 U.S. 474, 505] does not have the power to make decisions. Within the county government there are numerous departments which are controlled by officials elected independently of the Commissioners Court and over whom the Commissioners Court does not exercise control. The Commissioners view themselves primarily as road commissioners. "The other department heads really have the say in that department. We merely approve the salary. We do not hire anyone in any department in Midland County except the road department. The department heads of the other departments do hire the employees." 22 </s> As the Texas Supreme Court stated, "the county commissioners court is not charged with the management and control of all of the county's business affairs . . . . [T]he various officials elected by all the voters of the county have spheres that are delegated to them by law and within which the commissioners court may not interfere or usurp." 406 S. W. 2d, at 428. These officials, elected on a direct, one man, one vote, countywide basis, include the Assessor and Collector of Taxes, the County Attorney, the Sheriff, the Treasurer, the County Clerk, and the County Surveyor. 23 The County Judge, who is the presiding officer of the Commissioners Court, is also elected on a countywide basis. 24 Other county officials and employees are appointed by the Commissioners Court. 25 </s> [390 U.S. 474, 506] </s> The elected officials are generally residents of the city, probably because of its preponderant vote. A Commissioner testified that "Every elected official . . . in Midland County today [except the three rural commissioners], and it has been way back for years, has been elected by the people that live here in the city limits of Midland." Another Commissioner testified that of about 150 employees of the county, only four of those who were not elected lived in the rural precincts. Of all the elected officials only the three rural commissioners lived outside the city limits. 26 And, as I have noted, the fifth member of the Commissioners Court, its Chairman, is the County Judge who is elected at large in the county. 27 It is apparent that the city people have much more control over the county government than the election of the Commissioners Court would indicate. Many of the county functions which most concern the city, for example, tax assessment and collection, are under the jurisdiction of officials elected by the county at large. 28 </s> [390 U.S. 474, 507] </s> In sum, the Commissioners Court's functions and powers are quite limited, and they are defined and restricted so that their primary and preponderant impact is on the rural areas and residents. The extent of its impact on the city is quite limited. To the extent that there is direct impact on the city, the relevant powers, in important respects, are placed in the hands of officials elected on a one man, one vote basis. Indeed, viewed in terms of the realities of rights and powers, it appears that the city residents have the power to elect the officials who are most important to them, and the rural residents have the electoral power with respect to the Commissioners Court which exercises powers in which they are primarily interested. </s> In face of this, to hold that "no substantial variation" from equal population may be allowed under the Equal Protection Clause is to ignore the substance of the rights and powers involved. It denies - it does not implement - substantive equality of voting rights. It is like insisting that each stockholder of a corporation have only one vote even though the stake of some may be $1 and the stake of others $1,000. The Constitution does not force such a result. Equal protection of the laws is not served by it. </s> Despite the fact, as I have shown, that many governmental powers in the county are exercised by officials elected at large and that the powers of the Commissioners Court are limited, the Court insists that the Commissioners Court is a unit with "general governmental powers." This simply is not so except in the most superficial sense. The Court is impressed by the fact that the jurisdiction of the Commissioners Court extends [390 U.S. 474, 508] over the entire area of the county. But this is more form than reality. </s> Substance, not shibboleth, should govern in this admittedly complex and subtle area; and the substance is that the geographical extent of the Commissioners Court is of very limited meaning. Midland County's Commissioners Court has its primary focus in nonurban areas and upon the nonurban people. True, the county's revenues come largely from the City of Midland. But the Commissioners Court fixes the tax rate subject to the specific limitations provided by the legislature. It must spend tax revenues in the categories and percentages which the legislature fixes. Taxes are assessed and collected, not by it, but by an official elected on a countywide basis. It is quite likely that if the city dwellers were given control of the Commissioners Court, they would reduce the load because it is spent primarily in the rural area. This is a state matter. If the State Legislature, in which presumably the city dwellers are fairly represented (Reynolds v. Sims), wishes to reduce the load, it may do so. But unless we are ready to adopt the position that the Federal Constitution forbids a State from taxing city dwellers to aid their rural neighbors, the fact that city dwellers pay most taxes should not determine the composition of the county governing body. We should not use tax impact as the sole or controlling basis for vote distribution. It is merely one in a number of factors, including the functional impact of the county government, which should be taken into account in determining whether a particular voting arrangement results in reasonable recognition of the rights and interests of citizens. Certainly, neither tax impact nor the relatively few services rendered within the City of Midland should compel the State to vest practically all voting power in the city residents to the [390 U.S. 474, 509] virtual denial of a voice to those who are dependent on the county government for roads, welfare, and other essential services. </s> III. </s> I have said that in my judgment we should not decide this case but should give Texas a chance to come up with an acceptable result. Texas' own courts hold that the present system is constitutionally intolerable. The 1963 population estimates relied upon in this case show that the district which includes most of the City of Midland with 67,906 people has one representative, and the three rural districts, each of which has its own representative, have 852; 414; and 828 people respectively. While it may be that this cannot be regarded as satisfying the Equal Protection Clause under any view, I suggest that applying the Court's formula merely errs in the opposite direction: Only the city population will be represented, and the rural areas will be eliminated from a voice in the county government to which they must look for essential services. With all respect, I submit that this is a destructive result. It kills the very value which it purports to serve. Texas should have a chance to devise a scheme which, within wide tolerance, eliminates the gross underrepresentation of the city, but at the same time provides an adequate, effective voice for the nonurban, as well as the urban, areas and peoples. 29 </s> [Footnote 1 The Texas Supreme Court noted that the Commissioners Court, and not Texas' judicial courts, has power to redistrict. This view may prove to be troublesome, but we are not bound to anticipate either that the Commissioners Court will not properly do the job or that Texas will not otherwise put its house in order in Midland County. </s> [Footnote 2 Reynolds v. Sims did not put the Equal Protection Clause to a radical or new use. Its holding is in the mainstream of our equal protection cases. Our cases hold that people who stand in the same relationship to their government cannot be treated differently by that government. To do so would be to mark them as inferior, "implying inferiority in civil society" (Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880)), or "inferiority as to their status in the community" (Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954)). It would be to treat them as if they were, somehow, less than people. </s> [Footnote 3 "Since legislatures are responsible for enacting laws by which all citizens are to be governed, they should be bodies which are collectively responsive to the popular will. And the concept of equal protection has been traditionally viewed as requiring the uniform treatment of persons standing in the same relation to the governmental action questioned or challenged. With respect to the allocation of legislative representation, all voters, as citizens of a State, stand in the same relation regardless of where they live. . . . To the extent that a citizen's right to vote is debased, he is that much less a citizen." 377 U.S., at 565 , 567. </s> [Footnote 4 U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments 1967, Governmental Units in 1967, at 1 (prelim. rept. Oct. 1967). </s> [Footnote 5 If these complexities do not exist in a given case (that is, if the functions of the governing unit involved have an essentially equal impact upon all the citizens within its geographical jurisdiction), then the one man, one vote rule would apply as it did in Reynolds. Some city councils, for example, are in effect miniature state legislatures. Some county governing units have geographical jurisdiction which is co-extensive with a city or which includes only reasonably homogeneous rural areas. </s> [Footnote 6 See C. Adrian, State and Local Governments 210-217 (1960); C. Snider, Local Government in Rural America 119-139 (1957) [390 U.S. 474, 501] (hereafter cited as Snider); International Union of Local Authorities, Local Government in the United States of America 13-14 (1961) (hereafter cited as Local Government); National Municipal League, Model County Charter xi-xxxviii (1956). See generally S. Duncombe, County Government in America (1966) (hereafter cited as Duncombe). </s> [Footnote 7 See Duncombe 3-5. </s> [Footnote 8 See U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments: 1962, Governmental Organization, Table 17. </s> [Footnote 9 See U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Governing Boards of County Governments: 1965. </s> [Footnote 10 See Duncombe 70-102. </s> [Footnote 11 See Duncombe 41-63. </s> [Footnote 12 See U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments: 1962, Finances of County Governments, Table 11. </s> [Footnote 13 See Duncombe 13-14. </s> [Footnote 14 See W. Anderson & E. Weidner, State and Local Government 30-31 (1951); Snider 131-134. </s> [Footnote 15 Local Government, at 14. </s> [Footnote 16 See, e. g., ibid.; Duncombe 41-63; Snider 44-45, 252-254. </s> [Footnote 17 In 1962 the population of Midland County was 67,717. More than 62,000 lived in the urban area governed by the municipal government. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments: 1962, Government Organization 186. </s> [Footnote 18 Tex. Const., Art. XI, 5; R. Young, The Place System in Texas Elections (Institute of Public Affairs, University of Texas, 1965) 38. </s> [Footnote 19 See W. Benton, Texas, Its Government and Politics 360-362 (1966) (hereafter cited as Benton); S. MacCorkle and D. Smith, Texas Government 339-340 (1964) (hereafter cited as MacCorkle); C. Patterson, S. McAlister, and G. Hester, State and Local Government in Texas 384-385, 388 (1961) (hereafter cited as Patterson); Municipal and County Government 113-114 (J. Claunch ed. 1961); F. Gantt, I. Dawson, and L. Hagard (eds.), Governing Texas, [390 U.S. 474, 503] Documents and Readings 254 (1966); C. McCleskey, The Government and Politics of Texas 303-304, 305 (1966) (hereafter cited as McCleskey). There is a home-rule provision in the Texas Constitution which applies to counties, Art. IX, 3. But that provision is virtually unworkable and, as of 1966, there were no counties operating under home rule. Benton 372-375. See also McCleskey 304, and MacCorkle 341. </s> [Footnote 20 The 1967 amendment to Art. VIII, 9, maintains the 80 limitation and still speaks of "the four constitutional purposes." It provides, though, that the county "may" put all tax money into one general fund without regard to the purpose or the source of each tax. For a discussion of the county's taxing power and other sources of county revenue, see Benton 367-368. </s> [Footnote 21 This testimony appears in the typed transcript of record but not in the portions printed by the parties. </s> [Footnote 22 See n. 21, supra. Commentators on Texas local government have noted this lack of control by the Commissioners Court. See, e. g., MacCorkle 344-345; McCleskey 307, 310; Benton 369. </s> [Footnote 23 Article VIII, 14; Art. V, 21; Art. V, 23; Art. XVI, 44; Art. V, 20; and Art. XVI, 44, of the Texas Constitution respectively. </s> [Footnote 24 Article V, 15, 18, of the Texas Constitution. </s> [Footnote 25 For a description of county officials generally and of their functions, see McCleskey 306-310, MacCorkle 335-339, and Patterson 390-392. For a listing of county officials who are elected see [390 U.S. 474, 506] U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments 1967, Elective Offices of State and Local Governments 117-118 (prelim. rept. Aug. 1967). </s> [Footnote 26 See n. 21, supra. </s> [Footnote 27 Note 24, supra. There was testimony below to the effect that the county judge votes only in case of a tie vote. But it appears that this limitation may be self-imposed. "The county judge enjoys equal voting rights with all the other members of the commissioners' court, which includes the right to make or second any motion and the right to vote whether there be a tie among the votes of other members of the court or not." 1 Opinions of the Attorney General of Texas 453 (No. 0-1716, 1939). See McCleskey 307, n. 27. </s> [Footnote 28 The Assessor and Collector of Taxes is elected by the qualified voters of the county at large. Tex. Const., Art. VIII, 14; U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments 1967, Elective Offices of State and Local Governments 117 (prelim. rept. Aug. 1967). The Commissioners Court has power to adjust the Assessor and Collector's valuation. Art. VIII, 18, of the Texas Constitution. However, testimony below indicated that the Commissioners [390 U.S. 474, 507] Court sits to hear taxpayer complaints only a few days each year. The Commissioners Court does not go over the Assessor and Collector's tax rendition sheets before he sends notices to the taxpayers. </s> [Footnote 29 Cf. Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment Decisions on Counties and Other Forms of Municipal Government, 65 Col. L. Rev. 21, 40-49 (1965). </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART, dissenting. </s> I would dismiss the writ as improvidently granted for the reasons stated by MR. JUSTICE HARLAN and MR. JUSTICE FORTAS. [390 U.S. 474, 510] </s> Since the Court does reach the merits, however, I add that I agree with most of what is said in the thorough dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE FORTAS. Indeed, I would join that opinion were it not for the author's unquestioning endorsement of the doctrine of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 . I continue to believe that the Court's opinion in that case misapplied the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment - that the apportionment of the legislative body of a sovereign State, no less than the apportionment of a county government, is far too subtle and complicated a business to be resolved as a matter of constitutional law in terms of sixth-grade arithmetic. My views on that score, set out at length elsewhere, * closely parallel those expressed by MR. JUSTICE FORTAS in the present case. </s> [Footnote * Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 744 (dissenting opinion). </s> [390 U.S. 474, 511]

United States Supreme Court OAKLEY V. LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE R. CO.(1949) No. 28 Argued: Decided: November 14, 1949 </s> Mr. Morton Lipten, Washington, D.C., for petitioner. Mr. C. S. Landrum, Lexington, Ky., for Louisville & Nashville R. Co. [ Oakley v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. 338 U.S. 278 (1949) ] </s> [338 U.S. 278 , 279] </s> Mr. Cornelius J. Petzhold, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Cincinnati, N.O. & T. P. Ry. Co. Mr. Richard R. Lyman, Toledo, Ohio, for System Federation No. 21 and others. </s> Mr. Justice BURTON delivered the opinion of the Court. In both No. 28 and No. 29, the issue is whether, under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940,1 one year of reemployment of a veteran by his preservice employer terminated that veteran's right to the seniority to which he was entitled by virtue of that Act's treatment of him as though he had remained continuously in his civilian employment. For the reasons hereinafter stated, and pursuant to our previous decisions, our answer is 'No.' In No. 29, there is the further question whether, after the expiration of such year, a United States District Court could entertain a complaint filed by the veteran to enforce his right to such seniority. Our answer is 'Yes.' In each case, a verteran sought, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, a declaratory judgment and an order restoring him to the seniority which he claimed he would have had if he had remained continuously in his civilian employment. In No. 28, Oakley, the petitioner, alleged that when he was inducted into the Armed Forces on May 7, 1944, he was employed as a locomotive machinist at Loyall, Kentucky, </s> [338 U.S. 278 , 280] </s> by the respondent, Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company; that, on May 22, 1946, he was honorably discharged from the Armed Forces; that, on July 17, 1946, he was reemployed by the respondent as a locomotive machinist with seniority from that date; that, on July 1, 1945, while he was with the Armed Forces, the respondent's Loyall Shop was transferred to Corbin, Kentucky; 'that had he not been in the Armed Forces he would have been transferred to the Corbin Shop with seniority from July 1, 1945, * * *'; and that, because of the respondent's failure to credit him with seniority from the earlier date, he has been subjected to certain disadvantages in working hours and to an increased possibility of being laid off from his employment. He filed his complaint, April 14, 1947, under 8(e) of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 891, as reenacted, 60 Stat. 341, 50 U.S.C.App. 308(e), 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, 308(e). The court, on its own motion, assigned the case for argument 'upon the question whether, under the opinion of the Supreme Court in The Trailmobile Company, et al. v. Whirls ( 331 U.S. 40 ) (No. 85, April 14, 1947), the cause has been rendered moot by the expiration of the statutory year to which Section 8(c) of the Selective Training and Service Act limited plaintiff's right to any special or preferential standing in respect to restored seniority.' Thereupon, the collective bargaining agent of the machinist employees of the respondent, which had intervened as a defendant, moved to dismiss the cause on the ground that more than one year had elapsed since the date of the petitioner's restoration to his employment. This motion is here considered upon the basis of the facts pleaded in the complaint. 2 </s> [338 U.S. 278 , 281] </s> In No. 29, Haynes, the petitioner, alleged that, when he enlisted in the Armed Forces on February 1, 1942, he was employed as a machinist helper at Somerset, Kentucky, by the respondent, Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway Company (originally sued as the Southern Railway System); that, on October 31, 1945, he was honorably discharged from the Armed Forces; that, on November 16, 1945, he was reemployed by the respondent as a machinist helper, with seniority from that date; 'that during his service in the Armed Forces the defendant company promoted six helper machinists to helper apprentices, and that these six men were junior in seniority to himself, and that had he not entered the Armed Forces as above mentioned he would have been promoted to helper apprentice and would have been given the pay as such, * * *'; and that such rate of pay exceeded that of the petitioner during his reemployment. He filed his complaint, February 14, 1947, asking for restoration to his claimed status and for the additional compensation to which that status would have entitled him. The respondent answered, but certain intervening defendants, following a procedure similar to that in No. 28, filed a motion to dismiss the cause for the reasons there stated. The District Court heard the motions together and dismissed both actions. 3 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth </s> [338 U.S. 278 , 282] </s> Circuit affirmed. 170 F.2d 1008; 171 F.2d 128. We granted certiorari, 336 U.S. 943 , because of the close relation of these dismissals to our decisions in Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275 , 167 A.L.R. 110, and Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U.S. 40 . The court below recognized that 8(c)4 granted to the respective veterans special statutory protection against discharge without cause and against loss of certain benefits during the first year of their reemployment. That court, however, concluded also that the expiration of that year not only terminated the veteran's right to such special statutory protection, but likewise automatically terminated his right to the seniority in the restored position which he would have had if he had remained continuously in his civilian employment. That additional conclusion is not justified by the opinions of this </s> [338 U.S. 278 , 283] </s> Court or by the terms of the Act. We reserved the point in the Trailmobile case, supra: 'We find it unnecessary therefore to pass upon petitioners' position in this case, namely, that all protection afforded by virtue of 8(c) terminates with the ending of the specified year. We hold only that so much of it ends then as would give the reemployed veteran a preferred standing over employees not veterans having identical seniority rights as of the time of his restoration. We expressly reserve decision upon whether the statutory security extends beyond the one-year period to secure the reemployed veteran against impairment in any respect of equality with such a fellow worker.' 331 U.S. at page 60, 67 S.Ct. at page 392. </s> In the Fishgold case, we did not deal with the effect, if any, upon a veteran's seniority, of the expiration of his first year of reemployment. We there dealt with the initial terms of his restored position. We stated, in effect, that an honorably discharged veteran, covered by the statute, was entitled by the Act to be restored not to a position which would be the precise equivalent of that which he had left when he joined the Armed Forces, but rather to a position which, on the moving escalator of terms and conditions affecting that particular employment, would be comparable to the position which he would have held if he had remained continuously in his civilian employment. Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275 , 284-285, 1110-1111, 167 A.L.R. 110; see also, Aeronautical Industrial Dist. Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521, 526 , 1289, 1290. In the Trailmobile case, supra, 331 U.S. at pages 56 and 60, 67 S.Ct. at pages 990, 992, we dealt with the one year of special statutory protection given to the veteran in his restored position. We said, in effect, that this provision protected him not only from the total loss of that position by 'discharge' from it 'without cause,' but that it also pro- </s> [338 U.S. 278 , 284] </s> tected him, for one year, against the loss of certain other benefits incidental to his restored position. The instant cases take us one step further. In them we hold that the expiration of the year did not terminate the veteran's right to the seniority to which he was entitled by virtue of the Act's treatment of him as though he had remained continuously in his civilian employment; nor did it open the door to discrimination against him, as a veteran. Section 8(c) of the Act requires that the veteran shall be restored to his position 'without loss of seniority, * * *.' He therefore assumes, upon his reemployment, the seniority he would have had if he had remained in his civilian employment. His seniority status secured by this statutory wording continues beyond the first year of his reemployment, subject to the advantages and limitations applicable to the other employees. In the instant cases, the respective complaints stated, in effect, that the complainants therein had not been restored to the places to which they were entitled on the escalators of their respective civilian employments. In No. 28, the allegation was that the petitioner was entitled, by virtue of the status he would have enjoyed had he remained continuously in his civilian employment, to the seniority of a locomotive machinist at Corbin from July 1, 1945, rather than from July 17, 1946. If he were entitled to the higher rating upon his reemployment, the Act did not deprive him of that rating merely by virtue of the expiration of his first year of reemployment. The motion to dismiss this action because of the expiration of that year, accordingly, should have been denied. In No. 29, we reach the same result. That result is not affected by the failure of the veteran, in this case, to file his complaint until nearly three months after the expiration of his first year of reemployment. The Act did not establish a one-year statute of limitations upon the asser- </s> [338 U.S. 278 , 285] </s> tion of the veteran's initial rights of reemployment. It added special statutory protection, for one year, against certain types of discharges or demotions that might rob the veteran's reemployment of its substance, but the expiration of that year did not terminate the right of the veteran to the seniority to which he was, in the first instance, entitled by virtue of the Act's treatment of him as though he had remained continuously in his civilian employment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals in each case is therefore reversed and the respective causes are remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. Mr. Justice JACKSON concurs in the result. Mr. Justice DOUGLAS took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. Footnotes 1. See especially, 8(a), (b), (c) and (e), 54 Stat. 890, as amended, 56 Stat. 724, 58 Stat. 798, 60 Stat. 341, 50 U.S.C.App. 308(a), (b), (c) and (e), 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, 308(aÄc, e). See also, Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275 , 278, 280, 281, 1107, 1108, 1109, 167 A.L.R. 110, for reprints of the material portions of the Act. 2. The respondent previously had answered, filed a request for admissions under Rule 36, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., received petitioner's admissions, and moved for summary judgment on the pleadings, the admissions, and an affidavit filed in support of the motion. In the meantime, System Federation No. 91 of the Railway Employes' Department of the American Federation of Labor, acting on its own behalf and as the collective bargaining agent of respondent's machinist employees, was permitted to intervene and to answer. It then filed the motion to dismiss the cause which was acted upon by the court. Accordingly, neither the answers nor the motion for summary judgment are before us, and we have considered the case on the petitioner's allegations in his complaint. 3. In No. 28, the court said: 'This cause coming on to be heard on the motion of the intervening defendants to dismiss the cause on the ground that the question presented has become moot, because more than one year has elapsed since the date of the plaintiff's restoration to employment with the defendant, L. & N. Railroad Company, and the Court being advised, it is ordered and adjudged that said motion be, and the same is hereby, sustained, and this action is now dismissed as moot, without cost to either the plaintiff, or the defendant, or the intervening defendants.' </s> In No. 29, the entry was the same except for the name of the defendant railway. 4. 'Sec. 8. * * * '(c) Any person who is restored to a position in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (A) or (B) of subsection (b) shall be considered as having been on Furlough or leave of absence during his period of ( training and service in the land or naval forces), shall be so restored without loss of seniority, shall be entitled to participate in insurance or other benefits offered by the employer pursuant to established rules and practices relating to employees on furlough or leave of absence in effect with the employer at the time such person was (inducted) into such ( forces), and shall not be discharged from such position without cause within one year after such restoration.' 54 Stat. 890, as reenacted, 60 Stat. 341, 50 U.S.C.App. 308(c), 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, 308(c).

United States Supreme Court FRANK J. MUSCARELLO v. UNITED STATES(1998) No. 96-1654 Argued: March 23, 1998Decided: June 8, 1998 </s> </s> A person who "uses or carries a firearm" "during and in relation to" a "drug trafficking crime" is subject to a 5-year mandatory prison term. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). In the first case, police officers found a handgun locked in the glove compartment of petitioner Muscarello's truck, which he was using to transport marijuana for sale. In the second case, federal agents at a drug-sale point found drugs and guns in the trunk of petitioners' car. In both cases, the Courts of Appeals found that petitioners had carried firearms in violation of §924(c)(1). </s> Held: The phrase "carries a firearm" applies to a person who knowingly possesses and conveys firearms in a vehicle, including in the locked glove compartment or trunk of a car, which the person accompanies. Pp. 2-14. </s> (a) As a matter of ordinary English, one can "carry firearms" in a wagon, car, truck, or other vehicle which one accompanies. The word's first, or basic, meaning in dictionaries and the word's origin make clear that "carry" includes conveying in a vehicle. The greatest of writers have used "carry" with this meaning, as has the modern press. Contrary to the arguments of petitioners and the dissent, there is no linguistic reason to think that Congress intended to limit the word to its secondary meaning, which suggests support rather than movement or transportation, as when, for example, a column "carries" the weight of an arch. Given the word's ordinary meaning, it is not surprising that the Federal Circuit Courts have unanimously concluded that "carry" is not limited to the carrying of weapons di- </s> -----* Together with No. 96-8837, Cleveland et al. v. United States, on </s> certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. rectly on the person but can include their carriage in a car. Pp. 2-7. </s> (b) Neither the statute's basic purpose-to combat the "dangerous combination" of "drugs and guns," Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 240 -nor its legislative history supports circumscribing the scope of the word "carry" by applying an "on the person" limitation. Pp. 7-9. </s> (c) Petitioners' remaining arguments to the contrary-that the definition adopted here obliterates the statutory distinction between "carry" and "transport," a word used in other provisions of the "firearms" section of the United States Code; that it would be anomalous to construe "carry" broadly when the related phrase "uses . . . a firearm," 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), has been construed narrowly to include only the "active employment" of a firearm, Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144 ; that this Court's reading of the statute would extend its coverage to passengers on buses, trains, or ships, who have placed a firearm, say, in checked luggage; and that the "rule of lenity" should apply because of statutory ambiguity-are unconvincing. Pp. 9-14. No. 96-1654, 106 F. 3d 636, and No. 96-8837, 106 F. 3d 1056, affirmed. B REYER , J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which S TEVENS , </s> O'C ONNOR , K ENNEDY , and T HOMAS , JJ., joined. G INSBURG , J., filed a </s> dissenting opinion, in which R EHNQUIST , C. J., and S CALIA and S OUTER , </s> JJ., joined. </s> NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. </s> U.S. Supreme Court </s> Nos. 96-1654 AND 96-8837 </s> v. </s> ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT DONALD E. CLEVELAND AND ENRIQUE GRAY- SANTANA, PETITIONERS 96-8837 v. UNITED STATES ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT [June 8, 1998] </s> JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> A provision in the firearms chapter of the federal criminal code imposes a 5-year mandatory prison term upon a person who "uses or carries a firearm" "during and in relation to" a "drug trafficking crime." 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). The question before us is whether the phrase "carries a firearm" is limited to the carrying of firearms on the person. We hold that it is not so limited. Rather, it also applies to a person who knowingly possesses and conveys firearms in a vehicle, including in the locked glove compartment or trunk of a car, which the person accompanies. </s> I </s> The question arises in two cases, which we have consolidated for argument. The defendant in the first case, Frank J. Muscarello, unlawfully sold marijuana, which he carried in his truck to the place of sale. Police officers found a handgun locked in the truck's glove compartment. During plea proceedings, Muscarello admitted that he had "carried" the gun "for protection in relation" to the drug offense, App. in No. 96-1654, p. 12, though he later claimed to the contrary, and added that, in any event, his "carr[ying]" of the gun in the glove compartment did not fall within the scope of the statutory word "carries." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 96-1654, p. 10a. </s> The defendants in the second case, Donald Cleveland and Enrique Gray-Santana, placed several guns in a bag, put the bag in the trunk of a car, and then traveled by car to a proposed drug-sale point, where they intended to steal drugs from the sellers. Federal agents at the scene stopped them, searched the cars, found the guns and drugs, and arrested them. </s> In both cases the Courts of Appeals found that the defendants had "carrie[d]" the guns during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense. 106 F. 3d 636, 639 (CA5 1997); 106 F. 3d 1056, 1068 (CA1 1997). We granted certiorari to determine whether the fact that the guns were found in the locked glove compartment, or the trunk, of a car, precludes application of §924(c)(1). We conclude that it does not. </s> II </s> A </s> We begin with the statute's language. The parties vigorously contest the ordinary English meaning of the phrase "carries a firearm." Because they essentially agree that Congress intended the phrase to convey its ordinary, and not some special legal, meaning, and because they argue the linguistic point at length, we too have looked into the matter in more than usual depth. Although the word "carry" has many different meanings, only two are relevant here. When one uses the word in the first, or primary, meaning, one can, as a matter of ordinary English, "carry firearms" in a wagon, car, truck, or other vehicle that one accompanies. When one uses the word in a different, rather special, way, to mean, for example, "bearing" or (in slang) "packing" (as in "packing a gun"), the matter is less clear. But, for reasons we shall set out below, we believe Congress intended to use the word in its primary sense and not in this latter, special way. </s> Consider first the word's primary meaning. The Oxford English Dictionary gives as its first definition "convey, originally by cart or wagon, hence in any vehicle, by ship, on horseback, etc." 2 Oxford English Dictionary 919 (2d ed. 1989); see also Webster's Third New International Dictionary 343 (1986) ( first definition: "move while supporting ( as in a vehicle or in one's hands or arms)"); The Random House Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 319 (2d ed. 1987) ( first definition: "to take or support from one place to another; convey; transport"). </s> The origin of the word "carries" explains why the first, or basic, meaning of the word "carry" includes conveyance in a vehicle. See The Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology 146 (1988) (tracing the word from Latin "carum," which means "car" or "cart"); 2 Oxford English Dictionary, supra , at 919 (tracing the word from Old French "carier" and the late Latin "carricare," which meant to "convey in a car"); The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology 148 (C. Onions ed. 1966) (same); The Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology, supra , at 143 (explaining that the term "car" has been used to refer to the automobile since 1896). </s> The greatest of writers have used the word with this meaning. See, e.g. , the King James Bible, 2 Kings 9:28 ("[H]is servants carried him in a chariot to Jerusalem"); id. , Isaiah 30:6 ("[T]hey will carry their riches upon the shoulders of young asses"). Robinson Crusoe says, "[w]ith my boat, I carry'd away every Thing." D. Defoe, Robinson Crusoe 174 (J. Crowley ed. 1972). And the owners of Queequeg's ship, Melville writes, "had lent him a [wheelbarrow], in which to carry his heavy chest to his boardinghouse." H. Melville, Moby Dick 43 (U. Chicago 1952). This Court, too, has spoken of the "carrying" of drugs in a car or in its "trunk." California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 572 -573 (1991); Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 249 (1991). </s> These examples do not speak directly about carrying guns. But there is nothing linguistically special about the fact that weapons, rather than drugs, are being carried. Robinson Crusoe might have carried a gun in his boat; Queequeg might have borrowed a wheelbarrow in which to carry, not a chest, but a harpoon. And, to make certain that there is no special ordinary English restriction (unmentioned in dictionaries) upon the use of "carry" in respect to guns, we have surveyed modern press usage, albeit crudely, by searching computerized newspaper databases-both the New York Times database in Lexis/Nexis, and the "US News" database in Westlaw. We looked for sentences in which the words "carry," "vehicle," and "weapon" (or variations thereof) all appear. We found thousands of such sentences, and random sampling suggests that many, perhaps more than one third, are sentences used to convey the meaning at issue here, i.e., the carrying of guns in a car. </s> The New York Times, for example, writes about "an excon" who "arrives home driving a stolen car and carrying a load of handguns," Mar. 21, 1992, section 1, p. 18, col. 1, and an "official peace officer who carries a shotgun in his boat," June 19, 1988, section 12WC, p. 2, col. 1; cf. The New York Times Manual of Style and Usage, a Desk Book of Guidelines for Writers and Editors, forword (L. Jordan rev. ed. 1976) (restricting Times journalists and editors to the use of proper English). The Boston Globe refers to the arrest of a professional baseball player "for carrying a semiloaded automatic weapon in his car." Dec. 10, 1994, p. 75, col. 5. The Colorado Springs Gazette Telegraph speaks of one "Russell" who "carries a gun hidden in his car." May 2, 1993, p. B1, col. 2. The Arkansas Gazette refers to a "house" that was "searched" in an effort to find "items that could be carried in a car, such as . . . guns." Mar. 10, 1991, p. A1, col. 2. The San Diego Union-Tribune asks, "What, do they carry guns aboard these boats now?" Feb. 18, 1992, p. D2, col. 5. </s> Now consider a different, somewhat special meaning of the word "carry"-a meaning upon which the linguistic arguments of petitioners and the dissent must rest. The Oxford English Dictionary's twenty-sixth definition of "carry" is "bear, wear, hold up, or sustain, as one moves about; habitually to bear about with one." 2 Oxford English Dictionary, supra , at 921. Webster's defines "carry" as "to move while supporting," not just in a vehicle, but also "in one's hands or arms." Webster's Third New International Dictionary, supra , at 343. And Black's Law Dictionary defines the entire phrase "carry arms or weapons" as </s> "To wear, bear or carry them upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose of use, or for the purpose of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in case of a conflict with another person." </s> Black's Law Dictionary 214 (6th ed. 1990). </s> These special definitions, however, do not purport to limit the "carrying of arms" to the circumstances they describe. No one doubts that one who bears arms on his person "carries a weapon." But to say that is not to deny that one may also "carry a weapon" tied to the saddle of a horse or placed in a bag in a car. Nor is there any linguistic reason to think that Congress intended to limit the word "carries" in the statute to any of these special definitions. To the contrary, all these special definitions embody a form of an important, but secondary, meaning of "carry," a meaning that suggests support rather than movement or transportation, as when, for example, a column "carries" the weight of an arch. 2 Oxford English Dictionary, supra , at 919, 921. In this sense a gangster might "carry" a gun (in colloquial language, he might "pack a gun") even though he does not move from his chair. It is difficult to believe, however, that Congress intended to limit the statutory word to this definitionimposing special punishment upon the comatose gangster while ignoring drug lords who drive to a sale carrying an arsenal of weapons in their van. </s> We recognize, as the dissent emphasizes, that the word "carry" has other meanings as well. But those other meanings, ( e.g. , "carry all he knew," "carries no colours"), see post , at 6, are not relevant here. And the fact that speakers often do not add to the phrase "carry a gun" the words "in a car" is of no greater relevance here than the fact that millions of Americans did not see Muscarello carry a gun in his car. The relevant linguistic facts are that the word "carry" in its ordinary sense includes carrying in a car and that the word, used in its ordinary sense, keeps the same meaning whether one carries a gun, a suitcase, or a banana. </s> Given the ordinary meaning of the word "carry," it is not surprising to find that the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals have unanimously concluded that "carry" is not limited to the carrying of weapons directly on the person but can include their carriage in a car. United States v. Toms , 136 F. 3d 176, 181 (CADC 1998); United States v. Foster , 133 F. 3d 704, 708 (CA9 1998); United States v. Eyer , 113 F. 3d 470, 476 (CA3 1997); 106 F. 3d, at 1066 (case below);106 F. 3d, at 639 (case below); United States v. Mal cuit , 104 F. 3d 880, 885, rehearing en banc granted, 116 F. 3d 163 (CA6 1997), United States v. Mitchell , 104 F. 3d 649, 653-654 (CA4 1997); United States v. Molina , 102 F. 3d 928, 932 (CA7 1996); United States v. Willis , 89 F. 3d 1371, 1379 (CA8 1996); United States v. Miller , 84 F. 3d 1244, 1259-1260 (1996), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Holland , 116 F. 3d 1353 (CA10 1997); United States v. Giraldo , 80 F. 3d 667, 676-677 (CA2 1996); United States v. Farris , 77 F. 3d 391, 395-396 (CA11 1996). </s> B </s> We now explore more deeply the purely legal question of whether Congress intended to use the word "carry" in its ordinary sense, or whether it intended to limit the scope of the phrase to instances in which a gun is carried "on the person." We conclude that neither the statute's basic purpose nor its legislative history support circumscribing the scope of the word "carry" by applying an "on the person" limitation. </s> This Court has described the statute's basic purpose broadly, as an effort to combat the "dangerous combination" of "drugs and guns." Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 240 (1993). And the provision's chief legislative sponsor has said that the provision seeks "to persuade the man who is tempted to commit a Federal felony to leave his gun at home." 114 Cong. Rec. 22231 (1968) (Rep. Poff); see Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 405 (1980) (describing Poff's comments as "crucial material" in interpreting the purpose of §924(c)); Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 13 -14 (1978) (concluding that Poff's comments are "clearly probative" and "certainly entitled to weight"); see also 114 Cong. Rec. 22243-22244 (statutes would apply to "the man who goes out taking a gun to commit a crime") (Rep. Hunt); id. , at 22244 ("Of course, what we are trying to do by these penalties is to persuade the criminal to leave his gun at home") (Rep. Randall); id ., at 22236 ("We are concerned . . . with having the criminal leave his gun at home") (Rep. Meskill). </s> From the perspective of any such purpose (persuading a criminal "to leave his gun at home") what sense would it make for this statute to penalize one who walks with a gun in a bag to the site of a drug sale, but to ignore a similar individual who, like defendant Gray-Santana, travels to a similar site with a similar gun in a similar bag, but instead of walking, drives there with the gun in his car? How persuasive is a punishment that is without effect until a drug dealer who has brought his gun to a sale (indeed has it available for use) actually takes it from the trunk (or unlocks the glove compartment) of his car? It is difficult to say that, considered as a class, those who prepare, say, to sell drugs by placing guns in their cars are less dangerous, or less deserving of punishment, than those who carry handguns on their person. </s> We have found no significant indication elsewhere in the legislative history of any more narrowly focused relevant purpose. We have found an instance in which a legislator referred to the statute as applicable when an individual "has a firearm on his person," Ibid. (Rep. Meskill); an instance in which a legislator speaks of "a criminal who takes a gun in his hand," id ., at 22239 (Rep. Pucinski); and a reference in the Senate Report to a "gun carried in a pocket." S. Rep No. 98-225, p. 314, n. 10 (1983); see also 114 Cong. Rec. 21788, 21789 (1968) (references to gun "carrying" without more). But in these instances no one purports to define the scope of the term "carries": and the examples of guns carried on the person are not used to illustrate the reach of the term "carries" but to illustrate, or to criticize, a different aspect of the statute. </s> Regardless, in other instances, legislators suggest that the word "carries" has a broader scope. One legislator indicates that the statute responds in part to the concerns of law enforcement personnel, who had urged that "carry ing short firearms in motor vehicles be classified as carrying such weapons concealed." Id., at 22242 (Rep. May). Another criticizes a version of the proposed statute by suggesting it might apply to drunken driving, and gives as an example a drunken driver who has a "gun in his car." Id ., at 21792 (Rep. Yates). Others describe the statute as criminalizing gun "possession"-a term that could stretch beyond both the "use" of a gun and the carrying of a gun on the person. See id ., at 21793 (Rep. Casey); id ., at 22236 (Rep. Meskill); id ., at 30584 (Rep. Collier); id ., at 30585 (Rep. Skubitz). </s> C </s> We are not convinced by petitioners' remaining arguments to the contrary. First, they say that our definition of "carry" makes it the equivalent of "transport." Yet, Congress elsewhere in related statutes used the word "transport" deliberately to signify a different, and broader, statutory coverage. The immediately preceding statutory subsection, for example, imposes a different set of penalties on one who, with an intent to commit a crime, "ships, transports, or receives a firearm" in interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 924(b). Moreover, §926A specifically "entitle[s]" a person "not otherwise prohibited . . . from transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm" to "transport a firearm . . . from any place where he may lawfully possess and carry" it to "any other place" where he may do so. Why, petitioners ask, would Congress have used the word "transport," or used both "carry" and "transport" in the same provision, if it had intended to obliterate the distinction between the two? </s> The short answer is that our definition does not equate "carry" and "transport." "Carry" implies personal agency and some degree of possession, whereas "transport" does not have such a limited connotation and, in addition, implies the movement of goods in bulk over great distances. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 343 (noting that "carry" means "moving to a location some distance away while supporting or maintaining off the ground" and "is a natural word to use in ref. to cargoes and loads on trucks, wagons, planes, ships, or even beasts of burden," while "transport refers to carriage in bulk or number over an appreciable distance and, typically, by a customary or usual carrier agency"); see also Webster's Dictionary of Synonyms 141 (1942). If Smith, for example, calls a parcel delivery service, which sends a truck to Smith's house to pick up Smith's package and take it to Los Angeles, one might say that Smith has shipped the package and the parcel delivery service has transported the package. But only the truck driver has "carried" the package in the sense of "carry" that we believe Congress intended. Therefore, "transport" is a broader category that includes "carry" but also encompasses other activity. </s> The dissent refers to §926A and to another statute where Congress used the word "transport" rather than "carry" to describe the movement of firearms. 18 U. S. C. §§925(a)(2)(B); post , at 8-9. According to the dissent, had Congress intended "carry" to have the meaning we give it, Congress would not have needed to use a different word in these provisions. But as we have discussed above, we believe the word "transport" is broader than the word "carry." </s> And, if Congress intended "carry" to have the limited definition the dissent contends, it would have been quite unnecessary to add the proviso in §926A requiring a person, to be exempt from penalties, to store her firearm in a locked container not immediately accessible. See §926A (quoted in full at post , 8-9) (exempting from criminal penalties one who transports a firearm from a place where "he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm" but not exempting the "transportation" of a firearm if it is "readily accessible or is directly accessible from the passenger compartment of transporting vehicle"). The statute simply could have said that such a person may not "carry" a firearm. But, of course, Congress did not say this because that is not what "carry" means. </s> As we interpret the statutory scheme, it makes sense. Congress has imposed a variable penalty with no mandatory minimum sentence upon a person who "transports" (or "ships" or "receives") a firearm knowing it will be used to commit any "offense punishable by imprisonment for [more than] . . . one year," §924(b), and it has imposed a 5year mandatory minimum sentence upon one who "carries" a firearm "during and in relation to" a "drug trafficking crime," §924(c). The first subsection imposes a less strict sentencing regime upon one who, say, ships firearms by mail for use in a crime elsewhere; the latter subsection imposes a mandatory sentence upon one who, say, brings a weapon with him (on his person or in his car) to the site of a drug sale. </s> Second, petitioners point out that, in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), we considered the related phrase "uses . . . a firearm" found in the same statutory provision now before us. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) ("uses or carries a firearm"). We construed the term "use" narrowly, limiting its application to the "active employment" of a firearm. Bailey , 516 U.S., at 144 . Petitioners argue that it would be anomalous to construe broadly the word "carries," its statutory next-door neighbor. </s> In Bailey , however, we limited "use" of a firearm to "active employment" in part because we assumed "that Congress . . . intended each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning." Id ., at 146. A broader interpretation of "use," we said, would have swallowed up the term "carry." Ibid . But "carry" as we interpret that word does not swallow up the term "use." "Use" retains the same independent meaning we found for it in Bailey , where we provided examples involving the displaying or the barter ing of a gun. Ibid . "Carry" also retains an independent meaning, for, under Bailey , carrying a gun in a car does not necessarily involve the gun's "active employment." More importantly, having construed "use" narrowly in Bailey , we cannot also construe "carry" narrowly without undercutting the statute's basic objective. For the narrow interpretation would remove the act of carrying a gun in a car entirely from the statute's reach, leaving a gap in coverage that we do not believe Congress intended. </s> Third, petitioners say that our reading of the statute would extend its coverage to passengers on buses, trains, or ships, who have placed a firearm, say, in checked luggage. To extend this statute so far, they argue, is unfair, going well beyond what Congress likely would have thought possible. They add that some lower courts, thinking approximately the same, have limited the scope of "carries" to instances where a gun in a car is immediately accessible, thereby most likely excluding from coverage a gun carried in a car's trunk or locked glove compartment. See, e.g ., Foster , 133 F. 3d, at 708 (concluding that person "carries" a firearm in a car only if the firearm is immediately accessible); Giraldo , 80 F. 3d, at 676 (same). </s> In our view, this argument does not take adequate account of other limiting words in the statute-words that make the statute applicable only where a defendant "carries" a gun both "during and in relation to" a drug crime. §924(c)(1) (emphasis added). Congress added these words in part to prevent prosecution where guns "played" no part in the crime. See S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 314, n. 10; cf. United States v. Stewart , 779 F. 2d 538, 539 (CA9 1985) (Kennedy, J.) (observing that " 'in relation to' " was "added to allay explicitly the concern that a person could be prosecuted . . . for committing an entirely unrelated crime while in possession of a firearm"), overruled in part on other grounds, United States v. Hernandez , 80 F. 3d 1253, 1257 (CA9 1996). </s> Once one takes account of the words "during" and "in relation to," it no longer seems beyond Congress' likely intent, or otherwise unfair, to interpret the statute as we have done. If one carries a gun in a car "during" and "in relation to" a drug sale, for example, the fact that the gun is carried in the car's trunk or locked glove compartment seems not only logically difficult to distinguish from the immediately accessible gun, but also beside the point. </s> At the same time, the narrow interpretation creates its own anomalies. The statute, for example, defines "firearm" to include a "bomb," "grenade," "rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces," or "missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than onequarter ounce," where such device is "explosive," "incendiary," or delivers "poison gas." 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(4)(A). On petitioners' reading, the "carry" provision would not apply to instances where drug lords, engaged in a major transaction, took with them "firearms" such as these, which most likely could not be carried on the person. </s> Fourth, petitioners argue that we should construe the word "carry" to mean "immediately accessible." And, as we have said, they point out that several Circuit Courts of Appeals have limited the statute's scope in this way. See, e.g ., Foster, supra, at 708; Giraldo, supra, at 676. That interpretation, however, is difficult to square with the statute's language, for one "carries" a gun in the glove compartment whether or not that glove compartment is locked. Nothing in the statute's history suggests that Congress intended that limitation. And, for reasons pointed out above, see supra , at 11, we believe that the words "during" and "in relation to" will limit the statute's application to the harms that Congress foresaw. </s> Finally, petitioners and the dissent invoke the "rule of lenity." The simple existence of some statutory ambiguity, however, is not sufficient to warrant application of that rule, for most statutes are ambiguous to some degree. Cf. Smith , 508 U.S., at 239 ("The mere possibility of articulating a narrower construction . . . does not by itself make the rule of lenity applicable"). " 'The rule of lenity applies only if, "after seizing everything from which aid can be derived," . . . we can make "no more than a guess as to what Congress intended." ' " United States v. Wells , 519 U.S. 482, 499 (1997) (quoting Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 64 (1995), Smith , supra , at 239, and Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 (1958)). To invoke the rule, we must conclude that there is a " 'grievous ambiguity or uncertainty' in the statute." Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 , n. 17 (1994) (quoting Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991)). Certainly, our decision today is based on much more than a " guess as to what Congress intended, " and there is no "grievous ambiguity" here. The problem of statutory interpretation in this case is indeed no different from that in many of the criminal cases that confront us. Yet, this Court has never held that the rule of lenity automatically permits a defendant to win. </s> In sum, the "generally accepted contemporary meaning" of the word "carry" includes the carrying of a firearm in a vehicle. The purpose of this statute warrants its application in such circumstances. The limiting phrase "during and in relation to" should prevent misuse of the statute to penalize those whose conduct does not create the risks of harm at which the statute aims. </s> For these reasons, we conclude that the petitioners' conduct falls within the scope of the phrase "carries a firearm." The decisions of the Courts of Appeals are affirmed. </s> It is so ordered. </s> U.S. Supreme Court </s> Nos. 96-1654 AND 96-8837 </s> v. </s> ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT DONALD E. CLEVELAND AND ENRIQUE GRAY- SANTANA, PETITIONERS 96-8837 v. UNITED STATES ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT [June 8, 1998] </s> JUSTICE GINSBURG , with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE , JUSTICE SCALIA , and S 2558 3510 () 25 JUSTICE SOUTER join, dissenting. </s> Section 924(c)(1) of Title 18, United States Code, is a punishment-enhancing provision; it imposes a mandatory five-year prison term when the defendant "during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking . . . uses or carries a firearm." In Bailey v. United States , 516 U.S. 137 (1995), this Court held that the term "uses," in the context of §924(c)(1), means "active employment" of the firearm. In today's cases we confront a related question: What does the term "carries" mean in the context of §924(c)(1), the enhanced punishment prescription again at issue. </s> It is uncontested that §924(c)(1) applies when the defendant bears a firearm, i.e. , carries the weapon on or about his person "for the purpose of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in case of a conflict." Black's Law Dictionary 214 (6th ed. 1990) (defining the phrase "carry arms or weapons"); see ante , at 5. The Court holds that, in addition, "carries a firearm," in the context of §924(c)(1), means personally transporting, possessing, or keeping a firearm in a vehicle, anyplace in a vehicle. </s> Without doubt, "carries" is a word of many meanings, definable to mean or include carting about in a vehicle. But that encompassing definition is not a ubiquitously necessary one. Nor, in my judgment, is it a proper construction of "carries" as the term appears in §924(c)(1). In line with Bailey and the principle of lenity the Court has long followed, I would confine "carries a firearm," for §924(c)(1) purposes, to the undoubted meaning of that expression in the relevant context. I would read the words to indicate not merely keeping arms on one's premises or in one's vehicle, but bearing them in such manner as to be ready for use as a weapon. </s> I </s> A </s> I note first what is at stake for petitioners. The question before the Court "is not whether possession of a gun [on the drug offender's premises or in his car, during and in relation to commission of the offense,] means a longer sentence for a convicted drug dealer. It most certainly does. . . . Rather, the question concerns which sentencing statute governs the precise length of the extra term of punishment," §924(c)(1)'s "blunt 'mandatory minimum' " five-year sentence, or the more finely tuned "sentencing guideline statutes, under which extra punishment for drug-related gun possession varies with the seriousness of the drug crime." United States v. McFadden , 13 F. 3d 463, 466 (CA1 1994) (Breyer, C. J., dissenting). </s> Accordingly, there would be no "gap," see ante , at 12, no relevant conduct "ignore[d]," see ante , at 8, were the Court to reject the Government's broad reading of §924(c)(1). To be more specific, as cogently explained on another day by today's opinion writer: </s> "The special 'mandatory minimum' sentencing statute says that anyone who ' uses or carries' a gun 'during and in relation to any . . . drug trafficking crime' must receive a mandatory five-year prison term added on to his drug crime sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). At the same time, the Sentencing Guidelines, promulgated under the authority of a different statute, 28 U.S.C. § 994 provide for a two-level (i.e., a 30% to 40%) sentence enhancement where a 'firearm . . . was possessed' by a drug offender, U. S. S. G. §2D1.1(b)(1), unless the possession clearly was not 'connected with the [drug] offense.' " </s> McFadden , 13 F. 3d, at 467 (Breyer, C. J., dissenting). </s> In Muscarello's case, for example, the underlying drug crimes involved the distribution of 3.6 kilograms of marijuana, and therefore carried a base offense level of 12. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §2D1.1(a)(3) (Nov. 1995). After adjusting for Muscarello's acceptance of responsibility, see id., §3E1.1(a), his final offense level was 10, placing him in the 6-to-12 month sentencing range. See id., ch. 5, pt. A. The two-level enhancement for possessing a firearm, id., §2D1.1(b)(1), would have increased his final offense level to 12 (a sentencing range of 10 to 16 months). In other words, the less rigid (tailored to "the seriousness of the drug crime," McFadden , 13 F. 3d, at 466) Guidelines regime would have added four months to Muscarello's prison time, in contrast to the five-year minimum addition the Court's reading of §924(c)(1) mandates. 1 In sum, drug traffickers will receive significantly longer sentences if they are caught travelling in vehicles in which they have placed firearms. The question that divides the Court concerns the proper reference for enhancement in the cases at hand, the Guidelines or §924(c)(1). </s> B </s> Unlike the Court, I do not think dictionaries, 2 </s> surveys of press reports, 3 </s> or the Bible 4 </s> tell us, dispositively, what "carries" means embedded in §924(c)(1). On definitions, "carry" in legal formulations could mean, inter alia , transport, possess, have in stock, prolong (carry over), be infectious, or wear or bear on one's person. 5 </s> At issue here is not "carries" at large but "carries a firearm." The Court's computer search of newspapers is revealing in this light. Carrying guns in a car showed up as the meaning "perhaps more than one third" of the time. Ante , at 4. One is left to wonder what meaning showed up some two thirds of the time. Surely a most familiar meaning is, as the Constitution's Second Amendment ("keep and bear Arms") (emphasis added) and Black's Law Dictionary, at 214, indicate: "wear, bear, or carry . . . upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose . . . of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with another person." </s> On lessons from literature, a scan of Bartlett's and other quotation collections shows how highly selective the Court's choices are. See ante , at 3-4. If "[t]he greatest of writers" have used "carry" to mean convey or transport in a vehicle, so have they used the hydra-headed word to mean, inter alia , carry in one's hand, arms, head, heart, or soul, sans vehicle. Consider, among countless examples: </s> "[H]e shall gather the lambs with his arm, and carry them in his bosom." </s> The King James Bible, Isaiah 40:11. </s> "And still they gaz'd, and still the wonder grew, That one small head could carry all he knew." </s> O. Goldsmith, The Deserted Village, ll. 215-216, in The Poetical Works of Oliver Goldsmith 30 (A. Dobson ed. 1949). "There's a Legion that never was 'listed, That carries no colours or crest." R. Kipling, The Lost Legion, st. 1, in Rudyard Kipling's Verse, 1885-1918, p. 222 (1920). "There is a homely adage which runs, 'Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far.' " T. Roosevelt, Speech at Minnesota State Fair, Sept. 2, 1901, in J. Bartlett, Familiar Quotations 575:16 (J. Kaplan ed. 1992). 6 These and the Court's lexicological sources demonstrate vividly that "carry" is a word commonly used to convey various messages. Such references, given their variety, are not reliable indicators of what Congress meant, in §924(c)(1), by "carries a firearm." </s> C </s> Noting the paradoxical statement, " 'I use a gun to protect my house, but I've never had to use it,' " the Court in Bailey , 516 U.S., at 143 , emphasized the importance of context-the statutory context. Just as "uses" was read to mean not simply "possession," but "active employment," so "carries," correspondingly, is properly read to signal the most dangerous cases-the gun at hand, ready for use as a weapon. 7 </s> It is reasonable to comprehend Congress as having provided mandatory minimums for the most lifejeopardizing gun-connection cases (guns in or at the defendant's hand when committing an offense), leaving other, less imminently threatening, situations for the more flexible guidelines regime. 8 </s> As the Ninth Circuit suggested, it is not apparent why possession of a gun in a drug dealer's moving vehicle would be thought more dangerous than gun possession on premises where drugs are sold: "A drug dealer who packs heat is more likely to hurt someone or provoke someone else to violence. A gun in a bag under a tarp in a truck bed [or in a bedroom closet] poses substantially less risk." United States v. Foster , 133 F. 3d 704, 707 (CA9 1998) (en banc). 9 For indicators from Congress itself, it is appropriate to consider word usage in other provisions of Title 18's chapter on "Firearms." See Bailey , 516 U.S., at 143 , 146 (interpreting §924(c)(1) in light of 18 U. S. C. §§922(g), 922(j), 922(k), 922( o )(1), 924(d)(1), 930(a), 930(b)). The Court, however, does not derive from the statutory complex at issue its thesis that " '[c]arry' implies personal agency and some degree of possession, whereas 'transport' does not have such a limited connotation and, in addition, implies the movement of goods in bulk over great distances." Ante , at 9. Looking to provisions Congress enacted, one finds that the Legislature did not acknowledge or routinely adhere to the distinction the Court advances today; instead, Congress sometimes employed "transports" when, according to the Court, "carries" was the right word to use. </s> Section 925(a)(2)(B), for example, provides that no criminal sanction shall attend "the transportation of [a] firearm or ammunition carried out to enable a person, who lawfully received such firearm or ammunition from the Secretary of the Army, to engage in military training or in competitions." The full text of §926A, rather than the truncated version the Court presents, see ante , at 9, is also telling: </s> "Notwithstanding any other provision of any law or any rule or regulation of a State or any political subdivision thereof, any person who is not otherwise prohibited by this chapter from transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm shall be entitled to transport a firearm for any lawful purpose from any place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm to any other place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm if, during such transportation the fire- </s> arm is unloaded, and neither the firearm nor any </s> ammunition being transported is readily accessible or </s> is directly accessible from the passenger compartment </s> of such transporting vehicle: Provided , That in the </s> case of a vehicle without a compartment separate </s> from the driver's compartment the firearm or ammu- </s> nition shall be contained in a locked container other </s> than the glove compartment or console." In describing when and how a person may travel in a vehicle that contains his firearm without violating the law, §§925(a)(2)(B) and 926A use "transport," not "carry," to "impl[y] personal agency and some degree of possession." See ante , at 9. 10 </s> Reading "carries" in §924(c)(1) to mean "on or about [one's] person" is fully compatible with these and other "Firearms" statutes. 11 </s> For example, under §925(a)(2)(B), one could carry his gun to a car, transport it to the shooting competition, and use it to shoot targets. Under the conditions of §926A, one could transport her gun in a car, but under no circumstances could the gun be readily accessible while she travels in the car. "[C]ourts normally try to read language in different, but related, statutes, so as best to reconcile those statutes, in light of their purposes and of common sense." McFadden , 13 F. 3d, at 467 (Breyer, C. J., dissenting). So reading the "Firearms" statutes, I would not extend the word "carries" in §924(c)(1) to mean transports out of hand's reach in a vehicle. 12 </s> II </s> Section 924(c)(1), as the foregoing discussion details, is not decisively clear one way or another. The sharp division in the Court on the proper reading of the measure confirms, "[a]t the very least, . . . that the issue is subject to some doubt. Under these circumstances, we adhere to the familiar rule that, 'where there is ambiguity in a criminal statute, doubts are resolved in favor of the defendant.' " Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 284 -285 (1978) (citation omitted); see United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 54 (1994) ("[W]here text, structure, and history fail to establish that the Government's position is unambiguously correct-we apply the rule of lenity and resolve the ambiguity in [the defendant's] favor."). "Carry" bears many meanings, as the Court and the "Firearms" statutes demonstrate. 13 </s> The narrower "on or about [one's] person" interpretation is hardly implausible nor at odds with an accepted meaning of "carries a firearm." </s> Overlooking that there will be an enhanced sentence for the gun-possessing drug dealer in any event, see supra , at 2-4, the Court asks rhetorically: "How persuasive is a punishment that is without effect until a drug dealer who has brought his gun to a sale (indeed has it available for use) actually takes it from the trunk (or unlocks the glove compartment) of his car?" Ante , at 8. Correspondingly, the Court defines "carries a firearm" to cover "a person who knowingly possesses and conveys firearms [anyplace] in a vehicle . . . which the person accompanies." Ante , at 1. Congress, however, hardly lacks competence to select the words "possesses" or "conveys" when that is what the Legislature means. 14 </s> Notably in view of the Legislature's capacity to speak plainly, and of overriding concern, the Court's inquiry pays scant attention to a core reason for the rule of lenity: "[B]ecause of the seriousness of criminal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity. This policy embodies 'the instinctive distaste against men languishing in prison unless the lawmaker has clearly said they should.' " United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (quoting H. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in Benchmarks 196, 209 (1967)). </s> * * * </s> The narrower "on or about [one's] person" construction of "carries a firearm" is consistent with the Court's construction of "uses" in Bailey to entail an immediacy element. It respects the Guidelines system by resisting overbroad readings of statutes that deviate from that system. See McFadden , 13 F. 3d, at 468 (Breyer, C. J., dissenting). It fits plausibly with other provisions of the "Firearms" chapter, and it adheres to the principle that, given two readings of a penal provision, both consistent with the statutory text, we do not choose the harsher construction. The Court, in my view, should leave it to Congress to speak " 'in language that is clear and definite' " if the Legislature wishes to impose the sterner penalty. Bass , 404 U.S., at 347 (quoting United States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 222 (1952)). Accordingly, I would reverse the judgments of the First and Fifth Circuits. </s> Notes </s> 1 The Sentencing Guidelines carry out "a major congressional effort to create a fairly sophisticated . . system that distinguishes among different kinds of criminal behavior and punishes accordingly." United States v. McFadden , 13 F. 3d, at 467-468 (Breyer, C. J., dissenting). A "mandatory minimum" statute deviates from the general regime Congress installed. "Given the importance (to Congress) of the Guidelines system, . courts should take care not to interpret [with unnecessary breadth] . . . deviations from the basic congressionally-directed effort to rationalize sentencing." Id. , at 468. </s> 2 I note, however, that the only legal dictionary the Court cites, Black's Law Dictionary, defines "carry arms or weapons" restrictively. See ante , at 5; supra , at 1-2. </s> 3 Many newspapers, the New York Times among them, have published stories using "transport," rather than "carry," to describe gun placements resembling petitioners'. See, e.g. , Atlanta Constitution, Feb. 27, 1998, p. 9D, col. 2 ("House members last week expanded gun laws by allowing weapons to be carried into restaurants or transported anywhere in cars ."); Chicago Tribune, June 12, 1997, sports section, p. 13 ("Disabled hunters with permission to hunt from a standing vehicle would be able to transport a shotgun in an all-terrain vehicle as long as the gun is unloaded and the breech is open."); Colorado Springs Gazette Telegraph, Aug. 4, 1996, p. C10 (British gun laws require "locked steel cases bolted onto a car for transporting guns from home to shooting range ."); Detroit News, Oct. 26, 1997, p. D14 ("It is unlawful to carry afield or transport a rifle . . . or shotgun if you have buckshot, slug, ball loads, or cut shells in possession except while traveling directly to deer camp or target range with firearm not readily available to vehicle occupants."); N. Y. Times, July 4, 1993, p. A21, col. 2 ("[T]he gun is supposed to be transported unloaded , in a locked box in the trunk."); Santa Rosa Press Democrat, Sept. 28, 1996, p. B1 ("Police and volunteers ask that participants . . . transport [their guns] to the fairgrounds in the trunks of their cars."); Worcester Telegram & Gazette, July 16, 1996, p. B3 ("Only one gun can be turned in per person. Guns transported in a vehicle should be locked in the trunk.") (emphasis added in all quotations). </s> 4 The translator of the Good Book, it appears, bore responsibility for determining whether the servants of Ahaziah "carried" his corpse to Jerusalem. Compare ante , at 3-4, with, e.g. , The New English Bible, 2 Kings 9:28 ("His servants conveyed his body to Jerusalem."); Saint Joseph Edition of the New American Bible ("His servants brought him in a chariot to Jerusalem."); Tanakh: The Holy Scriptures ("His servants conveyed him in a chariot to Jerusalem."); see also id., Isaiah 30:6 ("They convey their wealth on the backs of asses."); The New Jerusalem Bible ("[T]hey bear their riches on donkeys' backs.") (emphasis added in all quotations). </s> 5 The dictionary to which this Court referred in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995), contains 32 discrete definitions of "carry," including "[t]o make good or valid," "to bear the aspect of," and even "[t]o bear (a hawk) on the fist." See Webster's New International Dictionary of English Language 412 (2d ed. 1949). </s> 6 Popular films and television productions provide corroborative illustrations. In "The Magnificent Seven," for example, O'Reilly (played by Charles Bronson) says: "You think I am brave because I carry a gun; well, your fathers are much braver because they carry responsibility, for you, your brothers, your sisters, and your mothers." See http://us.imdb.com/M/search_quotes?for=carry. And in the television series "M*A*S*H," Hawkeye Pierce (played by Alan Alda) presciently proclaims: "I will not carry a gun. . . . I'll carry your books, I'll carry a torch, I'll carry a tune, I'll carry on, carry over, carry forward, Cary Grant, cash and carry, carry me back to Old Virginia, I'll even 'harikari' if you show me how, but I will not carry a gun!" See http://www.geocities.com/Hollywood/8915/mashquotes.html. </s> 7 In my view, the Government would carry its burden by proving a firearm was kept so close to the person as to approximate placement in a pocket or holster, e.g. , guns carried at one's side in a briefcase or handbag, or strapped to the saddle of a horse. See ante , at 5. </s> 8 The Court reports that the Courts of Appeals "have unanimously concluded that 'carry' is not limited to the carrying of weapons directly on the person." Ante , at 6-7. In Bailey , however, the Government's argument based on a similar observation did not carry the day. See Brief for United States in Bailey v. United States , O. T. 1995, Nos. 947448 and 94-7492, p. 16, n. No Court of Appeals had previously adopted an "active employment" construction of "uses . . . a firearm" in §924(c)(1), yet this Court did exactly that. See 516 U.S., at 144 . </s> 9 The "Firearms" statutes indicate that Congress, unlike the Court, ante , at 8, recognizes that a gun in the hand is indeed more dangerous than a gun in the trunk. See, e.g. , 18 U.S.C. § 926A (permitting the transportation of firearms in a vehicle, but only if "neither the firearm nor any ammunition being transported is readily accessible or is directly accessible from the passenger compartment of such transporting vehicle"); see infra , at 8-9. </s> 10 The Court asserts that " 'transport' is a broader category that includes 'carry' but encompasses other activity." Ante , at 10. "Carry," however, is not merely a subset of "transport." A person seated at a desk with a gun in hand or pocket is carrying the gun, but is not transporting it. Yes, the words "carry" and "transport" often can be employed interchangeably, as can the words "carry" and "use." But in Bailey , this Court settled on constructions that gave "carry" and "use" independent meanings. See Bailey , 516 U.S., at 145 -146. Without doubt, Congress is alert to the discrete meanings of "transport" and "carry" in the context of vehicles, as the Legislature's placement of each word in §926A illustrates. The narrower reading of "carry" preserves discrete meanings for the two words, while in the context of vehicles the Court's interpretation of "carry" is altogether synonymous with "transport." Tellingly, when referring to firearms traveling in vehicles, the "Firearms" statutes routinely use a form of "transport"; they never use a form of "carry." </s> 11 See infra , at 11-12, nn. 13, 14. The Government points to numerous federal statutes that authorize law enforcement officers to "carry firearms" and notes that, in those authorizing provisions, "carry" of course means "both on the person and in a vehicle." Brief for United States 31-32, and n. 18. Quite right. But as viewers of "Sesame Street" will quickly recognize, "one of these things [a statute authorizing conduct] is not like the other [a statute criminalizing conduct]." The authorizing statutes in question are properly accorded a construction compatible with the clear purpose of the legislation to aid federal law enforcers in the performance of their official duties. It is fundamental, however, that a penal statute is not to be construed generously in the Government's favor. See, e.g. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971). </s> 12 The Court places undue reliance on Representative Poff's statement that §924(c)(1) seeks " 'to persuade the man who is tempted to commit a Federal felony to leave his gun at home.' " See ante , at 7 (quoting 114 Cong. Rec. 22231 (1968)). As the Government argued in its brief to this Court in Bailey: "In making that statement, Representative Poff was not referring to the 'carries' prong of the original Section 924(c). As originally enacted, the 'carries' prong of the statute prohibited only the 'unlawful' carrying of a firearm while committing an offense. The statute would thus not have applied to an individual who, for instance, had a permit for carrying a gun and carried it with him when committing an offense, and it would have had no force in 'persuading' such an individual 'to leave his gun at home.' Instead, Representative Poff was referring to the 'uses' prong of the original Section 924(c)." Brief for United States in Bailey v. United States , O. T. 1995, Nos. 94-7448 and 94-7492, p. 28. Representative Poff's next sentence confirms that he was speaking of "uses," not "carries": "Any person should understand that if he uses his gun and is caught and convicted, he is going to jail." 114 Cong. Rec., at 22231 (emphasis added). </s> 13 Any doubt on that score is dispelled by examining the provisions in the "Firearms" chapter, in addition to §924(c)(1), that include a form of the word "carry": 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(5) (" carry out a bequest"); §§922(s)(6)(B)(ii), (iii) (" carry out this subsection"); §922(u) (" carry away [a firearm]"); 18 U. S. C. A. §924(a)(6)(B)(ii) (Supp. 1998) (" carry or otherwise possess or discharge or otherwise use [a] handgun"); 18 U. S.§924(e)(2)(B) (" carrying of a firearm"); §925(a)(2) (" carried out to enable a person"); §926(a) (" carry out the provisions of this chapter"); §926A ("lawfully possess and carry such firearm to any other place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm"); §929(a)(1) ("uses or carries a firearm and is in possession of armor piercing ammunition"); §930(d)(3) ("lawful carrying of firearms . . . in a Federal facility incident to hunting or other lawful purposes") (emphasis added in all quotations). </s> 14 See, e.g. , 18 U. S. A. §924(a)(6)(B)(ii) (Supp. 1998) ("if the person sold . a handgun . . to a juvenile knowing . . . that the juvenile intended to carry or otherwise possess . . the handgun . . . in the commission of a crime of violence"); 18 U.S.C. § 926A ("may lawfully possess and carry such firearm to any other place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm"); §929(a)(1) ("uses or carries a firearm and is in possession of armor piercing ammunition"); §2277 ("brings, carries or possesses any dangerous weapon") (emphasis added in all quotations).

United States Supreme Court PICKELSIMER v. WAINWRIGHT(1963) No. 16 Argued: Decided: October 14, 1963 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 36, Misc., Mihelcich v. Wainwright, Corrections Director; No. 54, Misc., Cowan v. Wainwright, Corrections Director; No. 55, Misc., Dumond v. Wainwright, Corrections Director; No. 60, Misc., Sharp v. Wainwright, Corrections Director; No. 62, Misc., Baker v. Wainwright, Corrections Director; No. 70, Misc., Heard v. Wainwright, Corrections Director; No. 71, Misc., Campbell v. Wainwright, Corrections Director; No. 86, Misc., Mitchell v. Wainwright, Corrections Director; and No. 87, Misc., Kitchens v. Wainwright, Corrections Director, all on petitions for writs of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida. </s> Certiorari granted; judgments vacated; and cases remanded for further consideration in light of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 . </s> Petitioners pro se. </s> Richard W. Ervin, Attorney General of Florida, and A. G. Spicola, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for respondent in No. 16, Misc., No. 60, Misc., and No. 70, Misc. Richard W. Ervin, Attorney General of Florida, and George R. Georgieff, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent in No. 36, Misc., No. 54, Misc., and No. 87, Misc. Richard W. Ervin, Attorney General of Florida, and James G. Mahorner, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent in No. 55, Misc., No. 62, Misc., No. 71, Misc., and No. 86, Misc. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> The motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petitions for writs of certiorari are granted. The [375 U.S. 2, 3] judgments are vacated and the cases are remanded to the Supreme Court of Florida for further consideration in light of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 . </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting. </s> I am unable to agree with the Court's summary disposition of these 10 Florida cases, and believe that the federal question which they present in common is deserving of full-dress consideration. That question is whether the denial of an indigent defendant's right to court-appointed counsel in a state criminal trial as established last Term in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 , invalidates his pre-Gideon conviction. </s> When this Court is constrained to change well-established constitutional rules governing state criminal proceedings, as has been done here and in other recent cases, see, e. g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 ; Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 ; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 , it seems to me that the question whether the States are constitutionally required to apply the new rule retrospectively, which may well require the reopening of cases long since finally adjudicated in accordance with then applicable decisions of this Court, is one that should be decided only after informed and deliberate consideration. Surely no general answer is to be found in "the fiction that the law now announced has always been the law." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 26 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Nor do I believe that the circumstance that Gideon was decided in the context of a state collateral proceeding rather than upon direct review, as were the new constitutional doctrines enunciated in Mapp and Ker, forecloses consideration of the retroactivity issue in this instance. 1 </s> [375 U.S. 2, 4] </s> In the current swift pace of constitutional change, the time has come for the Court to deal definitively with this important and far-reaching subject. 2 Without intimating any view as to how the question should be decided in these cases, I would set one or more of them for argument. 3 </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The Court's opinion in Gideon contains no discussion of this issue. Similarly, in cases decided last Term in which we summarily vacated [375 U.S. 2, 4] the judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of Gideon, e. g., Bryant v. Wainwright, 374 U.S. 492 , the question of retroactivity was not treated in the dispositions. </s> [Footnote 2 Such cases as Eskridge v. Washington State Prison Board, 357 U.S. 214 , and Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420 , hardly constitute precedents for a rule of general application. </s> [Footnote 3 In all but two of these cases, the State suggests that the judgments can be supported on an adequate independent state ground, even though the Florida Supreme Court denied relief without hearing or explanatory opinion, and despite the apparent concession in Nos. 36 and 87 that the state court did face the federal question and rule adversely to the petitioners. It is abundantly clear that each of the state grounds suggested is either plainly unavailing or so tenuous that it would be disrespectful of the Florida Supreme Court to regard it as the basis of that court's judgment. Cf. Klinger v. Missouri, 13 Wall. 257; Adams v. Russell, 229 U.S. 353, 358 -359; Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 478 -479. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the federal question is properly before this Court in all of the cases. </s> [375 U.S. 2, 5]

United States Supreme Court SEA-LAND SERVICES, INC. v. GAUDET(1974) No. 72-1019 Argued: November 7, 1973Decided: January 21, 1974 </s> Respondent's husband, a longshoreman, was severely injured aboard petitioner's vessel in Louisiana navigable waters. Shortly after termination of an action based on unseaworthiness, in which he recovered damages for past and future wages, pain and suffering, and medical and incidental expenses, the husband died and respondent brought this maritime wrongful-death action for damages suffered by her. The District Court dismissed respondent's suit on grounds of res judicata and failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, on the basis of Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 . Held: Respondent's maritime wrongful-death action is not barred by decedent's recovery in his lifetime for damages for his personal injuries. Pp. 575-595. </s> (a) Moragne v. States Marine Lines, supra, created a true wrongful-death remedy that is founded upon the death itself and is independent of any action the decedent may have had for his own personal injuries, and because respondent's suit thus involves a different cause of action from decedent's, it is not precluded by res judicata. Pp. 575-583. </s> (b) The maritime wrongful-death remedy permits a decedent's dependents to recover damages for loss of support, services, and society, as well as damages for funeral expenses. Pp. 583-591. </s> (c) All but the first of the foregoing elements of damages could not accrue until the decedent's death and therefore could not subject petitioner to double liability. Though there is an apparent overlap between a decedent's recovery for loss of future wages and the dependents' subsequent claim for support, the doctrine of collateral estoppel would bar dependents from recovering for loss of support to the extent that the decedent had recovered for future wages. Pp. 591-595. </s> 463 F.2d 1331, affirmed. </s> BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which DOUGLAS, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., [414 U.S. 573, 574] filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., and STEWART and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, post, p. 595. </s> Stuart A. McClendon argued the cause for petitioner. On the brief was Richard L. Greenland. </s> George W. Reese argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was George M. Leppert. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970), overruling The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886), held that an action for wrongful death based on unseaworthiness is maintainable under federal maritime law, but left the shaping of the new nonstatutory action to future cases. The question in this case is whether the widow of a longshoreman may maintain such an action for the wrongful death of her husband - alleged to have resulted from injuries suffered by him while aboard a vessel in navigable waters - after the decedent recovered damages in his lifetime for his injuries. </s> Respondent's husband suffered severe injuries while working as a longshoreman aboard petitioner's vessel, the S. S. Claiborne, in Louisiana navigable waters. He recovered $140,000 for his permanent disability, physical agony, and loss of earnings in an action based on unseaworthiness, 1 but died shortly after the action was terminated. Respondent brought this wrongful-death action in the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana for damages suffered by her. Based on her husband's recovery, the District Court dismissed the widow's suit on grounds of res judicata and failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Moragne gave "Mrs. Gaudet . . . a compensable [414 U.S. 573, 575] cause of action for Mr. Gaudet's death wholly apart from and not extinguished by the latter's recovery for his personal injuries . . . ." 463 F.2d 1331, 1332 (1972). We granted certiorari, 411 U.S. 963 (1973), and now affirm. </s> I </s> The harshness of the Harrisburg rule that in the absence of a statute, there is no maritime action for wrongful death, was only partially relieved by enactment of federal and state wrongful-death statutes. 2 The Death [414 U.S. 573, 576] on the High Seas Act, 41 Stat. 537, 46 U.S.C. 761-768, created a wrongful-death action for death outside the three-mile limit. 3 The Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. 688, incorporating the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65, 45 U.S.C. 51-60, established such an action based on negligence for the wrongful death of a seaman regardless of the situs of the wrong; but otherwise, wrongful-death actions for deaths occurring on navigable waters within the three-mile territorial waters of a State depended upon whether the State had enacted a wrongful-death statute and, if so, whether the statute permitted recovery. 4 </s> Moragne reflected dissatisfaction with this state of the law that illogically and unjustifiably deprived the dependents of many maritime death victims of an adequate remedy for their losses. Three clearly unjust consequences were of particular concern: </s> "The first of these is simply the discrepancy produced whenever the rule of The Harrisburg holds sway: within territorial waters, identical conduct violating federal law (here the furnishing of an unseaworthy vessel) produces liability if the victim is merely injured, but frequently not if he is killed. . . . </s> "The second incongruity is that identical breaches of the duty to provide a seaworthy ship, resulting in death, produce liability outside the three-mile [414 U.S. 573, 577] limit - since a claim under the Death on the High Seas Act may be founded on unseaworthiness, see Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 430 n. 4 (1958) - but not within the territorial waters of a State whose local statute excludes unseaworthiness claims. . . . </s> "The third, and assertedly the `strangest' anomaly is that a true seaman - that is, a member of a ship's company, covered by the Jones Act - is provided no remedy for death caused by unseaworthiness within territorial waters, while a longshoreman, to whom the duty of seaworthiness was extended only because he performs work traditionally done by seamen, does have such a remedy when allowed by a state statute (footnote omitted)." 398 U.S., at 395 -396. </s> In overruling The Harrisburg, Moragne ended these anomalies by the creation of a uniform federal cause of action for maritime death, designed to extend to the dependents of maritime wrongful-death victims admiralty's "special solicitude for the welfare of those men who under[take] to venture upon hazardous and unpredictable sea voyages." Id., at 387. Our approach to the resolution of the issue before us must necessarily be consistent with the extension of this "special solicitude" to the dependents of the seafaring decedent. </s> Petitioner, Sea-Land Services, Inc. (Sea-Land), would attach no significance to this extension in shaping the maritime wrongful-death remedy. It argues that the wrongful-death remedy should recognize no loss independent of the decedent's claim for his personal injuries, and therefore that respondent had a wrongful-death remedy only "in the event Gaudet failed to prosecute [his own claim] during his lifetime." Brief for Petitioner 6. But Moragne had already implicitly rejected that argument; [414 U.S. 573, 578] for we there recognized that a single tortious act might result in two distinct, though related harms, giving rise to two separate causes of action: "in the case of mere injury, the person physically harmed is made whole for his harm, while in the case of death, those closest to him - usually spouse and children - seek to recover for their total loss of one on whom they depended." Id., at 382. Thus, Moragne created a true wrongful-death remedy - founded upon the death itself and independent of any action the decedent may have had for his own personal injuries. 5 Because the respondent's suit involves a different cause of action, it is not precluded by res judicata. For res judicata operates only to bar </s> "repetitious suits involving the same cause of action. [The bar] rests upon considerations of economy of judicial time and public policy favoring the establishment of certainty in legal relations. The rule provides that when a court of competent jurisdiction [414 U.S. 573, 579] has entered a final judgment on the merits of a cause of action, the parties to the suit and their privies are thereafter bound `not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose.' Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 . The judgment puts an end to the cause of action, which cannot again be brought into litigation between the parties upon any ground whatever, absent fraud or some other factor invalidating the judgment. See Von Moschzisker, `Res Judicata,' 38 Yale L. J. 299; Restatement of the Law of Judgments, 47, 48." Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948). </s> To be sure, a majority of courts interpreting state and federal wrongful-death statutes have held that an action for wrongful death is barred by the decedent's recovery for injuries during his lifetime. But the bar does not appear to rest in those cases so much upon principles of res judicata or public policy as upon statutory limitations on the wrongful-death action. As one authority has noted, "[t]he fact that all civil remedies for wrongful death derive from statute has important consequences. Since the right was unknown to common law, the legislatures which created the right were free to impose restrictions upon it." 2 Harper & James 24.1, p. 1285. Thus, England's Lord Campbell's Act, 6 the first wrongful-death statute, permits recovery "whensoever the Death of a [414 U.S. 573, 580] Person shall be caused by [the] wrongful Act . . . [of another] and the Act . . . is such as would (if Death had not ensued) have entitled the Party injured to maintain an Action and recover Damages in respect thereof . . . ." Early English cases interpreting the Act held that this language conditioned wrongful-death recovery upon the existence of an actionable cause of the decedent at his death; 7 if the deceased had reduced his claim to judgment [414 U.S. 573, 581] and settled with or released his tortfeasor, and therefore up to the time he died could not have maintained a further action for his injuries, his dependents could have no cause of action for his wrongful death. Since Lord Campbell's Act became the prototype of American wrongful-death statutes, most state statutes contained nearly identical language and have been similarly interpreted by state courts. 8 Though the federal wrongful-death statutes do [414 U.S. 573, 582] not contain the same controversial language, the FELA, at least, has been held to be "essentially identical with" Lord Campbell's Act, Michigan C. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 69 (1913), and therefore similar restrictions have been placed on FELA wrongful-death recovery. Mellon v. Goodyear, 277 U.S. 335, 345 (1928). 9 </s> [414 U.S. 573, 583] </s> Moragne, on the other hand, requires that the shape of the new maritime wrongful-death remedy (not a statutory creation but judge-made, see The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 611 (1959) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.)) be guided by the principle of maritime law that "certainly it better becomes the humane and liberal character of proceedings in admiralty to give than to withhold the remedy, when not required to withhold it by established and inflexible rules," The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909 (No. 12,578) (C. C. Md. 1865), quoted in Moragne, 398 U.S., at 387 . Since the policy underlying the remedy is to insure compensation of the dependents for their losses resulting from the decedent's death, the remedy should not be precluded merely because the decedent, during his lifetime, is able to obtain a judgment for his own personal injuries. No statutory language or "established and inflexible rules" of maritime law require a contrary conclusion. 10 </s> II </s> Sea-Land argues that, if dependents are not prevented from bringing a separate cause of action for wrongful death in cases where the decedent has already received a judgment for his personal injuries, then necessarily it [414 U.S. 573, 584] will be subject to double liability. In order to evaluate this argument it is necessary first to identify the particular harms suffered by the dependents, for which the maritime wrongful-death remedy permits recovery of damages. In identifying these compensable harms, we are not without useful guides; for in Moragne we recognized that with respect to "particular questions of the measure of damages, the courts will not be without persuasive analogy for guidance. Both the Death on the High Seas Act and the numerous state wrongful-death acts have been implemented with success for decades. The experience thus built up counsels that a suit for wrongful death raises no problems unlike those that have long been grist for the judicial mill." 398 U.S., at 408 . Our review of those authorities, and the policies of maritime law, persuade us that, under the maritime wrongful-death remedy, the decedent's dependents may recover damages for their loss of support, services, and society, as well as funeral expenses. </s> Recovery for loss of support has been universally recognized, 11 and includes all the financial contributions [414 U.S. 573, 585] that the decedent would have made to his dependents had he lived. Similarly, the overwhelming majority of state wrongful-death acts 12 and courts interpreting the Death on the High Seas Act 13 have permitted recovery for the monetary value of services the decedent provided and would have continued to provide but for his wrongful death. 14 Such services include, for example, the nurture, training, education, and guidance that a child would have received had not the parent been wrongfully killed. 15 Services the decedent performed at home or for his spouse are also compensable. 16 </s> Compensation for loss of society, however, presents a closer question. The term "society" embraces a broad range of mutual benefits each family member receives from the others' continued existence, including love, affection, care, attention, companionship, comfort, and protection. 17 Unquestionably, the deprivation of these [414 U.S. 573, 586] benefits by wrongful death is a grave loss to the decedent's dependents. Despite this fact, a number of early wrongful-death statutes were interpreted by courts to preclude recovery for these losses on the ground that the statutes were intended to provide compensation only for "pecuniary loss," and that the loss of society is not such an economic loss. 18 Other wrongful-death statutes contain express language limiting recovery to pecuniary losses; 19 for example, the Death on the High [414 U.S. 573, 587] Seas Act limits recovery to "a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit the suit is brought . . .," 46 U.S.C. 762 (emphasis added), and consequently has been construed to exclude recovery for the loss of society. 20 </s> A clear majority of States, on the other hand, have rejected such a narrow view of damages, and, either by express statutory provision or by judicial construction, permit recovery for loss of society. 21 This expansion of damages recoverable under wrongful-death statutes to include loss of society has led one commentator to observe that "[w]hether such damages are classified as `pecuniary,' or recognized and allowed as non-pecuniary, the recent trend is unmistakably in favor of permitting such recovery." Speiser 218. Thus, our decision to permit recovery for loss of society aligns the [414 U.S. 573, 588] maritime wrongful-death remedy with a majority of state wrongful-death statutes. 22 But in any event, our decision is compelled if we are to shape the remedy to comport with the humanitarian policy of the maritime law to show "special solicitude" for those who are injured within its jurisdiction. 23 </s> Objection to permitting recovery for loss of society often centers upon the fear that such damages are somewhat speculative and that factfinders will return [414 U.S. 573, 589] excessive verdicts. 24 We were not unaware of this objection in Moragne, where we said: </s> "[O]ther courts have recognized that calculation of the loss sustained by dependents or by the estate of the deceased, which is required under most present wrongful-death statutes . . . does not present difficulties more insurmountable than assessment of damages for many nonfatal personal injuries." 398 U.S., at 385. </s> For example, juries are often called upon to measure damages for pain and suffering, mental anguish in disfigurement cases, or intentional infliction of emotional harm. In fact, since the 17th century, juries have assessed damages for loss of consortium - which encompasses loss of society - in civil actions brought by husbands whose wives have been negligently injured. 25 </s> [414 U.S. 573, 590] More recently, juries have been asked to measure loss of consortium suffered by wives whose husbands have been negligently harmed. 26 Relying on this history, the Florida Supreme Court recognized as early as 1899 that the damages for loss of society recovered by a wife for the wrongful death of her husband were "no more fanciful or speculative than the frugality, industry, usefulness, attention and tender solicitude of a wife [all of which a husband might recover at common law in an action for consortium], and the one can be compensated [as easily] by that simple standard of pecuniary loss . . . as the other." Florida C. & P. R. Co. v. Foxworth, 41 Fla. 1, 73, 25 So. 338, 348. </s> We are confident that the measure of damages for loss of society in a maritime wrongful-death action can "be left to turn mainly upon the good sense and deliberate judgment of the tribunal assigned by law to ascertain what is a just compensation for the injuries inflicted." The City of Panama, 101 U.S. 453, 464 (1880). As in all damages awards for tortious injury, "[i]nsistence on mathematical precision would be illusory and the judge or juror must be allowed a fair latitude to make reasonable approximations guided by judgment and practical experience," Whitaker v. Blidberg Rothchild Co., 296 F.2d 554, 555 (CA4 1961). Moreover, appellate tribunals have amply demonstrated their ability to control excessive awards, see, e. g., Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Richardson, 295 F.2d 583 (CA2 1961); Dugas v. National Aircraft Corp., 438 F.2d 1386 (CA3 1971). [414 U.S. 573, 591] </s> Finally, in addition to recovery for loss of support, services, and society, damages for funeral expenses may be awarded under the maritime wrongful-death remedy in circumstances where the decedent's dependents have either paid for the funeral or are liable for its payment. A majority of States provided for such recovery under their wrongful-death statutes. 27 Furthermore, although there is a conflict over whether funeral expenses are compensable under the Death on the High Seas Act, compare The Culberson, 61 F.2d 194 (CA3 1932), with Moore v. The O S Fram, 226 F. Supp. 816 (SD Tex. 1963), aff'd, sub nom. Wilhelm Seafoods, Inc. v. Moore, 328 F.2d 868 (CA5 1964), it is clear that funeral expenses were permitted under the general maritime law prior to The Harrisburg, see, e. g., Hollyday v. The David Reeves, 12 F. Cas. 386 (No. 6,625) (Md. 1879). We therefore find no persuasive reason for not following the earlier admiralty rule and thus hold that funeral expenses are compensable. 28 </s> Turning now to Sea-Land's double-liability argument, we note that, in contrast to the elements of damages which we today hold may be recovered in a maritime wrongful-death action, the decedent recovered damages only for his loss of past and future wages, pain and suffering, and medical and incidental expenses. Obviously, the decedent's recovery did not include damages for the dependents' loss of services or of society, and funeral expenses. Indeed, these losses - unique to the decedent's [414 U.S. 573, 592] dependents - could not accrue until the decedent's death. Thus, recovery of damages for these losses in the maritime wrongful-death action will not subject Sea-Land to double liability or provide the dependents with a windfall. </s> There is, however, an apparent overlap between the decedent's recovery for loss of future wages and the dependents' subsequent claim for support. 29 In most instances, the dependents' support will derive, at least in part, from the decedent's wages. But, when a tortfeasor has already fully compensated the decedent, during his lifetime, for his loss of future wages, the tortfeasor should not be required to make further compensation in a subsequent wrongful-death suit for any portion of previously paid wages. Any potential for such double liability can be eliminated by the application of familiar principles of collateral estoppel to preclude a decedent's dependents from attempting to relitigate the issue of the support due from the decedent's future wages. 30 </s> [414 U.S. 573, 593] </s> Collateral estoppel applies </s> "where the second action between the same parties is upon a different cause or demand . . . . In this situation, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel, not as to matters which might have been litigated and determined, but `only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered.' Cromwell v. County of Sac, [94 U.S. 351.] 353. And see Russell v. Place, 94 U.S. 606 ; Southern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1 . 48; Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co., 320 U.S. 661 , 671. Since the cause of action involved in the second proceeding is not swallowed by the judgment in the prior suit, the parties are free to litigate points which were not at issue in the first proceeding, even though such points might have been tendered and decided at that time. But matters which were actually litigated and determined in the first proceeding cannot later be relitigated." Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S., at 597 -598. </s> And while the general rule is that nonparties to the first action are not bound by a judgment or resulting determination of issues, see Blonder-Tongue v. University Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 320 -327 (1971), several exceptions exist. The pertinent exception here is that nonparties may be collaterally estopped from relitigating issues necessarily decided in a suit brought by a party who acts as a fiduciary representative for the beneficial interest of the nonparties. 31 In such cases, "the beneficiaries [414 U.S. 573, 594] are bound by the judgment with respect to the interest which was the subject of the fiduciary relationship; they are . . . bound by the rules of collateral estoppel in suits upon different causes of action," F. James, Civil Procedure 11.28, p. 592 (1965). </s> Under the prevailing American rule, a tort victim suing for damages for permanent injuries is permitted to base his recovery "on his prospective earnings for the balance of his life expectancy at the time of his injury undiminished by any shortening of that expectancy as a result of the injury," 2 Harper & James 24.6, pp. 1293-1294 (emphasis in original). 32 Thus, when a decedent brings his own personal-injury action during his lifetime and recovers damages for his lost wages he acts in a fiduciary capacity to the extent that he represents his dependents' interest in that portion of his prospective earnings which, but for his wrongful death, they had a reasonable expectation of his providing for their support. Since the decedent's recovery of any future wages will normally be dependent upon his fully litigating that issue, we need not fear that applying principles of collateral estoppel to preclude [414 U.S. 573, 595] the decedent's dependents' claim for a portion of those future wages will deprive the dependents of their day in court. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The jury reduced a verdict of $175,000 by 20% because of decedent's contributory negligence. </s> [Footnote 2 Wrongful-death statutes are to be distinguished from survival statutes. The latter have been separately enacted to abrogate the common-law rule that an action for tort abated at the death of either the injured person or the tortfeasor. Survival statutes permit the deceased's estate to prosecute any claims for personal injury the deceased would have had, but for his death. They do not permit recovery for harms suffered by the deceased's family as a result of his death. See Michigan C. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59 (1913); Schumacher, Rights of Action Under Death and Survival Statutes, 23 Mich. L. Rev. 114 (1924) (hereafter Schumacher); Winfield, Death as Affecting Liability in Tort, 29 Col. L. Rev. 239 (1929); Livingston, Survival of Tort Actions, A Proposal for California Legislation, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 63 (1949); New York Law Revision Commission Report 157 et seq. (1935). The underlying reasons for survival statutes have been summarized by Professor Harper: "At early common law, the personal representative could not be sued for a tort committed by the decedent during his lifetime. From early notions of the untransmittability of blame - and the quasi-criminal nature of early tort law must not be forgotten - to the crystallization of the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona, the common law was developed without exception, and the rule was uniform that tort actions died with the parties, either wrongdoer or injured party. There was, then, no survival of a right of action either in favor of or against an executor or administrator until statutes modified somewhat the rule of dependability upon the lives of the original parties to the wrong." F. Harper, Law of Torts 673-674 (1933), quoted in 2 F. Harper & F. James, Law of Torts 24.1 n. 2 (1956) (hereafter Harper & James). Survival statutes, in one form or another, have been enacted in over one-half the States and [414 U.S. 573, 576] supplement the state wrongful-death statutes, see W. Prosser, The Law of Torts 126, p. 900 (4th ed. 1971) (hereafter Prosser), though in a small number of States the survival statute provides the only death remedy available, see 2 Harper & James 24.2, p. 1288. The Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 59, and the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 688, but not the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. 761-768, contain survival provisions. </s> [Footnote 3 Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 430 n. 4 (1958). </s> [Footnote 4 The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959). </s> [Footnote 5 Most wrongful-death statutes have also been construed to create an independent cause of action in favor of the decedent's dependents, see F. Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act 23 (2d ed. 1913) (hereafter Tiffany); 2 Harper & James 24.2; Schumacher 121. Thus, for example, Coleridge, J., said of England's Lord Campbell's Act, "[I]t will be evident that this Act does not transfer this right of action to [the decedent's] representative, but gives to the representative a totally new right of action, on different principles," Blake v. Midland R. Co., 18 Q. B. (Ad. & E., N. S.) *93, *110, 118 Eng. Rep. 35, 41 (1852). See also Seward v. The Vera Cruz, 10 App. Cas. 59, 70 (Lord Blackburn). Interpreting the wrongful-death provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51-60, this Court described the action as "independent of any cause of action which the decedent had, and includes no damages which he might have recovered for his injury if he had survived. It is one beyond that which the decedent had, - one proceeding upon altogether different principles. It is a liability for the loss and damage sustained by relatives dependent upon the decedent," Michigan C. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S., at 68 . </s> [Footnote 6 Lord Campbell's Act, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93, An Act for compensating the Families of Persons killed by Accidents (Aug. 26, 1846): "Whereas no Action at Law is now maintainable against a Person who by his wrongful Act, Neglect, or Default may have caused the Death of another Person . . .: Be it therefore enacted . . . That whensoever the Death of a Person shall be caused by wrongful Act, [414 U.S. 573, 580] Neglect, or Default, and the Act, Neglect, or Default is such as would (if Death had not ensued) have entitled the Party injured to maintain an Action and recover damages in respect thereof, then and in every such Case the Person who would have been liable if Death had not ensued shall be liable to an Action for Damages, notwithstanding the Death of the Person injured, and although the Death shall have been caused under such Circumstances as amount in Law to Felony. "II. And be it enacted, That every such Action shall be for the Benefit of the Wife, Husband, Parent, and Child of the Person whose Death shall have been so caused, and shall be brought by and in the Name of the Executor or Administrator of the Person deceased; and in every such Action the Jury may give such Damages as they may think proportioned to the Injury resulting from such Death to the Parties respectively for whom and for whose Benefit the Action shall be brought . . . . "III. Provided always, and be it enacted, That not more than One Action shall lie for and in respect of the same Subject Matter of Complaint . . . ." </s> [Footnote 7 See, e. g., Read v. Great Eastern R. Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. 555, 558, in which the court held: "The question turns upon the construction of s. 1 of 9 & 10 Vict. (Lord Campbell's Act), c. 93. Before that statute the person who received a personal injury, and survived its consequences, could bring an action, and recover damages for the injury; but if he died from its effects, then no action could be brought. To meet this state of the law the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93, was passed, and `whenever the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, and the act is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action, and recover damages in respect thereof, then . . . the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable for an action for damages notwithstanding the death of the [414 U.S. 573, 581] party injured.' Here, taking the plea to be true, the party injured could not `maintain an action in respect thereof,' because he had already received satisfaction." </s> [Footnote 8 See, e. g., Legg v. Britton, 64 Vt. 652, 24 A. 1016 (1892); Melitch v. United R. & E. Co., 121 Md. 457, 88 A. 229 (1913). This interpretation has been by no means universal. A number of courts interpreting Lord Campbell's Act-type state wrongful-death statutes have held that a wrongful-death action could be prosecuted even though before his death the decedent could not have brought a cause of action for his personal injuries because he had already recovered a judgment, settled, or released his claims. A classic statement of this view is that of the South Dakota Supreme Court in Rowe v. Richards, 35 S. D. 201, 215-216, 151 N. W. 1001, 1006 (1915): "We must confess our inability to grasp the logic of any course of so-called reasoning through which the conclusion is drawn that the husband simply because he may live to suffer from a physical injury and thus become vested with a cause of action for the violation of his own personal right, has an implied power to release a cause of action - one which has not then accrued; one which may never accrue; and one which from its very nature cannot accrue until his death; and one which, if it ever does accrue, will accrue in favor of his wife and be based solely upon a violation of a right vested solely in the wife." The contrary interpretation of the pertinent statutory language has also been the subject of scholarly criticism. Professor Prosser argues: "It is not at all clear, however, that such provisions of the death acts ever were intended to prevent recovery where the deceased once had a cause of action, but it has terminated before his death. The more reasonable interpretation would seem to be that they are directed at the necessity of some original tort on the part of the defendant, under circumstances giving rise to liability in the [414 U.S. 573, 582] first instance, rather than to subsequent changes in the situation affecting only the interest of the decedent." Prosser 127, p. 911. See also Schumacher 120-121; Fleming, The Lost Years: A Problem in the Computation and Distribution of Damages, 50 Calif. L. Rev. 598, 608-610 (1962); Anno., 70 Am. St. Rep. 666, 684 (1898). In States where the limiting language of Lord Campbell's Act is absent from the wrongful-death statute, the courts have permitted wrongful-death actions although the decedent had already recovered for his own injuries, see, e. g., Blackwell v. American Film Co., 189 Cal. 689, 693-694, 209 P. 999, 1001 (1922). </s> [Footnote 9 Beyond the common elements that the FELA may share with Lord Campbell's Act, express statutory terms peculiar to the FELA lend additional support for the result reached in Mellon v. Goodyear. The Act provides: "Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce . . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce, or, in case of the death of such employee, to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such employee; and, if none, then of such employee's parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such employee, for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence . . . of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence . . . ." 45 U.S.C. 51 (emphasis added). The significant language, of course, is the use of the disjunctive "or." This language was understood by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Oliver, 261 F. 1, 2 (1919): "The two distinct rights of action are given in the alternative or disjunctively. The language used indicates the absence of an intention to allow recoveries for the same wrong by both the injured employe and, in case of his death, by his personal representative; only one [414 U.S. 573, 583] recovery being allowed when the injured employe dies without having enforced the right of action given to him. It seems to be a fair inference from that language that the right of action given to the injured employe's personal representative was intended to be unenforceable after the enforcement and satisfaction of the one given to the employe himself." </s> [Footnote 10 Significantly, the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. 761-768, the only federal statute "that deals specifically and exclusively with actions for wrongful death . . . for breaches of the duties imposed by general maritime law," Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 407 (1970), has not been interpreted, as the FELA has been, to bar wrongful-death recovery in cases where the decedent has already recovered during his lifetime for his personal injuries. </s> [Footnote 11 See, e. g., Michigan C. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S., at 70 ; The S. S. Black Gull, 90 F.2d 619 (CA2 1937) (interpreting the Death on the High Seas Act); Dugas v. National Aircraft Corp., 438 F.2d 1386 (CA3 1971) (interpreting the Death on the High Seas Act); Tiffany 153, 160; S. Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful Death 3.4 (1966) (hereafter Speiser); Prosser 127, p. 906. Damages for loss of support have also been awarded consistently in post-Moragne maritime wrongful-death actions. See, e. g., Dennis v. Central Gulf S. S. Corp., 323 F. Supp. 943 (ED La. 1971), aff'd, 453 F.2d 137 (CA5 1972); Petition of United States Steel Corp., 436 F.2d 1256 (CA6 1970); In re Cambria S. S. Co., 353 F. Supp. 691 (ND Ohio 1973); Mascuilli v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 439 (ED Pa. 1972); In re Sincere Navigation Corp., 329 F. Supp. 652 (ED La. 1971); Petition of Canal Barge Co., 323 F. Supp. 805 (ND Miss. 1971). </s> [Footnote 12 Tiffany 158-164; Speiser 3.36, 3.40. </s> [Footnote 13 Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Richardson, 295 F.2d 583 (CA2 1961); Dugas v. National Aircraft Corp., supra; Carli v. New London Flying Service, Inc., 1965 AMC 1644 (DC Conn. 1962). </s> [Footnote 14 Such damages have also been recovered in post-Moragne maritime wrongful-death actions. See, e. g., Dennis v. Central Gulf S. S. Corp., supra; Petition of United States Steel Corp., supra; In re Cambria S. S. Co., supra; Mascuilli v. United States, supra; In re Sincere Navigation Corp., supra; Petition of Canal Barge Co., supra. </s> [Footnote 15 See, e. g., Michigan C. R. Co. v. Vreeland, supra, at 71; Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Richardson, supra; Gaydos v. Domabyl, 301 Pa. 523, 152 A. 549 (1930). </s> [Footnote 16 See, e. g., Michigan C. R. Co. v. Vreeland, supra, at 71, 74; Carli v. New London Flying Service, Inc., supra; Alden v. Norwood Arena, Inc., 332 Mass. 267, 124 N. E. 2d 505 (1955); Kroeger v. Safranek, 165 Neb. 636, 87 N. W. 2d 221 (1957). </s> [Footnote 17 Loss of society must not be confused with mental anguish or grief, which is not compensable under the maritime wrongful-death remedy. The former entails the loss of positive benefits, while the [414 U.S. 573, 587] latter represents an emotional response to the wrongful death. The difference between the two is well expressed as follows: "When we speak of recovery for the beneficiaries' mental anguish, we are primarily concerned, not with the benefits they have lost, but with the issue of compensating them for their harrowing experience resulting from the death of a loved one. This requires a somewhat negative approach. The fundamental question in this area of damages is what deleterious effect has the death, as such, had upon the claimants? In other areas of damage, we focus on more positive aspects of the injury such as what would the decedent, had he lived, have contributed in terms of support, assistance, training, comfort, consortium, etc. . . . . . . . . "The great majority of jurisdictions, including several which do allow damages for other types of nonpecuniary loss, hold that the grief, bereavement, anxiety, distress, or mental pain and suffering of the beneficiaries may not be regarded as elements of damage in a wrongful death action." Speiser 3.45, p. 223 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). </s> [Footnote 18 Lord Campbell's Act, which, by its terms, allows the jury to award "such damages as they may think proportional to the injury," was interpreted to permit recovery only for "pecuniary losses," Blake v. Midland R. Co., 18 Q. B. (Ad. & E., N. S.) *93, 118 Eng. Rep. 35 (1852). Most American courts, interpreting similar wrongful-death statutes, followed suit, see, e. g., Michigan C. R. Co. v. Vreeland, supra, at 70. See also Speiser 3.1. </s> [Footnote 19 A list of the States that have such statutes and reprints of the individual statutes may be found in Speiser 3.1, p. 58 n. 5, and Appendix. </s> [Footnote 20 See, e. g., Middleton v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., Inc., 70 F.2d 326 (CA2 1934); First Nat. Bank in Greenwich v. National Airlines, Inc., 288 F.2d 621 (CA2 1961). </s> [Footnote 21 The various state and federal wrongful-death statutes have been closely canvassed and catalogued in Speiser (Supp. 1972) and Comment, Wrongful Death Damages in North Carolina, 44 N.C. L. Rev. 402 (1966). Those sources indicate that 27 of the 44 state and territorial wrongful-death statutes which measure damages by the loss sustained by the beneficiaries, permit recovery for loss of society. Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, Mississippi, Nevada, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming have statutes expressly providing for such damages. Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, New Mexico, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, and Washington have equivocal statutory language that has been judicially interpreted to include recovery for loss of society. Finally, the wrongful-death statutes of California, Delaware, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Pennsylvania, Texas, and the Virgin Islands, which either expressly or by judicial construction limit recovery to pecuniary losses, have been judicially interpreted, nevertheless, to permit recovery for the pecuniary value of the decedent's society. </s> [Footnote 22 We recognize, of course, that our decision permits recovery of damages not generally available under the Death on the High Seas Act. Traditionally, however, "Congress has largely left to this Court the responsibility for fashioning the controlling rules of admiralty law," Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963). The scope and content of the general maritime remedy for wrongful death established in Moragne is no exception. After combing the legislative history of the Death on the High Seas Act, we concluded in Moragne that Congress expressed "no intention . . . of foreclosing any nonstatutory federal remedies that might be found appropriate to effectuate the policies of general maritime law." 398 U.S., at 400 . Nothing in the legislative history of the Act suggests that Congress intended the Act's statutory measure of damages to pre-empt any additional elements of damage for a maritime wrongful-death remedy which this Court might deem "appropriate to effectuate the policies of general maritime law." To the contrary, Congress' insistence that the Act not extend to territorial waters, see S. Rep. No. 216, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1919); H. R. Rep. No. 674, 66th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1920); 59 Cong. Rec. 4482-4486 (1920), indicates that Congress was not concerned that there be a uniform measure of damages for wrongful deaths occurring within admiralty's jurisdiction, for in many instances state wrongful-death statutes extending to territorial waters provided a more liberal measure of damages than the Death on the High Seas Act. See Greene v. Vantage S. S. Corp., 466 F.2d 159 (CA4 1972). </s> [Footnote 23 Insofar as Simpson v. Knutsen, 444 F.2d 523 (CA9 1971), and Petition of United States Steel Corp., 436 F.2d 1256 (CA6 1970), are inconsistent with our holding, we disagree. </s> [Footnote 24 Of course, the maritime wrongful-death remedy is an admiralty action ordinarily tried to the court and not a jury. There are instances, however, where the admiralty action may be joined with a civil claim, for example, a claim based upon the Jones Act, see Moragne, 398 U.S., at 396 n. 12; Peace v. Fidalgo Island Packing Co., 419 F.2d 371 (CA9 1969), or a state survival statute, see Dugas v. National Aircraft Corp., 438 F.2d 1386 (CA3 1971); Petition of Gulf Oil Corp., 172 F. Supp. 911 (SDNY 1959); cf. Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 430 n. 4 (1958), and a jury trial may be requested. </s> [Footnote 25 See, e. g., Young v. Pridd, 3 Cro. Car. 89, 79 Eng. Rep. 679 (Ex. Ch. 1627); Hyde v. Scyssor, 2 Cro. Jac. 538, 79 Eng. Rep. 462 (K. B. 1619); Mowry v. Chaney, 43 Iowa 609 (1876); Guevin v. Manchester St. R., 78 N. H. 289, 99 A. 298 (1916); Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium, 22 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1923); Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 Col. L. Rev. 651 (1930); Note, Judicial Treatment of Negligent Invasion of Consortium, 61 Col. L. Rev. 1341 (1961). Damages for loss of consortium have been awarded by courts of admiralty as well. See N. Y. & Long Branch Steamboat Co. v. Johnson, 195 F. 740 (CA3 1912); 1 E. Benedict, Admiralty 366 (6th ed. 1940) ("When a [414 U.S. 573, 590] personal injury to a wife is maritime by locality, her husband may recover his damages for loss of her services, loss of consortium, etc., in admiralty"). But see Igneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257 (CA2 1963). </s> [Footnote 26 See, e. g., Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 87 U.S. App. D.C. 57, 183 F.2d 811 (1950); Prosser 125, p. 895; Note, Judicial Treatment of Negligent Invasion of Consortium, 61 Col. L. Rev. 1341 (1961). </s> [Footnote 27 See Speiser 3.49; Comment, Wrongful Death Damages in North Carolina, 44 N.C. L. Rev. 402, 419-420 (1966). </s> [Footnote 28 Funeral expenses have been awarded in post-Moragne wrongful-death actions. See, e. g., Greene v. Vantage S. S. Corp., 466 F.2d 159 (CA4 1972); Dennis v. Central Gulf S. S. Corp., 323 F. Supp. 943 (ED La. 1971), aff'd, 453 F.2d 137 (CA5 1972); Mascuilli v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 439 (ED Pa. 1972); In re Sincere Navigation Corp., 329 F. Supp. 652 (ED La. 1971). </s> [Footnote 29 The Court of Appeals below recognized the potential problem of double recovery and committed "to the discretion of the trial court the task of making an appropriate deduction from or accommodation of any judgment to which Mrs. Gaudet might otherwise be entitled, to insure that no double recovery results. Cf. Billiot v. Sewart, 382 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1967); Prosser, [Law of Torts,] at 934-935," 463 F.2d, at 1333 n. 1. In our view, application of collateral estoppel principles makes resort to theories of setoff or recoupment generally unnecessary. </s> [Footnote 30 If the dependents' total support received from the decedent exceeds the future wages paid to the decedent by the tortfeasor, the dependents will have an actionable cause for support against the tortfeasor for the difference. In that circumstance, if a special verdict was not rendered in the decedent's action specifying the amount of damages awarded for future wages, it may become necessary in the dependents' action to determine what portion of the decedent's lump-sum recovery for his injuries was attributable to future wages. This in no way conflicts with our holding that the dependents will be estopped from relitigating the amount of future [414 U.S. 573, 593] wages; it is merely an acknowledgment that the amount of the wage recovery in the first action may have to be clarified in the second. </s> [Footnote 31 See Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Parties, 50 Iowa L. Rev. 27, 63-64 (1964); Note, Developments in the Law - [414 U.S. 573, 594] Res Judicata, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 818, 855-856 (1952); Restatement of Judgments 92 (1942) deals expressly with wrongful-death actions and provides that, even in cases where the wrongful-death action is not premised upon the decedent's having an extant cause of action for personal injuries at the time of his death, "the rules of res judicata apply in actions brought after his death as to issues litigated in an action brought by him and terminating in a judgment before his death," id., comment on subsection (1). </s> [Footnote 32 This rule appears to have been rejected in England in favor of compensating a personal-injury victim on the basis of his life expectancy after the accident. See Oliver v. Ashman, 1961. 3 W. L. R. 669 (C. A.); Fleming, The Lost Years: A Problem in the Computation and Distribution of Damages, 50 Calif. L. Rev. 598, 600 (1962). Under the English rule, the accident victim is not permitted to recover lost wages for the difference in years between his pre-accident and post-accident life expectancy. </s> MR. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting. </s> The Court today rewrites several areas of the admiralty law of wrongful death. In holding that a wrongful-death action may be brought although the decedent has previously recovered in his own suit based on the same wrongful act, the Court disregards a major body of maritime and state law. The majority opinion also opens up an area of sentimental damages that has not been allowed under traditional admiralty doctrine. It hopes to prevent double recovery through a novel application of collateral estoppel principles, which rests in turn on the unprecedented concept that a seriously injured person acts as a fiduciary for an undefined class of potential beneficiaries with regard to his own recovery in his own personal-injury action. Given the sweep of the majority's approach, the upshot in many areas will be a nearly total nullification of the congressional enactments previously governing maritime wrongful death. Except for a technical joinder of counts to obtain a jury trial and thus to maximize the benefits promised by the Court's opinion, no one entitled to rely on the admiralty doctrine of unseaworthiness will, after today, seek relief under the federal maritime wrongful-death statutes. Several limitations built into those congressional enactments have been swept aside by the majority's decision. </s> In reaching these results, the majority purports to apply Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. [414 U.S. 573, 596] 375 (1970). It is true that Moragne overruled The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886), and held that an action for death caused by a violation of maritime duties would lie under the general law of admiralty. But Moragne does not support the Court's far-reaching holdings in this case. Indeed, Moragne, which was essentially a response to a gap in maritime remedies for deaths occurring in state territorial waters, explicitly counsels against the sort of tabula rasa restructuring of the law of admiralty undertaken by the majority. Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice Harlan stressed the need to "assure uniform vindication of federal policies . . . ." 398 U.S., at 401 . He eschewed "the fashioning of a whole new body of federal law . . .," id., at 405, believing that the lower courts would have slight difficulty "in applying accepted maritime law to actions for wrongful death." Id., at 406. He stated that those courts would find "persuasive analogy for guidance" in the accumulated experiences under the state wrongful-death statutes and the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. 761 et seq., 398 U.S., at 408 . He emphasized the consistency of the Court's holding with the congressional purposes behind the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 688. 398 U.S., at 400 -402. </s> The Court has now rejected these guidelines so recently laid down in Moragne. Disregarding the source of law endorsed by Moragne, as well as the concern for uniformity expressed in that opinion, the Court has fashioned a new substantive right of recovery in conflict with "accepted maritime law" and a new body of law with regard to the elements of damages recoverable in admiralty wrongful-death actions. In my view, these unprecedented extensions of admiralty law exhibit little deference for stare decisis or, indeed, for enunciated congressional policy. I also believe these new doctrines are unsound as a matter of principle, will create difficulty [414 U.S. 573, 597] and confusion in the litigation of admiralty cases, and are very likely to result in duplicative recoveries. </s> I </s> Long accepted law under the Jones Act, 1 one of the two federal maritime wrongful-death statutes, 2 does not countenance the result reached by the majority today. The Jones Act "created a federal right of action for the wrongful death of a seaman based on the statutory action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act [FELA]." Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 429 (1958). Since the FELA, 45 U.S.C. 51-60, is the "regime which the Jones Act made applicable to seamen . . .," 3 the "entire judicially developed doctrine of liability" under the FELA governs a Jones Act case. [414 U.S. 573, 598] Kernan, supra, at 439. An uninterrupted line of FELA and Jones Act cases going back a half century holds that if the decedent reduces his claim to settlement or judgment prior to his death, or otherwise extinguishes his right to pursue the claim, no subsequent wrongful-death action may be brought. See, e. g., Mellon v. Goodyear, 277 U.S. 335 (1928); Flynn v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 283 U.S. 53 (1931); Walrod v. Southern Pacific Co., 447 F.2d 930 (CA9 1971); Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Oliver, 261 F. 1 (CA5 1919); Gilmore v. Southern R. Co., 229 F. Supp. 198 (ED La. 1964); Purvis v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 93 F. Supp. 271 (SDNY 1949). </s> Mellon and its progeny hold unequivocally that a judgment, settlement, or similarly conclusive event with regard to the decedent's own right to seek recovery for his personal injuries "[precludes] any remedy by the personal representative based upon the same wrongful act." Mellon, supra, at 344. The Court in Mellon quoted with approval the following language from a state court opinion: </s> "`"Whether the right of action is a transmitted right or an original right, whether it be created by a survival statute or by a statute creating an independent right, the general consensus of opinion seems to be that the gist and foundation of the right in all cases is the wrongful act, and that for such wrongful act but one recovery should be had, and that if the deceased had received satisfaction in his lifetime, either by settlement and adjustment or by adjudication in the courts, no further right of action existed."'" 277 U.S., at 345 . (Citation omitted.) </s> The Mellon rule does not rest on a disagreement in principle with the majority's view, ante, at 577-578, that a single wrong is capable of producing separate and distinct injuries, those to the decedent and those to his beneficiaries. [414 U.S. 573, 599] Indeed, the Court in Mellon explicitly recognized that distinction. It noted that although originating in the same wrongful act, there are two separate and distinct claims, one assertable by the injured person and the other upon his death by his personal representative or dependents. 277 U.S., at 340 , 342. Nevertheless, Mellon and uniformly consistent Jones Act and FELA cases that have followed it hold that when the decedent extinguishes his own claim he simultaneously forecloses any wrongful-death action. As Mr. Justice Holmes put it for a unanimous Court in Flynn, supra, the wrongful-death action is "derivative and dependent upon the continuance of a right in the injured employee at the time of his death." 283 U.S., at 56 (citation omitted). Thus, the Court's opinion in this case creates a square conflict with one of the major bodies of maritime law that Moragne viewed as a source of guidance. </s> The Court's implication that the Death on the High Seas Act 4 supports its departure from Mellon, ante, at 583 n. 10, is at best conjectural. In fact, no cases addressing the situation presented here appear to have arisen under that Act. Conceivably such a case could arise, because the High Seas Act by its terms covers deaths caused by injuries inflicted at sea, not simply deaths occurring on the high seas. Cf. Lacey v. L. W. Wiggins Airways, Inc., 95 F. [414 U.S. 573, 600] Supp. 916 (Mass. 1951). 5 Thus, it would be possible in theory for a person injured at sea to recover for his personal injuries and, following his death, for his survivors to attempt to bring suit under the High Seas Act. But certainly the Act would not be read as allowing the subsequent action. Such a result would conflict with the Mellon line of cases under the Jones Act and the FELA, producing precisely the lack of uniformity normally sought to be avoided in admiralty. Moreover, the High Seas Act contains a substitution provision, 46 U.S.C. 765, that by implication forbids a wrongful-death action following a decedent's judgment. Section 765 provides that if a person who suffers injuries within the scope of the Act dies during the pendency of his own personal injury action, that action may be transformed by a personal representative into a wrongful-death action countenanced by the Act. 6 Surely this substitution provision evidences a congressional recognition [414 U.S. 573, 601] that only one action or the other should be allowed to proceed to judgment. </s> The Court's reference in Moragne to the "strong concern for uniformity" in admiralty law, 398 U.S., at 401 , often repeated and often related to congressional policies underlying the Jones Act and the Death on the High Seas Act, id., at 396 n. 12, 401-402, was not an expression of concern solely for intellectual consistency. "Such uniformity not only will further the concerns of both of the . . . Acts but also will give effect to the constitutionally based principle that federal admiralty law should be `a system of law coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole country.' The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 575 (1875)." 398 U.S., at 401 -402. But the lack of uniformity produced by the majority's holding should be evident. For example, whether a seaman's injuries occur on land or at sea will be determinative under the majority's approach. If on land, the seaman will have the Jones Act as his admiralty-related remedy. 7 Under that Act and the Mellon line of cases his own personal-injury action will foreclose a subsequent wrongful-death action - a misfortune that would not have befallen him and his survivors if only he had been lucky enough to have been injured at sea. This anomaly is not something, I suspect, the Court will long abide. Since "[i]t has been consistently true in this branch of the law that whatever a seaman can get under one theory he can sooner or later get under all the others . . .," 8 the Court's holding undoubtedly portends an express overruling of Mellon and its successors, cases that the Court bypasses today. </s> Aside from the disunity in the law of admiralty inherent in its opinion. I fail to see how the Court can square [414 U.S. 573, 602] its sweeping approach with Moragne's reliance on and admonition to draw by analogy from the federal statutes. E. g., 398 U.S., at 400 -402, 408. Moragne envisioned a process of accommodation with those statutes, not their abrupt and near-total forced obsolescence. In this regard, it might be noted that the Court has still not resolved many of the practical questions left open in Moragne, such as how to define the class of beneficiaries or an appropriate limitation period. Presumably, in resolving such questions the lower courts are to continue to rely on the admiralty wrongful-death statutes. Now they are placed in the interesting position of analogizing to statutes under which the very claim before them would be blocked. </s> II </s> The Court in Moragne also counseled the lower courts to draw by analogy from the case law under the state wrongful-death statutes. Id., at 408. Under the great majority of those statutes, whether of survival or true death act character, Mrs. Gaudet's cause of action would have been foreclosed by her husband's recovery. 9 </s> [414 U.S. 573, 603] The Restatement of Torts is also in direct conflict with the position taken by the Court: </s> "Although the death statutes create a new cause of action, both they and the survival statutes are dependent upon the rights of the deceased. Hence where no action could have been brought by the deceased had he not been killed, no right of action exists. Likewise a release by the deceased or a judgment either in his favor or, if won on the merits, in favor of the defendant, bars an action after his death. . . ." 10 </s> Because of the likelihood of double recovery and the threat to repose inherent in the majority's holding, several leading commentators also favor the majority rule under the state wrongful-death statutes. 11 This is [414 U.S. 573, 604] particularly true where, as here, the deceased in his own action has recovered his loss of earnings over his preaccident life expectancy. 12 Even those opposed to the majority position under state law recognize the "force" of that view in such a case. 13 </s> [414 U.S. 573, 605] </s> III </s> The Court devotes a major portion of its opinion to the elements of damages recoverable under Moragne. Ante, at 584-591. In particular, the Court embraces the Court of Appeals' suggestion, 463 F.2d 1331, 1333 (CA5 1972), that Mrs. Gaudet is entitled to seek damages for loss of "society," including love, affection, care, attention, companionship, comfort, and protection. Ante, at 585-590. Although I would not otherwise address the question of damages because I believe that no cause of action exists here, I think it important to note that the Court's holding that loss of society may be recovered is a clear example of the majority's repudiation of the congressional purposes expressed in the two federal maritime wrongful-death statutes. 14 The traditional admiralty view is that such nonpecuniary damages are not recoverable under the Death on the High Seas Act and the Jones Act. </s> The Death on the High Seas Act by its terms restricts recovery to pecuniary losses, 15 a restriction the lower [414 U.S. 573, 606] federal courts have consistently read as excluding loss of consortium and similar nonpecuniary injuries to personal relationship, affections, and sentiments. 16 Because of its relationship to the FELA and its overlapping coverage with the Death on the High Seas Act, the Jones Act also has been read as forbidding recovery of the sentimental losses approved by the Court today. 17 Moreover, these well-established damages principles under the two federal maritime wrongful-death statutes, coupled with a concern for uniformity in admiralty law, have led most lower courts that have taken part in the continuing development of the Moragne cause of action to conclude that the affection-related damages endorsed by the Court are not recoverable under Moragne. 18 These courts have [414 U.S. 573, 607] heeded Moragne's admonition not to fashion a whole new body of law, yet their holdings are disapproved by the majority. Ante, at 588 n. 23. </s> IV </s> The reasons underlying the extensive state and admiralty precedent contrary to the Court's holding that this action may be brought are not difficult to discern. The majority's statement that this precedent rests not so much on policy as on "statutory limitations on the wrongful-death action . . .," ante, at 579, is erroneous. 19 The [414 U.S. 573, 608] large number of courts that have refused to adopt the majority's view have done so for very good, practical reasons. The Court has adopted a rule that will be difficult to administer, that presents a serious risk of unfairness for those in petitioner's position, and that fails to foster the law's normal regard for finality. </s> The majority's position requires it to establish procedures to prevent a double recovery of the elements of damages awarded Gaudet in his own lawsuit. This is no easy task, as "[i]t should be obvious that as yet no satisfactory systematic solution to the whole [double recovery] problem has been found." 20 The Court adopts a collateral estoppel theory, and apparently would implement this by treating the injured seaman as a "fiduciary" for his dependents. Ante, at 593-594. Apart from the utter novelty of this extension of the law of trusts and fiduciary duties, the majority's estoppel theory is hardly a "satisfactory solution" to the problem of unfair recoveries. 21 Apparently the Court intends to limit the elements [414 U.S. 573, 609] of proof of damages that may be introduced at the second trial. But this will in no way guarantee that the second trier of fact will succeed in compartmentalizing the allowable from the unallowable elements of damages in the second trial. The highly conceptualized nature of the parsing of categories of damages undertaken by the Court suggests how unlikely it is that the majority's theoretical distinctions will be meaningful in practice. And control by way of appellate review of the injustices that are bound to occur will be, practically speaking, an impossible task. </s> Mr. Gaudet's judgment was given by a jury. It would be unrealistic to assume that that verdict was restricted to an objective measurement of Gaudet's lost earnings plus the "value" of his pain and suffering. In all likelihood, Gaudet's award reflected an element of the jury's concern for a permanently disabled working man. As anyone who has tried jury cases knows, jury sympathy commonly overcomes a theoretical inability to recover for such intangibles as loss of society. If Mrs. Gaudet is then allowed to recover in her subsequent lawsuit the full value, whatever that is, of her loss of love, attention, care, affection, companionship, comfort, and protection, she will be given a second opportunity to benefit from the imprecision built into any award for injuries that cannot be measured objectively. The Gaudet family may well then receive substantially more than just compensation for its injuries. </s> One expression of jury sympathy is commonplace, despite its conflict with the damages principles that in theory control. But certainly two opportunities for [414 U.S. 573, 610] jury sentiment cross the line between benignity and bonanza and should not be sanctioned. And, it is in those cases where the decedent's suit and the subsequent Moragne wrongful-death action are both tried to juries that the majority's procedures for preventing a windfall are most likely to break down. Since it is an admiralty action, a Moragne claim by itself will not entitle the wrongful-death claimant to a jury. But there will be cases in which the claimant will be able to join a state law action to a Moragne claim and obtain a jury for both, either in state or federal court. See, ante, at 589 n. 24. When that happens, those in petitioner's position will be subjected twice to the vagaries of a jury, the second time on such wide-open damages concepts as those embraced by the majority. </s> The Court's approval of a second recovery based on the same wrong for which decedent already had recovered, compounded by its rejection of traditional admiralty "pecuniary loss" damage standards, seems particularly inappropriate given the nature of the claim relied on by both Gaudets. The maritime concept of unseaworthiness is not based on fault. The doctrine has evolved into a judicially created form of strict liability. 22 When the law imposes absolute liability, it often restricts recovery to damages for those injuries that are clearly ascertainable and susceptible of monetary compensation. E. g., Igneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257, 268 (CA2 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 949 (1964). This reflects the impossibility of deterrence and the inappropriateness of punishment in many cases where liability is absolute. The Court has broken with that wise rule of social policy in this case. [414 U.S. 573, 611] </s> The Court also has ignored the law's normal regard for an end to duplicative litigation arising from the same transaction. After her husband's judgment was affirmed on appeal, 23 Mrs. Gaudet commenced this action by, in essence, changing a few lines in her husband's complaint and filing it again in the same United States District Court as a Moragne wrongful-death action. That court's dismissal of Mrs. Gaudet's complaint on res judicata grounds 24 is hardly surprising, given the striking similarities between the two Gaudet complaints. Both complaints were based on the maritime doctrine of unseaworthiness, a condition that Mrs. Gaudet alleged was established as a matter of res judicata by Mr. Gaudet's successful lawsuit. App. 2, 5-6. The same facts and injuries were alleged. Id., at 1-2, 4-5. Both sought recovery, in the amount of $250,000. Id., at 2, 6. Whereas Mr. Gaudet had sought recovery for lost earnings, id., at 2, Mrs. Gaudet sought compensation for her "severe financial loss." Id., at 5. Thus, on the face of the complaints, Mrs. Gaudet apparently sought recovery solely for elements of damages that had been encompassed by her husband's judgment. 25 </s> There should be strong reasons of policy to justify such repetitive suits and to impose on petitioner the attendant doubling of litigation expenses. The reasons advanced by the majority opinion do not, in my view, approach that level of persuasion. Petitioner has already fully litigated, and paid, a large judgment compensating [414 U.S. 573, 612] Gaudet's estate for the injuries Gaudet incurred on board its vessel. Ordinarily, petitioner would have been able to consider the case closed and to order its affairs on the basis of a verdict affirmed on appeal. Today's result deprives petitioner of that reliance interest, subjecting it to another round of litigation with wide-open damages possibilities. The admiralty precedents, the prevailing weight of state law, and elementary fairness call for relieving petitioner of that unjustifiable burden. </s> As noted at the outset of this dissent, the Court has written new admiralty law as to the right of survivors to recover for wrongful death and has expanded significantly the elements of damages recoverable. In reaching these results, the majority opinion has discredited, if not in substance overruled, the unanimous decisions of the Court in the Mellon and Flynn cases. In Moragne, a decision on which I believe the majority places a mistaken reliance, the Court emphasized its reluctance to disregard or overrule established precedent: </s> "Very weighty considerations underlie the principle that courts should not lightly overrule past decisions. Among these are the desirability that the law furnish a clear guide for the conduct of individuals, to enable them to plan their affairs with assurance against untoward surprise; the importance of furthering fair and expeditious adjudication by eliminating the need to relitigate every relevant proposition in every case; and the necessity of maintaining public faith in the judiciary as a source of impersonal and reasoned judgments. The reasons for rejecting any established rule must always be weighed against these factors." 398 U.S., at 403 . </s> Mr. Justice Harlan, for the Court, then went on to state with care the reasons for rejecting The Harrisburg [414 U.S. 573, 613] rule, described as an "unjustifiable anomaly." Id., at 404. The substantive rule rejected today is no comparable anomaly. It has been the generally applied doctrine since wrongful-death actions were introduced in this country. It has been the rule of the relevant federal statutes since their inception, and Congress has not modified the rule during that entire period. It was the rule announced in Mellon and Flynn, supra, cases the Court chooses not to follow today. And, unlike the opinion in Moragne, the majority has not provided, in my view, sound reasons of precedent or policy for overturning the rule. </s> [Footnote 1 46 U.S.C. 688. The Jones Act provides: "Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply; and in case of the death of any seaman as a result of any such personal injury the personal representative of such seaman may maintain an action for damages at law with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the right of action for death in the case of railway employees shall be applicable. Jurisdiction in such actions shall be under the court of the district in which the defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is located." Since the Act employs the terms "in the course of his employment . . .," the cause of action it provides "follows from the seaman's employment status and is not limited to injury or death occurring on the high seas." Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 394 (1970). Proof of negligence is a predicate to recovery. Ibid. </s> [Footnote 2 The second such statute, the Death on the High Seas Act, is discussed below. See text, infra, at 599-601 and nn. 4-6. </s> [Footnote 3 Igneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257, 266 (CA2 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 949 (1964). </s> [Footnote 4 46 U.S.C. 761 et seq. The opening section of the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. 761, provides: "Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any State, or the District of Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies of the United States, the personal representative of the decedent may maintain a suit for damages in the district courts of the United States, in admiralty, for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative against the vessel, person, or corporation which would have been liable if death had not ensued." </s> [Footnote 5 But see Pickles v. F. Leyland & Co., 10 F.2d 371 (Mass. 1925). Pickles holds that if the death occurs on land, the High Seas Act is not applicable, even though the injuries ultimately producing death were inflicted at sea. Id., at 372. If this were the correct view, it would be easy to see why cases like the instant one had not previously arisen under the High Seas Act. The Act would simply not allow actions like the present one. However, the Act says "death . . . caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas . . .," not "death occurring on the high seas." See n. 4, supra. Pickles, therefore, is probably an erroneous reading of the Act. </s> [Footnote 6 Section 765 reads: "If a person die as the result of such wrongful act, neglect, or default as is mentioned in section 761 of this title [see n. 4, supra] during the pendency in a court of admiralty of the United States of a suit to recover damages for personal injuries in respect of such act, neglect, or default, the personal representative of the decedent may be substituted as a party and the suit may proceed as a suit under this chapter for the recovery of [pecuniary losses]." </s> [Footnote 7 See n. 1, supra. </s> [Footnote 8 G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty 308 (1957). </s> [Footnote 9 E. g., Roberts v. Union Carbide Corp., 415 F.2d 474 (CA3 1969) (New Jersey law); Schlavick v. Manhattan Brewing Co., 103 F. Supp. 744 (ND Ill. 1952) (Indiana law). The cases are reviewed in W. Prosser, The Law of Torts 911-912 (4th ed. 1971) (hereafter Prosser); 2 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts 24.6 (1956 and Supp. 1968); Fleming, The Lost Years: A Problem in the Computation and Distribution of Damages, 50 Calif. L. Rev. 598, 599, 608-609 (1962) (hereafter Fleming). The latter commentator notes that "[a]t least twenty-three jurisdictions . . . have so held in the clearest terms and some half a dozen more have so indicated in dicta." Id., at 608-609, n. 38. Nine or 10 contrary jurisdictions constitute a "substantial minority view" according to Prosser 912 and nn. 35-39. However, Prosser notes that this view is "largely confined to jurisdictions which do not allow the decedent to recover for his own curtailed life . . . ." Id., at 912. As the Court points out, ante, at 593-594, the Moragne cause of action is not subject to that limitation. </s> [Footnote 10 Restatement of Torts, Explanatory Notes 925, comment a, p. 639 (1939). This position is repeated almost verbatim in the most recent working draft of the second Restatement. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, Explanatory Notes 925, comment a, p. 196 (Tent. Draft No. 19, Mar. 30, 1973). See also Restatement of Torts, Explanatory Notes 926, comment a, p. 646: "[In those states with statutes combining the functions of a death statute and a survival statute] the representatives of the deceased can recover in a single action both for the damages preceding death and for those caused by the death. Even in such States, however, a judgment obtained by the deceased or a release of the cause of action by him terminates the right of action." Accord, Restatement (Second) of Torts, Explanatory Notes 926, comment a, p. 204. See also id., Explanatory Notes 925, comment i, p. 199: "[A] release of his claim by the injured person bars an action after his death for causing the death, as also does a judgment either for, or if on the merits, against him given in an action brought by him for the tort." </s> [Footnote 11 E. g., 2 Harper & James, supra, at 1293-1294: "If . . . deceased recovers before his death, his recovery for permanent injuries will be based, under the prevailing American rule, on [414 U.S. 573, 604] his prospective earnings for the balance of his life expectancy at the time of his injury undiminished by any shortening of that expectancy as a result of the injury. Presumably any settlement would reflect the legal liability under this rule. The danger of double recovery becomes clear when it is recalled that any benefits of which the survivors were deprived, by the death, would have come out of these very prospective earnings if deceased had lived. At least in the case of serious and apparently permanent injuries, therefore, there is real danger of double recovery if a wrongful death action is allowed after recovery or release by deceased during his lifetime." (Emphasis in original; citations omitted.) See id., at n. 14: "[Double recovery] is a `theoretical' as well as a `practical' danger. . . . The prevailing rules . . . seem therefore to be fully justified." (Citation omitted.) See also Prosser 911: "The courts undoubtedly have been influenced by a fear of double recovery. This is of course possible in point of law, not only under the survival type of death act, but also in any jurisdiction where the decedent would be allowed to recover for the prospective earnings lost through his diminished life expectancy." (Citations omitted.) The latter appears to have been the measure of Mr. Gaudet's recovery in his personal-injury action. 463 F.2d 1331, 1333 n. 1 (CA5 1972); Tr. of Oral Arg. 20-21. </s> [Footnote 12 E. g., Duffey, The Maldistribution of Damages in Wrongful Death, 19 Ohio St. L. J. 264, 273 (1958): In such cases, "[t]he recovery in the wrongful death action based on the decedent's future earning capacity is . . . simply a portion or segment of the larger recovery obtained by the injured person himself in the personal injury action." See n. 11, supra. </s> [Footnote 13 Fleming 610. "[The fear of duplication of damages] has force . . . whenever allowance was made for prospective loss of earnings [in the decedent's own lawsuit], since this would have drawn on, or depleted, the fund contingently available to satisfy the dependants for loss of their expectancy of support." This commentator also states that the minority of state courts that do not view decedent recovery as a bar to a subsequent wrongful-death action and that [414 U.S. 573, 605] are "content with the bland assertion that no duplication of damages can arise because the release or recovery by the decedent could not have covered the period beyond his death . . ." are relying on a "protestation of faith rather than a conclusion drawn from proven facts . . . ." Id., at 615 (emphasis in original). </s> [Footnote 14 I do not address the correctness of the Court's holding that Moragne allows the recovery of loss of services, see, e. g., Michigan C. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 71 , 73 (1913), or funeral expenses. Compare Cities Service Oil Co. v. Launey, 403 F.2d 537, 540 (CA5 1968), with Greene v. Vantage S. S. Corp., 466 F.2d 159, 167 (CA4 1972). </s> [Footnote 15 46 U.S.C. 762. Section 762 provides: "The recovery in such suit shall be a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit the suit is brought and shall be apportioned among them by the court in proportion to the loss they may severally have suffered by reason of the death of the person by whose representative the suit is brought." </s> [Footnote 16 E. g., Igneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d, at 266 n. 21; Middleton v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 70 F.2d 326, 330 (CA2), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 577 (1934). See Dugas v. National Aircraft Corp., 438 F.2d 1386, 1392 (CA3 1971) ("The amount of recovery under the Death on the High Seas Act is determined by the actual pecuniary loss sustained by the beneficiary due to the wrongful death"). </s> [Footnote 17 E. g., Igneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, supra, at 266 ("[I]t is established . . . that the damages recoverable by a seaman's widow suing for wrongful death under the Jones Act do not include recovery for loss of consortium"). Cf. Cities Service Oil Co. v. Launey, supra, at 540. See Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. McGinnis, 228 U.S. 173, 175 (1913); Michigan C. R. Co. v. Vreeland, supra, at 68, 70-71; G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty 306 (1957): "Recovery under the High Seas Act like that under FELA 51 [and thus the Jones Act] is based on pecuniary loss to the beneficiaries as a result of the wrongful death. The damage calculation therefore involves an estimate of what the decedent's life expectancy would have been, his probable earnings during that period and the amounts he would have contributed to beneficiaries." </s> [Footnote 18 E. g., Simpson v. Knutsen, 444 F.2d 523 (CA9 1971); Petition of United States Steel Corp., 436 F.2d 1256, 1279 (CA6 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 987 (1971); In re Cambria S. S. Co., 353 F. Supp. 691, 697-698 (ND Ohio 1973); Green v. Ross, 338 F. Supp. [414 U.S. 573, 607] 365, 367 (SD Fla. 1972); Petition of Canal Barge Co., 323 F. Supp. 805, 820-821 (ND Miss. 1971). The state courts of Louisiana, the State where Mr. Gaudet's injuries occurred, have reached the same result. Strickland v. Nutt, 264 So.2d 317, 322 (La. App.), aff'd sub nom. DeRouen v. Nutt, 262 La. 1123, 266 So.2d 432 (1972). ("The Moragne case, with the desire for uniformity in maritime death actions announced therein, precludes loss of love and affection as an element of damage here.") Only one Fifth Circuit case, other than the instant case, and two cases from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana have concluded that Moragne signaled a break with settled admiralty wrongful-death damages rules. Dennis v. Central Gulf S. S. Corp., 453 F.2d 137, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972); In re Farrell Lines, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 91 (1971); In re Sincere Navigation Corp., 329 F. Supp. 652 (1971). In the latter case, the court candidly admitted that its decision "may conflict with Moragne's goal of uniformity of recovery for all who perish on navigable water." Id., at 657. </s> [Footnote 19 The majority's opinion, apparently in an effort to avoid the force of precedent contrary to its view, contrasts disparagingly these statutes with the more "humane" judge-made rule of Moragne. Ante, at 581-583. But the majority ignores the extent to which the Court in Moragne expressly identified its holding with the policy and principles of the very statutes now criticized: "The policy thus established [by the state and federal wrongful-death statutes] has become itself a part of our law, to be given its appropriate weight not only in matters of statutory construction [414 U.S. 573, 608] but also in those of decisional law." 398 U.S., at 390 -391. And, again: "Both the Death on the High Seas Act and the numerous state wrongful-death acts have been implemented with success for decades. The experience thus built up counsels that a suit for wrongful death raises no problems unlike those that have long been grist for the judicial mill." Id., at 408. Contrary to the Court's intimations, there is no basis for suggesting a tension between these statutes and Moragne. Indeed, it is clear from the Moragne opinion that the Court relied upon the statutes in its analysis, sought only to fill a narrow gap in the law left by them, and considered that the statutes afforded "persuasive analogy for guidance" in developing the Moragne cause of action. Ibid. </s> [Footnote 20 Prosser 912 (footnote omitted). </s> [Footnote 21 The theory probably creates more problems than it resolves. What are the boundaries of the class of potential beneficiaries who are estopped to relitigate loss of support? If a seriously injured person is the fiduciary for an undefined class of potential beneficiaries, may he be enjoined from wasting his assets or disinheriting members [414 U.S. 573, 609] of his family? There will also be some nice questions under the majority's approach about whether a particular item of proof at the second trial is to be introduced with regard to the forbidden issue of support or the permissible issue of, say, services. </s> [Footnote 22 Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S., at 399 . Cf., Comment, Maritime Wrongful Death After Moragne: The Seaman's Legal Lifeboat, 59 Geo. L. J. 1411 n. 4 (1971). </s> [Footnote 23 Stein v. Sea-Land Services, Inc., 440 F.2d 1181 (CA5 1971). It might be noted that because Gaudet's death intervened between the jury verdict and the appeal, his recovery went directly to his estate, not to him personally. </s> [Footnote 24 Pet. for Cert. 17. </s> [Footnote 25 Although the majority fails to address the point, presumably its result means that Mrs. Gaudet must at least amend her complaint upon remand to the District Court. </s> [414 U.S. 573, 614]

United States Supreme Court SOUTH CAROLINA v. BAKER(1988) No. 94 Argued: December 7, 1987Decided: April 20, 1988 </s> Section 310(b)(1) of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 removes the federal income tax exemption for interest earned on publicly offered long-term bonds (hereinafter referred to as bonds) issued by state and local governments (hereinafter referred to collectively as States) unless those bonds are issued in registered (as opposed to bearer) form. South Carolina invoked this Court's original jurisdiction, contending that 310(b)(1) is constitutionally invalid under the Tenth Amendment and the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity. A Special Master was appointed. After conducting hearings and taking evidence, he concluded that 310(b)(1) is constitutional and recommended entering judgment for the defendant. South Carolina and the National Governors' Association (NGA), as an intervenor, filed exceptions to various factual findings of the Master and to his legal conclusions concerning their constitutional challenges. </s> Held: </s> 1. Section 310(b)(1) does not violate the Tenth Amendment or constitutional principles of federalism by effectively compelling States to issue bonds in registered form. Pp. 511-515. </s> (a) The Tenth Amendment limits on Congress' authority to regulate state activities are structural, not substantive - that is, the States must find their protection from congressional regulation through the national political process, not through judicially defined spheres of unregulable state activity. In this case, South Carolina has not even alleged that it was deprived of any right to participate in the national political process or that it was singled out in a way that left it politically isolated and powerless. The allegations South Carolina does make - that Congress was uninformed and chose an ineffective remedy - do not amount to an allegation that the political process operated in a defective manner. Pp. 512-513. </s> (b) NGA's contention that 310 is invalid because it commandeers the state legislative and administrative process by coercing States into enacting legislation authorizing bond registration and into administering the registration scheme finds no support in the claim left open by FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 . Section 310 regulates state activities; it does not, as did the statute in FERC, seek to control or influence the [485 U.S. 505, 506] manner in which States regulate private parties. That a State wishing to engage in certain activity must take administrative and sometimes legislative action to comply with federal standards regulating that activity is a commonplace that presents no constitutional defect. Moreover, under NGA's theory, any State could immunize its activities from federal regulation by simply codifying the manner in which it engages in those activities. Pp. 513-515. </s> 2. Section 310(b)(1) does not violate the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity by taxing the interest earned on unregistered state bonds. Section 310(b)(1) is inconsistent with this Court's holding in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 , that state bond interest was immune from a nondiscriminatory federal tax, but that decision has been effectively overruled by subsequent case law. Under the intergovernmental tax immunity jurisprudence prevailing at Pollock's time, neither the Federal nor the State Governments could tax income that an individual directly derived from any contract with the other government. This general rule was based on the rationale that any tax on income a party received under a contract with the government was a tax on the contract and thus a tax "on" the government because it burdened the government's power to enter into the contract. That rationale has been repudiated by modern intergovernmental tax immunity case law, and the government contract immunities have been, one by one, overruled. The owners of state bonds have no constitutional entitlement not to pay taxes on income they earn from the bonds, and States have no constitutional entitlement to issue bonds paying lower interest rates than other issuers. The nondiscriminatory tax under 310 is imposed on and collected from bondholders, not States, and any increased administrative costs incurred by States in implementing the registration system are not "taxes" within the meaning of the tax immunity doctrine. Moreover, the provisions of 310 seek to assure that all publicly offered long-term bonds are issued in registered form, whether issued by state or local governments, the Federal Government, or private corporations. Pp. 515-527. </s> Exceptions to Special Master's Report overruled, and judgment entered for defendant. </s> BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, and in which SCALIA, J., joined except for Part II. STEVENS, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 527. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 528. REHNQUIST, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 528. O'CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 530. KENNEDY, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. [485 U.S. 505, 507] </s> John P. Linton argued the cause for plaintiff. With him on the brief were Charlton deSaussure, Jr., T. Travis Medlock, Attorney General of South Carolina, Frank K. Sloan, Chief Deputy Attorney General, and Grady L. Patterson III. </s> Lewis B. Kaden argued the cause for plaintiff-in-intervention National Governors' Association. With him on the briefs were James D. Liss, Barry Friedman, and Richard B. Geltman. </s> Solicitor General Fried argued the cause for defendant. With him on the brief were Acting Assistant Attorney General Durney, Deputy Solicitor General Lauber, Andrew J. Pincus, Michael L. Paup, and Francis M. Allegra. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania et al. by LeRoy S. Zimmerman, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Michael A. Roman, Deputy Attorney General, and Suellen M. Wolfe, Chief Deputy Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Grace Berg Schaible of Alaska, Robert K. Corbin of Arizona, Robert Butterworth of Florida, Warren Price III of Hawaii, Linley E. Pearson of Indiana, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, William J. Guste, Jr., of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Edwin L. Pittman of Mississippi, William L. Webster of Missouri, Mike Greely of Montana, Stephen E. Merrill of New Hampshire, W. Cary Edwards of New Jersey, Lacy H. Thornburg of North Carolina, Nicholas Spaeth of North Dakota, Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., of Ohio, Robert Henry of Oklahoma, Jeffrey Amestoy of Vermont, Mary Sue Terry of Virginia, Charlie Brown of West Virginia, Donald J. Hanaway of Wisconsin, and Joseph B. Meyer of Wyoming; for the Government Finance Officers Association by John J. Keohane and Donald J. Robinson; and for the Public Securities Association by Glenn M. Young, Paul E. Gutermann, and Joseph R. Cortese. </s> JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Section 310(b)(1) of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. 97-248, 96 Stat. 596, 26 U.S.C. 103(j)(1), removes the federal income tax exemption for interest earned on publicly offered long-term bonds issued by state and local governments unless those bonds are [485 U.S. 505, 508] issued in registered form. 1 This original jurisdiction case presents the issues whether 310(b)(1) of TEFRA either (1) violates the Tenth Amendment and constitutional principles of federalism by compelling States to issue bonds in registered form or (2) violates the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity by taxing the interest earned on unregistered state bonds. </s> I </s> Historically, bonds have been issued as either registered bonds or bearer bonds. These two types of bonds differ in the mechanisms used for transferring ownership and making payments. Ownership of a registered bond is recorded on a central list, and a transfer of record ownership requires entering the change on that list. 2 The record owner automatically receives interest payments by check or electronic transfer of funds from the issuer's paying agent. Ownership of a bearer bond, in contrast, is presumed from possession and is transferred by physically handing over the bond. The bondowner obtains interest payments by presenting bond coupons to a bank that in turn presents the coupons to the issuer's paying agent. </s> In 1982, Congress enacted TEFRA, which contains a variety of provisions, including 310, designed to reduce the federal deficit by promoting compliance with the tax laws. Congress had become concerned about the growing magnitude of tax evasion; Internal Revenue Service (IRS) studies indicated that unreported income had grown from an estimated range of $31.1 billion to $32.2 billion in 1973 to a range of $93.3 billion to $97 billion in 1981. Compliance Gap: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Internal [485 U.S. 505, 509] Revenue Service of the Senate Committee on Finance, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 (1982). Unregistered bonds apparently became a focus of attention because they left no paper trail and thus facilitated tax evasion. Then Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy John Chapoton testified before the House Ways and Means Committee that a registration requirement would help prevent tax evasion because bearer bonds often represent unreported and untaxed income that, without a system of recorded ownership, the IRS has difficulty reconstructing. Hearings on H. R. 6300 before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 35 (1982). He also expressed concern that bearer bonds were being used to avoid estate and gift taxes and as a medium of exchange in the illegal sector. Ibid. In reporting out the bill containing the provision that eventually became 310 of TEFRA, the Senate Finance Committee Report expressed the same concerns: </s> "The committee believes that a fair and efficient system of information reporting and withholding cannot be achieved with respect to interest-bearing obligations as long as a significant volume of long-term bearer instruments is issued. A system of book-entry registration will preserve the liquidity of obligations while requiring the creation of ownership records that can produce useful information reports with respect to both the payment of interest and the sale of obligations prior to maturity through brokers. Furthermore, registration will reduce the ability of noncompliant taxpayers to conceal income and property from the reach of the income, estate, and gift taxes. Finally, the registration requirement may reduce the volume of readily negotiable substitutes for cash available to persons engaged in illegal activities." S. Rep. No. 97-494, Vol. 1, p. 242 (1982). </s> Section 310 was designed to meet these concerns by providing powerful incentives to issue bonds in registered form. [485 U.S. 505, 510] </s> Because 310 aims to address the tax evasion concerns posed generally by unregistered bonds, it covers not only state bonds but also bonds issued by the United States and private corporations. Section 310(a) requires the United States to issue publicly offered bonds with a maturity of more than one year in registered form. 3 With respect to similar bonds issued by private corporations, 310(b)(2)-(6) impose a series of tax penalties on nonregistration. Corporations declining to issue the covered bonds in registered form lose tax deductions and adjustments for interest paid on the bonds, 310(b)(2) and (3), and must pay a special excise tax on the bond principal, 310(b)(4). Holders of these unregistered corporate bonds generally cannot deduct capital losses or claim capital-gain treatment for any losses or gains sustained on the bonds. 310(b)(5) and (6). Section 310 (b)(1) completes this statutory scheme by denying the federal income tax exemption for interest earned on state bonds to owners of long-term publicly offered state bonds that are not issued in registered form. </s> South Carolina invoked the original jurisdiction of this Court, contending that 310(b)(1) is constitutionally invalid under the Tenth Amendment and the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity. We granted South Carolina leave to file the instant complaint against the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367 (1984), and appointed as Special Master the Honorable Samuel J. Roberts, 466 U.S. 948 (1984). The National Governors' Association (NGA) intervened. 4 After conducting hearings and taking evidence, the Special Master concluded that 310(b)(1) was constitutional and recommended [485 U.S. 505, 511] entering judgment for the defendant. South Carolina and the NGA filed exceptions to various factual findings of the Special Master and to the Master's legal conclusions concerning their constitutional challenges. </s> II </s> We address the claim that 310(b)(1) violates the Tenth Amendment first. 5 South Carolina and the NGA contend, and the Master found, that 310 effectively requires States to issue bonds in registered form, noting that if States issued bonds in unregistered form, competition from other nonexempt bonds would force States to increase the interest paid on state bonds by 28-35%, and that even though almost all state bonds were issued in bearer form before 310 became effective, since then no State has issued a bearer bond. Report of Special Master 2, 23-24. South Carolina and the NGA thus argue that, for purposes of Tenth Amendment analysis, we must treat 310 as if it simply banned bearer bonds altogether without giving States the option to issue nonexempt bearer bonds. The Secretary does not dispute the finding that 310 effectively requires registration, see Brief for Defendant 19 (urging the Court to adopt all the Master's findings), preferring to argue that 310 survives Tenth Amendment scrutiny because a blanket prohibition by Congress on the issuance of bearer bonds can apply to States without violating the Tenth Amendment. For the purposes of Tenth Amendment analysis, then, we treat 310 as if it directly regulated States by prohibiting outright the issuance of bearer bonds. 6 </s> [485 U.S. 505, 512] </s> A </s> The Tenth Amendment limits on Congress' authority to regulate state activities are set out in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Garcia holds that the limits are structural, not substantive - i. e., that States must find their protection from congressional regulation through the national political process, not through judicially defined spheres of unregulable state activity. Id., at 537-554. South Carolina contends that the political process failed here because Congress had no concrete evidence quantifying the tax evasion attributable to unregistered state bonds and relied instead on anecdotal evidence that taxpayers have concealed taxable income using bearer bonds. It also argues that Congress chose an ineffective remedy by requiring registration because most bond sales are handled by brokers who must file information reports regardless of the form of the bond and because beneficial ownership of registered bonds need not necessarily be recorded. </s> Although Garcia left open the possibility that some extraordinary defects in the national political process might render congressional regulation of state activities invalid under the Tenth Amendment, the Court in Garcia had no occasion to identify or define the defects that might lead to such invalidation. See id., at 556. Nor do we attempt any definitive articulation here. It suffices to observe that South [485 U.S. 505, 513] Carolina has not even alleged that it was deprived of any right to participate in the national political process or that it was singled out in a way that left it politically isolated and powerless. Cf. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 , n. 4 (1938). Rather, South Carolina argues that the political process failed here because 310(b)(1) was "imposed by the vote of an uninformed Congress relying upon incomplete information." Brief for Plaintiff 101. 7 But nothing in Garcia or the Tenth Amendment authorizes courts to second-guess the substantive basis for congressional legislation. Cf. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981). Where, as here, the national political process did not operate in a defective manner, the Tenth Amendment is not implicated. </s> B </s> The NGA argues that 310 is invalid because it commandeers the state legislative and administrative process by coercing States into enacting legislation authorizing bond registration and into administering the registration scheme. They cite FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982), which left open the possibility that the Tenth Amendment might set some limits on Congress' power to compel States to regulate on behalf of federal interests, id., at 761-764. The extent to which the Tenth Amendment claim left open in FERC survives Garcia or poses constitutional limitations independent of those discussed in Garcia is far from clear. We need not, however, address that issue because we find the claim discussed in FERC inapplicable to 310. [485 U.S. 505, 514] </s> The federal statute at issue in FERC required state utility commissions to do the following: (1) adjudicate and enforce federal standards, (2) either consider adopting certain federal standards or cease regulating public utilities, and (3) follow certain procedures. The Court in FERC first distinguished National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), noting that the statute in National League of Cities presented questions concerning "the extent to which state sovereignty shields the States from generally applicable federal regulations," whereas the statute in FERC "attempts to use state regulatory machinery to advance federal goals." FERC, 456 U.S., at 759 . The Court in FERC then concluded that, whatever constitutional limitations might exist on the federal power to compel state regulatory activity, Congress had the power to require that state adjudicative bodies adjudicate federal issues and to require that States regulating in a pre-emptible field consider suggested federal standards and follow federally mandated procedures. Id., at 759-767. </s> Because, by hypothesis, 310 effectively prohibits issuing unregistered bonds, it presents the very situation FERC distinguished from a commandeering of state regulatory machinery: the extent to which the Tenth Amendment "shields the States from generally applicable federal regulations." 456 U.S., at 759 . Section 310 regulates state activities; it does not, as did the statute in FERC, seek to control or influence the manner in which States regulate private parties. The NGA nonetheless contends that 310 has commandeered the state legislative and administrative process because many state legislatures had to amend a substantial number of statutes in order to issue bonds in registered form and because state officials had to devote substantial effort to determine how best to implement a registered bond system. Such "commandeering" is, however, an inevitable consequence of regulating a state activity. Any federal regulation demands compliance. That a State wishing to engage in certain [485 U.S. 505, 515] activity must take administrative and sometimes legislative action to comply with federal standards regulating that activity is a commonplace that presents no constitutional defect. After Garcia, for example, several States and municipalities had to take administrative and legislative action to alter the employment practices or raise the funds necessary to comply with the wage and overtime provisions of the Federal Labor Standards Act. 8 Indeed, even the pre-Garcia line of Tenth Amendment cases recognized that Congress could constitutionally impose federal requirements on States that States could meet only by amending their statutes. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 253 -254, and n. 2 (1983) (Burger, C. J., dissenting) (citing state statutes from over half the States that did not comply with the federal statute upheld by the Court). Under the NGA's theory, moreover, any State could immunize its activities from federal regulation by simply codifying the manner in which it engages in those activities. In short, the NGA's theory of "commandeering" would not only render Garcia a nullity, but would also restrict congressional regulation of state activities even more tightly than it was restricted under the now overruled National League of Cities line of cases. We find the theory foreclosed by precedent, and uphold the constitutionality of 310 under the Tenth Amendment. </s> III </s> South Carolina contends that even if a statute banning state bearer bonds entirely would be constitutional, 310 unconstitutionally violates the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity because it imposes a tax on the interest earned on a state bond. We agree with South Carolina that 310 is [485 U.S. 505, 516] inconsistent with Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), which held that any interest earned on a state bond was immune from federal taxation. </s> The Secretary and the Master, however, suggest that we should uphold the constitutionality of 310 without explicitly overruling Pollock because 310 does not abolish the tax exemption for state bond interest entirely but rather taxes the interest on state bonds only if the bonds are not issued in the form Congress requires. In our view, however, this suggestion implicitly rests on a rather mischievous proposition of law. If, for example, Congress imposed a tax that applied exclusively to South Carolina and levied the tax directly on the South Carolina treasury, we would be obligated to adjudicate the constitutionality of that tax even if Congress allowed South Carolina to escape the tax by restructuring its state government in a way Congress found more to its liking. The United States cannot convert an unconstitutional tax into a constitutional one simply by making the tax conditional. Whether Congress could have imposed the condition by direct regulation is irrelevant; Congress cannot employ unconstitutional means to reach a constitutional end. Under Pollock, a tax on the interest income derived from any state bond was considered a direct tax on the State and thus unconstitutional. 157 U.S., at 585 -586. If this constitutional rule still applies, Congress cannot threaten to tax the interest on state bonds that do not conform to congressional dictates. We thus decline to follow a suggestion that would force us to embrace implicitly a proposition of law far more controversial than the current validity of Pollock's ban on taxing state bond interest, and proceed to address whether Pollock should be explicitly overruled. 9 </s> [485 U.S. 505, 517] </s> Under the intergovernmental tax immunity jurisprudence prevailing at the time, Pollock did not represent a unique immunity limited to income derived from state bonds. Rather, Pollock merely represented one application of the more general rule that neither the Federal nor the State Governments could tax income an individual directly derived from any contract with another government. 10 Not only was it unconstitutional for the Federal Government to tax a bondowner on the interest he or she received on any state bond, but it was also unconstitutional to tax a state employee on the income earned from his employment contract, Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (1871), to tax a lessee on income derived from lands leased from a State, Burnet v. Coronado Oil, 285 U.S. 393 (1932), or to impose a sales tax on proceeds a vendor derived from selling a product to a state agency, Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570 (1931). Income derived from the same kinds of contracts with the Federal Government were likewise immune from taxation by the States. See Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 2 Pet. 449 (1829) (federal bond interest immune from state taxation); Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County, 16 Pet. 435 (1842) (federal employee immune from state tax on salary); Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501 (1922) (income derived from federal lease immune from state tax); Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218 (1928) (vendor immune from sales tax on vendor's proceeds from sale to the United States). Cases concerning the tax immunity of income derived from state contracts freely cited principles established in federal tax immunity cases, and vice versa. See, e. g., [485 U.S. 505, 518] Coronado Oil, supra, at 398; Indian Motocycle, supra, at 575-579; Pollock, supra, at 586. See generally Indian Motocycle, supra, at 575 (immunity of States from federal tax equal to immunity of Federal Government from state tax); Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 521 -522 (1926); Collector v. Day, supra, at 127. </s> This general rule was based on the rationale that any tax on income a party received under a contract with the government was a tax on the contract and thus a tax "on" the government because it burdened the government's power to enter into the contract. The Court in Pollock borrowed its reasoning directly from the decision in Weston exempting federal bond interest from state taxation: </s> "`The right to tax the contract to any extent, when made, must operate upon the power to borrow before it is exercised, and have a sensible influence on the contract. The extent of this influence depends on the will of a distinct government. To any extent, however inconsiderable, it is a burthen on the operations of government. . . . The tax on government stock is thought by this court to be a tax on the contract, a tax on the [government's] power to borrow money . . . and consequently to be repugnant to the Constitution.'" Pollock, supra, at 586, quoting Weston, supra, at 467, 468. </s> Thus, although a tax was collected from an independent private party, the tax was considered to be "on" the government because the tax burden might be passed on to it through the contract. This reasoning was used to define the basic scope of both federal and state tax immunities with respect to all types of government contracts. 11 See, e. g., Coronado Oil, [485 U.S. 505, 519] supra, at 400-401 ("Here the lease . . . was an instrumentality of the State . . . . To tax the income of the lessee arising therefrom would amount to an imposition upon the lease itself"); Panhandle Oil, supra, at 222 ("It is immaterial that the seller and not the purchaser is required to report and make payment to the State. Sale and purchase constitute a transaction by which the tax is measured and on which the burden rests"); Gillespie, supra, at 505-506 ("`A tax upon the leases is a tax upon the power to make them . . .'" (quoting Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U.S. 522, 530 (1916))). The commonality of the rationale underlying all these immunities for government contracts [485 U.S. 505, 520] was highlighted by Indian Motocycle, 283 U.S. 570 (1931). In that case, the Court reviewed the then current status of intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine, observing that a tax on interest earned on a state or federal bond was unconstitutional because it would burden the exercise of the government's power to borrow money and that a tax on the salary of a State or Federal Government employee was unconstitutional because it would burden the government's power to obtain the employee's services. Id., at 576-578. It then concluded that under the same principle a sales tax imposed on a vendor for a sale to a state agency was unconstitutional because it would burden the sale transaction. Id., at 579. </s> The rationale underlying Pollock and the general immunity for government contract income has been thoroughly repudiated by modern intergovernmental immunity case law. In Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939), the Court announced: "The theory . . . that a tax on income is legally or economically a tax on its source, is no longer tenable." Id., at 480. The Court explained: </s> "So much of the burden of a non-discriminatory general tax upon the incomes of employees of a government, state or national, as may be passed on economically to that government, through the effect of the tax on the price level of labor or materials, is but the normal incident of the organization within the same territory of two governments, each possessing the taxing power. The burden, so far as it can be said to exist or to affect the government in any indirect or incidental way, is one which the Constitution presupposes . . . ." Id., at 487. </s> See also James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 160 (1937) (the fact that a tax on a Government contractor "may increase the cost to the Government . . . would not invalidate the tax"); Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 424 (1938). The thoroughness with which the Court abandoned the burden theory was demonstrated most emphatically when the Court upheld a state sales tax imposed on a Government [485 U.S. 505, 521] contractor even though the financial burden of the tax was entirely passed on, through a cost-plus contract, to the Federal Government. Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941). The Court stated: </s> "The Government, rightly we think, disclaims any contention that the Constitution, unaided by Congressional legislation, prohibits a tax exacted from the contractors merely because it is passed on economically, by the terms of the contract or otherwise, as part of the construction cost to the Government. So far as such a non-discriminatory state tax upon the contractor enters into the cost of the materials to the Government, that is but a normal incident of the organization within the same territory of two independent taxing sovereignties. The asserted right of the one to be free of taxation by the other does not spell immunity from paying the added costs, attributable to the taxation of those who furnish supplies to the Government and who have been granted no tax immunity. So far as a different view has prevailed, we think it no longer tenable." Id., at 8-9 (citations omitted). </s> King & Boozer thus completely foreclosed any claim that the nondiscriminatory imposition of costs on private entities that pass them on to States or the Federal Government unconstitutionally burdens state or federal functions. Subsequent cases have consistently reaffirmed the principle that a non-discriminatory tax collected from private parties contracting with another government is constitutional even though part or all of the financial burden falls on the other government. See Washington v. United States, 460 U.S. 536, 540 (1983); United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 734 (1982); United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 460 -462, and n. 9 (1977); United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 469 (1958). </s> With the rationale for conferring a tax immunity on parties dealing with another government rejected, the government [485 U.S. 505, 522] contract immunities recognized under prior doctrine were, one by one, eliminated. Overruling Burnet v. Coronado Oil, 285 U.S. 393 (1932), and Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501 (1922), the Court upheld the constitutionality of a federal tax on net income a corporation derived from a state lease in Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938). See also Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 (1949) (upholding constitutionality of state tax on gross income derived from Indian lease). Later, the Court explicitly overruled Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (1871), and upheld the constitutionality of a nondiscriminatory state tax on the salary of a federal employee. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, supra. 12 And in the course of upholding a sales tax on a cost-plus Government contractor, the Court in King & Boozer overruled Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218 (1928). See also James, supra (upholding state tax on gross income independent contractor received from Federal Government). The only premodern tax immunity for parties to government contracts that has so far avoided being explicitly overruled is the immunity for recipients of governmental bond interest. 13 That this Court [485 U.S. 505, 523] has yet to overrule Pollock explicitly, however, is explained not by any distinction between the income derived from government bonds and the income derived from other government contracts, but by the historical fact that Congress has always exempted state bond interest from taxation by statute, beginning with the very first federal income tax statute. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, II(B), 38 Stat. 168. </s> In sum, then, under current intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine the States can never tax the United States directly but can tax any private parties with whom it does business, even though the financial burden falls on the United States, as long as the tax does not discriminate against the United States or those with whom it deals. See Washington, supra, at 540; County of Fresno, supra, at 460-463; City of Detroit, supra, at 473; Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, supra, at 359-364. A tax is considered to be directly on the Federal Government only "when the levy falls on the United States itself, or on an agency or instrumentality so closely connected to the Government that the two cannot realistically be viewed as separate entities." New Mexico, supra, at 735. The rule with respect to state tax immunity is essentially the same, see, e. g., Graves, supra, at 485; Mountain Producers Corp., supra, at 386-387, except that at least some nondiscriminatory federal taxes can be collected directly from the States even though a parallel state tax could not be collected directly from the Federal Government. 14 See generally n. 11, supra. [485 U.S. 505, 524] </s> We thus confirm that subsequent case law has overruled the holding in Pollock that state bond interest is immune from a nondiscriminatory federal tax. We see no constitutional reason for treating persons who receive interest on government bonds differently than persons who receive income from other types of contracts with the government, and no tenable rationale for distinguishing the costs imposed on States by a tax on state bond interest from the costs imposed [485 U.S. 505, 525] by a tax on the income from any other state contract. We stated in Graves that "as applied to the taxation of salaries of the employees of one government, the purpose of the immunity was not to confer benefits on the employees by relieving them from contributing their share of the financial support of the other government, whose benefits they enjoy, or to give an advantage to a government by enabling it to engage employees at salaries lower than those paid for like services by other employers, public or private . . . ." 306 U.S., at 483 . Likewise, the owners of state bonds have no constitutional entitlement not to pay taxes on income they earn from state bonds, and States have no constitutional entitlement to issue bonds paying lower interest rates than other issuers. 15 </s> [485 U.S. 505, 526] </s> Indeed, this Court has in effect acknowledged that a holder of a Government bond could constitutionally be taxed on bond interest in Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner, 459 U.S. 392 (1983), which involved a state tax on federal bond interest. Although that case involved an interpretation of 31 U.S.C. 742, we premised our statutory interpretation on the observation that "[o]ur decisions have treated 742 as principally a restatement of the constitutional rule." 459 U.S., at 397 . We then stated: "Where, as here, the economic but not the legal incidence of the tax falls upon the Federal Government, such a tax generally does not violate the constitutional immunity if it does not discriminate against holders of federal property or those with whom the Federal Government deals." Ibid. (emphasis added). </s> TEFRA 310 thus clearly imposes no direct tax on the States. The tax is imposed on and collected from bondholders, not States, and any increased administrative costs incurred by States in implementing the registration system are not "taxes" within the meaning of the tax immunity doctrine. See generally United States v. Mississippi Tax Comm'n, 421 U.S. 599, 606 (1975) (describing tax as an enforced contribution to provide for the support of government). Nor does 310 discriminate against States. The provisions of 310 seek to assure that all publicly offered long-term bonds are issued in registered form, whether issued by state or local [485 U.S. 505, 527] governments, the Federal Government, or private corporations. See supra, at 510. Accordingly, the Federal Government has directly imposed the same registration requirement on itself that it has effectively imposed on States. The incentives States have to switch to registered bonds are necessarily different than those of corporate bond issuers because only state bonds enjoy any exemption from the federal tax on bond interest, but the sanctions for issuing unregistered corporate bonds are comparably severe. See ibid. Removing the tax exemption for interest earned on state bonds would not, moreover, create a discrimination between state and corporate bonds since corporate bond interest is already subject to federal tax. </s> IV </s> Because the federal imposition of a bond registration requirement on States does not violate the Tenth Amendment and because a nondiscriminatory federal tax on the interest earned on state bonds does not violate the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine, we uphold the constitutionality of 310(b)(1), 16 overrule the exceptions to the Special Master's Report, and approve his recommendation to enter judgment for the defendant. </s> It is so ordered. </s> JUSTICE KENNEDY took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 For simplicity, we will refer to state and local governments collectively as "States" and will refer to publicly offered long-term bonds as "bonds." </s> [Footnote 2 The record owner of a registered bond may sometimes differ, however, from the beneficial owner, and sellers can transfer beneficial ownership of most types of registered bonds without entering a change on the central list. </s> [Footnote 3 Section 310 also provides various special exceptions to the registration requirements and incentives provided under subsections (a) and (b) for long-term publicly offered bonds issued by private corporations and Federal and State Governments, but those exceptions are not relevant here. </s> [Footnote 4 The Special Master's recommendation to grant the NGA's motion for leave to intervene is hereby adopted. </s> [Footnote 5 We use "the Tenth Amendment" to encompass any implied constitutional limitation on Congress' authority to regulate state activities, whether grounded in the Tenth Amendment itself or in principles of federalism derived generally from the Constitution. </s> [Footnote 6 Given our holding infra, at 524-525, that a federal tax on the interest paid on state bonds does not violate the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine, one could argue that any law exempting state bond interest from the tax applicable to interest on other bonds is, in effect, a subsidy, and [485 U.S. 505, 512] that Congress' decision to subsidize only registered state bonds must be judged under our Spending Clause cases. See generally South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 -211 (1987) (stating that "a perceived Tenth Amendment limitation on congressional regulation of state affairs did not concomitantly limit the range of conditions legitimately placed on federal grants," but that at some point "the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive" as to be unconstitutional). The parties have not, however, chosen to attack or defend 310(b)(1) based on a Spending Clause theory, and we decline to address the unlitigated issues of whether Spending Clause analysis applies or what its import would be in this case. </s> [Footnote 7 South Carolina also filed a number of exceptions to the Master's findings that the registration requirement imposed little financial or administrative burden on States and had little effect on States' ability to raise capital. These exceptions, and the NGA's exception to the Master's failure to find an interest rate differential between registered and bearer bonds, raise no issue concerning the operation of the national political process, and we need not address them here. </s> [Footnote 8 See generally Hearings on S. 1570 before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); The Impact of the Supreme Court's Garcia Decision Upon States and Their Political Subdivisions: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Economic Goals and Intergovernmental Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). </s> [Footnote 9 The Secretary also argues that we need not reach the tax immunity issue on the ground that, because all state bonds have been issued in registered form since 310 became effective, no federal tax on state bearer bond interest has ever actually been imposed. We see no reason, however, why [485 U.S. 505, 517] South Carolina cannot bring a facial challenge to 310 rather than an as-applied challenge. </s> [Footnote 10 Income indirectly derived from a contract with the government was treated differently. See, e. g., Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U.S. 216, 227 -230 (1931) (constitutional to tax capital gain on sale of state bond because State not a party to the sale contract); see also Greiner v. Lewellyn, 258 U.S. 384 (1922) (constitutional to tax transfer of estate even though state bonds are included in determining the value of the estate). </s> [Footnote 11 The sources of the state and federal immunities are, of course, different: the state immunity arises from the constitutional structure and a concern for protecting state sovereignty whereas the federal immunity arises from the Supremacy Clause. The immunities have also differed somewhat in their underlying political theory and in their doctrinal contours. Many of this Court's opinions have suggested that the Constitution should be interpreted [485 U.S. 505, 519] to confer a greater tax immunity on the Federal Government than on States because all the people of the States are represented in the Federal Government whereas all the people of the Federal Government are not represented in individual States. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 412 (1938); McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 435-436 (1819); New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 577 , and n. 3 (1946) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). In fact, the federal tax immunity has always been greater than the States' immunity. The Federal Government, for example, possesses the power to enact statutes immunizing those with whom it deals from state taxation even if intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine would not otherwise confer an immunity. See, e. g., Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 478 (1939). The States lack any such power. Also, although the Federal Government has always enjoyed blanket immunity from any state tax considered to be "on" the Government under the prevailing methodology, the States have never enjoyed immunity from all federal taxes considered to be "on" a State. See infra, at 523, and n. 14. To some, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), may suggest further limitations on state tax immunity. We need not, however, decide here the extent to which the scope of the federal and state immunities differ or the extent, if any, to which States are currently immune from direct nondiscriminatory federal taxation. It is enough for our purposes that federal and state tax immunity cases have always shared the identical methodology for determining whether a tax is "on" a government, and that this identity has persisted even though the methodology for both federal and state immunities has changed as intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine shifted into the modern era. See Graves, supra, at 485. </s> [Footnote 12 Prior to that the Court had already confined Collector v. Day to its facts in Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938), which upheld the constitutionality of a federal tax on the salaries of state employees involved in state construction projects. </s> [Footnote 13 South Carolina and the Government Finance Officers Association as amicus curiae argue that the legislative history of the Sixteenth Amendment, which authorizes Congress to "collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment," manifests an intent to freeze into the Constitution the tax immunity for state bond interest that existed in 1913. We disagree. The legislative history merely shows that the words "from whatever source derived" of the Sixteenth Amendment were not affirmatively intended to authorize Congress to tax state bond interest or to have any other effect on which incomes were subject to federal taxation, and that the sole purpose of the Sixteenth Amendment was to remove the apportionment requirement for whichever incomes were otherwise taxable. 45 Cong. Rec. 2245-2246 (1910); id., at 2539; see also Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 17 -18 (1916). Indeed, if [485 U.S. 505, 523] the Sixteenth Amendment had frozen into the Constitution all the tax immunities that existed in 1913, then most of modern intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine would be invalid. </s> [Footnote 14 All federal activities are immune from direct state taxation, see Graves, 306 U.S., at 477 , but at least some state activities have always been subject to direct federal taxation. For a time, only the States' governmental, as opposed to proprietary, activities enjoyed tax immunity, see e. g., Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214, 227 (1934); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 454 -463 (1905), but this distinction was subsequently abandoned as untenable by all eight Justices participating in [485 U.S. 505, 524] New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946). See id., at 579-581, 583 (opinion of Frankfurter, J., joined by Rutledge, J.); id., at 586 (Stone, C. J., concurring, joined by Reed, Murphy, and Burton, JJ.); id., at 591 (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Black, J.). Two Justices reasoned that any nondiscriminatory tax on a State was constitutional, even if directly collected from the State. See id., at 582-584 (Frankfurter, J., joined by Rutledge, J.). Four other Justices declined to hold that every nondiscriminatory tax levied directly on a State would be constitutional because "there may be non-discriminatory taxes which, when laid on a State, would nevertheless impair the sovereign status of the State quite as much as a like tax imposed by a State on property or activities of the national government. Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 447 -448 (1943). This is not because the tax can be regarded as discriminatory but because a sovereign government is the taxpayer, and the tax, even though non-discriminatory, may be regarded as infringing its sovereignty." 326 U.S., at 587 (Stone, C. J., concurring, joined by Reed, Murphy, and Burton, JJ.) (emphasis added) (the cited discussion from Mayo stressed the difference between levying a tax on a government and on those with whom the government deals); see also 326 U.S., at 588 ("Only when and because the subject of taxation is State property or a State activity must we consider whether such a non-discriminatory tax unduly interferes with the performance of the State's functions of government"). The four Justices then concluded that the tax at issue was constitutional even though directly levied on the State because recognizing an immunity would "accomplish a withdrawal from the taxing power of the nation a subject of taxation of a nature which has been traditionally within that power from the beginning." Ibid. We need not concern ourselves here, however, with the extent to which, if any, States are currently immune from direct federal taxation. See n. 11, supra. For our purposes, the important principle New York reaffirms is that the issue whether a nondiscriminatory federal tax might nonetheless violate state tax immunity does not even arise unless the Federal Government seeks to collect the tax directly from a State. </s> [Footnote 15 South Carolina distinguishes the taxes by arguing that the interest paid to a State's bondholders is more essential to the maintenance of a state government than the salaries paid to employees. This strikes us as counterintuitive in fact. More importantly, the essential/nonessential distinction it invokes is exactly the type of distinction we concluded was unworkable in Garcia, 469 U.S., at 542 -547 (rejecting rules of state immunity turning on whether a governmental function is "essential," "governmental" versus "proprietary," "traditional," "uniquely governmental," "necessary," or "integral"). </s> "`There is not, and there cannot be, any unchanging line of demarcation between essential and non-essential governmental functions. Many governmental functions of today have at some time in the past been non-governmental. The genius of our government provides that, within the sphere of constitutional action, the people - acting not through the courts but through their elected legislative representatives - have the power to determine as conditions demand, what services and functions the public welfare requires.'" Id., at 546, quoting Gerhardt, 304 U.S., at 427 (Black, J., concurring). </s> Similarly, JUSTICE O'CONNOR would have us judge the constitutionality of each tax imposing an indirect burden on state and local governments by determining whether the tax had "substantial" adverse effects on those governments. Post, at 531-533. We fail to see how this substantiality test distinguishes taxes on state bond interest from taxes on state employees' salaries. More importantly, we disagree with JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S apparent assumption that if this Court does not undertake the open-ended and administratively daunting inquiry required by her test, we leave [485 U.S. 505, 526] States at the mercy of a congressional power to destroy them via excessive taxation. Post, at 533-534. The nondiscrimination principle at the heart of modern intergovernmental tax immunity case law does not leave States unprotected from excessive federal taxation - it merely recognizes that the best safeguard against excessive taxation (and the most judicially manageable) is the requirement that the government tax in a nondiscriminatory fashion. For where a government imposes a nondiscriminatory tax, judges can term the tax "excessive" only by second-guessing the extent to which the taxing government and its people have taxed themselves, and the threat of destroying another government can be realized only if the taxing government is willing to impose taxes that will also destroy itself or its constituents. </s> [Footnote 16 Because we hold that Congress could have prohibited States from issuing any unregistered bonds by direct regulation, we necessarily reject South Carolina's argument that 310(b)(1) is an impermissible regulatory tax because it imposes a tax on activities not subject to federal regulatory power. That 310(b) is purely regulatory in purpose and effect and was never intended to raise any federal revenue does not alone render it unconstitutional. See Minor v. United States, 396 U.S. 87, 98 , n. 13 (1969). </s> JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring. </s> Although the Court properly finds support for its holding in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, [485 U.S. 505, 528] 469 U.S. 528 (1985), the outcome of this case was equally clear well before that case was decided. See South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 403 -419 (1984) (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). It should be emphasized, however, that neither the Court's decision today, nor what I have written in the past, expresses any opinion about the wisdom of taxing the interest on bonds issued by state or local governments. </s> JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. </s> I join in the Court's judgment, and in its opinion except for Part II. I do not join the latter because, as observed by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, post, at 529-530, it unnecessarily casts doubt upon FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982), and because it misdescribes the holding in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). I do not read Garcia as adopting - in fact I read it as explicitly disclaiming - the proposition attributed to it in today's opinion, ante, at 512-513, that the "national political process" is the States' only constitutional protection, and that nothing except the demonstration of "some extraordinary defects" in the operation of that process can justify judicial relief. We said in Garcia: "These cases do not require us to identify or define what affirmative limits the constitutional structure might impose on federal action affecting the States under the Commerce Clause. See Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911)." 469 U.S., at 556 (emphasis added). I agree only that that structure does not prohibit what the Federal Government has done here. </s> CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, concurring in the judgment. </s> Today the Court reaches two results regarding 310(b)(1) of TEFRA that I believe are analytically distinct. First, the Court finds that 310(b)(1) does not violate the Tenth Amendment by compelling States to issue bonds in registered form. Second, the majority concludes that the statute [485 U.S. 505, 529] also does not contravene the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity; in doing so, the majority overrules our decision in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). While I agree that the principles of intergovernmental tax immunity are not threatened in this case, in my view the Court unnecessarily casts doubt on the protective scope of the Tenth Amendment in the course of upholding 310 (b)(1). </s> The Special Master appointed by the Court made a number of factual determinations about the impact that the TEFRA registration requirements would have upon the States. Most notably, the Special Master found that the registration requirements have had no substantive effect on the abilities of States to raise debt capital, on the political processes by which States decide to issue debt, or on the power of the States to choose the purpose to which they will dedicate the proceeds of their tax-exempt borrowing. After an exhaustive investigation, the Special Master summarized: "TEFRA has not changed how much the States borrow, for what purposes they borrow, how they decide to borrow, or any other obviously important aspect of the borrowing process." Report of Special Master 118. </s> This well-supported conclusion that 310(b)(1) has had a de minimis impact on the States should end, rather than begin, the Court's constitutional inquiry. Even the more expansive conception of the Tenth Amendment espoused in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), recognized that only congressional action that "operate[s] to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions," runs afoul of the authority granted Congress. Id., at 852. The Special Master determined that no such displacement has occurred through the implementation of the TEFRA requirements; I see no need to go further, as the majority does, to discuss the possibility of defects in the national political process that spawned TEFRA, nor to hypothesize that the Tenth Amendment [485 U.S. 505, 530] concerns voiced in FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982), may not have survived Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Those issues, intriguing as they may be, are of no moment in the present case and are best left unaddressed until clearly presented. </s> JUSTICE O'CONNOR, dissenting. </s> The Court today overrules a precedent that it has honored for nearly 100 years and expresses a willingness to cancel the constitutional immunity that traditionally has shielded the interest paid on state and local bonds from federal taxation. Henceforth the ability of state and local governments to finance their activities will depend in part on whether Congress voluntarily abstains from tapping this permissible source of additional income tax revenue. I believe that state autonomy is an important factor to be considered in reviewing the National Government's exercise of its enumerated powers. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 581 (1985) (O'CONNOR, J., joined by Powell and REHNQUIST, JJ., dissenting). I dissent from the decision to overrule Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), and I would invalidate Congress' attempt to regulate the sovereign States by threatening to deprive them of this tax immunity, which would increase their dependence on the National Government. </s> Section 310(b)(1) of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), 26 U.S.C. 103(j)(1), provides that the interest paid on state and local bonds will be subject to federal income tax unless the bonds are issued in registered form. The Court readily concludes that Congress could have prohibited outright the issuance of bearer bonds without violating the Tenth Amendment. Ante, at 511-513. But regardless of whether Congress could have required registration of the bonds directly under its commerce power, I agree with the Court that Congress may not accomplish the same end by an unconstitutional means. Ante, at 515-516. [485 U.S. 505, 531] In my view, the Tenth Amendment and principles of federalism inherent in the Constitution prohibit Congress from taxing or threatening to tax the interest paid on state and municipal bonds. It is also arguable that the States' autonomy is protected from substantial federal incursions by virtue of the Guarantee Clause of the Constitution, Art. IV, 4. See Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 70-78 (1988) (arguing that judicial enforcement of the Guarantee Clause is proper). </s> The Court never expressly considers whether federal taxation of state and local bond interest violates the Constitution. Instead, the majority characterizes the federal tax exemption for state and local bond interest as an aspect of intergovernmental tax immunity, and it describes the decline of the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine in this century. But constitutional principles do not depend upon the rise or fall of particular legal doctrines. This Court has a continuing responsibility "to oversee the Federal Government's compliance with its duty to respect the legitimate interests of the States." Garcia, supra, at 581 (O'CONNOR, J., joined by Powell and REHNQUIST, JJ., dissenting). In my view, the Court shirks its responsibility because it fails to inquire into the substantial adverse effects on state and local governments that would follow from federal taxation of the interest on state and local bonds. </s> Long-term debt obligations are an essential source of funding for state and local governments. In 1974, state and local governments issued approximately $23 billion of new municipal bonds; in 1984, they issued $102 billion of new bonds. Report of Special Master 20. State and local governments rely heavily on borrowed funds to finance education, road construction, and utilities, among other purposes. As the Court recognizes, States will have to increase the interest rates they pay on bonds by 28-35% if the interest is subject to the federal income tax. Ante, at 511. Governmental operations [485 U.S. 505, 532] will be hindered severely if the cost of capital rises by one-third. If Congress may tax the interest paid on state and local bonds, it may strike at the very heart of state and local government activities. </s> In the pivotal cases which first set limits to intergovernmental tax immunity, this Court paid close attention to the practical effects of its decisions. The Court limited the government's immunity only after it determined that application of a tax would not substantially affect government operations. Thus in the first case to uphold federal income taxation of revenue earned by a state contractor, this Court observed that "neither government may destroy the other nor curtail in any substantial manner the exercise of its powers." Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523 -524 (1926). When this Court extended its holding to the case of a state tax on a federal contractor, it expressly noted that the tax "does not interfere in any substantial way with the performance of federal functions." James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 161 (1937). In upholding the application of the federal income tax to income derived from a state lease, this Court decided that mere theoretical concerns about interference with the functions of government did not justify immunity, but that "[r]egard must be had to substance and direct effects." Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376, 386 (1938). In Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938), this Court upheld the application of the federal income tax to income earned by a state employee, because there is "[no] immunity when the burden on the state is so speculative and uncertain that if allowed it would restrict the federal taxing power without affording any corresponding tangible protection to the state government." Id., at 419-420. </s> The instant case differs critically from the cases quoted above because the Special Master found that, if the interest on state and local bonds is taxed, the cost of borrowing by state and local governments would rise substantially. This [485 U.S. 505, 533] certainly would affect seriously state and local government operations. The majority is unconcerned with this difference because it is satisfied with the formal test of intergovernmental tax immunity that can be distilled from later cases. Under this test, if a tax is not imposed directly on the government, and does not discriminate against the government, then it does not violate intergovernmental tax immunity. See ante, at 523. </s> I do not think the Court's bipartite test adequately accommodates the constitutional concerns raised by the prospect of applying the federal income tax to the interest paid on state and local bonds. This Court has a duty to inquire into the devastating effects that such an innovation would have on state and local governments. Although Congress has taken a relatively less burdensome step in subjecting only income from bearer bonds to federal taxation, the erosion of state sovereignty is likely to occur a step at a time. "If there is any danger, it lies in the tyranny of small decisions - in the prospect that Congress will nibble away at state sovereignty, bit by bit, until someday essentially nothing is left but a gutted shell." L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 381 (2d ed. 1988). </s> Federal taxation of state activities is inherently a threat to state sovereignty. As Chief Justice Marshall observed long ago, "the power to tax involves the power to destroy." McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 431 (1819). Justice Holmes later qualified this principle, observing that "[t]he power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits." Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis and Stone, JJ., dissenting). If this Court is the States' sole protector against the threat of crushing taxation, it must take seriously its responsibility to sit in judgment of federal tax initiatives. I do not think that the Court has lived up to its constitutional role in this case. The Court has failed to enforce the constitutional safeguards of state autonomy and [485 U.S. 505, 534] self-sufficiency that may be found in the Tenth Amendment and the Guarantee Clause, as well as in the principles of federalism implicit in the Constitution. I respectfully dissent. </s> [485 U.S. 505, 535]

United States Supreme Court S & E CONTRACTORS, INC. v. UNITED STATES(1972) No. 70-88 Argued: October 21, 1971Decided: April 24, 1972 </s> In a contract disputes procedure, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) approved claims of its contractor for additional compensation. In response to an AEC certifying officer's request for advice as to one item, however, the General Accounting Office (GAO) ruled that the claims could not be certified for payment. When the AEC then refused to pay the compensation, the contractor brought suit in the Court of Claims alleging that the GAO had no authority to overturn the AEC approval. The Government, through the Department of Justice, defended on the ground that the AEC determination was not final but was subject to judicial review under the standards specified in 321 of the Wunderlich Act, "[t]hat . . . the same is fraudulent or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evidence." The Court of Claims held that "the Government has the right to the same extent as the contractor to seek judicial review of an unfavorable administrative decision on a contract claim." Held: </s> 1. The AEC, which for the purpose of this contract was the United States, had exclusive administrative authority under the disputes clause procedure to resolve the dispute here at issue, and neither the contract between the parties nor the Wunderlich Act permitted still further administrative review by the GAO. Pp. 8-12. [406 U.S. 1, 2] </s> 2. The Wunderlich Act does not confer upon the Department of Justice the right to appeal from a decision of an administrative agency, nor is this a case involving a contractor's fraud, concerning which the Department has broad powers to act under several statutory provisions. Pp. 12-19. </s> 193 Ct. Cl. 335, 433 F.2d 1373, reversed. </s> DOUGLAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and STEWART, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., and STEWART and POWELL, JJ., joined, post, p. 19. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which WHITE and MARSHALL, JJ., joined post, p. 23. REHNQUIST, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. </s> Geoffrey Creyke, Jr., reargued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was John P. Wiese. </s> Irving Jaffe reargued the cause for the United States. On the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Gray, Samuel Huntington, and Walter H. Fleischer. </s> Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Edward L. Wright, Beverly C. Moore, F. Trowbridge vom Baur, Overton A. Currie, Marshall J. Doke, Jr., Gilbert A. Cuneo, George M. Coburn, Eldon H. Crowell, and John A. McWhorter for the American Bar Association, and by Harold C. Petrowitz, pro se. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The question presented in this case is whether the Department of Justice may challenge the finality of a contract disputes decision made by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in favor of its contractor, where the contract provides that the decision of AEC shall be "final [406 U.S. 1, 3] and conclusive." Section 1 of the Wunderlich Act leaves open for contest a claim that "is fraudulent or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evidence." 1 </s> Moreover, 41 U.S.C. 322, provides that "[n]o government contract shall contain a provision making final on a question of law the decision of any administrative official, representative, or board." </s> The Department of Justice challenged the settlement made by the AEC on two grounds, (1) that the decision was "not supported by substantial evidence" and (2) that it was "erroneous as a matter of law." </s> But the disputes clause in the contract 2 says that the decision of the AEC is "final and conclusive," unless [406 U.S. 1, 4] a court determines that the award is vulnerable under 1 and 2 of the Act. There is no federal statute which submits disputes of this character to review by one or more administrative agencies, where as here there is no charge of fraud or bad faith. Nor is there a statute which enables another federal agency to contest in court the validity of the decision of the AEC, absent fraud or bad faith. </s> In plain lay language the question then is whether, absent fraud or bad faith, the contractor can rely on the ruling of the federal agency with which it made the contract or can be forced to go through still another tier of federal review. We hold that absent fraud or bad faith the federal agency's settlement under the disputes clause is binding on the Government; that there is not another tier of administrative review; and that, save for fraud or bad faith, the decision of AEC is "final and conclusive," it being for these purposes the Federal Government. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Claims. [406 U.S. 1, 5] </s> I </s> On August 4, 1961, petitioner contracted with the AEC to build a testing facility at the National Reactor Test Station in Idaho. The work was completed and accepted by the AEC on June 29, 1962. Because of various changes in contract specifications and difficulties in meeting performance schedules, petitioner submitted a series of claims to the contracting officer for resolution under the standard disputes clause contained in the contract, asking for equitable modifications of the contract and additional compensation. On August 8 and November 8, 1962, the contracting officer approved some of the claims and disapproved others, and the petitioner sought review of the adverse decisions with the AEC. </s> Since it did not then have a contract appeals board, 3 the Commission referred petitioner's appeal to a hearing examiner, before whom an adversary hearing was held. On June 26, 1963, the examiner decided in favor of eight of petitioner's claims and remanded the dispute to the contracting officer for negotiations to determine the exact amount due petitioner. 2 A. E. C. 631. The contracting officer then sought review of this decision by the Commission. See 10 CFR 2.760 (Jan. 1, 1963). </s> The Commission declined to review four of the claims, 2 A. E. C. 738, which had the effect of sustaining the examiner's decision on them. 10 CFR 2.762 (a) (Jan. 1, 1963). Included within this group was the examiner's determination that amounts due petitioner could not be retained to offset claims allegedly owed by petitioner to other contractors and other agencies of government. The [406 U.S. 1, 6] Commission modified the examiner's decision on three of the remaining claims and reversed him on the last, which petitioner has since abandoned. It "remanded to the contracting officer with instructions to proceed to final settlement or decision in accordance with the decision of the hearing examiner dated June 26, 1963, as modified by [its] order of November 14, 1963, and by [that] decision." 2 A. E. C. 850, 856. </s> On March 6, 1964, prior to the AEC's final ruling but after it had upheld the examiner's decision on the "retainage" claim, a certifying officer of the Commission requested the opinion of the General Accounting Office on whether a voucher for the retainage claim could be certified for payment. Jurisdiction for the Comptroller General's review was purportedly founded upon 31 U.S.C. 82d. 4 After some 33 months of what amounted to a plenary review of the proceedings before the examiner, the Comptroller General concluded that the voucher could not be certified for payment. 46 Comp. Gen. 441. On March 27, 1967, the AEC wrote petitioner, saying, "The Atomic Energy Commission's view is that S&E Contractors, Inc. has exhausted its administrative recourse to the Commission. The Commission will take no action, in connection with the claims, inconsistent with the views expressed by the Comptroller General . . . ." The petitioner then brought this action in the Court of Claims seeking a judgment of $1.95 million and an order remanding the case for negotiations on the time extension [406 U.S. 1, 7] to which it claimed it was entitled under the AEC's original decision. </s> The defenses tendered raised no issue of any fraud or bad faith of the contractor against the United States. </s> On cross-motions for summary judgment, a commissioner of the Court of Claims ruled in favor of petitioner, holding that the General Accounting Office lacked authority to review the decision of the AEC and that the AEC's refusal to follow its own decisions favorable to petitioner was a breach of the disputes clause of the contract. On review by the Court of Claims, however, that decision was reversed by a four-to-three vote. While the majority acknowledged "that the Comptroller General effectively stopped payment of the claims," it did not pass upon the legality of that action. 193 Ct. Cl. 335, 340, 433 F.2d 1373, 1375. Reasoning, instead, that the Wunderlich Act allowed both the Department of Justice and contractors an equal right to judicial review of administrative decisions and that the AEC's refusal to abide by its earlier decision was a permissible means of obtaining this review, it remanded petitioner's claims "to the commissioner for his consideration and report on the various claims under Wunderlich Act standards." Id., at 351, 433 F.2d, at 1381. </s> The Commissioner did not base his opinion on any issue of fraud or bad faith of the contractor against the United States, nor did the Court of Claims. The case is now here on a petition for writ of certiorari which we granted. 402 U.S. 971 . </s> Petitioner argues that neither the text nor the legislative history of the Wunderlich Act supports the right of the United States to seek judicial review of an administrative decision on a contractual dispute, that the General Accounting Office was without statutory or contractual authority to overturn the AEC's decision, and that the [406 U.S. 1, 8] AEC should not be allowed to abandon after some 33 months its own decision that had been made in petitioner's favor. In response, the Solicitor General contends that the Wunderlich Act does give the Department of Justice the right of judicial review of contract decisions made by federal administrative agencies and that the Department of Justice is free to assert whatever defenses it desires in the Court of Claims without regard to the earlier actions of the federal contracting agency. </s> II </s> The disputes clause included in Government contracts is intended, absent fraud or bad faith, to provide a quick and efficient administrative remedy and to avoid "vexatious and expensive and, to the contractor oftentimes, ruinous litigation." Kihlberg v. United States, 97 U.S. 398, 401 (1878). The contractor has ceded his right to seek immediate judicial redress for his grievances and has contractually bound himself to "proceed diligently with the performance of the contract" during the disputes process. The purpose of avoiding "vexatious litigation" would not be served, however, by substituting the action of officials acting in derogation of the contract. 5 </s> The result in some cases might be sheer disaster. In the present case nearly a decade has passed since petitioner completed the performance of a contract under which the only agency empowered to act determined that it was entitled to payment. To postpone payment for such a period is to sanction precisely the sort of "vexatious litigation" which the disputes process was designed to avoid. [406 U.S. 1, 9] </s> Here, petitioner contracted with the United States acting through the AEC and it was exclusively with this Commission that the administrative resolution of disputes rested. Disputes initially were to be resolved between the contractor and the contracting officer and, if a settlement satisfactory to the contractor could be reached at that level, no review would lie. 6 See United States v. Mason & Hanger Co., 260 U.S. 323 ; United States v. Corliss Steam-Engine Co., 91 U.S. 321 . </s> By the disputes clause 7 the decision of the AEC is "final and conclusive" unless "a court of competent jurisdiction" decides otherwise for the enumerated reasons. Neither the Wunderlich Act nor the disputes clause empowers any other administrative agency to have a veto of the AEC's "final" decision or authority to review it. Nor does any other Act of Congress, except where fraud or bad faith is involved, give any other part of the Executive Branch authority to submit the matter to any court for determination. In other words, we cannot infer that by some legerdemain the disputes clause submitted the dispute to further administrative challenge or approval, 8 and did not mean what it says when it made [406 U.S. 1, 10] the AEC's decision "final and conclusive." See United States v. Mason & Hanger Co., supra, at 326. Kipps, The Right of the Government to Have Judicial Review of a Board of Contract Appeals Decision Made Under the Disputes Clause, 2 Pub. Contract L. J. 286 (1969); Schultz, Wunderlich Revisited: New Limits on Judicial Review of Administrative Determination of Government Contract Disputes, 29 Law & Contemp. Prob. 115, 132-133 (1964). </s> A citizen has the right to expect fair dealing from his government, see Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 , and this entails in the present context treating the government as a unit rather than as an amalgam of separate entities. Here, the AEC spoke for the United States and its decision, absent fraud or bad faith, should be honored. Cf. NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138 . </s> Since the AEC withheld payment solely because of the views of the Comptroller General and since he had been given no authority to function as another tier of administrative review, there was no valid reason for the AEC not to settle with petitioner according to its earlier decision. For that purpose the AEC was the United States. Cf. Small Business Administration v. McClellan, 364 U.S. 446, 449 . </s> The cases deny review by the Comptroller General of administrative disputes clause decisions as "without legal authority" absent fraud or overreaching. E. g., McShain Co. v. United States, 83 Ct. Cl. 405, 409 (1936). In [406 U.S. 1, 11] James Graham Mfg. Co. v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 715 (ND Cal. 1950), for example, the contracting agency had determined that the contractor was entitled to reimbursement for certain expenditures under two cost-plus-fee contracts, but the Comptroller General refused payment. While the court noted the "extensive and broad" powers of the Comptroller General, it held that, absent instances of "fraud or overreaching," where the Comptroller General's power was founded upon specific statutory provisions such as 41 U.S.C. 53, he had no "authority to determine the propriety of contract payments" approved by the contracting agency. 91 F. Supp., at 716. Accordingly, summary judgment was entered by the court, which said, "Since the Navy Department has determined that plaintiff contractor is entitled to the payment sought, this Court must adjudge accordingly." Id., at 717. </s> Congress contemplated giving the General Accounting Office such powers and, indeed, the Senate twice passed - in the form of the McCarran bill - a provision which would have allowed the Comptroller to review disputes decisions to determine if they were "fraudulent, grossly erroneous, so mistaken as necessarily to imply bad faith, or not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence." S. 24, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). "If enacted, it would [have] invest[ed] the GAO with the power - which it has never had - to upset an administrative decision which it [found] `grossly erroneous' or `not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.'" Schultz, Proposed Changes in Government Contract Disputes Settlement: The Legislative Battle over the Wunderlich Case, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 217, 243 (1953). The House of Representatives rejected this provision, however, and the Wunderlich Act was ultimately passed in its present form. We cannot, therefore, construe [406 U.S. 1, 12] it to give the Comptroller General powers which Congress has plainly denied. </s> It is suggested, however, that the Comptroller General's power is not one of review over the AEC decision but is merely the power "to force the contractor to bring suit and thus to obtain judicial review for the Government." The disputes clause, however, sets forth the administrative means for resolving contractual disputes. Under the present contract the AEC is the final administrative arbiter of such claims and nowhere is there a provision for oversight by the Comptroller General. The Comptroller General, however, conducted a 33-month de novo review of the AEC proceedings; he blocked the payment to which the AEC determined petitioner was entitled; and he placed upon petitioner the burden of going to the Court of Claims to receive that payment. That action by the Comptroller General was a form of additional administrative oversight foreclosed by the disputes clause. </s> III </s> A majority of the Court of Claims held "that the Government has the right to the same extent as the contractor to seek judicial review of an unfavorable administrative decision on a contract claim." 193 Ct. Cl., at 346, 433 F.2d, at 1378. The Solicitor General adopts this view and sees in the Attorney General's obligation to conduct litigation on behalf of the United States, 28 U.S.C. 516, 519, the power to overturn decisions of coordinate offices of the Executive Department. </s> The Attorney General has the duty to "conduct . . . litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party," 28 U.S.C. 516, and to "supervise all [such] litigation," 28 U.S.C. 519. That power is pervasive but it does not appear how under the Wunderlich Act it gives the Department of Justice the right to appeal from a decision of the Atomic [406 U.S. 1, 13] Energy Commission. Normally, where the responsibility for rendering a decision is vested in a coordinate branch of Government, the duty of the Department of Justice is to implement that decision and not to repudiate it. See 39 Op. Atty. Gen. 67, 68 (1937); 38 Op. Atty. Gen. 149, 150 (1934); 25 Op. Atty. Gen. 524, 529 (1905); 25 Op. Atty. Gen. 93, 96 (1903); 20 Op. Atty. Gen. 711, 713 (1894); 20 Op. Atty. Gen. 270, 272 (1891); 17 Op. Atty. Gen. 332, 333 (1882). Indeed, this view of the role of the Department of Justice may be traced back to William Wirt, the first of our Attorneys General to keep detailed records of his tenure in office. "Wirt it was who first recorded the propositions that the Attorney General does not decide questions of fact, that the Attorney General does not sit as an arbitrator in disputes between the government departments and private individuals nor as a reviewing officer to hear appeals from the decisions of public officers . . . ." H. Cummings & C. McFarland, Federal Justice 84 (1937) (footnotes omitted). </s> The power to appeal to the Court of Claims a decision of the federal agency under a disputes clause in a contract which the agency is authorized to make is not to be found in the Wunderlich Act and its underlying legislative history. 9 That Act was designed to overturn our [406 U.S. 1, 14] decision in United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98 (1951), which had closed the courthouse doors to certain citizens aggrieved by administrative action amounting to something less than fraud. See S. Rep. No. 32, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R. Rep. No. 1380, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. It should not be construed to require a citizen to perform the Herculean task of beheading the Hydra in order to obtain justice from his Government. </s> We are reluctant to construe a statute enacted to free citizens from a form of administrative tyranny so as to subject them to additional bureaucratic oversight, where there is no evidence of fraud or overreaching. In this connection, it should be noted that committee reports accompanying the Wunderlich Act indicate that judicial review was provided so that contractors would not inflate their bids to take into account the uncertainties of administrative action. 10 This objective would be ill served [406 U.S. 1, 15] if Government contractors - having won a favorable decision before the agencies with whom they contracted - had also to run the gantlet of the General Accounting Office and the Department of Justice. </s> IV </s> A contractor's fraud is of course a wholly different genus than the case now before us. Even where the contractor has obtained a judgment and the time for review of it has expired, fraud on an administrative agency or on the court enforcing the agency action is ground for setting aside the judgment. "[S]etting aside the judgment to permit a new trial, altering the terms of the judgment, or restraining the beneficiaries of the judgment from taking any benefit whatever from it," Hazel-Atlas Co. v. Hartford Co., 322 U.S. 238, 245 , are the usual forms of relief which have been granted. Patents obtained with unclean hands and contracts that are based on those patents are similarly tainted and will not be enforced. Precision Co. v. Automotive Co., 324 U.S. 806 . Contracts with the United States - like patents - are matters concerning far more than the interest of the adverse parties; they entail the public interest: </s> "[W]here a suit in equity concerns the public interest as well as the private interests of the litigants this doctrine assumes even wider and more significant proportions. For if an equity court properly uses the maxim to withhold its assistance in such a case it not only prevents a wrongdoer from enjoying the fruits of his transgression but averts an injury to the public." Id., at 815. [406 U.S. 1, 16] </s> Congress has made elaborate provisions for dealing with fraudulent claims of contractors. Where the Comptroller General is convinced "that any settlement was induced by fraud," he is directed to "certify . . . all the facts . . . to the Department of Justice, to the Administrator of General Services, and to the contracting agency concerned." 58 Stat. 664, as amended, 41 U.S.C. 116 (b). The Administrator of General Services is also given broad powers of investigation and he is directed to give the Department of Justice "any information received by him indicating any fraudulent practices, for appropriate action." 41 U.S.C. 118 (d). Moreover, whenever "any contracting agency or the Administrator of General Services believes that any settlement was induced by fraud," the facts shall be reported to the Department of Justice. 41 U.S.C. 118 (e). And the Department of Justice is given broad powers to act. Ibid. In addition, Congress has imposed severe penalties on contractors who commit fraudulent acts and it has given the federal courts power to hear and determine such cases. 41 U.S.C. 119. </s> Broad, flexible civil remedies are also provided against those who "use or engage in . . . an agreement, combination, or conspiracy to use or engage in or to cause to be used or engaged in, any fraudulent trick, scheme, or device, for the purpose of securing or obtaining, or aiding to secure or obtain, for any person any payment, property, or other benefits from the United States or any Federal agency in connection with the procurement, transfer, or disposition of property . . . ." 63 Stat. 392, 40 U.S.C. 489 (b). </s> As to the Court of Claims, 28 U.S.C. 2514 provides that: "A claim against the United States shall be forfeited to the United States by any person who corruptly practices or attempts to practice any fraud against the United States in the proof, statement, establishment, or allowance thereof. [406 U.S. 1, 17] </s> "In such cases the Court of Claims shall specifically find such fraud or attempt and render judgment of forfeiture." 11 </s> These statutory provisions show that, apart from the inherent power of courts to deal with fraud, the Department of Justice indubitably has standing to appear or intervene at any time in any appropriate court to restrain enforcement of contracts with the United States based on fraud. See, e. g., United States v. Hougham, 364 U.S. 310 (1960); Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956); United States v. Dinerstein, 362 F.2d 852 (CA2 1966). </s> So far as the Wunderlich Act is concerned, it is irrelevant whether the administrative agency deciding this dispute is the AEC or the AEC's board of contract appeals. It was common in the beginning to give final authority over the resolution of disputes under a Government contract to the designated contracting officer, save for "fraud or such gross mistake as would necessarily imply bad faith, or a failure to exercise an honest judgment." Kihlberg v. United States, 97 U.S., at 402 . Later came the present boards of contract appeals. </s> Boards of contract appeals within the respective agencies today are common. They are not statutory creations but are established by administrative regulations. S. Doc. No. 99, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., Operation and Effectiveness of Government Boards of Contract Appeals 20-21. Their decisions "constitute administrative [406 U.S. 1, 18] adjudication in its purest sense." Id., at 21. As noted, 12 the AEC has had a board of contract appeals since 1964. Boards of contract appeals were in effect long before the Wunderlich Act and that explains why the Act provides for review "of any decision of the head of any department or agency or his duly authorized representative or board." 41 U.S.C. 321 (emphasis added). </s> We held in United States v. Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709 , that even where the decision on review in the Court of Claims is that of a board of contract appeals, the review must be on the administrative record and that no trial de novo may be held. That decision led to proposals in Congress that, in effect, rulings of contract appeals boards be denied finality. 13 S. Doc. No. 99, supra, at 25-26 and n. 70. But Congress has not taken that step. Some have urged that where a decision of a board of contract appeals is involved, the United States should have standing to appeal to the Court of Claims. Id., at 159. But our leading authority on these problems, Professor Harold C. Petrowitz, who wrote S. Doc. No. 99, supra, observed, "This has never been done, and the procedure may appear anomalous in view of the relatively close relationship between boards and the agencies they serve." Ibid. However serious the problem may be and whatever its dimensions, it is obviously one for the Congress to resolve, not for us to resolve within the limits of the Wunderlich Act. </s> This case does not involve the situation where an administrative agency, upon timely petition for rehearing or prompt sua sponte reconsideration, determines that its earlier decision was wrong and, for that reason, refuses [406 U.S. 1, 19] to abide by it. The AEC has not to this day, repudiated the merits of its decisions in favor of petitioner. Nor, to repeat, is this a case of a fraud of a contractor against the United States. This is simply an instance where a contractor successfully resolved its disputes with the agency with which it had contracted and to whom that power had been delegated. The fruits of petitioner's labors were frustrated, however, by the intermeddling of another agency without power to act and, when petitioner sought enforcement of its rights in court, still another agency of the Government entered and sought to disavow the decision made here by the AEC. </s> If the General Accounting Office or the Department of Justice is to be an ombudsman reviewing each and every decision rendered by the coordinate branches of the Government, that mandate should come from Congress, not from this Court. </s> The judgment of the Court of Claims is </s> Reversed. </s> MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The Wunderlich Act, 68 Stat. 81, provides: "No provision of any contract entered into by the United States, relating to the finality or conclusiveness of any decision of the head of any department or agency or his duly authorized representative or board in a dispute involving a question arising under such contract, shall be pleaded in any suit now filed or to be filed as limiting judicial review of any such decision to cases where fraud by such official or his said representative or board is alleged: Provided, however, That any such decision shall be final and conclusive unless the same is fraudulent or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evidence." 41 U.S.C. 321. "No Government contract shall contain a provision making final on a question of law the decision of any administrative official, representative, or board." 41 U.S.C. 322. </s> [Footnote 2 The contract provided: "6. Disputes "(a) Except as otherwise provided in this contract, any dispute concerning a question of fact arising under this contract which is not disposed of by agreement shall be decided by the Contracting Officer, who shall reduce his decision to writing and mail or otherwise furnish a copy thereof to the Contractor. The decision of the Contracting Officer shall be final and conclusive unless, within [406 U.S. 1, 4] 30 days from the date of receipt of such copy, the Contractor mails or otherwise furnishes to the Contracting Officer a written appeal addressed to the Commission. The decision of the Commission or its duly authorized representative for the determination of such appeals shall be final and conclusive unless determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to have been fraudulent, or capricious, or arbitrary, or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or not supported by substantial evidence. In connection with any appeal proceeding under this clause, the Contractor shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to offer evidence in support of its appeal. Pending final decision of a dispute hereunder, the Contractor shall proceed diligently with the performance of the contract and in accordance with the Contracting Officer's decision. "(b) This `Disputes' Clause does not preclude consideration of law questions in connection with decisions provided for in paragraph (a) above; Provided, that nothing in this contract shall be construed as making final the decision of any administrative official representative, or board on a question of law." </s> [Footnote 3 The Atomic Energy Commission Board of Contract Appeals was not established until 1964. See 10 CFR 3.1 et seq. (Jan. 1, 1971). </s> [Footnote 4 Volume 55 Stat. 876, 31 U.S.C. 82d provides: "The liability of certifying officers or employees shall be enforced in the same manner and to the same extent as now provided by law with respect to enforcement of the liability of disbursing and other accountable officers; and they shall have the right to apply for and obtain a decision by the Comptroller General on any question of law involved in a payment on any vouchers presented to them for certification." </s> [Footnote 5 The American Bar Association, as amicus curiae, notes "that the contractor's consent to permit a specific representative of the Government to decide disputes - the Commission - should not be read as permitting any different representative of the Government to `veto' decisions rendered by the Commission which are in favor of the contractor." </s> [Footnote 6 While the quoted language from paragraph 6 (a) of the contract concerns factual disputes and while questions of law are dealt with in paragraph 6 (b) (see n. 2, supra), there is no reason to believe that the two clauses should not be considered in pari materia or that a different avenue for review should apply to legal questions than to those of fact. Indeed, paragraph 6 (b) speaks of "consideration of law questions in connection with decisions provided for in paragraph (a)." (Emphasis added.) The difference between the two clauses relates only to the standard of reviewability and does not establish separate avenues of review. </s> [Footnote 7 See n. 2, supra. </s> [Footnote 8 For certain types of fraud against the Government, Congress has vested the General Accounting Office with investigative powers. In the case of kickbacks by Government contractors, for example, "the General Accounting Office shall have the power to inspect the [406 U.S. 1, 10] plants and to audit the books and records of any prime contractor or subcontractor engaged in the performance of a negotiated contract," 74 Stat. 741, 41 U.S.C. 53, and criminal penalties are provided if a violation is established. 41 U.S.C. 54. If the Comptroller General has the broad, roving, investigatory powers that are asserted, specific statutory grants of authority such as this provision relating to kickbacks would be superfluous. </s> [Footnote 9 It has been said that the Act's legislative history "has something for everyone." Kipps, The Right of the Government to Have Judicial Review of a Board of Contract Appeals Decision Made Under the Disputes Clause, 2 Pub. Contract L. J. 286, 295 (1969). Suffice it to say we find the Act's history at best ambiguous. In construing laws we have been extremely wary of testimony before committee hearings and of debates on the floor of Congress save for precise analyses of statutory phrases by the sponsors of the proposed laws. See generally NLRB v. Fruit Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 288 (1956); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394 -395 (1951); United States v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co., 247 U.S. 310, 318 (1918); Omaha [406 U.S. 1, 14] & Council Bluffs Street R. Co. v. ICC, 230 U.S. 324, 333 (1913); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U.S. 290, 318 (1897). The reason is the caveat of Mr. Justice Holmes, "We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means." The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 419. </s> [Footnote 10 The House Report stated, "A continuation of this situation [created by the Wunderlich decision] will render the performance of Government work less attractive to the responsible industries upon whom the Government must rely for the performance of such work, and will adversely affect the free and competitive nature of such work. It will discourage the more responsible element of every industry from engaging in Government work and will attract more speculative elements whose bids will contain contingent allowances intended to protect them from unconscionable decisions of Government officials rendered during the performance of their contracts." H. R. Rep. No. 1380, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 4. In a similar vein, the Senate Report on the Senate version of the Wunderlich Act stated, "The impact of this decision on the many business firms who, in a condition of expanding production with respect to the defense of the United States, must deal with many [406 U.S. 1, 15] of the Government departments in Government construction and defense materials, was one that could only cause great expense to the United States in that the contractors would be forced to puff up their bids so as to be sure of sufficient funds to provide for unforeseen contingencies." S. Rep. No. 32, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 2. </s> [Footnote 11 Where the Department of Justice has successfully asserted this defense of fraud, the Court of Claims has disallowed contractors claims. See, e. g., Kamen Soap Products Co. v. United States, 129 Ct. Cl. 619, 124 F. Supp. 608 (1954) (fraudulent preparation of evidence); Morris Demolition Corp. v. United States, 99 Ct. Cl. 336 (1943); Jerman v. United States, 96 Ct. Cl. 540 (1942) (fraudulent invoices); Mervin Contracting Corp. v. United States, 94 Ct. Cl. 81 (1941) (false payroll vouchers); Atlantic Contracting Co. v. United States, 57 Ct. Cl. 185 (1922) (embezzlement). </s> [Footnote 12 See n. 3, supra. And see 29 Fed. Reg. 12829 et seq. </s> [Footnote 13 For other aspects of exhaustion of administrative review of decisions from boards of contract appeals, see United States v. Moorman, 338 U.S. 457 ; United States v. Grace & Sons, 384 U.S. 424 ; United States v. Utah Construction Co., 384 U.S. 394 . </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, and MR. JUSTICE POWELL join, concurring. </s> Because I agree that in this case, where neither fraud nor bad faith is charged, the Wunderlich Act, 41 U.S.C. 321-322, does not operate to give the United States the power to challenge a contract disputes clause finding of fact in favor of the contractor by the Government's own contracting agency, I join the Court's opinion and its judgment. I venture some supportive comments: </s> 1. The contracting officer and the Atomic Energy Commission acted here in an executive capacity for the United [406 U.S. 1, 20] States. See Small Business Administration v. McClellan, 364 U.S. 446, 448 -450 (1960). The Commission is the party to the contract with the contractor. Its exercise of executive judgment is necessarily that of the United States. Yet the Government, by its position here, would grant itself the right to challenge its own executive determination whenever the General Accounting Office, by interposition, thinks this should be done. This, for me, does not make good sense and, in the absence of clear congressional authorization, I doubt that it would make good law. </s> 2. The disputes clause in Government contracts has been employed for over four decades. The clause is one drawn and prescribed by the United States. It is not one drawn by the contractor or by any group of contractors with whom the United States deals. And for years, with the specified exceptions, that clause itself has been regarded as conferring no right of judicial review on the part of the Government. </s> 3. By accepting the disputes clause in his contract, the contractor bears the interim financial burden and gives up the right of rescission and the right to sue for damages. What he receives in return is the Government's assurances of speedy settlement and of prompt payment, not payment delayed for months or, as here, for years. </s> 4. To compel a contractor to go through the administrative process and to proceed and to perform with less than his usual arsenal of defenses against administrative arbitrariness or unfairness, and then to have that determination submitted to judicial review at the behest of still another agency of Government, subjects the contractor to untoward delay in payment and to a financial hazard that may well prove to be ruinous. </s> 5. The result would be a strange one if, as even the GAO here concedes, a contracting officer's decision favorable to a contractor possesses finality, United States v. Corliss [406 U.S. 1, 21] Steam-Engine Co., 91 U.S. 321 (1876); United States v. Mason & Hanger Co., 260 U.S. 323 (1922), while a decision at the higher level of the agency itself does not. When the officer and the contractor agree to the disposition of a dispute, there is no occasion for the issuance of a decision by the contracting officer, and the Wunderlich Act, by its terms, does not apply. And if the contractor accepts a decision of the contracting officer, and does not appeal to the Commission, that decision, by the specific provisions of the disputes clause, is final and conclusive as to questions of fact. Under the Government's position, however, the decision at the agency head would enjoy no such preferred and conclusive status. * </s> 6. Lurking in the background of the Court's decision is advantage to the Government resulting from what strikes me as a possible breach of contract. The contractor here, according to the long-term understanding of the disputes clause, consented to the disposition of disputes by the contracting officer and by the AEC on appeal, and to the finality of decision at those points. It did not [406 U.S. 1, 22] consent to its review or to the exercise of veto power by any other agency of Government. When the United States then disavows the Commission's decision - a decision that, as the Court notes, to this day has never been withdrawn or repudiated by the AEC - it seems to me that the Government imposes something to which the contractor has not agreed. </s> 7. The legislative history, which the dissent finds so clearly supportive of its conclusion, is not at all that clear for me. I doubt if anyone who reads and absorbs the Appendix to the dissent's opinion will find it clear and indicative. I regard it, as does the Court and as did the dissenters in the Court of Claims, as decidedly ambiguous at best. Even the Court of Claims majority struggled with the history and conceded that it did not "explicitly" provide for Government-instituted judicial review. 193 Ct. Cl. 335, 342, 433 F.2d 1373, 1376. This is not surprising, for the Wunderlich Act was intended to relieve contractors from the holding in United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98 (1951), where the Court restricted contractor-instigated judicial review to the situation of alleged and proved fraud. In Wunderlich the Government sought to reinstate an Interior Secretary's fact decision, favorable to the Government and adverse to the contractor, which the Court of Claims had set aside as "arbitrary," "capricious," and "grossly erroneous." The Government there urged - and prevailed over three dissenting votes - a narrow judicial review standard for the contractor. Congress reacted, and the Wunderlich Act overrode this restrictive measure of review and opened the door to the contractor to the extent permitted by the proviso clause of 321. </s> I am not able to read into this legislative change a corresponding nod in the direction of the Government. The flat rejection by Congress of the proposed provision for GAO review is significant. There would be no point [406 U.S. 1, 23] in that rejection if GAO has the power to defeat the finality of the disputes decision anyway. And the differing approaches taken on this appeal by the Department of Justice and the GAO themselves indicate the inconclusiveness of the legislative history. </s> 8. The issue is not whether advantage is or is not to be taken of the Government. Of course, the Government's rights are to be protected. That protection, however, is afforded by the nature and workings of the contract disputes system, by its emphasis on expeditious performance and getting the job done, and by the presence of the contracting officer and the agency, but not of the GAO. This results in fulfillment of the contract and, at the same time, gives the contractor the protection he needs against fraud, capriciousness, arbitrariness, bad faith, and absence of evidence. In the exercise of its legislative judgment, Congress has determined that in this area the Government needs no more. </s> I therefore join in reversing the judgment of the Court of Claims and in giving this contractor the benefit of the decision made by the Atomic Energy Commission itself, the very agency that was the contractor's opposite party to the contract. </s> [Footnote * Judge Collins, dissenting in the Court of Claims, says it well: "When a dispute arises between a contractor and the Government, the `disputes' clause sets out clearly the procedure to be followed. First, the parties may voluntarily settle the dispute. If they do, that is the end of the matter. If no settlement is reached, the disputed matters are decided by the agency's contracting officer. If the contractor does not appeal to the agency from the contracting officer's decision within the prescribed time, that, again, is the end of the matter. If, however, the contractor does appeal to the agency, then, according to the court, a decision rendered by the agency or its board favorable to the contractor is not the end of the matter; the agency is free at any time to disavow or repudiate its own decision, thereby forcing the contractor to sue. The anomaly created by the court's decision is too obvious to need elaboration. While an agency will still be bound by the decisions of its contracting officers, it will not be bound by decisions made at the highest level." 193 Ct. Cl. 335, 379-380, 433 F.2d 1373, 1397-1398. (Footnotes omitted.) </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE WHITE and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting. </s> This is a suit by petitioner against the United States to recover on a contract between petitioner and the Atomic Energy Commission. The contract included a "disputes clause," which provided that the Commission would decide any factual disputes that arose under the contract and that its decision would "be final and conclusive unless determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to have been fraudulent, or capricious, or arbitrary, or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or not supported by substantial evidence." [406 U.S. 1, 24] The disputes clause also provided that while it did "not preclude consideration of law questions in connection with [disputes] decisions," it was not to "be construed as making final the [Commission's] decision . . . on a question of law." Disputes arose during performance of the contract, and the Commission decided them in petitioner's favor. The General Accounting Office, however, when rendering an advisory opinion requested on behalf of the Commission as to one of the disputed items, disagreed with the Commission's decision, and for that reason the Commission refused to pay. In petitioner's subsequent suit in the Court of Claims, petitioner relied upon the Commission's decision as a "final and conclusive" resolution of the disputes, entitling petitioner to summary judgment. The Department of Justice defended the suit on the grounds that the Commission's decision was not supported by substantial evidence and was erroneous on questions of law. The issue before us is whether the Government, through the Department of Justice, may assert those defenses. </s> It may be helpful at the outset to put this case in perspective by reviewing briefly the law developed over the past century to regulate the enforcement of disputes clauses in Government procurement contracts. Until 1954, with the passage of the Wunderlich Act, disputes clauses provided that the decision of a designated Government official upon a matter in dispute under the contract would be final and binding upon both parties. Although in terms the disputes clauses precluded judicial review of disputes decisions, this Court beginning in 1878 consistently held that the finality of a disputes decision could be challenged in court by either party on the ground of fraud or bad faith by the deciding Government official. Thus the "fraud" exception to the finality of disputes decisions was not written into disputes clauses but was judicially fashioned. [406 U.S. 1, 25] </s> Under this system, then, a contractor dissatisfied with an adverse disputes decision could contest the finality of that decision only by proving in court that it was fraudulent. The Government, of course, bore an identical burden when it contested the finality of a disputes decision in favor of the contractor. That situation arose when GAO, congressional watchdog of Government expenditures, refused to sanction payment to a contractor of the amount found due under a disputes decision in his favor and thereby forced him to bring suit. GAO's view of the disputes decision, however, was of no consequence in court; indeed, whether or not the Government defended the contractor's suit was a matter solely for the judgment of the Government's lawyer, the Department of Justice. Once in court, the contractor relied upon the finality of the disputes decision and recovered on that basis unless the Government proved that the decision was fraudulent. </s> Over the years, the Court of Claims gradually broadened the fraud exception to the finality of disputes decisions. In 1951, however, this Court stopped the trend by holding that a disputes decision, rendered pursuant to a disputes clause purporting to make that decision final, was conclusive upon both parties unless the challenger proved in court that the deciding Government official was guilty of "conscious wrongdoing, an intention to cheat or be dishonest." United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98, 100 (1951). Wunderlich's narrow definition of the fraud exception alarmed the Government as well as contractors, for, in practical effect, it meant that disputes decisions were virtually invulnerable to challenge. </s> The result of this concern was the so-called Wunderlich Act, drafted by GAO and supported by GAO, Government procurement agencies, and contractors. The Act overruled Wunderlich by directing that no disputes clause, purporting to make disputes decisions final, "shall [406 U.S. 1, 26] be pleaded in any suit . . . as limiting judicial review of any [disputes] decision to cases where fraud by [the Government] official . . . is alleged." The Act did more than simply overrule Wunderlich, however, for it also explicitly stated the grounds upon which courts could set aside disputes decisions: "any [disputes] decision shall be final and conclusive unless the same is fraudulent or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evidence." Finally, the Act provided that "[n]o Government contract shall contain a provision making final on a question of law the decision of any [Government] official . . . ." </s> The Wunderlich Act, then, rendered the old forms of disputes clauses unserviceable, for no longer could the parties bind themselves to the finality of a disputes decision, judicially reviewable only if the challenger proved that it was fraudulent. Consequently, the disputes clause in the contract before us did not even attempt to provide for the finality of the Commission's disputes decisions, but instead expressly tracked the language of the Act. Under this disputes clause and the Act, the party dissatisfied with a disputes decision is no longer limited to challenging the finality of that decision only on the ground that it was "fraudulent," for the dissatisfied party is now entitled also to prove in court that the decision was "capricious," "arbitrary," "so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith," "not supported by substantial evidence," or incorrect "on a question of law." In this case, the Government relied upon the last two grounds to challenge the finality of the Commission's disputes decision in favor of petitioner. 1 </s> [406 U.S. 1, 27] </s> As noted above, under pre-Wunderlich Act disputes clauses, which purported to make disputes decisions final, the Government, like the contractor, could avail itself of the judicially created fraud exception to the finality of disputes decisions. The Government obtained judicial review when GAO refused to sanction payment after a disputes decision in favor of the contractor, thus forcing him to bring a suit in which the Department of Justice represented the Government. That was precisely the path followed in this case, for GAO, in response to a request for an advisory opinion, informed the Commission that payment would be improper because the disputes decision did not meet the standards of the Wunderlich Act, and, in petitioner's subsequent suit, the Department of Justice represented the Government. Had this case arisen under earlier forms of disputes clauses, which purported to make disputes decisions final, and before the Wunderlich Act, the Government could have defended the suit only on the judicially created ground that the disputes decision was fraudulent. Under the current clause and the Act, [406 U.S. 1, 28] however, the Government is not limited to that narrow ground. Like the contractor, the Government may now also rely upon any or all of the other grounds enumerated in the clause and the Act. The Commission's disputes decision is not "final and conclusive," under the clause and the Act, if the Court of Claims determines, as the Government asserted here, that the decision was "not supported by substantial evidence" or was incorrect "on a question of law." 2 </s> Yet the Court today holds that the Government has no right to defend petitioner's suit. Had the Commission's disputes decision been adverse to petitioner, of course, petitioner would have been free to challenge its finality in court, under the disputes clause and the Act, on the grounds that it was "not supported by substantial evidence" and was incorrect "on a question of law." The Court holds, however, that the Government may not challenge the finality of the disputes decision in favor of petitioner because the Government, under the disputes clause and the Act, has no right to judicial review of disputes decisions. 3 The Court reaches this [406 U.S. 1, 29] conclusion on the strength of its assertions that GAO had no business exercising its statutory authority and advising the Commission that the disputes decision was erroneous, that the Department of Justice had no business exercising its statutory authority and appearing in the Court of Claims to defend petitioner's suit, and that the Government is always entitled to relief if the contractor perpetrates a fraud. Noticeably absent from the Court's opinion is any justification for interpreting the disputes clause and the Act to apply only when a disputes decision is adverse to the contractor. Somehow the Court construes a contract and a statute that bar finality for all disputes decisions to require finality for disputes decisions in favor of contractors. </s> Today's decision is demonstrably wrong. The Court holds that Congress enacted the Wunderlich Act for the benefit of contractors, to arm them with grounds in addition to fraud to challenge in court the finality of disputes decisions unfavorable to them. Yet, without an iota of support in the language of the Act, which expressly governs "any" disputes decision in "any suit," or in the Act's legislative history, which confirms that the expanded grounds of judicial review were to be available to both the Government and contractors, the Court holds that the Government, unlike contractors, may not rely upon the Act to challenge in court the finality of disputes decisions. Indeed, the Court goes further, for, as noted, the disputes clause before us did not purport to make the Commission's disputes decisions final. The Court thus holds that the Act denies the Government the privilege of entering into a contract that affords it as well as the contractor the right to judicial review of disputes decisions. Hence, while the [406 U.S. 1, 30] Act ensures that contractors are entitled to judicial review even when the disputes clause provides for finality, the Act also, according to the Court, ensures that the Government is denied judicial review even when the disputes clause does not provide for finality. Today's decision produces the absurd result that when the Government agreed to a disputes clause with no provision for judicial review, it could nevertheless challenge the finality of a disputes decision at least for fraud, but now that the Government has agreed to a disputes clause specifying five grounds of judicial review, including fraud, it is entitled, holds the Court, to none at all. 4 The Government's position is thus worse than it was before the Act, for it is deprived of even the limited review for fraud to which it was entitled under Wunderlich. Finally, the Act flatly prohibits disputes clauses that make disputes decisions final on questions of law. The clause before us, following the Act, expressly provided [406 U.S. 1, 31] that the Commission's disputes decisions could not be final on questions of law. Yet, in the face of the Act and the disputes clause, the Court holds that the Commission's decision is final on questions of law. </s> Analysis of the judicial history of disputes clauses, both in this Court and in the Court of Claims, will unfortunately unduly extend the length of this opinion. But the devastation today's decision wreaks upon Government procurement practices is sufficient justification, and Congress should be alert to the urgent need for immediate remedial legislation. Congress alone can restore the former balance between Government and contractor, for today's decision not only holds that the Act's expanded scope of judicial review is available solely for contractors, but also holds that the Act, in some unspecified way, prohibits the contracting parties from agreeing to a disputes clause that affords the Government that same scope of review. Congress must therefore make more explicit what is already explicit in the Wunderlich Act, but this time in terms so plain that even this Court will be unable to thwart the congressional will. </s> I </s> A </s> The contract in Kihlberg v. United States, 97 U.S. 398 (1878), as the Court construed it, provided that the decision of a designated Government official would be "conclusive." The official rendered a decision adverse to the contractor, and the contractor brought suit. Because there was "neither allegation nor proof of fraud or bad faith" by the official, the Court held that his decision could not "be subjected to the revisory power of the courts without doing violence to the plain words of the contract." Id., at 401. The Court then enunciated the standard of judicial review that has been the [406 U.S. 1, 32] basis for the decision of every subsequent disputes clause case, both in this Court and in the Court of Claims: "in the absence of fraud or such gross mistake as would necessarily imply bad faith, or a failure to exercise an honest judgment, his action in the premises is conclusive upon the [contractor] as well as upon the government." Id., at 402 (emphasis added). </s> The very first case in this Court, then, laid down the rule that a decision rendered pursuant to a disputes clause was equally binding upon both parties; the contractor and the Government could impeach a disputes decision that the contract purported to make final, but only by proving that the decision was fraudulent. Until today, this Court never departed from the Kihlberg view that the same standard of judicial review is available to both parties. </s> Sweeney v. United States, 109 U.S. 618 (1883), reiterated the Kihlberg rule in another suit by a contractor dissatisfied with a disputes decision rendered by a Government official. Because "there was neither fraud, nor such gross mistake as would necessarily imply bad faith, nor any failure to exercise an honest judgment on the part of the officer," the Court held, "on the authority of Kihlberg v. United States," that the official's decision was conclusive. Id., at 620. </s> The Court next decided three cases involving contracts between private parties. In Martinsburg & Potomac R. Co. v. March, 114 U.S. 549 (1885), a contractor agreed to do certain work for a railroad company, and the contract provided that disputes would be decided by a company official whose decision would be "final and conclusive." Id., at 553. The official's decision was in favor of the company, and the contractor brought suit. The Court, stating that the "case is within the principles announced in Kihlberg v. United States and [406 U.S. 1, 33] Sweeney v. United States," id., at 550 (here, and in subsequent similar quotations, citations not repeated), held that the official's decision was conclusive because there was no proof that he "had been guilty of fraud, or had made such gross mistake in his estimates as necessarily implied bad faith, or had failed to exercise an honest judgment in discharging the duty imposed upon him," id., at 553. </s> The contract in Chicago, S. F. & C. R. Co. v. Price, 138 U.S. 185 (1891), was essentially the same as the contract in March. In Price, however, the official's disputes decision was in favor of the contractor. The company refused to pay in accordance with the decision, and the contractor brought suit. The Court first reviewed March and stressed that March had applied "the principles announced in Kihlberg v. United States and Sweeney v. United States." Id., at 193. The Court then pointed out that "[t]he only difference between that case [March] and the present one is that the alleged mistakes of the engineer in the former were favorable to the railroad company, while in this case they are favorable to the contractors." Id., at 194. "[T]hat difference," said the Court, "cannot affect the interpretation of the contract." Ibid. Because there was no proof of "fraud upon the part of the company's engineers, or such gross mistakes by them as imply bad faith," the Court held that the disputes decision was binding upon the company. Id., at 195. </s> Price thus established that the party whose employee was delegated authority to make the disputes decision could also challenge the finality of that decision, although, like the contractor, only under the Kihlberg test of fraud. The Court reaffirmed this application of the Kihlberg rule in Sheffield & Birmingham Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Gordon, 151 U.S. 285 (1894), holding that [406 U.S. 1, 34] "in the absence of fraud or mistake" by the company official, his decision in favor of the contractor "was conclusive upon the company." Id., at 292. </s> United States v. Gleason, 175 U.S. 588 (1900), involved a Government official's disputes decision adverse to the contractor. The Court again affirmed the rule of Kihlberg and the intervening cases </s> "that it is competent for parties to a contract, of the nature of the present one, to make it a term of the contract that the decision of an engineer, or other officer, of all or specified matters of dispute that may arise during the execution of the work shall be final and conclusive, and that, in the absence of fraud or of mistake so gross as to necessarily imply bad faith, such decision will not be subjected to the revisory power of the courts. Martinsburg & Potomac Railroad v. March; Chicago, Sante Fé &c. Railroad v. Price." Id., at 602. </s> The Court also followed the Kihlberg rule in Ripley v. United States, 223 U.S. 695, 701 -702, 704 (1912), and Merrill-Ruckgaber Co. v. United States, 241 U.S. 387 (1916). </s> In United States v. Mason & Hanger Co., 260 U.S. 323 (1922), the contractor was paid in accordance with a disputes decision in his favor, but the Comptroller of the Treasury disagreed with the decision and subsequently deducted the amount paid from other sums due the contractor. Id., at 325. The contractor brought suit, relying upon the finality of the disputes decision. The Court's holding was direct and simple: </s> "We have decided that the parties to the contract can so provide and that the decision of the officer is conclusive upon the parties. Kihlberg v. United States; Martinsburg & Potomac R. R. Co. v. March; [406 U.S. 1, 35] United States v. Gleason; Ripley v. United States. This is extending the rule between private parties to the Government." Id., at 326. </s> Mason & Hanger, then, applied the Kihlberg rule when the contractor in a Government contract relied upon the disputes decision by a Government official and the Government challenged it. Hence, both parties to a Government contract, like both parties to a private contract, as in Price and Gordon, were free to challenge the finality of a disputes decision, although only upon the limited grounds permissible under Kihlberg. </s> Mason & Hanger also held that "the Comptroller of the Treasury has no power" over a disputes decision, 260 U.S., at 326 , meaning that his disagreement with the decision was irrelevant and had no effect in court, where the parties' rights under the contract were determined. The Government, like the contractor, could prevail only by proving that the disputes decision was fraudulent. The Comptroller's authority was limited to his power to refuse to sanction payment to the contractor, thereby forcing the contractor to bring suit for a judicial determination of his right to payment in accordance with the disputes decision in his favor. 5 </s> In sum, the rule first announced in Kihlberg in 1878 had, with Mason & Hanger in 1922, been held to apply to any disputes decision, whether in a Government or in a private contract, and to apply no matter which party relied upon the finality of the decision. If the Government (or, in a private contract, the party whose official decided the dispute) relied upon the finality of the decision, the contractor had to prove that it was fraudulent. Kihlberg; Sweeney; March; Gleason. If [406 U.S. 1, 36] the contractor relied upon the finality of the decision, the Government (or, in a private contract, the party whose official decided the dispute) had to prove that it was fraudulent. Price; Gordon; Mason & Hanger. 6 </s> In United States v. Moorman, 338 U.S. 457 (1950), the Court once again gave extended consideration to the proper judicial interpretation of disputes clauses. The Court pointed out that "[c]ontractual provisions such as these have long been used by the Government. No congressional enactment condemns their creation or enforcement." Id., at 460. The Court then reviewed Kihlberg, Sweeney, and March, and said that "[t]he holdings of the foregoing cases have never been departed from by this Court. They stand for the principle that parties competent to make contracts are also competent to make such agreements." Id., at 461. The Court added that "[i]f parties competent to decide for themselves are to be deprived of the privilege of making such anticipatory provisions for settlement of disputes, this deprivation should come from the legislative branch of government." Id., at 462. </s> Finally, came United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98 (1951). The contract contained the usual disputes clause providing that the disputes decision was "final and conclusive." Id., at 99. After noting that the [406 U.S. 1, 37] same disputes clause had been upheld in Moorman, the Court stated: </s> "Contracts, both governmental and private, have been before this Court in several cases in which provisions equivalent to [this disputes clause] have been approved and enforced `in the absence of fraud or such gross mistake as would necessarily imply bad faith, or a failure to exercise an honest judgment . . . .' Kihlberg v. United States; Sweeney v. United States; Martinsburg & P. R. Co. v. March; Chicago, S. F. & C. R. Co. v. Price." Id., at 99-100. </s> We thus have an unbroken line of cases in this Court, from 1878 to 1951, applying a simple, straightforward rule of judicial review. A contractual disputes clause making final a decision by an agent of one of the parties was given full effect in court, subject to the judicially created exception that allowed relief to the party challenging the decision if he was able to prove that it was fraudulent. This rule applied whether the contract was Government or private and no matter which party challenged the finality of the decision. In short, a disputes clause was equally binding upon both parties. </s> B </s> Most disputes clause cases, of course, have been decided not by this Court but by the Court of Claims. That court followed the Kihlberg rule when a contractor challenged a disputes decision against him, see, e. g., Kennedy v. United States, 24 Ct. Cl. 122 (1889); P. H. McLaughlin & Co. v. United States, 37 Ct. Cl. 150 (1902); Pacific Hardware Co. v. United States, 49 Ct. Cl. 327 (1914); Brinck v. United States, 53 Ct. Cl. 170 (1918); Southern Shipyard Corp. v. United States, 76 Ct. Cl. 468 (1932), as well as when the Government challenged a disputes decision in the contractor's favor. [406 U.S. 1, 38] </s> In Pacific Hardware, supra, the contract provided that a Government official would deduct specified amounts from the contract price if the contractor delayed in performing the contract. Deductions were made, and the contractor brought suit. The court applied the Kihlberg rule and upheld the deductions. 49 Ct. Cl., at 336. The contract also provided that the official could waive deductions under certain circumstances. The contractor argued that this power violated public policy and therefore vitiated the contract. The court rejected the argument, but added that the power to decide in favor of the contractor by waiving deductions, like the power to decide against the contractor by making deductions, was subject to the Kihlberg rule: </s> "Of course, if there were fraud or such gross error as implies bad faith or a failure to exercise an honest judgment in deciding that the deductions be not made, the Government would not be bound and the contractor would remain liable." Id., at 337. </s> In Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. United States, 58 Ct. Cl. 633 (1923), the disputes decision was in favor of the contractor, but the Government refused to pay because the Comptroller of the Treasury disagreed with the decision. The contractor argued "that the contract reposed in the contracting officer . . . the right to determine whether or not and the extent to which the contractor was entitled to extension of time, and that the finding of that officer was conclusive upon the parties in the absence of fraud or mistakes so gross as to imply bad faith." Id., at 637. </s> The court, noting "that a long line of decisions not only by this court but by the Supreme Court requires the sustaining of the [contractor's] contention," stated: </s> "Provisions in Government contracts reposing in some designated official the right to determine certain [406 U.S. 1, 39] questions and making his determination thereof conclusive are of frequent occurrence. Such provisions are inserted largely for the protection of the Government, and the cases in which such a determination by the designated official has been upheld by the courts have been largely cases in which the rule has been invoked in favor of the United States and against the [contractor], but the rule is none the less effective if perchance it occasionally may operate the other way." Id., at 638 (emphasis added). </s> In Penn Bridge Co. v. United States, 59 Ct. Cl. 892 (1924), the disputes decision was in favor of the contractor, but the Comptroller General disagreed with the decision and deducted the amount from other sums due the contractor. The Court, referring to the Comptroller's attempt to "substitute his judgment for that of the contracting officer and thereby eliminate from the case the finding of the contracting officer when the rights of the parties are in this court for adjudication." id., at 898, stated that "action by the comptroller could [not] in any way conclude this court in the determination of the rights of the parties under the contract," id., at 896. The court then applied the Kihlberg rule. Id., at 897. </s> Penn Bridge, then, aside from reaffirming that the same rule of judicial review applied whether the Government or the contractor challenged the finality of a disputes decision, also demonstrates that GAO's view of the correctness of a disputes decision was of no effect in court. GAO's only power - the power of the purse - was to force the contractor to bring suit and thus to obtain judicial review for the Government. But once the case reached court, review was the same for both parties. </s> GAO's opinion of a disputes decision was irrelevant in court even when GAO favored the contractor. In [406 U.S. 1, 40] Eaton, Brown & Simpson, Inc. v. United States, 62 Ct. Cl. 668 (1926), the disputes decision was in favor of the Government, but the Comptroller General disagreed and paid the contractor. In the contractor's suit to recover on other claims, the court held that the disputes decision controlled and deducted the amount GAO had paid from other sums due the contractor. "The action of the comptroller is not conclusive upon this court in determining the rights of the parties. See Penn Bridge Co. v. United States." Id., at 685. </s> In Carroll v. United States, 76 Ct. Cl. 103 (1932), the Comptroller General disagreed with a disputes decision in favor of the contractor and assessed damages in a sum greater than the amount due under the contract. The contractor brought suit, and the Government argued that it was entitled to the excess. The court replied: </s> "The issue is not a new or novel one insofar as judicial precedents are concerned. At least beginning with the case of Kihlberg v. United States to the present time, the Supreme Court has uniformly held that in Government contracts containing provisions similar to the one in suit, the parties are competent to bind themselves to the conclusiveness and finality of the action and findings of the department with which the contract is made, and that such action is not open to the supervisory power of the courts unless overturned by proof of fraud or such gross error as to warrant the implication of fraud." Id., at 124-125. </s> In Albina Marine Iron Works v. United States, 79 Ct. Cl. 714 (1934), the disputes decision was in the contractor's favor, but the Comptroller General disagreed and assessed damages. The court held that the disputes decision </s> "was a final disposition of the matter. Neither [406 U.S. 1, 41] fraud nor bad faith is alleged or proven. The court cannot go behind the decision of the contracting officer where the contract makes him the final arbiter of the facts of the case unless there has been fraud or such gross error which, in effect, would imply bad faith. The cases in this court and the Supreme Court so holding are numerous." Id., at 720. </s> After repeating that it could not review the disputes decision "without the establishment of fraud or such gross error which would imply bad faith," the court concluded: </s> "It is seldom that a case arises like the instant case, where the contractor is upholding the decision of the contracting officer and the Government is attempting to overthrow the decision of the officer appointed and designated by it to contract and carry out the terms of the undertaking. Unless proven to the contrary, full faith and credit should be accorded an officer of the Government in arriving at a decision which requires fair and impartial action on his part." Id., at 721. </s> In McShain Co. v. United States, 83 Ct. Cl. 405 (1936), the designated Government official decided that the contractor's delay in completing the contract was unavoidable. The Comptroller General later decided that part of the delay was the contractor's fault and deducted damages from the amount due under the contract. The contractor brought suit, relying upon the finality of the disputes decision. The court said: </s> "Neither fraud nor bad faith is alleged or proven. This court and the Supreme Court by numerous decisions have held there is no going behind the decision of the contracting officer when the contract provides that `his finding of facts therein shall be final and conclusive on the parties thereto.' The action of the Comptroller General was without [406 U.S. 1, 42] legal authority. Kihlberg v. United States; United States v. Gleason." Id., at 409. 7 </s> In B-W Construction Co. v. United States, 97 Ct. Cl. 92 (1942), the Comptroller General deducted damages for delay after a disputes decision in the contractor's favor. The court held that because of the disputes clause "[i]t is . . . the action of the head of the department that is before us for review. On the question now before us that action is binding on us unless we find that it was arbitrary or grossly erroneous. In no event are we bound under this contract by the action of the Comptroller General." Id., at 123. </s> In Mitchell Canneries v. United States, 111 Ct. Cl. 228, 77 F. Supp. 498 (1948), the Comptroller General disagreed with a disputes decision in favor of the contractor and set off that amount against other sums due the contractor on other contracts. The court applied "[t]he established principle of law that the findings of fact of a contracting officer are binding upon both the Government and the contractor if there is no fraud, gross error or arbitrariness by the contracting officer amounting to bad faith." Id., at 247, 77 F. Supp., at 502. </s> These Court of Claims cases are further cogent authority that the Government was, until today, entitled to exactly the same judicial review as contractors. A disputes clause providing for a final decision by a Government [406 U.S. 1, 43] official was equally binding upon both parties. GAO's opinion of that decision was irrelevant in court. GAO's only power was to refuse to sanction payment under a disputes decision favorable to a contractor and thereby compel the contractor to bring suit. Once in court, the standard of review applicable to contractor challenges likewise controlled the Government's challenge. </s> The district courts reached the identical result. In James Graham Mfg. Co. v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 715 (ND Cal. 1950), the Comptroller General refused to accept a disputes decision in favor of the contractor. Although the agency adhered to the merits of its decision, it refused to pay because of the Comptroller's contrary view. The court said: </s> "Another officer of the United States government, the Comptroller General, who has general control of the government's purse strings, has refused to sanction payment of the account which the Navy Department has approved. The question . . . is: Has he power to determine that payment shall not be made? </s> "The powers of the Comptroller General are extensive and broad. But he does not, absent fraud or overreaching, have authority to determine the propriety of contract payments when the contracts themselves vest the final power of determination in the contracting executive department. United States v. Mason & Hanger Co.; United States v. Moorman." Id., at 716. 8 </s> [406 U.S. 1, 44] </s> In Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 97 F. Supp. 948 (Del. 1951), the contractor received an adverse disputes decision from the contracting officer but won reversal on appeal to the agency. GAO disagreed with the agency's decision and refused to pay, forcing the contractor to bring suit. The court held for the contractor on the authority of Mason & Hanger, Penn Bridge, and James Graham. Id., at 951. </s> C </s> The law was thus crystal clear. The district courts, the Court of Claims, and this Court consistently applied the rule, originally announced almost a century ago in Kihlberg, that contractual clauses providing for the finality of disputes decisions rendered by an employee of one of the parties were enforceable in court, with the judicially created exception for fraudulent decisions. No court, nor even any contractor, ever questioned that GAO could obtain judicial review for the Government simply by refusing to approve payment on a disputes [406 U.S. 1, 45] decision favorable to a contractor. It was accepted by all that the Government and the contractor both were entitled to judicial review. 9 The problem that gave rise to the Wunderlich Act was not who was entitled to judicial review nor how judicial review was to be attained. The problem was the scope of judicial review. </s> As the Court noted in United States v. Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709, 713 (1963), under the Kihlberg rule a court's function "in matters governed by `disputes' clauses was in effect to give an extremely limited review of the administrative decision"; the Court of Claims, however, had "somewhat expanded" the scope of judicial review "over the years." See, e. g., Needles v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 535, 601-607 (1944). It was this expansion of the scope of judicial review that Wunderlich addressed. </s> Certiorari was granted in Wunderlich "to clarify the rule of this Court which created an exception to the conclusiveness of such administrative decision[s]." 342 U.S., at 99 . The Court gave a restrictive interpretation to this exception. </s> "Despite the fact that other words such as `negligence,' `incompetence,' `capriciousness,' and `arbitrary' [406 U.S. 1, 46] have been used in the course of the opinions, this Court has consistently upheld the finality of the department head's decision unless it was founded on fraud, alleged and proved. So fraud is in essence the exception. By fraud we mean conscious wrongdoing, an intention to cheat or be dishonest. The decision of the department head, absent fraudulent conduct, must stand under the plain meaning of the contract." Id., at 100. </s> Within a month after Wunderlich was decided, its restrictive scope of judicial review was applied against the Government. In Leeds & Northrup Co. v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 999 (ED Pa. 1951), the contractor, after a favorable disputes decision, was reimbursed for certain costs. Several years later, GAO reviewed that decision, disagreed with it, and set off the amount already paid from sums due the contractor on another contract. The contractor was therefore compelled to bring suit. The court first pointed out that GAO's power </s> "is subject to the rights of parties to a contract, including the Government, to provide for some designated person or persons, even if in the employ of one of the parties, to make a final determination of any question which may arise between them. This principle has been unequivocally declared by the courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States, in many cases." Id., at 1002. </s> After quoting extensively from James Graham, the court stated the rule of judicial review as follows: </s> "The Bureau's determinations of questions of fact under [the disputes clause] are final and conclusive in the absence of fraud. United States v. Wunderlich. For a court to set aside such determinations under [the disputes clause], fraud, meaning conscious wrongdoing or an intention to cheat or be [406 U.S. 1, 47] dishonest, must be alleged and proved. United States v. Wunderlich." Id., at 1003. </s> See also Sunroc Refrigeration Co. v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 131 (ED Pa. 1952), which, following Leeds & Northrup, also applied the Wunderlich scope of review against the Government. </s> II </s> The Wunderlich opinion concluded, "If the standard of fraud that we adhere to is too limited, that is a matter for Congress." 342 U.S., at 100 . Almost immediately after the decision was issued, congressional legislation was sought to expand the scope of judicial review limited by Wunderlich to "fraud" in a narrow sense. I have attached an Appendix detailing the legislative history and shall only summarize that history here. </s> Although several bills were introduced in the 82nd Congress, congressional attention focused upon S. 2487. In its original form, S. 2487 provided: </s> "That no provision of any [Government] contract . . . relating to the finality or conclusiveness of any decision of the Government [official], in a dispute involving a question of fact arising under such contract, shall be construed to limit judicial review of any such decision only to cases in which fraud by such Government [official] is alleged." </s> Wunderlich, of course, construed the standard disputes clause, which purported to make disputes decisions final, to limit judicial review to instances of fraudulent decisions. S. 2487, then, was simply an acceptance of the invitation extended in Wunderlich itself. S. 2487, however, did not specify what the scope of judicial review would be, but merely directed that judicial review could not be limited to fraud. Moreover, there was no indication in the language of S. 2487 that it was overruling [406 U.S. 1, 48] Wunderlich only as to disputes decisions unfavorable to contractors. It obviously applied to the judicial review of "any such decision." (Emphasis added.) </s> The Comptroller General's initial report of GAO's views on S. 2487 made that abundantly clear. The report criticized Wunderlich as contrary to the interests of both the Government and contractors. Indeed, as a representative of the Government, the Comptroller General stressed Wunderlich's undesirable impact upon the Government's interest, for administrative "officials can make just as arbitrary determinations in favor of contractors, at the expense of the taxpayers." 10 And, as the Assistant Comptroller General put it in his testimony at the Senate hearings, Wunderlich "means that the decision of the administrative officials nearly always will be final because of the extreme difficulty of proving fraud." 11 Because the restricted scope of judicial review prescribed in Wunderlich applied to the Government no less than to contractors, GAO had good reason for its concern. 12 </s> GAO then offered a substitute bill that it believed would protect the Government's interests. The bill provided that a disputes clause decision </s> "shall not be treated as binding if the General Accounting Office or a court finds that the action of [the Government official] is fraudulent, arbitrary, [406 U.S. 1, 49] capricious, grossly erroneous, or that it is not supported by substantial evidence." </s> GAO's substitute bill thus differed from S. 2487 in two respects. First, rather than merely reversing Wunderlich, it explicitly defined the expanded scope of review by specifying five grounds upon which a disputes decision could be set aside. Clearly this expanded review was to operate for both contractors and the Government, just as the "fraud" standard of review always had. It would be absurd to suppose that GAO defined the expanded scope of review only for contractors. </s> Second, GAO's substitute bill authorized GAO review in addition to judicial review. More precisely, it empowered GAO as well as the courts to set aside any disputes decision, whether favorable to the contractor or favorable to the Government. That was a significant expansion of S. 2487. GAO never previously was empowered to upset a disputes decision. Rather, GAO authority was always limited to refusing to sanction payment on a decision favorable to a contractor, thereby forcing him into court. At that point, of course, GAO's view of the merits of the disputes decision was irrelevant. Consequently, GAO's substitute bill, if enacted, would have increased GAO's power enormously, for it effectively authorized GAO to oust the courts of all jurisdiction to review disputes decisions that GAO considered unacceptable. Not surprisingly, this part of GAO's proposal became highly controversial. </s> Extended hearings on S. 2487 were held in the Senate. Although most of the witnesses and statements concerned themselves solely with urging expanded judicial review for contractors, without adverting to such review for the Government, there were notable exceptions. The Associated General Contractors took the position that judicial review must be available to both parties, as did [406 U.S. 1, 50] several attorneys who specialized in the representation of contractors. 13 Opponents of that view proposed bills that would have expressly limited the right of judicial review to contractors. 14 The Comptroller General subsequently submitted another report objecting to these bills because their adoption would deprive the Government of the defense of administrative finality while permitting contractors "to utilize such defense should the accounting officers of the Government attempt to question the validity of a payment." 15 It is significant that no one ever suggested during the Senate hearings that the expanded scope of review provided in S. 2487 and GAO's substitute bill was to be available only for contractors and not also for the Government. </s> An amended S. 2487 was reported out of Committee following the hearings. 16 It provided that no disputes clause </s> "shall be pleaded as limiting judicial review of any [disputes] decision to cases in which fraud by [the Government] official . . . is alleged." </s> Thus, amended S. 2487, like the bill in its original form, contained an explicit reversal of the Wunderlich standard of judicial review. Like the original bill, moreover, amended S. 2487 gave not the slightest indication that it was a command solely to the Government not to "plead" the disputes clause as limiting the contractor's right to judicial review. Amended S. 2487 plainly directed [406 U.S. 1, 51] that no disputes clause could be pleaded to limit judicial review of any disputes decisions. Neither party, under amended S. 2487, could rely upon a disputes clause to limit the other party's right to judicial review to instances of fraudulent disputes decisions. </s> Amended S. 2487, however, went beyond the original bill by incorporating GAO's substitute bill: </s> "[A]nd any such provision shall be void with respect to any such decision which the General Accounting Office or a court, having jurisdiction, finds fraudulent, grossly erroneous, so mistaken as necessarily to imply bad faith, or not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence." </s> Thus, amended S. 2487 reversed Wunderlich, adopted GAO's definition of the expanded scope of review, and authorized GAO as well as the courts to apply that expanded review and set aside any disputes decisions. </s> The Committee Report on amended S. 2487 expressly noted "that to the same extent [the Wunderlich] decision would operate to the disadvantage of an aggrieved contractor, it would also operate to the disadvantage of the Government in those cases, as sometimes happens, when the contracting officer makes a decision detrimental to the Government interest in the claim." 17 The reversal of Wunderlich, then, was clearly seen as an expansion of judicial review that would apply no matter which party, the Government or the contractor, challenged the disputes decision. </s> The report then explained that the addition of GAO's proposal meant that amended S. 2487 would </s> "have the effect of permitting review in the General Accounting Office or a court with respect to any decision of a contracting officer or a head of an agency which is found to be fraudulent, grossly erroneous, [406 U.S. 1, 52] so mistaken as necessarily to imply bad faith, or not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. In other words, in those instances where a contracting officer has made a mistaken decision, either wittingly or unwittingly, it will not be necessary for the aggrieved party to, in effect, charge him with being a fraud or a cheat in order to affect [sic] collection of what is rightfully due." 18 </s> Thus, the expanded scope of review, explicitly defined, would be available to both parties before either GAO or a court. In short, amended S. 2487 empowered a court to set aside a disputes decision at the behest of either the Government or the contractor, and, likewise, it empowered GAO to set aside a decision challenged by either party. Although the report asserted that amended S. 2487 was intended "simply to recognize the jurisdiction which the General Accounting Office already has," 19 in fact amended S. 2487 would have given GAO the entirely new power to make a binding review of disputes decisions. It would have made GAO, as was later charged, into a second court of claims. </s> Although the Senate passed amended S. 2487, the 82d Congress expired without House action. When it was re-introduced in the Senate of the 83d Congress, 20 Senator McCarran, the bill's sponsor, observed that the Wunderlich decision "cuts two ways" and, as an example, cited a case I have already discussed, Leeds & Northrup Co. v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 999 (ED Pa. 1951), in which "[t]he Comptroller General . . . attempted to recover on behalf of the Government, because the mistake was against the Government. The contractor interposed a [406 U.S. 1, 53] defense based on . . . the Wunderlich case. . . . [T]he result was a failure of recovery on behalf of the Government." 21 Thus, Senator McCarran, like GAO, recognized that the narrow review permissible under Wunderlich bound both the Government and the contractor, and, like GAO, he considered that reversal of Wunderlich would also apply equally to both parties. A month later during floor debate, Senator McCarran again emphasized that while Wunderlich could "operate greatly to the disadvantage of contractors," it could also "operate to the disadvantage of the Government." 22 The Senate then passed the bill, obviously with the understanding that the expanded scope of judicial review provided would be available to both the Government and contractors. </s> Amended S. 2487 was also introduced in the House of the 83d Congress. 23 At the initial House hearing in July 1953, several witnesses asserted that enactment of the bill was essential to enable both the Government and contractors to obtain effective judicial review of disputes decisions. 24 Opposition then developed to the provision empowering GAO to invalidate such decisions. The objection was, quite predictably, that "[t]he effect of the provision is to set up the General Accounting Office as a `court of claims.' . . . [A]n agency of the legislative branch . . . should not be used to perform functions intended for the judicial branch." 25 </s> Understanding the precise nature of this objection is important. No one suggested that amended S. 2487 [406 U.S. 1, 54] did not grant the Government the same scope of judicial review that it granted contractors. Obviously, since amended S. 2487 authorized both GAO and the courts to exercise the same review, and since the objection was that GAO should not be able to set aside disputes decisions favorable to contractors, it would have been absurd to suggest that amended S. 2487 did not likewise authorize the courts to set aside such decisions. Nor did anyone question the ability of GAO to obtain judicial review for the Government through its power to refuse to approve payment on disputes decisions. All agreed that the purpose of the proposed legislation was to overturn the standard of review set by Wunderlich; the narrow scope of judicial review permissible under that case was to be done away with in favor of a broader, specifically defined review. The purpose was to expand judicial review, not to insert further administrative review into the disputes process. Thus, the opposition urged, not unreasonably, that the avowed purpose of overruling Wunderlich would not be served by expanding GAO's power to transform it into another court. Hence, deletion of GAO from amended S. 2487 would leave the power of binding review exclusively with the courts. </s> The Comptroller General bowed to this opposition. Stating (erroneously, I think) that GAO "has not asked for authority which it did not have before the decision in the Wunderlich case," he offered another substitute bill deleting the objectionable provision. He asserted that "this substitute language will accomplish what we have been striving for all along and will place the General Accounting Office in precisely the same situation it was in before" Wunderlich. 26 This bill, in the form submitted by GAO with one minor addition, was enacted as the Wunderlich Act. [406 U.S. 1, 55] </s> Thus, the result of GAO's attempt to obtain the power of binding review over disputes decisions was failure. That power was left where it was before the Act, solely with the courts. GAO simply retained the power it had always had, the power to force the contractor into court where the Government would get judicial review of the disputes decision in his favor. </s> The hearings resumed in January 1954. In urging passage of GAO's revised substitute bill, GAO's General Counsel stated that, despite deletion of the provision for binding GAO review, the bill would not only protect contractors but would also protect the Government "against decisions adverse to the interests of the United States. Certainly the rights of contract[ors] and the Government to review or appeal should be coextensive." 27 Similarly, the Associate General Counsel of the General Services Administration asserted that GAO's revised substitute bill was adequate to "insure an opportunity to protect the Government against excessive generosity," since GAO, under the bill, "could seek a court review by a setoff or by applying to the Department of Justice for recovery in a case where they felt that the action of the contracting officer was grossly erroneous as against the Government." 28 </s> Many witnesses who opposed GAO's original substitute bill, and thus opposed amended S. 2487, now supported GAO's revised substitute bill because it made clear that the power to set aside disputes decisions was vested exclusively in the courts and not shared by the courts with GAO. There was no suggestion from anyone that deletion of GAO from amended S. 2487 also had the effect of precluding the Government from obtaining judicial review under the standards available to contractors. Any [406 U.S. 1, 56] such suggestion would have been absurd, for, as noted above, amended S. 2487 granted the courts and GAO exactly the same power. In fact, at one point in the hearings, a witness objected that GAO's revised substitute bill did "not say specifically that an appeal can be taken by an aggrieved contractor." The ensuing colloquy with Committee members made plain that the language of the bill "necessarily include[d] both parties." 29 Moreover, as in the case of the Senate Committee, the House Committee was presented with a proposed bill that would have expressly limited the right of judicial review to contractors. 30 As with the Senate, that suggestion was not adopted. Instead, the Committee reported out the bill, submitted by GAO, that is now the Wunderlich Act. </s> The Act expanded the scope of judicial review, and that was all it did. The Committee report made that plain. "The committee foresees no possibility of the proposed legislation creating any new rights that a contractor may not have had prior to its enactment, with the exception of the standards of review therein prescribed." 31 Nor did the Act grant GAO new power, for, as the report said, "there is no intention of setting up the General Accounting Office as a `court of claims.'" On the other hand, the Act did not diminish GAO's existing authority to hold up payment and force the contractor to bring suit, as the report also stressed. "The elimination of the specific mention of the General Accounting Office from the provisions of the bill as amended should not be construed as taking away any of the jurisdiction of that Office." 32 Thus GAO authority was left exactly where it was. [406 U.S. 1, 57] </s> A point I have already made about deletion of the reference to GAO bears repeating. Amended S. 2487, by incorporating GAO's original substitute bill, granted GAO precisely the same binding power of review that it granted the courts. Contractors did not object to that provision because it authorized GAO to set aside disputes decisions unfavorable to contractors. They objected because amended S. 2487 authorized GAO to set aside disputes decisions favorable to contractors. That power, opponents of amended S. 2487 urged, must be vested solely in the courts. They prevailed, and the reference to GAO was deleted. Deletion of the authority granted to GAO obviously could have no effect whatever on the identical authority granted to the courts. 33 </s> The Senate originally passed amended S. 2487 upon the clear understanding that the expanded scope of judicial review it contained would be available to both the [406 U.S. 1, 58] Government and contractors. When the House bill came to the Senate after deletion of the GAO provision, Senator McCarran, who had previously stressed that Wunderlich hurt both the Government and contractors, explained that while the House bill differed from the bill passed by the Senate, since it deleted the authority to GAO, it was "designed to accomplish the same purpose." 34 That purpose, of course, was to overturn Wunderlich and to provide the courts with grounds of review in addition to fraud. The two bills could not, of course, "accomplish the same purpose" if the House bill authorized expanded judicial review only for contractors, leaving the Government either with the Wunderlich standard or with no review at all. After Senator McCarran responded affirmatively to the statement that the difference was only "a modification of the language in the Senate bill, and the two bills agree in their effect," 35 the Senate passed the House bill. </s> The text of the Act is its own witness to the congressional purpose. It provides that no clause in a Government contract purporting to make final an administrative determination of a dispute arising under the contract "shall be pleaded in any suit . . . as limiting judicial review." The proviso then defines the applicable scope of review. </s> It is impossible to read the plain words of this statute as directing that judicial review is available only for disputes decisions unfavorable to contractors. Indeed, the language is so clear that there should be no need to search through the legislative history for a contrary meaning. 36 That history, in any event, demonstrates that the Act means exactly what it says. [406 U.S. 1, 59] </s> Two significant considerations buttress my conclusion that the Court's construction of the Act is patently and grievously erroneous. </s> First. The bill that became the Wunderlich Act was a Government bill. As the Committee report said, the Act, with a minor exception, "is exactly the same legislation suggested by the Comptroller General." 37 GAO offered it as a substitute for the original S. 2487 because of Government concern that administrative "officials can make just as arbitrary determinations in favor of contractors, at the expense of the taxpayers." 38 The bill explicitly stated that the expanded scope of review would add to "fraudulent" the grounds that the disputes decision was "arbitrary," "capricious," "grossly erroneous," or "not supported by substantial evidence." After GAO modified the bill to delete the provision authorizing GAO review, in addition to court review, on those grounds, Government procurement agencies joined forces with GAO in strong support of passage. It is absurd to suppose that the Government pressed for a bill that granted contractors an expanded scope of judicial review, inserted in the bill by the Government, yet denied the Government judicial review on those same grounds. </s> Second. That absurdity is compounded by the consequences that result from interpreting the Act to deny [406 U.S. 1, 60] the Government judicial review of disputes decisions. Before Wunderlich, the Government could challenge the finality of those decisions at least on the ground of fraud. If the Act affords only contractors judicial review and denies review to the Government, it follows that the Government has been deprived even of the right it had under Wunderlich to challenge "fraudulent" disputes decisions. The principal Government procurement agencies, now including the Atomic Energy Commission, have created contract appeals boards as the final level of agency review of disputes decisions. Because the Act expressly provides for judicial review of such "board" decisions, interpreting it to deny the Government review means that however "fraudulent," however "arbitrary," however "capricious," however "grossly erroneous," however clearly "not supported by substantial evidence" the board's determination, the procurement agency and the Government itself are helpless to redress the wrong. In this case, that might mean the loss of more than one million dollars to American taxpayers. But at stake are countless millions. To say that Government wrote and secured passage of a bill to work that result is preposterous. 39 </s> III </s> So far as I can penetrate the Court's opinion, its primary premise is exposed by such sentences as these: "The purpose of avoiding `vexatious litigation' would [406 U.S. 1, 61] not be served, however, by substituting the action of officials acting in derogation of the contract." Ante, at 8. 40 "Neither the Wunderlich Act nor the disputes clause empowers any other administrative agency to have a veto of AEC's `final' decision or authority to review it." Id., at 9. "In other words, we cannot infer that by some legerdemain the disputes clause submitted the dispute to further administrative challenge or approval . . . ." Ibid. "Here, the AEC spoke for the United States and its decision, absent fraud or bad faith, should be honored." Id., at 10. 41 "Since the AEC withheld payment solely because of the views of the Comptroller General and since he had been given no authority to function as another tier of administrative review, there was no valid reason for AEC not to settle with petitioner according to its earlier decision." Ibid. 42 "That action by the [406 U.S. 1, 62] Comptroller General was a form of additional administrative oversight foreclosed by the disputes clause." Id., at 12. "[The Act] should not be construed to require a citizen to perform the Herculean task of beheading the Hydra in order to obtain justice from his Government." Id., at 14. "We are reluctant to construe a statute enacted to free citizens from a form of administrative tyranny so as to subject them to additional bureaucratic oversight, where there is no evidence of fraud or over-reaching." Id., at 14. 43 "This objective [preventing the inflating of bids] would be ill served if Government contractors - having won a favorable decision before the agencies with whom they contracted - had also to run the gantlet of the General Accounting Office and the Department of Justice." Id., at 14-15. </s> The Court's bete noire, then, is primarily the General Accounting Office, with a sideswipe at the Department of Justice. We are left to infer, I gather, that Congress shared the Court's distaste for the activities of those agencies in these cases and enacted the Wunderlich Act, not only to arm contractors with expanded grounds of judicial review of disputes decisions favorable to the Government, but also, by the device of denying judicial review to the Government, to abolish the authority of GAO to disapprove payments to contractors under disputes decisions, thus forcing contractors to sue, and, by that device, to relieve the Department of Justice of any suits [406 U.S. 1, 63] to defend on behalf of the United States. There are three dispositive answers to the Court's supposition. </s> First. The notion that Congress enacted the Wunderlich Act to abolish the authority of GAO and the Department of Justice is completely a figment of the Court's own imagination. As the judicial history shows, both agencies have exercised for decades powers identical to those exercised in this case, with no prior complaints that I can discover and with complete congressional approval. I need only quote from the Committee report that accompanied the bill that is now the Wunderlich Act. </s> "The proposed legislation, as amended, will not add to, narrow, restrict, or change in any way the present jurisdiction of the General Accounting Office either in the course of a settlement or upon audit, and the language used is not intended either to change the jurisdiction of the General Accounting Office or to grant any new jurisdiction, but simply to recognize the jurisdiction which the General Accounting Office already has. </s> "The elimination of the specific mention of the General Accounting Office from the provisions of the bill as amended should not be construed as taking away any of the jurisdiction of that Office. It is intended that the General Accounting Office, as was its practice, in reviewing a contract and change orders for the purpose of payment, shall apply the standards of review that are granted to the courts under this bill. At the same time there is no intention of setting up the General Accounting Office as a `court of claims.' Nor should the elimination of the specific mention of the General Accounting Office in the bill be construed as limiting its review to the fraudulent intent standard prescribed by the Wunderlich decision. [406 U.S. 1, 64] </s> "The specific intent of this legislation, insofar as it affects the General Accounting Office, is explicitly stated in the letter . . . from the Comptroller General himself . . . ." </s> The report then quoted from the Comptroller General's letter, in which he said that GAO "has not asked for authority which it did not have before the decision in the Wunderlich case," and in which he quoted from the Senate Committee's report on amended S. 2487: </s> "[I]t is not intended to narrow or restrict or change in any way the present jurisdiction of the General Accounting Office, either in the course of a settlement or upon audit; [it] is not intended either to change the jurisdiction of the General Accounting Office or to grant any new jurisdiction, but simply to recognize the jurisdiction which the General Accounting Office already has." 44 </s> Second. The case law detailed earlier in this opinion, including Eaton, Brown & Simpson, Inc. v. United States, 62 Ct. Cl. 668 (1926), in which GAO disagreed with a disputes decision in favor of the Government and paid the contractor, establishes without question that GAO has no power to overturn a disputes decision. The limit of its authority is to refuse to sanction payment to the contractor and thus force him to bring suit. The judicial precedents in this Court, the Court of Claims, and the district [406 U.S. 1, 65] courts are explicit that only a court can determine the merits of the dispute within the grounds of review specified by the Wunderlich Act. It is therefore completely irrelevant that "the AEC withheld payment solely because of the views of the Comptroller General." Ante, at 10. Indeed, the Court exposes the fallacy of its own position when it states that "the disputes clause in the contract says that the decision of the AEC is `final and conclusive,' unless a court determines that the award is vulnerable under 1 and 2 of the Act." Id., at 3-4 (emphasis added). See also id., at 9: "By the disputes clause the decision of AEC is `final and conclusive' unless `a court of competent jurisdiction' decides otherwise for the enumerated reasons." (Emphasis added.) </s> Third. Similarly, the Court states, in response to the Government's nonexistent contention that the Department of Justice has "the power to overturn decisions of coordinate offices of the Executive Department," id., at 12, "That power [of the Department of Justice to defend suits against the United States] is pervasive but it does not appear how under the Wunderlich Act it gives the Department of Justice the right to appeal from a decision of the Atomic Energy Commission," id., at 12-13 (emphasis added). See also id., at 13: "The power to appeal to the Court of Claims a decision of the federal agency under a disputes clause in a contract which the agency is authorized to make is not to be found in the Wunderlich Act and its underlying legislative history." (Emphasis added.) No one suggests that the Department of Justice has a "right to appeal." It is involved in this case only because GAO's refusal to sanction payment forced petitioner to sue the United States, thus creating a lawsuit that the Department of Justice, as the Government's lawyer, had a duty to defend. It would be strange if the Department had a duty to confess judgment. </s> In support of its construction of the Act, the Court [406 U.S. 1, 66] makes a statement, which I have already quoted, that invites a further comment: </s> "[J]udicial review was provided so that contractors would not inflate their bids to take into account the uncertainties of administrative action. This objective would be ill served if Government contractors - having won a favorable decision before the agencies with whom they contracted - had also to run the gantlet of the General Accounting Office and the Department of Justice." Id., at 14-15. </s> Contractor witnesses at the committee hearings asserted that contractors would have to inflate their bids if they could attack a disputes decision only on the ground that it was fraudulent. As the Court says, the Act resolved this problem by expanding the scope of judicial review, so that contractors can attack a disputes decision on grounds in addition to fraud. That was the protection Congress gave contractors so that they would not have to inflate their bids. </s> After recognizing this, the Court says that because contractors got expanded judicial review to prevent the necessity of inflating bids, they also got the benefit of not having decisions in their favor subject to judicial review at all, since otherwise the objective of preventing inflated bids "would be ill-served." It would be difficult to imagine a more obvious non sequitur. The Court could as easily say that "[t]his objective would be ill served" if the contractors ever lost a disputes decision. </s> I might add that the Court does not say that the "objective would be ill served" if favorable contractor decisions were subject to judicial review; it says that the "objective would be ill served" if contractors "had also to run the gantlet of the General Accounting Office and the Department of Justice." Yet what the Court means, of course, is judicial review, for neither GAO nor [406 U.S. 1, 67] the Department of Justice can take a favorable decision away from a contractor. Only a court can do that. </s> The Court is forced to go to extreme lengths to assert that the Government still may have relief for fraud. That is because the Court concedes, as it must, that its construction of the Act denying the Government judicial review forecloses review of disputes decisions that are "fraudulent," just as it forecloses judicial review of decisions that are "arbitrary," "capricious," "grossly erroneous," or "not supported by substantial evidence." The Court's attempted escape is to suggest that the Government may have relief for fraud under the statutes in which "Congress has made elaborate provisions for dealing with fraudulent claims of contractors." Id., at 16. Apart from the absence of any explanation why, if statutory remedies were always available, this Court found it necessary to fashion, for Government and contractor alike, a judicial exception to the finality of disputes decisions, the point is frivolous. 45 Obviously the fraud statutes the Court mentions have no application whatever to the fraud we are discussing in this case. </s> The "fraud" that is an issue in a disputes clause case is not contractor fraud. Not one case construing a disputes clause, from 1878 to the present day, ever mentions "fraud" by the contractor. Nor has anyone ever suggested [406 U.S. 1, 68] that the Government needs judicial review of disputes decisions to guard against fraud by the contractor. The "fraud" that is involved is a fraudulent decision. The disputes clause and the Act itself provide judicial review to determine whether the "decision . . . is fraudulent." (Emphasis added.) When a disputes decision is challenged, the only questions concern that decision: was it "fraudulent"? was it "capricious"? was it "arbitrary"? was it "grossly erroneous"? was it "not supported by substantial evidence"? 46 The Court is absolutely right that "[a] contractor's fraud is of course a wholly different genus than the case now before us." Id., at 15. </s> IV </s> The time-tested standards of statutory construction require interpretation of the statutory wording to effect the congressional purpose as revealed by legislative history. The Court totally discards those standards in construing the Wunderlich Act. Instead, the Court purports to discover a nonexistent hostility of Congress toward the "intermeddling," id., at 19, of GAO and the Department of Justice in the disputes process and for that reason a congressional purpose to prevent the subjection of "citizens . . . to additional bureaucratic oversight," id., at 14. The virtually century-long judicial history that forms the background of the Act, its explicit language, and its clear legislative history completely refute the proposition. I dissent and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Claims. [406 U.S. 1, 69] </s> APPENDIX TO OPINION OF BRENNAN, J., DISSENTING </s> Within two months after the decision in United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98 (1951), six bills to expand the scope of judicial review of agency disputes decisions were introduced. S. 2432 (Sen. Chavez); S. 2487 (Sen. McCarran); H. R. 6214 (Rep. Celler); H. R. 6301 (Rep. Springer); H. R. 6338 (Rep. Wilson); H. R. 6404 (Rep. Walter). Hearings were held in the Senate on S. 2487. Hearings on S. 2487 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952). S. 2487 provided: </s> "That no provision of any contract entered into by the United States, relating to the finality or conclusiveness of any decision of the Government contracting officer, or of the head of the department or agency of the United States concerned or his representative, in a dispute involving a question of fact arising under such contract, shall be construed to limit judicial review of any such decision only to cases in which fraud by such Government contracting officer or such head of department or agency or his representative is alleged." Id., at 1. </s> The Comptroller General's report to the Judiciary Committee, setting forth GAO's views on S. 2487, stated that GAO felt that the result of the Wunderlich decision was "undesirable both as to the contractor's interests and the interests of the Government." Id., at 5-6. The Comptroller General stressed the latter interest. </s> "I am as deeply concerned, however, that the rule allows the contracting officials uncontrolled discretion over the Government's contractual affairs as well and places them in a position to make as arbitrary and reckless use of their power against the [406 U.S. 1, 70] interests of the Government as against the interests of the contractor. In other words, deciding officials can make just as arbitrary determinations in favor of contractors, at the expense of the taxpayers." Id., at 6. </s> The report concluded that GAO considered S. 2487 </s> "inadequate and . . . objectionable because no provision is made therein for a review of decisions of administrative officers by the General Accounting Office. Without a provision to that effect the General Accounting Office in performing its statutory functions would be precluded from questioning the propriety or legality of payments made to a contractor as the result of an arbitrary or grossly erroneous decision on the part of the contracting officer." Id., at 7. </s> The report recommended a substitute bill, which provided that </s> "Any stipulation in a Government contract to the effect that disputed questions shall be finally determined by an administrative official, representative or board shall not be treated as binding if the General Accounting Office or a court finds that the action of such officer, representative or board is fraudulent, arbitrary, capricious, grossly erroneous, or that it is not supported by substantial evidence." Ibid. </s> Frank L. Yates, the Assistant Comptroller General, expanded on the report in his testimony before the Subcommittee. He asserted that prior to Wunderlich disputes clause decisions on questions of fact arising under Government contracts "were not disturbed by the General Accounting Office or the courts unless the action of the administrative officer was fraudulent, arbitrary, capricious, grossly erroneous, or without foundation in fact." [406 U.S. 1, 71] Wunderlich, Mr. Yates said, "means that the decision of the administrative officials nearly always will be final because of the extreme difficulty of proving fraud." Id., at 8. And, he continued, "the rule works both ways," for "[a] deciding administrative official can make decisions adverse to the Government as well as to contractors, in which event an improper decision results in a burden, an improper burden, to the taxpayers of the country." Id., at 9. Thus, he said, "it appears that the executive contracting agencies without specific legislation authorizing them to do so, may, by agreement with the contractor, circumvent the operations of courts and the General Accounting Office to the serious detriment of both private business and the Government." Id., at 9-10. Mr. Yates explained that GAO's substitute bill would restore "to the courts and to the General Accounting Office . . . their normal and proper jurisdiction," for: </s> "[I]t would permit [administrative officers] to make determinations on questions of fact which would have final effect if the decisions were not found by the General Accounting Office or the courts to be fraudulent, arbitrary, capricious, et cetera. Such a law not only would protect a contractor from fraudulent, arbitrary or capricious action by giving him, in addition to resort to the courts, a further administrative remedy before the General Accounting Office . . . but it would also provide a protection, through the General Accounting Office, against decisions adverse to the interests of the United States. Certainly the rights of contractors and the Government to review or appeal should be coextensive." Id., at 11. </s> The managing director of the Associated General Contractors, H. E. Foreman, testified that the construction industry had for many years attempted without success to secure changes in the standard disputes clause. The [406 U.S. 1, 72] industry's latest proposed disputes clause, which Mr. Foreman read at the hearing, provided "[t]hat nothing in this contract . . . shall void the right of either party to this contract carrying the dispute before a court of competent jurisdiction." Id., at 24. The association's general counsel, John C. Hayes, stated that its position was "that any decision made by a contracting officer or head of a department, agency, or bureau, should be subject to judicial review, in order to guarantee that such decision is reasonable, made with due regard to the rights of both the contracting parties, and supported by the evidence upon which such decision was based." Id., at 29. In amplifying on this position, Mr. Hayes testified that only "by permitting judicial review of the contracting officer's decision . . . can the rights of both the contracting parties be protected." Although he then referred to the need for legislation that would authorize the courts to "enter judgment against the United States on any claim in which the contractor shall seek a review" of a disputes decision, he immediately added that the legislation should provide "that any provision in any contract with the United States abridging the right of the parties to court review shall be null and void." Id., at 30. Finally, in commenting on GAO's proposed substitute bill, Mr. Hayes said that the association "would welcome further administrative review," but that contractors also "should be permitted our judicial review, whether it be the government or whether it be the contractor, it doesn't make any difference. It has to cut both ways . . . ." Id., at 31. Replying to a specific question, Mr. Hayes denied that judicial review "was a one-way street in favor of the contractor," repeating that "it cuts both ways." He concluded that the association wished "to take the position of being absolutely fair in urging legislation that will protect the rights of both Government and contractor." Id., at 32. [406 U.S. 1, 73] </s> There was much discussion of GAO's substitute bill and GAO's role in the review of agency disputes decisions. A former counsel to the Comptroller General, O. R. McGuire, testified that GAO's review should be limited to questions of law and that GAO should "accept the facts, unless, of course, there is fraud, or just gross mistake." Id., at 41. John W. Gaskins, who was on the brief for Wunderlich in the Supreme Court, proposed a revision of GAO's substitute bill specifically granting both GAO and the courts "jurisdiction to set aside any [administrative] decision" that did not comport with the standards set out in GAO's bill. Id., at 68. Gardiner Johnson, an attorney who specialized in the representation of contractors, testified that, as he understood GAO's position, GAO "simply wanted practically the same right that the contractors are requesting, to take an appeal from what they consider to be an unfair and unreasonable decision." Id., at 84. As so understood, he said, "our people have no basic quarrel with that. We are against all forms of unfair, unreasonable decisions either against the Government and the taxpayer or against the contractor." Id., at 83. </s> Most of the witnesses and most of the submitted statements, however, were concerned only with protecting contractors. E. g., id., at 2-3, 62, 70-75, 85-87, 119-136. A few witnesses went even further. Robert E. Kline, Jr., an attorney representing the National Association of River and Harbors Contractors, proposed amendments to S. 2487 designed "to assure full restoration to Government contractors of their inherent right to judicial review of unjust decisions by Government contracting officers and department heads." Id., at 58. These amendments specifically limited the legislation to contractors' suits in which a court would "enter judgment against the United States." Id., at 59. Alan Johnstone, an attorney representing a contractor, initially suggested that the legislation [406 U.S. 1, 74] "should provide . . . simply that all administrative determinations in the performance of a contract with the United States shall be subject to review by the Comptroller General and by the courts, according to law, the provisions of any such contract to the contrary notwithstanding." Id., at 61-62. Mr. Johnstone returned to testify later and, although expressing a preference for a "bill mak[ing] justiciable any grievance which either of the parties to the contract would have," submitted two proposed bills on behalf of himself, Mr. McGuire, and Mr. Gaskins, both of whom had already testified, and Harry D. Ruddiman, who subsequently testified at the House hearings. These proposals made judicial review available only to contractors, one providing that "the United States shall not employ as a defense the finality of" agency decisions, the other that "the United States shall not avail itself of the defense of the finality of such decision[s]." Id., at 107. </s> In contrast, the Associated General Contractors, adhering to the position its representatives had taken at the hearings, submitted a resolution adopted at its annual convention stating that any disputes decision "should be subject to judicial review, in order to guarantee that such decision is reasonable, made with due regard to the rights of both the contracting parties, and supported by the evidence upon which such decision was based," and urging legislation that would provide "that any provision in any contract with the United States abridging the rights of the parties thereto to court review shall be null and void." Id., at 114. </s> After the hearings concluded, the Comptroller General sent the Committee a copy of his report to the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee dealing with the House bills. Id., at 116-119. This report reiterated many of the comments made in the Comptroller General's earlier report to the Senate Committee. The report [406 U.S. 1, 75] also objected to the two proposed bills, submitted by Mr. Johnston, limiting judicial review to contractors on the ground that "the Government would be precluded from employing the finality of the administrative decision as a defense to a suit, [while] the contractors would be free to utilize such defense should the accounting officers of the Government attempt to question the validity of a payment made to a contractor." The report, as did the prior one, recommended adoption of GAO's substitute bill. Id., at 119. </s> S. 2487 was reported out in amended form, incorporating the substance of GAO's proposal. As amended, S. 2487 provided </s> "That no provision of any contract entered into by the United States, relating to the finality or conclusiveness, in a dispute involving a question arising under such contract, of any decision of an administrative official, representative, or board, shall be pleaded as limiting judicial review of any such decision to cases in which fraud by such official, representative, or board is alleged; and any such provision shall be void with respect to any such decision which the General Accounting Office or a court, having jurisdiction, finds fraudulent, grossly erroneous, so mistaken as necessarily to imply bad faith, or not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. . . ." S. Rep. No. 1670, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1952). </s> The Committee report stated that "[t]he purpose of the proposed legislation is to overcome the inequitable effect, under a recent Supreme Court decision, of language in Government contracts which makes the decision of the contracting officer or the head of the agency final with respect to questions of fact." Ibid. The report pointed out "that to the same extent [the Wunderlich] decision [406 U.S. 1, 76] would operate to the disadvantage of an aggrieved contractor, it would also operate to the disadvantage of the Government in those cases, as sometimes happens, when the contracting officer makes a decision detrimental to the Government interest in the claim." Id., at 2. The report further explained that: </s> "S. 2487 will have the effect of permitting review in the General Accounting Office or a court with respect to any decision of a contracting officer or a head of an agency which is found to be fraudulent, grossly erroneous, so mistaken as necessarily to imply bad faith, or not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. In other words, in those instances where a contracting officer has made a mistaken decision, either wittingly or unwittingly, it will not be necessary for the aggrieved party to, in effect, charge him with being a fraud or a cheat in order to affect [sic] collection of what is rightfully due." Ibid. </s> Finally, the report stressed that amended S. 2487 was "not intended to narrow or restrict or change in any way the present jurisdiction of the General Accounting Office . . . but simply to recognize the jurisdiction which the General Accounting Office already has." Id., at 2-3. </s> Although the Senate, without debate, passed amended S. 2487, 98 Cong. Rec. 7783-7784; id., at 9059, the House did not act upon it during the 82d Congress. It was reintroduced in the Senate of the 83d Congress as S. 24. The Committee report was, with formal changes, identical to the report on amended S. 2487. S. Rep. No. 32, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). Senator McCarran, the bill's sponsor, explained on the floor that the effect of the Wunderlich decision was to require "that the aggrieved party allege and prove that some Government employee deliberately cheated, or intended to defraud [406 U.S. 1, 77] him, in order to get a court review of the question." 99 Cong. Rec. 4572. He also noted that: </s> "Senators who have looked into this matter know that this decision of the Supreme Court cuts two ways. It can hurt the Government badly, as well as doing an injustice to contractors. In a recent case . . . [t]he Comptroller General . . . attempted to recover on behalf of the Government, because the mistake was against the Government. The contractor interposed a defense based on . . . the Wunderlich case . . . [T]he result was a failure of recovery on behalf of the Government. </s> "It was because of this case . . . that the Comptroller General . . . testified before the Judiciary Committee in behalf of this bill." Id., at 4573. </s> Later the same day, however, Senator McCarran stated that the Air Force "objected to the fact that the bill gave the Comptroller General the same right that was given to a contractor to question a decision of a contracting officer." Id., at 4598. He also stated that "the Comptroller General feels that in order to protect the interests of the Government, it is necessary that he shall have as much right to question the decision of a contracting officer . . . as may be given to the private party to the contract." Id., at 4599. When S. 24 reached the floor a month later, Senator McCarran again emphasized that while the Wunderlich decision could "operate greatly to the disadvantage of contractors," it could also "operate to the disadvantage of the Government." Id., at 6170. The Senate then passed the bill. Id., at 6201. </s> Representative Reed introduced amended S. 2487 in the House as H. R. 1839, and hearings were held on it and two related bills, H. R. 3634 (Rep. Celler) and H. R. 6946 (Rep. Willis). Hearings on H. R. 1839 et al. before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on [406 U.S. 1, 78] the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., ser. 12 (1953, 1954). </s> At the initial hearing in July 1953, all witnesses supported the bill. Elwyn L. Simmons, a contractor, asserted that, because of "incompetent or negligent or capricious agency representative[s]," the Wunderlich decision could "work as readily against the Government's interests as against that of the contractor" and that "only your immediate legislative action through enactment of H. R. 1839 or S. 24 can now protect both the Government and the contractor from this . . . unprecedented situation." Id., at 4. Referring to the Senate debates on S. 24, Mr. Simmons noted </s> "that there was some objection by contractors doing business with the Air Force to the inclusion of the GAO under the provisions of this bill. I do not know what basis these Air Force contractors have for their objection, but we as general contractors are used to the GAO in our business and their auditing staff and forms no basis for our objection." Id., at 5. </s> George P. Leonard, an officer of the Wunderlich Contracting Co., testified that because of Wunderlich "neither the Government through the GAO, nor the contractors through the courts, have any right to appeal from contracting officers' decisions even though they may be grossly erroneous." Id., at 7. He added that he saw "no reason why anybody should object to either the General Accounting Office or the courts passing on these decisions of the contracting officers." Id., at 8. </s> Harry D. Ruddiman, who argued for Wunderlich before the Supreme Court, submitted a prepared statement asserting that unless H. R. 1839 was enacted, "not only the contractor but also the Government, will be unable to obtain effective judicial review of contracting officers' decisions." In his view, H. R. 1839 "would restore to [406 U.S. 1, 79] the courts an effective review of determinations made by contracting officers." Id., at 12. Although, in light of the Senate reports on amended S. 2487 and S. 24, Mr. Ruddiman discounted "[f]ears . . . that the reference to the General Accounting Office in S. 24 would give it powers with respect to the review of payments under Government contracts beyond those which it already possesses," he suggested in his statement that "any doubt on the matter . . . can very easily be removed by striking out the words 'the General Accounting Office or'" in H. R. 1839. Id., at 13. In his testimony, however, Mr. Ruddiman expressed reservations about removing GAO from the bill. </s> "Lastly, I would like to deal with an objection which has been raised to including the General Accounting Office in the provisions of this bill. I don't know just exactly what the basis of the objection is, but in my opinion, any fears along that line are groundless. As I see it, the General Accounting Office, as a matter of practice, in reviewing contracts and change orders for purposes of payment, is always going to apply the standards of review that are granted to the courts. That has been their practice before the Wunderlich decision. They figured if there was good reason to doubt the finality of the decision, the matter ought to be referred to the courts. I think that is all that would be done by the language of this bill. </s> "At one time I thought there would probably be no objection to striking out the reference to the General Accounting Office as mentioned in S. 24 or H. R. 1839. I felt that even if you had no reference, the General Accounting Office would still exercise that same jurisdiction. However, in view of the fact that the Senate has already passed a bill which has included a reference to the General Accounting [406 U.S. 1, 80] Office, I think it would be dangerous now to eliminate the General Accounting Office from the provisions of this bill. It might be misconstrued as taking away this jurisdiction from the General Accounting Office." Id., at 16. </s> Representative Graham, a committee member, replied that it was "needless to refer to" GAO anyway. Ibid. Mr. Ruddiman, however, adhered to his view in a letter to the Subcommittee the following day. </s> "I feel that if the bill, as passed by the Senate, had contained no reference to the General Accounting Office, and the House of Representatives had passed such a bill without amendment, the General Accounting Office as a practical matter would, in reviewing payments under Government contracts and change orders, employ these same standards of review that are granted by the bill to the courts. Thus, if the General Accounting Office was confronted with an administrative decision which it thought would be set aside by the courts, it would refuse to make payment and throw the matter into court. However, since the Senate, in passing S. 24, has expressly included the General Accounting Office in the bill, some doubt as to the General Accounting Office jurisdiction might arise if the House of Representatives should then strike out all reference to the General Accounting Office. There would then be the possibility that this action would be construed as limiting review by the General Accounting Office to the ineffective ground of fraudulent intent prescribed by the Wunderlich decision. It is therefore my suggestion that the bill be passed without change in the language employed by the Senate." Id., at 17. </s> Alan Johnston, the final witness of the day, likewise [406 U.S. 1, 81] urged that GAO be left in H. R. 1839. Id., at 18. He said that "this bill would throw wide the portals of the courts of justice to anyone, including the Government, which has a grievance," and, referring, as had Senator McCarran, to Leeds & Northrup Co. v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 999 (ED Pa. 1951), in which a contractor successfully asserted a Wunderlich defense, he said "that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander." Id., at 19. </s> Opposition to H. R. 1839 was also becoming apparent. Among the letters sent to the Committee, id., at 22-30, all calling for legislation to protect the rights of contractors, was one urging deletion of the reference to GAO because "[t]he effect of the provision is to set up the General Accounting Office as a 'court of claims.' . . . [A]n agency of the legislative branch . . . should not be used to perform functions intended for the judicial branch." Id., at 26. </s> Shortly before the hearings resumed in January 1954, the Comptroller General wrote the Chairman of the Committee about H. R. 1839. He noted that "there was considerable opposition to the bill from some quarters . . . on the basis . . . that the General Accounting Office should not be given express authority by statute to review and overrule the determinations of administrative officials." Id., at 135. He responded that GAO "has not asked for authority which it did not have before the decision in the Wunderlich case," and he referred to the statement in the Senate reports that the bill would not affect GAO's jurisdiction. Nevertheless, he then presented a substitute bill, to which he said there would be little or no opposition by industry groups and administrative agencies. He stated that "this substitute language will accomplish what we have been striving for all along and will place the General Accounting Office in [406 U.S. 1, 82] precisely the same situation it was in before" Wunderlich. Id., at 136. GAO's proposed bill provided: </s> "That no provision of any contract entered into by the United States, relating to the finality or conclusiveness of any decision of the head of any department or agency or his duly authorized representative or board in a dispute involving a question arising under such contract, shall be pleaded as limiting judicial review of any such decision to cases where fraud by such official or his said representative or board is alleged: Provided, however, that any such decision shall be final and conclusive unless the same is fraudulent or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evidence. . . ." Ibid. </s> With the addition of the words "in any suit now filed or to be filed," added to deal with retroactivity problems, see, e. g., id., at 48, 82, GAO's bill eventually was enacted as the Wunderlich Act. </s> In commenting upon GAO's bill, E. L. Fisher, GAO's general counsel, reiterated much of the testimony of the Assistant Comptroller General, Mr. Yates, at the Senate hearing. Mr. Fisher, as had Mr. Yates, stressed that the Wunderlich "rule works both ways. A deciding administrative official can make decisions adverse to the Government as well as to contractors." Id., at 38. Mr. Fisher, in language virtually identical to that earlier used by Mr. Yates, urged passage of either H. R. 1839 or GAO's proposed substitute because they </s> "would permit [administrative officers] to make determinations on questions of fact which would have final effect if the decisions were not found by the General Accounting Office or the courts to be fraudulent, arbitrary, capricious, and so forth. Such a law not only would protect a contractor from fraudulent, [406 U.S. 1, 83] arbitrary or capricious action by giving him, in addition to resort to the courts, a further administrative remedy before the General Accounting Office, and would also provide a protection, through the General Accounting Office, against decisions adverse to the interests of the United States. Certainly the rights of contract[ors] and the Government to review or appeal should be coextensive." Id., at 39. </s> The associate general counsel of the General Services Administration, J. H. Macomber, Jr., similarly emphasized the need to protect the Government's interests, stating "that there should be some provision in the legislation, if not an explicit provision at least by appropriate wording with respect to the judicial review portion, that will insure an opportunity to protect the Government against excessive generosity, against decisions of the contracting officer adverse to the Government." Id., at 59. Mr. Macomber suggested that </s> "there might be some doubt under the wording of H. R. 6946 . . . where specific reference is made to a finding by the court[,] as to whether the General Accounting Office could seek a court review by a setoff or by applying to the Department of Justice for recovery in a case where they felt that the action of the contracting officer was grossly erroneous as against the Government. I think that the language suggested by the Comptroller General's revision gets away from that difficulty." Ibid. </s> Mr. Simmons, a contractor who had supported H. R. 1839 at the initial hearing, appeared again to support GAO's substitute bill on the ground that it "was prepared to meet objections of certain industries against giving the General Accounting Office express statutory authority to review administrative decisions under the disputes [406 U.S. 1, 84] clause, and is designed to give the General Accounting Office no more authority in this connection than it had before the Wunderlich decision." Id., at 76. </s> Many other witnesses supported GAO's substitute bill on essentially the same grounds. E. g., id., at 52-56, 77-88, 91-95, 101-104, 123-124. Louis F. Dahling, associate counsel for the Automobile Manufacturers Association, asserted that H. R. 1839 would "make the General Accounting Office another Court of Claims" and thus deprive contractors of their day in court. </s> "Now, it does not appear from the language in that bill that there would be any appeal from a decision of the General Accounting Office, and that office will in all probability make the first review of any disputes clause decision. If that agency should decide that the decision was not supported by substantial evidence, it would appear that the contractor would have no redress. Furthermore, the General Accounting Office is a part of the legislative department of the Government. . . . If this agency is made another Court of Claims, in a sense it becomes a judge and jury and a prosecutor." Id., at 97. </s> Mr. Dahling therefore supported GAO's bill because it did "not grant judicial power to the General Accounting Office." Id., at 98. Charles Maechling, Jr., a representative of the Radio-Electronics-Television Manufacturers Association, echoed this view. </s> "Under S. 24, however, the scope and powers of the General Accounting Office are vastly enlarged, and this agency of the Government, which has heretofore exercised principally investigatory and audit functions, becomes clothed with powers of a judicial nature. S. 24 appears to set up the General Accounting Office as a third administrative tier of review in Government contract disputes." Id., at 105. [406 U.S. 1, 85] </s> Similarly, the American Merchant Marine Institute submitted a statement objecting to H. R. 1839. </s> "in so far as it establishes the General Accounting Office as a sort of intermediate or `floating' court and vests it with express statutory authority to set aside [an administrative] decision merely because its administrative officers in their opinion consider the decision not to be supported by substantial evidence. On the other hand, we fully agree that a decision of a contracting officer or, upon appeal, of the head of the contracting agency, should be subject to judicial review and reversal by the courts . . . . This judicial function, however, should not be shared with or otherwise vested in the General Accounting Office . . . . The literal effect of S. 24 appears to be that once the General Accounting Office may have found the decision to be not supported by substantial evidence, it may not thereafter be pleaded in court either by the contracting party or the Government as limiting the scope of judicial review to that provided for by the disputes clause." Id., at 122. </s> Opposition to H. R. 1839, then, was premised on the fear that its reference to GAO might deprive contractors of any recourse to the courts. That judicial review was the contractors' sole concern is also clear from the position taken by the Associated General Contractors, id., at 61-75, which supported H. R. 1839 on the ground that it would restore to contractors "the fundamental right of judicial review of disputes arising under Government contracts." Id., at 62. </s> That deletion of the reference to GAO was not understood as denying judicial review to the Government becomes evident from an examination of Representative Willis' testimony about his bill. H. R. 6946, which was identical to H. R. 1839 except that it omitted the words "the General Accounting Office or." Id., at 31. He testified [406 U.S. 1, 86] that the "Wunderlich decision could react and has reacted unfavorably to the Government where the Government felt it was the aggrieved party." Id., at 32. The following colloquy then occurred: </s> "Mr. HYDE. The only question that occurred to me was that you mentioned there might be a time when the Government was the aggrieved party. With the present procedure, the Government is not likely to be the aggrieved party? </s> "Mr. WILLIS. It could be. It could very well be, because here you are dealing with fraud, and the court says that in order to have relief one must be guilty of fraud. Now, a contracting officer who hands down a decision against the Government can very adversely affect the Government itself, and the Government some of these days might find a decision very much against itself. The decision works both ways, in that there is no appeal either way from the holding of the contracting officer unless a showing of fraud is made, and the Government itself might be caught some of these days under this Wunderlich decision. I know of one case when the court so ruled. </s> . . . . . </s> "Mr. HYDE. If the contracting officer makes a finding, under what circumstances would the Government be the one to take an appeal or want to take an appeal? Who would be the one in the Government to say, `We are going to take an appeal'? </s> "Mr. WILLIS. I imagine the General Accounting Office would be interested, and the Department of Justice and the Department of Defense. Suppose a dispute arises . . . [a]nd then on matters of fact the contracting officer holds one way. Then neither side has recourse unless there is a showing that the [406 U.S. 1, 87] contracting officer was dishonest, was guilty of fraud, or intended to cheat someone." Id., at 33-34. </s> This testimony is significant also in light of the later testimony of Franklin M. Schultz, a former law professor who had written about the problems created by the Wunderlich decision. Mr. Schultz expressed concern that GAO's substitute bill did "not say specifically that an appeal can be taken by an aggrieved contractor." A committee member then asked whether the language of GAO's bill did "not necessarily include both parties." Id., at 110. The following colloquy ensued: </s> "Mr. SCHULTZ. Yes, and that is exactly my point. . . . [S]everal years from now, if the Comptroller General decides . . . that a contracting officer's decision is not supported by substantial evidence, he could refuse payment, and in a court action he could say that this bill means that it is a two-way street, not only may the contractor upset the contracting officer for not having substantial evidence behind the decision, but in the case where the contracting officer makes a decision favorable to the contractor the GAO has similar upsetting power. . . . </s> . . . . . </s> "Mr. WILLIS. This judicial review referred to in that passage there referring to a review by GAO, when GAO has been left out deliberately as compared to S. 24? </s> "Mr. SCHULTZ. Well, that is persuasive, sir, but you do have the testimony of Mr. Fisher, sponsoring [GAO's] bill . . . saying that the rights of contractors and the Government to appeal should be coextensive. . . ." Id., at 110-111. </s> Mr. Schultz went on to say, what was implicit in the above colloquy, that his objection was not to judicial [406 U.S. 1, 88] review for the Government, which he recognized would be available, but to judicial review for either the Government or contractors on the basis of the "substantial evidence" test. He indicated that his "own preference would be for the language of [GAO's] bill without the phrase `substantial evidence,'" id., at 113, and in a subsequent letter to the Subcommittee he again suggested that neither the Government nor contractors should be permitted to rely upon that standard to upset an administrative decision, id., at 118-119. </s> The Subcommittee was presented with, but took no action upon, a bill proposed by the American Bar Association that would have expressly limited the right of judicial review to contractors. Id., at 89. Instead, the Committee reported out the bill that is now the Wunderlich Act. H. R. Rep. No. 1380, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). The report stated: </s> "The purpose of the proposed legislation . . . is to overcome the effect of the Supreme Court decision . . . under which the decisions of Government officers rendered pursuant to the standard disputes clauses in Government contracts are held to be final absent fraud on the part of such Government officers. </s> ". . . The proposed legislation also prescribes fair and uniform standards for the judicial review of such administrative decisions in the light of the reasonable requirements of the various Government departments and agencies, of the General Accounting Office and of Government contractors." Id., at 1-2. </s> The report also discussed the effect of the legislation on GAO, in much the same terms as had the prior Senate reports. </s> "The proposed legislation, as amended, will not add to, narrow, restrict, or change in any way the present [406 U.S. 1, 89] jurisdiction of the General Accounting Office either in the course of a settlement or upon audit, and the language used is not intended either to change the jurisdiction of the General Accounting Office or to grant any new jurisdiction, but simply to recognize the jurisdiction which the General Accounting Office already has. </s> "The elimination of the specific mention of the General Accounting Office from the provisions of the bill as amended should not be construed as taking away any of the jurisdiction of that Office. It is intended that the General Accounting Office, as was its practice, in reviewing a contract and change orders for the purpose of payment, shall apply the standards of review that are granted to the courts under this bill. At the same time there is no intention of setting up the General Accounting Office as a `court of claims.' Nor should the elimination of the specific mention of the General Accounting Office in the bill be construed as limiting its review to the fraudulent intent standard prescribed by the Wunderlich decision." Id., at 6-7. </s> Representative Graham stated on the floor of the House that the Comptroller General had approved the bill, and the House passed it without debate. 100 Cong. Rec. 5510. When the bill came to the Senate, Senator McCarran explained that </s> "The purpose of the proposed legislation is to overcome the inequitable effect, under the decision of the Supreme Court in the Wunderlich case, of language in Government contracts which makes the decision of the contracting officer or the head of the agency final, with respect to questions of fact. To put it another way, the objective of this bill is to preserve the right of review by the courts in cases [406 U.S. 1, 90] involving action by a contracting officer which is arbitrary, capricious, fraudulent, or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith. </s> "The language of the House bill, while quite different from the language approved in the Senate, is designed to accomplish the same purpose. It is my understanding the Department of Justice takes the view that the House language will accomplish the same purpose as the Senate language. It is my further understanding that the Comptroller General of the United States has expressed complete satisfaction with the House language, and has declared that in his opinion it will accomplish the purposes sought to be served by the Senate language." Id., at 5717. </s> After Senator McCarran further assured the Senate that GAO was "satisfied with the language in the House bill" and that "otherwise [he] would not care to go along," ibid., a final colloquy occurred: </s> "Mr. THYE. As I understand, the bill was passed by the Senate, and a similar bill was passed by the House. The only question involved is a modification of the language in the Senate bill, and the two bills agree in their effect, so to speak? </s> "Mr. McCARRAN. That is correct. </s> "Mr. THYE. There is nothing else of a legislative nature involved. Is that correct? </s> "Mr. McCARRAN. That is correct." Id., at 5718. </s> The Senate then passed the bill. Ibid. </s> [Footnote 1 The concurring opinion seems to read the judicial-review provision out of the disputes clause: "And if the contractor accepts a decision of the contracting officer, and does not appeal to the Commission, that decision, by the specific provisions of the disputes [406 U.S. 1, 27] clause, is final and conclusive as to questions of fact. Under the Government's position, however, the decision at the agency head would enjoy no such preferred and conclusive status." Ante, at 21 (emphasis added). The Commission's disputes decision does not have "conclusive status" under the disputes clause, of course, because of a "specific provision" of the clause. That provision directs that the Commission's decision is "final and conclusive unless" (emphasis added) a court determines that it was "fraudulent," etc. It does not direct that the Commission's decision is final and conclusive unless the contractor appeals to the courts. That is the language of the earlier provision, referred to by the concurring opinion, under which the contracting officer's decision is final and conclusive unless the contractor appeals to the Commission. If "the specific provisions of the disputes clause" apply after the contracting officer's decision, surely they also apply after the Commission's decision. </s> [Footnote 2 The Court's opening sentence appears to say that we are dealing with a pre-Wunderlich Act disputes clause that "provides that the decision of AEC shall be `final and conclusive.'" Ante, at 2-3. The Court later recognizes the obvious: "By the Disputes Clause the decision of AEC is `final and conclusive' unless `a court of competent jurisdiction' decides otherwise for the enumerated reasons." Id., at 9. </s> [Footnote 3 It was suggested at oral argument that the procurement agency might pay the contractor in accordance with a disputes decision in his favor and that subsequently, prompted by GAO's post-audit, the Department of Justice might sue the contractor to recoup the payment on the ground that the agency's decision was improper under the disputes clause and the Wunderlich Act. The Court's holding today, of course, prohibits the Government from obtaining judicial review of disputes decisions by that method. Indeed, that would be an a fortiori case, for the agency not only would have decided in favor of the contractor, but also would have paid him in accordance [406 U.S. 1, 29] with its decision. If a disputes decision is final when the agency refuses to implement it by payment, certainly it is final when the agency pays. </s> [Footnote 4 The Court's constant repetition of the phrase "fraud or bad faith" might suggest to the casual reader that the Court is holding that the Government may challenge the finality of disputes decisions on those grounds. That, however, is not true, for fraud and bad faith are two of the grounds specified in the disputes clause and the Wunderlich Act: a disputes decision may be set aside if it is "fraudulent" or if it is "so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith." In contrast to the disputes clause and the Act, the Court is not referring to disputes decisions resulting from the fraud or bad faith of the disputes decisionmaker. Rather the Court is referring to fraud or bad faith on the part of the contractor, as the Court's statement of facts makes clear: "The defenses tendered raised no issue of any fraud or bad faith of the contractor against the United States." Ante, at 7. "The Commissioner did not base his opinion on any issue of fraud or bad faith of the contractor against the United States, nor did the Court of Claims." Ibid. See also id., at 9-10, n. 8 and Part IV of the Court's opinion. The concurring opinion also refers to "fraud" and "bad faith." Ante, at 19. Again, however, the reference is not to fraud and bad faith as used in the disputes clause and the Act. </s> [Footnote 5 The Court's citation of Mason & Hanger, ante, at 10, is, to say the least, perplexing. </s> [Footnote 6 Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U.S. 536 (1926), which involved a contractor's challenge to the finality of a disputes decision by a Government official, also demonstrates that the rule was the same no matter which party challenged the decision. The Court there held that the official's decision was binding "unless there is an absence of good faith in the exercise of the judgment." Id., at 548. Significantly, the Court cited as authority, not only Kihlberg, Sweeney, March, and Gleason, all cases in which the contractor challenged and the Government (in March, the party whose official decided the dispute) relied upon the disputes decision, but also Mason & Hanger, in which the Government challenged the finality of a disputes decision upon which the contractor relied. </s> [Footnote 7 The Court cites McShain Co. for the proposition that "[t]he cases deny review" by GAO "absent fraud or overreaching." Ante, at 10. Since McShain Co. is simply another example of the application of the Kihlberg rule against the Government, I am at a loss to understand the Court's statement. As the excerpt I have quoted in the text demonstrates, McShain Co. did not "deny review" by GAO; rather, like the other cases, it held that GAO's view of the merits of the disputes decision was irrelevant in court and that the Government could upset the finality of that decision only by proving in court that it was fraudulent. </s> [Footnote 8 The Court states, ante, at 11, that the District Court in James Graham, by referring to "fraud or overreaching," referred to instances "where the Comptroller General's power was founded upon specific statutory provisions such as 41 U.S.C. 53," a statute relating to "kickbacks by Government contractors," id., at 9 n. 8. In [406 U.S. 1, 44] fact, however, the District Court not only did not refer to that statute, it did not refer to any statute, nor even intimate that a statute might be relevant. What the District Court did was use the phrase "fraud or overreaching" as shorthand for the Kihlberg rule, the judicially created fraud exception to the finality of disputes decisions. That usage is readily apparent from a glance at the District Court's citations: Mason & Hanger and Moorman from this Court, and Penn Bridge, Carroll, and McShain Co. from the Court of Claims. The Court also says, id., at 11, that in James Graham "summary judgment was entered by the court, which said, `Since the Navy Department has determined that plaintiff contractor is entitled to the payment sought, this Court must adjudge accordingly.'" The Court omits to quote the immediately preceding sentence in the James Graham opinion: "And the Navy Department's decision that these particular dues and contributions are reimbursable is not arbitrary or unconscionable." 91 F. Supp., at 717 (emphasis added). Thus, again, the District Court was referring to the disputes decision, and not, as the Court today would have it, to "fraud or overreaching" by the contractor. </s> [Footnote 9 The concurring opinion asserts that "[t]he contractor here, according to the long-term understanding of the disputes clause, consented to the disposition of disputes by the contracting officer and by the AEC on appeal, and to the finality of decision at those points." Ante, at 21. If the concurring opinion is speaking of pre-Wunderlich Act disputes clauses, the authorities I have cited establish the utter inaccuracy of the assertion. Indeed, the concurring opinion also asserts that "for years, with the specified exceptions, [the disputes] clause itself has been regarded as conferring no right of judicial review on the part of the Government." Id., at 20 (emphasis added). The italicized words can only refer to the judicially created exception for fraudulent decisions. The concurring opinion gives no indication that, in either of the assertions, it is referring to the current disputes clause. </s> [Footnote 10 Hearings on S. 2487 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6. </s> [Footnote 11 Id., at 8. </s> [Footnote 12 It is misleading to assert, as does the Court, that Wunderlich "closed the courthouse doors to certain citizens." Ante, at 14 (emphasis added). Similarly, the concurring opinion asserts that Wunderlich "restricted contractor-instigated judicial review" and that the Government "prevailed" in Wunderlich with "a narrow judicial review standard for the contractor." Ante, at 22 (emphasis added). The concurring opinion's assertions are the more surprising in view of its apparent recognition that the Government was subject to the same standard of judicial review as contractors. See n. 9, supra. </s> [Footnote 13 Hearings on S. 2487, supra, n. 10, at 29-32, 68, 83-84, 107, 114. </s> [Footnote 14 Id., at 59, 107. Moreover, H. R. 6301, also introduced in the 82d Congress, provided for judicial review only in those instances "in which the contractor shall seek to set aside a decision on a disputed question between the United States and such contractor, made by an officer, board, or other representative of the United States . . . ." Neither House supported this bill. </s> [Footnote 15 Hearings on S. 2487, supra, n. 10, at 119. </s> [Footnote 16 See S. Rep. No. 1670, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. </s> [Footnote 17 Id., at 2. </s> [Footnote 18 Ibid. </s> [Footnote 19 Id., at 3. </s> [Footnote 20 Amended S. 2487 was reintroduced as S. 24, but for ease of reference I will continue to refer to it as amended S. 2487. </s> [Footnote 21 99 Cong. Rec. 4573. </s> [Footnote 22 99 Cong. Rec. 6170. </s> [Footnote 23 Amended S. 2487 was introduced as H. R. 1839, but for ease of reference I will continue to refer to it as amended S. 2487. </s> [Footnote 24 Hearings on H. R. 1839 et al. before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., ser. 12, at 3-20. </s> [Footnote 25 Id., at 26. </s> [Footnote 26 Id., at 136. </s> [Footnote 27 Id., at 39. </s> [Footnote 28 Id., at 59. </s> [Footnote 29 Id., at 110. </s> [Footnote 30 Id., at 89. </s> [Footnote 31 H. R. Rep. No. 1380, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 6. </s> [Footnote 32 Id., at 7. </s> [Footnote 33 The Court's only foray into the legislative history is its assertion that "Congress contemplated giving the General Accounting Office such powers and, indeed, the Senate twice passed - in the form of the McCarran bill - a provision which would have allowed the Comptroller to review disputes decisions to determine if they" satisfied the standards of the Act. Ante, at 11. The Court therefore concludes that the Act cannot be construed "to give the Comptroller General powers which Congress has plainly denied." Id., at 12. Similarly, the concurring opinion asserts that "[t]he flat rejection by Congress of the proposed provision for GAO review is significant. There would be no point in that rejection if GAO has the power to defeat the finality of the disputes decision anyway." Ante, at 22-23. Unfortunately, the Court and the concurring opinion overlook that the proposed provision was not simply "for GAO review." It was for binding GAO review. Because it was not enacted, GAO does not "have a veto of AEC's `final' decision," ante, at 9 (opinion of the Court); GAO does not have "power to defeat the finality of the disputes decision," ante, at 23 (concurring opinion). Both the Act and the disputes clause specifically provide that only a court can set aside a disputes decision. And that is precisely the point the legislative history makes clear. </s> [Footnote 34 100 Cong. Rec. 5717. </s> [Footnote 35 100 Cong. Rec. 5718. </s> [Footnote 36 The need arises in this case only because petitioner argues that, despite the clear language of the Act, the legislative history reveals that Congress meant to reserve the right of judicial review solely [406 U.S. 1, 59] to contractors. It is thus somewhat odd that the Court considers it worthwhile to assert "that the Act's legislative history `has something for everyone'" and that the Court "find[s] the Act's history at best ambiguous." Ante, at 13 n. 9. The concurring opinion likewise professes to find the legislative history "decidedly ambiguous at best," ante, at 22, yet nevertheless goes on to assert that Congress "intended to relieve contractors" and "opened the door to the contractor," ibid. (emphasis added). These comments are all the more inexplicable because neither the Court nor the concurring opinion attempts even the most cursory analysis of the text of the Act itself. </s> [Footnote 37 H. R. Rep. No. 1380, supra, n. 31, at 6. </s> [Footnote 38 See n. 10, supra. </s> [Footnote 39 The concurring opinion asserts that "[i]n the exercise of its legislative judgment, Congress has determined that in this area the Government," unlike contractors, does not need the Act's protection "against fraud, capriciousness, arbitrariness, bad faith, and absence of evidence." Ante, at 23. As the concurring opinion never refers to the language of the Act, and finds the legislative history "not at all that clear," "decidedly ambiguous at best," id., at 22, and "inconclusive," id., at 23, it is difficult to understand the basis for this statement. </s> [Footnote 40 This statement, albeit obscurely, may mean that the purpose of avoiding litigation would not be served by subjecting a disputes decision in favor of the contractor to judicial review, for that would be litigation. Yet just as obviously the purpose of avoiding litigation would not be served by subjecting a disputes decision against the contractor to judicial review. </s> [Footnote 41 See n. 4 supra, n. 43, infra. </s> [Footnote 42 This is a difficult statement to understand. Assume that the Commission had "no valid reason" not to pay petitioner. Was the Commission's nonpayment in violation of the contract? Was it in violation of the Wunderlich Act? The Court does not say. If nonpayment violated neither the contract nor the Act, it seems rather strange that this Court should order the Commission to pay. The Court's statement appears to be connected with its later statement that "[t]he AEC has not, to this day, repudiated the merits of its decisions in favor of petitioner." Ante, at 19. Again, however, the Court does not say how or even whether the Commission's "non-repudiation" violated the contract or the Act. In the same vein, the concurring opinion asserts that there is "a possible breach of contract" in this case: "When the United States then disavows the Commission's decision - a decision which as the Court notes, to this day has never been withdrawn or repudiated by the AEC - it seems to me that the Government imposes [406 U.S. 1, 62] something to which the contractor has not agreed." Ante, at 21, 22. The concurring opinion, however, does not say how the Government's "disavowal" violated the contract. </s> [Footnote 43 If this statement implies that a contractor is "subject . . . to additional bureaucratic oversight, where there is . . . evidence of fraud or overreaching" (emphasis added), one might well ask why that is so. Fraud is only one of the five grounds of judicial review specified in the Act and the disputes clause. Obviously either all or none are available. See n. 4, supra. </s> [Footnote 44 H. R. Rep. No. 1380, supra, n. 31, at 6-7 (emphasis added). This detailed refutation that GAO authority was being curtailed was necessary to allay the fears expressed by the attorney who argued Wunderlich for the contractor. He testified during the House hearings that deletion of GAO from amended S. 2487, passed by the Senate, might be misconstrued as depriving GAO of its prior authority to refuse to sanction payment and thereby "throw the matter into court." See Appendix, infra, at 78-80. Today's decision fulfills his prophecy. </s> [Footnote 45 The Court asserts that "[i]f the Comptroller General has the broad, roving, investigatory powers that are asserted, specific statutory grants of authority such as this provision [41 U.S.C. 53] relating to kickbacks would be superfluous." Ante, at 10 n. 8. The GAO authority asserted here, however, is simply the authority to refuse to sanction payment under a disputes decision on the ground that the decision does not satisfy the standards of the Wunderlich Act. The Act, of course, has nothing whatever to do with illegal activities of contractors. It concerns only the finality of administrative disputes decisions. Enforcement of the Act obviously would not make the statutory prohibition of kickbacks "superfluous." </s> [Footnote 46 Even my Brother DOUGLAS once recognized this: "We should allow the Court of Claims, the agency close to these disputes, to reverse an official whose conduct is plainly out of bounds whether he is fraudulent, perverse, captious, incompetent, or just palpably wrong." United States v. Wunderlich, supra, at 102 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added). </s> [406 U.S. 1, 91]

United States Supreme Court SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA(1994) No. 92-9059 Argued: January 18, 1994Decided: June 17, 1994 </s> During the penalty phase of petitioner's South Carolina trial, the State argued that his future dangerousness was a factor for the jury to consider when deciding whether to sentence him to death or life imprisonment for the murder of an elderly woman. In rebuttal, petitioner presented evidence that his future dangerousness was limited to elderly women, and thus there was no reason to expect violent acts from him in prison. However, the court refused to give the jury his proposed instruction that, under state law, he was ineligible for parole. When asked by the jury whether life imprisonment carried with it the possibility of parole, the court instructed the jury not to consider parole in reaching its verdict, and that the terms life imprisonment and death sentence were to be understood to have their plain and ordinary meaning. The jury returned a death sentence. On appeal, the State Supreme Court concluded that, regardless of whether a trial court's refusal to inform a sentencing jury about a defendant's parole ineligibility might ever be error, the instruction given to petitioner's jury satisfied in substance his request for a charge on such ineligibility. </s> Held: </s> The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded. </s> ___ S. C. ___, 427 S. E. 2d 175, reversed and remanded. </s> JUSTICE BLACKMUN, joined by JUSTICE STEVENS, JUSTICE SOUTER, and JUSTICE GINSBURG, concluded: </s> 1. Where a defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and state law prohibits his release on parole, due process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible. An individual cannot be executed on the basis of information which he had no opportunity to deny or explain. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 . Petitioner's jury reasonably may have believed that he could be released on parole if he Page II were not executed. To the extent that this misunderstanding pervaded its deliberations, it had the effect of creating a false choice between sentencing him to death and sentencing him to a limited period of incarceration. The trial court's refusal to apprise the jury of information so crucial to its determination, particularly when the State alluded to the defendant's future dangerousness in its argument, cannot be reconciled with this Court's well established precedents interpreting the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 . Pp. 7-15. </s> 2. The trial court's instruction that life imprisonment was to be understood in its plain and ordinary meaning did not satisfy petitioner's request for a parole ineligibility charge, since it did nothing to dispel the misunderstanding reasonable jurors may have about the way in which any particular State defines "life imprisonment." Pp. 15-17. </s> JUSTICE O'CONNOR, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE KENNEDY, concluded that, where the State puts a defendant's future dangerousness in issue, and the only available alternative sentence to death is life imprisonment without possibility of parole, due process entitles the defendant to inform the sentencing jury - either by argument or instruction - that he is parole ineligible. If the prosecution does not argue future dangerousness, a State may appropriately decide that parole is not a proper issue for the jury's consideration even if the only alternative sentence to death is life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Here, the trial court's instruction did not satisfy petitioner's request for a parole ineligibility charge, since the rejection of parole is a recent development displacing the longstanding practice of parole availability, and since common sense dictates that many jurors might not know whether a life sentence carries with it the possibility of parole. Pp. 1-4. </s> BLACKMUN, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which STEVENS, SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. SOUTER, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which STEVENS, J., joined. GINSBURG, J., filed a concurring opinion. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and KENNEDY, J., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined. </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 1] </s> JUSTICE BLACKMUN announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which JUSTICE STEVENS, JUSTICE SOUTER, and JUSTICE GINSBURG join. </s> This case presents the question whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was violated by the refusal of a state trial court to instruct the jury in the penalty phase of a capital trial that, under state law, the defendant was ineligible for parole. We hold that, where the defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and state law prohibits the defendant's release on parole, due process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible. </s> I </s> A </s> In July, 1990, petitioner beat to death an elderly woman, Josie Lamb, in her home in Columbia, South Carolina. The week before petitioner's capital murder trial was scheduled to begin, he pleaded guilty to first degree burglary and two counts of criminal sexual conduct in connection with two prior assaults on elderly women. Petitioner's guilty pleas resulted in convictions for violent offenses, and those convictions rendered </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 2] </s> petitioner ineligible for parole if convicted for any subsequent violent crime offense. S.C.Code Ann. 24-21-640 (Supp. 1993). </s> Prior to jury selection, the prosecution advised the trial judge that the State "[o]bviously [was] going to ask you to exclude any mention of parole throughout this trial." App. 2. Over defense counsel's objection, the trial court granted the prosecution's motion for an order barring the defense from asking any question during voir dire regarding parole. Under the court's order, defense counsel was forbidden even to mention the subject of parole, and expressly was prohibited from questioning prospective jurors as to whether they understood the meaning of a "life" sentence under South Carolina law. 1 After a 3-day trial, petitioner was convicted of the murder of Ms. Lamb. </s> During the penalty phase, the defense brought forward mitigating evidence tending to show that petitioner's violent behavior reflected serious mental disorders that stemmed from years of neglect and extreme sexual and physical abuse petitioner endured as an adolescent. While there was some disagreement among witnesses regarding the extent to which petitioner's mental condition properly could be deemed a "disorder," witnesses for both the defense and the prosecution agreed that petitioner posed a continuing danger to elderly women. </s> In its closing argument, the prosecution argued that petitioner's future dangerousness was a factor for the jury to consider when fixing the appropriate punishment. The question for the jury, said the prosecution, was "what to do with [petitioner] now that he is in our </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 3] </s> midst." Id., at 110. The prosecution further urged that a verdict for death would be "a response of society to someone who is a threat. Your verdict will be an act of self-defense." Ibid. </s> Petitioner sought to rebut the prosecution's generalized argument of future dangerousness by presenting evidence that, due to his unique psychological problems, his dangerousness was limited to elderly women, and that there was no reason to expect further acts of violence once he was isolated in a prison setting. In support of his argument, petitioner introduced testimony from a female medical assistant and from two supervising officers at the Richland County jail where petitioner had been held prior to trial. All three testified that petitioner had adapted well to prison life during his pretrial confinement and had not behaved in a violent manner toward any of the other inmates or staff. Petitioner also offered expert opinion testimony from Richard L. Boyle, a clinical social worker and former correctional employee, who had reviewed and observed petitioner's institutional adjustment. Mr. Boyle expressed the view that, based on petitioner's background and his current functioning, petitioner would successfully adapt to prison if he was sentenced to life imprisonment. </s> Concerned that the jury might not understand that "life imprisonment" did not carry with it the possibility of parole in petitioner's case, defense counsel asked the trial judge to clarify this point by defining the term "life imprisonment" for the jury in accordance with S.C. Code 24-21-640 (Supp. 1993). 2 To buttress his request, </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 4] </s> petitioner proffered, outside the presence of the jury, evidence conclusively establishing his parole ineligibility. On petitioner's behalf, attorneys for the South Carolina Department of Corrections and the Department of Probation, Parole and Pardons testified that any offender in petitioner's position was, in fact, ineligible for parole under South Carolina law. The prosecution did not challenge or question petitioner's parole ineligibility. Instead, it sought to elicit admissions from the witnesses that, notwithstanding petitioner's parole ineligibility, petitioner might receive holiday furloughs or other forms of early release. Even this effort was unsuccessful, however, as the cross-examination revealed that Department of Corrections regulations prohibit petitioner's release under early release programs such as work release or supervised furloughs, and that no convicted murderer serving life without parole ever had been furloughed or otherwise released for any reason. </s> Petitioner then offered into evidence, without objection, the results of a statewide public opinion survey conducted by the University of South Carolina's Institute for Public Affairs. The survey had been conducted a few days before petitioner's trial, and showed that only 7.1 percent of all jury-eligible adults who were questioned firmly believed that a inmate sentenced to life imprisonment in South Carolina actually would be required to spend the rest of his life in prison. See App. 152-154. Almost half of those surveyed believed that a convicted murderer might be paroled within 20 years; nearly three-quarters thought that release certainly would occur in less than 30 years. Ibid. More than 75 percent of those surveyed indicated that, if they were called upon to make a capital sentencing decision as jurors, the amount of time the convicted murderer actually would have to spend in prison would be an "extremely important" or a "very important" factor in choosing between life and death. Id., at 155. </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 5] </s> Petitioner argued that, in view of the public's apparent misunderstanding about the meaning of "life imprisonment" in South Carolina, there was a reasonable likelihood that the jurors would vote for death simply because they believed, mistakenly, that petitioner eventually would be released on parole. </s> The prosecution opposed the proposed instruction, urging the court "not to allow . . . any argument by state or defense about parole and not charge the jury on anything concerning parole." Id., at 37. Citing the South Carolina Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991), the trial court refused petitioner's requested instruction. Petitioner then asked alternatively for the following instruction: </s> "I charge you that these sentences mean what they say. That is, if you recommend that the defendant Jonathan Simmons be sentenced to death, he actually will be sentenced to death and executed. If, on the other hand, you recommend that he be sentenced to life imprisonment, he actually will be sentenced to imprisonment in the state penitentiary for the balance of his natural life. </s> "In your deliberations, you are not to speculate that these sentences mean anything other than what I have just told you, for what I have told you is exactly what will happen to the defendant, depending on what your sentencing decision is." App. 162. </s> The trial judge also refused to give this instruction, but indicated that he might give a similar instruction if the jury inquired about parole eligibility. </s> After deliberating on petitioner's sentence for 90 minutes, the jury sent a note to the judge asking a single question: "Does the imposition of a life sentence carry with it the possibility of parole?" Id., at 145. Over </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 6] </s> petitioner's objection, the trial judge gave the following instruction: </s> "You are instructed not to consider parole or parole eligibility in reaching your verdict. Do not consider parole or parole eligibility. That is not a proper issue for your consideration. The terms life imprisonment and death sentence are to be understood in their plan [sic] and ordinary meaning." Id., at 146. </s> Twenty-five minutes after receiving this response from the court, the jury returned to the courtroom with a sentence of death. </s> On appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court, petitioner argued that the trial judge's refusal to provide the jury accurate information regarding his parole ineligibility violated the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 The South Carolina Supreme Court declined to reach the merits of petitioner's challenges. With one Justice dissenting, it concluded that, regardless of whether a trial court's refusal to inform a sentencing jury about a defendant's parole ineligibility might be error under </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 7] </s> some circumstances, the instruction given to petitioner's jury "satisfie[d] in substance [petitioner's] request for a charge on parole ineligibility," and thus there was no reason to consider whether denial of such an instruction would be constitutional error in this case. State v. Simmons, ___ S.C. ___, ___, 427 S.E.2d 175, 179 (1993). We granted certiorari, ___ U.S. ___ (1993). </s> II </s> The Due Process Clause does not allow the execution of a person "on the basis of information which he had no opportunity to deny or explain." Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S., at 362 . In this case, the jury reasonably may have believed that petitioner could be released on parole if he were not executed. To the extent this misunderstanding pervaded the jury's deliberations, it had the effect of creating a false choice between sentencing petitioner to death and sentencing him to a limited period of incarceration. This grievous misperception was encouraged by the trial court's refusal to provide the jury with accurate information regarding petitioner's parole ineligibility, and by the State's repeated suggestion that petitioner would pose a future danger to society if he were not executed. Three times petitioner asked to inform the jury that, in fact, he was ineligible for parole under state law; three times his request was denied. The State thus succeeded in securing a death sentence on the ground at least in part, of petitioner's future dangerousness, while at the same time concealing from the sentencing jury the true meaning of its non-capital sentencing alternative, namely, that life imprisonment meant life without parole. We think it is clear that the State denied petitioner due process. 4 </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 8] </s> A </s> This Court has approved the jury's consideration of future dangerousness during the penalty phase of a capital trial, recognizing that a defendant's future dangerousness bears on all sentencing determinations made in our criminal justice system. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275 (1976) (plurality opinion) (noting that "any sentencing authority must predict a convicted person's probable future conduct when it engages in the process of determining what punishment to impose"); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1003 , n. 17 (1983) (explaining that it is proper for a sentencing jury in a capital case to consider "the defendant's potential for reform and whether his probable future behavior counsels against the desirability of his release into society"). </s> Although South Carolina statutes do not mandate consideration of the defendant's future dangerousness in capital sentencing, the State's evidence in aggravation is not limited to evidence relating to statutory aggravating circumstances. See Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 948 -951 (1983) (plurality opinion); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S., at 1008 ("Once the jury finds that the defendant falls within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty . . . the jury then is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment"). Thus, prosecutors in South Carolina, like those in other States that impose the death penalty, frequently emphasize a defendant's future dangerousness in their evidence and argument at the sentencing phase; they urge the jury to sentence the defendant to death so that he will not be a danger to the public if released from prison. Eisenberg & Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 Cornell L.Rev. 1, 4 (1993). </s> Arguments relating to a defendant's future dangerousness ordinarily would be inappropriate at the guilt phase </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 9] </s> of a trial, as the jury is not free to convict a defendant simply because he poses a future danger; nor is a defendant's future dangerousness likely relevant to the question whether each element of an alleged offense has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. But where the jury has sentencing responsibilities in a capital trial, many issues that are irrelevant to the guilt-innocence determination step into the foreground and require consideration at the sentencing phase. The defendant's character, prior criminal history, mental capacity, background, and age are just a few of the many factors, in addition to future dangerousness, that a jury may consider in fixing appropriate punishment. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S., at 948 -951. </s> In assessing future dangerousness, the actual duration of the defendant's prison sentence is indisputably relevant. Holding all other factors constant, it is entirely reasonable for a sentencing jury to view a defendant who is eligible for parole as a greater threat to society than a defendant who is not. Indeed, there may be no greater assurance of a defendant's future nondangerousness to the public than the fact that he never will be released on parole. The trial court's refusal to apprise the jury of information so crucial to its sentencing determination, particularly when the prosecution alluded to the defendant's future dangerousness in its argument to the jury, cannot be reconciled with our well-established precedents interpreting the Due Process Clause. </s> B </s> In Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986), this Court held that a defendant was denied due process by the refusal of the state trial court to admit evidence of the defendant's good behavior in prison in the penalty </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 10] </s> phase of his capital trial. Although the majority opinion stressed that the defendant's good behavior in prison was "relevant evidence in mitigation of punishment," and thus admissible under the Eighth Amendment, id., at 4, citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion), the Skipper opinion expressly noted that the Court's conclusion also was compelled by the Due Process Clause. The Court explained that where the prosecution relies on a prediction of future dangerousness in requesting the death penalty, elemental due process principles operate to require admission of the defendant's relevant evidence in rebuttal. 476 U.S., at 5 , n. 1. See also id., at 9 (Powell, J., opinion concurring in judgment) ("[B]ecause petitioner was not allowed to rebut evidence and argument used against him," the defendant clearly was denied due process). </s> The Court reached a similar conclusion in Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977). In that case, a defendant was sentenced to death on the basis of a presentence report which was not made available to him, and which he therefore could not rebut. A plurality of the Court explained that sending a man to his death "on the basis of information which he had no opportunity to deny or explain" violated fundamental notions of due process. Id., at 362. The principle announced in Gardner was reaffirmed in Skipper, and it compels our decision today. See also Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (due process entitles a defendant to "`a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense'") (citation omitted); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 -87 (1985) (where the State presents psychiatric evidence of a defendant's future dangerousness at a capital sentencing proceeding, due process entitles an indigent defendant to the assistance of a psychiatrist for the development of his defense). </s> Like the defendants in Skipper and Gardner, petitioner was prevented from rebutting information that the </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 11] </s> sentencing authority considered, and upon which it may have relied, in imposing the sentence of death. The State raised the specter of petitioner's future dangerousness generally, but then thwarted all efforts by petitioner to demonstrate that, contrary to the prosecutor's intimations, he never would be released on parole and thus, in his view, would not pose a future danger to society. 5 The logic and effectiveness of petitioner's argument naturally depended on the fact that he was legally ineligible for parole, and thus would remain in prison if afforded a life sentence. Petitioner's efforts to focus the jury's attention on the question whether, in prison, he would be a future danger were futile, as he repeatedly was denied any opportunity to inform the jury that he never would be released on parole. The jury was left to speculate about petitioner's parole eligibility when evaluating petitioner's future dangerousness, and was denied a straight answer about petitioner's parole eligibility even when it was requested. </s> C </s> The State and its amici contend that petitioner was not entitled to an instruction informing the jury that petitioner is ineligible for parole because such information is inherently misleading. 6 Essentially, they argue </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 12] </s> that because future exigencies such as legislative reform, commutation, clemency, and escape might allow petitioner to be released into society, petitioner was not entitled to inform the jury that he is parole ineligible. Insofar as this argument is targeted at the specific wording of the instruction petitioner requested, the argument is misplaced. Petitioner's requested instruction ("If . . . you recommend that [the defendant] be sentenced to life imprisonment, he actually will be sentenced to imprisonment in the state penitentiary for the balance of his natural life," App. 162) was proposed only after the trial court ruled that South Carolina law prohibited a plain language instruction that petitioner was ineligible for parole under state law. To the extent that the State opposes even a simple parole ineligibility instruction because of hypothetical future developments, the argument has little force. Respondent admits that an instruction informing the jury that petitioner is ineligible for parole is legally accurate. Certainly, such an instruction is more accurate than no instruction at all, which leaves the jury to speculate whether "life imprisonment" means life without parole or something else. </s> The State's asserted accuracy concerns are further undermined by the fact that a large majority of States which provide for life imprisonment without parole as an alternative to capital punishment inform the sentencing authority of the defendant's parole ineligibility. 7 The </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 13] </s> few States that do not provide capital sentencing juries with any information regarding parole ineligibility seem to rely, as South Carolina does here, on the proposition that California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983), held </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 14] </s> that such determinations are purely matters of state law. 8 </s> It is true that Ramos stands for the broad proposition that we generally will defer to a State's determination as to what a jury should and should not be told about sentencing. In a State in which parole is available, how the jury's knowledge of parole availability will affect the decision whether or not to impose the death penalty is speculative, and we shall not lightly second-guess a decision whether or not to inform a jury of information regarding parole. States reasonably may conclude that truthful information regarding the availability of commutation, pardon, and the like, should be kept from the jury in order to provide "greater protection in [the States'] criminal justice system than the Federal Constitution requires." Id., at 1014. Concomitantly, nothing in the Constitution prohibits the prosecution from arguing any truthful information relating to parole or other forms of early release. </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 15] </s> But if the State rests its case for imposing the death penalty at least in part on the premise that the defendant will be dangerous in the future, the fact that the alternative sentence to death is life without parole will necessarily undercut the State's argument regarding the threat the defendant poses to society. Because truthful information of parole ineligibility allows the defendant to "deny or explain" the showing of future dangerousness, due process plainly requires that he be allowed to bring it to the jury's attention by way of argument by defense counsel or an instruction from the court. See Gardner, 430 U.S., at 362 . </s> III </s> There remains to be considered whether the South Carolina Supreme Court was correct in concluding that the trial court "satisfie[d] in substance [petitioner's] request for a charge on parole ineligibility," 427 S.E.2d, at 179, when it responded to the jury's query by stating that life imprisonment was to be understood in its "plain and ordinary meaning." Ibid. In the court's view, petitioner basically received the parole-ineligibility instruction he requested. We disagree. </s> It can hardly be questioned that most juries lack accurate information about the precise meaning of "life imprisonment" as defined by the States. For much of our country's history, parole was a mainstay of state and federal sentencing regimes, and every term (whether a term of life or a term of years) in practice was understood to be shorter than the stated term. See generally Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81 Calif.L.Rev. 61 (1993) (describing the development of mandatory sentencing laws). Increasingly, legislatures have enacted mandatory sentencing laws with severe penalty provisions, yet the precise contours of these penal laws vary from State to State. See Cheatwood, </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 16] </s> The Life Without Parole Sanction: Its Current Status and a Research Agenda, 34 Crime & Delinq. 43, 45, 48 (1988). Justice Chandler of the South Carolina Supreme Court observed that it is impossible to ignore "the reality, known to the `reasonable juror,' that, historically, life term defendants have been eligible for parole." State v. Smith, 298 S.C. 482, 489-490, 381 S.E.2d 724, 728 (1989) (opinion concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1060 (1990). 9 </s> An instruction directing juries that life imprisonment should be understood in its "plain and ordinary" meaning does nothing to dispel the misunderstanding reasonable jurors may have about the way in which any particular State defines "life imprisonment." 10 See Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990) (where there is a "reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence," the defendant is denied due process). </s> It is true, as the State points out, that the trial court admonished the jury that "you are instructed not to consider parole," and that parole "is not a proper issue </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 17] </s> for your consideration." App. 146. Far from ensuring that the jury was not misled, however, this instruction actually suggested that parole was available, but that the jury, for some unstated reason, should be blind to this fact. Undoubtedly, the instruction was confusing and frustrating to the jury, given the arguments by both the prosecution and the defense relating to petitioner's future dangerousness, and the obvious relevance of petitioner's parole ineligibility to the jury's formidable sentencing task. While juries ordinarily are presumed to follow the court's instructions, see Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 , n. 7 (1987), we have recognized that, in some circumstances, "the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored." Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968). See also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 642 (1980); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S., at 950 ("Any sentencing decision calls for the exercise of judgment. It is neither possible nor desirable for a person to whom the State entrusts an important judgment to decide in a vacuum, as if he had no experiences"). </s> But even if the trial court's instruction successfully prevented the jury from considering parole, petitioner's due process rights still were not honored. Because petitioner's future dangerousness was at issue, he was entitled to inform the jury of his parole ineligibility. An instruction directing the jury not to consider the defendant's likely conduct in prison would not have satisfied due process in Skipper, supra, and, for the same reasons, the instruction issued by the trial court in this case does not satisfy due process. </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 18] </s> IV </s> The State may not create a false dilemma by advancing generalized arguments regarding the defendant's future dangerousness while at the same time, preventing the jury from learning that the defendant never will be released on parole. The judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court accordingly is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The venire was informed, however, of the meaning of the term "death" under South Carolina law. The trial judge specifically advised the prospective jurors that "[b]y the death penalty, we mean death by electrocution." The sentencing jury was also so informed. App. 129. </s> [Footnote 2 Section 24-21-640 states: The board must not grant parole nor is parole authorized to any prisoner serving a sentence for a second or subsequent conviction, following a separate sentencing from a prior conviction, for violent crimes as defined in Section 16-1-60. Petitioner's earlier convictions for burglary in the first degree and criminal sexual assault in the first degree are violent offenses under 16-1-60. </s> [Footnote 3 Specifically, petitioner argued that under the Eighth Amendment his parole ineligibility was "`mitigating' in the sense that [it] might serve `as a basis for a sentence less than death,'" Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 -5 (1986), quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)(plurality opinion), and that therefore he was entitled to inform the jury of his parole ineligibility. He also asserted that by withholding from the jury the fact that it had a life without parole sentencing alternative, the trial court impermissibly diminished the reliability of the jury's determination that death was the appropriate punishment. Cf. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980). Finally, relying on the authority of Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977), petitioner argued that his due process right to rebut the State's argument that petitioner posed a future danger to society had been violated by the trial court's refusal to permit him to show that a noncapital sentence adequately could protect the public from any future acts of violence by him. </s> [Footnote 4 We express no opinion on the question whether the result we reach today is also compelled by the Eighth Amendment. </s> [Footnote 5 Of course, the fact that a defendant is parole ineligible does not prevent the State from arguing that the defendant poses a future danger. The State is free to argue that the defendant will pose a danger to others in prison and that executing him is the only means of eliminating the threat to the safety of other inmates or prison staff. But the State may not mislead the jury by concealing accurate information about the defendant's parole ineligibility. The Due Process Clause will not tolerate placing a capital defendant in a straitjacket by barring him from rebutting the prosecution's arguments of future dangerousness with the fact that he is ineligible for parole under state law. </s> [Footnote 6 In this regard, the State emphasizes that no statute prohibits </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 12] </s> petitioner's eventual release into society. While this technically may be true, state regulations unambiguously prohibit work release and virtually all other furloughs for inmates who are ineligible for parole. See App. 16. As for pardons, the statute itself provides that they are available only in "the most extraordinary circumstances." S.C.Code Ann. 24-21-950D (1989). </s> [Footnote 7 At present, there are 26 States that both employ juries in capital sentencing and provide for life imprisonment without parole as an alternative to capital punishment. In 17 of these, the jury expressly is informed of the defendant's ineligibility for parole. Nine States </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 13] </s> simply identify the jury's sentencing alternatives as death and life without parole. See Ala.Code 13A-5-46(e) (1982); Ark.Code Ann. 5-4-603(b) (1993); Cal. Penal Code Ann. 190.3 (West 1988); Conn.Gen.Stat. 53a-46a(f) (1985); Del.Code Ann. Tit. 11, 4209(a) (1987); La.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. Art. 905.6 (West Supp. 1994); Mo.Rev. Stat. 565.030.4 (1993); N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. 630:5 (Supp. 1992); Wash.Rev.Code 10.95.030 (Supp. 1994). Eight States allow the jury to specify whether the defendant should or should not be eligible for parole. See Ga.Code Ann. 17-10-31.1(a) (1993); Ind.Code 35-50-2-9 (Supp. 1993); Md.Ann.Code, Art. 27, 413(c)(3) (Supp. 1993); Nev.Rev.Stat. 175.554(2)(c)(2) (Michie Supp. 1993); Okla.Stat.Ann. Tit. 21, 701.10(A) (Supp. 1994); Ore.Rev.Stat. 163.105 (1991); Tenn.Code Ann. 39-13-204(a)-(f)(2) (Supp. 1993); Utah Code Ann. 76-3-207(4) (Supp. 1993). </s> In three States, statutory or decisional law requires that the sentencing jury be instructed, where accurate, that the defendant will be ineligible for parole. See Colo.Rev.Stat. 16-11-103(1)(b) (Supp. 1993); People v. Gacho, 122 Ill.2d 221, 262, 522 N.E.2d 1146, 1166 (1988); Turner v. State, 573 So.2d 657, 675 (Miss. 1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ (1991). </s> Three States have not considered the question whether jurors should be instructed that the defendant is ineligible for parole under state law. See Fla.Stat. 775.0823(1) (Supp. 1994); S.D. Codified Laws 24-15-4 (1988); Wyo.Stat. 6-2-101(b), 7-13-402(a) (Supp. 1993). The Florida Supreme Court, however, has approved for publication pattern jury instructions that inform capital sentencing juries of the no-parole feature of Fla.Stat. 775.0823(1). See Standard Jury Instructions - Criminal Cases, 603 So.2d 1175, 1205 (Fla. 1992). </s> Finally, there are four States in which the capital sentencing decision is made by the trial judge alone or by a sentencing panel of judges. Thus, in these States, as well, the sentencing authority is fully aware of the precise parole status of life-sentenced murderers. Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. 13-703(B) (Supp. 1993); Idaho Code 19-2515(d) (1987); Mont.Code Ann. 46-18-301 (1993); Neb.Rev.Stat. 29-2520 (1989). </s> [Footnote 8 Only two States other than South Carolina have a life without parole sentencing alternative to capital punishment for some or all convicted murderers but refuse to inform sentencing juries of this fact. See Commonwealth v. Henry, 524 Pa. 135, 160, 569 A.2d 929, 941 (1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 931 (1991); Commonwealth v. Strong, 522 Pa. 445, 458-460, 563 A.2d 479, 485-486 (1989); Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 248-249, 397 S.E.2d 385, 392-393 (1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ (1991); O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 701, 364 S.E.2d 491, 507, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988). </s> JUSTICE SCALIA points out that two additional States, Texas and North Carolina, traditionally have kept information about a capital defendant's parole ineligibility from the sentencing jury. See post, at 2. Neither of these States, however, has a life without parole sentencing alternative to capital punishment. It is also worthy of note that, pursuant to recently enacted legislation, North Carolina now requires trial courts to instruct capital sentencing juries concerning parole eligibility. See 1993 N.C.Sess.Laws, ch. 538, 29. </s> [Footnote 9 Public opinion and juror surveys support the commonsense understanding that there is a reasonable likelihood of juror confusion about the meaning of the term "life imprisonment." See Paduano & Smith, Deadly Errors: Juror Misperceptions Concerning Parole in the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 18 Colum. Human Rights L.Rev. 211, 222-225 (1987); Note, The Meaning of "Life" for Virginia Jurors and Its Effect on Reliability in Capital Sentencing, 75 Va.L.Rev. 1605, 1624 (1989); Eisenberg & Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 Cornell L.Rev. 1 (1993); Bowers, Capital Punishment & Contemporary Values: People's Misgivings and the Court's Misperceptions, 27 Law & Society 157, 169-170 (1993). </s> [Footnote 10 It almost goes without saying that, if the jury in this case understood that the "plain meaning" of "life imprisonment" was life without parole in South Carolina, there would have been no reason for the jury to inquire about petitioner's parole eligibility. </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 1] </s> JUSTICE SOUTER, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins, concurring. </s> I join in JUSTICE BLACKMUN's opinion that, at least when future dangerousness is an issue in a capital sentencing determination, the defendant has a due process right to require that his sentencing jury be informed of his ineligibility for parole. I write separately because I believe an additional, related principle also compels today's decision, regardless of whether future dangerousness is an issue at sentencing. </s> The Eighth Amendment entitles a defendant to a jury capable of a reasoned moral judgment about whether death, rather than some lesser sentence, ought to be imposed. The Court has explained that the Amendment imposes a heightened standard "for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case," Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and STEVENS, JJ.); see also, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 -428 (1980); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 383 -384 (1988). Thus, it requires provision of "accurate sentencing information [as] an indispensable prerequisite to a reasoned determination of whether a defendant shall live or die," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 2] </s> STEVENS, JJ.), and invalidates "procedural rules that ten[d] to diminish the reliability of the sentencing determination," Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638 (1980). </s> That same need for heightened reliability also mandates recognition of a capital defendant's right to require instructions on the meaning of the legal terms used to describe the sentences (or sentencing recommendations) a jury is required to consider, in making the reasoned moral choice between sentencing alternatives. Thus, whenever there is a reasonable likelihood that a juror will misunderstand a sentencing term, a defendant may demand instruction on its meaning, and a death sentence following the refusal of such a request should be vacated as having been "arbitrarily or capriciously" and "wantonly and . . . freakishly imposed." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); id., at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). </s> While I join the other Members of the Court's majority in holding that, at least, counsel ought to be permitted to inform the jury of the law that it must apply, see ante, at 15 (plurality opinion); post, at 1 (GINSBURG, J., concurring); post, at 3-4 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment), I also accept the general rule that, on matters of law, arguments of counsel do not effectively substitute for statements by the court. </s> "[A]rguments of counsel generally carry less weight with a jury than do instructions from the court. The former are usually billed in advance to the jury as matters of argument, not evidence, and are likely viewed as the statements of advocates; the latter, we have often recognized, are viewed as definitive and binding statements of the law." Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 384 (1990) (citation omitted). </s> I would thus impose that straightforward duty on the court. </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 3] </s> Because JUSTICE BLACKMUN persuasively demonstrates that juries in general are likely to misunderstand the meaning of the term "life imprisonment" in a given context, see ante, at 4-5, 15-16, and n. 9, the judge must tell the jury what the term means, when the defendant so requests. It is, moreover, clear that at least one of these particular jurors did not understand the meaning of the term, since the jury sent a note to the judge asking, "Does the imposition of a life sentence carry with it the possibility of parole?" Ante, at 5, 16, n. 10. The answer here was easy, and controlled by state statute. The judge should have said no. JUSTICE BLACKMUN shows that the instruction actually given was, at best, a confusing, "equivocal direction to the jury on a basic issue," Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 613 (1946), and that "there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way" that violated petitioner's rights. Boyde, supra, at 380. By effectively withholding from the jury the "life without parole" alternative, the trial court diminished the reliability of the jury's decision that death, rather than that alternative, was the appropriate penalty in this case. </s> While States are, of course, free to provide more protection for the accused than the Constitution requires, see California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1014 (1983), they may not provide less. South Carolina did so here. For these reasons, as well as those set forth by JUSTICE BLACKMUN, whose opinion I join, the judgment of the Supreme Court of South Carolina must be reversed. </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 1] </s> JUSTICE GINSBURG, concurring. </s> This case is most readily resolved under a core requirement of due process, the right to be heard. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986). When the prosecution urges a defendant's future dangerousness as cause for the death sentence, the defendant's right to be heard means that he must be afforded an opportunity to rebut the argument. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 , n. 1 (1986). To be full and fair, that opportunity must include the right to inform the jury, if it is indeed the case, that the defendant is ineligible for parole. JUSTICE BLACKMUN's opinion is in accord with JUSTICE O'CONNOR's on this essential point. See ante, at 9; 11, 14-15; post, at 2-4. </s> As a subsidiary matter, JUSTICE O'CONNOR's opinion clarifies that the due process requirement is met if the relevant information is intelligently conveyed to the jury; due process does not dictate that the judge herself, rather than defense counsel, provide the instruction. See post, at 3-4. I do not read JUSTICE BLACKMUN's opinion to say otherwise. * And I note that the trial </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 2] </s> court here not only refused to instruct the jury that in this case life means "life without parole"; the court also ordered petitioner's counsel to refrain from saying anything to the jury about parole ineligibility. App. 55-57. </s> On these understandings, I concur in JUSTICE BLACKMUN's opinion. </s> [Footnote * Compare ante, at 7, n. 4 (refraining from addressing Simmons' Eighth Amendment claim), with ante, at 2-3 (SOUTER, J., concurring) (Eighth Amendment requires judge to instruct jury about </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 2] </s> parole ineligibility). </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 1] </s> JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE KENNEDY join, concurring in the judgment. </s> "Capital sentencing proceedings must, of course, satisfy the dictates of the Due Process Clause," Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 746 (1990), and one of the hallmarks of due process in our adversary system is the defendant's ability to meet the State's case against him. Cf. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986). In capital cases, we have held that the defendant's future dangerousness is a consideration on which the State may rely in seeking the death penalty. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1002 -1003 (1983). But "[w]here the prosecution specifically relies on a prediction of future dangerousness in asking for the death penalty, . . . the elemental due process requirement that a defendant not be sentenced to death `on the basis of information which he had no opportunity to deny or explain' [requires that the defendant be afforded an opportunity to introduce evidence on this point]." Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 , n. 1 (1986), quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977) (plurality opinion); see also 476 U.S., at 9 -10 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). </s> In this case, petitioner physically and sexually assaulted three elderly women - one of them his own grandmother </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 2] </s> - before killing a fourth. At the capital sentencing proceeding, the State sought to show that petitioner is a vicious predator who would pose a continuing threat to the community. The prosecutor argued that the jury's role was to decide "what to do with [petitioner] now that he is in our midst," App. 110, and told the jury: "Your verdict should be a response of society to someone who is a threat. Your verdict will be an act of self-defense." Ibid.; see also id., at 102, 112. Petitioner's response was that he only preyed on elderly women, a class of victims he would not encounter behind bars. See id., at 121; ante, at 3. This argument stood a chance of succeeding, if at all, only if the jury were convinced that petitioner would stay in prison. Although the only available alternative sentence to death in petitioner's case was life imprisonment without possibility of parole, S.C.Code Ann. 16-3-20(A) and 24-21-640 (Supp. 1993), the trial court precluded the jury from learning that petitioner would never be released from prison. </s> Unlike in Skipper, where the defendant sought to introduce factual evidence tending to disprove the State's showing of future dangerousness, see 476 U.S., at 3 ; id., at 10-11 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment), petitioner sought to rely on the operation of South Carolina's sentencing law in arguing that he would not pose a threat to the community if he were sentenced to life imprisonment. We have previously noted with approval, however, that "[m]any state courts have held it improper for the jury to consider or to be informed - through argument or instruction - of the possibility of commutation, pardon, or parole." California v. Ramos, supra, at 1013, n. 30. The decision whether or not to inform the jury of the possibility of early release is generally left to the States. See id., at 1014. In a State in which parole is available, the Constitution does not require (or preclude) jury consideration of that fact. Likewise, if the prosecution does not </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 3] </s> argue future dangerousness, the State may appropriately decide that parole is not a proper issue for the jury's consideration even if the only alternative sentence to death is life imprisonment without possibility of parole. </s> When the State seeks to show the defendant's future dangerousness, however, the fact that he will never be released from prison will often be the only way that a violent criminal can successfully rebut the State's case. I agree with the Court that in such a case the defendant should be allowed to bring his parole ineligibility to the jury's attention - by way of argument by defense counsel or an instruction from the court - as a means of responding to the State's showing of future dangerousness. And despite our general deference to state decisions regarding what the jury should be told about sentencing, I agree that due process requires that the defendant be allowed to do so in cases in which the only available alternative sentence to death is life imprisonment without possibility of parole and the prosecution argues that the defendant will pose a threat to society in the future. Of course, in such cases, the prosecution is free to argue that the defendant would be dangerous in prison; the State may also (though it need not) inform the jury of any truthful information regarding the availability of commutation, pardon, and the like. See id., at 1001-1009. </s> The prosecutor in this case put petitioner's future dangerousness in issue, but petitioner was not permitted to argue parole ineligibility to the capital sentencing jury. Although the trial judge instructed the jurors that "[t]he terms life imprisonment and death sentence are to be understood in their pla[i]n and ordinary meaning," App. 146, I cannot agree with the court below that this instruction "satisfie[d] in substance [petitioner's] request for a charge on parole ineligibility." ___ S. C. ___, ___, 427 S.E.2d 175, 179 (1993). The rejection of parole by many States (and the Federal Government) is a recent </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 4] </s> development that displaces the longstanding practice of parole availability, see ante, at 15-16, and common sense tells us that many jurors might not know whether a life sentence carries with it the possibility of parole. While it may come to pass that the "plain and ordinary meaning" of a life sentence is life without parole, that the jury in this case felt compelled to ask whether parole was available shows that the jurors did not know whether or not a life-sentenced defendant will be released from prison. Moreover, the prosecutor, by referring to a verdict of death as an act of "self-defense," strongly implied that petitioner would be let out eventually if the jury did not recommend a death sentence. </s> Where the State puts the defendant's future dangerousness in issue, and the only available alternative sentence to death is life imprisonment without possibility of parole, due process entitles the defendant to inform the capital sentencing jury - by either argument or instruction - that he is parole ineligible. In this case, the prosecution argued at the capital sentencing proceeding that petitioner would be dangerous in the future. Although the only alternative sentence to death under state law was life imprisonment without possibility of parole, petitioner was not allowed to argue to the jury that he would never be released from prison, and the trial judge's instruction did not communicate this information to the jury. I therefore concur in the Court's judgment that petitioner was denied the due process of law to which he is constitutionally entitled. </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 1] </s> JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, dissenting. </s> Today's judgment certainly seems reasonable enough as a determination of what a capital sentencing jury should be permitted to consider. That is not, however, what it purports to be. It purports to be a determination that any capital sentencing scheme that does not permit jury consideration of such material is so incompatible with our national traditions of criminal procedure that it violates the Due Process Clause of the Constitution of the United States. There is really no basis for such a pronouncement, neither in any near uniform practice of our people nor in the jurisprudence of this Court. </s> With respect to the former, I shall discuss only current practice, since the parties and amici have addressed only that, and since traditional practice may be relatively uninformative with regard to the new schemes of capital sentencing imposed upon the States by this Court's recent jurisprudence. The overwhelming majority of the 32 States that permit juries to impose or recommend capital sentences do not allow specific information regarding parole to be given to the jury. To be sure, in many of these States, the sentencing choices specifically include "life without parole," so that the jury charge </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 2] </s> itself conveys the information whether parole is available. In at least eight of those States, however, the jury's choice is not merely between "life without parole" and "death," but among some variation of (parole eligible) "life," "life without parole" and "death" 1 - so that the precise date of availability of parole is relevant to the jury's choice. Moreover, even among those States that permit the jury to choose only between "life" (unspecified) and "death," South Carolina is not alone in keeping parole information from the jury. Four other States in widely separated parts of the country follow that same course, 2 and there are other States that lack any clear practice. 3 By contrast, the parties and their amici point to only ten States that arguably employ the procedure which, according to today's opinions, the Constitution requires. 4 This picture of national practice </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 3] </s> falls far short of demonstrating a principle so widely shared that it is part of even a current and temporary American consensus. </s> As for our prior jurisprudence: the opinions of JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE O'CONNOR rely on the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of Due Process, rather than on the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibition, as applied to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. But cf. ante, at 1-2 (SOUTER, J., concurring). The prior law applicable to that subject indicates that petitioner's due process rights would be violated if he was "sentenced to death `on the basis of information which he had no opportunity to deny or explain.'" Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 , n. 1 (1986), quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977). Both opinions try to bring this case within that description, but it does not fit. </s> The opinions paint a picture of a prosecutor who repeatedly stressed that petitioner would pose a threat to society upon his release. The record tells a different story. Rather than emphasizing future dangerousness as a crucial factor, the prosecutor stressed the nature of petitioner's crimes: the crime that was the subject of the prosecution, the brutal murder of a 79-year-old woman in her home, and three prior crimes confessed to by the petitioner, all rapes and beatings of elderly women, one of them his grandmother. I am sure it was the sheer depravity of those crimes, rather than any specific fear </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 4] </s> for the future, which induced the South Carolina jury to conclude that the death penalty was justice. </s> Not only, moreover, was future dangerousness not emphasized, but future dangerousness outside of prison was not even mentioned. The trial judge undertook specifically to prevent that, in response to the broader request of petitioner's counsel that the prosecutor be prevented from arguing future dangerousness at all: </s> "Obviously, I will listen carefully to the argument of the solicitor to see if it contravenes the actual factual circumstance. Certainly, I recognize the right of the State to argue concerning the defendant's dangerous propensity. I will not allow the solicitor, for example, to say to the jury anything that would indicate that the defendant is not going to be jailed for the period of time that is encompassed within the actual law. The fact that we do not submit the parole eligibility to the jury does not negate the fact that the solicitor must stay within the trial record." App. 56-57. </s> As I read the record, the prosecutor followed this admonition - and the Due Process Clause requires nothing more. </s> Both JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE O'CONNOR focus on two portions of the prosecutor's final argument to the jury in the sentencing phase. First, they stress that the prosecutor asked the jury to answer the question of "what to do with [petitioner] now that he is in our midst." That statement, however, was not made (as they imply) in the course of an argument about future dangerousness, but was a response to petitioner's mitigating evidence. Read in context, the statement is not even relevant to the issue in this case: </s> "The defense in this case as to sentence . . . [i]s a diversion. It's putting the blame on society, on his father, on his grandmother, on whoever else he can, </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 5] </s> spreading it out to avoid that personal responsibility. That he came from a deprived background. That he didn't have all of the breaks in life and certainly that helps shape someone. But we are not concerned about how he got shaped. We are concerned about what to do with him now that he is in our midst." Id., at 110. </s> Both opinions also seize upon the prosecutor's comment that the jury's verdict would be "an act of self-defense." That statement came at the end of admonition of the jury to avoid emotional responses and enter a rational verdict: </s> "Your verdict shouldn't be returned in anger. Your verdict shouldn't be an emotional catharsis. Your verdict shouldn't be . . . a response to that eight-year-old kid [testifying in mitigation] and really shouldn't be a response to the gruesome grotesque handiwork of [petitioner]. Your verdict should be a response of society to someone who is a threat. Your verdict will be an act of self-defense." Id., at 109-110. </s> This reference to "self-defense" obviously alluded neither to defense of the jurors' own persons nor specifically to defense of persons outside the prison walls, but to defense of all members of society against this individual, wherever he or they might be. Thus, as I read the record (and bear in mind that the trial judge was on the lookout with respect to this point), the prosecutor did not invite the jury to believe that petitioner would be eligible for parole - he did not mislead the jury. </s> The rule the majority adopts in order to overturn this sentence therefore goes well beyond what would be necessary to counteract prosecutorial misconduct (a disposition with which I might agree). It is a rule at least as sweeping as this: that the Due Process Clause overrides state law limiting the admissibility of information </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 6] </s> concerning parole whenever the prosecution argues future dangerousness. JUSTICE BLACKMUN appears to go even further, requiring the admission of parole ineligibility even when the prosecutor does not argue future dangerousness. See ante, at 9; but see ante, at 1 (GINSBURG, J., concurring). I do not understand the basis for this broad prescription. As a general matter, the Court leaves it to the States to strike what they consider the appropriate balance among the many factors - probative value, prejudice, reliability, potential for confusion, among others - that determine whether evidence ought to be admissible. Even in the capital punishment context, the Court has noted that "the wisdom of the decision to permit juror consideration of [post-sentencing contingencies] is best left to the States." California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1014 (1983). "[T]he States, and not this Court, retain `the traditional authority' to determine what particular evidence . . . is relevant." Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 11 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring). One reason for leaving it that way is that a sensible code of evidence cannot be invented piecemeal. Each item cannot be considered in isolation, but must be given its place within the whole. Preventing the defense from introducing evidence regarding parolability is only half of the rule that prevents the prosecution from introducing it as well. If the rule is changed for defendants, many will think that evenhandedness demands a change for prosecutors as well. State's attorneys ought to be able to say that if, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you do not impose capital punishment upon this defendant (or if you impose anything less than life without parole) he may be walking the streets again in eight years! Many would not favor the admission of such an argument - but would prefer it to a State scheme in which defendants can call attention to the unavailability of parole, but prosecutors cannot note its availability. This Court should not force </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 7] </s> state legislators into such a difficult choice unless the isolated state evidentiary rule that the Court has before it is not merely less than ideal, but beyond a high threshold of unconstitutionality. </s> The low threshold the Court constructs today is difficult to reconcile with our almost simultaneous decision in Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. ___ (1994). There, the Court holds that the proper inquiry when evidence is admitted in contravention of a state law is "whether the admission of evidence . . . so infected the sentencing proceedings with unfairness as to render the jury's imposition of the death penalty a denial of due process." Id., at ___ (slip op., at 11). I do not see why the unconstitutionality criterion for excluding evidence in accordance with state law should be any less demanding than the unconstitutionality criterion Romano recites for admitting evidence in violation of state law: "fundamental unfairness." And "fundamentally unfair" the South Carolina rule is assuredly not. The notion that the South Carolina jury imposed the death penalty "just in case" Simmons might be released on parole seems to me quite far-fetched. And the notion that the decision taken on such grounds would have been altered by information on the current state of the law concerning parole (which could, of course, be amended) is even more far-fetched. And the scenario achieves the ultimate in far-fetchedness when there is added the fact that, according to uncontroverted testimony of prison officials in this case, even current South Carolina law (as opposed to discretionary prison regulations) does not prohibit furloughs and work release programs for "life-without-parole" inmates. See App. 16-17. </s> When the prosecution has not specifically suggested parolability, I see no more reason why the United States Constitution should compel the admission of evidence showing that, under the State's current law, the defendant would be nonparolable than that it should compel </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 8] </s> the admission of evidence showing that parolable life sentence murderers are, in fact, almost never paroled, or are paroled only after age 70; or evidence to the effect that escapes of "life without parole" inmates are rare; or evidence showing that, though, under current law, the defendant will be parolable in 20 years, the recidivism rate for elderly prisoners released after long incarceration is negligible. All of this evidence may be thought relevant to whether the death penalty should be imposed, and a petition raising the last of these claims has already arrived. See Pet. for Cert. in Rudd v. Texas, O.T. 1993, No. 93-7955. </s> As I said at the outset, the regime imposed by today's judgment is undoubtedly reasonable as a matter of policy, but I see nothing to indicate that the Constitution requires it to be followed coast-to-coast. I fear we have read today the first page of a whole new chapter in the "death is different" jurisprudence which this Court is in the apparently continuous process of composing. It adds to our insistence that State courts admit "all relevant mitigating evidence," see, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), a requirement that they adhere to distinctive rules, more demanding than what the Due Process Clause normally requires, for admitting evidence of other sorts - Federal Rules of Death Penalty Evidence, so to speak, which this Court will presumably craft (at great expense to the swiftness and predictability of justice) year by year. The heavily outnumbered opponents of capital punishment have successfully opened yet another front in their guerilla war to make this unquestionably constitutional sentence a practical impossibility. </s> I dissent. </s> [Footnote 1 The eight States are Georgia, see Ga.Code Ann. 17-10-31.1 (Supp. 1993), Indiana, see Ind.Code 35-50-2-9 (1993), Maryland, see Md.Ann.Code, Art. 27, 413(c)(3) (Supp. 1993), Nevada, see Nev.Rev.Stat. 175.554(2)(c)(2) (1993), Oklahoma, see Okla.Stat., Tit. 21, 701.10(A) (Supp. 1993), Oregon, see Ore.Rev.Stat. 163.150 (Supp. 1991), Tennessee, see Tenn.Code Ann. 39-13-204(a) (Supp. 1993), and Utah, see Utah Code Ann. 76-3-207(4) (Supp. 1993). </s> [Footnote 2 The four States are Pennsylvania, see Commonwealth v. Henry, 524 Pa. 135, 159-161, 569 A.2d 929, 941 (1990), Texas, see Jones v. State, 843 S.W.2d 487, 495 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992), Virginia, see Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 247-250, 397 S.E.2d 385, 392-393 (1990), and North Carolina, see State v. Brown, 306 N.C. 151, 182-184, 293 S.E.2d 569, 589 (1982), which will alter its practice effective January 1, 1995, see 1993 N.C.Sess. Laws, Ch. 538, 29. </s> [Footnote 3 The States that allow the jury to choose between "life without parole" and "death" and have not squarely decided whether the jury should receive information about parole include South Dakota, see S.D. Codified Laws 24-15-4 (1988), and Wyoming, see Wyo.Stat. 7-13-402(a) (Supp. 1993). </s> [Footnote 4 The ten States identified by the parties and their amici are Colorado, see Colo.Rev.Stat. 16-11-103(1)(b) (Supp. 1993), Florida, see Standard Jury Instructions - Criminal Cases, Report No. 92-1, 603 So.2d 1175 (1992), Illinois, see People v. Gacho, 122 Ill.2d 221, 262-264, 522 N.E.2d 1146, 1166 (1988), Maryland, see Doering v. State, 313 Md. 384, 545 </s> [ SIMMONS v. SOUTH CAROLINA, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 3] </s> A.2d 1281 (1988), Mississippi, see Turner v. State, 573 So.2d 657 (Miss. 1990), New Jersey, see State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 312-314, 619 A.2d 1208, 1280 (1993), New Mexico, see State v. Henderson, 109 N. M. 655, 789 P.2d 603 (1990), Nevada, see Petrocelli v. State, 101 Nev. 46, 692 P.2d 503 (1985), Oklahoma, see Humphrey v. State, 864 P.2d 343 (Okla.Crim.App. 1993), Oregon, see Brief for State of Idaho et al. as Amici Curiae 8. Page I

United States Supreme Court BUTLER v. DEXTER(1976) No. 75-623 Argued: Decided: April 19, 1976 </s> This Court has no jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1253 over an appeal from a three-judge District Court's order enjoining appellants from prosecuting appellee theater operator on the felony charge that his motion picture projector used to exhibit an allegedly obscene film was a "criminal instrument" under 16.01 of the Texas Penal Code. The ground for the injunction was not that 16.01 was unconstitutional but that the local officials had acted in bad faith and unconstitutionally in using that statute (which the District Court found could "by no stretch of the imagination" be read as applying) as a pretext for forcing appellee to stop exhibiting the film, without any design to convict him on the felony charge. Since a three-judge court was therefore not required, the appeal should have been taken to the Court of Appeals. </s> 404 F. Supp. 33, vacated and remanded. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> This is an appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1253 from an order of a three-judge District Court enjoining the appellants from prosecuting the appellee on the felony charge that his motion picture projector is a "criminal instrument" under 16.01 of the Texas Penal Code. 1 </s> [425 U.S. 262, 263] Since no substantial question about the constitutionality of 16.01 has been raised, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction in this Court. 2 </s> The facts of this case are relatively simple. The appellee, Richard Dexter, ran the Fiesta Theatre in San Antonio, Tex., which in June and July 1974 was exhibiting the film "Deep Throat." On three 3 separate occasions, an officer of the San Antonio police force paid for admission, entered the theater, and viewed the film. The officer, on each occasion, then wrote out a "Motion for Adversary Hearing" to determine whether there was probable cause to seize the film for violating the Texas obscenity laws. Each time, a magistrate held a short "hearing" in the lobby of the theater, at which he heard the testimony of the police officer, then viewed the film. Each time, the magistrate then issued a warrant to seize the film and to seize the projector as a "criminal instrument" under 16.01 of the Texas Penal Code. Appellee was then arrested and charged with "commercial obscenity" in violation of Texas Penal Code, 43.23, and "use of a criminal instrument" in violation of 16.01. The charge of commercial obscenity is a Class B misdemeanor, carrying a fine not to exceed $1,000, confinement not to exceed 180 days, or both. 4 Appellee did not, according to the trial court, pursue any complaint about these charges in the federal court. He was brought to trial on these charges in the state courts and they are not in issue here. His challenge, rather, was against the prosecutor's charging him with violations of the criminal [425 U.S. 262, 264] instruments statute for his possession of ordinary 16-mm. movie projectors. Violation of that statute is a third-degree felony, and carries a penalty of from 2 to 10 years' confinement and a fine not to exceed $5,000. 5 Although the felony complaints were lodged and appellee was forced to post some $31,000 in bonds, these charges were never presented to the grand jury. 6 </s> A "criminal instrument," for purposes of the Texas statute, is anything "specially designed, made, or adapted for the commission of an offense." 7 From an examination of the "clear language of the statute" and from an examination of the unofficial "practice commentary" to the statute, the District Court concluded that "[b]y no stretch of the imagination could this statute be used to cover the plaintiff's actions or the possession of an ordinary portable 16 millimeter motion picture projector with removable interchangeable reels." 8 </s> From its conclusion as to the obvious inapplicability of the statute, and from the prosecutor's failure to present the charges to the grand jury, the District Court found that "[c]harging the plaintiff with a 16.01 violation . . . cannot have been undertaken with any design to actually convict the plaintiff of the crime. . . . Such a blatant use of an inappropriate statute, which bootstrapped the misdemeanor offense into a felony was effective in requiring [425 U.S. 262, 265] that bail for a felony offense be set, not once but several times. The authorities could not believe, however, that Dexter would ultimately be convicted." 9 </s> Appellants present several contentions regarding the jurisdiction of the District Court and the correctness of its decision. We do not reach these questions, however, as we have concluded that we have no jurisdiction to consider this case on direct appeal. Jurisdiction is predicated on 28 U.S.C. 1253, granting the right of direct appeal from an order "granting an . . . injunction in any civil action . . . required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges." Title 28 U.S.C. 2281 provides that "[a]n . . . injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute . . . shall not be granted . . . upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless the application therefor is heard and determined by a district court of three judges . . . ." Under this statute a three-judge court is required if "a complaint seeks to enjoin a state statute on substantial grounds of federal unconstitutionality, . . . even though nonconstitutional grounds of attack are also alleged . . . ." Florida Lime Growers v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73, 85 (1960). However, in this case the District Court ruled that the actions of the appellants were not taken in the enforcement of the statute and thus no serious question about the constitutionality of the statute was presented. </s> As noted above, the District Court found that the felony "criminal instruments" charges were made in bad faith and without any design actually to convict appellee on those charges. Rather, the felony charges were made as part of a pattern of harassment by the San [425 U.S. 262, 266] Antonio police designed to force appellee to stop exhibiting "Deep Throat." But the arrests and the charges were not made in any attempt to enforce 16.01. 10 Nor was the injunction granted on the ground that 16.01 was unconstitutional; rather, it was granted on the ground that the local officials had acted unconstitutionally in using that statute as a pretext for arrest and the setting of felony bonds when they knew that the statute was inapplicable and that no conviction could ever be obtained. Since no substantial question concerning the constitutionality of 16.01 was presented to the District Court, a three-judge court was not required. 11 Cf. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962). </s> A somewhat better argument might be made that the prosecutor's actions were part of an effort to enforce the commercial obscenity statute, albeit in a somewhat irregular manner. However, it could not be contended that the District Court grounded its injunction in any way on the unconstitutionality of the commercial obscenity [425 U.S. 262, 267] statute; the constitutionality of that statute was not even considered in this case. 12 </s> Since a three-judge court was not required in this case, the appeal should have been taken to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Since the time for appeal may have passed, we vacate the judgment and remand to the District Court so that it may enter a fresh decree from which a timely appeal can, if desired, be taken. Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90 (1974); Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97 (1967). </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Texas Penal Code Ann. 16.01 (1974): </s> "Unlawful Use of Criminal Instrument </s> "(a) A person commits an offense if: </s> "(1) he possesses a criminal instrument with intent to use it in the commission of an offense; or </s> "(2) with knowledge of its character and with intent to use or aid or permit another to use in the commission of an offense, he manufactures, adapts, sells, installs, or sets up a criminal instrument. </s> "(b) For purposes of this section, `criminal instrument' means anything that is specially designed, made, or adapted for the commission of an offense. </s> "(c) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree." </s> [Footnote 2 Although the appellee has not moved to dismiss the appeal, this Court must take notice on its own motion where jurisdiction does not appear. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 306 (1962). </s> [Footnote 3 There was another occasion where substantially the same events occurred, but appellee was not arrested, although a theater employee named William Walker was. </s> [Footnote 4 Tex. Penal Code Ann. 12.22 (1974). </s> [Footnote 5 Tex. Penal Code Ann. 12.34 (1974). </s> [Footnote 6 Appellants argued below that the District Attorney believed he was precluded from pursuing those charges by the restraining order issued by the federal court. However, the restraining order specifically provided that "no pending state criminal prosecutions are enjoined and the State is free to bring to trial and try any such cases." The District Judge also informed the appellants on at least two occasions during the hearings that the restraining order did not bar the bringing of indictments on any pending charges. </s> [Footnote 7 See n. 1, supra. </s> [Footnote 8 Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 404 F. Supp. 33, 48, 51 (SD Tex. 1975). </s> [Footnote 9 Id., at 48. </s> [Footnote 10 Cf. Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 252 (1941): "But an attack on lawless exercise of authority in a particular case is not an attack upon the constitutionality of a statute conferring the authority . . . . It is significant that the United States in its complaint did not charge the enabling acts of Oklahoma with unconstitutionality, but assailed merely the Governor's action as exceeding the bounds of law." This situation is, of course, to be distinguished from an attack on a statute said to be unconstitutional "as applied." See also Ex parte Bransford, 310 U.S. 354 (1940). </s> [Footnote 11 We have no occasion to consider whether the District Court was correct in deciding that 16.01 did not - and that appellants knew it did not - authorize appellants' actions. Nor do we consider whether, having so decided, the court was empowered to grant appellee relief enjoining the State from prosecuting him on the pending felony charges purportedly filed pursuant to that section. We hold only that by having made that decision, the court removed from the case any possibility that the statute might be enjoined on the grounds of its unconstitutionality. </s> [Footnote 12 This case was consolidated in the District Court with several other cases, at least some of which did bring into question the constitutionality of a state statute. Each case before this Court, however, must be considered separately to determine whether or not this Court has jurisdiction to consider its merits. </s> [425 U.S. 262, 268]

United States Supreme Court EVOLA v. UNITED STATES(1963) No. 194 Argued: Decided: October 21, 1963 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 195, Santora v. United States; No. 196, Genovese v. United States; No. 197, Gigante v. United States; No. 79, Misc., DiPalermo v. United States; No. 80, Misc., DiPalermo v. United States; No. 115, Misc., Mazzie v. United States; No. 149, Misc., Polizzano et al. v. United States, and No. 224, Misc., Barcellona v. United States, also on petitions for writs of certiorari to the same Court. </s> Certiorari granted; judgments vacated; and cases remanded. </s> Reported below: 315 F.2d 186. </s> Maurice Edelbaum for petitioner in No. 194. Herbert S. Siegal for petitioner in No. 195. Edward Bennett Williams and Wilfred L. Davis for petitioner in No. 196. Wilfred L. Davis for petitioner in No. 197. Allen S. Stim for petitioners in No. 149, Misc. Robert S. Carlson for petitioner in No. 224, Misc. Petitioners pro se in Misc. Nos. 79, 80 and 115. </s> Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Miller, Beatrice Rosenberg and Richard W. Schmude for the United States. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> The petitions for writs of certiorari in Nos. 194, 195, 196 and 197, and the motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, as well as the petitions for certiorari in No. 79, Misc., No. 80, Misc., No. 115, Misc., No. 149, Misc., and No. 224, Misc., are granted. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is vacated and the cases are remanded to that [375 U.S. 32, 33] court for reconsideration in light of Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487 , and for such further consideration as may be appropriate. </s> MR. JUSTICE CLARK, with whom MR. JUSTICE HARLAN and MR. JUSTICE WHITE join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. </s> I realize, of course, that in remanding these cases the Court neither decides that Campbell governs nor implies how the Court of Appeals should decide them. Nevertheless, I would grant the petitions for certiorari and set these cases for argument, since it is my feeling that it is futile to remand "for reconsideration in light of Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487 ." </s> Although these cases were decided prior to Campbell, the Court of Appeals' disposition has support in the record and is worthy of argument. * All the evidence before the District Court was documentary and the Court of Appeals was therefore correct in making factual determinations on the basis of such evidence. </s> [Footnote * I deem plenary consideration here preferable to this remand because the delineation of the limits of the Jencks Act has been peculiarly the province of this Court. The remand will merely delay a final decision which could be made on the record now before the Court and the identical record will no doubt return here no matter what determination is made by the Court of Appeals. While the Government accepts the District Court's finding that the Shaw notes should have been produced under 18 U.S.C. 3500, this does not relieve the courts of the obligation to examine independently the error confessed. Gibson v. United States, 329 U.S. 338 , and Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257 . </s> [375 U.S. 32, 34]

United States Supreme Court PASQUANTINO et al. v. UNITED STATES(2005) No. 03-725 Argued: November 9, 2004Decided: April 26, 2005 </s> Petitioners carried out a scheme to smuggle large quantities of liquor into Canada from the United States to evade Canada's heavy alcohol import taxes. They were convicted of violating the federal wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. §1343, for doing so. That statute prohibits the use of interstate wires to effect "any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses." The Fourth Circuit affirmed their convictions, rejecting petitioners' argument that their prosecution contravened the common-law revenue rule, which bars courts from enforcing foreign sovereigns' tax laws. The Fourth Circuit also held that Canada's right to receive tax revenue was "money or property" within §1343's meaning. Held:A plot to defraud a foreign government of tax revenue violates the federal wire fraud statute. Pp.3-21. (a)Section 1343's plain terms criminalize a scheme such as petitioners'. Their smuggling operation satisfies both of the §1343 elements that are in dispute here. First, Canada's right to uncollected excise taxes on the liquor petitioners imported into Canada is "property" within the statute's meaning. That right is an entitlement to collect money from petitioners, the possession of which is "something of value" to the Canadian Government. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358. Such valuable entitlements are "property" as that term ordinarily is employed. Second, petitioners' plot was a "scheme or artifice to defraud" Canada of its valuable entitlement to tax revenue, because petitioners routinely concealed imported liquor from Canadian officials and failed to declare those goods on customs forms. See Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313. Pp.3-7. </s> (b)The foregoing construction of §1343 does not derogate from the common-law revenue rule. Pp.8-21. </s> (1)Relying on the canon of construction that "[s]tatutes which invade the common law ... are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles, except where a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident," United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534, petitioners argue that, to avoid reading §1343 to derogate from the revenue rule, the Court should construe the otherwise-applicable statutory language to except frauds directed at evading foreign taxes. Whether §1343 derogates from the revenue rule depends on whether reading the statute to reach this prosecution conflicts with a well-established revenue rule principle. See United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 276. Thus, before concluding that Congress intended to exempt the present prosecution from §1343's broad reach, the Court must find that the revenue rule clearly barred such a prosecution as of 1952, the year Congress enacted the wire fraud statute. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22-23. Pp.8-9. </s> (2)No common-law case decided as of 1952 clearly established that the revenue rule barred the United States from prosecuting a fraudulent scheme to evade foreign taxes. Pp.9-17. </s> (i)The revenue rule has long been treated as a corollary of the rule that "[t]he Courts of no country execute the penal laws of another." The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66, 123. It was first treated as such in cases prohibiting the enforcement of tax liabilities of one sovereign in the courts of another sovereign, such as suits to enforce tax judgments. The revenue rule's grounding in these cases shows that, at its core, it prohibited the collection of tax obligations of foreign nations. The present prosecution is unlike these classic examples of actions traditionally barred by the revenue rule. It is not a suit that recovers a foreign tax liability, but is a criminal prosecution brought by the United States to punish domestic criminal conduct. Pp.9-11. </s> (ii)Cases applying the revenue rule to bar indirect enforcement of foreign revenue laws, in contrast to the direct collection of a tax obligation, cannot bear the weight petitioners place on them. Many of them were decided after Congress passed the wire fraud statute. Others come from foreign courts. And, significantly, none involved a domestic sovereign acting pursuant to authority conferred by a criminal statute to enforce the sovereign's own penal law. Moreover, none of petitioners' cases barred an action that had as its primary object the deterrence and punishment of fraudulent conduct--a substantial domestic regulatory interest entirely independent of foreign tax enforcement. The main object of the action in each of them was the collection of money that would pay foreign tax claims. The absence of such an object here means that the link between this prosecution and foreign tax collection is incidental and attenuated at best. Thus, it cannot be said whether Congress in 1952 would have considered this prosecution within the revenue rule. Petitioners answer unpersuasively that the recovery of taxes is indeed the object of this suit because restitution of Canada's lost tax revenue is required under the federal Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996. Whether restitution is mandatory is irrelevant here because §1343 advances the Government's independent interest in punishing fraudulent domestic criminal conduct. In any event, if awarding restitution to foreign sovereigns were contrary to the revenue rule, the proper resolution would be to construe the later enacted restitution statute not to allow such awards, rather than to assume that it impliedly repealed §1343 as applied to this prosecution. Pp.11-14. </s> (iii)Also unavailing is petitioners' argument that early English common-law cases holding unenforceable contracts executed to evade other nations' revenue laws demonstrate that "indirect" enforcement of such laws is at the very core of the revenue rule, rather than at its margins. Those early cases were driven by an interest in lessening the commercial disruption caused by high tariffs. By the mid-20th century, however, that rationale was supplanted, and courts began to apply the revenue rule to tax obligations on the strength of the analogy between a country's revenue laws and its penal ones. Because the early English cases rested on a far different foundation from that on which the revenue rule came to rest, they say little about whether the wire fraud statute derogated from the revenue rule in its mid-20th century form. Pp.14-15. </s> (iv)Petitioners' criminal prosecution "enforces" Canadian revenue law in an attenuated sense, but not in a sense that clearly would contravene the revenue rule. That rule never proscribed all enforcement of foreign revenue law. For example, at the same time they were enforcing domestic contracts that had the purpose of violating foreign revenue law, English courts also considered void foreign contracts that lacked tax stamps required under foreign revenue law. The line the revenue rule draws between impermissible and permissible "enforcement" of foreign revenue law has therefore always been unclear. The uncertainty persisted in American cases, which demonstrate that the extent to which the revenue rule barred indirect recognition of foreign revenue laws was unsettled as of 1952. Pp.15-17. </s> (3)The traditional rationales for the revenue rule do not plainly suggest that it barred this prosecution. First, this prosecution poses little risk of causing the principal evil against which the revenue rule was traditionally thought to guard: judicial evaluation of the revenue policies of foreign sovereigns. This action was brought by the Executive, "the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations," United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320. Although a prosecution like this one requires a court to recognize foreign law to determine whether the defendant violated U.S. law, it may be assumed that by electing to prosecute, the Executive has assessed this prosecution's impact on this Nation's relationship with Canada, and concluded that it poses little danger of causing international friction. Petitioners' broader argument that the revenue rule avoids giving domestic effect to politically sensitive and controversial policy decisions embodied in foreign revenue laws worries the Court little. The present prosecution, if authorized by the wire fraud statute, embodies the policy choice of the two political branches of Government--Congress and the Executive--to free the interstate wires from fraudulent use, irrespective of the object of the fraud. Such a reading of §1343 gives effect to that considered policy choice and therefore poses no risk of advancing Canadian policies illegitimately. Finally, petitioners' assertion that courts lack the competence to examine the validity of unfamiliar foreign tax schemes is not persuasive here. Foreign law posed no unmanageable complexity in this case, and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.1 gives federal courts sufficient means to resolve any incidental foreign law issues that may arise in wire fraud prosecutions. Pp.17-20. </s> (4)The Court's interpretation does not give §1343 extraterritorial effect. Petitioners' offense was complete the moment they executed their scheme intending to defraud Canada of tax revenue inside the United States. See Durland, supra, at 313. Therefore, only domestic conduct is at issue here. In any event, because §1343 punishes frauds executed "in interstate or foreign commerce," it is not a statute that involves only domestic concerns. Pp.20-21. 336 F.3d 321, affirmed. Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and Stevens, O'Connor, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Breyer, J., joined, and in which Scalia and Souter, JJ., joined as to Parts II and III. </s> DAVID B. PASQUANTINO, CARL J. PASQUANTINO,and ARTHUR HILTS, PETITIONERS v. UNITED STATES on writ of certiorari to the united states court ofappeals for the fourth circuit [April 26, 2005] </s> Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> At common law, the revenue rule generally barred courts from enforcing the tax laws of foreign sovereigns. The question presented in this case is whether a plot to defraud a foreign government of tax revenue violates the federal wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. §1343 (2000 ed., Supp. II). Because the plain terms of §1343 criminalize such a scheme, and because this construction of the wire fraud statute does not derogate from the common-law revenue rule, we hold that it does. I </s> Petitioners Carl J. Pasquantino, David B. Pasquantino, and Arthur Hilts were indicted for and convicted of federal wire fraud for carrying out a scheme to smuggle large quantities of liquor into Canada from the United States. According to the evidence presented at trial, the Pasquantinos, while in New York, ordered liquor over the telephone from discount package stores in Maryland. See 336 F.3d 321, 325 (CA4 2003) (en banc). They employed Hilts and others to drive the liquor over the Canadian border, without paying the required excise taxes. Ibid. The drivers avoided paying taxes by hiding the liquor in their vehicles and failing to declare the goods to Canadian customs officials. Id., at 333. During the time of petitioners' smuggling operation, between 1996 and 2000, Canada heavily taxed the importation of alcoholic beverages. See 1997 S.C., ch. 36, §§21.1(1), 21.2(1); Excise Act Schedule 1.(1), R.S.C., ch. E-14 (1985); Excise Act 2001, Schedule 4, ch. 22, 2002 S.C. 239. Uncontested evidence at trial showed that Canadian taxes then due on alcohol purchased in the United States and transported to Canada were approximately double the liquor's purchase price. App. 65-66. Before trial, petitioners moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that it stated no wire fraud offense. The wire fraud statute prohibits the use of interstate wires to effect "any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises." 18 U.S.C. §1343 (2000 ed., Supp. II). Petitioners contended that the Government lacked a sufficient interest in enforcing the revenue laws of Canada, and therefore that they had not committed wire fraud. App. 48-57. The District Court denied the motion and the case went to trial. The jury convicted petitioners of wire fraud. </s> Petitioners appealed their convictions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, again urging that the indictment failed to state a wire fraud offense. They argued that their prosecution contravened the common-law revenue rule, because it required the court to take cognizance of the revenue laws of Canada. Over Judge Hamilton's dissent, the panel agreed and reversed the convictions. 305 F.3d 291, 295 (2002). Petitioners also argued that Canada's right to collect taxes from them was not "money or property" within the meaning of the wire fraud statute, but the panel unanimously rejected that argument. Id., at 294-295; id., at 299 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). </s> The Court of Appeals granted rehearing en banc, vacated the panel's decision, and affirmed petitioners' convictions. 336 F.3d 321 (CA4 2003). It concluded that the common-law revenue rule, rather than barring any recognition of foreign revenue law, simply allowed courts to refuse to enforce the tax judgments of foreign nations, and therefore did not preclude the Government from prosecuting petitioners. Id., at 327-329. The Court of Appeals held as well that Canada's right to receive tax revenue was "money or property" within the meaning of the wire fraud statute. Id., at 331-332. </s> We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the Courts of Appeals over whether a scheme to defraud a foreign government of tax revenue violates the wire fraud statute. 541 U.S. 972 (2004). Compare United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 587 (CA1 1996) (holding that a scheme to defraud a foreign nation of tax revenue does not violate the wire fraud statute), with United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547, 552-553 (CA2 1997) (holding that a scheme to defraud a foreign nation of tax revenue violates the wire fraud statute). We agree with the Court of Appeals that it does and therefore affirm the judgment below.1 II </s> We first consider whether petitioners' conduct falls within the literal terms of the wire fraud statute. The statute prohibits using interstate wires to effect "any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises." 18 U.S.C. §1343 (2000 ed., Supp. II). Two elements of this crime, and the only two that petitioners dispute here, are that the defendant engage in a "scheme or artifice to defraud," ibid., and that the "object of the fraud ... be '[money or] property' in the victim's hands," Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 26 (2000).2 Petitioners' smuggling operation satisfies both elements. Taking the latter element first, Canada's right to uncollected excise taxes on the liquor petitioners imported into Canada is "property" in its hands. This right is an entitlement to collect money from petitioners, the possession of which is "something of value" to the Government of Canada. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). Valuable entitlements like these are "property" as that term ordinarily is employed. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. ___, ___ (2004) (slip op., at 7) ("When interpreting a statute, we must give words their ordinary or natural meaning" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Black's Law Dictionary 1382 (4th ed. 1951) (defining "property" as "extend[ing] to every species of valuable right and interest"). Had petitioners complied with this legal obligation, they would have paid money to Canada. Petitioners' tax evasion deprived Canada of that money, inflicting an economic injury no less than had they embezzled funds from the Canadian treasury. The object of petitioners' scheme was to deprive Canada of money legally due, and their scheme thereby had as its object the deprivation of Canada's "property." </s> The common law of fraud confirms this characterization of Canada's right to excise taxes. The right to be paid money has long been thought to be a species of property. See 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 153-155 (1768) (classifying a right to sue on a debt as personal property); 2 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law *351 (same). Consistent with that understanding, fraud at common law included a scheme to deprive a victim of his entitlement to money. For instance, a debtor who concealed his assets when settling debts with his creditors thereby committed common-law fraud. 1 J. Story, Equity Jurisprudence §378 (I. Redfield 10th rev. ed. 1870); Chesterfield v. Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 2 Ves. Sen. 125 (ch. 1750); 1 S. Rapalje & R. Lawrence, A Dictionary of American and English Law 546 (1883). That made sense given the economic equivalence between money in hand and money legally due. The fact that the victim of the fraud happens to be the Government, rather than a private party, does not lessen the injury. </s> Our conclusion that the right to tax revenue is property in Canada's hands, contrary to petitioners' contentions, is consistent with Cleveland, supra. In that case, the defendant, Cleveland, had obtained a video poker license by making false statements on his license application. Id., at 16-17. We held that a State's interest in an unissued video poker license was not "property," because the interest in choosing particular licensees was "'purely regulatory'" and "[could not] be economic." Id., at 22-23. We also noted that "the Government nowhere allege[d] that Cleveland defrauded the State of any money to which the State was entitled by law." Ibid. </s> Cleveland is different from this case. Unlike a State's interest in allocating a video poker license to particular applicants, Canada's entitlement to tax revenue is a straightforward "economic" interest. There was no suggestion in Cleveland that the defendant aimed at depriving the State of any money due under the license; quite the opposite, there was "no dispute that [the defendant's partnership] paid the State of Louisiana its proper share of revenue" due. Id., at 22. Here, by contrast, the Government alleged and proved that petitioners' scheme aimed at depriving Canada of money to which it was entitled by law. Canada could hardly have a more "economic" interest than in the receipt of tax revenue. Cleveland is therefore consistent with our conclusion that Canada's entitlement is "property" as that word is used in the wire fraud statute. </s> Turning to the second element at issue here, petitioners' plot was a "scheme or artifice to defraud" Canada of its valuable entitlement to tax revenue. The evidence showed that petitioners routinely concealed imported liquor from Canadian officials and failed to declare those goods on customs forms. See 336 F.3d, at 333. By this conduct, they represented to Canadian customs officials that their drivers had no goods to declare. This, then, was a scheme "designed to defraud by representations," Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313 (1896), and therefore a "scheme or artifice to defraud" Canada of taxes due on the smuggled goods. </s> Neither the antismuggling statute, 18 U.S.C. §546,3 nor U.S. tax treaties, see Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 115-119 (CA2 2001), convince us that petitioners' scheme falls outside the terms of the wire fraud statute.4 Unlike the treaties and the antismuggling statute, the wire fraud statute punishes fraudulent use of domestic wires, whether or not such conduct constitutes smuggling, occurs aboard a vessel, or evades foreign taxes. See post, at 9, n.9 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the antismuggling statute does not apply to this prosecution). Petitioners would be equally liable if they had used interstate wires to defraud Canada not of taxes due, but of money from the Canadian treasury. The wire fraud statute "applies without differentiation" to these two categories of fraud. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. ___, ___ (2005) (slip op., at 6). "To give these same words a different meaning for each category would be to invent a statute rather than interpret one." Ibid. We therefore decline to "interpret [this] criminal statute more narrowly than it is written." Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 406 (1998). III </s> We next consider petitioners' revenue rule argument. Petitioners argue that, to avoid reading §1343 to derogate from the common-law revenue rule, we should construe the otherwise-applicable language of the wire fraud statute to except frauds directed at evading foreign taxes. Their argument relies on the canon of construction that "[s]tatutes which invade the common law ... are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles, except where a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident." United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This presumption is, however, no bar to a construction that conflicts with a common-law rule if the statute "'speak[s] directly' to the question addressed by the common law." Ibid. (citations omitted). Whether the wire fraud statute derogates from the common-law revenue rule depends, in turn, on whether reading §1343 to reach this prosecution conflicts with a well-established revenue rule principle. We clarified this constraint on the application of the nonderogation canon in United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274 (2002). The issue in Craft was whether the property interest of a tenant by the entirety was exempt from a federal tax lien. Id., at 276. We construed the federal tax lien statute to reach such a property interest, despite the tension between that construction and the common-law rule that entireties property enjoys immunity from liens, because this "common-law rule was not so well established with respect to the application of a federal tax lien that we must assume that Congress considered the impact of its enactment on the question now before us." Id., at 288.5 So too here, before we may conclude that Congress intended to exempt the present prosecution from the broad reach of the wire fraud statute, we must find that the common-law revenue rule clearly barred such a prosecution. We examine the state of the common law as of 1952, the year Congress enacted the wire fraud statute. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1999).6 </s> The wire fraud statute derogates from no well-established revenue rule principle. We are aware of no common-law revenue rule case decided as of 1952 that held or clearly implied that the revenue rule barred the United States from prosecuting a fraudulent scheme to evade foreign taxes. The traditional rationales for the revenue rule, moreover, do not plainly suggest that it swept so broadly. We consider these two points in turn. A </s> We first consider common-law revenue rule jurisprudence as it existed in 1952, the year Congress enacted §1343. Since the late 19th and early 20th century, courts have treated the common-law revenue rule as a corollary of the rule that, as Chief Justice Marshall put it, "[t]he Courts of no country execute the penal laws of another." The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66, 123 (1825). The rule against the enforcement of foreign penal statutes, in turn, tracked the common-law principle that crimes could only be prosecuted in the country in which they were committed. See, e.g., J. Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws §620, p. 840 (M. Bigelow ed. 8th ed. 1883). The basis for inferring the revenue rule from the rule against foreign penal enforcement was an analogy between foreign revenue laws and penal laws. See Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 290 (1888); Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 Harv. L.Rev. 193, 219 (1932) (hereinafter Leflar). Courts first drew that inference in a line of cases prohibiting the enforcement of tax liabilities of one sovereign in the courts of another sovereign, such as a suit to enforce a tax judgment.7 The revenue rule's grounding in these cases shows that, at its core, it prohibited the collection of tax obligations of foreign nations. Unsurprisingly, then, the revenue rule is often stated as prohibiting the collection of foreign tax claims. See Brief for Petitioners 16 (noting that "[t]he most straightforward application of the revenue rule arises when a foreign sovereign attempts to sue directly in its own right to enforce a tax judgment in the courts of another nation").8 </s> The present prosecution is unlike these classic examples of actions traditionally barred by the revenue rule. It is not a suit that recovers a foreign tax liability, like a suit to enforce a judgment. This is a criminal prosecution brought by the United States in its sovereign capacity to punish domestic criminal conduct. Petitioners nevertheless argue that common-law revenue rule jurisprudence as of 1952 prohibited such prosecutions. Revenue rule cases, however, do not establish that proposition, much less clearly so. 1 </s> Petitioners first analogize the present action to several cases that have applied the revenue rule to bar indirect enforcement of foreign revenue laws, in contrast to the direct collection of a tax obligation. They cite, for example, a decision of an Irish trial court holding that a private liquidator could not recover assets unlawfully distributed and moved to Ireland by a corporate director, because the recovery would go to satisfy the company's Scottish tax obligations. Peter Buchanan Ltd. v. McVey, 1955 A.C. 516, 529-530 (Ir. H. Ct. 1950), app. dism'd, 1955 A.C. 530 (Ir. Sup. Ct. 1951).9 The court found that "the sole object of the liquidation proceedings in Scotland was to collect a revenue debt," because if the liquidator won, "every penny recovered after paying certain costs ... could be claimed by the Scottish Revenue." Id., at 530. According to the Buchanan court, "[i]n every case the substance of the claim must be scrutinized, and if it then appears that it is really a suit brought for the purpose of collecting the debts of a foreign revenue it must be rejected." Id., at 529. Buchanan and the other cases on which petitioners rely cannot bear the weight petitioners place on them. Many of them were decided after 1952, too late for the Congress that passed the wire fraud statute to have relied on them. Others come from foreign courts. Drawing sure inferences regarding Congress' intent from such foreign citations is perilous, as several of petitioners' cases illustrate.10 </s> More important, none of these cases clearly establishes that the revenue rule barred this prosecution. None involved a domestic sovereign acting pursuant to authority conferred by a criminal statute. The difference is significant. An action by a domestic sovereign enforces the sovereign's own penal law. A prohibition on the enforcement of foreign penal law does not plainly prevent the Government from enforcing a domestic criminal law. Such an extension, to our knowledge, is unprecedented in the long history of either the revenue rule or the rule against enforcement of penal laws. </s> Moreover, none of petitioners' cases (with the arguable exception of Banco Do Brasil, S.A. v. A.C. Israel Commodity Co., 12 N.Y. 2d 371, 190 N.E. 2d 235 (App. 1963)) barred an action that had as its primary object the deterrence and punishment of fraudulent conduct--a substantial domestic regulatory interest entirely independent of foreign tax enforcement. The main object of the action in each of those cases was the collection of money that would pay foreign tax claims. The absence of such an object in this action means that the link between this prosecution and foreign tax collection is incidental and attenuated at best, making it not plainly one in which "the whole object of the suit is to collect tax for a foreign revenue." Buchanan, supra, at 529. Even those courts that as of 1952 had extended the revenue rule beyond its core prohibition had not faced a case closely analogous to this one--and thus we cannot say with any reasonable certainty whether Congress in 1952 would have considered this prosecution within the revenue rule. </s> Petitioners answer that the recovery of taxes is indeed the object of this suit, because restitution of the lost tax revenue to Canada is required under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§3663A-3664 (2000 ed. and Supp. II).11 We do not think it matters whether the provision of restitution is mandatory in this prosecution. Regardless, the wire fraud statute advances the Federal Government's independent interest in punishing fraudulent domestic criminal conduct, a significant feature absent from all of petitioners' revenue rule cases. The purpose of awarding restitution in this action is not to collect a foreign tax, but to mete out appropriate criminal punishment for that conduct. </s> In any event, any conflict between mandatory restitution and the revenue rule would not change our holding today. If awarding restitution to foreign sovereigns were contrary to the revenue rule, the proper resolution would be to construe the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act not to allow such awards, rather than to assume that the later enacted restitution statute impliedly repealed §1343 as applied to frauds against foreign sovereigns. 2 </s> We are no more persuaded by a second line of cases on which petitioners rely. Petitioners analogize the present case to early English common-law cases from which the revenue rule originally derived. Those early cases involved contract law, and they held that contracts executed with the purpose of evading the revenue laws of other nations were enforceable, notwithstanding the rule against enforcing contracts with illegal purposes. See Boucher v. Lawson, Cas. T. Hard. 85, 89-90, 95 Eng. Rep. 53, 55-56 (K.B. 1734); Planche v. Fletcher, 1 Dougl. 251, 99 Eng. Rep. 164 (K.B. 1779). Petitioners argue that these cases demonstrate that "indirect" enforcement of revenue laws is at the very core of the common-law revenue rule, rather than at its margins. The argument is unavailing. By the mid-20th century, the revenue rule had developed into a doctrine very different from its original form. Early revenue rule cases were driven by the interest in lessening the commercial disruption caused by the high tariffs of the day. As Lord Hardwicke explained, if contracts that aimed at circumventing foreign revenue laws were unenforceable, "it would cut off all benefit of such trade from this kingdom, which would be of very bad consequence to the principal and most beneficial branches of our trade." Boucher, supra, at 89, 95 Eng. Rep., at 56. By the 20th century, however, that rationale for the revenue rule had been supplanted. By then, as we have explained, courts had begun to apply the revenue rule to tax obligations on the strength of the analogy between a country's revenue laws and its penal ones, see supra, at 8-9, superseding the original promotion-of-commerce rationale for the rule. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 Harv. Int'l L.J. 161, 178 (2002); Buchanan, 1955 A.C., at 522-524, 528-529. The early English cases rest on a far different foundation from that on which the revenue rule came to rest. They thus say little about whether the wire fraud statute derogated from the revenue rule in its mid-20th century form. 3 </s> Granted, this criminal prosecution "enforces" Canadian revenue law in an attenuated sense, but not in a sense that clearly would contravene the revenue rule. From its earliest days, the revenue rule never proscribed all enforcement of foreign revenue law. For example, at the same time they were enforcing domestic contracts that had the purpose of violating foreign revenue law, English courts also considered void foreign contracts that lacked tax stamps required under foreign revenue law. See Alves v. Hodgson, 7 T.R. 241, 243, 101 Eng. Rep. 953, 955 (K.B. 1797); Clegg v. Levy, 3 Camp. 166, 167, 170 Eng. Rep. 1343, 1343 (N.P. 1812). Like the present prosecution, cases voiding foreign contracts under foreign law no doubt "enforced" foreign revenue law in the sense that they encouraged the payment of foreign taxes; yet they fell outside the revenue rule's scope. The line the revenue rule draws between impermissible and permissible "enforcement" of foreign revenue law has therefore always been unclear. The uncertainty persisted in American courts that recognized the revenue rule. In one of the earliest appearances of the revenue rule in America, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire entertained an action that required extensive recognition of a sister State's revenue laws. Henry v. Sargeant, 13 N.H. 321 (1843). There, the plaintiff sought damages, alleging that a Vermont selectman had imposed an illegal tax on him. Id., at 331. The court found that the revenue rule did not bar the action, id., at 331-332, though the suit required the court to enforce the revenue laws of Vermont. See id., at 335-338. </s> Likewise, in Inre Hollins, 79 Misc. 200, 139 N.Y.S. 713 (Sur. Ct.), aff'd, 160 App. Div. 886, 144 N.Y.S. 1121 (1913); aff'd, 212 N.Y. 567, 106 N.E. 1034 (App. 1914) (per curiam), the court held that an estate executor could satisfy foreign taxes due on a decedent's estate out of property of the estate, notwithstanding a legatee's argument that the revenue rule barred authorizing such payments. 79 Misc., at 207-208, 139 N.Y.S., at 716-717. The court explained: "While it is doubtless true that this court will not aid a foreign government in the enforcement of its revenue laws, it will not refuse to direct a just and equitable administration of that part of an estate within its jurisdiction merely because such direction would result in the enforcement of such revenue laws." Id., at 208, 139 N.Y.S., at 717. </s> These cases demonstrate that the extent to which the revenue rule barred indirect recognition of foreign revenue laws was unsettled as of 1952. Following the reasoning of Inre Hollins, for instance, Congress might well have thought that courts would enforce the wire fraud statute, even if doing so might incidentally recognize Canadian revenue law. The uncertainty highlights that "[i]ndirect enforcement is ... easier to describe than to define," and "it is sometimes difficult to draw the line between an issue involving merely recognition of a foreign law and indirect enforcement of it." 1 A. Dicey & J. Morris, Conflict of Laws 90 (L. Collins gen. ed. 13th ed. 2000). Even if the present prosecution is analogous to the indirect enforcement cases on which petitioners rely, those cases do not yield a rule sufficiently well established to narrow the wire fraud statute in the context of this criminal prosecution. B </s> Having concluded that revenue rule jurisprudence is no clear bar to this prosecution, we next turn to whether the purposes of the revenue rule, as articulated in the relevant authorities, suggest differently. They do not. First, this prosecution poses little risk of causing the principal evil against which the revenue rule was traditionally thought to guard: judicial evaluation of the policy-laden enactments of other sovereigns. See, e.g., Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 604 (CA2 1929) (L. Hand, J., concurring). As Judge Hand put it, allowing courts to enforce another country's revenue laws was thought to be a delicate inquiry "when it concerns the relations between the foreign state and its own citizens .... To pass upon the provisions for the public order of another state is, or at any rate should be, beyond the powers of a court; it involves the relations between the states themselves, with which courts are incompetent to deal, and which are intrusted to other authorities." Ibid. </s> The present prosecution creates little risk of causing international friction through judicial evaluation of the policies of foreign sovereigns. This action was brought by the Executive to enforce a statute passed by Congress. In our system of government, the Executive is "the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations," United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936), and has ample authority and competence to manage "the relations between the foreign state and its own citizens" and to avoid "embarass[ing] its neighbor[s]," Moore, supra, at 604 (L. Hand, J., concurring); see also Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948). True, a prosecution like this one requires a court to recognize foreign law to determine whether the defendant violated U.S. law. But we may assume that by electing to bring this prosecution, the Executive has assessed this prosecution's impact on this Nation's relationship with Canada, and concluded that it poses little danger of causing international friction. We know of no common-law court that has applied the revenue rule to bar an action accompanied by such a safeguard, and neither petitioners nor the dissent directs us to any. The greater danger, in fact, would lie in our judging this prosecution barred based on the foreign policy concerns animating the revenue rule, concerns that we have "neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility" to evaluate. Ibid. </s> More broadly, petitioners argue that the revenue rule avoids giving domestic effect to politically sensitive and controversial policy decisions embodied in foreign revenue laws, regardless of whether courts need pass judgment on such laws. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 448 (1964) (White, J., dissenting) ("[C]ourts customarily refuse to enforce the revenue and penal laws of a foreign state, since no country has an obligation to further the governmental interests of a foreign sovereign"). This worries us little here. The present prosecution, if authorized by the wire fraud statute, embodies the policy choice of the two political branches of our Government--Congress and the Executive--to free the interstate wires from fraudulent use, irrespective of the object of the fraud. Such a reading of the wire fraud statute gives effect to that considered policy choice. It therefore poses no risk of advancing the policies of Canada illegitimately. </s> Still a final revenue rule rationale petitioners urge is the concern that courts lack the competence to examine the validity of unfamiliar foreign tax schemes. See, e.g., Leflar 218. Foreign law, of course, posed no unmanageable complexity in this case. The District Court had before it uncontroverted testimony of a Government witness that petitioners' scheme aimed at violating Canadian tax law. See App. 65-66. </s> Nevertheless, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.1 addresses petitioners' concern by setting forth a procedure for interpreting foreign law that improves on those available at common law. Specifically, it permits a court, in deciding issues of foreign law, to consider "any relevant material or source--including testimony--without regard to the Federal Rules of Evidence." By contrast, common-law procedures for dealing with foreign law--those available to the courts that formulated the revenue rule--were more cumbersome. See Advisory Committee Notes on Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 26.1 (noting that the rule improves on common-law procedures for proving foreign law). Rule 26.1 gives federal courts sufficient means to resolve the incidental foreign law issues they may encounter in wire fraud prosecutions. IV Finally, our interpretation of the wire fraud statute does not give it "extraterritorial effect."12 Post, at 7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Petitioners used U.S. interstate wires to execute a scheme to defraud a foreign sovereign of tax revenue. Their offense was complete the moment they executed the scheme inside the United States; "[t]he wire fraud statute punishes the scheme, not its success." United States v. Pierce, 224 F.3d 158, 166 (CA2 2000) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); see Durland, 161 U.S., at 313 ("The significant fact is the intent and purpose"). This domestic element of petitioners' conduct is what the Government is punishing in this prosecution, no less than when it prosecutes a scheme to defraud a foreign individual or corporation, or a foreign government acting as a market participant. See post, at 8, n.8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that such prosecutions of foreign individuals, corporations, and governments are domestic applications of the wire fraud statute).13 In any event, the wire fraud statute punishes frauds executed "in interstate or foreign commerce," 18 U.S.C. §1343 (2000 ed., Supp. II), so this is surely not a statute in which Congress had only "domestic concerns in mind." Small v. United States, post, at __ (slip op., at 3) (internal quotation marks omitted). *** </s> It may seem an odd use of the Federal Government's resources to prosecute a U.S. citizen for smuggling cheap liquor into Canada. But the broad language of thewire fraud statute authorizes it to do so and no canon of statutory construction permits us to read the statutemore narrowly. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.14 It is so ordered. </s> DAVID B. PASQUANTINO, CARL J. PASQUANTINO,and ARTHUR HILTS, PETITIONERS v. UNITED STATES on writ of certiorari to the united states court ofappeals for the fourth circuit [April 26, 2005] </s> Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Breyer joins, and Justice Scalia and Justice Souter join as to Parts II and III, dissenting. </s> This case concerns extension of the "wire fraud" statute, 18 U.S.C. §1343 (2000 ed., Supp. II), to a scenario extraterritorial in significant part: The Government invoked the statute to reach a scheme to smuggle liquor from the United States into Canada and thereby deprive Canada of revenues due under that nation's customs and tax laws. Silent on its application to activity culminating beyond our borders, the statute prohibits "any scheme" to defraud that employs in its execution communication through interstate or international wires. A relevant background norm, known as the common-law revenue rule, bars suit in one country to enforce another country's tax laws. </s> The scheme at issue involves liquor purchased from discount sellers in Maryland, trucked to New York, then smuggled into Canada to evade Canada's hefty tax on imported alcohol.1 Defendants below, petitioners here, were indicted under §1343 for devising a scheme "to defraud the governments of Canada and the Province of Ontario of excise duties and tax revenues relating to the importation and sale of liquor." App. to Pet. for Cert. 58a. Each of the six counts in question was based on telephone calls between New York and Maryland. Id., at 60a-64a. </s> The Court today reads the wire fraud statute to draw into our courts, at the prosecutor's option, charges that another nation's revenue laws have been evaded. The common-law revenue rule does not stand in the way, the Court instructs, for that rule has no application to criminal prosecutions under the wire fraud statute. </s> As I see it, and as petitioners urged, Reply Brief 17-19, the Court has ascribed an exorbitant scope to the wire fraud statute, in disregard of our repeated recognition that "Congress legislates against the backdrop of the presumption against extraterritoriality." See EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (ARAMCO); Small v. United States, post, at 3 (The Court has "adopt[ed] the legal presumption that Congress ordinarily intends its statutes to have domestic, not extraterritorial, application."); Reply Brief 17, n. 23 ("This prosecution clearly gives the wire fraud statute extraterritorial effect in that '[t]he actions in [Canada] are ... most naturally understood as the kernel of' Petitioners' alleged fraud." (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. ___, ___ (2004) (slip op., at 5)).2 Notably, when Congress explicitly addressed international smuggling, see 18 U.S.C. §546, it provided for criminal enforcement of the customs laws of a foreign nation only when that nation has a reciprocal law criminalizing smuggling into the United States. Currently, Canada has no such reciprocal law. </s> Of overriding importance in this regard, tax collection internationally is an area in which treaties hold sway. See Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 115-119 (CA2 2001) (referencing tax treaties to which the United States is a party). There is a treaty between the United States and Canada regarding the collection of taxes, but that accord requires certification by the taxing nation that the taxes owed have been "finally determined." See Protocol Amending Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, September 26, 1980, S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-4, 2030 U.N.T.S. 236, Art. 15, ¶2 (entered into force Nov. 9, 1995) (hereinafter Protocol). Moreover, the treaty is inapplicable to persons, like petitioners in this case, who are United States citizens at the time that the tax liability is incurred. Art. 15, ¶8. </s> Today's novel decision is all the more troubling for its failure to take account of Canada's primary interest in the matter at stake. UnitedStates citizens who have committed criminal violations of Canadian tax law can be extradited to stand trial in Canada.3 Canadian courts are best positioned to decide "whether, and to what extent, the defendants have defrauded the governments of Canada and Ontario out of tax revenues owed pursuant to their own, sovereign, excise laws." 336 F.3d 321, 343 (CA4 2003) (en banc) (Gregory, J., dissenting). I </s> The Government's prosecution of David Pasquantino, Carl Pasquantino, and Arthur Hilts for wire fraud was grounded in Canadian customs and tax laws. The wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. §1343, required the Government to allege and prove that the defendants engaged in a scheme to defraud a victim--here, the Canadian Government--of money or property. See ante, at 5 (describing Canada as the "victim" of a scheme having "as its object the deprivation of Canada's 'property'"). To establish the fraudulent nature of the defendants' scheme and the Canadian Government's entitlement to the money withheld by the defendants, the United States offered proof at trial that Canada imposes import duties on liquor, and that the defendants intended to evade those duties. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 58a; App. 65-74. The defendants' convictions for wire fraud therefore resulted from, and could not have been obtained without proof of, their intent to violate Canadian revenue laws. See United States v. Pierce, 224 F. 3d 158, 166-168 (CA2 2000) ("If no Canadian duty or tax actually existed, the [defendants] were no more guilty of wire fraud than they would have been had they used the wires" to smuggle liquor into New York City, "in the sincere but mistaken belief that New York City imposes a duty on such ... shipments."). The United States Government's reliance on Canadian customs and tax laws continued at sentencing. The United States Sentencing Guidelines mandated that the defendants be sentenced on the basis of, among other things, the amount by which the defendants defrauded the Canadian Government. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §2F1.1(b)(1) (Nov. 2000). Accordingly, the District Court calculated the number of cases of liquor smuggled into Canada and the aggregate amount of import duties evaded by the defendants. The court concluded that the Pasquantinos avoided over $2.5 million in Canadian duties, and Hilts, over $1.1 million. See App. 97-101, 104-105.4 The resulting offense-level increases yielded significantly longer sentences for the defendants.5 As Judge Gregory stated in dissent below, the fact that "the bulk of the defendants' sentences were related, not to the American crime of wire fraud, but to the Canadian crime of tax evasion," shows that "this case was primarily about enforcing Canadian law." 336 F.3d, at 342-343. </s> Expansively interpreting the text of the wire fraud statute, which prohibits "any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of ... fraudulent pretenses," the Court today upholds the Government's deployment of §1343 essentially to enforce foreign tax law. This Court has several times observed that the wire fraud statute has a long arm, extending to "everything designed to defraud by representations as to the past or present, or suggestions and promises as to the future." Durland v. United States, 161 U. S. 306, 313 (1896). But the Court has also recognized that incautious reading of the statute could dramatically expand the reach of federal criminal law, and we have refused to apply the proscription exorbitantly. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987) (refusing to construe 18 U.S.C. §1341, the mail fraud statute, to reach corruption in local government, stating: "[W]e read §1341 as limited in scope to the protection of property rights. If Congress desires to go further, it must speak more clearly than it has."); see also Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 24-25 (2000) (holding that §1341 does not reach schemes to make false statements on a state license application, in part based on reluctance to "approve a sweeping expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction in the absence of a clear statement by Congress").6 </s> Construing §1343 to encompass violations of foreign revenue laws, the Court ignores the absence of anything signaling Congress' intent to give the statute such an extraordinary extraterritorial effect.7 "It is a longstanding principle of American law," ARAMCO, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). See also Small, post, at 3 (interpreting the phrase "convicted in any court," 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1), in light of the "commonsense notion" that Congress ordinarily intends statutes to have only domestic application (quoting Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204, n. 5 (1993))). Absent a clear statement of "the affirmative intention of the Congress," Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S. A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957), this Court ordinarily does not read statutes to reach conduct that is "the primary concern of a foreign country," Foley Bros., 336 U.S., at 286; cf. F.Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. ___, ___ (2004) (slip op., at 8) (referring to presumption that "legislators take account of the legitimate sovereign interests of other nations when they write American laws"). </s> Section 1343, which contains no reference to foreign law as an element of the domestic crime of wire fraud, contrasts with federal criminal statutes that chart the courts' course in this regard. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §1956(c)(1) (defendant must know that transaction involved the proceeds of activity "that constitutes a felony under State, Federal, or foreign law"); 16 U.S.C. §3372(a)(2)(A) (banning importation of wildlife that has been "taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of any ... foreign law"). These statutes indicate that Congress, which has the sole authority to determine the extraterritorial reach of domestic laws, is fully capable of conveying its policy choice to the Executive and the courts. I would not assume from legislative silence that Congress left the matter to Executive discretion.8 </s> The presumption against extraterritoriality, which guides courts in the absence of congressional direction, provides ample cause to conclude that §1343 does not extend to the instant scheme. Moreover, as to foreign customs and tax laws, there is scant room for doubt about Congress' general perspective: Congress has actively indicated, through both domestic legislation and treaties, that it intends "strictly [to] limit the parameters of any assistance given" to foreign nations. Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d, at 119; see also United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 588 (CA1 1996) ("National [foreign] policy judgments ... could be undermined if federal courts were to give general effect to wire fraud prosecutions for ... violating the revenue laws of any country."). </s> First, Congress has enacted a specific statute criminalizing offenses of the genre committed by the defendants here: 18 U.S.C. §546 prohibits transporting goods "into the territory of any foreign government in violation of the laws there in force." Section 546's application, however, is expressly conditioned on the foreign government's enactment of reciprocal legislation prohibiting smuggling into the United States. See ibid. (prohibition applies "if under the laws of such foreign government any penalty or forfeiture is provided for violation of the laws of the United States respecting the customs revenue"). The reciprocity limitation reflects a legislative determination that this country should not provide other nations with greater enforcement assistance than they give to the United States. The limitation also cabins the Government's discretion as to which nation's customs laws to enforce, thereby avoiding the appearance of prosecutorial overreaching. See 305 F.3d 291, 297, n.9 (CA4 2002) (Gregory, J.) ("Where do we draw the line as to which countries' laws we will help enforce?"), vacated and reh'g en banc granted (2003). Significantly, Canada has no statute criminalizing smuggling into the United States, rendering §546 inapplicable to schemes resembling the one at issue here.9 </s> Second, the United States and Canada have negotiated, and the Senate has ratified, a comprehensive tax treaty, in which both nations have committed to providing collection assistance with respect to each other's tax claims. See Protocol, Art. 15, ¶2. Significantly, the Protocol does not call upon either nation to interpret or calculate liability under the other's tax statutes; it applies only to tax claims that have been fully and finally adjudicated under the law of the requesting nation. Further, the Protocol bars assistance in collecting any claim against a citizen or corporation of "the requested State." Art. 15, ¶8. These provisions would preclude Canada from obtaining United States assistance in enforcing its claims against the Pasquantinos and Hilts. I would not assume that Congress understood §1343 to provide the assistance that the United States, in the considered foreign policy judgment of both political branches, has specifically declined to promise. II </s> Complementing the principle that courts ordinarily should await congressional instruction before giving our laws extraterritorial thrust, the common-law revenue rule holds that one nation generally does not enforce another's tax laws. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 448 (1964) (White, J., dissenting) (noting that "our courts customarily refuse to enforce the revenue and penal laws of a foreign state"); cf. Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 275-276 (1935). The Government argues, and the Court accepts, that domestic wire fraud prosecutions premised on violations of foreign tax law do not implicate the revenue rule because the court, while it must "recognize foreign [revenue] law to determine whether the defendant violated U.S. law," ante, at 18, need only "enforce" foreign law "in an attenuated sense." See ante, at 16; Brief for United States 17-19. As discussed above, however, the defendants' conduct arguably fell within the scope of §1343 only because of their purpose to evade Canadian customs and tax laws; shorn of that purpose, no other aspect of their conduct was criminal in this country. See supra, at 4-6; Boots, 80 F.3d, at 587 ("[U]pholding defendants' section 1343 conviction would amount ... to penal enforcement of Canadian customs and tax laws."). It seems to me unavoidably obvious, therefore, that this prosecution directly implicates the revenue rule. It is equally plain that Congress did not endeavor, by enacting §1343, to displace that rule. The application of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §3663A, to wire fraud offenses is corroborative. Section 3663A applies to all "offense[s] against property," §3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii), and directs that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law ... the court shall order ... that the defendant make restitution to the victim of the offense," §3663A(a)(1) (emphasis added). The Government acknowledges, however, that it "did not urge the district court to order restitution in this case on the theory that it was not 'appropriate ... since the victim is a foreign government and the loss derives from tax laws of the foreign government.'" Brief for United States 19-20 (quoting Letter from United States Attorney S. Schenning to United States District Chief Judge J. Motz, Feb. 16, 2001, App. 106). The Government now disavows this concession. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 36 (While "the prosecutor did concede below that restitution was not appropriately ordered," it is in fact "[t]he position of the United States ... that restitution under the mandatory statute should be ordered and it does not infringe the revenue rule."). Nevertheless, the very fact that the Government effectively invited the District Court to overlook the mandatory restitution statute out of concern for the revenue rule is revealing. It further demonstrates that the Government's expansive reading of §1343 warrants this Court's disapprobation. </s> Any tension between §3663A and the wire fraud statute, the Government suggests and the Court accepts, would be relieved if this Court construed §3663A to exclude restitution that might encounter a revenue rule shoal. See ante, at 14; Brief for United States 21. Congress, however, has expressed with notable clarity a policy of mandatory restitution in all wire fraud prosecutions. In contrast, Congress was "quite ambiguous" concerning §1343's coverage of schemes to evade foreign taxes. Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, in my view, is an additional indicator that "Congress ... [did not] envision foreign taxes to be the object of [a] scheme to defraud," id., at 35-36, and I would construe §1343 accordingly. III </s> Finally, the rule of lenity counsels against adopting the Court's interpretation of §1343. It is a "close question" whether the wire fraud statute's prohibition of "any scheme ... to defraud" includes schemes directed solely at defrauding foreign governments of tax revenues. See id., at 33. We have long held that, when confronted with "two rational readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other, we are to choose the harsher only when Congress has spoken in clear and definite language." McNally, 344 U.S. 218, 221-222 (1952). This interpretive guide is particularly appropriate here. Wire fraud is a predicate offense under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §1961(1) (2000 ed., Supp. II), and the money laundering statute, §1956(c)(7)(A) (2000 ed.). See Cleveland, 531 U.S., at 25. A finding that particular conduct constitutes wire fraud therefore exposes certain defendants to the severe criminal penalties and forfeitures provided in both RICO, see §1963 (2000 ed.), and the money laundering statute, §1956(a), (b) (2000 ed. and Supp. II). *** </s> For the reasons stated, I would hold that §1343 does not extend to schemes to evade foreign tax and customs laws. I would therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. </s> FOOTNOTESFootnote 1We express no view on the related question whether a foreign government, based on wire or mail fraud predicate offenses, may bring a civil action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act for a scheme to defraud it of taxes. See Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 106 (CA2 2001) (holding that the Government of Canada cannot bring a civil RICO suit to recover for a scheme to defraud it of taxes); Republic of Honduras v. Philip Morris Cos., 341 F.3d 1253, 1255 (CA11 2003) (same with respect to other foreign governments). Footnote 2Although Cleveland interpreted the term "property" in the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. §1341 (2000 ed., Supp. II), we have construed identical language in the wire and mail fraud statutes in pari materia. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 20 (1999) ("'scheme or artifice to defraud'"); Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25, and n. 6 (1987) ("scheme or artifice to defraud"; "money or property"). Footnote 3Section 546 provides: "Any person owning in whole or in part any vessel of the United States who employs, or participates in, or allows the employment of, such vessel for the purpose of smuggling, or attempting to smuggle, or assisting in smuggling, any merchandise into the territory of any foreign government in violation of the laws there in force, if under the laws of such foreign government any penalty or forfeiture is provided for violation of the laws of the United States respecting the customs revenue, and any citizen of, or person domiciled in, or any corporation incorporated in, the United States, controlling or substantially participating in the control of any such vessel, directly or indirectly, whether through ownership of corporate shares or otherwise, and allowing the employment of said vessel for any such purpose, and any person found, or discovered to have been, on board of any such vessel so employed and participating or assisting in any such purpose, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." Footnote 4Any overlap between the antismuggling statute and the wire fraud statute is beside the point. The Federal Criminal Code is replete with provisions that criminalize overlapping conduct. See Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L.Rev. 505, 518, and n. 62 (2002); United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 505-509, and nn. 8-10 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The mere fact that two federal criminal statutes criminalize similar conduct says little about the scope of either. Footnote 5See also United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (requiring the statute to "'speak directly' to the question addressed by the common law"); Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (stating that this presumption is applicable "where a common-law principle is well established"); United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411 (1957) (declining to interpret the term "'stolen'" in a federal criminal statute according to the common law because the term had "no accepted common-law meaning"). Footnote 6These principles convince us that much more than the summary conclusion that it is "unavoidably obvious . . . that this prosecution directly implicates the revenue rule" and that this prosecution is "'primarily about enforcing Canadian law,'" post, at 6, 11 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) is required to demonstrate that a revenue rule principle firmly established as of 1952 bars this prosecution. That task requires inquiry into common-law revenue rule jurisprudence--an inquiry the dissent does not undertake. Footnote 7See Colorado v. Harbeck, 232 N.Y. 71, 85, 133 N.E. 357, 360 (App. 1921); Maryland v. Turner, 75 Misc. 9, 10-13, 132 N.Y.S. 173, 175 (Sup. Ct. 1911); Detroit v. Proctor, 44 Del. 193, 200-202, 61 A.2d 412, 415-416 (Super. Ct. 1948); Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F. 2d 600, 603-604 (CA2 1929) (L. Hand, J., concurring) (citing cases), aff'd on other grounds, 281 U.S. 18 (1930); Arkansas v. Bowen, 20 D.C. 291, 295 (Sup. Ct. 1891), aff'd, 3 App. D.C. 537 (1894); Leflar 216, n. 63 (citing cases). Footnote 8See also Her Majesty the Queen v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161, 1163-1164 (CA9 1979) (stating the revenue rule as an exception to the rule that a state enforces foreign judgments, citing, inter alia, pre-1952 cases); Peter Buchanan Ltd. v. McVey, 1955 A. C. 516, 526 (Ir. H. Ct. 1950), app. dism'd, 1955 A. C. 530 (Ir. Sup. Ct. 1951) (citing English revenue rule cases as "establish[ing] that the courts of our country will not enforce the revenue claims of a foreign country in a suit brought for the purpose by a foreign public authority"); Leflar 219 (stating the revenue rule as a prohibition on "extrastate actions for revenue collection"); Moore, supra, at 603 (L. Hand, J., concurring) (characterizing the revenue rule as an exception to the rule that a "liability arising under the law of a foreign state will be recognized by the courts of another"); Harbeck, supra, at 85, 133 N.E., at 360 (stating that the revenue rule "precludes one state from acting as a collector of taxes for a sister state"); cf. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States §483 (1986) (stating that the rule does not require, but allows, courts to refuse enforcement of foreign tax judgments). Footnote 9Petitioners also cite QRS 1 Aps v. Frandsen, [2000] I. L. Pr. 8, [1999] 3 All E.R. 289 (App.) (holding that a liquidator was not entitled to recover corporate funds needed to pay foreign taxes); Stringam v. Dubois, [1993] 3 W. W. R. 273, 7 Alta. L.R. (3d) 120 (App. 1992) (rejecting suit by the U.S. executor of a will to require the sale of real property in Canada to pay U.S. estate taxes); Banco Do Brasil, S.A. v. A.C. Israel Commodity Co., 12 N.Y. 2d 371, 377, 190 N.E. 2d 235, 237 (App. 1963) (rejecting suit by instrumentality of Brazil to recover for a conspiracy to circumvent its foreign exchange regulations); United States v. Harden, [1963] 44 W. W. R. 630, 633, S.C.R. 366, 370-371 (Sup. Ct. Can.) (holding that a stipulated judgment to pay U.S. taxes was not enforceable in Canadian courts); Attorney-General for Canada v. Schulze, [1901] 9 Scots Law Times 4, 4-5 (refusing to enforce judgment for court costs, where costs were incurred by a foreign state in defending the legality of its forfeiture of the defendant's goods as penalty for infraction of revenue laws); Indian and General Investment Trust, Ltd. v. Borax Consolidated Ltd., [1920] 1 K. B. 539, 550 (holding that a private debtor was not entitled to deduct U.S. income tax from its interest payments on loan due in England). Footnote 10For example, in Government of India v. Taylor, 1955 A. C. 491 (H.L.), on which petitioners rely heavily, the court's application of the revenue rule rested in part on a ground peculiar to English law, namely, that an Act of Parliament had excluded tax judgments from a statute that provided for the enforcement of foreign judgments. That act thus demonstrated that the revenue rule "appear[ed] to have been recognized by Parliament." Id., at 506; see also Borax, supra, at 549 (holding that a private debtor was not entitled to deduct U.S. income tax from its interest payments on a loan, in part because "there [was] an express Act of Parliament which permits payment to the English Income Tax authorities to be a discharge pro tanto of the debt which a person owes in respect of yearly interest to another" while "[t]here [was] no Act of Parliament which allows payment of income tax to another country to be reckoned as discharge"); Schulze, supra, at 5 (holding that a foreign state could not recover court costs incurred in defending the legality of a tax forfeiture, in part because "in our [i.e., Scottish] law, the expenses of an action have always been regarded as a mere accessory or incident of the principal claim"). In addition, as we explain below, features peculiar to the American system of separation of powers cast doubt on the notion that the revenue rule bars this prosecution. See infra, at 18-19. Footnote 11See 18 U.S.C.A. §3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii) (Supp. 2004) ("This section shall apply in all sentencing proceedings for convictions of ... an offense against property under this title ... including any offense committed by fraud or deceit"). Footnote 12As some indication of the novelty of the dissent's "extraterritoriality" argument, we note that this argument was not pressed or passed upon below and was raised only as an afterthought in petitioners' reply brief, depriving the Government of a chance to respond. Reply Brief for Petitioners 17-18. Footnote 13The dissent says that a scheme to defraud a foreign corporation or individual "does not necessarily depend on any determination of foreign law" and therefore "is of a different order." Post, at 8, n.8 (opinion of Ginsburg, J.). That is not so. Many such schemes will necessarily require interpretation of foreign law. Without proof of foreign law, it is impossible to tell whether the scheme had the purpose of depriving the foreign corporation or individual of valuable property interests as defined by foreign law. See supra, at 4-5; United States v. Pierce, 224 F.3d 158, 165-168 (CA2 2000). The fact that a prosecution might involve foreign revenue law, rather than any other type of foreign law, is relevant to whether such a prosecution is in derogation of the revenue rule, see supra, at 8-21, not to whether it is "extraterritorial." Footnote 14Petitioners argue in a footnote that their sentences should be vacated in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___ (2004). Brief for Petitioners 26, n. 29. Petitioners did not raise this claim before the Court of Appeals or in their petition for certiorari. We therefore decline to address it. See, e.g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 244, n. 6 (2001) (declining to address "matter ... not raised or decided below, or presented in the petition for certiorari"); Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. ___ (2005) (affirming federal convictions despite the imposition of sentence enhancements, see Brief for Petitioners therein, O. T. 2004, No. 03-1293, etc., p. 7, n.6). FOOTNOTESFootnote 1The Government offered a Canadian customs officer's testimony at trial that if alcohol is purchased for $56 per case in the United States, the Canadian tax would be approximately $100 per case. App. 65-66; see infra, at 5, n. 4. Footnote 2Petitioners' reliance on the presumption against extraterritorial application of laws enacted with domestic concerns in mind was no mere afterthought. See ante, at 20, n.12. The presumption was explicitly featured in petitioners' reply brief. See Reply Brief 17-19, and n. 23 (observing, inter alia, that the presumption against extraterritoriality "is especially true when criminal liability is at stake"); see also Brief for Petitioners 40, n. 46. Both parties ask us to determine the scope of §1343, and the presumption against extraterritoriality is a guide to interpretation of the kind courts ordinarily bring to bear in endeavoring to discern the meaning of a legislative text. Moreover, the Government's responses to petitioners' revenue rule arguments coincide with the Government's position on the presumption against extraterritoriality. Compare Brief for United States 22-26, with Tr. of Oral Arg. 35, 46-47 (responding to the Court's questions about extraterritoriality, counsel for the Government asserted that Congress left to Executive discretion the determination whether "enforcement of [foreign] tax systems" is appropriate). Footnote 3Indeed, the defendants have all been indicted in Canada for failing to report excise taxes and possession of unlawfully imported spirits, 336 F.3d 321, 343 (CA4 2003) (en banc) (Gregory, J., dissenting), but Canada has not requested their extradition, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 12-13, 30. Footnote 4The casual manner in which the Government and the District Court reached these totals detracts from the Court's assertion that "[f]oreign law, of course, posed no unmanageable complexity in this case." Ante, at 19. In making its sentencing recommendation to the court, the Government did not proffer evidence of the precise rate at which Canada taxes liquor imports, or reference any provisions of Canadian law. Rather, it relied on the trial testimony of an intelligence officer with Canadian Customs, who surmised, based on her experience in working at the border, that Canadian taxes on a $56 case of liquor would be approximately $100. See App. 104. The Customs officer was not offered as an expert witness and "[t]he [D]istrict [C]ourt never determined whether [her] calculations were accurate as a matter of Canadian law." 336 F. 3d, at 343 (Gregory, J., dissenting). Thus, if foreign law posed no complexity in this case, it is not because the parties and the court were easily able to interpret and apply Canadian law, but rather because the Government and the court made no serious attempt to do so. That no such effort was made here, in derogation of the Government's and the court's shared obligation to ensure that the calculations potentially affecting a defendant's sentence are as accurate as possible, is "deeply troubling," ibid., and suggests that the Government was unprepared to grapple with the details of foreign revenue laws. Footnote 5I note that petitioners' sentences were enhanced on the basis of judicial factfindings, in violation of the Sixth Amendment. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. ___, ___ (2005) (Stevens, J., for the Court) (slip op., at 5-9); see also Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___ (2004). Despite the Court's affirmance of their convictions, therefore, the petitioners may be entitled to resentencing. See Booker, 543 U. S., at ___, ___ (Breyer, J., for the Court) (slip op., at 25-26). The Court declines to address the defendants' plea for resentencing, stating that "[p]etitioners did not raise this claim before the Court of Appeals or in their petition for certiorari." See ante, at 21, n. 14. This omission was no fault of the defendants, however, as the petition in this case was filed and granted well before the Court decided Blakely. Petitioners thus raised Blakely at the earliest possible point: in their merits briefing. The rule that we do not consider issues not raised in the petition is prudential, not jurisdictional, see Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U. S. Philips Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 32-33 (1993) (per curiam), and a remand on the Blakely-Booker question would neither prejudice the Government nor require this Court to delve into complex issues not passed on below. Footnote 6I note that, on the Court's interpretation, federal prosecutors could resort to the wire and mail fraud statutes to reach schemes to evade not only foreign taxes, but state and local taxes as well. Footnote 7I do not read into §1343's coverage of frauds executed "in interstate or foreign commerce," ante, at 21, congressional intent to give §1343 extraterritorial effect. A statute's express application to acts committed in foreign commerce, the Court has repeatedly held, does not in itself indicate a congressional design to give the statute extraterritorial effect. See ARAMCO, 499 U.S., at 250-253. Footnote 8The application of 18 U.S.C. §1343 (2000 ed., Supp. II), to schemes to defraud a foreign individual or corporation, or even a foreign governmental entity acting as a market participant, is of a different order, and does not necessarily depend on any determination of foreign law. As the Court of Appeals observed in United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 587 (CA1 1996), upholding a defendant's wire fraud conviction in a case like the one here presented "would amount functionally to penal enforcement of Canadian customs and tax laws." See also ibid. (noting that courts "will enforce foreign non-tax civil judgments unless due process, jurisdictional, or fundamental public policy considerations interfere" (citing Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States §483, and Reporters' Notes, n.1 (1986)), but "[o]ur courts customarily refuse to enforce the revenue and penal laws of a foreign state, since no country has an obligation to further the governmental interests of a foreign sovereign" (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 448 (1964) (White, J., dissenting))). Footnote 9Section 546's requirement that a vessel have been used to transport the goods to the foreign country would render §546 inapplicable to these defendants' conduct in any event.

United States Supreme Court MILLS v. HABLUETZEL(1982) No. 80-6298 Argued: January 12, 1982Decided: April 5, 1982 </s> A Texas statute ( 13.01) provides that a paternity suit to identify the natural father of an illegitimate child for purposes of obtaining support must be brought before the child is one year old, or the suit is barred. Appellant mother of an illegitimate child and the Texas Department of Human Resources brought suit in a Texas Court on behalf of the child to establish that appellee was his natural father. The trial court dismissed the suit under 13.01 because the child was one year and seven months old when the suit was filed. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, holding that the one-year limitation was not tolled during minority and did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. </s> Held: </s> The one-year period for establishing paternity denies illegitimate children in Texas the equal protection of law. Pp. 97-101. </s> (a) A State that grants an opportunity for legitimate children to obtain paternal support must also grant that opportunity to illegitimate children, Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 , and this latter opportunity must be more than illusory, although it need not be coterminous with the procedures accorded legitimate children. Pp. 97-98. </s> (b) The period for obtaining support granted by Texas to illegitimate children must be of sufficient duration to present a reasonable opportunity for those with an interest in such children to assert claims on their behalf. And the time limitation on that opportunity must be substantially related to the State's interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims. Section 13.01 fails to meet either of these requirements and thus denies equal protection. Pp. 98-101. </s> Reversed and remanded. </s> REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., and BRENNAN and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, and in Part I of which POWELL, J., joined, post, p. 102. POWELL, J., filed a statement concurring in the judgment, post, p. 106. </s> Michael E. Mankins argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant. [456 U.S. 91, 92] </s> Lola L. Bonner argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief was John H. Flinn. </s> JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This Court has held that once a State posits a judicially enforceable right of children to support from their natural fathers, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the State from denying that same right to illegitimate children. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973). In this case we are required to determine the extent to which the right of illegitimate children recognized in Gomez may be circumscribed by a State's interest in avoiding the prosecution of stale or fraudulent claims. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals, Thirteenth Supreme Judicial District, upheld against federal constitutional challenges the State's one-year statute of limitation for suits to identify the natural fathers of illegitimate children. We noted probable jurisdiction. 451 U.S. 936 . We begin by reviewing the history of the statute challenged by appellant. </s> I </s> Like all States, Texas imposes upon parents the primary responsibility for support of their legitimate children. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. (Code) 4.02, 12.04(3) (1975 and Supp. 1982). That duty extends beyond the dissolution of marriage, Code 14.05, regardless of whether the parent has custody of the child, Hooten v. Hooten, 15 S. W. 2d 141 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929), and may be enforced on the child's behalf in civil proceedings. Code 14.05(a). Prior to our decision in Gomez, Texas recognized no enforceable duty on the part of a natural father to support his illegitimate children. See Home of the Holy Infancy v. Kaska, 397 S. W. 2d 208 (Tex. 1965); Lane v. Phillips, 69 Tex. 240, 6 S. W. 610 (1887); Bjorgo v. Bjorgo, 391 S. W. 2d 528 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965). A natural father could even assert illegitimacy as a defense to [456 U.S. 91, 93] prosecution for criminal nonsupport. See Curtin v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 625, 238 S. W. 2d 187 (1950). </s> Reviewing the Texas law in Gomez, we held that "a State may not invidiously discriminate against illegitimate children by denying them substantial benefits accorded children generally." 409 U.S., at 538 . "[O]nce a State posits a judicially enforceable right on behalf of children to needed support from their natural fathers," we stated, "there is no constitutionally sufficient justification for denying such an essential right to a child simply because its natural father has not married its mother." Ibid. Although we recognized that "the lurking problems with respect to proof of paternity . . . are not to be lightly brushed aside," we concluded that they did not justify "an impenetrable barrier that works to shield otherwise invidious discrimination." Ibid. Accordingly, we held Texas' denial of support rights to illegitimate children to be a denial of equal protection of law. </s> In response to our decision in Gomez, the Texas Legislature considered legislation that would have provided illegitimate children with a cause of action to establish the paternity of their natural fathers and would have imposed upon those fathers the same duty of support owed to legitimate children. The legislature did not enact that legislation, however, choosing instead to establish a procedure by which natural fathers voluntarily could legitimate their illegitimate children and thereby take upon themselves the obligation of supporting those children. Texas Dept. of Human Resources v. Hernandez, 595 S. W. 2d 189, 191 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). No provision was made for illegitimate children to seek support from fathers who fail to support them. </s> Not surprisingly, this legislation was found by Texas courts to be an inadequate response to Gomez. A panel of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that, because of Gomez, "[w]hen the Legislature later provided judicial relief against the father on behalf of a legitimate child for support, it necessarily [456 U.S. 91, 94] provided the same relief on behalf of an illegitimate child." In re R ____ V____ M ____, 530 S. W. 2d 921, 922-923 (1975). Only after this judicial recognition of a right to support did the Texas Legislature establish procedures for a paternity and support action on behalf of illegitimate children. Texas Dept. of Human Resources v. Hernandez, supra, at 191. </s> The rights of illegitimate children to obtain support from their biological fathers are now governed by Chapter 13 of Title 2 of the Code 13.01 et seq. The Code recognizes that establishment of paternity is the necessary first step in all suits by illegitimate children for support from their natural fathers. See In re Miller, 605 S. W. 2d 332, 334 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); Texas Dept. of Human Resources v. Delley, 581 S. W. 2d 519, 522 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). Accordingly, Chapter 13 establishes procedures to be followed in judicial determinations of paternity and works in conjunction with other provisions of the Code to establish the duty of fathers to support their illegitimate children. See Code 12.04, 14.05. Once paternity has been determined, Chapter 13 authorizes the court to order the defendant father "to make periodic payments or a lump-sum payment, or both, for the support of the child until he is 18 years of age," Code 14.05(a). See Code 13.42(b). </s> Although it granted illegitimate children the opportunity to obtain support by establishing paternity, Texas was less than generous. It significantly truncated that opportunity by the statutory provision at issue in this case, 13.01: </s> "A suit to establish the parent-child relationship between a child who is not the legitimate child of a man and the child's natural father by proof of paternity must be brought before the child is one year old, or the suit is barred." </s> Texas views this provision as part of the substantive right accorded illegitimate children, not simply as a procedural limitation [456 U.S. 91, 95] on that right. Texas Dept. of Human Resources v. Hernandez, supra, at 192-193. Moreover, Texas courts have applied 13.01 literally to mean that failure to bring suit on behalf of illegitimate children within the first year of their life "results in [their] being forever barred from the right to sue their natural father for child support, a limitation their legitimate counterparts do not share." In re Miller, supra, at 334. Thus, in response to the constitutional requirements of Gomez, Texas has created a one-year window in its previously "impenetrable barrier," through which an illegitimate child may establish paternity and obtain paternal support. 1 </s> II </s> Appellant in this case is the mother of a child born out of wedlock in early 1977. In October 1978, she and the Texas Department of Human Resources, to which appellant had assigned [456 U.S. 91, 96] the child's support rights, 2 brought suit on behalf of the child to establish that appellee was his natural father. Appellee answered by asserting that the action was barred by 13.01 because the child was one year and seven months old when the suit was filed. The trial court agreed with appellee and dismissed the suit. </s> The dismissal was affirmed on appeal by the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, and discretionary review was denied by the Texas Supreme Court upon a finding of no reversible error. 3 The Court of Civil Appeals, relying upon its decision in Texas Dept. of Human Resources v. Hernandez, 595 S. W. 2d 189 (1980), held that the one-year limitation was not tolled during minority and did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Hernandez decision in turn relied upon the constitutional analysis in Texas Dept. of Human Resources v. Chapman, 570 S. W. 2d 46 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), where another division of the Court of Civil Appeals had found that "the legitimate state interest in precluding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims" was rationally related to the one-year bar and therefore did not deny illegitimate children equal protection of the law. Id., at 49. </s> Appellant argues that the 13.01 bar imposes a burden on illegitimate children that is not shared by legitimate children, and that the burden is not justified by the State's interest in avoiding the prosecution of stale or fraudulent claims. In [456 U.S. 91, 97] addition, appellant argues that 13.01 deprives illegitimate children of their right to support without due process of law. Because we agree with appellant's first argument, we need not consider her second. </s> III </s> Our decision in Gomez held that "a State may not invidiously discriminate against illegitimate children by denying them substantial benefits accorded children generally." 409 U.S., at 538 . Specifically, we held that a State which grants an opportunity for legitimate children to obtain paternal support must also grant that opportunity to illegitimate children. If Gomez and the equal protection principles which underlie it are to have any meaning, it is clear that the support opportunity provided by the State to illegitimate children must be more than illusory. The period for asserting the right to support must be sufficiently long to permit those who normally have an interest in such children to bring an action on their behalf despite the difficult personal, family, and financial circumstances that often surround the birth of a child outside of wedlock. It would hardly satisfy the demands of equal protection and the holding of Gomez to remove an "impenetrable barrier" to support, only to replace it with an opportunity so truncated that few could utilize it effectively. </s> The fact that Texas must provide illegitimate children with a bona fide opportunity to obtain paternal support does not mean, however, that it must adopt procedures for illegitimate children that are coterminous with those accorded legitimate children. Paternal support suits on behalf of illegitimate children contain an element that such suits for legitimate children do not contain: proof of paternity. Such proof is often sketchy and strongly contested, frequently turning upon conflicting testimony from only two witnesses. Indeed, the problems of proving paternity have been recognized repeatedly by this Court. Parham v. Hughes, [456 U.S. 91, 98] 441 U.S. 347, 357 , 361 (1979); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 269 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 772 (1977); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S., at 538 . 4 </s> Therefore, in support suits by illegitimate children more than in support suits by legitimate children, the State has an interest in preventing the prosecution of stale or fraudulent [456 U.S. 91, 99] claims, and may impose greater restrictions on the former than it imposes on the latter. Such restrictions will survive equal protection scrutiny to the extent they are substantially related to a legitimate state interest. See Lalli v. Lalli, supra, at 265; Trimble v. Gordon, supra, at 767; Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976). 5 The State's interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims will justify those periods of limitation that are sufficiently long to present a real threat of loss or diminution of evidence, or an increased vulnerability to fraudulent claims. </s> The equal protection analysis in this case, therefore, focuses on two related requirements. First, the period for obtaining support granted by Texas to illegitimate children must be sufficiently long in duration to present a reasonable opportunity for those with an interest in such children to assert claims on their behalf. Second, any time limitation placed on that opportunity must be substantially related to [456 U.S. 91, 100] the State's interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims. Applying these two requirements to the one-year right granted by Texas, we find a denial of equal protection. </s> By granting illegitimate children only one year in which to establish paternity, Texas has failed to provide them with an adequate opportunity to obtain support. Paternity suits in Texas "may be brought by any person with an interest in the child," Code 11.03, but during the child's early years will often be brought by the mother. It requires little experience to appreciate the obstacles to such suits that confront unwed mothers during the child's first year. Financial difficulties caused by childbirth expenses or a birth-related loss of income, continuing affection for the child's father, a desire to avoid disapproval of family and community, or the emotional strain and confusion that often attend the birth of an illegitimate child all encumber a mother's filing of a paternity suit within 12 months of birth. Even if the mother seeks public financial assistance and assigns the child's support claim to the State, it is not improbable that 12 months would elapse without the filing of a claim. Several months could pass before a mother finds the need to seek such assistance, takes steps to obtain it, and is willing to join the State in litigation against the natural father. 6 A sense of the inadequacy of this one-year period is accentuated by a realization that failure to file within 12 months "results in illegitimates being forever barred from the right to sue their natural father for child support," In re Miller, 605 S. W. 2d, at 334, while legitimate children may seek such support at any time until the age of 18. 7 </s> [456 U.S. 91, 101] </s> Moreover, this unrealistically short time limitation is not substantially related to the State's interest in avoiding the prosecution of stale or fraudulent claims. In Gomez we recognized that the problems of proof in paternity suits "are not to be lightly brushed aside," but held that such problems do not justify a complete denial of support rights to illegitimate children. 409 U.S., at 538 . Neither do they justify a period of limitation which so restricts those rights as effectively to extinguish them. We can conceive of no evidence essential to paternity suits that invariably will be lost in only one year, nor is it evident that the passage of 12 months will appreciably increase the likelihood of fraudulent claims. 8 </s> Accordingly, we conclude that the one-year period for establishing paternity denies illegitimate children in Texas the equal protection of law. 9 The judgment of the Texas [456 U.S. 91, 102] Court of Civil Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. </s> Reversed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Since the Court of Civil Appeals' decision in this case, the Texas Legislature has amended 13.01 to increase to four years the period for asserting paternity claims. 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 674, 2, Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 13.01 (Supp. 1982). Appellee argues that this amendment renders appellant's claim moot, or at least requires a remand so that the Texas courts can determine whether the amendment is retroactive. We disagree. </s> The case is not moot because 13.01, as applied by the courts below, continues to stand as a bar to appellant's assertion of a paternity claim against appellee. At the filing of appellant's claim the child was more than one year old, and on September 1, 1981, the effective date of the amendment, the child was more than four years old. </s> It seems probable that the amendment would not be applied retroactively by Texas courts. "It is well established law in Texas that after a cause of action has become barred by a statute of limitation, the defendant has a vested right to rely on the statute as a defense, and the state legislature cannot divest the defendant of this right by thereafter lifting the bar of limitation which had accrued in favor of the defendant. Any statute that had such an effect would be considered a retroactive law violative of Article 1, sec. 16 of the Constitution of the State of Texas." Penry v. Wm. Barr, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 126, 128 (ED Tex. 1976) (citations omitted). See also Mellinger v. City of Houston, 68 Tex. 37, 3 S. W. 249 (1887); [456 U.S. 91, 96] Brantley v. Phoenix Insurance Co., 536 S. W. 2d 72, 74 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. State, 380 S. W. 2d 123, 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). </s> [Footnote 2 Prior to filing this support suit against appellee, appellant sought financial assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program. As conditions to eligibility for such assistance, appellant was required "to assign the State any rights to support" held by the child, 42 U.S.C. 602(a)(26)(A), and "to cooperate with the State . . . in establishing the paternity of [the] child born out of wedlock with respect to whom aid [was] claimed." 42 U.S.C. 602(a)(26)(B)(i). </s> [Footnote 3 The decisions of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals and the Texas Supreme Court are not officially reported. </s> [Footnote 4 Appellant contends that time limitations on the right of illegitimate children to prove paternity would never be justified by the State's desire to avoid litigation of stale or fraudulent claims because "[t]he interests of the state, and those of the alleged father, to prevent incorrect claims of paternity are . . . protected by the recent advance in blood and genetic testing." Brief for Appellant 29. We previously have recognized that blood tests are highly probative in proving paternity, Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 6 -8 (1981), but disagree with appellant's contention that their existence negates the State's interest in avoiding the prosecution of stale or fraudulent claims. </s> Traditional blood tests do not prove paternity. They prove nonpaternity, excluding from the class of possible fathers a high percentage of the general male population. H. Krause, Illegitimacy: Law and Social Policy 123-136 (1971). Thus, the fact that a certain male is not excluded by these tests does not prove that he is the child's natural father, only that he is a member of the limited class of possible fathers. More recent developments in the field of blood testing have sought not only to "prove nonpaternity" but also to predict paternity with a high degree of probability. See Terasaki, Resolution by HLA Testing of 1000 Paternity Cases Not Excluded by ABO Testing, 16 J. Fam. L. 543 (1978). The proper evidentiary weight to be given to these techniques is still a matter of academic dispute. See, e. g., Jaffee, Comment on the Judicial Use of HLA Paternity Test Results and Other Statistical Evidence: Response to Terasaki, 17 J. Fam. L. 457 (1979). Whatever evidentiary rule the courts of a particular State choose to follow, if the blood test evidence does not exclude a certain male, he must thereafter turn to more conventional forms of proof - evidence of lack of access to the mother, his own testimony, the testimony of others - to prove that, although not excluded by the blood test, he is not in fact the child's father. As to this latter form of proof, the State clearly has an interest in litigating claims while the evidence is relatively fresh. </s> This interest is particularly real under Texas procedures. Texas law requires that putative fathers submit to blood tests. Code 13.02. Refusal to submit to the tests may result in a citation for contempt, Code 13.02(b), and may be introduced to the jury as evidence that the putative [456 U.S. 91, 99] father has not been biologically excluded from the class of possible fathers. Code 13.06(d). The results of the blood tests are introduced at a pretrial conference held for the purpose of dismissing the complaint if the father has been excluded by the tests from the class of possible fathers. Code 13.04, 13.05(a). Thus, the only paternity cases which actually go to trial in Texas are those in which the putative father has refused to submit to blood tests or has not been excluded by their results, cases in which conventional types of evidence are of paramount importance. </s> [Footnote 5 Lalli v. Lalli and Trimble v. Gordon involved the right of illegitimate children to inherit from their natural fathers, while Mathews v. Lucas involved the right of illegitimate children to receive social security benefits. There is no reason to think that the factual differences between those cases and the present case call for a variation of the general principle which those cases have laid down. In Lucas the Court expressly relied on Gomez v. Perez in reaching its result. 427 U.S., at 507 . And in Lalli the requirement imposed by New York law for an illegitimate child to inherit from its natural father was that the paternity of the father be declared in a judicial proceeding sometime before his death. 439 U.S., at 263 . Thus, even those of our cases which have dealt with entitlement to government benefits, or with the intestate distribution of a natural father's property, have frequently involved support orders or adjudications of paternity as a means for establishing the entitlement or the right there sought. </s> [Footnote 6 See n. 2, supra. </s> [Footnote 7 The Texas Family Code imposes no period of limitation on the right of a legitimate child to obtain support from its father, a right which lasts until the child is 18 years old. 14.05(a). Although Texas law includes a 4-year limitations period applicable to "[e]very action . . . for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed," Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art., 5529 [456 U.S. 91, 101] (Vernon 1982), the running of that period is tolled during minority. Art. 5535. See also In re Miller, 605 S. W. 2d, at 334. </s> [Footnote 8 Appellee contends that the one-year limitation of 13.01 also is justified by the State's "interest in the continuation of the institutions of family and marriage" and the avoidance of any state actions that would "discourage either institution or . . . encourage persons to have children out of wedlock." Brief for Appellee 21. Important as such a state interest might be, we have repeatedly held that "imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing." Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). See also Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S., at 265 ; Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S., at 769 -770; Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S., at 505 . </s> [Footnote 9 The restrictions imposed by States to control problems of proof, like the restriction imposed by Texas in this case, often take the form of statutes of limitation. "Statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and convenience rather than in logic. . . . They are practical and pragmatic devices to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims, and the citizen from being put to his defense after memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence has been lost." Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945). Because such statutes "are by definition arbitrary," ibid., they are best left to legislative determination and control. Normally, therefore, States are free to set periods of limitation without fear of violating some provision of the Constitution. In [456 U.S. 91, 102] this case, however, the limitation period enacted by the Texas Legislature has the unusual effect of emasculating a right which the Equal Protection Clause requires the State to provide to illegitimate children. </s> JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE BRENNAN, and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, and with whom JUSTICE POWELL joins as to Part I, concurring. </s> Today, this Court holds that a Texas statute prescribing a one-year statute of limitation for paternity suits violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although I agree with the Court's analysis and result, I write separately because I fear that the opinion may be misinterpreted as approving the 4-year statute of limitation now used in Texas. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 13.01 (Supp. 1982). </s> I </s> As the Court notes, the response of the Texas Legislature to our opinion in Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973), was "less than generous." Ante, at 94. The one-year statute of limitation for paternity suits, enacted following our decision in Gomez, severely restricted the opportunity for illegitimate children to obtain financial support from their natural fathers, an opportunity not denied legitimate children. Although the need for proof of paternity distinguishes legitimate from illegitimate children in their claims for child support, the State's asserted justification is neither sufficiently weighty nor substantially related to the limitation to uphold the statute under the Fourteenth Amendment. </s> The appellee has set forth a number of "state interests" to justify the one-year statute of limitation, but the Court accepts only one of these as permissible - the interest in preventing the prosecution of stale or fraudulent claims. The Court holds today that this interest will justify only those [456 U.S. 91, 103] statutes of limitation that "are sufficiently long to present a real threat of loss or diminution of evidence, or an increased vulnerability to fraudulent claims." Ante, at 99. The Court elaborates: </s> "It requires little experience to appreciate the obstacles to such suits that confront unwed mothers during the child's first year. Financial difficulties caused by childbirth expenses or a birth-related loss of income, continuing affection for the child's father, a desire to avoid disapproval of family and community, or the emotional strain and confusion that often attend the birth of an illegitimate child all encumber a mother's filing of a paternity suit within 12 months of birth." Ante, at 100. </s> Certainly, these circumstances demonstrate that the one-year period of limitation once provided by 13.01 is not sufficiently long to permit either the child or the mother to assert a claim for child support; moreover, there is nothing to indicate that the period is substantially related to the asserted interest in preventing the prosecution of stale or fraudulent claims. However, it is not only birth-related circumstances that compel the conclusion that the statutory distinction in this case between legitimate and illegitimate children is unconstitutional. To begin with, the strength of the asserted state interest is undercut by the countervailing state interest in ensuring that genuine claims for child support are satisfied. The State's interest stems not only from a desire to see that "justice is done," but also from a desire to reduce the number of individuals forced to enter the welfare rolls. 1 By making it difficult for unwed mothers to obtain child support [456 U.S. 91, 104] payments from the natural fathers of their illegitimate children, the one-year statute of limitation could only increase the burden on the state welfare system. Thus, while the State surely has an interest in preventing the prosecution of stale and fraudulent claims, at the same time it has a strong interest, peculiar to the State itself, in ensuring that genuine claims for child support are not denied. 2 </s> It is also significant to the result today that a paternity suit is one of the few Texas causes of action not tolled during the minority of the plaintiff. 3 Of all the difficult proof problems that may arise in civil actions generally, paternity, an issue unique to illegitimate children, is singled out for special treatment. When this observation is coupled with the Texas Legislature's efforts to deny illegitimate children any significant opportunity to prove paternity and thus obtain child [456 U.S. 91, 105] support, it is fair to question whether the burden placed on illegitimate is designed to advance permissible state interests. </s> Finally, the practical obstacles to filing suit within one year of birth could as easily exist several years after the birth of the illegitimate child. For example, if, because of the continuing relationship between the natural father and the mother, the father has provided the child with financial support for several years, the mother understandably would be unlikely or even unwilling 4 to jeopardize her relationship with the child's father by filing a paternity suit in order to protect her child's right to financial support at some indeterminate future date. Alternatively, the child may have lived with the father alone or his relatives for a number of [456 U.S. 91, 106] years, a situation that leaves the child obviously unable to sue his father to establish paternity. The risk that the child will find himself without financial support from his natural father seems as likely throughout his minority as during the first year of his life. </s> II </s> A review of the factors used in deciding that the one-year statute of limitation cannot withstand an equal protection challenge indicates that longer periods of limitation for paternity suits also may be unconstitutional. In short, there is nothing special about the first year following birth that compels the decision in this case. Because I do not read the Court's decision as prejudging the constitutionality of longer periods of limitation, I join it. </s> [Footnote 1 In holding that the general 4-year statute of limitation, which governed paternity suits for children born before enactment of 13.01, would be tolled during the plaintiff's minority, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals wrote: </s> "We agree with the Washington Supreme Court which held that `[t]he state has a compelling interest in assuring that the primary obligation for support of illegitimate children falls on both natural parents rather than on [456 U.S. 91, 104] the taxpayers of this state.' State v. Wood, 89 Wash. 2d 97, 569 P.2d 1148, 1151 (1977)." Texas Dept. of Human Resources v. Delley, 581 S. W. 2d 519, 522 (1979). </s> [Footnote 2 The State's concern about stale and fraudulent claims is substantially alleviated by recent scientific developments in blood testing dramatically reducing the possibility that a defendant will be falsely accused of being the illegitimate child's father. In Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981), this Court discussed a report by the American Bar Association and the American Medical Association indicating that a series of blood tests could provide over a 90% probability of negating a finding of paternity for erroneously accused men. See Miale, Jennings, Rettberg, Sell, & Krause, Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines: Present Status of Serologic Testing in Problems of Disputed Parentage, 10 Family L. Q. 247, 258 (1976). The Court concluded that the "effectiveness of the [tests] attests the probative value of blood test evidence in paternity cases." 452 U.S., at 8 . See also Terasaki, Resolution by HLA Testing of 1000 Paternity Cases Not Excluded by ABO Testing, 16 J. Family L. 543 (1978). </s> [Footnote 3 Most statutes of limitation in Texas are governed by Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 5535 (Vernon 1982), which provides: </s> "If a person entitled to bring any action mentioned in this subdivision of this title be at the time the cause of action accrues either a minor, a married person under twenty-one years of age, a person imprisoned or a person of unsound mind, the time of such disability shall not be deemed a portion of the time limited for the commencement of the action and such [456 U.S. 91, 105] person shall have the same time after the removal of his disability that is allowed to others by the provisions of this title." </s> See Simpson v. City of Abilene, 388 S. W. 2d 760 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (holding the 2-year statute of limitation for bringing a negligence action tolled during the plaintiff's minority). </s> In Texas Dept. of Human Resources v. Hernandez, 595 S. W. 2d 189, 192 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980), the Texas Court of Civil Appeals expressly held that Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 13.01 (Supp. 1982) is not tolled on account of the plaintiff's minority on the ground that tolling the statute of limitation "would but constitute a disingenuous way of holding Section 13.01 unconstitutional." Moreover, according to the court, by incorporating the time limitation into the statute creating the substantive right, the "limitation qualifies the right so that it becomes a part of the substantive law rather than the procedural law." 595 S. W. 2d, at 193. Thus, as a matter of state law, the tolling provision in Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 5535 (Vernon 1982) does not apply to 13.01. </s> [Footnote 4 The unwillingness of the mother to file a paternity action on behalf of her child, which could stem from her relationship with the natural father or, as the Court points out, from the emotional strain of having an illegitimate child, or even from the desire to avoid community and family disapproval, may continue years after the child is born. The problem may be exacerbated if, as often happens, the mother herself is a minor. The possibility of this unwillingness to file suit underscores that the mother's and child's interests are not congruent, and illustrates the unreasonableness of the Texas statute of limitation. </s> JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment. </s> I join Part I of JUSTICE O'CONNOR's concurring opinion, but do not join the Court's opinion. I am concerned, for the reasons persuasively stated by JUSTICE O'CONNOR, that the Court's opinion may be read as prejudging the constitutionality of longer periods of limitation. As she observes, it is significant "that a paternity suit is one of the few Texas causes of action not tolled during the minority of the plaintiff." Ante, at 104. </s> [456 U.S. 91, 107]

United States Supreme Court ATCHISON R. CO. v. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N(1953) No. 22 Argued: October 14, 1953Decided: November 9, 1953 </s> The Public Utilities Commission of California entered orders, pursuant to a state statute, authorizing certain grade separation improvements, and requiring in each case that 50% of the costs be borne by the railroad. The improvements were designed to meet local transportation needs and to promote public safety and convenience, and were made necessary by the growth of the communities affected. There was no showing on the record in either case of arbitrariness or unreasonableness in the Commission's orders, and none was claimed except that the Commission refused to allocate costs on the basis of benefits to the railroads. Held: The orders of the Commission are not arbitrary or unreasonable and do not deprive the railroads of their property without due process of law, nor do they interfere unreasonably with interstate commerce. Pp. 347-355. </s> (a) In sustaining the Commission's orders by denying writs of review, the State Supreme Court upheld the statute as applied by the Commission, and the cases are properly here on appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1257 (2). Pp. 348-349. </s> (b) The railroads were not entitled to have the costs of the improvements allocated only on the basis of benefits which will accrue to their property. Pp. 352-354. </s> (c) Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405 , distinguished. Pp. 353-354. </s> (d) The allocation of costs against the railroads in excess of benefits received did not constitute an undue burden on interstate commerce. P. 355. </s> Affirmed. </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 43, Southern Pacific Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of California et al., argued October 14-15, 1953, also on appeal from the same court. [346 U.S. 346, 347] </s> In each of these cases the Public Utilities Commission of California entered orders authorizing certain grade separation improvements and allocating a share of the cost to the railroad. 51 Cal. P. U. C. 771, 788. The State Supreme Court denied review. On appeal to this Court, affirmed, p. 355. </s> Douglas F. Smith argued the cause for appellant in No. 22 and Burton Mason argued the cause for appellant in No. 43. With them on a joint brief were Jonathan C. Gibson, R. S. Outlaw, Robert W. Walker, Kenneth F. Burgess and Arthur R. Seder, Jr. for appellant in No. 22, and George L. Buland, E. J. Foulds and Randolph Karr for appellant in No. 43. </s> Roger Arnebergh argued the cause for appellees in No. 22. With him on the briefs were Bourke Jones for the City of Los Angeles, appellee in that case, and Henry McClernan and John H. Lauten for the City of Glendale in No. 43. Ray L. Chesebro was also with them on statements opposing jurisdiction and motions to dismiss or affirm. </s> Hal F. Wiggins argued the cause for appellees in No. 43. With him on the briefs was Everett C. McKeage for the Public Utilities Commission. </s> MR. JUSTICE MINTON delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> These cases present the same questions of law and will be disposed of together. The Public Utilities Commission of California entered orders 1 authorizing the construction of certain grade separation improvements and allocating the costs therefor, pursuant to 1202 of the [346 U.S. 346, 348] Public Utilities Code of California. 2 On petitions to the Supreme Court of California, that court denied review of the Commission's orders, 3 and these appeals followed. We postponed jurisdiction until a hearing on the merits. </s> We think the Commission's orders must be treated as an act of the legislature for purposes of determining our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1257 (2). Live Oak Water Users' Assn. v. Railroad Commission, 269 U.S. 354, 356 ; Lake Erie & Western R. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 249 U.S. 422, 424 . The Commission has construed 1202 as authorizing these orders. The appellants presented squarely to the Supreme Court of California their contention that in the allocation of costs, these orders take their property without due process of law and are so arbitrary and burdensome as to constitute an interference with interstate commerce, in violation of [346 U.S. 346, 349] the Constitution of the United States. In sustaining the Commission's orders by denying writs of review, the Supreme Court of California upheld the statute as applied by the Commission, and the cases are properly here on appeal. Kansas City S. R. Co. v. Road Improvement District, 256 U.S. 658, 659 -660. </s> The principal question presented by these appeals is whether the allocation of the reasonable cost of grade separation improvements is arbitrary as to the railroads unless imposed on the basis of benefits received, or, since the costs are incurred in the exercise of the police power in the interest of public safety, convenience and necessity, may they be allocated on the basis of fairness and reasonableness. </s> No. 22. </s> In this case, the Commission authorized the enlarging of two existing railroad underpasses where the Santa Fe tracks cross Washington Boulevard in Los Angeles. These underpasses were constructed in 1914 under an agreement between the railroad and the City providing that each party was to pay one-half of the cost. The Commission found the structures to be 75% depreciated. When constructed, their chief utility was to facilitate access to a garbage reduction plant. Washington Boulevard is now one of the main east and west thoroughfares of Los Angeles, and other streets and highways feed into it. It is not a part of the State highway system nor is it a freeway. The grade separations concerned here are in one of the principal industrial districts of the City and are a traffic bottleneck. For most of its length, Washington Boulevard is 60 feet wide, but at the site in question, the roadway narrows to 20 feet, with a vertical clearance of less than 14 feet. The City's easement at this point is 90 feet. As improved, two 33-foot roadways and two 7-foot sidewalks will be provided, and the underpasses will be heightened. The improvement is being made to [346 U.S. 346, 350] promote the safety and convenience of the public and to meet vastly increased local transportation needs, made necessary by the rapid growth of the City. In 1910 the City had a population of 102,000, in 1920 of 576,000, and in 1948 of 1,987,000. Los Angeles County's population in 1910 was 504,000 and in 1948 was over four million. Vehicular traffic in the area has increased tremendously since construction of the present underpasses in 1914. </s> Considering all of these facts and evidence by the railroad that there were no benefits to be derived by the railroad from this improvement, the Commission decided that there "is a need for widening and increasing the height of the existing underpasses," 4 and that the preferred plan submitted by the City of Los Angeles "sets out the construction which would be most practicable and best meet the public safety, convenience and necessity in this matter." 5 The Commission found that $569,355 of the cost was attributable to the presence of the railroad tracks and that the railroad should pay 50% of this amount and the City 50%. </s> No. 43. </s> This case does not differ materially from Case No. 22 except that here a grade crossing will be replaced by an underpass. Los Feliz Boulevard runs in a northeast-southwest direction, crossing at grade five Southern Pacific tracks approximately at the boundary of the cities of Los Angeles and Glendale. The street becomes known as Los Feliz Road in Glendale. Los Feliz is not a part of the State highway system nor is it a freeway, but, like Washington Boulevard, is an access street for adjacent properties and for other streets feeding into it in this congested area and as a through street has reached capacity. When the crossing is blocked by trains, 38 or more [346 U.S. 346, 351] vehicles may back up in each of three lanes, causing a "backlash" on San Fernando Road, 820 feet distant. The crossing now has manually-operated crossing gates, and several relatively minor accidents have occurred there during the last 25 years. The plan approved by the Commission passes the street under the railroad tracks, with two 40-foot roadways, separated by a median strip and with 5-foot sidewalks on each side. The structure when completed will be 105 feet wide. The total cost necessitated by the presence of the tracks was estimated at $1,493,200. The Commission ordered that 50% be borne by the railroad, 25% by Los Angeles County, and 12 1/2% each by the cities of Los Angeles and Glendale. Construction of the grade separation was found by the Commission to be "in the interest of public safety, convenience and necessity . . . ." 6 </s> In each of these cases, the railroads introduced evidence intended to show that their share of the costs should be based on benefits received and that they would receive little or no benefit from the construction. For the most part, this evidence related to the nature of the traffic on the boulevards, the fact that the improvements are required primarily to facilitate traffic flow on the streets, the "revolution" in transportation that has occurred since the early part of this century and its effect on the reasons for constructing grade separations and on the financial position of railroads, the competition afforded railroads by motor vehicles utilizing the public streets and highways, and the effect of the proposed construction on operation of the railroads. The appellants contended that the costs should be distributed on the basis of benefits, and since the railroads would receive little or no benefits, they should be required to pay only a small part of the costs or nothing, as the case may be. The cities contended in both cases that the railroads should bear all the costs attributable [346 U.S. 346, 352] to the presence of the tracks. After lengthy hearings and after considering all the evidence and the arguments advanced, the Commission decided that it was not bound to follow any particular theory in apportioning the costs but may allocate the costs in the exercise of its sound discretion. </s> We do not understand the appellants to contest the right of the Commission to enter the orders or the reasonableness of the estimated costs. Their principal contention is that as to them the cost of the improvements may be distributed only on the basis of benefits which will accrue to their property. In this contention, we think the appellants are in error. These were not improvements whose purpose and end result is to enhance the value of the property involved by reason of the added facilities, such as street, sewer or drainage projects, where the costs assessed must bear some relationship to the benefits received. Chesebro v. Los Angeles County Dist., 306 U.S. 459 ; Valley Farms Co. v. Westchester, 261 U.S. 155 ; Kansas City S. R. Co. v. Road Improvement District, supra; Gast Realty & Investment Co. v. Schneider Granite Co., 240 U.S. 55 . </s> Rather, in the cases at bar, the improvements were instituted by the State or its subdivisions to meet local transportation needs and further safety and convenience, made necessary by the rapid growth of the communities. In such circumstances, this Court has consistently held that in the exercise of the police power, the cost of such improvements may be allocated all to the railroads. Erie R. Co. v. Board, 254 U.S. 394, 409 -411; Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Omaha, 235 U.S. 121, 127 ; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minneapolis, 232 U.S. 430, 441 ; Cincinnati, I. & W. R. Co. v. Connersville, 218 U.S. 336, 344 . There is the proper limitation that such allocation of costs must be fair and reasonable. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 415 , and the cases there cited. This was the standard applied by the Commission. It [346 U.S. 346, 353] was not an arbitrary exercise of power by the Commission to refuse to allocate costs on the basis of benefits alone. The railroad tracks are in the streets not as a matter of right but by permission from the State or its subdivisions. The presence of these tracks in the streets creates the burden of constructing grade separations in the interest of public safety and convenience. Having brought about the problem, the railroads are in no position to complain because their share in the cost of alleviating it is not based solely on the special benefits accruing to them from the improvements. </s> The appellants rely heavily on the Nashville case, supra, but that decision is in accord with the long-established rule which we here follow and which the Commission applied. As this Court said in the Nashville case: "The claim of unconstitutionality rests wholly upon the special facts here shown." P. 413. In that case, the railroad's share of the cost was fixed at 50% by a Tennessee statute and no consideration was given by the Supreme Court of Tennessee as to whether the application of the statutory amount was unreasonable under the special facts advanced. The grade separation ordered in the Nashville case was located in the rural community of Lexington, Tennessee, which had a population in 1910 of 1,497, in 1920 of 1,792, and in 1930 of 1,823. The improvement was not required to meet the transportation needs of Lexington and was being constructed without regard to that community's growth or to considerations of public safety and convenience resulting from such growth. The highway there under improvement was part of the State highway system and the grade was to be removed primarily as part of economic and engineering planning and to qualify the improvement of the highway for federal aid. Other facts offered pointed principally to the state and nation-wide nature of the highway system and the particular highway there involved, the competition afforded railroads by the users of such highways and [346 U.S. 346, 354] the effect of such competition on the revenues of the railroads, and the increasing importance of grade separations as a means of assuring rapid movement of motor vehicles rather than as an exclusively safety measure. </s> As stated by this Court, "[t]he main contention is that to impose upon the Railway, under these circumstances, one-half of the cost is action so arbitrary and unreasonable as to deprive it of property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." P. 413. Thus, the contention of the railroad and the rule recognized by this Court in the Nashville opinion was that there could be an allocation of costs subject to the limitation that they be allocated always with regard to the rule against unreasonableness and arbitrariness. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Tennessee was reversed and the case remanded thereto because that court had refused to consider whether the special facts shown "were of such persuasiveness as to have required the state court to hold that the statute and order complained of are arbitrary and unreasonable. That determination should, in the first instance, be made by the Supreme Court of the State." Pp. 432-433. </s> In our cases, not only are the facts distinguishable in many material particulars but unlike the Supreme Court of Tennessee which refused to consider the facts to determine whether the statute's allocation of 50% was arbitrary or unreasonable, the California Commission considered all the evidence offered, including that going to the benefits received, and properly applied the rule of allocation sanctioned by this Court, and the California Supreme Court found no occasion to review the Commission's orders. There is no showing on these records of arbitrariness or unreasonableness in the Commission's orders, and none is claimed except as the Commission refused to allocate costs on the basis of benefits received, which we hold it was not required to do. [346 U.S. 346, 355] </s> It is next contended that the allocation of grade separation costs against the railroads in excess of benefits received constitutes an undue burden on interstate commerce. We have decided that there is no showing that the orders here under attack were arbitrary or unreasonable. Certainly, if the Commission has the right to order these improvements and has not, in allocating the costs, acted so arbitrarily as to deprive the railroads of their property without due process of law, the fact that the improvements may interfere with interstate commerce is incidental. The construction and use of public streets is a matter peculiarly of local concern and great leeway is allowed local authorities where there is no conflicting federal regulation, even though interstate commerce be subject to material interference. Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111 ; South Carolina v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 187 . No conflict with federal regulation is involved here. See Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Board, 278 U.S. 24, 35 . </s> When the appellants went on the streets in question, they assumed the burden of sharing on a fair and reasonable basis the costs of any changes for the reason of public safety and convenience made necessary by the growth of the communities. </s> "To engage in interstate commerce the railroad must get on to the land and to get on to it must comply with the conditions imposed by the State for the safety of its citizens." Erie R. Co. v. Board, supra, p. 411. </s> The orders of the Commission are not arbitrary or unreasonable and do not deprive the appellants of their property without due process of law, nor do they interfere unreasonably with interstate commerce. </s> The judgments of the Supreme Court of California are </s> Affirmed. </s> THE CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The final orders may be found at 51 Cal. P. U. C. 771 and 51 Cal. P. U. C. 788. </s> [Footnote 2 " 1202. Exclusive powers of commission. The commission has the exclusive power: </s> "(a) To determine and prescribe the manner, including the particular point of crossing, and the terms of installation, operation, maintenance, use, and protection of each crossing of one railroad by another railroad or street railroad, and of a street railroad by a railroad, and of each crossing of a public or publicly used road or highway by a railroad or street railroad, and of a street by a railroad or vice versa, subject to the provisions of Sections 1121 to 1127, inclusive, of the Streets and Highways Code so far as applicable. </s> "(b) To alter, relocate, or abolish by physical closing any such crossing heretofore or hereafter established. </s> "(c) To require, where in its judgment it would be practicable, a separation of grades at any such crossing heretofore or hereafter established and to prescribe the terms upon which such separation shall be made and the proportions in which the expense of the construction, alteration, relocation, or abolition of such crossings or the separation of such grades shall be divided between the railroad or street railroad corporations affected or between such corporations and the State, county, city, or other political subdivision affected." Deering's Cal. Pub. U. C. A., 1951. </s> [Footnote 3 40 Adv. Cal., No. 2, Minutes, 1; 40 Adv. Cal., No. 15, Minutes, 1. </s> [Footnote 4 51 Cal. P. U. C. 771, 779. </s> [Footnote 5 Ibid. </s> [Footnote 6 51 Cal. P. U. C. 788, 795. </s> [346 U.S. 346, 356]

United States Supreme Court SUNRAY OIL CO. v. F. P. C.(1960) No. 335 Argued: Decided: June 27, 1960 </s> An independent producer of natural gas contracted to sell to an interstate pipeline company from specified reserves a specified amount of gas each year at specified prices for a term of 20 years, and it applied to the Federal Power Commission under the Natural Gas Act for a certificate of convenience and necessity authorizing it to make such sales for a term of 20 years only. Instead, the Commission tendered a certificate without any time limitation. The producer accepted it, reserving the right to object, on review, to the unlimited nature of the certificate. Held: The Commission did not exceed its authority in issuing a certificate unlimited as to time. Pp. 138-158. </s> (a) To hold that the Commission must place a time limitation upon such a certificate (1) would greatly impair its control under 7 (b) over the abandonment by natural gas companies of their facilities and services subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, and (2) would make unavailable the procedural safeguards under 4 (d) and 4 (e) which are applicable to rate changes. Pp. 141-147. </s> (b) A different conclusion is not required by the language of 7 (e) authorizing the Commission to issue a certificate "authorizing the whole or any part of the operation, sale, service, construction, extension, or acquisition covered by the application." Pp. 147-151. </s> (c) The authority of the Commission to issue a certificate unlimited as to time should not be denied on the theory that it could accomplish the same result indirectly, either (1) by denying all applications for limited certificates, or (2) by prescribing conditions under 7 (e) that the certificates be permanent. Pp. 151-152. </s> (d) The conclusion here reached is supported by the consistent administrative practice of the Commission in making a clear distinction between the underlying "service" to the public and the contractual means by which it is implemented. Pp. 152-154. [364 U.S. 137, 138] </s> (e) The conclusion here reached is not inconsistent with that reached in United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., 350 U.S. 332 . Pp. 154-156. </s> (f) An initial application of an independent producer to sell natural gas in interstate commerce leads to a certificate of public convenience and necessity under which the Commission controls the basis on which the gas may be initially dedicated to interstate use, Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Service Commission, 360 U.S. 378 ; and once so dedicated there can be no withdrawal of that supply from continued interstate movement without Commission approval. P. 156. </s> (g) Other objections to the Commission's order either are not properly before this Court or are without merit. Pp. 156-158. </s> 267 F.2d 471, affirmed. </s> Melvin Richter argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were M. Darwin Kirk, Homer E. McEwen, Jr. and Dale E. Doty. </s> Howard E. Wahrenbrock argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Doub, Alan S. Rosenthal, Willard W. Gatchell, Robert L. Russell and Peter H. Schiff. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case presents an important question under the Natural Gas Act. 1 This question, central to the case, is: When a company, proposing to make, under contract, jurisdictional sales 2 of natural gas in interstate commerce, [364 U.S. 137, 139] applies for a certificate of public convenience and necessity as required by the Act, and requests that the certificate be limited in time to the duration of a contract for the sale of gas which it has entered, does the Federal Power Commission have the authority to tender it, instead, a certificate without time limitation? </s> Petitioner, Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Company, an independent producer of natural gas, entered into a contract with United Gas Pipeline Company, an interstate transmission company. The contract covered considerable acreage owned by, or under mineral lease to, petitioner in Vermilion and Lafayette Parishes, Louisiana, in and about what is called the Ridge field. Under it, United agreed to take an annual amount of gas from petitioner equivalent to 4.5625 per cent of petitioner's gas reserves in the area covered by the agreement; 3 and United had the right, in addition, to call for any amount up to 150 per cent of the amount it had annually agreed to take. The term of the agreement was 20 years. The initial price provided was 20.5 cents per thousand cubic feet (Mcf.); and the price was to increase one cent per Mcf. every five years. 4 </s> Section 7 (c) of the Natural Gas Act provides that "no natural-gas company . . . shall engage in the transportation or sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission . . . unless there is in force with respect to such natural-gas company a certificate of public convenience [364 U.S. 137, 140] and necessity issued by the Commission authorizing such acts or operations." This Court held in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 , that by virtue of 1 (b) of the Act, sales of gas by an independent producer to a pipeline "in interstate commerce . . . for resale for ultimate public consumption" came within the scope of the Act. 5 Petitioner had no certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing sales in interstate commerce from the field in question. Accordingly, in order to carry out its contract with United, it was necessary for petitioner to apply for a certificate from the Commission, which it did. </s> Petitioner's application for the certificate contained the request that the certificate sought "provide for its own expiration on the expiration of the . . . contract term so as to authorize Applicant to cease the delivery and sale of gas thereunder at that time." The Commission, upholding its examiner's recommendations, rejected the contentions of petitioner that there should be issued to cover the contract only a certificate limited to the term of the contract itself, and tendered it a certificate without time limitation. 6 19 F. P. C. 618. Petitioner applied for a rehearing of the Commission's order. Basic to this application was the contention that "The Commission is without authority to issue a certificate to an applicant authorizing more than the whole or some part of the sale covered by the application for certificate of public convenience and necessity . . . ." The Commission denied the rehearing application. 19 F. P. C. 1107. [364 U.S. 137, 141] </s> Petitioner did not avail itself of its undoubted right to stand firm on its own application, and reject the proffered certificate. Cf. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Service Comm'n 360 U.S. 378, 387 -388. 7 Instead it accepted the Commission's certificate and commenced deliveries of gas under it, reserving its right to object, on review, to the certificate's unlimited nature. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected petitioner's objections, and affirmed the order of the Commission, 267 F.2d 471. In view of the importance of the central question presented, to which we have already alluded, we granted certiorari. 361 U.S. 880 . We are in agreement with the Court of Appeals, and affirm its judgment. </s> The practical reasons behind petitioner's superficially self-abnegating desire to have a limited rather than an unlimited authorization from the Commission are obvious from a study of the Natural Gas Act's provisions. Obvious also is the damaging effect that acceptance of petitioner's central contention would have upon the policies of the Act. </s> I. </s> Section 7 (b) of the Natural Gas Act regulates the abandonment by natural-gas companies of their facilities and services subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission. 8 The section follows a common pattern in federal [364 U.S. 137, 142] utility regulation 9 in forbidding such abandonment "without the permission and approval of the Commission first had and obtained." The Commission is to extend permission for an abandonment of service only on a finding "that the available supply of natural gas is depleted to the extent that the continuance of service is unwarranted, or that the present or future public convenience or necessity permit such abandonment." The proposal of petitioner was for a certificate that would by its own terms expire when the contract with United expired. Thus at the end of the period, petitioner would become free to cease supplying gas to the interstate market from the Ridge area without further leave of the Commission, and without there having been made the findings that Congress deemed necessary. </s> If petitioner's contentions, as to the want of authority in the Commission to grant a permanent certificate where one of limited duration has been sought for, were to be sustained, the way would be clear for every independent producer of natural gas to seek certification only for the limited period of its initial contract with the transmission company, and thus automatically be free at a future date, untrammeled by Commission regulation, to reassess whether it desired to continue serving the interstate market. And contracts - as did the 1947 contract in the companion case to the one at bar, Sun Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, post, p. 170 - might provide for termination in the event of a rate reduction by the Commission. Petitioner's theory, by tying the term of the certificate to the contract, would mean that such a reduction of rates would under those circumstances enable the producer to cease supplying gas, without obligation to justify its cessation [364 U.S. 137, 143] of this service as being consistent with the public convenience and necessity. </s> The consequences of petitioner's argument do not stop there. The identical provisions of the Natural Gas Act regulate pipeline companies as well as independent producers. If producers can insist in their certificates on the inclusion of a provision relieving them in advance from their obligation to continue the supply of gas, as of a date certain, pipeline companies - whose dealings with local distributing companies generally also take the form of a "sale" of gas to them - could insist on a similar provision. If an individual producer were thus left free to discontinue his supply, the transmission company would be forced to find a supplier of gas elsewhere, and make connection with him, to continue its service; and the consumer ultimately would pay the bill for the rearrangement. If the pipeline company were left free to cease its service to the local distribution company, a local economy which had grown dependent on natural gas as a fuel would be at its mercy. And this, though the primary practical problem that led to the passage of the Act was the great economic power of the pipeline companies as compared with that of communities seeking natural gas service. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 610 . </s> And there are practical consequences, related to rate control, which are even more concrete. The companion case, Sun Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, post, p. 170, illustrates them. If petitioner's certificate of public convenience must expire with its first contract with United, service after then - under a new contract or otherwise - will require a new certificate. And under that certificate, petitioner may file, pursuant to 4 (c) of the Act. 10 its [364 U.S. 137, 144] rates for the "new" service. The only power the Commission would have, under the Act, with respect to those rates, would be to bear the burden of proof in an investigation under 5 of the Act, 11 that the rates are unjust or unreasonable, and thereupon order a new rate, solely for prospective application. Last Term in the so-called Catco case, Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, supra, at 389, we had occasion to remark that "the delay incident to determination in 5 proceedings through which initial certificated rates are reviewable appears nigh interminable." At oral argument, counsel for the Commission confirmed that no contested major producer's 5 case had been finally adjudicated by the Commission in the six years since this Court's decision in the Phillips case. In contrast to 5 are the protections that would be available if at the conclusion of the original contract the producer's certificate remained in full force and effect. Then the rates to be charged under a new contract or otherwise would have to be filed as rate changes under 4 (d) of the Act, with 30 days' [364 U.S. 137, 145] notice to the Commission and the public. 12 Under 4 (e), the Commission, on complaint of any State, state commission, or municipality, or sua sponte, may order a hearing on the new rate, and suspend the effectiveness of the rate for five months. 13 At the hearing, the gas company [364 U.S. 137, 146] would have to shoulder the burden of proving that its new rates were just and reasonable. If the hearing were not concluded by the end of the suspension period, the increased rate could be collected ad interim; but the Commission is empowered to require the company to collect the increment under bond and accounting, and refund it if it could not make out its case for the increase. </s> Clearly, the rate change provisions of 4 (d) and 4 (e), rather than the "initial rate" provisions of 4 (c), are better tailored to the situation that exists when an initial contract of sale of natural gas terminates, and the supply of gas continues, whether under a new contract or without one. When a producer commences interstate sales from a particular field, or when an interstate transmission company commences sales to a local distributing company, there are by definition no existing rates, and accordingly the protective provisions of 4 (d) and (e), which are bottomed on delaying the effectiveness of, and suspending, changes, are not relevant. But of course this is not the case where one sales contract expires and service continues; in this situation, where a rate change is proposed, the protective provisions fit as well as they do in the case of a rate change made pursuant to a contract, during its term. </s> Thus it is apparent that petitioner's position would enable it to make what in practical effect would be rate [364 U.S. 137, 147] changes, but without compliance with the procedures of 4 (d) and 4 (e), and subject to revision only in procedures which are likely to "provide a windfall for the natural gas company with a consequent squall for the consumers," as we said in Catco. 360 U.S., at 390 . When attached to the leverage of a power to abandon service, at a contract's termination, without contemporaneous Commission approval, this power to exercise contractual control not only over rates but over the mode of their regulation, would be a substantial one indeed. And, like the power to force an advance license for the abandonment of the continued supply of gas, the power would be one enjoyed by pipeline companies and producers alike. Further, declaration today of a want of authority in the Commission to issue a certificate of longer duration than that of a sales contract attached to the application would have a retroactive effect; it would at least furnish a guide to the construction of certificates issued previously on such applications. See Sun Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, post, p. 170. </s> This court declared as early as the Hope Natural Gas case that the primary aim of the Natural Gas Act was "to protect consumers against exploitation at the hands of natural gas companies." 320 U.S. 591, 610 . We reiterated that declaration last Term in Catco, and observed that "The Act was so framed as to afford consumers a complete, permanent and effective bond of protection from excessive rates and charges." 360 U.S., at 388 . Against the backdrop of the practical consequences of the petitioner's claim and the purposes of the Act, we look to the details of its argument that the Commission is limited, in granting its certificate of public convenience and necessity, to a term certificate of the duration petitioner has proposed. </s> First. Petitioner's argument is based primarily on its construction of 7 (e) of the Act. That section provides [364 U.S. 137, 148] that a certificate of public convenience and necessity shall be issued "to any qualified applicant therefor, authorizing the whole or any part of the operation, sale, service, construction, extension, or acquisition covered by the application." 14 This, petitioner urges, makes it clear that the outside limit of what the Commission may authorize is what the applicant proposes. Further, petitioner urges that the language requiring a finding "that the applicant is able and willing properly to do the acts and to perform the service proposed" negates the Commission's authority to go beyond the time limitations the applicant inserts in its proposal; for it is claimed that it cannot be found that petitioner is willing to do more than what it has proposed. Under petitioner's theory, the abandonment provisions of 7 (b) would have application only if it was desired to abandon service while the contract was still in effect. </s> The argument seems to us unpersuasive even on the face of the statutory language. It depends in the first instance upon freighting the phrase "the whole or any part," obviously intended to give the Commission power to grant less than the whole of an application, with a [364 U.S. 137, 149] load of negative meaning which nothing in the legislative history indicates that it was to bear. Even without the illumination of the purpose of the Act, it could be argued with equal force that all that was meant was that the certificate to be granted be one sufficient to authorize the specific "sale" proposed; which an unlimited certificate clearly is, in any case. But apart from this, petitioner's contention depends on the assumption that the provisions relied upon speak only in terms of the specific "sale" contemplated by the parties and not in terms of a "service" in the movement of gas in interstate commerce, of which "service" the initial "sale" is the commencement. For under 7 (e) the Commission is authorized to issue a certificate authorizing the "service" covered by the application, as well as a "sale"; and since 7 (c), 15 which details [364 U.S. 137, 150] the acts for which a certificate is a prerequisite, sets forth no specific antecedent for the "service" to which 7 (e) refers, it might well be thought that one who "engage[s] in the transportation or sale of natural gas," which 7 (c) does refer to, is performing a "service" within the meaning of 7 (e). Certainly there is no more likely antecedent in 7 (c). The structure of 4 (c) presents the same feature, 16 and that of the abandonment provisions of 7 (b) themselves 17 looks the same way. </s> Furthermore, within 7 (e) itself, there is found the further requirement to which petitioner itself points - that with respect to an application for a certificate of any nature, a two-part finding must be made: that the applicant is willing and able "to do the acts and to perform the service proposed." Thus, it is evident that all the matters for which a certificate is required - the construction of facilities or their extension, as well as the making of jurisdictional sales - must be justified in terms of a "service" to which they relate. Accordingly, 7 (e) [364 U.S. 137, 151] itself gives positive indication that the "service" which the Commission's certificate may authorize is something quite apart from simply the specific sales which 7 (c) forbids without a certificate sufficient to authorize them. To be sure, 7 (e) requires that the applicant be found willing to perform the "service" in question; but surely such willingness can be inferred from its willingness to enter into a long-term sales contract. To say that the finding cannot be made in view of the applicant's declared desire to stop and have a look in 20 years as to its continued desire to be subject to regulation, and that this is a limit on its willingness to perform the service that the certificates must respect, is to make effective regulation turn on the desire of the regulated enterprise to be subject to it. 18 The willingness to make the proposed "sale" thus must imply willingness to perform the "service" which it represents. Thus even as a verbal argument, petitioner's contentions lack persuasiveness. </s> Second. Once we pass beyond parsing the Act to a consideration of its purpose, and of the practice under it, the construction we have given it becomes inescapable. We have outlined the serious consequences for the regulatory scheme that acceptance of the petitioner's argument would entail. These consequences cannot readily be averted by other means suggested by the Act. </s> It is urged that if it is in the public interest to award only an unlimited certificate, the Commission might attain this end by refusing all applications for a limited one, intimating that an unlimited application would be favorably regarded. But the action of the Commission in refusing the certificate as originally applied for would [364 U.S. 137, 152] be subject to judicial review; and once it were held that the Commission had no authority to award a certificate of longer duration than that prayed for, such an indirect method of attaining the same end might well meet judicial condemnation as arbitrary. There is also some suggestion that the Commission might use its power, under 7 (e), of attaching to the certificate "such reasonable terms and conditions as the public convenience and necessity may require," to attach the "condition" that the certificate be permanent. But again, once want of power to do this directly were established, the existence of power to achieve the same end indirectly through the conditioning power might well be doubted; and the acceptance of a certificate for a longer duration than requested might not be said properly to be a "term or condition" of a limited one at all. 19 We think the Commission's power to protect the public interest under 7 (e) need not be restricted to these indirect and dubious methods. </s> The Commission's practice supports its authority here in the terms of 7 (e). It has long drawn a distinction between the underlying service to the public a natural gas company performs and the specific manifestation - the contractual relationship - which that service takes at a given moment. For example, an independent producer may file as its rate schedule its contract of sale with a [364 U.S. 137, 153] pipeline company. That contract may provide in explicit terms for an adjustment of rates at a future time - even one foreordained in a precise amount. Yet when the adjustment is made pursuant to the contract, the adjustment is subject, as a "change" in rates, to the procedures of 4 (d) and 4 (e) - however explicit the upward adjustment was in the contract from the start. Cf. Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 363 U.S. 263 . This position of the Power Commission is evidence that the service in which the producer engages is distinct from the contract which regulates his relationship with the transmission company in performing the service. And it has been upheld in every Court of Appeals case on the question. Episcopal Theological Seminary v. Federal Power Comm'n, 269 F.2d 228; Bel Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 255 F.2d 548, and companion cases; Continental Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 236 F.2d 839; Cities Service Gas Producing Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 233 F.2d 726; Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 121 F.2d 159. See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 358 U.S. 103, 110 . If the Act does not contemplate that in a seller's contract there may inhere the power, of the contract's own accord, to effect a rate change at a future date unchecked by the regulatory scheme, it is hard to believe that it contemplated that contracts would of necessity have the effect of providing for a discontinuance of service, without further leave of the Commission. </s> Further, the Power Commission has from an early date taken the view that there is a continuing obligation to perform "service" imposed by the Act which outlasts the term of a seller's original contract of sale. As early as 1942 it held that an abandonment of service after the expiry of such a contract had to have Commission approval under 7 (b). United Gas Pipe Line Co., [364 U.S. 137, 154] 3 F. P. C. 3, 9. This ruling was made by Commissioners who had been in office during the passage of the Act. 20 It was not a fundamental ruling on a broad question of jurisdiction as to which a court might enjoy a wider latitude of review. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 678 . It was rather an early implementation and application of a detail of the statutory scheme by the Commission in a regulatory setting before it. The ruling has been followed, see Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 11 F. P. C. 167, 172, and we think this contemporaneous and consistent construction, pointing again to a distinction between the underlying "service" to the public and the contractual means by which it is implemented, is to be afforded weight in the construction we make. </s> Third. But against these considerations, it is urged that United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., 350 U.S. 332 , establishes dominant factors which impel one to the construction petitioner would put on the Act. Petitioner claims that Mobile establishes a principle that the Act (unlike many other regulatory schemes) 21 in general preserves the integrity of private contracts, and that the judgment below is in conflict with that principle. </s> The petitioner states accurately enough the principle that Mobile establishes. See 350 U.S., at 338 , 344. But the conclusion petitioner asserts does not follow. In Mobile, this Court held that where a seller of gas had entered into a contract for the sale, it could not, by virtue of the provision in 4 for rate changes, file an increase in rates that violated the terms of the contract. This was because the scheme of the Act was one which built the regulatory system on a foundation of private contracts. [364 U.S. 137, 155] It was held in the Memphis case, United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., supra, that the corollary of Mobile was that where the contract left the seller free to act, he could act unilaterally under 4. </s> It is apparent that the Commission's order in no way violates the integrity of petitioner's contract with United. During its term, both parties are bound by it to the same extent as any members of this regulated industry. When it expires, petitioner, to be sure, will be under an obligation to continue to deliver gas to United on the latter's request unless it can justify an abandonment before the Commission; but we do not see how this in any way disturbs the integrity of the contract during its term. The obligation that petitioner will be under after the contract term will not be one imposed by contract but by the Act. It will be free then, as it was not free during the contract term under the contract here in question, to make rate changes under 4 without United's consent. It is said that petitioner will be in a position of inequality, because it must supply gas then to United without a corresponding obligation on United to take it. But United, subject to the Act in its sales to local distributors, has its obligations too; and if in fulfilling them it desires to have a continuing supply of gas with the stability of price protection which a contract furnishes under Mobile, it may be discovered that each side has its bargaining strength. In any event, we do not see how the prospect of this situation after the term of petitioner's contract in any way impairs the integrity of any contract. Mobile is thus simply beside the point. </s> The short of the matter is that Mobile recognized that there were two sources of price and supply stability inherent in the regulatory system established by the Natural Gas Act - the provisions of private contracts and the public regulatory power. See 350 U.S., at 344 . Petitioner now urges an application of that decision that could [364 U.S. 137, 156] make private contracts the only stabilizing factor under the Act. Not only does this reading have nothing to do with the integrity of private contracts which Mobile underwrote, but it makes a severe incursion into the sources of that stability of natural-gas prices and supply to which that decision gave confirmation. Our consideration of this, as well as the rest of petitioner's arguments, leads us to reiterate as our holding the clear implication of what we recently said in Catco: An initial application of an independent producer, to make movements of natural gas in interstate commerce, leads to a certificate of public convenience and necessity under which the Commission controls the basis on which "gas may be initially dedicated to interstate use. Moreover, once so dedicated there can be no withdrawal of that supply from continued interstate movement without Commission approval. The gas operator, although to this extent a captive subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, is not without remedy to protect himself." 360 U.S., at 389 . That remedy he has, as the Court there said, in the "change" power under 4 (d) when his contract has expired or where his contract permits its use during its term. Under a similar Act, this Court has held to the same effect as we hold today. Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 343 U.S. 414, 423 -424. </s> II. </s> Once the power of the Commission to issue the certificate without time limitation is established, the other objections of the petitioner fall readily. It is contended that the Commission's order, by requiring the petitioner to supply gas beyond the term of its contract, may, by requiring petitioner to produce more gas than it has contemplated, offend the provision of 1 (b) of the Act that the Act does not apply "to the production or gathering [364 U.S. 137, 157] of natural gas." The point was not raised before the Commission, and accordingly is not for our consideration here; 22 and we might say in any event that the point is not for evaluation in this certification proceeding, but rather on the specific facts presented in the context of an abandonment application by petitioner under 7 (b), after the expiration of its contract, when and if it desires to make one. We intimate no view as to its merit. 23 </s> Other objections seem primarily directed to the point that the Commission imposed the burden of proof on the petitioner to show that the certificate should be limited, in the public interest, rather than itself taking on the burden of supporting its issuance of an unlimited certificate. There is no contention that the Commission was again indulging in the erroneous notion that it had no power to issue a limited certificate. Cf. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 239 F.2d 97, reversed on other grounds, 353 U.S. 944 . This procedural formulation seems to us well within the Commission's discretion as an implementation of the Act's protective provisions which we have discussed. And, though much urged by petitioner, the fact that the Commission has certificated pipeline operations despite their showing of gas resources of a shorter duration than petitioner's contract term is not inconsistent with the Commission's [364 U.S. 137, 158] approach here. 24 From the fact that the Commission has issued certificates in the presence of what may prove to be physical limitations on the service to be rendered under them, 25 it does not follow that the Commission cannot take care lest these physical problems in the continuation of supply become further complicated by the legal certificate term limitations for which the petitioner contends. </s> Finally it is suggested that for various reasons which petitioner claims to be related to the public interest, it would be more advantageous if gas producers were given a free hand, after the completion of each contract, to determine for themselves whether they should continue to serve the interstate market. These considerations were not urged before the Commission, and hence we are not called upon to decide whether they would compel a different approach by the Commission to the question of time limitations in certificates, or even whether, in the light of the Act's provisions - particularly the policy expressed in 7 (b) - it would be proper for it so to rely on them. There is no contention made that petitioner demonstrated any specific circumstances in its own case indicating that, despite the Commission's general policy, the public convenience and necessity warranted a limited certificate for it. </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 52 Stat. 821, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 717-717w. </s> [Footnote 2 Section 1 (b) of the Act provides that "The provisions of this Act shall apply to the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use, and to natural-gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale, but shall not apply to any other transportation or [364 U.S. 137, 139] sale of natural gas or to the local distribution of natural gas or to the facilities used for such distribution or to the production or gathering of natural gas." 52 Stat. 821, 15 U.S.C. 717 (b). </s> [Footnote 3 The amount of the reserves was subject to redetermination during the term of the contract pursuant to its Article IV, but only prospective effect would be given the redeterminations. </s> [Footnote 4 Article IX of the contract also provided for adjustment of these prices, by way of upward or downward escalation, in accordance with a price index of the Department of Labor. </s> [Footnote 5 See note 2, supra. </s> [Footnote 6 The Commission reached this conclusion without dissent. There was one dissent, by Commissioner Connole, from the issuance of the certificate, but only insofar as the Commission failed to attach a rate condition for which the Commission staff had contended. This aspect of the case was not brought before the court below for review in these proceedings. </s> [Footnote 7 Of course the economics of the industry might preclude an unyielding assumption of such a position. See 360 U.S., at 394 . </s> [Footnote 8 The text of the section provides: "No natural-gas company shall abandon all or any portion of its facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or any service rendered by means of such facilities, without the permission and approval of the Commission first had and obtained, after due hearing, and a finding by the Commission that the available supply of natural gas is depleted to the extent that the continuance of service is unwarranted, or that the present or future public convenience or necessity permit such abandonment." 52 Stat. 824, 15 U.S.C. 717 (b). </s> [Footnote 9 See 1 (18) of the Interstate Commerce Act, as added by the Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 477, 49 U.S.C. 1 (18); 214 (a) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended by the Act of March 6, 1943, 57 Stat. 11, 47 U.S.C. 214 (a). </s> [Footnote 10 "Under such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe, every natural-gas company shall file with the Commission . . . schedules showing all rates and charges for any transportation or sale [364 U.S. 137, 144] subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, and the classifications, practices, and regulations affecting such rates and charges, together with all contracts which in any manner affect or relate to such rates, charges, classifications, and services." 52 Stat. 822, 15 U.S.C. 717c (c). </s> [Footnote 11 In pertinent part, 5 (a) of the Act provides: "Whenever the Commission, after a hearing had upon its own motion or upon complaint of any State, municipality, State commission, or gas distributing company, shall find that any rate, charge, or classification demanded, observed, charged, or collected by any natural-gas company in connection with any transportation or sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or that any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential, the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order . . . ." 52 Stat. 823, 15 U.S.C. 717d (a). </s> [Footnote 12 "Unless the Commission otherwise orders, no change shall be made by any natural-gas company in any such rate, charge, classification or service, or in any rule, regulation, or contract relating thereto, except after thirty days' notice to the Commission and to the public. Such notice shall be given by filing with the Commission and keeping open for public inspection new schedules stating plainly the change or changes to be made in the schedule or schedules then in force and the time when the change or changes will go into effect. . . ." 52 Stat. 823, 15 U.S.C. 717c (d). </s> [Footnote 13 "Whenever any such new schedule is filed the Commission shall have authority, either upon complaint of any State, municipality, or State commission, or upon its own initiative without complaint, at once, and if it so orders, without answer or formal pleading by the natural-gas company, but upon reasonable notice, to enter upon a hearing concerning the lawfulness of such rate, charge, classification, or service; and, pending such hearing and the decision thereon, the Commission, upon filing with such schedules and delivering to the natural-gas company affected thereby a statement in writing of its reasons for such suspension, may suspend the operation of such schedule and defer the use of such rate, charge, classification, or service, but not for a longer period than five months beyond the time when it would otherwise go into effect: Provided, That the Commission shall not have authority to suspend the rate, charge, classification, or service for the sale of natural gas for resale for industrial use only; and after full hearings, either completed before or after the rate, charge, classification, or service goes into effect, the Commission may make such orders with reference thereto as would be proper in a proceeding initiated after it had become effective. If the proceeding has not been concluded and an order made at the expiration of the suspension period, on motion of the natural-gas company making the filing, the proposed change of rate, charge, classification, or service shall go into effect. Where increased rates or charges are thus made effective, the Commission may, by order, require the natural-gas company to furnish a bond, to be approved by the Commission, to refund any amounts ordered by the Commission, to keep [364 U.S. 137, 146] accurate accounts in detail of all amounts received by reason of such increase, specifying by whom and in whose behalf such amounts were paid, and, upon completion of the hearing and decision, to order such natural-gas company to refund, with interest, the portion of such increased rates or charges by its decision found not justified. At any hearing involving a rate or charge sought to be increased, the burden of proof to show that the increased rate or charge is just and reasonable shall be upon the natural-gas company, and the Commission shall give to the hearing and decision of such questions preference over other questions pending before it and decide the same as speedily as possible." 52 Stat. 823, 15 U.S.C. 717c (e). </s> [Footnote 14 "Except in the cases governed by the provisos contained in subsection (c) of this section, a certificate shall be issued to any qualified applicant therefor, authorizing the whole or any part of the operation, sale, service, construction, extension, or acquisition covered by the application, if it is found that the applicant is able and willing properly to do the acts and to perform the service proposed and to conform to the provisions of the Act and the requirements, rules, and regulations of the Commission thereunder, and that the proposed service, sale, operation, construction, extension, or acquisition, to the extent authorized by the certificate, is or will be required by the present or future public convenience and necessity; otherwise such application shall be denied. The Commission shall have the power to attach to the issuance of the certificate and to the exercise of the rights granted thereunder such reasonable terms and conditions as the public convenience and necessity may require." Added by the Act of February 7, 1942, 56 Stat. 84, 15 U.S.C. 717f (e). </s> [Footnote 15 "No natural-gas company or person which will be a natural-gas company upon completion of any proposed construction or extension shall engage in the transportation or sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or undertake the construction or extension of any facilities therefor, or acquire or operate any such facilities or extensions thereof, unless there is in force with respect to such natural-gas company a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Commission authorizing such acts or operations: Provided, however, That if any such natural-gas company or predecessor in interest was bona fide engaged in transportation or sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, on the effective date of this amendatory Act, over the route or routes or within the area for which application is made and has so operated since that time, the Commission shall issue such certificate without requiring further proof that public convenience and necessity will be served by such operation, and without further proceedings, if application for such certificate is made to the Commission within ninety days after February 7, 1942. Pending the determination of any such application, the continuance of such operation shall be lawful. </s> "In all other cases the Commission shall set the matter for hearing and shall give such reasonable notice of the hearing thereon to all interested persons as in its judgment may be necessary under rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Commission; and the application shall be decided in accordance with the procedure provided [364 U.S. 137, 150] in subsection (e) of this section and such certificate shall be issued or denied accordingly: Provided, however, That the Commission may issue a temporary certificate in cases of emergency, to assure maintenance of adequate service or to serve particular customers, without notice or hearing, pending the determination of an application for a certificate, and may by regulation exempt from the requirements of this section temporary acts or operations for which the issuance of a certificate will not be required in the public interest." Added by the Act of February 7, 1942, 56 Stat. 83, 15 U.S.C. 717f (c). </s> [Footnote 16 Not only does 4 (c), note 10, supra, contain a reference to "services" in a context where the antecedent must be "transportation or sale," but it recognizes that a "contract" may "affect or relate to" such services. </s> [Footnote 17 It will be noted that 7 (b) does not refer to the abandonment of the continuation of sales, but rather to the abandonment of "services." See note 8, supra. Accordingly, if petitioner was correct in saying that its contract did not involve a "service," it would be difficult to see the applicability of the abandonment provision even during the term of the contract, when petitioner concedes it is applicable. </s> [Footnote 18 In fact, as to this contention, the examiner summarized the effect of petitioner's position by saying that it amounted to a declaration that petitioner "would prefer not to be subject to regulation." 19 F. P. C. 618, 635. </s> [Footnote 19 One Court of Appeals has described the granting of a permanent certificate upon an application for a limited one as a conditional certificate, but its discussion would appear to negate the inference that it meant a condition in the ordinary sense of one attached by authority of the last sentence of 7 (e). See Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 239 F.2d 97, 99, n. 3, reversed on other grounds, 353 U.S. 944 . The Commission's order here rested alternatively on the conditioning power, and on the ground we have supported above. 19 F. P. C., at 620. Once the power to grant a permanent certificate under the general provisions of 7 (e) is established, resort to the conditioning power is superfluous. </s> [Footnote 20 Commissioners Manly, Draper, Scott, and Seavey, who signed the decision, were all on the Commission at the time of the passage of the 1938 Act. </s> [Footnote 21 See, e. g., Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 80 -82. </s> [Footnote 22 "No objection to the order of the Commission shall be considered by the court unless such objection shall have been urged before the Commission in the application for rehearing unless there is reasonable ground for failure so to do." Section 19 (b), 52 Stat. 831, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 717r (b). Petitioner did not comply with this provision. </s> [Footnote 23 Petitioner makes an argument based on the limitations found in a proviso to 7 (a) of the Act, the Commission's authority to require the extension of transportation facilities and the sale of gas to local distributors. 52 Stat. 824, 15 U.S.C. 717f (a). But the Commission's order in no way relied on 7 (a), and accordingly this argument of petitioner must be rejected. </s> [Footnote 24 Primary reliance is put on Transwestern Pipeline Co., 22 F. P. C. 391, 395-396, and Trunkline Gas Co., 21 F. P. C. 704, 709, where the Commission certificated pipeline companies despite the fact that their presently established gas reserves were shown to have a deliverability life of about 13 years. </s> [Footnote 25 It might be observed that in these cases the Commission issued certificates without time limitations. Thus if the companies, failing to find new sources of gas supply, desired to abandon service because of a depletion of supply, they would have to make proof thereof before the Commission, under 7 (b). The Commission thus, even though there may be physical problems beyond its control, kept legal control over the continuation of service by the applicants. [364 U.S. 137, 159] </s> MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, concurring in the dissent. * </s> In joining MR. JUSTICE HARLAN'S opinion I should like to add a word by way of emphasis. </s> Once analysis of the problem of these two cases, relating as they do exclusively to independent producers of natural gas, is stripped of darkening details and reduced to its statutory determinants, as spelled out in my Brother HARLAN'S dissent, the answer becomes clear and uncomplicated. If a licensing agency has power to grant a particular kind of license, an applicant has the right to apply for such a license. It may be withheld without ado only if the agency has arbitrary - judicially unreviewable - power to withhold such a license. Concededly the Commission has power to grant a time-limited certificate, and its denial of such a certificate is not free from judicial review. Therefore it must give a reason for denying a proper application, with due regard, of course, to its wide discretionary power for determining what satisfies "public convenience and necessity." The Commission cannot rest denial on its ipse dixit. Nor can the Commission rest on the general spirit or the ultimate purposes of the Natural Gas Act, for to do so amounts to saying that the Act forbids time certificates, when in fact it does not. </s> [Footnote * [These opinions apply also to No. 321, Sun Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, post, p. 170.] </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, whom MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER, and MR. JUSTICE STEWART join, dissenting. * </s> The basic issue presented by these two cases is essentially this: When an independent producer of natural gas enters into a contract for the sale of his gas in interstate commerce for resale, and seeks a certificate from the Federal Power Commission to carry out that contract, [364 U.S. 137, 160] may the Commission issue a certificate of unlimited duration not limited to the term of the contract, in the absence of a special showing that the public convenience and necessity require the certificate to be perpetual? In holding that it may, I believe the Court has strained the provisions of the Natural Gas Act beyond permissible limits in order to reach a result which it deems more appropriate to effective regulation. In my opinion, neither will the Act bear the meaning the Court attributes to it, nor will a contrary interpretation bring about the practical evils which the Court imagines. </s> I. </s> In my view the Court's conclusions are attributable at bottom to its failure to take into account the basic distinction between an interstate pipeline and an independent producer of natural gas. A pipeline performs a service akin to those traditionally performed by public utilities. The independent producer, on the other hand, is unique among the objects of public-utility regulation because it is not engaged in rendering a service to the public in the conventional sense of that concept, but rather simply in selling a commodity which it owns. The Court's basic error, it seems to me, is its notion that the petitioners are rendering a continuing service to the public in the same sense as a pipeline or other conventional utility, to which the usual modes of utility regulation are equally applicable. </s> I think that the Natural Gas Act, particularly as construed by the Court in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 , recognizes this important distinction. The basic jurisdictional framework of the Natural Gas Act is found in 1 (b) which provides: </s> "The provisions of this chapter shall apply to the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, [364 U.S. 137, 161] to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale . . ., and to natural-gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale, but shall not apply to . . . the production or gathering of natural gas." (Emphasis added.) </s> In Phillips the application of this provision to independent producers, such as the petitioners in these cases, was considered. Phillips there contended that it was not subject to the Act because it did not engage in the interstate transmission of gas and was not affiliated with any interstate pipeline company, and that to regulate its prices would be to control the "production or gathering" of natural gas, which is specifically exempted by 1 (b). The Court rejected that argument, holding that Phillips' sales, which were unquestionably made "in interstate commerce . . . for resale," were subject to the Commission's jurisdiction. It recognized that the Act creates two separate and distinct bases of jurisdiction - transportation and sale; that an independent producer engages solely in the latter; and that because of the production and gathering exemption, it is only the act of sale itself, which occurs at the very end of the production and gathering process, to which the Commission's jurisdiction attaches. It is thus evident that the Court recognized that, as to independent producers, the Act envisaged only a limited scheme of regulation, namely control over the prices and the other terms of sale of their natural gas. The blurring of this distinction respecting the scope of the regulatory scheme of the Act as between independent producers and others can only lead to confusion when, as here, the Court is faced with deciding the proper scope of the operative provisions of the statute. </s> The operative provisions of the Act consistently reflect their more limited reach as regards independent producers [364 U.S. 137, 162] than with respect to others. Section 7 (c) requires certification in order to </s> "engage in the transportation or sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or undertake the construction or extension of any facilities therefor, or acquire or operate any such facilities or extensions thereof . . . ." </s> Thus three distinct categories of jurisdictional acts are subject to certification: (1) transportation, (2) sale, and (3) maintenance of jurisdictional facilities. A pipeline must necessarily secure authorization for both transportation and maintenance of jurisdictional facilities, acts which by their nature are continuing services. But I do not understand the Court to contend that petitioners, as independent producers, have engaged in any jurisdictional act other than a sale. </s> The word "sale," in its ordinary sense, signifies a transaction limited in duration and amount. Section 7 (c) requires certification of a sale, and there is nothing in the Act which suggests that the certification is to be broader than the jurisdictional act which it authorizes. On the contrary, 7 (e), infra, p. 163, directs the Commission to issue a certificate authorizing "the . . . sale . . . covered by the application." The Court suggests that a perpetual certificate does in fact authorize the specific sale proposed, and that to say that the Commission can authorize no more than that is to "load" the statutory language with a negative implication which was never intended. However, authorizing a producer to sell in perpetuity is certainly something different from authorizing him to make a specific sale. It could hardly be contended that a statutory direction to the Commission to authorize "the . . . sale . . . covered by the application" permits it to authorize some different sale. [364 U.S. 137, 163] </s> The Court's assumption that a perpetual certificate authorizes nothing different than what the producer has in effect applied for can in the end be justified only by its view, alluded to before, that what is involved is not a "sale" at all, but a "service" consisting of the perpetual movement of gas in interstate commerce. However, as already mentioned, this flouts the industrial realities. The independent producer does not perform a service; he owns and sells a commodity. Since he need not dedicate his gas supply to the interstate market at all, surely he may propose the amount he will dedicate. The Commission of course need not accept the proposal. But neither can it in effect require acceptance of a certificate authorizing something more, on pain of denying the applicant any certificate, without satisfying the requirements of 7 (e), infra, for the imposition of conditions on certificates. </s> The Court, however, purports to find support in the statute for its notion that a sale is really a perpetual service. It relies primarily on 7 (e), which provides in relevant part that </s> "a certificate shall be issued to any qualified applicant therefor, authorizing the whole or any part of the operation, sale, service, construction, extension, or acquisition covered by the application, if it is found that the applicant is able and willing properly to do the acts and to perform the service proposed, . . . and that the proposed service, sale, operation, construction, extension, or acquisition . . . will be required by the . . . public convenience and necessity . . . ." (Emphasis added.) </s> It would appear plain from the face of the very language quoted that, while the word "service" is used, it is used disjunctively with "sale" and several other words, so that a sale and a service are simply two different, and not [364 U.S. 137, 164] synonymous, things the Commission is authorized to certificate. However, the Court reasons that "service" must refer back to "transportation or sale," for which 7 (c) requires a certificate. But 7 (c) requires a certificate for three separate categories of jurisdictional acts - transportation, sale, and maintenance of facilities. And 7 (e), concededly referring back to those categories, lists six items - operation, sale, service, construction, extension, and acquisition. Why the term "service" in 7 (e) should be thought to refer to "sale," the least apt of the three categories in 7 (c) which it could describe, when it is immediately preceded in 7 (e) by the word "sale" itself, is difficult to understand. </s> The Court further says that the provisions of 4 (c) 1 and 7 (b) 2 present the same feature. In 4 (c), the word "service" again appears as part of an omnibus definition which refers to a number of antecedents. Even assuming, as the Court does, that the only antecedent is "transportation or sale," there is no reason to suppose that [364 U.S. 137, 165] "service" was meant to be taken as the equivalent of "sale" as well as of "transportation," or that it limits either. Section 7 (b) refers only to the abandonment of services "rendered by means of" jurisdictional facilities. There is not the slightest hint in the section that sales are considered to be such services. </s> Finally, the Court points to the requirement of 7 (e), ante, p. 148, that the applicant for a certificate be willing and able "to do the acts and perform the service proposed." From this it infers that all the matters for which 7 (c), ante, p. 149, requires a certificate "must be justified in terms of a `service' to which they relate." I should have thought it quite plain that an applicant is required to "perform the service proposed" only if a service is proposed. Perhaps it would have been more apt for Congress to have said "do the acts and/or perform the services proposed," but I cannot understand how the clause as written can be read as meaning that whatever the applicant proposes must be both an act and a service. </s> I must conclude that there is nothing in the statute which makes "sale" the equivalent of "service." On the contrary, the terms are always used disjunctively. A sale, as a jurisdictional ground distinct from either transportation or the maintenance of jurisdictional facilities ( 1 (b) ante, p. 160) is a limited transaction. A certificate authorizing a sale authorizes no more and, in my view, must be regarded as expiring when the underlying sale terminates, except in a situation where the Commission has properly conditioned issuance on continuance of the certificate for a longer period. See post, p. 167. It is suggested that the Commission has consistently held that the obligation to provide service persists even after a particular contract terminates. See United Gas Pipe Line Co., 3 F. P. C. 3; Cabot Gas Corp., id., 357; Godfrey L. Cabot, Inc., id., 582; Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 11 F. P. C. 167, 172. All those cases, however, involved pipeline companies [364 U.S. 137, 166] which were in fact providing a continuing service and which had facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission regardless of the duration of a particular contract. They serve as no authority for the present quite different situation where an independent producer is subject to the Commission's jurisdiction only by virtue of his sales. </s> II. </s> The Court asserts that a construction of the statute contrary to the one it reaches will result in intolerable consequences, primarily in two respects. First, it says, producers and pipelines would be able to abandon their undertakings at the end of the contract term without a showing that the public convenience and necessity justify such abandonment, thus defeating the policy of 7 (b) of the Act, and giving the industry a lever to avert regulation of any kind. Second, it concludes, producers would be able, at the expiration of their contracts, to file a higher price as an initial rate under a new certificate. This would force the Commission, it is said, to test the reasonableness of the rate under 5 (a), ante, p. 144, where the Commission has the burden of proof and where experience has shown the procedure to be subject to great delays, and would avoid the rate-change procedures of 4 (e), ante, p. 145, where the producer has the burden of proof and the effectiveness of the rate can be suspended pending investigation. </s> As to abandonment, the Court's view again rests on the erroneous notion that the Commission is charged with assuring continuity of "service" on the part of independent producers. However, 7 (b), by its own terms, prohibits abandonment of only two things: jurisdictional facilities, and any service "rendered by means of" such facilities. The Court does not suggest that petitioners have any jurisdictional facilities. And there can be no [364 U.S. 137, 167] apprehension about the pipelines, since they clearly provide a service by means of jurisdictional facilities and are certificated for an unlimited duration. </s> There is a more basic reason, however, why the evils which the Court imagines do not exist. The Commission is required to issue a certificate only if the applicant's proposal is required by the public convenience and necessity. The vast majority of sales are, of economic necessity, bona fide transactions of substantial duration (see United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., 350 U.S. 332 , at 344) and will, of course, be approved in ordinary course. But surely, if a proposal contains such disingenuous provisions as the Court suggests, its certification would not be in the public interest. The Court's fear that denial of the certificate under such circumstances would be overturned on review is the severest speculation, especially in an area where the Commission is entrusted with such wide discretion. </s> Furthermore, the Commission can tender a perpetual certificate under its 7 (e) power to attach reasonable terms and conditions. 3 But in such a case, it would have to bear the burden of showing that the public convenience and necessity require such a condition. What the Court in effect permits the Commission to do here is simply to attach the condition without such a showing. If, as the Commission stoutly maintains, a limited certificate would constitute a serious threat to the public interest, then surely it is not too much to ask it to show that fact before tendering a producer a certificate different from the one he has requested. And where the Commission has fairly made such a showing, I cannot believe, with all deference [364 U.S. 137, 168] to the Court's contrary intimation, that there is the slightest danger that its action would nonetheless be overturned on the theory it was attempting to accomplish indirectly that which it cannot do directly. Such a view assumes that a court will be blind to the conditioning power expressly given the Commission by statute, and ignores the fact that there is a very real difference between tendering an unlimited certificate when the Commission has made no affirmative showing of public need for a perpetual duration and tendering one when it has made such a showing. In the last analysis, that additional burden is the only consequence which turns on the outcome of these cases. </s> I would hold that where, as in No. 335, an independent producer applies for authority simply to engage in a sale transaction specifically limited in duration, the Commission has no authority to tender an unlimited certificate without bearing the burden of showing that such a departure from the proposal is required by the public convenience and necessity. </s> III. </s> The question remains whether petitioner in No. 321 proposed a sale transaction which was limited in duration and whether the Commission certificated no more than that sale. The term of the contract filed with the Commission was clearly limited to 10 years. Petitioner's application incorporated that contract by reference, and declared that "[t]his application is hereby made only for a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing the sale of natural gas in the circumstances above described." The Commission ordered that a certificate be "hereby issued . . . authorizing the sale by Applicant of natural gas . . . as more fully described in the application and exhibits in this proceeding. . . . The certificate . . . shall be effective only so long as Applicant [364 U.S. 137, 169] continues the acts or operations hereby authorized in accordance with the provisions of the Natural Gas Act . . . ." I think the fair interpretation of all this is that what was authorized was the sale proposed, and that the certificate should therefore be taken as limited in duration to the term of the sale contract. </s> The Commission, however, contends that since, at the time petitioner's certificate was issued, it had taken the position in Sunray Oil Corp., 14 F. P. C. 877, that it had no power to issue a certificate specifically limited in duration, this certificate must be taken as one unlimited in duration. That position, however, was later reversed on appeal, Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 239 F.2d 97, and the Commission acquiesced therein. But the Commission was more fundamentally wrong in believing that a certificate authorizing a sale is unlimited unless specifically otherwise conditioned. Therefore, when it tendered to petitioner a certificate without any limiting language, its erroneous belief that it was issuing a perpetual certificate could not bind petitioner. The Commission was authorized to issue only a certificate limited to the duration of the sale unless a condition were expressly imposed to the contrary, and what it issued purported to be no more than that. Petitioner cannot be taken to have acquiesced in a certificate authorizing something other than it requested, where the certificate gave no notice of that fact, simply because the Commission may have believed its effect to be otherwise. </s> I fear this is another instance where the Court has taken impermissible liberties with statutory language in order to remedy what it considers an undesirable deficiency in the way Congress has written the statute. Cf. United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 493 (dissenting opinion). </s> I would reverse the judgments in both cases. </s> [Footnote * [These opinions apply also to No. 321, Sun Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, post, p. 170.] </s> [Footnote 1 "(c) Under such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe, every natural-gas company shall file with the Commission, within such time (not less than sixty days from June 21, 1938) and in such form as the Commission may designate, and shall keep open in convenient form and place for public inspection, schedules showing all rates and charges for any transportation or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, and the classifications, practices, and regulations affecting such rates and charges, together with all contracts which in any manner affect or relate to such rates, charges, classifications, and services." </s> [Footnote 2 "(b) No natural-gas company shall abandon all or any portion of its facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or any service rendered by means of such facilities, without the permission and approval of the Commission first had and obtained, after due hearing, and a finding by the Commission that the available supply of natural gas is depleted to the extent that the continuance of service is unwarranted, or that the present or future public convenience or necessity permit such abandonment." </s> [Footnote 3 "The Commission shall have the power to attach to the issuance of the certificate and to the exercise of the rights granted thereunder such reasonable terms and conditions as the public convenience and necessity may require." </s> [364 U.S. 137, 170]

United States Supreme Court BOARD OF TRUSTEES v. SWEENEY(1978) No. 77-1792 Argued: Decided: November 13, 1978 </s> Where the Court of Appeals in respondent's employment discrimination action against petitioners (employer) appears to have imposed a heavier burden on the employer than Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 , requires with respect to meeting the employee's prima facie case of discrimination, its judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for reconsideration in light of Furnco. </s> Certiorari granted; 569 F.2d 169, vacated and remanded. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. In Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978), we stated that "[t]o dispel the adverse inference from a prima facie showing under McDonnell Douglas, the employer need only `articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.'" Id., at 578, quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). We stated in McDonnell Douglas that the plaintiff "must . . . be afforded a fair opportunity to show that [the employer's] stated reason for [the plaintiff's] rejection was in fact pretext." Id., at 804. The Court of Appeals in the present case, however, referring to McDonnell Douglas, stated that "in requiring the defendant to prove absence of discriminatory motive, the Supreme Court placed the burden squarely on the party with the greater access to such evidence." 569 F.2d 169, 177 (CA1 1978) (emphasis added). 1 </s> [439 U.S. 24, 25] </s> While words such as "articulate," "show," and "prove," may have more or less similar meanings depending upon the context in which they are used, we think that there is a significant distinction between merely "articulat[ing] some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" and "prov[ing] absence of discriminatory motive." By reaffirming and emphasizing the McDonnell Douglas analysis in Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, supra, we made it clear that the former will suffice to meet the employee's prima facie case of discrimination. Because the Court of Appeals appears to have imposed a heavier burden on the employer than Furnco warrants, its judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for reconsideration in the light of Furnco, supra, at 578. 2 </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 While the Court of Appeals did make the statement that the dissent quotes, post, at 27, it also made the statement quoted in the text above. These statements simply contradict one another. The statement quoted in the text above would make entirely superfluous the third step in the [439 U.S. 24, 25] Furnco-McDonnell Douglas analysis, since it would place on the employer at the second stage the burden of showing that the reason for rejection was not a pretext, rather than requiring contrary proof from the employee as a part of the third step. We think our remand is warranted both because we are unable to determine which of the two conflicting standards the Court of Appeals applied in reviewing the decision of the District Court in this case, and because of the implication in its opinion that there is no difference between the two standards. We, of course, intimate no view as to the correct result if the proper test is applied in this case. </s> [Footnote 2 We quite agree with the dissent that under Furnco and McDonnell Douglas the employer's burden is satisfied if he simply "explains what he has done" or "produc[es] evidence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons." Post, at 28, 29. But petitioners clearly did produce evidence to support their legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation for refusing to promote respondent during the years in question. See 569 F.2d, at 172-173, 178; App. to Pet. for Cert. B-2 to B-24. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals held that petitioners had not met their burden because the proffered legitimate explanation did not "rebut" or "disprove" respondent's prima facie case [439 U.S. 24, 26] or "prove absence of nondiscriminatory motive." 569 F.2d, at 177-179; see App. to Pet. for Cert. B-25. This holding by the Court of Appeals is further support for our belief that the court appears to have imposed a heavier burden on the employer than Furnco, and the dissent here, require. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting. </s> Whenever this Court grants certiorari and vacates a court of appeals judgment in order to allow that court to reconsider [439 U.S. 24, 26] its decision in the light of an intervening decision of this Court, the Court is acting on the merits. Such action always imposes an additional burden on circuit judges who - more than any other segment of the federal judiciary - are struggling desperately to keep afloat in the flood of federal litigation. For that reason, such action should not be taken unless the intervening decision has shed new light on the law which, if it had been available at the time of the court of appeals' decision, might have led to a different result. </s> In this case, the Court's action implies that the recent opinion in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 , made some change in the law as explained in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 . When I joined the Furnco opinion, I detected no such change and I am still unable to discern one. In both cases, the Court clearly stated that when the complainant in a Title VII trial establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, "the burden which shifts to the employer is merely that of proving that he based his employment decision on a legitimate consideration, and not an illegitimate one such as race." 1 </s> [439 U.S. 24, 27] </s> The Court of Appeals' statement of the parties' respective burdens in this case is wholly faithful to this Court's teachings in McDonnell Douglas. The Court of Appeals here stated: </s> "As we understand those cases [McDonnell Douglas and Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, a plaintiff bears the initial burden of presenting evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut the prima facie case by showing that a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason accounted for its actions. If the rebuttal is successful, the plaintiff must show that the stated reason was a mere pretext for discrimination. The ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of discrimination remains with the plaintiff, who must convince the court by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has been the victim of discrimination." 569 F.2d 169, 177 (CA1 1978) (emphasis added). </s> This statement by the Court of Appeals virtually parrots this Court's statements in McDonnell Douglas and Furnco. Nonetheless, this Court vacates the judgment on the ground that "the Court of Appeals appears to have imposed a heavier burden on the employer than Furnco warrants." Ante, at 25. As its sole basis for this conclusion, this Court relies on a distinction drawn for the first time in this case "between merely `articulat[ing] some legitimate, nondiscriminatory [439 U.S. 24, 28] reason' and `prov[ing] absence of discriminatory motive.'" Ante, at 25. 2 This novel distinction has two parts, both of which are illusory and were unequivocally rejected in Furnco itself. </s> First is a purported difference between "articulating" and "proving" a legitimate motivation. Second is the difference between affirming a nondiscriminatory motive and negating a discriminatory motive. </s> With respect to the first point, it must be noted that it was this Court in Furnco, not the Court of Appeals in this case, that stated that the employer's burden was to "prov[e] that he based his employment decision on a legitimate consideration." 3 Indeed, in the paragraph of this Court's opinion in Furnco cited earlier, the words "prove" and "articulate" were used interchangeably, 4 and properly so. For they were descriptive of the defendant's burden in a trial context. In litigation the only way a defendant can "articulate" the reason for his action is by adducing evidence that explains what he has done; when an executive takes the witness stand to "articulate" his reason, the litigant for whom he speaks is [439 U.S. 24, 29] thereby proving those reasons. If the Court intends to authorize a method of articulating a factual defense without proof, surely the Court should explain what it is. </s> The second part of the Court's imaginative distinction is also rejected by Furnco. When an employer shows that a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason accounts for his action, he is simultaneously demonstrating that the action was not motivated by an illegitimate factor such as race. Furnco explicitly recognized this equivalence when it defined the burden on the employer as "that of proving that he based his employment decision on a legitimate consideration, and not an illegitimate one such as race." 5 Whether the issue is phrased in the affirmative or in the negative, the ultimate question involves an identification of the real reason for the employment decision. On that question - as all of these cases make perfectly clear - it is only the burden of producing evidence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons which shifts to the employer; the burden of persuasion, as the Court of Appeals properly recognized, remains with the plaintiff. </s> In short, there is no legitimate basis for concluding that the Court of Appeals erred in this case - either with or without the benefit of Furnco. The Court's action today therefore needlessly imposes additional work on circuit judges who have already considered and correctly applied the rule the Court directs them to reconsider and reapply. </s> [Footnote 1 This language is quoted from the following paragraph in Furnco: </s> "When the prima facie case is understood in the light of the opinion in McDonnell Douglas, it is apparent that the burden which shifts to the employer is merely that of proving that he based his employment decision on a legitimate consideration, and not an illegitimate one such as race. To prove that, he need not prove that he pursued the course which would both enable him to achieve his own business goal and allow him to consider the most employment applications. Title VII prohibits him from having as a goal a work force selected by any proscribed discriminatory practice, but it does not impose a duty to adopt a hiring procedure that maximizes hiring of minority employees. To dispel the adverse inference from a prima facie showing under McDonnell Douglas, the employer need [439 U.S. 24, 27] only `articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.'" 438 U.S., at 577 -578 (emphasis in original). </s> The comparable passage in McDonnell Douglas reads as follows: </s> "The burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection. We need not attempt in the instant case to detail every matter which fairly could be recognized as a reasonable basis for a refusal to hire. Here petitioner has assigned respondent's participation in unlawful conduct against it as the cause for his rejection. We think that this suffices to discharge petitioner's burden of proof at this stage and to meet respondent's prima facie case of discrimination." 411 U.S., at 802 -803. </s> [Footnote 2 The Court also suggests that "further support" for its decision is derived from the Court of Appeals' "holding" that "petitioners had not met their burden because the proffered legitimate explanation did not `rebut' or `disprove' respondent's prima facie case . . . 569 F.2d, at 177-179." Ante, at 25-26, n. 2. The actual "holding" of the Court of Appeals was that "the trial court's finding that sex discrimination impeded the plaintiff's second promotion was not clearly erroneous." 569 F.2d 169, 179 (CA1 1978). The Court of Appeals reached this conclusion by considering all of the evidence presented by both parties to determine whether the evidence of discrimination offered by the plaintiff was "sufficient . . . to sustain the district court's findings" in light of the counter evidence offered by the employer. Ibid. Such factual determinations by two federal courts are entitled to a strong presumption of validity. </s> [Footnote 3 438 U.S., at 577 (quoted in n. 1, supra; emphasis added). It should also be noted that the Court of Appeals did not state that the petitioners' burden here was to "prove" anything; rather, the burden which shifted to them as defendants was to "show" a legitimate reason for their action. </s> [Footnote 4 See n. 1, supra. </s> [Footnote 5 438 U.S., at 577 . </s> [439 U.S. 24, 30]

United States Supreme Court TOTH v. QUARLES(1955) No. 20235 Argued: October 13, 1955Decided: November 7, 1955 </s> Five months after he had been honorably discharged from the United States Air Force and had returned to his home and was privately employed, an ex-serviceman was arrested by military authorities on charges of murder and conspiracy to commit murder while he was an airman in Korea. When arrested he had no relationship of any kind with the military. Under authority of Art. 3 (a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, he was taken to Korea to stand trial before a court-martial. Held: He could not constitutionally be subjected to trial by court-martial. Pp. 13-23. </s> 1. The Act cannot be sustained as an appropriate exercise of the constitutional power of Congress "To raise and support Armies," "To declare War," or to punish "Offences against the Law of Nations." Pp. 13-14. </s> 2. This assertion of military authority over civilians cannot rest on the President's power as Commander-in-Chief, nor on any theory of martial law. P. 14. </s> 3. The Fifth Amendment does not grant court-martial power to Congress; it merely makes clear that there need be no indictment for such military offenses as Congress can authorize military tribunals to try under its Article I power to make rules to govern the armed forces. P. 14, n. 5. </s> 4. The Act is not a valid exercise of the power granted Congress in Article I of the Constitution "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," as supplemented by the Necessary and Proper Clause. Pp. 14-23. </s> (a) The power granted Congress "To make Rules" to regulate "the land and naval Forces" is to be construed as restricting court-martial jurisdiction to persons who have a relationship with the armed forces. P. 15. </s> (b) This construction is required by the fact that any such expansion of court-martial jurisdiction as the Act provides necessarily [350 U.S. 11, 12] encroaches on the jurisdiction of federal courts set up under Article III of the Constitution, where persons on trial are surrounded with more constitutional safeguards than in military tribunals. Pp. 15-20. </s> (c) It is within the constitutional power of Congress to provide for federal district court trials of discharged soldiers accused of offenses committed while in the armed services. Pp. 20-21. </s> (d) The constitutional grant of power to Congress to regulate the armed forces does not empower Congress to deprive civilians of trials under Bill of Rights safeguards; and power to circumvent those safeguards is not to be inferred from the Necessary and Proper Clause. Pp. 21-22. </s> (e) A different result than that here reached is not required by the fact that some other countries which do not have our Bill of Rights subject civilians who were once soldiers to trials by court-martial rather than to trials by civilian courts. P. 22. </s> (f) Considerations of discipline in the armed forces do not warrant expansion of court-martial jurisdiction at the expense of the normal and constitutionally preferable system of trial by jury. Pp. 22-23. </s> (g) Ex-servicemen, like other civilians, are entitled to have the benefit of safeguards afforded those tried in the regular courts authorized by Article III of the Constitution. P. 23. </s> 94 U.S. App. D.C. 28, 215 F.2d 22, reversed. </s> William A. Kehoe, Jr. argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Al. Philip Kane, Charles V. Koons, John J. McGrath, Peter F. Flaherty, Joseph H. Ridge, James F. Smith and L. Pat McGrath. </s> Solicitor General Sobeloff argued the cause for respondent on the reargument, and Marvin E. Frankel on the original argument. With them on the brief on the original argument were Assistant Attorney General Olney, Beatrice Rosenberg, Carl H. Imlay and Chester W. Wilson. With them on the brief on the reargument was Mr. Olney. </s> Ralph B. Gregg filed a brief for the American Legion, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. [350 U.S. 11, 13] </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> After serving with the United States Air Force in Korea, Robert W. Toth was honorably discharged. He returned to his home in Pittsburgh and went to work in a steel plant. Five months later he was arrested by military authorities on charges of murder and conspiracy to commit murder while an airman in Korea. 1 At the time of arrest he had no relationship of any kind with the military. He was taken to Korea to stand trial before a court-martial under authority of a 1950 Act of Congress. 2 The Court of Appeals sustained the Act, rejecting the contention that civilian ex-servicemen like Toth could not constitutionally be subjected to trial by court-martial. 94 U.S. App. D.C. 28, 215 F.2d 22. We granted certiorari to pass upon this important constitutional question. 348 U.S. 809 . 3 </s> The 1950 Act cannot be sustained on the constitutional power of Congress "To raise and support Armies," "To declare War," or to punish "Offences against the Law of [350 U.S. 11, 14] Nations." 4 And this assertion of military authority over civilians cannot rest on the President's power as commander-in-chief, or on any theory of martial law. See Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 124-127. The Government's contention is that the Act is a valid exercise of the power granted Congress in Article I of the Constitution "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," as supplemented by the Necessary and Proper Clause. 5 </s> This Court has held that the Article I clause just quoted authorizes Congress to subject persons actually in the armed service to trial by court-martial for military and naval offenses. 6 Later it was held that court-martial jurisdiction could be exerted over a dishonorably discharged soldier then a military prisoner serving a sentence imposed by a prior court-martial. 7 It has never been intimated by this Court, however, that Article I military jurisdiction could be extended to civilian ex-soldiers who had severed all relationship with the military and its institutions. 8 To allow this extension of military [350 U.S. 11, 15] authority would require an extremely broad construction of the language used in the constitutional provision relied on. For given its natural meaning, the power granted Congress "To make Rules" to regulate "the land and naval Forces" would seem to restrict court-martial jurisdiction to persons who are actually members or part of the armed forces. There is a compelling reason for construing the clause this way: any expansion of court-martial jurisdiction like that in the 1950 Act necessarily encroaches on the jurisdiction of federal courts set up under Article III of the Constitution where persons on trial are surrounded with more constitutional safeguards than in military tribunals. </s> Article III provides for the establishment of a court system as one of the separate but coordinate branches of the National Government. It is the primary, indeed the sole business of these courts to try cases and controversies between individuals and between individuals and the Government. This includes trial of criminal cases. [350 U.S. 11, 16] These courts are presided over by judges appointed for life, subject only to removal by impeachment. Their compensation cannot be diminished during their continuance in office. The provisions of Article III were designed to give judges maximum freedom from possible coercion or influence by the executive or legislative branches of the Government. But the Constitution and the Amendments in the Bill of Rights show that the Founders were not satisfied with leaving determination of guilt or innocence to judges, even though wholly independent. They further provided that no person should be held to answer in those courts for capital or other infamous crimes unless on the presentment or indictment of a grand jury drawn from the body of the people. Other safeguards designed to protect defendants against oppressive governmental practices were included. One of these was considered so important to liberty of the individual that it appears in two parts of the Constitution. Article III, 2, commands that the "Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed." And the Sixth Amendment provides that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . ." This right of trial by jury ranks very high in our catalogue of constitutional safeguards. 9 </s> [350 U.S. 11, 17] </s> We find nothing in the history or constitutional treatment of military tribunals which entitles them to rank along with Article III courts as adjudicators of the guilt or innocence of people charged with offenses for which they can be deprived of their life, liberty or property. Unlike courts, it is the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise. But trial of soldiers to maintain discipline is merely incidental to an army's primary fighting function. To the extent that those responsible for performance of this primary function are diverted from it by the necessity of trying cases, the basic fighting purpose of armies is not served. And conceding to military personnel that high degree of honesty and sense of justice which nearly all of them undoubtedly have, it still remains true that military tribunals have not been and probably never can be constituted in such way that they can have the same kind of qualifications that the Constitution has deemed essential to fair trials of civilians in federal courts. For instance, the Constitution does not provide life tenure for those performing judicial functions in military trials. They are appointed by military commanders and may be removed at will. Nor does the Constitution protect their salaries as it does judicial salaries. Strides have been made toward making courts-martial less subject to the will of the executive department which appoints, supervises and ultimately controls them. But from the very nature of things, courts have more independence in passing on the life and liberty of people than do military tribunals. </s> Moreover, there is a great difference between trial by jury and trial by selected members of the military forces. [350 U.S. 11, 18] It is true that military personnel because of their training and experience may be especially competent to try soldiers for infractions of military rules. Such training is no doubt particularly important where an offense charged against a soldier is purely military, such as disobedience of an order, leaving post, etc. But whether right or wrong, the premise underlying the constitutional method for determining guilt or innocence in federal courts is that laymen are better than specialists to perform this task. This idea is inherent in the institution of trial by jury. </s> Juries fairly chosen from different walks of life bring into the jury box a variety of different experiences, feelings, intuitions and habits. 10 Such juries may reach completely different conclusions than would be reached by specialists in any single field, including specialists in the military field. 11 On many occasions, fully known to the Founders of this country, jurors - plain people - have manfully stood up in defense of liberty [350 U.S. 11, 19] against the importunities of judges and despite prevailing hysteria and prejudices. 12 The acquittal of William Penn is an illustrious example. 13 Unfortunately, instances could also be cited where jurors have themselves betrayed the cause of justice by verdicts based on prejudice or pressures. In such circumstances independent trial judges and independent appellate judges have a most important place under our constitutional plan since they have power to set aside convictions. 14 </s> The 1950 Act here considered deprives of jury trial and sweeps under military jurisdiction over 3,000,000 persons who have become veterans since the Act became effective. That number is bound to grow from year to year; there are now more than 3,000,000 men and women in uniform. 15 These figures point up what would be the enormous scope of a holding that Congress could subject every ex-serviceman and woman in the land to trial by court-martial for any alleged offense committed while he or she had been a member of the armed forces. Every veteran discharged since passage of the 1950 Act is subject to military trial for any offense punishable by as much as five years' imprisonment unless the offense is now punishable in a civilian court. And one need only glance at the Military Code to see what a vast number and variety of offenses are thus brought under [350 U.S. 11, 20] military jurisdiction. 16 Included within these are crimes such as murder, conspiracy, absence without leave, contempt toward officials, disrespect toward superior officers, willful or neglectful loss, damage, or destruction of government property, making false official statements, dueling, breach of the peace, forgery, fraud, assault, and many others. 17 It is true that with reference to some of these offenses, very minor ones, veterans cannot now be tried because of a presidential order fixing the punishment for such offenses at less than five years. 18 But that amelioration of the Military Code may be temporary, since punishment can be raised or lowered at the will of the President. It is also true that under the present law courts-martial have jurisdiction only if no civilian court does. But that might also be changed by Congress. Thus there is no justification for treating the Act as a mere minor increase of congressional power to expand military jurisdiction. It is a great change, both actually and potentially. </s> Fear has been expressed that if this law is not sustained discharged soldiers may escape punishment altogether for crimes they commit while in the service. But that fear [350 U.S. 11, 21] is not warranted and was not shared by the Judge Advocate General of the Army who made a strong statement against passage of the law. 19 He asked Congress to "confer jurisdiction upon Federal courts to try any person for an offense denounced by the [military] code if he is no longer subject thereto. This would be consistent with the fifth amendment of the Constitution." The Judge Advocate General went on to tell Congress that "If you expressly confer jurisdiction on the Federal courts to try such cases, you preserve the constitutional separation of military and civil courts, you save the military from a lot of unmerited grief, and you provide for a clean, constitutional method for disposing of such cases." It is conceded that it was wholly within the constitutional power of Congress to follow this suggestion and provide for federal district court trials of discharged soldiers accused of offenses committed while in the armed services. This concession is justified. U.S. Const., Art. III, 2; and see, e. g., Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 211 -212; United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97 -98; Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 -74. There can be no valid argument, therefore, that civilian ex-servicemen must be tried by court-martial or not tried at all. If that is so it is only because Congress has not seen fit to subject them to trial in federal district courts. </s> None of the other reasons suggested by the Government are sufficient to justify a broad construction of the constitutional grant of power to Congress to regulate the armed forces. That provision itself does not empower Congress [350 U.S. 11, 22] to deprive people of trials under Bill of Rights safeguards, and we are not willing to hold that power to circumvent those safeguards should be inferred through the Necessary and Proper Clause. It is impossible to think that the discipline of the Army is going to be disrupted, its morale impaired, or its orderly processes disturbed, by giving ex-servicemen the benefit of a civilian court trial when they are actually civilians. And we are not impressed by the fact that some other countries which do not have our Bill of Rights indulge in the practice of subjecting civilians who were once soldiers to trials by courts-martial instead of trials by civilian courts. 20 </s> There are dangers lurking in military trials which were sought to be avoided by the Bill of Rights and Article III of our Constitution. Free countries of the world have tried to restrict military tribunals to the narrowest jurisdiction deemed absolutely essential to maintaining discipline among troops in active service. Even as late as the Seventeenth Century standing armies and courts-martial were not established institutions in England. 21 Court-martial jurisdiction sprang from the belief that within the military ranks there is need for a prompt, ready-at-hand means of compelling obedience and order. But Army discipline will not be improved by court-martialing rather than trying by jury some civilian ex-soldier who has been wholly separated from the service for months, years or perhaps decades. Consequently considerations of discipline provide no excuse for new expansion of court-martial jurisdiction at the expense of the normal [350 U.S. 11, 23] and constitutionally preferable system of trial by jury. 22 </s> Determining the scope of the constitutional power of Congress to authorize trial by court-martial presents another instance calling for limitation to "the least possible power adequate to the end proposed." 23 We hold that Congress cannot subject civilians like Toth to trial by court-martial. They, like other civilians, are entitled to have the benefit of safeguards afforded those tried in the regular courts authorized by Article III of the Constitution. </s> Reversed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The charges were violations of Articles 118 and 81 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 64 Stat. 140, 134, 50 U.S.C. 712 and 675. </s> [Footnote 2 Art. 3 (a), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 64 Stat. 109, 50 U.S.C. 553, provides: "Subject to the provisions of article 43, any person charged with having committed, while in a status in which he was subject to this code, an offense against this code, punishable by confinement of five years or more and for which the person cannot be tried in the courts of the United States or any State or Territory thereof or of the District of Columbia, shall not be relieved from amenability to trial by courts-martial by reason of the termination of said status." </s> [Footnote 3 This habeas corpus proceeding was brought in the District Court for the District of Columbia by Toth's sister while he was held in Korea. Without passing on any constitutional question the District Court ordered Toth discharged on the ground that he should not have been carried to Korea for trial without a hearing. 113 F. Supp. 330, 114 F. Supp. 468. </s> [Footnote 4 See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 ; In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 . </s> [Footnote 5 The Fifth Amendment provides that "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger . . . ." This provision does not grant court-martial power to Congress; it merely makes clear that there need be no indictment for such military offenses as Congress can authorize military tribunals to try under its Article I power to make rules to govern the armed forces. </s> [Footnote 6 Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65. </s> [Footnote 7 Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1 </s> [Footnote 8 In 1863 Congress passed a statute authorizing trial of ex-soldiers for commission of fraud against the Government while in the service; this law also authorized court-martial trial of contractors not part of the military forces. 12 Stat. 696. The latter provision of the 1863 law appears never to have been sustained by any court. Lower [350 U.S. 11, 15] courts have disagreed as to the constitutional validity of the provision authorizing ex-soldiers to be tried. See, e. g., In re Bogart, 3 Fed. Cas. 796. Compare Ex parte Henderson, 11 Fed. Cas. 1067; United States ex rel. Flannery v. Commanding General, 69 F. Supp. 661, reversed by stipulation in unreported order of the Second Circuit, No. 20235, April 18, 1946. See United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210 . A statute authorizing court-martial trial of inmates of the Soldiers' Home has been ruled unconstitutional by the Judge Advocate General of the Army. Dig. Op. J. A. G. (1912), pp. 1010, 1012. It was declared that "such inmates are not a part of the Army of the United States, but are civilians." Id., at 1012. Col. Winthrop, concededly a leading authority on military law, expressed the view that "this class of statutes, which in terms or inferentially subject persons formerly in the army, but become finally and legally separated from it, to trial by court-martial, are all necessarily and alike unconstitutional . . . ." 1 Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents (2d ed. 1896), 146. The War Department reprinted this classic volume for the guidance of the Army in 1920. Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents (2d ed., Reprint 1920). </s> [Footnote 9 A declaration of rights adopted by nine colonies in 1765 contained this statement: "That trial by jury, is the inherent and invaluable right of every British subject in these colonies." Harvard Classics, Volume 43, p. 148. The Declaration of Independence stated as one of the grievances of the colonies that the King of Great Britain had [350 U.S. 11, 17] deprived the colonists of the benefits of trial by jury in many cases and that he had "affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil power." Another charge was that he had transported colonials "beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offences." </s> [Footnote 10 Chief Justice Cooley said: "The trial of criminal cases is by a jury of the country, and not by the court. The jurors, and they alone, are to judge of the facts, and weigh the evidence. The law has established this tribunal because it is believed that, from its numbers, the mode of their selection, and the fact that the jurors come from all classes of society, they are better calculated to judge of motives, weigh probabilities, and take what may be called a common sense view of a set of circumstances, involving both act and intent, than any single man, however pure, wise and eminent he may be. This is the theory of the law; and as applied to criminal accusations, it is eminently wise, and favorable alike to liberty and to justice." People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9, 27. </s> [Footnote 11 "Juries undoubtedly may make mistakes: they may commit errors: they may commit gross ones. But changed as they constantly are, their errors and mistakes can never grow into a dangerous system. The native uprightness of their sentiments will not be bent under the weight of precedent and authority. The esprit du corps will not be introduced among them; nor will society experience form them those mischiefs, of which the esprit du corps, unchecked, is sometimes productive." II Wilson's Works (Andrews ed. 1896) 222. </s> [Footnote 12 An outstanding instance is the Dean of St. Asaph's Case, 21 How. St. Tr. 847, discussed in Stryker, For the Defense, 119-136. </s> [Footnote 13 Penn and Mead's Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 951. After trial the jurors were fined for acquitting Penn contrary to the court's instructions. One was imprisoned for not paying the fine, but the Court of Common Pleas released him in a habeas corpus proceeding, upholding the freedom of the jury to decide the case. Bushell's Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 999. </s> [Footnote 14 See II Wilson's Works (Andrews ed. 1896) 222. </s> [Footnote 15 Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-25, No. 101 (U.S. Dept. Commerce 1954). </s> [Footnote 16 Arts. 77-134, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 64 Stat. 133-143, 50 U.S.C. 671-728. </s> [Footnote 17 A particularly sweeping offense, punishable by death and not subject to any statute of limitations, is found in Article 94, which provides in part that anyone "(2) who with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of lawful civil authority, creates, in concert with any other person or persons, revolt, violence, or other disturbance against such authority is guilty of sedition; (3) who fails to do his utmost to prevent and suppress an offense of mutiny or sedition being committed in his presence, or fails to take all reasonable means to inform his superior or commanding officer of an offense of mutiny or sedition which he knows or has reason to believe is taking place, is guilty of a failure to suppress or report a mutiny or sedition." (Emphasis supplied.) </s> [Footnote 18 See Table of Maximum Punishments, 127c, MCM, 1951, 16 Fed. Reg. 1364-1368. </s> [Footnote 19 Hearings before Subcommittee of Senate Committee on Armed Services on S. 857 and H. R. 4080, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 256-257. The Assistant General Counsel of the Office of Secretary of Defense, who was chairman of a committee that helped draft the Uniform Code of Military Justice, expressed doubts as to the constitutionality of Article 3 (a). Hearings before Subcommittee of House Committee on Armed Services on H. R. 2498, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 881. </s> [Footnote 20 The historical background of this country's preference for civilian over military trials was impressively presented in the arguments of counsel and opinion of this Court in Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 121. And see Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 . </s> [Footnote 21 3 Macaulay, History of England from the Accession of James the Second (London, 1855), 45. </s> [Footnote 22 Mr. Justice Sutherland writing for the Court in Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 485 -486, said, "The right of trial by jury is of ancient origin, characterized by Blackstone as `the glory of the English law' and `the most transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy' (Bk. 3, p. 379); and, as Justice Story said (2 Story on the Constitution, 1779), . . . the Constitution would have been justly obnoxious to the most conclusive objection if it had not recognized and confirmed it in the most solemn terms.' With, perhaps, some exceptions, trial by jury has always been, and still is, generally regarded as the normal and preferable mode of disposing of issues of fact in civil cases at law as well as in criminal cases. Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care. Compare Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 ." </s> [Footnote 23 Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 230-231. </s> MR. JUSTICE REED, with whom MR. JUSTICE BURTON and MR. JUSTICE MINTON join, dissenting. </s> This case presents the question whether or not an honorably discharged ex-serviceman may be apprehended by military authorities to stand trial by court-martial for a crime alleged to have been committed by him while he was a member of the armed forces of the United States. The answer turns upon the constitutionality and construction of the applicable provisions of the Uniform Code of Military [350 U.S. 11, 24] Justice, 64 Stat. 108, 50 U.S.C. 551 et seq., under which the United States Air Force acted in this case. </s> Whenever an enactment of Congress to cure weaknesses in criminal procedure is declared unconstitutional by this Court on the ground of lack of legislative power, the door is closed for all practical purposes forever on the method that Congress deems effective for correcting crime. Only an overruling of this case can change today's constitutional determination. </s> The judgment just announced turns loose, without trial or possibility of trial, a man accused of murder. In future similar cases among the military, if Congress enacts the substitute law as the Court suggests, ante, p. 21, the accused must face a jury far removed from the scene of the alleged crime and before jurors without the understanding of the quality and character of a military crime possessed by those accustomed to administer the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Or perhaps those accused will be extradited and tried by foreign law. </s> A dissent is justified, I think, if its argument may limit, in some degree, further interpreting limitations by the judiciary on the power granted by the Constitution to Congress: "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces" without the jury and venue requirements of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. These requirements are appropriate for civil trials but, by custom, our precedents and express language are inapplicable to "cases arising in the land or naval forces." </s> Robert W. Toth, after service in the United States Air Force, was honorably discharged on December 8, 1952. On April 8, 1953, formal charges were signed under the procedures required by the Uniform Code of Military Justice charging Toth with premeditated murder and conspiracy to commit murder. 1 The specifications under the [350 U.S. 11, 25] charges alleged that the offenses were committed by Toth while an Airman First Class, United States Air Force, on September 27, 1952, at an air base in Korea, and the victim was a named Korean national. It was further alleged that Toth was a civilian subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice under Article 3 (a) thereof which provides: </s> "Subject to the provisions of article 43, any person charged with having committed, while in a status in which he was subject to this code, an offense against this code, punishable by confinement of five years or more and for which the person cannot be tried in the courts of the United States or any State or Territory thereof or of the District of Columbia, shall not be relieved from amenability to trial by courts-martial by reason of the termination of said status." 64 Stat. 109, 50 U.S.C. 553 (a). 2 </s> On May 13, 1953, pursuant to orders originally issued by the Acting Secretary of the Air Force on April 30, 1953, and further supplemental orders through appropriate Air Force command channels, Toth was apprehended by Air Force police at his place of employment in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. On May 15, 1953, he was flown to Korea where he arrived on May 18, 1953. </s> This was the situation when the petition for habeas corpus was filed by the relator. The Government did not question jurisdiction in the District Court and after argument that court ordered the writ to issue. 3 Toth was returned to the United States and produced in court, whereupon the District Court ordered his discharge on the ground that even if the Air Force police had authority to apprehend Toth, they had no legal power to transport him to a distant point for trial or at least to do so without [350 U.S. 11, 26] a hearing. The court therefore found it unnecessary to pass on the constitutional objections raised by the petitioner as to the invalidity of Article 3 (a). 114 F. Supp. 468. </s> On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the District Court, discharged the writ and ordered Toth returned to the military authorities. 94 U.S. App. D.C. 28, 215 F.2d 22. The Court of Appeals held that Article 3 (a) of the Code was constitutionally valid and that the Code provided the necessary authorization and machinery to apprehend and transport for trial, in the manner here followed, persons in civilian status who were amenable to courts-martial by reason of the provisions of Article 3 (a). </s> The Code was enacted May 5, 1950, after careful military and congressional study to assure that the military justice of the unified services would be in accordance with the present-day standards of fairness. 4 Article 3 (a) was adopted in view of the decision of this Court in Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210 (1949), holding the Articles for the Government of the Navy, then in force, did not allow trial on charges filed subsequent to honorable discharge "without a grant of congressional authority," id., at 215, although the charges arose from acts committed while the defendant was in military service. The near escape from military justice of Army personnel accused of the theft in Germany of the Hesse crown jewels was also in mind. 5 It was thought that a serviceman's discharge should not bar his prosecution in a military court for crimes committed when subject to military discipline. 6 </s> [350 U.S. 11, 27] </s> The enactment of Article 3 (a) was chosen instead of the alternative of federal district court jurisdiction, although thorough presentations of objections not only on constitutional but also on policy grounds appear in the committee report and the Congressional Record. 7 The military were well aware, as was Congress, of possible unfavorable public reaction to extension of the jurisdiction of military courts to discharged veterans for alleged misdeeds during service. The language of Article 3 (a) was drawn to cover only the most serious offenses and restricted to those instances in which the guilty would otherwise escape trial or punishment in any American courts. Although Congress, under Art. I, 8, cl. 14, 8 and the Necessary and Proper Clause, doubtless might have authorized the civil courts to try charges arising from violations of the Military Code during former service, even [350 U.S. 11, 28] though committed on foreign soil, 9 it chose the method of Article 3 (a). </s> No question of accommodating the liberty of the citizen to requirements of the military through the interpretation of an ambiguous Act arises. Compare Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 300 . It is not for courts to question the wisdom of the legislation. Its obvious purpose was to assure, insofar as discipline may do so, the proper conduct of our far-flung and numerous military personnel in foreign lands. One need not stress the necessity of orderly conduct by the military on foreign posts for the maintenance of good relations in friendly or vanquished countries. It also seems a reasonable choice that uniform treatment by courts-martial trial of all accused of crimes punishable by the Military Code is preferred for morale and disciplinary purposes to courts-martial trial only for those who remain in the service. This case itself would make a good example of the difficulty of a federal district court trial. We address ourselves to the constitutionality of Article 3 (a). </s> (a) The congressional power under Article I of the Constitution to regulate the armed forces is conceded by the Court to embrace the power to provide for trial by court-martial and military punishment for violations of the Military Code. But the Court holds that that power ceases when the serviceman becomes a civilian. Nothing, we think, in the words of Article I or in the history of that congressional power justifies limiting trial and [350 U.S. 11, 29] punishment by the military, for crimes committed by members of the armed services, to the period of service. Certainly the power of Congress to provide for a military trial and punishment for a breach of the Military Code on charges brought before the end of enlistment or discharge may continue thereafter. 10 The crime charged against Toth was one covered by the Code. The circumstance that he was discharged from the service prior to the detection of the alleged crime and prior to being charged with its commission should make no constitutional difference. </s> Courts-martial are deeply rooted in history. War is a grim business, requiring sacrifice of ease, opportunity, freedom from restraint, and liberty of action. Experience has demonstrated that the law of the military must be capable of prompt punishment to maintain discipline. The power to regulate the armed forces must have been granted to Congress so that it would have the authority over its armed forces that other nations have long exercised, subject only to limitations of the Constitution. Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65, 78-79; Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13, 21 . The Government calls our attention to the current provisions for military trial after discharge of other nations with legal background similar to ours. Each of them allows such trials under varying conditions. 11 </s> [350 U.S. 11, 30] Whether English courts-martial before 1789 exercised jurisdiction over charges preferred after separation from service cannot be categorically asserted in view of the paucity of cases. It would seem, however, that the language of Article I itself properly should be interpreted [350 U.S. 11, 31] to empower Congress to authorize courts-martial after separation from the services. The crime charged was committed during service and violated the Military Code. Surely when read with the Necessary and Proper Clause, the conclusion must follow. Article 3 (a) bears a reasonable relation to the "Government and Regulation" of the armed forces; it is appropriate and plainly adapted to that end. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 419 et seq. That has been the test of congressional power. </s> This is not an effort to make a civilian subject to military law, in distinction to martial law, as in Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 121, 123, 127. Such an effort would meet condemnation as an invasion of the liberty of the citizen. See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 ; Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 . Congress was granted authority to regulate the armed forces in order to enforce obedience by members of the military establishment to military regulation during their service to the end that order may be ensured. Disobedience may occur in nationally critical times. What reason can there be for [350 U.S. 11, 32] refusing courts-martial jurisdiction over crimes so committed by a serviceman merely because they passed undiscovered during the service period? 12 Could there now be doubt as to the power of Congress under Art. I to make a draftee subject to courts-martial before actual induction into the armed forces? This Court had none in 1944. Then we said, when considering a habeas corpus for release from military imprisonment after trial by court-martial of a person claiming civilian status: </s> "We have no doubt of the power of Congress to enlist the manpower of the nation for prosecution of the war and to subject to military jurisdiction those who are unwilling, as well as those who are eager, to come to the defense of their nation in its hour of peril. Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 [Selective Draft Law Cases]." Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542, 556 . </s> Toth may be a civilian but his crime was a violation of military regulations. </s> Judicial history lends its weight to the conclusion that congressional power to institute criminal proceedings against a military person continues after the accused's discharge. In 1863, the Congress enacted an Act to prevent and punish frauds upon the Government of the United States. It provided that any person in the military [350 U.S. 11, 33] forces shall be punished for fraud under military regulation "as the court-martial may adjudge, save the punishment of death." 12 Stat. 696-697, 1. Under 2, jurisdiction of the court-martial was extended to dischargees. 13 The provision for charge and court-martial after discharge was ruled constitutional in 1866 by Attorney General Stanbery. 14 The section was held constitutional in 1873. In re Bogart, 3 Fed. Cas. 796. See other cases, note 22, infra. It was apparently held unconstitutional in 1946 under Article I in the District Court for the Southern District of New York, although the problem under the Fifth Amendment was also considered. United States ex rel. Flannery v. Commanding General, 69 F. Supp. 661, 664. 15 </s> [350 U.S. 11, 34] </s> It is also to be noted that the present Uniform Code, Art. 4, 50 U.S.C. 554, provides that an officer dismissed by the President may request trial by court-martial after such dismissal. A similar provision was first enacted by Congress in 1865, 12, 13 Stat. 487, 489; see Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents (2d ed., Reprint 1920), 64, 65. </s> The Court finds a "compelling reason" for construing the clause for Army regulation more narrowly than has been done by the Congress and the Executive for many years. This is that trial by Article III judges and juries offers safeguards to military offenders superior to those offered by courts-martial. Under our judicial system the use of juries has been found satisfactory in civil life. The argument for the adoption of civil trials for the military might appeal to Congress, if presented there. But, with due respect to the premise of the majority, the assumed superiority of the civil courts in the trial of service crimes should have no force in the construction of the constitutional power of Congress to enact Article 3 (a) of the Code. Belief that an accused has better opportunities to escape conviction in a civil court should not influence a conclusion as to constitutional power. As later appears in this opinion, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments except the land and naval forces from their commands. The advantages and disadvantages of indictment, venue and jury trial for the military have been weighed and determined adversely to the Court's conclusion by the Constitution and the Congress. Certainly the number of former members of the armed services now living is immaterial to the constitutional issue, as are the "dangers" suggested to be "lurking in military trials." The military is in position to give its personnel a fair trial. The only logical ground for declaring Article 3 (a) unconstitutional is that military crimes cannot be so punished because such procedure is beyond the reach of the congressional [350 U.S. 11, 35] authority to make rules for government of military personnel. Subsequent punishment by military procedures will help discipline during service. Such a conclusion by Congress is not strained or unreasonable but a natural use of its power to make regulations for the armed services. The choice is for Congress, not the Court. </s> (b) Another constitutional problem arises, i. e., that Article 3 (a) is unlawful by reason of the limitations on prosecutions of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution. 16 </s> The argument upon the Sixth Amendment requires only summary treatment. The rights to a speedy and public trial, impartiality of the triers, information as to the charge, confrontation, compulsory process for witnesses and assistance of counsel are not in issue. This accused will not have for his trial a jury of the State and district of the crime, previously ascertained by our law. That is an impossibility in the circumstances of this case. Nor can it be that the Sixth Amendment requirements as [350 U.S. 11, 36] to jury and place were intended to apply to the "cases arising in the land or naval forces" which were excepted from the protection of the grand jury by the Fifth. That would abrogate the authority of Congress to govern the military by courts-martial. It was so announced by this Court, unanimously, in Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 122. 17 </s> [350 U.S. 11, 37] Defendants in cases arising in the armed forces, we think, are not entitled to demand trial by jury, whether the crime was committed on foreign soil or at a place within a State or previously ascertained district. </s> Turning to the Fifth Amendment, the critical words are obviously "cases arising in the land or naval forces." The events leading to the taking of Toth into custody occurred while he was enlisted. They constituted then and now a violation of the Uniform Code. Relator would limit the quoted words to cases where charges had been filed during service. She stresses the phrase "when in actual service," but this Court has held and all the history of our courts-martial shows that such phrase has reference only to "cases arising . . . in the Militia." Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109, 114 . </s> The Fifth, like the other early amendments, arose from the determination to protect the rights of citizens. As the Articles of Confederation, Article 9, granted authority to the central government to make rules for the government and regulation of the armed forces, the Nation was [350 U.S. 11, 38] conversant with the problem. In the state conventions for ratification of the Constitution, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York and Rhode Island suggested words for regulation of the armed forces quite similar to the ones adopted by Congress. 18 It will be observed that two employ "arise." Three speak of "cases." Since the state suggestions were made as the result of consideration of the proposed Constitution, it is quite natural that the language of Article III concerning the judicial power would find an echo in the suggestions. Article III, 2, reads, "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority . . . ." When the Congress considered the Act against military fraud in 1863, note 13, supra, no one suggested that a "case," the prosecution for which under the Act did not [350 U.S. 11, 39] begin until after discharge of a serviceman, would not be a "case arising in the land or naval forces." The concern of Congress was with the liability of contractors, as part of military personnel, under 1 of the Act, when they had no true military service status. 19 Because not service-connected, the contractors' clause has been held unconstitutional. Ex parte Henderson, 11 Fed. Cas. 1067, 1071. </s> The word "case," of course, might refer to litigation - a charge or complaint brought in court, here a prosecution. But it seems to us that its meaning, as used in the constitutional clauses under consideration, is a state of facts for judicial action, i. e., the series of events that creates an enforceable right or obligation. The context in which it is used bears on the final definition. Here "cases arising" is more specific than the word "case" alone. The Government gives us several citations to cases applying the meaning for which it contends. 20 </s> [350 U.S. 11, 40] Relator does the same. 21 Article III uses "cases arising" under federal law to indicate the extent of possible federal jurisdiction over legal rights or duties created by the laws of the United States. The meaning of "cases arising" in Article III and the Fifth Amendment must be determined by their purpose. That purpose is similar - to mark the source of the cause of action that ripens into a civil complaint or criminal charge. However restricted the word "case" may be, its use with "arising" points to the source of the litigation. If a case is claimed to exist only after institution of legal proceedings, nevertheless that case has its roots, it arises, in the events that give life to the cause of action. When a case so arises was stated thus in Gully v. First Nat. Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112 , in an opinion concerning the removal statute, where [350 U.S. 11, 41] removal was asked because the state suit was alleged to have arisen under federal law: </s> "To bring a case within the statute, a right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff's cause of action. . . . The right or immunity must be such that it will be supported if the Constitution or laws of the United States are given one construction or effect, and defeated if they receive another. . . ." </s> One of the purposes of the Fifth Amendment by this exception was to preserve the separation of military law from the requirements of civil law. The regulation of the armed forces by Congress under cl. 14 of 8, Art. I, was to be left for legislative judgment that discipline might be maintained by speedy trial and punishment in accordance with military law. The reasons, set out in our discussion of Article I power to regulate the armed forces, need not be repeated here. We ask ourselves, "What law is the basis of this prosecution?" The answer is the Military Code. If so, the case arises "in the land or naval forces." </s> That conclusion has the support of the weight of the precedents dealing with this phase of the Fifth Amendment. To meet the argument of defendant that jurisdiction must attach before discharge, it was said in the Bogart case, 3 Fed. Cas. 796, 799: </s> "Among the ordinary and most common definitions of the word `arise,' are `to proceed, to issue, to spring,' and a case arising in the land or naval forces upon a fair and reasonable construction of the whole article, appears to us to be a case proceeding, issuing or springing from acts in violation of the naval laws and regulations committed while in the naval forces or service." [350 U.S. 11, 42] </s> This statement has been strengthened by the accord given the argument by other courts. 22 </s> (c) The Court, of course, does not gainsay the constitutional authority of Congress to adopt a military code for regulation of members of the armed forces without regard to the generally applicable requirements of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. It holds that where the constitutional safeguards of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments for a citizen's freedom from tyranny are at stake, they should not be withdrawn except through absolute necessity. There is no such necessity here for it would have been possible to have provided a proper civil trial with the full protection of the applicable clauses of the Amendments. But here we are considering an exception to the safeguards offered by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. That exception has been written into the Constitution from the experience of history to protect the discipline of the armed forces. Of course, that exception from the protections of these Amendments should be strictly construed to hold those excluded to the minimum as was done in Ex parte Henderson, supra, p. 39. Construction of the Constitution, however, should not be allowed to emasculate the natural meaning of language designed to protect the Nation in the regulation of its armed forces. </s> What we have argued in the foregoing pages of this opinion supports our conclusion on this tendered rule of construction. Granting that there are possible means of affording civil trials to persons discharged from the Army for military crimes committed during their service, we think that Congress has power to provide for punishment of these military crimes under the constitutional exceptions discussed. Such punishment, if our analysis of [350 U.S. 11, 43] Article I and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments is correct, will be for military crimes of servicemen, not of civilians, and for the maintenance of discipline in the armed forces. </s> The relator phrases strongly her argument against Toth's prosecution by courts-martial. To her the issue is "military dictatorship." Though she concedes that Congress may have merely desired to bar absolution from crime by discharge from service, such purpose, she argues, should not override the Constitution or be allowed to foreshadow a "military dictatorship." She forebodes that every petty crime may be included and limitation of prosecution be extended until all discharged servicemen shall live their lives under fear of the Military. The law still has degrees of harshness and courts and legislatures must act in reason. The possibility of individual abuse of power is ever present even under our Constitution but the probability of obliteration of any such tendency through judicial, executive or legislative action is the citizen's protection under the Constitution. A fear that punishment by courts-martial of servicemen after discharge may bear a threat to the rights and security of citizens is extravagant. It is true today, as it was in the time of the Founding Fathers, that the methods for maintenance of Army discipline should be subject to public opinion as expressed through Congress. If trial of discharged servicemen by courts-martial under the carefully defined provisions of Article 3 (a) seems harsh or hurtful to liberty, the door of Congress remains open for amelioration. This decision that a veteran, let out of the military forces before charges, must, by the Constitution, be tried by the civil courts for his military crimes impairs congressional power. Now only another Constitutional Amendment or a reversal of today's judgment will enable Congress to deal consistently with those violating the Uniform Code of Military Justice. We cannot agree that those who adopted the constitutional provisions for the [350 U.S. 11, 44] protection of military discipline intended such a result. Toth's alleged accomplices have been convicted by military courts and we see no reason why he should not be tried as proposed. </s> The decision below should be affirmed. </s> [Footnote 1 The charges were violations of Articles 118 and 81 respectively of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 50 U.S.C. 712, 675. </s> [Footnote 2 Article 43 is the statute of limitations applicable to offenses punishable under the Code, 50 U.S.C. 618. </s> [Footnote 3 113 F. Supp. 330. </s> [Footnote 4 S. Rep. No. 486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 3; H. R. Rep. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2. </s> [Footnote 5 Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services on H. R. 2498, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 879-885. See Durant v. Hiatt, 81 F. Supp. 948. </s> [Footnote 6 Both the House and Senate Committee Reports stated that the need for Article 3 (a) was to remedy the undesirable situation pointed [350 U.S. 11, 27] out by the Hirshberg decision. Both reports contain the following sentence: "In the opinion of the committee, the present provisions [Article 3 (a)] of this subdivision provide a desirable degree of continuing jurisdiction and at the same time place sufficient limitations on the continuing jurisdiction to prevent capricious actions on the part of military authorities." H. R. Rep. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11; S. Rep. No. 486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8. The same view was expressed by the managers of the bill in the House and Senate. Representative Brooks at 95 Cong. Rec. 5721 and Senator Kefauver at 96 Cong. Rec. 1358. Views against the adoption of Article 3 (a) were urged in committee and on the floor but did not prevail. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services on S. 857 and H. R. 4080, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 256-257; 96 Cong. Rec. 1294, 1366, 1412-1417. </s> [Footnote 7 96 Cong. Rec. 1294 et seq. The proposed substitute for Article 3 (a) was: "Subject to the provisions of article 43, jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon the several district courts of the United States to try and punish according to the applicable provisions and limitations of this code and the regulations made thereunder - </s> "(1) any person charged with having committed an offense against this code while in a status in which he was subject to this code which status has been terminated; . . . ." </s> [Footnote 8 "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; . . . ." </s> [Footnote 9 "The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed." Art. III, 2, cl. 3. </s> Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 , and cases cited; Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921. </s> [Footnote 10 Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 382 ; Mosher v. Hunter, 143 F.2d 745. Cf. Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1, 7 ; Walker v. Morris, 3 American Jurist and Law Magazine 281. </s> [Footnote 11 Section 158 of the British Army Act (Gt. Brit., Stats. Rev., 3d ed., Vol. X, 457, 563-564; War Office, Manual of Military Law, Pt. I, 1951, 376-377) provides: </s> "(I) Where an offence under this Act has been committed by any person while subject to military law, such person may be taken into and kept in military custody, and tried and punished for such offence, although he, or the corps or battalion to which he belongs, has ceased to be subject to military law in like manner as he might have been [350 U.S. 11, 30] taken into and kept in military custody, tried or punished, if he or such corps or battalion had continued so subject: </s> "Provided that where a person has since the commission of an offence ceased to be subject to military law, he shall not be tried for such offence, except in the case of the offence of mutiny, desertion, or fraudulent enlistment, unless his trial commences within three months after he had ceased to be subject to military law, or unless the offence was committed outside the United Kingdom and is an offence which when committed in England is punishable by the law of England, and the Attorney-General consents to the trial . . . ." </s> The British Army Act, including the provision in 158 for court-martial after termination of military service, dates from 1881. 17 Law Reports (Statutes) 44 and 45 Vict. 260, 331. </s> See also the Defence Act of Australia, 103 (3), Commonwealth Acts, Vol. II (1901-1950), 1560, 1596; National Defence Act of Canada, 1950, 56 (2) and (3), and 68 (f), Revised Statutes of Canada, 1952, Vol. III, 3814 and 3821. New Zealand has a similar statute (Army Act, 127 (1), New Zealand Statutes, 1950, 283, 370-371). </s> At the time of our Constitutional Convention, there had already been held the well-known court-martial of Lord George Sackville for disobedience of orders of his Chief, Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, at the battle of Minden. The trial took place after his dismissal from his command and the service. The King, George II, submitted the question of jurisdiction of the court-martial to the twelve judges composing the Courts of King's Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer, headed by Lord Mansfield, and received the following advisory answer: </s> "In obedience to your Majesty's commands, signified to us by a letter . . ., referring to us the following question, `Whether an officer of the army having been dismissed from his Majesty's service, and having no military employment, is triable by a Court Martial for a military offence lately committed by him while in actual service and pay as an officer?' </s> "We have taken the same into consideration, and see no ground [350 U.S. 11, 31] to doubt of the legality of the jurisdiction of a Court Martial in the case put by the above question." </s> The judges ended with a reservation of the privilege of changing their minds if the matter were judicially presented, apparently in accordance with the practice in such advisory opinions. See note, 28 Eng. Rep. 941. II Eden's Chancery Reports, App., p. 371. See Trials, Courts Martial - Sackville, 1760. On conviction the King directed the sentence be recorded in the order book of every regiment, British and American. In view of the prominence of the parties and the subsequent distinguished career of Lord George Sackville, who died in 1785 after having been advanced in 1782 to the peerage as Viscount Sackville for his services in Parliament, the Irish administration, and as Secretary of State for the Colonies, the case could hardly have escaped the notice of the members of the Constitutional Convention. See VII Dictionary of Nat. Biography 1110; 4 Smollett, History of England, 337; Tytler, Military Law (2d ed.), 113. 8 Op. Atty. Gen. 328. But see, 31 Op. Atty. Gen. 521; Clode, Martial and Military Law, 92. </s> [Footnote 12 It must be noted, however, that a leading military authority is against that view. See Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents (2d ed., Reprint 1920), 105, although he admits the weight of the precedents is against him. </s> See, however, a comparable authority, Edmund M. Morgan, Court-Martial Jurisdiction, 4 Minn. Law Rev. 79, 83 (1920). For further discussion of the problem, see Myers and Kaplan, Crime Without Punishment, 35 Geo. L. J. 303 (1947); Note, Military Jurisdiction over Discharged Servicemen: Constitutionality and Judicial Protection, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 479 (1954); Note, The Amenability of the Veteran to Military Law, 46 Col. L. Rev. 977 (1946). </s> [Footnote 13 "That any person heretofore called or hereafter to be called into or employed in such forces or service, who shall commit any violation of this act and shall afterwards receive his discharge, or be dismissed from the service, shall, notwithstanding such discharge or dismissal, continue to be liable to be arrested and held for trial and sentence by a court-martial, in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had not received such discharge or been dismissed." </s> This was carried into the Articles of War. Rev. Stat. (1878), Art. 60, p. 235; 10 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) 1566, Art. 94, amended 62 Stat. 641, and in the Articles for the Government of the Navy, 34 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) 1200, Art. 14 (Eleventh), until the enactment of the present Uniform Code, Art. 3. </s> [Footnote 14 12 Op. Atty. Gen. 4, 5: "It is simply a regulation which is to follow a dismissal, providing, in certain contingencies, for the restoration of the officer to the service, and leaving the dismissal in full force if those contingencies do not happen." </s> In 1848 Attorney General Toucey, in the absence of any applicable rule for the government of the Army, had ruled that a charge of murder could not be brought against an officer already mustered out. 5 Op. Atty. Gen. 55, 58. A similar conclusion was stated by Attorney General Palmer (1919), 31 Op. Atty. Gen. 521, 529. See 8 Op. Atty. Gen. 328, 332. </s> [Footnote 15 We are advised by the Government that this case was reversed by stipulation. See Kronberg v. Hale, 180 F.2d 128, 130. </s> [Footnote 16 Fifth Amendment: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." </s> Sixth Amendment: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." </s> [Footnote 17 "Another guarantee of freedom was broken when Milligan was denied a trial by jury. The great minds of the country have differed on the correct interpretation to be given to various provisions of the Federal Constitution; and judicial decision has been often invoked to settle their true meaning; but until recently no one ever doubted that the right of trial by jury was fortified in the organic law against the power of attack. It is now assailed; but if ideas can be expressed in words, and language has any meaning, this right - one of the most valuable in a free country - is preserved to every one accused of crime who is not attached to the army, or navy, or militia in actual service. The sixth amendment affirms that `in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury,' language broad enough to embrace all persons and cases; but the fifth, recognizing the necessity of an indictment, or presentment, before any one can be held to answer for high crimes, `excepts cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service, in time of war or public danger;' and the framers of the Constitution, doubtless, meant to limit the right of trial by jury, in the sixth amendment, to those persons who were subject to indictment or presentment in the fifth." </s> The four who concurred agreed with the majority on this point: </s> "The Constitution itself provides for military government as well as for civil government. And we do not understand it to be claimed that the civil safeguards of the Constitution have application in cases within the proper sphere of the former. </s> "What, then, is that proper sphere? Congress has power to raise and support armies; to provide and maintain a navy; to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces; and to provide for governing such part of the militia as may be in the service of the United States. </s> "It is not denied that the power to make rules for the government of the army and navy is a power to provide for trial and punishment by military courts without a jury. It has been so understood and exercised from the adoption of the Constitution to the present time. </s> "Nor, in our judgment, does the fifth, or any other amendment, [350 U.S. 11, 37] abridge that power. `Cases arising in the land and naval forces, or in the militia in actual service in time of war or public danger,' are expressly excepted from the fifth amendment, `that no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury,' and it is admitted that the exception applies to the other amendments as well as to the fifth. </s> . . . . . </s> "We think, therefore, that the power of Congress, in the government of the land and naval forces and of the militia, is not at all affected by the fifth or any other amendment." 4 Wall., at 137-138. </s> It was so held as to Haupt, treated as an American citizen in Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 20 , 24, 40, 44. </s> "We conclude that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments did not restrict whatever authority was conferred by the Constitution to try offenses against the law of war by military commission, and that petitioners, charged with such an offense not required to be tried by jury at common law, were lawfully placed on trial by the Commission without a jury." Id., at 45. </s> [Footnote 18 Massachusetts: "That no person shall be tried for any crime by which he may incur an infamous punishment, or loss of life, until he be first indicted by a grand jury, except in such cases as may arise in the government and regulation of the land and naval forces." </s> New Hampshire: "That no person shall be tried for any crime by which he may incur an infamous punishment, or loss of life, until he first be indicted by a grand jury, except in such cases as may arise in the government and regulation of the land and naval forces." </s> New York: "That (except in the government of the land and naval forces, and of the militia when in actual service, and in cases of impeachment) a presentment or indictment by a grand jury ought to be observed as a necessary preliminary to the trial of all crimes cognizable by the judiciary of the United States; . . . ." </s> Rhode Island: "That, in all capital and criminal prosecutions, a man hath the right to demand the cause and nature of his accusation, to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses, to call for evidence, and be allowed counsel in his favor, and to a fair and speedy trial by an impartial jury in his vicinage, without whose unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty, (except in the government of the land and naval forces,) nor can he be compelled to give evidence against himself." I Elliot's Debates (2d ed.), 323, 326, 328, 334. </s> [Footnote 19 As to that, Senator Howard, in charge of the bill, said: </s> "The question arises, what is a `case arising in the land or naval forces of the United States?' There is not any doubt that a soldier or officer who has enlisted in the service of the United States is or may be made subject to martial law. Why is he made subject to martial law? Because, being in the service of the United States, the act committed by him is a case arising in that service. . . . An officer or soldier enters the Army under contract, under an agreement to render this service; and how, I beg to inquire, does the case of a contractor who engages to furnish arms, equipments, or munitions of war to the United States for the same purpose, differ from the case of an officer or soldier who is simply to bear arms and use the materials which the contractor is to furnish?" Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 953 (1863). </s> [Footnote 20 United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336, 388, "the waters on which . . . cases may arise"; Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 441, 466, "case of collision taking place on the Mississippi river"; and "cause of action arisen on the ocean." Id., at 467. De Lovio v. Boit, 7 Fed. Cas. 418, 432, 434-435. </s> [Footnote 21 "This clause enables the judicial department to receive jurisdiction to the full extent of the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, when any question respecting them shall assume such a form that the judicial power is capable of acting on it. That power is capable of acting only when the subject is submitted to it by a party who asserts his rights in the form prescribed by law. It then becomes a case, and the constitution declares, that the judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States." Osborn v. Bank of The United States, 9 Wheat. 738, at 819. </s> "By cases and controversies are intended the claims of litigants brought before the courts for determination by such regular proceedings as are established by law or custom for the protection or enforcement of rights, or the prevention, redress, or punishment of wrongs. Whenever the claim of a party under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States takes such a form that the judicial power is capable of acting upon it, then it has become a case. The term implies the existence of present or possible adverse parties whose contentions are submitted to the court for adjudication." In re Pacific R. Commission, 32 F. 241, 255. </s> "These definitions have been adhered to by this Court in Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356 and Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 ." </s> [Footnote 22 Ex parte Joly, 290 F. 858; Terry v. United States, 2 F. Supp. 962; Kronberg v. Hale, 180 F.2d 128. </s> MR. JUSTICE MINTON, whom MR. JUSTICE BURTON joins, dissenting. </s> I agree with the opinion of MR. JUSTICE REED, and I would add another reason why I think the judgment should be affirmed. </s> A civilian not under the jurisdiction of the Military Code has a right to be tried in a civil court for an alleged crime as a civilian. My trouble is that I don't think Toth was a full-fledged civilian. By 50 U.S.C. 553, Congress had retained jurisdiction to try Toth for a crime he had committed while a soldier and for which admittedly he could have been tried by court-martial if the United States had discovered his crime one minute before discharge. </s> He was not a full-fledged civilian under his discharge. He was still a soldier to answer in court-martial for the crime he had committed while a soldier. He had a conditional discharge only. The United States clearly reserved the right to charge and try him by court-martial for a crime committed while in the status of a soldier. This is the way Congress had provided for his trial. No other way was provided. That it may have provided another way is not to say the way provided is invalid. </s> I know of no reason why Congress could not pass this statute, 50 U.S.C. 553, retaining court-martial jurisdiction over Toth to answer for a crime he allegedly committed when he was clearly subject to court-martial. Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1 , holds that, even though discharged from service, one convicted and serving sentence for a military offense could still be tried by court-martial [350 U.S. 11, 45] for murder and conspiracy to commit murder, even though the crime was alleged to have been committed within the limits of a state. Congress had made no provision for retention of status in that case as it had in this case, yet the Court implied the continuing military status to warrant the jurisdiction. No implied status is necessary here. It is expressly reserved by statute. Toth remained in that status by virtue of the statute. </s> [350 U.S. 11, 46]

United States Supreme Court IOWA v. TOVAR(2004) No. 02-1541 Argued: January 21, 2004Decided: March 8, 2004 </s> At respondent Tovar's November 1996 arraignment for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol (OWI), in response to the trial court's questions, Tovar affirmed that he wanted to represent himself and to plead guilty. Conducting the guilty plea colloquy required by the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court explained that, if Tovar pleaded not guilty, he would be entitled to a speedy and public jury trial where he would have the right to counsel who could help him select a jury, question and cross-examine witnesses, present evidence, and make arguments on his behalf. By pleading guilty, the court cautioned, Tovar would give up his right to a trial and his rights at that trial to be represented by counsel, to remain silent, to the presumption of innocence, and to subpoena witnesses and compel their testimony. The court then informed Tovar of the maximum and minimum penalties for an OWI conviction, and explained that, before accepting a guilty plea, the court had to assure itself that Tovar was in fact guilty of the charged offense. To that end, the court informed Tovar of the two elements of the OWI charge:The defendant must have (1)operated a motor vehicle in Iowa (2)while intoxicated. Tovar confirmed, first, that on the date in question, he was operating a motor vehicle in Iowa and, second, that he did not dispute the result of the intoxilyzer test showing his blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit nearly twice over. The court then accepted his guilty plea and, at a hearing the next month, imposed the minimum sentence of two days in jail and a fine. In 1998, Tovar was again charged with OWI, this time as a second offense, an aggravated misdemeanor under Iowa law. Represented by counsel in that proceeding, he pleaded guilty. In 2000, Tovar was charged with third-offense OWI, a class "D" felony under Iowa law. Again represented by counsel, Tovar pleaded not guilty to the felony charge. Counsel moved to preclude use of Tovar's first (1996) OWI conviction to enhance his 2000 offense from an aggravated misdemeanor to a third-offense felony. Tovar maintained that his 1996 waiver of counsel was invalid--not fully knowing, intelligent, and voluntary--because he was never made aware by the court of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. The trial court denied the motion, found Tovar guilty, and sentenced him on the OWI third-offense charge. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court of Iowa reversed and remanded for entry of judgment without consideration of Tovar's first OWI conviction. Holding that the colloquy preceding acceptance of Tovar's 1996 guilty plea had been constitutionally inadequate, Iowa's high court ruled, as here at issue, that two warnings not given to Tovar are essential to the "knowing and intelligent" waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the plea stage: The defendant must be advised specifically that waiving counsel's assistance in deciding whether to plead guilty (1) entails the risk that a viable defense will be overlooked and (2) deprives him of the opportunity to obtain an independent opinion on whether, under the facts and applicable law, it is wise to plead guilty. Held:Neither warning ordered by the Iowa Supreme Court is mandated by the Sixth Amendment. The constitutional requirement is satisfied when the trial court informs the accused of the nature of the charges against him, of his right to be counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of allowable punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea. Pp.8-15. (a)The Sixth Amendment secures to a defendant facing incarceration the right to counsel at all "critical stages" of the criminal process, see, e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170, including a plea hearing, White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (per curiam). Because Tovar received a two-day prison term for his first OWI conviction, he had a right to counsel both at the plea stage and at trial had he elected to contest the charge. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34, 37. Although an accused may choose to forgo representation, any waiver of the right to counsel must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464. The information a defendant must possess in order to make an intelligent election depends on a range of case-specific factors, including his education or sophistication, the complex or easily grasped nature of the charge, and the stage of the proceeding. See Johnson, 487 U.S. 285, 298; see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, a less searching or formal colloquy may suffice at earlier stages of the criminal process, 487 U.S., at 299. In Patterson, this Court described a pragmatic approach to right-to-counsel waivers, one that asks "what purposes a lawyer can serve at the particular stage of the proceedings in question, and what assistance [counsel] could provide to an accused at that stage." Id., at 298. Less rigorous warnings are required pretrial because, at that stage, "the full dangers and disadvantages of self-representation ... are less substantial and more obvious to an accused than they are at trial." Id., at 299. Pp.8-11. </s> (b)The Sixth Amendment does not compel the two admonitions ordered by the Iowa Supreme Court. "[T]he law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the defendant fully understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in general in the circumstances ...." United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629. Even if the defendant lacked a full and complete appreciation of all of the consequences flowing from his waiver, the State may nevertheless prevail if it shows that the information provided to the defendant satisfied the constitutional minimum. Patterson, 487 U.S., at 294. The Iowa high court gave insufficient consideration to this Court's guiding decisions. In prescribing scripted admonitions and holding them necessary in every guilty plea instance, that court overlooked this Court's observations that the information a defendant must have to waive counsel intelligently will depend upon the particular facts and circumstances in each case, Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464. Moreover, as Tovar acknowledges, in a collateral attack on an uncounseled conviction, it is the defendant's burden to prove that he did not competently and intelligently waive his right to counsel. Tovar has never claimed that he did not fully understand the 1996 OWI charge or the range of punishment for that crime prior to pleading guilty. He has never "articulate[d] with precision" the additional information counsel could have provided, given the simplicity of the charge. See Patterson, 487 U.S., at 294. Nor does he assert that he was unaware of his right to be counseled prior to and at his arraignment. Before this Court, he suggests only that he may have been under the mistaken belief that he had a right to counsel at trial, but not if he was, instead, going to plead guilty. Given "the particular facts and circumstances surrounding [this] case," Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464, it is far from clear that warnings of the kind required by the Iowa Supreme Court would have enlightened Tovar's decision whether to seek counsel or to represent himself. In a case so straightforward, the two admonitions at issue might confuse or mislead a defendant more than they would inform him, i.e., the warnings might be misconstrued to convey that a meritorious defense exists or that the defendant could plead to a lesser charge, when neither prospect is a realistic one. If a defendant delays his plea in the vain hope that counsel could uncover a tenable basis for contesting or reducing the criminal charge, the prompt disposition of the case will be impeded, and the resources of either the State (if the defendant is indigent) or the defendant himself (if he is financially ineligible for appointed counsel) will be wasted. States are free to adopt by statute, rule, or decision any guides to the acceptance of an uncounseled plea they deem useful, but the Federal Constitution does not require the two admonitions here in controversy. Pp.11-15. 656 N.W. 2d 112, reversed and remanded. Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. </s> IOWA, PETITIONER v. FELIPE EDGARDO TOVAR on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of iowa [March 8, 2004] </s> Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The Sixth Amendment safeguards to an accused who faces incarceration the right to counsel at all critical stages of the criminal process. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967). The entry of a guilty plea, whether to a misdemeanor or a felony charge, ranks as a "critical stage" at which the right to counsel adheres. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34 (1972); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (per curiam). Waiver of the right to counsel, as of constitutional rights in the criminal process generally, must be a "knowing, intelligent ac[t] done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). This case concerns the extent to which a trial judge, before accepting a guilty plea from an uncounseled defendant, must elaborate on the right to representation. </s> Beyond affording the defendant the opportunity to consult with counsel prior to entry of a plea and to be assisted by counsel at the plea hearing, must the court, specifically: (1) advise the defendant that "waiving the assistance of counsel in deciding whether to plead guilty [entails] the risk that a viable defense will be overlooked"; and (2) "admonis[h]" the defendant "that by waiving his right to an attorney he will lose the opportunity to obtain an independent opinion on whether, under the facts and applicable law, it is wise to plead guilty"? 656 N.W. 2d 112, 121 (Iowa 2003). The Iowa Supreme Court held both warnings essential to the "knowing and intelligent" waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. Ibid. </s> We hold that neither warning is mandated by the Sixth Amendment. The constitutional requirement is satisfied when the trial court informs the accused of the nature of the charges against him, of his right to be counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of allowable punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea. I </s> On November 2, 1996, respondent Felipe Edgardo Tovar, then a 21-year-old college student, was arrested in Ames, Iowa, for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (OWI). See Iowa Code §321J.2 (1995).1 An intoxilyzer test administered the night of Tovar's arrest showed he had a blood alcohol level of 0.194. App. 24. The arresting officer informed Tovar of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S 436 (1966). Tovar signed a form stating that he waived those rights and agreed to answer questions. Iowa State Univ. Dept. of Public Safety, OWI Supplemental Report 3 (Nov. 2, 1996), Lodging of Petitioner; Iowa State Univ. Dept. of Public Safety, Rights Warnings (Nov. 2, 1996), Lodging ofPetitioner. Some hours after his arrest, Tovar appeared before a judge in the Iowa District Court for Story County. The judge indicated on the Initial Appearance form that Tovar appeared without counsel and waived application for court-appointed counsel. Initial Appearance in No. OWCR 23989 (Nov. 2, 1996), Lodging of Petitioner. The judge also marked on the form's checklist that Tovar was "informed of the charge and his ... rights and receive[d] a copy of the Complaint." Ibid. Arraignment was set for November 18, 1996. In the interim, Tovar was released from jail. </s> At the November 18 arraignment,2 the court's inquiries of Tovar began: "Mr. Tovar appears without counsel and I see, Mr. Tovar, that you waived application for a court appointed attorney. Did you want to represent yourself at today's hearing?" App. 8-9. Tovar replied: "Yes, sir." Id., at 9. The court soon after asked: "[H]ow did you wish to plead?" Tovar answered: "Guilty." Ibid. Tovar affirmed that he had not been promised anything or threatened in any way to induce him to plead guilty. Id., at 13-14. </s> Conducting the guilty plea colloquy required by the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure, see Iowa Rule Crim. Proc. 8 (1992),3 the court explained that, if Tovar pleaded not guilty, he would be entitled to a speedy and public trial by jury, App. 15, and would have the right to be represented at that trial by an attorney, who "could help [Tovar] select a jury, question and cross-examine the State's witnesses, present evidence, if any, in [his] behalf, and make arguments to the judge and jury on [his] behalf," id., at 16. By pleading guilty, the court cautioned, "not only [would Tovar] give up [his] right to a trial [of any kind on the charge against him], [he would] give up [his] right to be represented by an attorney at that trial." Ibid. The court further advised Tovar that, if he entered a guilty plea, he would relinquish the right to remain silent at trial, the right to the presumption of innocence, and the right to subpoena witnesses and compel their testimony. Id., at 16-19. </s> Turning to the particular offense with which Tovar had been charged, the court informed him that an OWI conviction carried a maximum penalty of a year in jail and a $1,000 fine, and a minimum penalty of two days in jail and a $500 fine. Id., at 20. Tovar affirmed that he understood his exposure to those penalties. Ibid. The court next explained that, before accepting a guilty plea, the court had to assure itself that Tovar was in fact guilty of the charged offense. Id., at 21-22. To that end, the court informed Tovar that the OWI charge had only two elements: first, on the date in question, Tovar was operating a motor vehicle in the State of Iowa; second, when he did so, he was intoxicated. Id., at 23. Tovar confirmed that he had been driving in Ames, Iowa, on the night he was apprehended and that he did not dispute the results of the intoxilyzer test administered by the police that night, which showed that his blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit nearly twice over. Id., at 23-24. </s> After the plea colloquy, the court asked Tovar if he still wished to plead guilty, and Tovar affirmed that he did. Id., at 27-28. The court then accepted Tovar's plea, observing that there was "a factual basis" for it, and that Tovar had made the plea "voluntarily, with a full understanding of [his] rights, [and] ... of the consequences of [pleading guilty]." Id., at 28. </s> On December 30, 1996, Tovar appeared for sentencing on the OWI charge4 and, simultaneously, for arraignment on a subsequent charge of driving with a suspended license. Id., at 45-46; see Iowa Code §321J.21 (1995).5 Noting that Tovar was again in attendance without counsel, the court inquired: "Mr. Tovar, did you want to represent yourself at today's hearing or did you want to take some time to hire an attorney to represent you?" App. 46.6 Tovar replied that he would represent himself. Ibid. The court then engaged in essentially the same plea colloquy on the suspension charge as it had on the OWI charge the previous month. Id., at 48-51. After accepting Tovar's guilty plea on the suspension charge, the court sentenced him on both counts: For the OWI conviction, the court imposed the minimum sentence of two days in jail and a $500 fine, plus a surcharge and costs; for the suspension conviction, the court imposed a $250 fine, plus a surcharge and costs. Id., at 55. </s> On March 16, 1998, Tovar was convicted of OWI for a second time. He was represented by counsel in that proceeding, in which he pleaded guilty. Record 60; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 24, n.1. </s> On December 14, 2000, Tovar was again charged with OWI, this time as a third offense, see Iowa Code §321J.2 (1999), and additionally with driving while license barred, see §321.561. Iowa law classifies first-offense OWI as a serious misdemeanor and second-offense OWI as an aggravated misdemeanor. §§321J.2(2)(a)-(b). Third-offense OWI, and any OWI offenses thereafter, rank as class "D" felonies. §321J.2(2)(c). Represented by an attorney, Tovar pleaded not guilty to both December 2000 charges. Record 55. </s> In March 2001, through counsel, Tovar filed a Motion for Adjudication of Law Points;7 the motion urged that Tovar's first OWI conviction, in 1996, could not be used to enhance the December 2000 OWI charge from a second-offense aggravated misdemeanor to a third-offense felony. App. 3-5.8 Significantly, Tovar did not allege that he was unaware at the November 1996 arraignment of his right to counsel prior to pleading guilty and at the plea hearing. Instead, he maintained that his 1996 waiver of counsel was invalid--not "full knowing, intelligent, and voluntary"--because he "was never made aware by the court ... of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation." Id., at 3-4. </s> The court denied Tovar's motion in May 2001, explaining: "Where the offense is readily understood by laypersons and the penalty is not unduly severe, the duty of inquiry which is imposed upon the court is only that which is required to assure an awareness of [the] right to counsel and a willingness to proceed without counsel in the face of such awareness." App. to Pet. for Cert. 36-37 (brackets in original). Tovar then waived his right to a jury trial and was found guilty by the court of both the OWI third-offense charge and driving while license barred. Id., at 33. Four months after that adjudication, Tovar was sentenced. On the OWI third-offense charge, he received a 180-day jail term, with all but 30 days suspended, three years of probation, and a $2,500 fine plus surcharges and costs. App. 70-71. For driving while license barred, Tovar received a 30-day jail term, to run concurrently with the OWI sentence, and a suspended $500 fine. Id., at 71. </s> The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed, App. to Pet. for Cert. 23-30, but the Supreme Court of Iowa, by a 4 to 3 vote, reversed and remanded for entry of judgment without consideration of Tovar's first OWI conviction, 656 N.W. 2d 112 (2003). Iowa's highest court acknowledged that "the dangers of proceeding pro se at a guilty plea proceeding will be different than the dangers of proceeding pro se at a jury trial, [therefore] the inquiries made at these proceedings will also be different." Id., at 119. The court nonetheless held that the colloquy preceding acceptance of Tovar's 1996 guilty plea had been constitutionally inadequate, and instructed dispositively: "[A] defendant such as Tovar who chooses to plead guilty without the assistance of an attorney must be advised of the usefulness of an attorney and the dangers of self-representation in order to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.... [T]he trial judge [must] advise the defendant generally that there are defenses to criminal charges that may not be known by laypersons and that the danger in waiving the assistance of counsel in deciding whether to plead guilty is the risk that a viable defense will be overlooked. The defendant should be admonished that by waiving his right to an attorney he will lose the opportunity to obtain an independent opinion on whether, under the facts and applicable law, it is wise to plead guilty. In addition, the court must ensure the defendant understands the nature of the charges against him and the range of allowable punishments." Id., at 121.9 </s> We granted certiorari, 539 U.S. -- (2003), in view of the division of opinion on the requirements the Sixth Amendment imposes for waiver of counsel at a plea hearing, compare, e.g., United States v. Akins, 276 F. 3d 1141, 1146-1147 (CA9 2002), with State v. Cashman, 491 N.W. 2d 462, 465-466 (S.D. 1992), and we now reverse the judgment of the Iowa Supreme Court. II </s> The Sixth Amendment secures to a defendant who faces incarceration the right to counsel at all "critical stages" of the criminal process. See, e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S., at 170; United States v. Wade, 388 U.S., at 224. A plea hearing qualifies as a "critical stage." White v. Maryland, 373 U.S., at 60. Because Tovar received a two-day prison term for his 1996 OWI conviction, he had a right to counsel both at the plea stage and at trial had he elected to contest the charge. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S., at 34, 37. A person accused of crime, however, may choose to forgo representation. While the Constitution "does not force a lawyer upon a defendant," Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942), it does require that any waiver of the right to counsel be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). Tovar contends that his waiver of counsel in November 1996, at his first OWI plea hearing, was insufficiently informed, and therefore constitutionally invalid. In particular, he asserts that the trial judge did not elaborate on the value, at that stage of the case, of an attorney's advice and the dangers of self-representation in entering a plea. Brief for Respondent 15.10 </s> We have described a waiver of counsel as intelligent when the defendant "knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open." Adams, 317 U.S., at 279. We have not, however, prescribed any formula or script to be read to a defendant who states that he elects to proceed without counsel. The information a defendant must possess in order to make an intelligent election, our decisions indicate, will depend on a range of case-specific factors, including the defendant's education or sophistication, the complex or easily grasped nature of the charge, and the stage of the proceeding. See Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464. </s> As to waiver of trial counsel, we have said that before a defendant may be allowed to proceed pro se, he must be warned specifically of the hazards ahead. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), is instructive. The defendant in Faretta resisted counsel's aid, preferring to represent himself. The Court held that he had a constitutional right to self-representation. In recognizing that right, however, we cautioned: "Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing ...." Id., at 835 (internal quotation marks omitted). </s> Later, in Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988), we elaborated on "the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation" to which Faretta referred. "[A]t trial," we observed, "counsel is required to help even the most gifted layman adhere to the rules of procedure and evidence, comprehend the subtleties of voir dire, examine and cross-examine witnesses effectively ..., object to improper prosecution questions, and much more." 487 U.S., at 299, n.13. Warnings of the pitfalls of proceeding to trial without counsel, we therefore said, must be "rigorous[ly]" conveyed. Id., at 298. We clarified, however, that at earlier stages of the criminal process, a less searching or formal colloquy may suffice. Id., at 299. </s> Patterson concerned postindictment questioning by police and prosecutor. At that stage of the case, we held, the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), adequately informed the defendant not only of his Fifth Amendment rights, but of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel as well. 487 U.S., at 293. Miranda warnings, we said, effectively convey to a defendant his right to have counsel present during questioning. In addition, they inform him of the "ultimate adverse consequence" of making uncounseled admissions, i.e., his statements may be used against him in any ensuing criminal proceeding. 487 U.S., at 293. The Miranda warnings, we added, "also sufficed ... to let [the defendant] know what a lawyer could 'do for him,'" namely, advise him to refrain from making statements that could prove damaging to his defense. 487 U.S., at 294. </s> Patterson describes a "pragmatic approach to the waiver question," one that asks "what purposes a lawyer can serve at the particular stage of the proceedings in question, and what assistance he could provide to an accused at that stage," in order "to determine the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the type of warnings and procedures that should be required before a waiver of that right will be recognized." Id., at 298. We require less rigorous warnings pretrial, Patterson explained, not because pretrial proceedings are "less important" than trial, but because, at that stage, "the full dangers and disadvantages of self-representation ... are less substantial and more obvious to an accused than they are at trial." Id., at 299 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). </s> In Tovar's case, the State maintains that, like the Miranda warnings we found adequate in Patterson, Iowa's plea colloquy suffices both to advise a defendant of his right to counsel, and to assure that his guilty plea is informed and voluntary. Brief for Petitioner 20; Tr. of Oral Arg. 3. The plea colloquy, according to the State, "makes plain that an attorney's role would be to challenge the charge or sentence," and therefore adequately conveys to the defendant both the utility of counsel and the dangers of self-representation. Brief for Petitioner 25. Tovar, on the other hand, defends the precise instructions required by the Iowa Supreme Court, see supra, at 7-8, as essential to a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea stage waiver of counsel. Brief for Respondent 15. </s> To resolve this case, we need not endorse the State's position that nothing more than the plea colloquy was needed to safeguard Tovar's right to counsel. Preliminarily, we note that there were some things more in this case. Tovar first indicated that he waived counsel at his Initial Appearance, see supra, at 3, affirmed that he wanted to represent himself at the plea hearing, see supra, at 3, and declined the court's offer of "time to hire an attorney" at sentencing, when it was still open to him to request withdrawal of his plea, see supra, at 4-5, and n.4. Further, the State does not contest that a defendant must be alerted to his right to the assistance of counsel in entering a plea. See Brief for Petitioner 19 (acknowledging defendant's need to know "retained or appointed counsel can assist" at the plea stage by "work[ing] on the issues of guilt and sentencing"). Indeed, the Iowa Supreme Court appeared to assume that Tovar was informed of his entitlement to counsel's aid or, at least, to have pretermitted that issue. See 656 N.W. 2d, at 117. Accordingly, the State presents a narrower question: "Does the Sixth Amendment require a court to give a rigid and detailed admonishment to a pro se defendant pleading guilty of the usefulness of an attorney, that an attorney may provide an independent opinion whether it is wise to plead guilty and that without an attorney the defendant risks overlooking a defense?" Pet. for Cert. i. </s> Training on that question, we turn to, and reiterate, the particular language the Iowa Supreme Court employed in announcing the warnings it thought the Sixth Amendment required: "[T]he trial judge [must] advise the defendant generally that there are defenses to criminal charges that may not be known by laypersons and that the danger in waiving the assistance of counsel in deciding whether to plead guilty is the risk that a viable defense will be overlooked," 656 N.W. 2d, at 121; in addition, "[t]he defendant should be admonished that by waiving his right to an attorney he will lose the opportunity to obtain an independent opinion on whether, under the facts and applicable law, it is wise to plead guilty," ibid. Tovar did not receive such advice, and the sole question before us is whether the Sixth Amendment compels the two admonitions here in controversy.11 We hold it does not. </s> This Court recently explained, in reversing a lower court determination that a guilty plea was not voluntary: "[T]he law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the defendant fully understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in general in the circumstances--even though the defendant may not know the specific detailed consequences of invoking it." United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002) (emphasis in original). We similarly observed in Patterson: "If [the defendant] ... lacked a full and complete appreciation of all of the consequences flowing from his waiver, it does not defeat the State's showing that the information it provided to him satisfied the constitutional minimum." 487 U.S., at 294 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Iowa Supreme Court gave insufficient consideration to these guiding decisions. In prescribing scripted admonitions and holding them necessary in every guilty plea instance, we further note, the Iowa high court overlooked our observations that the information a defendant must have to waive counsel intelligently will "depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case," Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464; supra, at 9. </s> Moreover, as Tovar acknowledges, in a collateral attack on an uncounseled conviction, it is the defendant's burden to prove that he did not competently and intelligently waive his right to the assistance of counsel. See Watts v. State, 257 N.W. 2d 70, 71 (Iowa 1977); Brief for Respondent 5, 26-27. In that light, we note that Tovar has never claimed that he did not fully understand the charge or the range of punishment for the crime prior to pleading guilty. Further, he has never "articulate[d] with precision" the additional information counsel could have provided, given the simplicity of the charge. See Patterson, 487 U.S., at 294; supra, at 4. Nor does he assert that he was unaware of his right to be counseled prior to and at his arraignment. Before this Court, he suggests only that he "may have been under the mistaken belief that he had a right to counsel at trial, but not if he was merely going to plead guilty." Brief for Respondent 16 (emphasis added).12 </s> Given "the particular facts and circumstances surrounding [this] case," see Johnson, 304 U.S., at 464, it is far from clear that warnings of the kind required by the Iowa Supreme Court would have enlightened Tovar's decision whether to seek counsel or to represent himself. In a case so straightforward, the United States as amicus curiae suggests, the admonitions at issue might confuse or mislead a defendant more than they would inform him: The warnings the Iowa Supreme Court declared mandatory might be misconstrued as a veiled suggestion that a meritorious defense exists or that the defendant could plead to a lesser charge, when neither prospect is a realistic one. If a defendant delays his plea in the vain hope that counsel could uncover a tenable basis for contesting or reducing the criminal charge, the prompt disposition of the case will be impeded, and the resources of either the State (if the defendant is indigent) or the defendant himself (if he is financially ineligible for appointed counsel) will be wasted. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 9, 28-29; Tr. of Oral Arg. 20-21. </s> We note, finally, that States are free to adopt by statute, rule, or decision any guides to the acceptance of an uncounseled plea they deem useful. See, e.g., Alaska Rule Crim. Proc. 39(a) (2003); Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.111(d) (2003); Md. Ct. Rule 4-215 (2002); Minn. Rule Crim.Proc. 5.02 (2003); Pa. Rule Crim. Proc. 121, comment (2003). We hold only that the two admonitions the Iowa Supreme Court ordered are not required by the Federal Constitution. * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. </s> FOOTNOTESFootnote 1"A person commits the offense of operating while intoxicated if the person operates a motor vehicle in this state in either of the following conditions: a. While under the influence of an alcoholic beverage .... b. While having an alcohol concentration ... of .10 or more." Iowa Code §321J.2(1) (1995). Footnote 2Tovar appeared in court along with four other individuals charged with misdemeanor offenses. App. 6-10. The presiding judge proposed to conduct the plea proceeding for the five cases jointly, and each of the individuals indicated he did not object to that course of action. Id., at 11. Footnote 3The Rule has since been renumbered 2.8. Footnote 4At that stage, it was still open to Tovar to request withdrawal of his guilty plea on the OWI charge and to substitute a plea of not guilty. See Iowa Rule Crim. Proc. 8(2)(a) (1992). Footnote 5In order to appear at the OWI arraignment, Tovar drove to the courthouse despite the suspension of his license; he was apprehended en route home. App. 50, 53. Footnote 6Prior to asking Tovar whether he wished to hire counsel, the court noted that Tovar had applied for a court-appointed attorney but that his application had been denied because he was financially dependent upon his parents. Id., at 46. Tovar does not here challenge the absence of counsel at sentencing. Footnote 7See Iowa Rule Crim. Proc.10(2) (1992) ("Any defense, objection, or request which is capable of determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised before trial by motion."); State v. Wilt, 333 N. W. 2d 457, 460 (Iowa 1983) (approving use of motions for adjudication of law points under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 10(2) where material facts are undisputed). Footnote 8Tovar conceded that the 1998 OWI conviction could be used for enhancement purposes. Record 60. Footnote 9The dissenting justices criticized the majority's approach as "rigid" and out of line with the pragmatic approach this Court described in Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 298 (1988). 656 N.W. 2d, at 122. They noted that, in addition to advice concerning the constitutional rights a guilty plea relinquishes, Tovar was "made fully aware of the penal consequences that might befall him if he went forward without counsel and pleaded guilty." Ibid. Footnote 10The United States as amicus curiae reads our decision in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), to hold that a constitutionally defective waiver of counsel in a misdemeanor prosecution, although warranting vacation of any term of imprisonment, affords no ground for disturbing the underlying conviction. Amicus accordingly contends that the Constitution should not preclude use of an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction to enhance the penalty for a subsequent offense, regardless of the validity of the prior waiver. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 11, n.3. The State, however, does not contest the Iowa Supreme Court's determination that a conviction obtained without an effective waiver of counsel cannot be used to enhance a subsequent charge. See ibid. We therefore do not address arguments amicus advances questioning that premise. See also id., at 29, n.12. Footnote 11The Supreme Court of Iowa also held that "the court must ensure the defendant understands the nature of the charges against him and the range of allowable punishments." 656 N.W. 2d, at 121. The parties do not dispute that Tovar was so informed. Footnote 12The trial court's comment that Tovar appeared without counsel at the arraignment and the court's inquiry whether Tovar wanted to represent himself at that hearing, see App. 8-9, hardly lend support to Tovar's suggestion of what he "may have" believed. See also id., at 46 (court's inquiry at sentencing whether Tovar "want[ed] to take some time to hire an attorney"); Iowa Rule Crim. Proc. 8(2)(a) (1992) ("[a]t any time before judgment," defendant may request withdrawal of guilty plea and substitution of not guilty plea).

United States Supreme Court J. E. M. AG SUPPLY, INC., dba FARM ADVANTAGE, INC., et al. v. PIONEER HI-BRED INTERNATIONAL, INC.(2001) No. 99-1996 Argued: October 3, 2001Decided: December 10, 2001 </s> Respondent Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. (Pioneer), holds 17 utility patents issued under 35 U.S.C. §101 that cover the manufacture, use, sale, and offer for sale of its inbred and hybrid corn seed products. Pioneer sells its patented hybrid seeds under a limited label license that allows only the production of grain and/or forage, and prohibits using such seed for propagation or seed multiplication or for the production or development of a hybrid or different seed variety. Petitioner J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., doing business as Farm Advantage, Inc., bought patented seeds from Pioneer in bags bearing the license agreement and then resold the bags. Pioneer filed this patent infringement suit against Farm Advantage and distributors and customers of Farm Advantage (collectively Farm Advantage or petitioners). Farm Advantage filed a patent invalidity counterclaim, arguing that sexually reproducing plants, such as Pioneer's corn plants, are not patentable subject matter within §101. Farm Advantage maintained that the Plant Patent Act of 1930 (PPA) and the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) set forth the exclusive statutory means for protecting plant life because these statutes are more specific than §101, and thus each carves out subject matter from §101 for special treatment. The District Court granted Pioneer summary judgment. Relying on this Court's broad construction of §101 in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, the District Court held that §101 clearly covers plant life. It also held that in enacting the PPA and the PVPA, Congress neither expressly nor implicitly removed plants from §101's subject matter. In particular, the District Court noted that Congress did not implicitly repeal §101 by passing the more specific PVPA because there was no irreconcilable conflict between the two statutes. The Federal Circuit affirmed. </s> Held:Newly developed plant breeds fall within the subject matter of §101, and neither the PPA nor the PVPA limits the scope of §101's coverage. Pp. 421. </s> (a)In approaching the question presented here, this Court is mindful that it has already recognized that §101's language is extremely broad and has concluded that living things are patentable under that provision, Chakrabarty, supra, at 308, 313, 315. Since 1985, the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has had an unbroken practice of conferring utility patents for plants. Nonetheless, petitioners argue that the PPA and the PVPA are the exclusive means of protecting new varieties of plants, and so awarding utility patents for plants upsets the scheme contemplated by Congress. Pp. 46. </s> (b)Neither the PPA's original nor its recodified text indicates that its protection for asexually reproduced plants was intended to be exclusive. The 1930 PPA amended the general patent provision to protect only the asexual reproduction of a plant. And Congress' 1952 revision, which placed plant patents into a separate chapter 15, was only a housekeeping measure that did not change the substantive rights or the relaxed requirements for such patents. Plant patents under the PPA thus continue to have very limited coverage and less stringent requirements than §101 utility patents. Importantly, chapter 15 nowhere states that plant patents are the exclusive means of granting intellectual property protection to plants. The arguments that petitioners advance for why the PPA should preclude assigning utility patents for plants are unpersuasive because petitioners fail to take account of the forward-looking perspective of the utility patent statute and the reality of plant breeding in 1930. Pp. 613. </s> (c)That the PVPA specifically authorizes limited patent-like protection for certain sexually reproduced plants does not evidence Congress' intent to deny broader §101 utility patent protection for such plants. While the PVPA creates a comprehensive statutory scheme with respect to its particular protections and subject matter, giving limited protection to plant varieties that are new, distinct, uniform, and stable, nowhere does it restrict the scope of patentable subject matter under §101. The PVPA contains no statement of exclusivity. Furthermore, at the time the PVPA was enacted, the PTO had already issued numerous utility patents for hybrid plant processes, which reaffirms that such material was within §101's scope. Petitioners also err in arguing that the PVPA altered §101's subject-matter coverage by implication. Repeal by implication requires that the earlier and later statutes be irreconcilable, Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550. The differences in the requirements for, and coverage of, utility patents and PVPA plant variety certificates, however, do not present irreconcilable conflicts because the requirements for a §101 utility patent are more stringent than those for a PVP certificate, and the protections afforded by a utility patent are greater than those afforded by a PVP certificate. Petitioners' suggestion that dual protection cannot exist when statutes overlap and purport to protect the same commercially valuable attribute or thing is rejected as well. This Court has given effect to two overlapping statutes, so long as each reaches some distinct cases, see Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253, and it has allowed dual protection in other intellectual property cases, see, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484. In this case, many plant varieties that are unable to satisfy §101's stringent requirements might still qualify for the PVPA's lesser protections. Pp. 1320. </s> (d)The PTO has assigned utility patents for plants for at least 16 years, and there has been no indication from either Congress or agencies with expertise that such coverage is inconsistent with the PVPA or the PPA. Congress has not only failed to pass legislation indicating that it disagrees with the PTO's interpretation of §101; it has even recognized the availability of utility patents for plants. P. 20. </s> 200 F.3d 1374, affirmed. </s> Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a concurring opinion. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, J., joined. O'Connor, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. </s> J. E. M. AG SUPPLY, INC., dba FARM ADVANTAGE,INC., etal., PETITIONERS v. PIONEER HI-BREDINTERNATIONAL, INC. </s> on writ of certiorari to the united states court ofappeals for the federal circuit </s> [December 10, 2001] </s> Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case presents the question whether utility patents may be issued for plants under 35 U. S. C. §101 (1994 ed.), or whether the Plant Variety Protection Act, 84 Stat. 1542, as amended, 7 U.S.C. §2321 et seq., and the Plant Patent Act of 1930, 35 U. S. C. §§161-164 (1994 ed. and Supp. V), are the exclusive means of obtaining a federal statutory right to exclude others from reproducing, selling, or using plants or plant varieties. We hold that utility patents may be issued for plants. </s> I </s> The United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has issued some 1,800 utility patents for plants, plant parts, and seeds pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §101. Seventeen of these patents are held by respondent Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. (Pioneer). Pioneer's patents cover the manufacture, use, sale, and offer for sale of the company's inbred and hybrid corn seed products. A patent for an inbred corn line protects both the seeds and plants of the inbred line and the hybrids produced by crossing the protected inbred line with another corn line. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,506,367, col. 3, App. 42. A hybrid plant patent protects the plant, its seeds, variants, mutants, and trivial modifications of the hybrid. See U. S. Patent No. 5,491,295, cols. 2-3, id., at 29-30. </s> Pedigree inbred corn plants are developed by crossing corn plants with desirable characteristics and then inbreeding the resulting plants for several generations until the resulting plant line is homogenous. Inbreds are often weak and have a low yield; their value lies primarily in their use for making hybrids. See, e.g., U. S. Patent No. 5,506,367, col. 6, id., at 43 (describing the traits and applications of the inbred corn line PHP38 by reference to the qualities exhibited in hybrid plants created with PHP38). </s> Hybrid seeds are produced by crossing two inbred corn plants and are especially valuable because they produce strong and vibrant hybrid plants with selected highly desirable characteristics. For instance, Pioneer's hybrid corn plant 3394 is "characterized by superior yield for maturity, excellent seedling vigor, very good roots and stalks, and exceptional stay green." U. S. Patent No. 5,491,295, cols. 2-3, id., at 29-30. Hybrid plants, however, generally do not reproduce true-to-type, i.e., seeds produced by a hybrid plant do not reliably yield plants with the same hybrid characteristics. Thus, a farmer who wishes to continue growing hybrid plants generally needs to buy more hybrid seed. </s> Pioneer sells its patented hybrid seeds under a limited label license that provides: "License is granted solely to produce grain and/or forage." Id., at 51. The license "does not extend to the use of seed from such crop or the progeny thereof for propagation or seed multiplication." Ibid. It strictly prohibits "the use of such seed or the progeny thereof for propagation or seed multiplication or for production or development of a hybrid or different variety of seed." Ibid. </s> Petitioner J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., doing business as Farm Advantage, Inc., purchased patented hybrid seeds from Pioneer in bags bearing this license agreement. Although not a licensed sales representative of Pioneer, Farm Advantage resold these bags. Pioneer subsequently brought a complaint for patent infringement against Farm Advantage and several other corporations and residents of the State of Iowa who are distributors and customers for Farm Advantage (referred to collectively as Farm Advantage or petitioners). Pioneer alleged that Farm Advantage has "for a long-time past been and still [is] infringing one or more [Pioneer patents] by making, using, selling, or offering for sale corn seed of the ... hybrids in infringement of these patents-in-suit." Id., at 10. </s> Farm Advantage answered with a general denial of patent infringement and entered a counterclaim of patent invalidity, arguing that patents that purport to confer protection for corn plants are invalid because sexually reproducing plants are not patentable subject matter within the scope of 35 U.S.C. §101 (1994 ed.). App. 12-13, 17.Farm Advantage maintained that the Plant Patent Act of 1930 (PPA) and the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) set forth the exclusive statutory means for the protection of plant life because these statutes are more specific than §101, and thus each carves out subject matter from §101 for special treatment.1 </s> The District Court granted summary judgment to Pioneer. Relying on this Court's broad construction of §101 in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), the District Court held that the subject matter covered by §101 clearly includes plant life. 49 USPQ 2d 1813, 1817 (ND Iowa 1998). It further concluded that in enacting the PPA and the PVPA Congress neither expressly nor implicitly removed plants from §101's subject matter. Id., at 1819. In particular, the District Court noted that Congress did not implicitly repeal §101 by passing the more specific PVPA because there was no irreconcilable conflict between the PVPA and §101. Id., at 1821. </s> The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment and reasoning of the District Court. 200 F.3d 1374 (2000). We granted certiorari, 531 U.S. 1143 (2001), and now affirm. </s> II </s> The question before us is whether utility patents may be issued for plants pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §101 (1994 ed.). The text of §101 provides: </s> "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." </s> As this Court recognized over 20 years ago in Chakrabarty, 447 U.S., at 308, the language of §101 is extremely broad. "In choosing such expansive terms as `manufacture' and `composition of matter,' modified by the comprehensive `any,' Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope." Ibid. This Court thus concluded in Chakrabarty that living things were patentable under §101, and held that a manmade micro-organism fell within the scope of the statute. As Congress recognized, "the relevant distinction was not between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made inventions." Id., at 313. </s> In Chakrabarty, the Court also rejected the argument that Congress must expressly authorize protection for new patentable subject matter: </s> "It is, of course, correct that Congress, not the courts, must define the limits of patentability; but it is equally true that once Congress has spoken it is `the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.' Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). Congress has performed its constitutional role in defining patentable subject matter in §101; we perform ours in construing the language Congress has employed. . . . The subject-matter provisions of the patent law have been cast in broad terms to fulfill the constitutional and statutory goal of promoting `the Progress of Science and the useful Arts' with all that means for the social and economic benefits envisioned by Jefferson." Id., at 315. </s> Thus, in approaching the question presented by this case, we are mindful that this Court has already spoken clearly concerning the broad scope and applicability of §101.2 </s> Several years after Chakrabarty, the PTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences held that plants were within the understood meaning of "manufacture" or "composition of matter" and therefore were within the subject matter of §101. Inre Hibberd, 227 USPQ 443, 444 (1985). It has been the unbroken practice of the PTO since that time to confer utility patents for plants. To obtain utility patent protection, a plant breeder must show that the plant he has developed is new, useful, and non-obvious. 35 U.S.C. §§101-103 (1994 ed. and Supp. V). In addition, the plant must meet the specifications of §112, which require a written description of the plant and a deposit of seed that is publicly accessible. See 37 CFR §§1.801-1.809 (2001). </s> Petitioners do not allege that Pioneer's patents are invalid for failure to meet the requirements for a utility patent. Nor do they dispute that plants otherwise fall within the terms of §101's broad language that includes "manufacture" or "composition of matter." Rather, petitioners argue that the PPA and the PVPA provide the exclusive means of protecting new varieties of plants, and so awarding utility patents for plants upsets the scheme contemplated by Congress. Brief for Petitioners 11. We disagree. Considering the two plant specific statutes in turn, we find that neither forecloses utility patent coverage for plants. </s> A </s> The 1930 PPA conferred patent protection to asexually reproduced plants. Significantly, nothing within either the original 1930 text of the statute or its recodified version in 1952 indicates that the PPA's protection for asexually reproduced plants was intended to be exclusive. </s> Plants were first explicitly brought within the scope of patent protection in 1930 when the PPA included "plants" among the useful things subject to patents. Thus the 1930 PPA amended the general utility patent provision, Rev. Stat. §4886, to provide: </s> "Any person who has invented or discovered any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvements thereof, or who has invented or discovered and asexually reproduced any distinct and new variety of plant, other than a tuber-propagated plant, not known or used by others in this country, before his invention or discovery thereof, ... may ... obtain a patent therefor." Act of May 23, 1930, §1, 46 Stat. 376. </s> This provision limited protection to the asexual reproduction of the plant. Asexual reproduction occurs by grafting, budding, or the like, and produces an offspring with a genetic combination identical to that of the single parent--essentially a clone.3 The PPA also amended Revised Statutes §4888 by adding, "No plant patent shall be declared invalid on the ground of noncompliance with this section if the description is made as complete as is reasonably possible." Id., §2, 46 Stat. 376. </s> In 1952, Congress revised the patent statute and placed the plant patents into a separate chapter 15 of Title 35 entitled, "Patents for plants." 35 U.S.C. §§161-164.4 This was merely a housekeeping measure that did nothing to change the substantive rights or requirements for a plant patent. A "plant patent"5 continued to provide only the exclusive right to asexually reproduce a protected plant, §163, and the description requirement remained relaxed, §162.6 Plant patents under the PPA thus have very limited coverage and less stringent requirements than §101 utility patents. </s> Importantly, chapter 15 nowhere states that plant patents are the exclusive means of granting intellectual property protection to plants. Although unable to point to any language that requires, or even suggests, that Congress intended the PPA's protections to be exclusive, petitioners advance three reasons why the PPA should preclude assigning utility patents for plants. We find none of these arguments to be persuasive. </s> First, petitioners argue that plants were not covered by the general utility patent statute prior to 1930. Brief for Petitioners 19 ("If the patent laws before 1930 allowed patents on `plants' then there would have been no reason for Congress to have passed the 1930 PPA ..."). In advancing this argument, petitioners overlook the state of patent law and plant breeding at the time of the PPA's enactment. The Court in Chakrabarty explained the realities of patent law and plant breeding at the time the PPA was enacted: "Prior to 1930, two factors were thought to remove plants from patent protection. The first was the belief that plants, even those artificially bred, were products of nature for purposes of the patent law. ... The second obstacle to patent protection for plants was the fact that plants were thought not amenable to the `written description' requirement of the patent law." 447 U.S., at 311-312. Congress addressed these concerns with the 1930 PPA, which recognized that the work of a plant breeder was a patentable invention and relaxed the written description requirement. See §§1-2, 46 Stat. 376. The PPA thus gave patent protection to breeders who were previously unable to overcome the obstacles described in Chakrabarty. </s> This does not mean, however, that prior to 1930 plants could not have fallen within the subject matter of §101. Rather, it illustrates only that in 1930 Congress believed that plants were not patentable under §101, both because they were living things and because in practice they could not meet the stringent description requirement. Yet these premises were disproved over time. As this Court held in Chakrabarty, "the relevant distinction" for purposes of §101 is not "between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made inventions." 447 U.S., at 313. In addition, advances in biological knowledge and breeding expertise have allowed plant breeders to satisfy §101's demanding description requirement. </s> Whatever Congress may have believed about the state of patent law and the science of plant breeding in 1930, plants have always had the potential to fall within the general subject matter of §101, which is a dynamic provision designed to encompass new and unforeseen inventions. "A rule that unanticipated inventions are without protection would conflict with the core concept of the patent law that anticipation undermines patentability." Id., at 316. </s> Petitioners essentially ask us to deny utility patent protection for sexually reproduced plants because it was unforeseen in 1930 that such plants could receive protection under §101. Denying patent protection under §101 simply because such coverage was thought technologically infeasible in 1930, however, would be inconsistent with the forward-looking perspective of the utility patent statute. As we noted in Chakrabarty, "Congress employed broad general language in drafting §101 precisely because [new types of] inventions are often unforeseeable." Ibid. </s> Second, petitioners maintain that the PPA's limitation to asexually reproduced plants would make no sense if Congress intended §101 to authorize patents on plant varieties that were sexually reproduced. But this limitation once again merely reflects the reality of plant breeding in 1930. At that time, the primary means of reproducing bred plants true-to-type was through asexual reproduction. Congress thought that sexual reproduction through seeds was not a stable way to maintain desirable bred characteristics.7 Thus, it is hardly surprising that plant patents would protect only asexual reproduction, since this was the most reliable type of reproduction for preserving the desirable characteristics of breeding. See generally E. Sinnott, Botany Principles and Problems 266-267 (1935); J. Priestley & L. Scott, Introduction to Botany 530 (1938). </s> Furthermore, like other laws protecting intellectual property, the plant patent provision must be understood in its proper context. Until 1924, farmers received seed from the Government's extensive free seed program that distributed millions of packages of seed annually. See Fowler, The Plant Patent Act of 1930: A Sociological History of its Creation, 82 J. Pat. & Tm. Off. Soc. 621, 623, 632 (2000).8 In 1930, seed companies were not primarily concerned with varietal protection, but were still trying to successfully commodify seeds. There was no need to protect seed breeding because there were few markets for seeds. See Kloppenburg 71 ("Seed companies' first priority was simply to establish a market, and they continuedto view the congressional distribution as a principalconstraint"). </s> By contrast, nurseries at the time had successfully commercialized asexually reproduced fruit trees and flowers. These plants were regularly copied, draining profits from those who discovered or bred new varieties. Nurseries were the primary subjects of agricultural marketing and so it is not surprising that they were the specific focus of the PPA. See Fowler, supra, at 634-635; Kneen, Patent Plants Enrich Our World, National Geographic 357, 363 (1948). </s> Moreover, seed companies at the time could not point to genuinely new varieties and lacked the scientific knowledge to engage in formal breeding that would increase agricultural productivity. See Kloppenburg 77; Fowler, supra, at 633 ("Absent significant numbers of distinct new varieties being produced by seed companies, variety protection through something like a patent law would hardly have been considered a business necessity"). In short, there is simply no evidence, let alone the overwhelming evidence needed to establish repeal by implication, see Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Epstein, 516 U. S. 367, 381 (1996), that Congress, by specifically protecting asexually reproduced plants through the PPA, intended to preclude utility patent protection for sexually reproduced plants.9 </s> Third, petitioners argue that in 1952 Congress would not have moved plants out of the utility patent provision and into §161 if it had intended §101 to allow for protection of plants. Brief for Petitioners 20. Petitioners again rely on negative inference because they cannot point to any express indication that Congress intended §161 to be the exclusive means of patenting plants. But this negative inference simply does not support carving out subject matter that otherwise fits comfortably within the expansive language of §101, especially when §101 can protect different attributes and has more stringent requirements than does §161. </s> This is especially true given that Congress in 1952 did nothing to change the substantive rights or requirements for obtaining a plant patent. Absent a clear intent to the contrary, we are loath to interpret what was essentially a housekeeping measure as an affirmative decision by Congress to deny sexually reproduced plants patent protection under §101. </s> B </s> By passing the PVPA in 1970, Congress specifically authorized limited patent-like protection for certain sexually reproduced plants. Petitioners therefore argue that this legislation evidences Congress' intent to deny broader §101 utility patent protection for such plants. Petitioners' argument, however, is unavailing for two reasons. First, nowhere does the PVPA purport to provide the exclusive statutory means of protecting sexually reproduced plants. Second, the PVPA and §101 can easily be reconciled. Because it is harder to qualify for a utility patent than for a Plant Variety Protection (PVP) certificate, it only makes sense that utility patents would confer a greater scope of protection. </s> 1 </s> The PVPA provides plant variety protection for: </s> "The breeder of any sexually reproduced or tuber propagated plant variety (other than fungi or bacteria) who has so reproduced the variety ...." 7 U.S.C. §2402(a). </s> Infringement of plant variety protection occurs, inter alia, if someone sells or markets the protected variety, sexually multiplies the variety as a step in marketing, uses the variety in producing a hybrid, or dispenses the variety without notice that the variety is protected.10 </s> Since the 1994 amendments, the PVPA also protects "any variety that is essentially derived from a protected variety," §2541(c)(1), and "any variety whose production requires the repeated use of a protected variety," §2541(c)(3). See Plant Variety Protection Act Amendments of 1994, §9, 108 Stat. 3142. Practically, this means that hybrids created from protected plant varieties are also protected; however, it is not infringement to use a protected variety for the development of a hybrid. See 7 U.S.C. §2541(a)(4).11 </s> The PVPA also contains exemptions for saving seed and for research. A farmer who legally purchases and plants a protected variety can save the seed from these plants for replanting on his own farm. See §2543 ("[I]t shall not infringe any right hereunder for a person to save seed produced by the person from seed obtained, or descended from seed obtained, by authority of the owner of the variety for seeding purposes and use such saved seed in the production of a crop for use on the farm of the person ..."); see also Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179 (1995). In addition, a protected variety may be used for research. See 7 U.S.C. §2544 ("The use and reproduction of a protected variety for plant breeding or other bona fide research shall not constitute an infringement of the protection provided under this chapter"). The utility patent statute does not contain similar exemptions.12 </s> Thus, while the PVPA creates a statutory scheme that is comprehensive with respect to its particular protections and subject matter, giving limited protection to plant varieties that are new, distinct, uniform, and stable, §2402(a), nowhere does it restrict the scope of patentable subject matter under §101. With nothing in the statute to bolster their view that the PVPA provides the exclusive means for protecting sexually reproducing plants, petitioners rely on the legislative history of the PVPA. They argue that this history shows the PVPA was enacted because sexually reproducing plant varieties and their seeds were not and had never been intended by Congress to be included within the classes of things patentable under Title 35.13 </s> The PVPA itself, however, contains no statement that plant variety certificates were to be the exclusive means of protecting sexually reproducing plants. The relevant statements in the legislative history reveal nothing more than the limited view of plant breeding taken by some Members of Congress who believed that patent protection was unavailable for sexually reproduced plants. This view stems from a lack of awareness concerning scientificpossibilities. </s> Furthermore, at the time the PVPA was enacted, the PTO had already issued numerous utility patents for hybrid plant processes. Many of these patents, especially since the 1950's, included claims on the products of the patented process, i.e., the hybrid plant itself. See Kloppenburg 264. Such plants were protected as part of a hybrid process and not on their own. Nonetheless, these hybrids still enjoyed protection under §101, which reaffirms that such material was within the scope of §101. </s> 2 </s> Petitioners next argue that the PVPA altered the subject-matter coverage of §101 by implication. Brief for Petitioners 33-36. Yet "the only permissible justification for a repeal by implication is when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable." Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974). "The rarity with which [the Court has] discovered implied repeals is due to the relatively stringent standard for such findings, namely, that there be an irreconcilable conflict between the two federal statutes at issue." Matsushita, 516 U.S., at 381 (internal quotation marks omitted). </s> To be sure, there are differences in the requirements for, and coverage of, utility patents and plant variety certificates issued pursuant to the PVPA. These differences, however, do not present irreconcilable conflicts because the requirements for obtaining a utility patent under §101 are more stringent than those for obtaining a PVP certificate, and the protections afforded by a utility patent are greater than those afforded by a PVP certificate. Thus, there is a parallel relationship between the obligations and the level of protection under each statute. </s> It is much more difficult to obtain a utility patent for a plant than to obtain a plant variety certificate because a utility patentable plant must be new, useful, and nonobvious, 35 U.S.C. §§101-103. In addition, to obtain a utility patent, a breeder must describe the plant with sufficient specificity to enable others to "make and use" the invention after the patent term expires. §112. The disclosure required by the Patent Act is "the quid pro quo of the right to exclude." Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974). The description requirement for plants includes a deposit of biological material, for example seeds, and mandates that such material be accessible to the public. See 37 CFR §§1.801-1.809 (2001); see also App. 39 (seed deposits for U.S. Patent No. 5,491,295). </s> By contrast, a plant variety may receive a PVP certificate without a showing of usefulness or nonobviousness. See 7 U.S.C. §2402(a) (requiring that the variety be only new, distinct, uniform, and stable). Nor does the PVPA require a description and disclosure as extensive as those required under §101. The PVPA requires a "description of the variety setting forth its distinctiveness, uniformity and stability and a description of the genealogy and breeding procedure, when known." 7 U.S.C. §2422(2). It also requires a deposit of seed in a public depository, §2422(4), but neither the statute nor the applicable regulation mandates that such material be accessible to the general public during the term of the PVP certificate. See 7 CFR §97.6 (2001). </s> Because of the more stringent requirements, utility patent holders receive greater rights of exclusion than holders of a PVP certificate. Most notably, there are no exemptions for research or saving seed under a utility patent. Additionally, although Congress increased the level of protection under the PVPA in 1994, a plant variety certificate still does not grant the full range of protections afforded by a utility patent. For instance, a utility patent on an inbred plant line protects that line as well as all hybrids produced by crossing that inbred with another plant line. Similarly, the PVPA now protects "any variety whose production requires the repeated use of a protected variety." 7 U.S.C. §2541(c)(3). Thus, one cannot use a protected plant variety to produce a hybrid for commercial sale. PVPA protection still falls short of a utility patent, however, because a breeder can use a plant that is protected by a PVP certificate to "develop" a new inbred line while he cannot use a plant patented under §101 for such a purpose. See 7 U.S.C. §2541(a)(4) (infringement includes "use [of] the variety in producing (as distinguished from developing) a hybrid or different variety therefrom"). See also H.R. Rep. No. 91-1605, p.11 (1970); 1 D. Chisum, Patents §1.05[2][d][i], p.549 (2001). </s> For all of these reasons, it is clear that there is no "positive repugnancy" between the issuance of utility patents for plants and PVP coverage for plants. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 155 (1976). Nor can it be said that the two statutes "cannot mutually coexist." Ibid. Indeed, "when two statutes are capable of coexistence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective." Morton, 417 U.S., at 551. Here we can plainly regard each statute as effective because of its different requirements and protections. The plain meaning of §101, as interpreted by this Court in Chakrabarty, clearly includes plants within its subject matter. The PPA and the PVPA are not to the contrary and can be read alongside §101 in protecting plants. </s> 3 </s> Petitioners also suggest that even when statutes overlap and purport to protect the same commercially valuable attribute of a thing, such "dual protection" cannot exist. Brief for Petitioners 44-45. Yet this Court has not hesitated to give effect to two statutes that overlap, so long as each reaches some distinct cases. See Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253 (1992) (statutes that overlap "do not pose an either-or proposition" where each confers jurisdiction over cases that the other does not reach). Here, while utility patents and PVP certificates do contain some similar protections, as discussed above, the overlap is only partial. </s> Moreover, this Court has allowed dual protection in other intellectual property cases. "Certainly the patent policy of encouraging invention is not disturbed by the existence of another form of incentive to invention. In this respect the two systems [trade secret protection and patents] are not and never would be in conflict." Kewanee Oil, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (the patentability of an object does not preclude the copyright of that object as a work of art). In this case, many plant varieties that are unable to satisfy the stringent requirements of §101 might still qualify for the lesser protections afforded by the PVPA. </s> III </s> We also note that the PTO has assigned utility patents for plants for at least 16 years and there has been no indication from either Congress or agencies with expertise that such coverage is inconsistent with the PVPA or the PPA. The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, which has specific expertise in issues of patent law, relied heavily on this Court's decision in Chakrabarty when it interpreted the subject matter of §101 to include plants. Inre Hibberd, 227 USPQ 443 (1985). This highly visible decision has led to the issuance of some 1,800 utility patents for plants. Moreover, the PTO, which administers §101 as well as the PPA, recognizes and regularly issues utility patents for plants. In addition, the Department of Agriculture's Plant Variety Protection Office acknowledges the existence of utility patents for plants. </s> In the face of these developments, Congress has not only failed to pass legislation indicating that it disagrees with the PTO's interpretation of §101, it has even recognized the availability of utility patents for plants. In a 1999 amendment to 35 U.S.C. §119, which concerns the right of priority for patent rights, Congress provided: "Applications for plant breeder's rights filed in a WTO [World Trade Organization] member country ... shall have the same effect for the purpose of the right of priority ... as applications for patents, subject to the same conditions and requirements of this section as apply to applications for patents." 35 U.S.C. §119(f) (1994 ed., Supp. V). Crucially, §119(f) is part of the general provisions of Title 35, not the specific chapter of the PPA, which suggests a recognition on the part of Congress that plants are patentable under §101. </s> IV </s> For these reasons, we hold that newly developed plant breeds fall within the terms of §101, and that neither the PPA nor the PVPA limits the scope of §101's coverage. As in Chakrabarty, we decline to narrow the reach of §101 where Congress has given us no indication that it intends this result. 447 U.S., at 315-316. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> J. E. M. AG SUPPLY, INC., dba FARM ADVANTAGE,INC., et al, PETITIONERS v. PIONEER HI-BREDINTERNATIONAL, INC. </s> on writ of certiorari to the united states court ofappeals for the federal circuit </s> [December 10, 2001] </s> Justice Scalia, concurring. </s> This case presents an interesting and difficult point of statutory construction, seemingly pitting against each other two perfectly valid canons of interpretation: (1) that statutes must be construed in their entirety, so that the meaning of one provision sheds light upon the meaning of another; and (2) that repeals by implication are not favored. I think these sensible canons are reconcilable only if the first of them is limited by the second. That is to say, the power of a provision of law to give meaning to a pre-viously enacted ambiguity comes to an end once the am-biguity has been authoritatively resolved. At that point, use of the later enactment produces not clarification (governed by the first canon) but amendment (governed by thesecond). </s> In the present case, the only ambiguity that could have been clarified by the words added to the utility patent statute by the Plant Patent Act of 1930 (PPA) is whether the term "composition of matter" included living things. The newly enacted provision for plants invited the conclusion that this term which preceded it did not include living things. (The term "matter," after all, is sometimes used in a sense that excludes living things. See Webster's New International Dictionary 1515 (2d ed. 1950): "Physical substance as made up of chemical elements and distinguished from incorporeal substance, action, qualities, etc....`Matter is inert, senseless, and lifeless.' Johnson.") It is important to note that this is the only way in which the new PPA language could have clarified the ambiguity: There was no way in which "composition of matter" could be regarded as a category separate from plants, but not separate from other living things. </s> Stare decisis, however, prevents us from any longer regarding as an open question--as ambiguous--whether "composition of matter" includes living things. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 312-313 (1980), holds that it does. As the case comes before us, therefore, the language of the PPA--if it is to have any effect on the outcome--must do so by way of amending what we have held to be a statute that covers living things (and hence covers plants). At this point the canon against repeal by implication comes into play, and I agree with the Court that it determines the outcome. I therefore join the opinion of the Court. </s> J. E. M. AG SUPPLY, INC., dba FARM ADVANTAGE,INC., et al, PETITIONERS v. PIONEER HI-BREDINTERNATIONAL, INC. </s> on writ of certiorari to the united states court ofappeals for the federal circuit </s> [December 10, 2001] </s> Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens joins, dissenting. </s> The question before us is whether the words "manufacture" or "compositions of matter" contained in the utility patent statute, 35 U.S.C. §101 (1994 ed.) (Utility Patent Statute), cover plants that also fall within the scope of two more specific statutes, the Plant Patent Act of 1930 (PPA), 35 U.S.C. §161 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V), and the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA), 7 U.S.C. §2321 et seq. I believe that the words "manufacture" or "composition of matter" do not cover these plants. That is because Congress intended the two more specific statutes to exclude patent protection under the Utility Patent Statute for the plants to which the more specific Acts directly refer. And, as the Court implicitly recognizes, this Court neither considered, nor decided, this question in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). Consequently, I dissent. </s> I </s> Respondent and the Government claim that Chakrabarty controls the outcome in this case. This is incorrect, for Chakrabarty said nothing about the specific issue before us. Chakrabarty, in considering the scope of the Utility Patent Statute's language "manufacture, or composition of matter," 35 U.S.C. §101 (1994 ed.), asked whether those words included such living things as bacteria--a substance to which neither of the two specific plant Acts refers. 447 U.S., at 313-314. The Court held that the Utility Patent Statute language included a "new" bacterium because it was "a nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter" that was "not nature's handiwork." Id., at 309-310. It quoted language from a congressional Committee Report indicating that "Congress intended statutory subject matter to `include anything under the sun that is made by man.'" Id., at 309 (quoting S.Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952)). But it nowhere said or implied that this Utility Patent Statute language also includes the very subject-matter with which the two specific statutes deal, namely plants. Whether a bacterium technically speaking is, or is not, a plant, the Court considered it a "life form," and not the kind of "plant" that the two specific statutes had in mind. 447 U.S., at 314 (noting that the PVPA specifically excluded bacteria, and that the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals had held that bacteria were not plants for purposes of the PPA). </s> The Court did consider a complicated argument that sought indirectly to relate the two specific plant statutes to the issue before it. That argument went roughly as follows: (1) Congress enacted two special statutes related to plants. (2) Even though those two statutes do not cover bacteria, the fact that Congress enacted them shows that Congress thought the Utility Patent Statute's language ("manufacture, or composition of matter") did not cover any living thing, including bacteria. (3) Congress consequently must have intended the two special Acts to provide exclusive protection for all forms of "life" whether they do, or do not, count as the kinds of "plants" to which the specific statutes refer. </s> The Court, in reply, wrote that Congress, when enacting the specific statutes, might have (wrongly) believed that the Utility Patent Statute did not apply to plants, probably because Congress thought that plants were "natural products," not human products. Id., at 311. It added that Congress also might have believed that it was too difficult for plant inventors to meet patent law's ordinary "written description" requirement. Id., at 312. In addition, the Court pointed out that the relevant distinction between unpatentable and patentable subject matter was not between living and inanimate things, but rather between products of nature and human-made inventions. Id., at 312-313. As such, the bacteria at issue were patentable because they were products of human invention. And the Court concluded that "nothing" in Congress' decision to exclude bacteria from the PVPA supported "petitioner's position," namely that Congress intended no utility patent protection for any living thing. Id., at 313-314. </s> Neither this refutation nor the argument itself decides the question here. That question is not about general coverage for matters that the special statutes do not mention (namely, nonplant life forms such as bacteria). It is about general coverage for matters to which the special plant statutes do refer (namely, plants). Chakrabarty neither asked, nor answered, this latter question, the question now before us. And nothing in the Court's opinion indicates the contrary. </s> II </s> The critical question, as I have said, is whether the two specific plant statutes embody a legislative intent to deny coverage under the Utility Patent Statute to those plants to which the specific plant statutes refer. In my view, the first of these statutes, the PPA, reveals precisely that intent. And nothing in the later history of either the Utility Patent Statute or the PVPA suggests the contrary. </s> As initially enacted in 1930, the PPA began by amending the Utility Patent Statute to read as follows: </s> "Any person who has invented or discovered any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvements thereof, or who has invented or discovered and asexually reproduced any distinct and new variety of plant, other than a tuber-propagated plant ... may ... obtain a patent therefor[e]." Rev. Stat. §4886, as amended by Act of May 23, 1930, §1, 46 Stat. 376. (language added by the PPA italicized). </s> This language refers to all plants. It says that an inventor--in principle--can obtain a patent on any plant (the subject matter of the patent) that meets three requirements. It must be distinct; it must be new; and on one or more occasions it must have been "asexually reproduced," e.g., reproduced by means of a graft. </s> This last-mentioned "graft" requirement does not separate (1) those plants that can reproduce through grafting from (2) those plants that can reproduce by seed. The two categories are not mutually exclusive. P. Raven, R. Evert, & S. Eichhorn, Biology of Plants 179-180, 255 (6th ed. 1999). Many plants--perhaps virtually any plant--can be reproduced "asexually" as well as by seed. S. Rep. No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1930). Rather, the "asexual reproduction" requirement sought to ensure that the inventor was capable of reproducing the new variety "asexually" (through a graft) because that fact would guarantee that the variety's new characteristics had genetic (rather that, say, environmental) causes and would prove genetically stable over time. See ibid. ("A plant patent covers only the exclusive right of asexual reproduction, and obviously it would be futile to grant a patent for a new and distinct variety unless the variety had been demonstrated to be susceptible to asexual reproduction"); cf. Dunn v. Ragin, 50 USPQ 472, 474 (1941) (noting that asexual reproduction "determine[s] that the progeny in fact possess the characteristic or characteristics which distinguish it as a new variety"). </s> Although the section defining the PPA's coverage does not limit its scope to plants that reproduce primarily through grafting, a later section does so limit the protection that it offers. That section specifies that the patent holder will receive "the exclusive right to asexually reproduce the plant," e.g., the right to reproduce it through grafting, but he will not receive an exclusive right to reproduce the plant sexually, i.e., the right to reproduce it through seeds. 46 Stat. 376. And this is true regardless of whether the patent holder could reproduce true to type offspring through seeds. See S.Rep. No. 315, at 4 ("On the other hand, [the PPA] does not give any patent protection to the right of propagation of the new variety by seed, irrespective of the degree to which the seedlings come true to type"). This was a significant limitation because, the Court's contrary claim notwithstanding, ante, at 10, and n. 7, it was readily apparent in 1930 that a plant's desirable characteristics could be preserved through reproduction by seed. See Fowler, The Plant Patent Act of 1930: A Sociological History of its Creation, 82 J. Pat. & Tm. Off. Soc. 621, 635, 644 (2000). </s> In sum, the PPA permits patenting of new and distinct varieties of (1) plants that breeders primarily reproduce through grafts (say, apple trees), (2) plants that breeders primarily reproduce through seeds (say, corn), and (3) plants that reproduce both ways (say, violets). See C. Chong, Plant Propagation, reprinted in 1 CRC Handbook of Plant Science in Agriculture 91-92, 94, 104 (B. Christie & A. Hanson eds., 1987); Raven, Evert, & Eichhorn, supra, at 179. But, because that statute left plant buyers free to keep, to reproduce, and to sell seeds, the statute likely proved helpful only to those in the first category. Both the PPA's legislative history and the earliest patents granted under the Act fully support this interpretation. See S.Rep. No. 315, at 3 (explaining that varieties that "resul[t] from seedlings of cross pollenization of two species" were patentable under the Act); Plant Patent Nos. 1-2, 5-6, 8-11 (roses); Plant Patent Nos. 7, 15 (peach trees). </s> Given these characteristics, the PPA is incompatible with the claim that the Utility Patent Statute's language ("manufacture, or composition of matter") also covers plants. To see why that is so, simply imagine a plant breeder who, in 1931, sought to patent a new, distinct variety of plant that he invented but which he has never been able to reproduce through grafting, i.e., asexually. Because he could not reproduce it through grafting, he could not patent it under the more specific terms of the PPA. Could he nonetheless patent it under the more general Utility Patent Statute language "manufacture, or composition of matter?" </s> Assume the court that tried to answer that question was prescient, i.e., that it knew that this Court, in Chakrabarty, 523 U.S. 517, 530-533 (1998) (holding that a later, specific statute trumps an earlier, more general statute). </s> Nothing that occurred after 1930 changes this conclusion. In 1952, the Utility Patent Statute was recodified, and the PPA language I have quoted was given its own separate place in the Code. See 35 U.S.C. §161 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V). As Pioneer itself concedes, that change was not "substantive." Brief for Respondent 7, see also ante, at 7. Indeed, as recodified the PPA still allows a breeder to obtain a patent when he "invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant," 35 U.S.C. §161 (1994 ed.) (emphasis added), but it only allows the patent holder to "exclude others from asexually reproducing the plant or selling or using the plant so reproduced," §163 (emphasis added). </s> Nor does the enactment of the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, change the conclusion. The PVPA proved necessary because plant breeders became capable of creating new and distinct varieties of certain crops, corn for example, that were valuable only when reproduced through seeds--a form of reproduction that the earlier Act freely permitted. See S.Rep. No. 91-1246, pp.2-3 (1970). Just prior to its enactment a special Presidential Commission, noting the special problems that plant protection raised and favoring the development of a totally new plant protection scheme, had recommended that "[a]ll provisions in the patent statute for plant patents be deleted ...." President's Commission on the Patent System, To Promote the Progress of Useful Arts, S. Doc. No. 5, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 20-21 (1967) (hereinafter S. Doc.). InsteadCongress kept the PPA while adding the PVPA. The PVPA gave patent-like protection (for 20 years) to plants reproduced by seed, and it excluded the PPA's requirement that a breeder have "asexually reproduced" the plant. 7 U.S.C. §§2402, 2483. It imposed certain specific requirements. §2402 (variety must be new, distinct, uniform, and stable). And it provided the breeder with an exclusive right to sell, offer to sell, reproduce, import, or export the variety, including the seeds. §2483. </s> At the same time, the PVPA created two important exceptions. The first provided that a farmer who plants his fields with a protected plant "shall not infringe any right hereunder" by saving the seeds and planting them in future years. §2543. The second permitted "use and reproduction of a protected variety for plant breeding or other bona fide research." §2544. </s> Nothing in the history, language, or purpose of the 1970 statute suggests an intent to reintroduce into the scope of the general words "manufacture, or composition of matter" the subject matter that the PPA had removed, namely plants. To the contrary, any such reintroduction would make meaningless the two exceptions--for planting and for research--that Congress wrote into that Act. It is not surprising that no party argues that passage of the PVPA somehow enlarged the scope of the Utility Patent Statute. </s> III </s> The Court replies as follows to the claim that its reading of the Utility Patent Statute nullifies the PPA's limitation of protection to plants produced by graft and the PVPA's exemptions for seeds and research: (1) The Utility Patent Statute applies only to plants that are useful, novel, nonobvious, and for which the inventor provides an enabling written description of the invention. 35 U.S.C. §§101, 102, 103, 112 (1994 ed. and Supp. V). (2) The PVPA applies to plants that are novel, distinct, uniform, and stable. 7 U.S.C. §2402. (3) The second set of criteria seem slightly easier to meet, as they do not include nonobviousness and a written description (Pioneer does not argue that the "useful" requirement is significant). (4) And Congress could reasonably have intended the planting and research exceptions to apply only to the set of plants that can meet the easier, but not the tougher, criteria. </s> I do not find this argument convincing. For one thing, it is not clear that the general patent law requirements are significantly tougher. Counsel for Pioneer stated at oral argument that there are many more PVP certificates than there are plant patents. But he added that the major difference in criteria is the difference between the utility patent law's "nonobviousness" requirement and the specific Acts' requirement of "newness"--a difference that may reflect the Patent Office's more "rigorous" examination process. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 26, 30. But see S. Doc., at 20-21 (suggesting little difference because patent office tends to find "nonobviousness" as long as the plant is deemed "new" by the Department of Agriculture). </s> In any case, there is no relationship between the criteria differences and the exemptions. Why would anyone want to limit the exemptions--related to seedplanting and research--only to those new plant varieties that are slightly less original? Indeed, the research exemption would seem more useful in respect to more original, not less original, innovation. The Court has advanced no sound reason why Congress would want to destroy the exemptions in the PVPA that Congress created. And the Court's reading would destroy those exemptions. </s> The Court and Justice Scalia's concurrence also rely upon the interpretive canon that disfavors repeal by implication. The Court, citing Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996), says that "there is simply no evidence" that the PPA was meant to preclude §101 protection for sexually reproduced plants. Ante, at 11-12. But reliance on the canon of "implied repeal" is misplaced. The canon has traditionally been embraced when a party claims that a later statute--that does not actually modify an earlier statute--implicitly repeals the earlier legislation. E.g., 516 U.S., at 380-381. That canon has no relevance to the PPA--which explicitly amended the Utility Patent Statute by limiting protection to plants produced by graft. Even were that not so, the Court has noted that a later, more specific statute will ordinarily trump the earlier, more general one. See United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S., at 530-533. </s> Regardless, canons are not mandatory rules. They are guides to help courts determine likely legislative intent. See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. ___ (2001); see also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001); id., at 137-140 (Souter, J., dissenting). And that intent is critical. Those who write statutes seek to solve human problems. Fidelity to their aims requires us to approach an interpretive problem not as if it were a purely logical game, like a Rubik's Cube, but as an effort to divine human intent that underlies the statute. Here that effort calls not for an appeal to canons, but for an analysis of language, structure, history, and purpose. Those factors make clear that the Utility Patent Statute does not apply to plants. Nothing in Chakrabarty holds to the contrary. </s> For these reasons, I dissent </s> FOOTNOTES Footnote 1 </s> Petitioners favor a holding that the PVPA is the only means of protecting these corn plants primarily because the PVPA's coverage is generally less extensive and the hybrid seeds at issue do not have PVPA protection. App. 14. Most notably, the PVPA provides exemptions for research and for farmers to save seed from their crops for replanting. See, infra, at 14. Utility patents issued for plants do not contain such exemptions. </s> Footnote 2 </s> Justice Breyer argues that Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980), cannot determine the outcome of this case because it did not answer the precise question presented. See post, at 1-3 (dissenting opinion). But this simply misses the mark. Chakrabarty broadly interpreted the reach of §101. This interpretation is surely germane to the question whether sexually reproduced plants fall within the subject matter of §101. In addition, Chakrabarty's discussion of the PPA and the PVPA is relevant to petitioners' primary arguments against utility patent protection for sexually reproduced plants. See 447 U.S., at 310-314; see also infra, at 8-9. </s> Footnote 3 </s> By contrast, sexual reproduction occurs by seed and sometimes involves two different plants. </s> Footnote 4 </s> The PPA, as amended, provides: "Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant, including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings, other than a tuber propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." 35 U. S. C. §161. </s> Footnote 5 </s> Patents issued under §161 are referred to as "plant patents," which are distinguished from §101 utility patents and §171 design patents. </s> Footnote 6 </s> To obtain a plant patent under §161 a breeder must meet all of the requirements for §101, except for the description requirement. See §162 ("No plant patent shall be declared invalid for noncompliance with section 112 [providing for written description] of this title if the description is as complete as is reasonably possible"). </s> Footnote 7 </s> The Senate Report accompanying the bill notes: "All such plants must be asexually reproduced in order to have their identity preserved. This is necessary since seedlings either of chance or self-pollenization from any of these would not preserve the character of the individual." S. Rep. No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1930) (hereinafter S.Rep.). </s> This report, like the text, indicates Congress' intent to limit plant patent coverage to asexual reproduction, but explains that this limitation "recognizes a practical situation"--i.e., that propagation by seeds does not preserve the character of the original. See id., at 4 ("[T]he patent right granted is a right to propagate the new variety by asexual reproduction. It does not include the right to propagate by seeds. This limitation in the right granted recognizes a practical situation and greatly narrows the scope of the bill"). The limitation to asexual reproduction was a recognition of the "practical situation" that seedlings did not reproduce true-to-type. An exclusive right to asexual reproduction was the only type of coverage needed and thought possible given the state of plant breeding at the time. </s> Footnote 8 </s> At its high point in 1897, over 20 million packages of seed were distributed to farmers. See N. Klose, America's Crop Heritage 98 (1950). Even at the time the program was eliminated in 1924, it was the third largest line item in the Department of Agriculture's budget. See J. Kloppenburg, First the Seed: The Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology 1492-2000, p.71 (1988) (hereinafter Kloppenburg). </s> Footnote 9 </s> The dissent relies on United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517 (1998), for the proposition that "a later, more specific statute trumps an earlier, more general one." See post, at 10. Yet in Estate of Romani this purported rule was applied because the meaning of the earlier statute was "unresolved." 523 U.S., at 530. The Court noted that "despite the age of the statute, and despite the fact that it has been the subject of a great deal of litigation," its meaning had not been definitively established. Id., at 529. By contrast, the statutory terms "manufacture or composition of matter" were not similarly unresolved at the time the PPA was passed. In addition, these subject matter terms have been interpreted broadly to evolve with developments in science and technology. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S., at 315. Moreover, even in Estate of Romani, the Court considered that there was no "plain inconsistency" between the earlier and later statutes. 523 U.S., at 533. </s> Footnote 10 </s> 7 U.S.C. § 2541(a), which provides in full: </s> "(a) Acts constituting infringement </s> "Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, it shall be an infringement of the rights of the owner of a protected variety to perform without authority, any of the following acts in the United States, or in commerce which can be regulated by Congress or affecting such commerce, prior to expiration of the right to plant variety protection but after either the issue of the certificate or the distribution of a protected plant variety with the notice under section 2567 of this title: </s> "(1) sell or market the protected variety, or offer it or expose it for sale, deliver it, ship it, consign it, exchange it, or solicit an offer to buy it, or any other transfer of title or possession of it; </s> "(2) import the variety into, or export it from, the United States; </s> "(3) sexually multiply, or propagate by a tuber or part of a tuber, the variety as a step in marketing (for growing purposes) the variety; </s> "(4) use the variety in producing (as distinguished from developing) a hybrid or different variety therefrom; </s> "(5) use seed which had been marked `Unauthorized Propagation Prohibited' or `Unauthorized Seed Multiplication Prohibited' or progeny thereof to propagate the variety; </s> "(6) dispense the variety to another, in a form which can be propagated, without notice as to being a protected variety under which it was received; </s> "(7) condition the variety for the purpose of propagation, except to the extent that the conditioning is related to the activities permitted under section 2543 of this title; </s> "(8) stock the variety for any of the purposes referred to in paragraphs (1) through (7); </s> "(9) perform any of the foregoing acts even in instances in which the variety is multiplied other than sexually, except in pursuance of a valid United States plant patent; or </s> "(10) instigate or actively induce performance of any of the foregoing acts." </s> Footnote 11 </s> It is, however, infringement of a utility patent to use a protected plant in the development of another variety. See infra, at 18. </s> Footnote 12 </s> The dissent argues that our "reading would destroy" the PVPA's exemptions. Post, at 9. Yet such bold predictions are belied by the facts. According to the Government, over 5,000 PVP certificates have been issued, as compared to about 1,800 utility patents for plants. Tr. of Oral Arg. 41. Since 1985 the PTO has interpreted §101 to include utility patents for plants and there is no evidence that the availability of such patents has rendered the PVPA and its specific exemptions obsolete. </s> Footnote 13 </s> Petitioners point to a House Report that concluded: </s> "Under patent law, protection is presently limited to those varieties of plants which reproduce asexually, that is, by such methods as grafting or budding. No protection is available to those varieties of plants which reproduce sexually, that is, generally by seeds." H. R. Rep. No. 91-1605, p.1 (1970); Brief for Petitioners 40.

United States Supreme Court FTC v. STANDARD OIL CO. OF CAL.(1980) No. 79-900 Argued: October 15, 1980Decided: December 15, 1980 </s> The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued a complaint against respondent and several other major oil companies, alleging that the FTC had "reason to believe" that the companies were violating 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (Act), which prohibits unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce. While adjudication of the complaint before an Administrative Law Judge was still pending, respondent, having unsuccessfully sought to have the FTC withdraw the complaint, brought an action in Federal District Court, alleging that the FTC had issued its complaint without having "reason to believe" that respondent was violating the Act, and seeking an order declaring the complaint unlawful and requiring that it be withdrawn. The District Court dismissed the action. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the District Court could inquire whether the FTC in fact had made the determination that it had reason to believe that respondent was violating the Act, and that the issuance of the complaint was "final agency action" under 10 (c) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). </s> Held: </s> The FTC's issuance of its complaint was not "final agency action" under 10 (c) of the APA and hence was not judicially reviewable before the conclusion of the administrative adjudication. Pp. 238-246. </s> (a) The issuance of the complaint was not a definitive ruling or regulation and had no legal force or practical effect upon respondent's daily business other than the disruptions that accompany any major litigation. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 , distinguished. Immediate judicial review would serve neither efficiency nor enforcement of the Act. Pp. 239-243. </s> (b) Although respondent, by requesting the FTC to withdraw its complaint and awaiting the FTC's refusal to do so, may have exhausted its administrative remedy as to the averment of a "reason to believe," the FTC's refusal to withdraw the complaint does not render the complaint a "definitive" action. Such refusal does not augment the complaint's legal force or practical effect on respondent, nor does it diminish the concern for efficiency and enforcement of the Act. P. 243. [449 U.S. 232, 233] </s> (c) The expense and disruption in defending itself, even if substantial, does not constitute irreparable injury to respondent. P. 244. </s> (d) Respondent's challenge to the FTC's complaint will not become "insulated" from judicial review if it is not reviewed before the FTC's adjudication concludes, since under the APA a court of appeals reviewing a cease-and-desist order has the power to review alleged unlawfulness in the issuance of an agency complaint, assuming that the issuance of the complaint is not "committed to agency discretion by law." Pp. 244-245. </s> (e) Since issuance of the complaint averring "reason to believe" is a step toward, and will merge in, the FTC's decision on the merits, the claim of illegality in issuance of the complaint is not subject to judicial review as a "collateral" order. Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 , distinguished. P. 246. </s> 596 F.2d 1381, reversed and remanded. </s> POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 247. STEWART, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. </s> Solicitor General McCree argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Elliot Schulder, Michael N. Sohn, Howard E. Shapiro, Joanne L. Levine, and Mark W. Haase. </s> George A. Sears argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Richard W. Odgers and C. Douglas Floyd. * </s> [Footnote * Daniel J. Popeo and Paul D. Kamenar filed a brief for the Washington Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging affirmance. </s> JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case presents the question whether the issuance of a complaint by the Federal Trade Commission is "final agency action" subject to judicial review before administrative adjudication concludes. [449 U.S. 232, 234] </s> I </s> On July 18, 1973, the Federal Trade Commission issued and served upon eight major oil companies, including Standard Oil Company of California (Socal), 1 a complaint averring that the Commission had "reason to believe" that the companies were violating 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 45, 2 and stating the Commission's charges in that respect. 3 The Commission issued the complaint under authority of 5 (b) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. 45 (b), which provides: </s> "Whenever the Commission shall have reason to believe that any . . . person, partnership, or corporation has been or is using any unfair method of competition or unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce, and if it shall appear to the Commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be to the interest of the public it shall issue and serve upon such person, partnership, or corporation a complaint stating its charges in that respect and containing a notice of a hearing . . . ." </s> An adjudication of the complaint's charges began soon thereafter [449 U.S. 232, 235] before an Administrative Law Judge, and is still pending. </s> On May 1, 1975, Socal filed a complaint against the Commission in the District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that the Commission had issued its complaint without having "reason to believe" that Socal was violating the Act. 4 Socal sought an order declaring that the issuance of the complaint was unlawful and requiring that the complaint be withdrawn. Socal had sought this relief from the Commission and been denied. 5 In support of its allegation and request, Socal recited a series of events that preceded the issuance of the complaint and several events that followed. In Socal's estimation, the only inference to be drawn from these events was that the Commission lacked sufficient evidence when it issued the complaint to warrant a belief that Socal was violating the Act. </s> The gist of Socal's recitation of events preceding the issuance of the complaint is that political pressure for a public explanation of the gasoline shortages of 1973 forced the Commission to issue a complaint against the major oil companies despite insufficient investigation. The series of events began on May 31, 1973. As of that day, the Commission had not [449 U.S. 232, 236] examined any employees, documents, or books of Socal's, although the Commission had announced in December 1971, that it intended to investigate possible violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act in the petroleum industry. </s> On May 31, Senator Henry M. Jackson, then Chairman of the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee and of the Permanent Investigation Subcommittee of the Senate Committee of Government Operations, requested the Commission "to prepare a report within thirty days regarding the relationship between the structure of the petroleum industry and related industries and the current and prospective shortages of petroleum products." Immediately the Commission subpoenaed three Socal officers to testify before it, and they did so in late June. This examination was the Commission's only inquiry as to Socal's books and records, and the only interview of a Socal officer, prior to the issuance of the complaint. 6 On July 6, the Commission sent to Senator Jackson a "Preliminary Federal Trade Commission Staff Report on Its Investigation of the Petroleum Industry," requesting that the report not be made public because it had not yet "been evaluated or approved by the Commission." On July 9, Senator Jackson informed the Commission by letter that he intended to publish the report as a congressional committee reprint unless the Commission explained by July 13 why public release of the report would be improper. The Commission responded on July 11 that public release of the report, which the Commission characterized as "an internal staff memorandum," would be "inconsistent with [the Commission's] duty to proceed judiciously and responsibly in determining what, if any, action should be taken on the basis of the staff investigation." On July 13, Senator Jackson released the report for publication [449 U.S. 232, 237] by the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. On July 18, the Commission issued its complaint. </s> The subsequent events recited by Socal in its complaint were intended to confirm that the Commission lacked sufficient evidence before issuing its complaint to determine that it had reason to believe that Socal was violating the Act. One subsequent event was the issuance on August 27 of a report by the Office of Energy Advisor of the Department of the Treasury, concluding that the Commission's staff report was wrong in implying that the major oil companies had contrived the gasoline shortages. The report recommended that the complaint be withdrawn. A second event was Senator Jackson's statement in January 1974, at the conclusion of congressional hearings about the shortages, that he had found no "hard evidence" that the oil companies had created shortages. In addition to these expressions of doubt about the allegations of the Commission's complaint, Socal recounted the several failures of the Commission's complaint counsel in the adjudication to comply with orders of the Administrative Law Judge to identify the witnesses and documents on which the Commission intended to rely. The complaint counsel admitted that most of the evidence and witnesses the Commission hoped to introduce were yet to be secured through discovery, and he moved to relax the Commission's procedural rules for adjudication in order to allow such extensive discovery. In certifying this motion to the Commission, the Administrative Law Judge recommended "withdrawal of this case from adjudication - that is, dismissal without prejudice - so that it may be more fully investigated." The Commission denied the complaint counsel's motion and declined to follow the Administrative Law Judge's recommendations. </s> The District Court dismissed Socal's complaint on the ground that "a review of preliminary decisions made by administrative agencies, except under most unusual circumstances, would be productive of nothing more than chaos." The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 596 F.{4)d 1381 [449 U.S. 232, 238] (1979). It held the Commission's determination whether evidence before it provided the requisite reason to believe is "committed to agency discretion" and therefore is unreviewable according to 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701 (a) (2). The Court of Appeals held, however, that the District Court could inquire whether the Commission in fact had made the determination that it had reason to believe that Socal was violating the Act. If the District Court were to find upon remand that the Commission had issued the complaint "solely because of outside pressure or with complete absence of a `reason to believe' determination," 596 F.2d, at 1386, then it was to order the Commission to dismiss the complaint. The Court of Appeals further held that the issuance of the complaint was "final agency action" under 10 (c) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. 704. </s> We granted the Commission's petition for a writ of certiorari because of the importance of the questions raised by Socal's request for judicial review of the complaint before the conclusion of the adjudication. 445 U.S. 903 (1980). We now reverse. </s> II </s> The Commission averred in its complaint that it had reason to believe that Socal was violating the Act. That averment is subject to judicial review before the conclusion of administrative adjudication only if the issuance of the complaint was "final agency action" or otherwise was "directly reviewable" under 10 (c) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. 704. We conclude that the issuance of the complaint was neither. 7 </s> [449 U.S. 232, 239] </s> A </s> The Commission's issuance of its complaint was not "final agency action." The Court observed in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967), that "[t]he cases dealing with judicial review of administrative actions have interpreted the `finality' element in a pragmatic way." In Abbott Laboratories, for example, the publication of certain regulations by the Commissioner of Food and Drugs was held to be final agency action subject to judicial review in an action for declaratory judgment brought prior to any Government action for enforcement. The regulations required manufacturers of prescription drugs to print certain information on drug labels and advertisements. The regulations were "definitive" statements of the Commission's position, id., at 151, and had a "direct and immediate . . . effect on the day-to-day business" of the complaining parties. Id., at 152. They had "the status of law" and "immediate compliance with their terms [449 U.S. 232, 240] was expected." Ibid. In addition, the question presented by the challenge to the regulations was a "legal issue . . . fit for judicial resolution." Id., at 153. Finally, because the parties seeking the declaratory judgment represented almost all the parties affected by the regulations, "a pre-enforcement challenge . . . [was] calculated to speed enforcement" of the relevant Act. Id., at 154. Taking "a similarly flexible view of finality," id., at 150, and in view of similar pragmatic considerations, the Court had held the issuance of administrative regulations to be "final agency action" in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942), Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956), and United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956). 8 The issuance of the complaint in this case, however, is materially different. [449 U.S. 232, 241] </s> By its terms, the Commission's averment of "reason to believe" that Socal was violating the Act is not a definitive statement of position. It represents a threshold determination that further inquiry is warranted and that a complaint should initiate proceedings. To be sure, the issuance of the complaint is definitive on the question whether the Commission avers reason to believe that the respondent to the complaint is violating the Act. 9 But the extent to which the respondent may challenge the complaint and its charges proves that the averment of reason to believe is not "definitive" in a comparable manner to the regulations in Abbott Laboratories and the cases it discussed. </s> Section 5 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. 45 (b), in conjunction with Commission regulations, 16 CFR 3.41-3.46 (1980), and 5 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. 554 (1976 ed. and Supp. III), requires that the complaint contain a notice of hearing at which the respondent may present evidence and testimony before an administrative law judge to refute the Commission's charges. Either party to the adjudication may appeal an adverse decision of the administrative law judge to the full Commission, 5 U.S.C. 577; 16 CFR 3.52 (1980); see 15 U.S.C. 45 (c), which then may dismiss the complaint. See 15 U.S.C. 45 (c). If instead the Commission enters an order requiring the respondent to cease and desist from engaging in the challenged practice, the respondent still is not bound by the Commission's decision until judicial review is complete or the opportunity to seek review has lapsed. 15 U.S.C. 45 (g). 10 Thus, the averment of reason to believe is a prerequisite to a definitive agency position on the question whether Socal violated the Act, but itself is a determination only that adjudicatory proceedings will commence. [449 U.S. 232, 242] Cf. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950); Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948). </s> Serving only to initiate the proceedings, the issuance of the complaint averring reason to believe has no legal force comparable to that of the regulation at issue in Abbott Laboratories, nor any comparable effect upon Socal's daily business. The regulations in Abbott Laboratories forced manufacturers to "risk serious criminal and civil penalties" for noncompliance, 387 U.S., at 153 , or "change all their labels, advertisements, and promotional materials; . . . destroy stocks of printed matter; and . . . invest heavily in new printing type and new supplies." Id., at 152. Socal does not contend that the issuance of the complaint had any such legal or practical effect, except to impose upon Socal the burden of responding to the charges made against it. Although this burden certainly is substantial, it is different in kind and legal effect from the burdens attending what heretofore has been considered to be final agency action. </s> In contrast to the complaint's lack of legal or practical effect upon Socal, the effect of the judicial review sought by Socal is likely to be interference with the proper functioning of the agency and a burden for the courts. Judicial intervention into the agency process denies the agency an opportunity to correct its own mistakes and to apply its expertise. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975). Intervention also leads to piecemeal review which at the least is inefficient and upon completion of the agency process might prove to have been unnecessary. McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479, 484 (1971); McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 195 (1969). Furthermore, unlike the review in Abbott Laboratories, judicial review to determine whether the Commission decided that it had the requisite reason to believe would delay resolution of the ultimate question whether the Act was violated. Finally, every respondent to a Commission complaint [449 U.S. 232, 243] could make the claim that Socal had made. Judicial review of the averments in the Commission's complaints should not be a means of turning prosecutor into defendant before adjudication concludes. </s> In sum, the Commission's issuance of a complaint averring reason to believe that Socal was violating the Act is not a definitive ruling or regulation. It had no legal force or practical effect upon Socal's daily business other than the disruptions that accompany any major litigation. And immediate judicial review would serve neither efficiency nor enforcement of the Act. These pragmatic considerations counsel against the conclusion that the issuance of the complaint was "final agency action." </s> B </s> Socal relies, however, upon different considerations than these in contending that the issuance of the complaint is "final agency action." </s> Socal first contends that it exhausted its administrative remedies by moving in the adjudicatory proceedings for dismissal of the complaint. By thus affording the Commission an opportunity to decide upon the matter, Socal contends that it has satisfied the interests underlying the doctrine of administrative exhaustion. Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, at 765. The Court of Appeals agreed. 596 F.2d, at 1387. We think, however, that Socal and the Court of Appeals have mistaken exhaustion for finality. By requesting the Commission to withdraw its complaint and by awaiting the Commission's refusal to do so, Socal may well have exhausted its administrative remedy as to the averment of reason to believe. But the Commission's refusal to reconsider its issuance of the complaint does not render the complaint a "definitive" action. The Commission's refusal does not augment the complaint's legal force or practical effect upon Socal. Nor does the refusal diminish the concerns for efficiency and enforcement of the Act. [449 U.S. 232, 244] </s> Socal also contends that it will be irreparably harmed unless the issuance of the complaint is judicially reviewed immediately. Socal argues that the expense and disruption of defending itself in protracted adjudicatory proceedings constitutes irreparable harm. As indicated above, we do not doubt that the burden of defending this proceeding will be substantial. But "the expense and annoyance of litigation is `part of the social burden of living under government.'" Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n, 304 U.S. 209, 222 (1938). As we recently reiterated: "Mere litigation expense, even substantial and unrecoupable cost, does not constitute irreparable injury." Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974). </s> Socal further contends that its challenge to the Commission's averment of reason to believe can never be reviewed unless it is reviewed before the Commission's adjudication concludes. As stated by the Court of Appeals, the alleged unlawfulness in the issuance of the complaint "is likely to become insulated from any review" if deferred until appellate review of a cease-and-desist order. 596 F.2d, at 1387. Socal also suggests that the unlawfulness will be "insulated" because the reviewing court will lack an adequate record and it will address only the question whether substantial evidence supported the cease-and-desist order. 11 </s> We are not persuaded by this speculation. The Act expressly [449 U.S. 232, 245] authorizes a court of appeals to order that the Commission take additional evidence. 12 15 U.S.C. 45 (c). Thus, a record which would be inadequate for review of alleged unlawfulness in the issuance of a complaint can be made adequate. We also note that the APA specifically provides that a "preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action," 5 U.S.C. 704, and that the APA also empowers a court of appeals to "hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . . found to be . . . without observance of procedure required by law." 5 U.S.C. 706. Thus, assuming that the issuance of the complaint is not "committed to agency discretion by law," 13 a court of appeals reviewing a cease-and-desist order has the power to review alleged unlawfulness in the issuance of a complaint. We need not decide what action a court of appeals should take if it finds a cease-and-desist order to be supported by substantial evidence but the complaint to have been issued without the requisite reason to believe. It suffices to hold that the possibility does not affect the application of the finality rule. Cf. Macauley v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 327 U.S. 540, 545 (1946). [449 U.S. 232, 246] </s> C </s> There remains only Socal's contention that the claim of illegality in the issuance of the complaint is a "collateral" order subject to review under the doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). It argues that the Commission's issuance of the complaint averring reason to believe "fall[s] in that small class [of decisions] which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." Id., at 546. In that diversity case, a District Court refused to apply a state statute requiring shareholders bringing a derivative suit to post a security bond for the defendant's litigation expenses. This Court held that the District Court's order was subject to immediate appellate review under 28 U.S.C. 1291. Giving that section a "practical rather than a technical construction," the Court concluded that this order "did not make any step toward final disposition of the merits of the case and will not be merged in final judgment." 337 U.S., at 546 . </s> Cohen does not avail Socal. What we have said above makes clear that the issuance of the complaint averring reason to believe is a step toward, and will merge in, the Commission's decision on the merits. Therefore, review of this preliminary step should abide review of the final order. </s> III </s> Because the Commission's issuance of a complaint averring reason to believe that Socal has violated the Act is not "final agency action" under 10 (c) of the APA, it is not judicially reviewable before administrative adjudication concludes. 14 </s> [449 U.S. 232, 247] </s> We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for the dismissal of the complaint. </s> It is so ordered. </s> JUSTICE STEWART took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The other seven respondents to the complaint were Exxon Corp., Texaco, Inc., Gulf Oil Corp., Mobil Oil Corp., Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), Shell Oil Corp., and Atlantic Richfield Co. In re Exxon Corporation, et al., Docket No. 8934. </s> [Footnote 2 Section 5 of the Act, as set forth in 15 U.S.C. 45, provides in pertinent part: </s> "(a) . . . (1) Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful." </s> [Footnote 3 The Commission charged that the eight companies had "maintained and reinforced a noncompetitive market structure in the refining of crude oil into petroleum products," had "exercised monopoly power in the refining of petroleum products," and had followed "common courses of action in accommodating the needs and goals of each other throughout the petroleum industry." </s> [Footnote 4 Socal invoked federal-court jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. 704 and 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1337, 1346, 1361, and 2201. </s> [Footnote 5 The Commission had denied Socal's motion to dismiss the complaint on February 12, 1974. The Commission also had denied Socal's motion for reconsideration, stating: </s> "[I]t has long been settled that the adequacy of the Commission's `reason to believe' a violation of law has occurred and its belief that a proceeding to stop it would be in the `public interest' are matters that go to the mental processes of the Commissioners and will not be reviewed by the courts. Once the Commission has resolved these questions and issued a complaint, the issue to be litigated is not the adequacy of the Commission's pre-complaint information or the diligence of its study of the material in question but whether the alleged violation has in fact occurred. That is the posture of the instant matter." In re Exxon Corp., 83 F. T. C. 1759, 1760 (1974). </s> [Footnote 6 On July 6, 1973, the Commission subpoenaed certain of Socal's books and records, but the complaint was issued before those records were produced. The subpoena was quashed on July 27, 1973, by the commencement of adjudication. </s> [Footnote 7 In addition to contending that the issuance of the complaint is not "final" agency action, the Commission argues that the issuance is not "agency action" under 2 (g) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. 551 (13), and that, if agency action, it is "committed to agency discretion by law" under 10. 5 U.S.C. 701 (a) (2). </s> We agree with Socal and with the Court of Appeals that the issuance of the complaint is "agency action." The language of the APA and its [449 U.S. 232, 239] legislative history support this conclusion. According to 10 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. 701 (b) (2), "agency action" has the meaning given to it by 2, 5 U.S.C. 551. That section provides that "`agency action' includes the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act," 5 U.S.C. 551 (13), and also that "`order' means the whole or a part of a final disposition . . . of an agency in a matter other than rule making . . . ." 5 U.S.C. 551 (6). According to the legislative history of the APA: </s> "The term `agency action' brings together previously defined terms in order to simplify the language of the judicial-review provisions of section 10 and to assure the complete coverage of every form of agency power, proceeding, action, or inaction. In that respect the term includes the supporting procedures, findings, conclusions, or statements or reasons or basis for the action or inaction." S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 255 (1946). </s> We conclude that the issuance of the complaint by the Commission is "a part of a final disposition" and therefore is "agency action." </s> In view of our conclusion that the issuance of the complaint was not "final agency action," we do not address the question whether the issuance of a complaint is "committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. 701 (a) (2). </s> [Footnote 8 In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, the Court held reviewable a regulation of the Federal Communications Commission proscribing certain contractual arrangements between chain broadcasters and local stations. The Commission did not have authority to regulate such contracts; its regulation asserted only that the Commission would not license stations which maintained such contracts. In a challenge to the regulation before any enforcement action had been brought, the Court noted that the regulations had "the force of law before their sanctions are invoked as well as after," that they were "promulgated by order of the Commission," and that "the expected conformity to them causes injury cognizable by a court of equity." 316 U.S., at 418 -419. </s> In Frozen Food Express v. United States, the Court held reviewable an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission specifying commodities that were deemed not to be "agricultural . . . commodities." The carriage of such commodities exempted vehicles from ICC supervision. The order was held to be "final agency action" in a challenge brought by a carrier transporting commodities that the ICC's order had not included in its terms. </s> In United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., the Court also held reviewable as "final agency action" a Federal Communications Commission regulation announcing a policy not to issue television licenses to applicants already owning five such licenses. The rule making was complete and "operate[d] to control the business affairs of Storer." 351 U.S., at 199 . </s> [Footnote 9 The Commission held as much in its order denying Socal's motion for reconsideration of the motion to dismiss. See n. 5, supra. </s> [Footnote 10 Possible judicial review also includes review in this Court upon a writ of certiorari. 15 U.S.C. 45 (g). </s> [Footnote 11 The Court of Appeals additionally suggested that the complaint would be "insulated" from review because the alleged unlawfulness would be moot if Socal prevailed in the adjudication. These concerns do not support a conclusion that the issuance of a complaint averring reason to believe is "final agency action." To the contrary, one of the principal reasons to await the termination of agency proceedings is "to obviate all occasion for judicial review." Supra, at 242; McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479, 484 (1971); McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 195 (1969). Thus, the possibility that Socal's challenge may be mooted in adjudication warrants the requirement that Socal pursue adjudication, not shortcut it. </s> [Footnote 12 Section 5 (c), as set forth in 15 U.S.C. 45 (c), provides in pertinent part: </s> "If either party shall apply to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence, and shall show to the satisfaction of the court that such additional evidence is material and that there were reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce such evidence in the proceeding before the Commission, the court may order such additional evidence to be taken before the Commission and to be adduced upon the hearing in such manner and upon such terms and conditions as to the court may see proper." </s> [Footnote 13 Contrary to the suggestion of JUSTICE STEVENS in his concurring opinion, we do not hold that the issuance of the complaint is reviewable agency action. We leave open the question whether the issuance of the complaint is unreviewable because it is "committed to agency discretion by law." See n. 7, supra. </s> [Footnote 14 By this holding, we do not encourage the issuance of complaints by the Commission without a conscientious compliance with the "reason to believe" obligation in 15 U.S.C. 45 (b). The adjudicatory proceedings [449 U.S. 232, 247] which follow the issuance of a complaint may last for months or years. They result in substantial expense to the respondent and may divert management personnel from their administrative and productive duties to the corporation. Without a well-grounded reason to believe that unlawful conduct has occurred, the Commission does not serve the public interest by subjecting business enterprises to these burdens. </s> JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment. </s> "Agency action" is a statutory term that identifies the conduct of executive and administrative agencies that Congress intended to be reviewable in federal court. 1 In general, the term encompasses formal orders, rules, and interpretive decisions that crystallize or modify private legal rights. 2 Agency action that is merely "preliminary, procedural, or intermediate" is subject to judicial review at the termination of the proceeding in which the interlocutory ruling is made. 3 Today [449 U.S. 232, 248] the Court holds that an agency decision to initiate administrative proceedings is in the interlocutory category. In a footnote, ante, at 238-239, n. 7, the Court determines whether the decision is ever reviewable and in the body of the opinion the Court determines when it is reviewable. </s> In my opinion, Congress did not intend to authorize any judicial review of decisions to initiate administrative proceedings. The definition of "agency action" found in 5 U.S.C. 551 (13) plainly contemplates action that affects legal rights in some way. As the Court points out, ante, at 242, the mere issuance of a complaint has no legal effect on the respondent's rights. Although an agency's decision to file a complaint may have a serious impact on private parties who must respond to such complaints, that impact is comparable to that caused by a private litigant's decision to file a lawsuit or a prosecutor's decision to present evidence to a grand jury. A decision to initiate proceedings does not have the same kind of effect on legal rights as "an agency rule, order, license [or other sanction]." 4 I am aware of nothing in the Administrative Procedure Act, or its history, that indicates that Congress intended to authorize judicial review of this type of decision. [449 U.S. 232, 249] </s> The practical consequences of the Court's contrary holding - that the Commission's prelitigation decision, although not reviewable now, will be reviewable later 5 - confirms my opinion that the Court's decision does not reflect the intent of Congress. If the Commission ultimately prevails on the merits of its complaint, Socal surely will not be granted immunity because the Commission did not uncover the evidence of illegality until after the complaint was filed. On the other hand, if Socal prevails, there will be no occasion to review the contention that it now advances, because the only relief it seeks is a dismissal of the Commission's complaint. Socal is surely correct when it argues that unless review is available now, meaningful review can never be had. </s> The Court's casual reading of the Administrative Procedure Act is unfortunate for another reason. The disposition of a novel and important question of federal jurisdiction in a footnote will lend support to the notion that federal courts have a "carte blanche" authorizing judicial supervision of almost everything that the Executive Branch of Government may do. Because that notion has an inevitable impact on the quantity and quality of judicial service, federal judges should be especially careful to construe their own authority strictly. I therefore respectfully disagree with the Court's perfunctory analysis of the "agency action" issue. I do, however, concur in its judgment because I am persuaded that the Commission's decision to initiate a complaint is not "agency action" within the meaning of 10 (b) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 702. </s> [Footnote 1 Title 5 U.S.C. 702 provides in part: </s> "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." </s> [Footnote 2 Section 701 (b) (2) provides: </s> "For the purposes of this chapter - </s> . . . . . </s> "(2) `person', `rule', `order', `license', `sanction', `relief', and `agency action' have the meanings given them by section 551 of this title." </s> Section 551 (13) provides: </s> "`agency action' includes the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act." </s> [Footnote 3 Section 704 provides in part: </s> "A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action." </s> [Footnote 4 See n. 2, supra. The Court's partial quotation of the definition of the term "order" in 5 U.S.C. 551 (6), see ante, at 239, n. 7, implies that the Court regards the initial step in a proceeding as a "part" of the final order terminating the proceeding. In my opinion that is a rather plain misreading of the definition. An ordinary reader would interpret "part" of an order to refer to one of several paragraphs or sections in that document, not to actions that preceded the entry of the order. Under a contrary reading, presumably the Commission's action in filing a brief directed to some preliminary issue in the proceeding would be considered "part" of the agency action terminating the proceedings and therefore subject to judicial review. Section 551 (6) reads, in full, as follows: </s> "`order' means the whole or a part of a final disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other than rule making but including licensing." </s> [Footnote 5 Because judicial review of the Commission's decision is not specifically proscribed by statute, the decision to file a complaint will be reviewable later unless the Commission, by a showing of "clear and convincing" evidence, can overcome the strong presumption against a determination that its action was "committed to agency discretion" under 5 U.S.C. 701 (a) (2). See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975). </s> [449 U.S. 232, 250]

United States Supreme Court FORD MOTOR CO. v. HUFFMAN(1953) No. 193 Argued: Decided: April 6, 1953 </s> 1. A collective-bargaining agreement whereby an employer, in determining relative seniority of employment among its employees, gives them credit for pre-employment military service, as well as the credit for post-employment military service required by the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, is valid - although it works to the disadvantage of other employees, including those who were employed prior to their military service. Pp. 331-336. </s> 2. By accepting such a provision in a collective-bargaining agreement, a union does not exceed its authority as a certified collective-bargaining representative under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. Pp. 336-343. </s> 195 F.2d 170, reversed. </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 194, International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, CIO, v. Huffman et al., also on certiorari to the same court. </s> The District Court dismissed a class suit for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief brought by an employee to invalidate a seniority clause in a collective-bargaining agreement between his union and his employer. The Court of Appeals reversed. 195 F.2d 170. This Court granted certiorari. 344 U.S. 814 . Reversed and remanded, p. 343. </s> William T. Gossett argued the cause for petitioner in No. 193. With him on the brief were L. Homer Surbeck and Richard W. Hogue, Jr. </s> Harold A. Cranefield argued the cause for petitioner in No. 194. With him on the brief were Lowell Goerlich and Sol Goodman. [345 U.S. 330, 331] </s> Herbert H. Monsky argued the cause for respondents. With him on a brief was Samuel M. Rosenstein for Huffman, respondent. </s> Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Solicitor General Cummings, George J. Bott, David P. Findling and Mozart G. Ratner for the National Labor Relations Board; and by Nicholas Kelley, Francis S. Bensel and Hancock Griffin, Jr. for the Chrysler Corporation, in Nos. 193 and 194; and by Arthur J. Goldberg for the Congress of Industrial Organizations in No. 194. </s> MR. JUSTICE BURTON delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> In these cases we sustain the validity of collective-bargaining agreements whereby an employer, in determining relative seniority of employment among its employees, gives them credit for pre-employment military service as well as the credit required by statute for post-employment military service. 1 </s> These proceedings were begun in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky by respondent Huffman, acting individually and on behalf of a class of about 275 fellow employees of the Ford Motor Company, petitioner in Case No. 193 (here called Ford). His complaint is that his position, and that of each member of his class, has been lowered on the seniority roster at Ford's Louisville works, because of certain provisions in collective-bargaining agreements between Ford and the International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, CIO, petitioner in Case No. 194 (here called International). He contends that those provisions have [345 U.S. 330, 332] violated his rights, and those of each member of his class, under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended. 2 He contends also that International's acceptance of those provisions exceeded its authority as a collective-bargaining representative under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. 3 He asks, accordingly, that the provisions be declared invalid insofar as they prejudice the seniority rights of members of his class, and that appropriate injunctive relief be granted against Ford and International. After answer, both sides asked for summary judgment. 4 </s> The District Court dismissed the action without opinion but said in its order that it was "of the opinion that the collective bargaining agreement expresses an honest desire for the protection of the interests of all members of the union and is not a device of hostility to veterans. The Court finds that said collective bargaining agreement [345 U.S. 330, 333] sets up a seniority system which the Court deems not to be arbitrary, discriminatory or in any respect unlawful." The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, one judge dissenting. 195 F.2d 170. Ford and International filed separate petitions for certiorari seeking to review the same decision of the Court of Appeals. We granted both because of the widespread use of contractual provisions comparable to those before us, and because of the general importance of the issue in relation to collective bargaining. 344 U.S. 814 . </s> The pleadings state that Huffman entered the employ of Ford September 23, 1943, was inducted into military service November 18, 1944, was discharged July 1, 1946, and, within 30 days, was reemployed by Ford with seniority dating from September 23, 1943, as provided by statute. 5 It does not appear whether the other members of his class are veterans but, like him, all have seniority computed from their respective dates of employment by Ford. </s> The pleadings allege further that Huffman and the members of his class all have been laid off or furloughed from their respective employments at times and for [345 U.S. 330, 334] periods when they would not have been so laid off or furloughed except for the provisions complained of in the collective-bargaining agreements. Those provisions state, in substance, that after July 30, 1946, in determining the order of retention of employees, all veterans in the employ of Ford "shall receive seniority credit for their period of service, subsequent to June 21, 1941 in the land or naval forces or Merchant Marine of the United States or its allies, upon completion of their probationary period" of six months. 6 </s> The effect of these provisions is that whereas Huffman's seniority, and that of the members of his class, is computed [345 U.S. 330, 335] from their respective dates of employment by Ford and they have been credited with their subsequent military service, if any, yet in some instances they are now surpassed in seniority by employees who entered the employ of Ford after they did but who are credited with certain military service which they rendered before their employment by Ford. 7 </s> [345 U.S. 330, 336] </s> Respondent contended in the Court of Appeals that allowance of credit for pre-employment military service was invalid because it went beyond the credit prescribed by the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. That argument was rejected unanimously. 195 F.2d 170, 173. It has not been pressed here. There is nothing in that statute which prohibits allowing such a credit if the employer and employees agree to do so. The statutory rights of returning veterans are subject to changes in the conditions of their employment which have occurred in regular course during their absence in military service, where the changes are not hostile devices discriminating against veterans. Aeronautical Lodge v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521 ; and see Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U.S. 40 ; Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275 . See also, Oakley v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 338 U.S. 278 , as to a veteran's seniority status more than one year after his reemployment. </s> On the other hand, the second objection raised by respondent was sustained by a majority of the members of the Court of Appeals. This objection was that the authority of International, as a certified bargaining representative, was limited by statute and was exceeded when International agreed to the provisions that are before us. </s> The authority of every bargaining representative under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, is stated in broad terms: </s> "SEC. 7. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, [345 U.S. 330, 337] to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . . </s> . . . . . </s> "SEC. 9. (a) Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment: . . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) 61 Stat. 140, 143, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 157, 159 (a). </s> In the absence of limiting factors, the above purposes, including "mutual aid or protection" and "other conditions of employment," are broad enough to cover terms of seniority. The National Labor Relations Act, as passed in 1935 and as amended in 1947, exemplifies the faith of Congress in free collective bargaining between employers and their employees when conducted by freely and fairly chosen representatives of appropriate units of employees. That the authority of bargaining representatives, however, is not absolute is recognized in Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 198 -199, in connection with comparable provisions of the Railway Labor Act. Their statutory obligation to represent all members of an appropriate unit requires them to make an honest effort to serve the interests of all of those members, without hostility to any. Id., at 198, 202-204; Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210, 211 ; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 . </s> Any authority to negotiate derives its principal strength from a delegation to the negotiators of a discretion [345 U.S. 330, 338] to make such concessions and accept such advantages as, in the light of all relevant considerations, they believe will best serve the interests of the parties represented. A major responsibility of negotiators is to weigh the relative advantages and disadvantages of differing proposals. A bargaining representative, under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, often is a labor organization but it is not essential that it be such. The employees represented often are members of the labor organization which represents them at the bargaining table, but it is not essential that they be such. The bargaining representative, whoever it may be, is responsible to, and owes complete loyalty to, the interests of all whom it represents. In the instant controversy, International represented, with certain exceptions not material here, all employees at the Louisville works, including both the veterans with, and those without, prior employment by Ford, as well as the employees having no military service. Inevitably differences arise in the manner and degree to which the terms of any negotiated agreement affect individual employees and classes of employees. The mere existence of such differences does not make them invalid. The complete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected. A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion. </s> Compromises on a temporary basis, with a view to long-range advantages, are natural incidents of negotiation. Differences in wages, hours and conditions of employment reflect countless variables. Seniority rules governing promotions, transfers, layoffs and similar matters may, in the first instance, revolve around length of competent service. Variations acceptable in the discretion of bargaining representatives, however, may well include differences [345 U.S. 330, 339] based upon such matters as the unit within which seniority is to be computed, the privileges to which it shall relate, the nature of the work, the time at which it is done, the fitness, ability or age of the employees, their family responsibilities, injuries received in course of service, and time or labor devoted to related public service, whether civil or military, voluntary or involuntary. See, e. g., Hartley v. Brotherhood of Clerks, 283 Mich. 201, 277 N. W. 885; and see also, Williamson & Harris, Trends in Collective Bargaining (1945), 100-103. </s> The National Labor Relations Act, as amended, gives a bargaining representative not only wide responsibility but authority to meet that responsibility. We have held that a collective-bargaining representative is within its authority when, in the general interest of those it represents, it agrees to allow union chairmen certain advantages in the retention of their employment, even to the prejudice of veterans otherwise entitled to greater seniority. Aeronautical Lodge v. Campbell, supra, at 526-529. </s> The public policy and fairness inherent in crediting employees with time spent in military service in time of war or national emergency is so clear that Congress, in the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, required some credit to be given for it in computing seniority both in governmental and in private employment. See note 5, supra. Congress there prescribed that employees who left their private civilian employment to enter military service should receive seniority credit for such military service, provided their prior civilian employment, however brief, was bona fide and not on a temporary basis. There is little that justifies giving such a substantial benefit to a veteran with brief prior civilian employment that does not equally justify giving it to a veteran who was inducted into military service before having a chance to enter any civilian employment, or to a veteran who never worked [345 U.S. 330, 340] for the particular employer who hired him after his return from military service. The respective values of all such veterans, as employees, are substantially the same. From the point of view of public policy and industrial stability, there is much to be said, especially in time of war or emergency, for allowing credit for all military service. Any other course adopts the doubtful policy of favoring those who stay out of military service over those who enter it. </s> The above considerations took concrete form in the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944 which added the requirement that credit for military service be given by every civilian federal agency, whether the military service preceded or followed civilian employment. 8 Apparently recognizing the countless variations in conditions affecting private employment, Congress, however, did not make credit for such pre-employment military service compulsory in private civilian employment. A little later, the Administrator of the Retraining and Reemployment Administration of the United States Department of Labor assembled a representative committee to recommend principles to serve as guides to private employers in their employment of veterans and others. 9 Among 15 principles [345 U.S. 330, 341] developed by that committee, and "wholeheartedly" endorsed by the Secretary of Labor, in 1946, were the following: </s> "8. All veterans having reemployment rights under Federal statutes should be accorded these statutory rights as a minimum. </s> . . . . . </s> "13. Newly hired veterans who have served a probationary period and qualified for employment should be allowed seniority credit, at least for purposes of job retention, equal to time spent in the armed services plus time spent in recuperation from service-connected injuries or disabilities either through hospitalization or vocational training." 10 </s> The provisions before us reflect such a policy. 11 It [345 U.S. 330, 342] is not necessary to define here the limits to which a collective-bargaining representative may go in accepting proposals to promote the long-range social or economic welfare of those it represents. Nothing in the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, so limits the vision and action of a bargaining representative that it must disregard public policy and national security. Nor does anything in that Act compel a bargaining representative to limit seniority clauses solely to the relative lengths of employment of the respective employees. Aeronautical Lodge v. Campbell, supra, at 526, and 528-529, n. 5. For examples of negotiated provisions protecting veterans from loss of seniority upon their return to private civilian employment, recognized by the National War Labor Board as coming within the proper scope of collective bargaining, in 1945, see, In re American Can Co., 27 War Lab. Rep. 634, 28 War Lab. Rep. 764, and In re Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 24 War Lab. Rep. 322, 28 War Lab. Rep. 483. See also, Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Collective Bargaining Contracts (1941), 369 et seq. </s> The provisions before us are within reasonable bounds of relevancy. They extended but slightly, during a period of war and emergency, the acceptance of credits for military service under circumstances where comparable credit already was required, by statute, in favor of all who had been regularly employed by Ford before entering military service. These provisions conform to the recommendation of responsible Government officials and round out a statutory requirement which, unless so rounded out, produces discriminations of its own. A failure to adopt these provisions might have resulted in [345 U.S. 330, 343] more friction among employees represented by International than did their adoption. </s> The several briefs of amici curiae, filed here by consent of all parties, demonstrate the widespread acceptance and relevance of the type of provisions before us. </s> We hold that International, as a collective-bargaining representative, had authority to accept these provisions. Accordingly, we find no ground sufficient to establish the invalidity of the provisions before us or to sustain an injunction against either petitioner. In accord: Haynes v. United Chemical Workers, 190 Tenn. 165, 228 S. W. 2d 101. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals which reversed that of the District Court therefore is reversed. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed and the cause is remanded to it. </s> Reversed and remanded. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Where the context permits, "military service" in this opinion includes service in the land or naval forces or Merchant Marine of the United States or its allies. </s> [Footnote 2 54 Stat. 890, 56 Stat. 724, 58 Stat. 798, 60 Stat. 341, 50 U.S.C. App. 308. </s> [Footnote 3 49 Stat. 452, 61 Stat. 140, 65 Stat. 601, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 157-159. </s> [Footnote 4 In No. 194, International also questions the jurisdiction of the District Court. International recognizes that one issue in the case is whether it engaged in an unfair labor practice when it agreed to the allowance of credit for pre-employment military service in computations of employment seniority. It then argues that the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 146, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 160 (a), vests the initial jurisdiction over such an issue exclusively in the National Labor Relations Board. This question was not argued in the Court of Appeals nor mentioned in its opinion and, in view of our position on the merits, it is not discussed here. Our decision interprets the statutory authority of a collective-bargaining representative to have such breadth that it removes all ground for a substantial charge that International, by exceeding its authority, committed an unfair labor practice. As to a somewhat comparable question considered in connection with the Railway Labor Act, see Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 ; Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 204 -207. </s> [Footnote 5 "SEC. 8. . . . "(b) In the case of any such person who, in order to perform such training and service, has left or leaves a position, other than a temporary position, in the employ of any employer and who (1) receives such certificate [of satisfactory completion of his period of training and service], (2) is still qualified to perform the duties of such position, and (3) makes application for reemployment within ninety days after he is relieved from such training and service . . . . . . . . "(B) if such position was in the employ of a private employer, such employer shall restore such person to such position or to a position of like seniority, status, and pay unless the employer's circumstances have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so; . . . ." 54 Stat. 890, 58 Stat. 798, 50 U.S.C. App. 308 (b) (B). </s> [Footnote 6 Article VIII of a supplementary agreement between Ford and International, dated July 30, 1946, contained the following: "Section 13 - . . . . . . . . . "(c) Any veteran of World War II who was not employed by any person or company at the time of his entry into the service of the land or naval forces or the Merchant Marine and who is a citizen of the United States and served with the allies and who has been honorably discharged from such training and service and who is hired by the company after he is relieved from training and service in the land or naval forces or after completion of service in the Merchant Marine shall, upon having been employed for six (6) months and not before, receive seniority credit for the period of such service subsequent to June 21, 1941, provided: "(1) Such veteran must apply for employment within ninety (90) days from the time he is relieved from such training or service in the land or naval forces or the time of his completion of such service in the Merchant Marine, and must obtain such employment within twelve (12) months from the time he is relieved from such training and service in the land or naval forces or the time of his completion of such service in the Merchant Marine. "(2) Such veteran shall not have previously exercised his right in any plant of this or any other company. "(3) A veteran so employed shall submit his service discharge papers to the company at the end of aforesaid probationary period of employment and the company shall place thereon in permanent form a statement showing that the veteran has exercised this right, [345 U.S. 330, 335] such statement to be signed by representatives of the company and the Union, and a copy thereof placed in the employee's record and a copy furnished to the Union. "(d) It is further understood and agreed that, regardless of any of the foregoing, all veterans in the [employ] of the company at the time the Contract is thus amended shall receive seniority credit for their period of service, subsequent to June 21, 1941 in the land or naval forces or Merchant Marine of the United States or its allies, upon completion of their probationary period." (Emphasis supplied.) The above provisions were continued in effect, in substantially identical form, in an agreement of August 21, 1947. An agreement of September 28, 1949, provided: "Section 12. . . . . . . . . "(c) Any employee who, prior to the effective date of this Agreement, has received the seniority credit provided for in Article VIII, Section 13 (c) or (d) of the Agreement between the Company and the Union dated August 21, 1947, or the comparable provision in the Supplementary Agreement between the Company and the Union dated July 30, 1946, shall continue to receive such seniority credit." </s> [Footnote 7 On Huffman's return to Ford in July, 1946, his employment seniority, including his military service, dated from September 23, 1943. It totaled about 33 months, including about 14 months of pre-service company employment and 19 of post-employment military service. An example of a veteran who, due to the agreements before us, outranks Huffman in employment seniority is one who entered military service July 1, 1943, without any prior employment, served honorably until discharged March 1, 1945, and, thereafter, has been employed continuously by Ford, including six months of satisfactory probationary employment. His seniority dates from July 1, 1943. By July 1, 1946, it totaled 36 months, including 20 months of pre-employment military service, and 16 of post-service company employment. [345 U.S. 330, 336] However, except for the collective-bargaining agreements, Huffman would then have outranked such a veteran by about 17 months, although Huffman's military service totaled one month less, his employment by Ford two months less and his combined military service and company employment three months less than that of such a veteran. </s> [Footnote 8 "SEC. 12. In any reduction in personnel in any civilian service of any Federal agency, competing employees shall be released in accordance with Civil Service Commission regulations which shall give due effect to tenure of employment, military preference, length of service, and efficiency ratings: Provided, That the length of time spent in active service in the armed forces of the United States of each such employee shall be credited in computing length of total service: . . . ." 58 Stat. 390, 5 U.S.C. 861. </s> [Footnote 9 This "Committee of Nine" consisted of representatives from the Business Advisory Council to the Secretary of Commerce, National Association of Manufacturers, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, American Federation of Labor, Congress of Industrial Organizations, Railway Labor Executives' Association, American Legion, Disabled American Veterans and Veterans of Foreign Wars. </s> [Footnote 10 Reemployment of Veterans Under Collective Bargaining, United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, October, 1947, Statement of Employment Principles dated October 7, 1946, App. D, pp. 46-48; and see Bulletin of Retraining and Reemployment Administration, United States Department of Labor, October 10, 1946, p. 5; Harbison, Seniority Problems During Demobilization and Reconversion, Industrial Relations Section, Department of Economics and Social Institutions, Princeton University (1944) 12-14. </s> [Footnote 11 Collective Bargaining Provisions - Seniority, Bull. No. 908-11, United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (1949), quotes many seniority clauses as examples of those then in use and including many factors other than length of employment. Among those quoted is the following: "61. Veteran Not Previously Employed Given Seniority Credit for Time Spent in Armed Forces. "Any veteran of World War II who has been discharged, other than dishonorably, from the armed forces of the United States and who immediately prior to his acceptance in the armed forces was not previously employed by [name of company] and who is employed by [name of company] within twelve (12) months after his discharge, provided it is his first place of employment after his discharge, shall [345 U.S. 330, 342] take his place on the seniority list after completing the sixty (60) day trial period. His seniority shall be computed from the day of his acceptance into the armed forces. However, no veteran covered by this section shall have seniority prior to December 7, 1941." P. 13. </s> [345 U.S. 330, 344]

United States Supreme Court BERRY v. CITY OF CINCINNATI(1973) No. 73-5245 Argued: Decided: November 5, 1973 </s> Persons convicted prior to the decision in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), are entitled to the constitutional rule enunciated in that case that, absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, an indigent accused may not be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, if he was denied the assistance of counsel, if they allege and prove a bona fide, existing case or controversy sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court. </s> Certiorari granted; 34 Ohio St. 2d 106, 296 N. E. 2d 532, reversed. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> Petitioner, who was serving a sentence for a misdemeanor offense when Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), was decided, sought relief in the state courts claiming that because Argersinger should be accorded retroactive effect and because his trial and sentencing were uncounseled, his conviction should be invalidated. The Supreme Court of Ohio refused to apply Argersinger to convictions occurring prior to that decision. City of Cincinnati v. Berry, 34 Ohio St. 2d 106, 296 N. E. 2d 532 (1973). Petitioner was enlarged on bail pending action on his claim and faces reincarceration should the judgment of the Ohio courts remain undisturbed. The motion to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for certiorari are granted, and the judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court is reversed. Those convicted prior to the decision in Argersinger are entitled to the constitutional rule enunciated in that case, Kitchens v. Smith, 401 U.S. 847 (1971); Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 and n. 6 (1971) (opinion of WHITE, J.); Burgett [414 U.S. 29, 30] v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114 (1967); cf. Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278 (1972), if they allege and prove a bona fide, existing case or controversy sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 50 -58 (1968); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237 -238 (1968); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 633 -634, n. 2 (1968). </s> So ordered. </s> [414 U.S. 29, 31]

United States Supreme Court EDELMAN v. CALIFORNIA(1953) No. 85 Argued: November 19, 1952Decided: January 12, 1953 </s> Certiorari to review petitioner's state-court conviction under a California vagrancy statute was improvidently granted and the writ is dismissed. Pp. 358-362. </s> 1. The claim that his conviction violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because the statute was vague and uncertain, is not properly before this Court when the conviction was affirmed below by default in accordance with state law. Pp. 358-359. </s> 2. The claim that his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were infringed by discriminatory enforcement of the vagrancy statute was disposed of on state procedural grounds and cannot be considered here. P. 359. </s> 3. Denial of his motion to recall the remittitur and vacate the judgment of the appellate court rested on an adequate state ground; and the claim that this denial deprived him of a hearing in the appellate court contrary to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be considered here. Pp. 359-362. </s> Certiorari dismissed. </s> Petitioner was convicted in a state court under a vagrancy statute and his conviction was affirmed by a state appellate court. This Court granted certiorari. 343 U.S. 955 . Writ dismissed, p. 362. </s> Emanuel Redfield argued the cause for petitioner. A. L. Wirin and Fred Okrand filed a brief for petitioner. </s> Philip E. Grey argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Ray L. Chesebro and Bourke Jones. [344 U.S. 357, 358] </s> MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Petitioner stands convicted under 647 (5) of the Penal Code of California, which provides in relevant part that "Every . . . dissolute person . . . [i]s a vagrant, and is punishable by a fine of not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500), or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment." The conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Department of the Los Angeles County Superior Court in an order which recited that the appeal had been submitted without argument. A motion to recall the remittitur and vacate the judgment of the appellate court was denied without opinion after a full hearing before three judges. We granted certiorari because of serious constitutional questions raised as to the validity of the vagrancy statute and its application to the petitioner. 343 U.S. 955 . However, on oral argument, doubts arose as to whether the federal questions were properly presented by the record. Accordingly, it is necessary at the outset to determine whether we have jurisdiction in this case. </s> Petitioner contends, first, that his conviction violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the vagrancy statute is vague, indefinite and uncertain. The record indicates that this defense was not raised on trial but was presented for the first time as the fifth of petitioner's grounds of appeal, stated as follows: "5. Vagrancy statute is unconstitutional because vague and indefinite." </s> It is clear that this Court is without power to decide whether constitutional rights have been violated when the federal questions are not seasonably raised in accordance with the requirements of state law. Hulbert v. City of Chicago, 202 U.S. 275 (1906); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. McGrew, 188 U.S. 291, 308 (1903). Noncompliance with such local law can thus be an adequate state ground [344 U.S. 357, 359] for a decision below. Aside from state law regarding the scope of review in cases such as this one, we note that California permits affirmance in criminal cases where the appellant fails to appear. 1 It follows that the question whether the vagrancy statute is invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment is not properly before us. </s> The argument that petitioner's rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were infringed by discriminatory law enforcement merits only brief comment. The evidence adduced on trial showed at most that the vagrancy statute is not used by the Los Angeles authorities in all of the cases in which it might be applicable. Doubtless recognizing the necessity of showing systematic or intentional discrimination, petitioner made an offer of proof phrased as follows, "I want to show by the police records that there are thousands and thousands of individuals in this city that are walking around that have committed many more offenses than this defendant that have never been charged with vagrancy." This offer was made in connection with a subpoena addressed to the local police records section. On motion of the city attorney the subpoena was quashed on the ground that the accompanying affidavit did not comply with the requirements of state law. Since California law determined this action, there is no federal question preserved for review in this aspect of the case. Hedgebeth v. North Carolina, 334 U.S. 806 (1948). </s> Petitioner urges, finally, that he was deprived of notice and opportunity to have a hearing in the appellate court. A careful study of the record discloses these facts: On [344 U.S. 357, 360] December 13, 1949, one day after sentence was imposed, the attorney who represented petitioner during the nine-day trial in Los Angeles Municipal Court filed written notice of appeal in that court. An application for substitution of attorneys was there filed and granted on February 7, 1950. The substituted attorney thereafter appeared in the trial court at hearings on the settlement of the statement on appeal. Preparation of that statement was a lengthy process, not concluded until June 18, 1951, when it was allowed and settled in final form by the trial judge. 2 </s> After the Appellate Department affirmed the conviction, petitioner filed a motion to "Recall the Remittitur and to Vacate the Judgment" of the Appellate Department on the ground that its judgment "was occasion[ed] by the inadvertence, and mistake of fact of the defendant and of the clerk of the above entitled court, and on the incomplete presentation of all the facts and law by the defendant . . . ." In a supporting affidavit, petitioner's original attorney stated that he received notice that the appeal had been set for argument; that he then went to the office of the Appellate Department clerk and advised the person attending the desk that the substituted attorney was the proper person to notify, and was assured that petitioner's then counsel would be notified of the date of the hearing. Substituted counsel filed an affidavit stating that he had not received such notice. 3 </s> [344 U.S. 357, 361] </s> The motion to recall the remittitur and vacate the judgment of the Appellate Department asserted no deprivation of any federal constitutional right. Further, the motion sought what, under California law, is an extraordinary remedy, not available where the court had "jurisdiction to render the judgment complained of and it does not affirmatively appear that it was the result of fraud, imposition or misapprehension of facts." People v. Stone, 93 Cal. App. 2d 858, 861, 210 P.2d 78, 80 (1949) and cases there cited; 23 Calif. L. Rev. 354. 4 Respondent has also suggested that state habeas corpus was available to petitioner to test the constitutionality of his restraint. This is borne out by In re Bell, 19 Cal. 2d 488, 122 P.2d 22 (1942), in which the State Supreme Court decided that California habeas corpus may be used to test the constitutionality of a statute under which the applicant has been convicted. The writ is, in fact, there stated to be the only remedy available for this purpose where the applicant has exhausted his remedy by appeal. Under California law, habeas corpus can also be used to raise other constitutional objections to criminal proceedings, such as deprivation of right to counsel. In re Bell, supra, 19 Cal. 2d, at 501, 122 P.2d, at 30. The denial of petitioner's motion, therefore, rested on an adequate state ground, his choice of the wrong remedy under local law. Woods v. Nierstheimer, 328 U.S. 211, 214 (1946). This is not a case in which there is serious doubt about the nature of the ground on which the decision below rested. Cf. State Commission v. Van Cott, 306 U.S. 511 (1939); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945). We are thus without power [344 U.S. 357, 362] to decide petitioner's claims on the merits, whatever may be their appeal. The writ was improvidently granted and must be dismissed. Stembridge v. Georgia, 343 U.S. 541 (1952). </s> It is so ordered. </s> MR. JUSTICE JACKSON concurs except that he thinks it is not material whether California will grant habeas corpus in this case. True, the petitioner's original appeal to the California court sought to raise a federal question. That was not passed upon because the appeal was dismissed for default. Whether the default should be considered excusable by any court is left highly in doubt by the record. At all events, in asking relief from it there was no claim that to take a default under such circumstances is forbidden to a state court by the Constitution of the United States, and such a claim would be frivolous if made. Hence, the petitioner is out of court for reasons of state law and practice, and the writ of certiorari should be dismissed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 See People v. Garza, 86 Cal. App. 97, 260 P. 390 (1927); Rule 8, Rules on Appeal from Municipal Courts and Inferior Courts in Criminal Cases, as amended to January 6, 1947; Deering's Cal. Penal Code, 1949, 1253; People v. Sukovitzen, 67 Cal. App. 2d 901, 155 P.2d 406 (1945). </s> [Footnote 2 Apparently the statement was agreed upon some time before June 18, judging from the docket entry of November 6, 1950, "Defendant's Counsel to engross Statement on Appeal," and an affidavit dated March 7, 1951, showing service of the engrossed statement on substituted counsel. </s> [Footnote 3 Rule 3 (b) of Revised Appellate Department Rules provides, in part, that "Failure of the clerk to mail any such notice [of hearing] shall not affect the jurisdiction of the Appellate Department." </s> [Footnote 4 See People v. McDermott, 97 Cal. 247, 32 P. 7 (1893), in which a motion to recall the remittitur of the State Supreme Court was denied, clearly on state grounds, under circumstances similar to those in the instant case. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS concurs, dissenting. </s> The petitioner was convicted of "vagrancy" in the Municipal Court of Los Angeles. He was given a 90-day jail sentence. The conviction for vagrancy was based primarily on what he had said in public speeches made in a Los Angeles park. He appealed to the Appellate Department of the Superior Court which was the highest court in California in which he could obtain review. One of a number of grounds of appeal was that the vagrancy statute was unconstitutional because vague and indefinite. The rules of the California appellate court specifically require that an appellant or his attorney of record shall be mailed notice of the date on which his appeal will be heard. California admits that [344 U.S. 357, 363] no such notice was given petitioner or his counsel of record on appeal and that neither knew the case was set for hearing. As a result neither was present when the case was called in the appellate court. Consequently that court affirmed the jail sentence by default without argument or consideration of the merits of the conviction or the constitutionality of the vagrancy statute. Immediately after discovery of this default affirmance petitioner moved to vacate the action. With full knowledge of all the foregoing facts, the appellate court denied the motion. Petitioner has thus had his constitutional contentions rejected and his conviction affirmed without notice and an opportunity to be heard through himself or counsel. In California, the right of appeal "is guaranteed by the Constitution to the prisoner, and is as sacred as the right of trial by jury. It is one of the means the law has provided to determine the question of his guilt or innocence." Ex parte Hoge, 48 Cal. 3, 6; In re Albori, 95 Cal. App. 42, 50-51, 272 P. 321, 324-325. Under these circumstances I agree with petitioner that refusal to give him or his counsel an opportunity to be heard in the appellate court denied him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 ; Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 ; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 . 1 Such a denial of due process cannot be justified by the state on any "adequate non-federal ground." For this reason I would not dismiss the certiorari but would reverse or vacate the appellate court's judgment. </s> The Court rests its dismissal on a belief that the petitioner can still test the validity of his conviction in a [344 U.S. 357, 364] habeas corpus proceeding in the California state courts. And the Court's belief as to availability of a state remedy is buttressed by a presumption that a state will not deny a remedy for deprivation of a constitutional right such as here alleged. Mooney v. Holohan, Warden, 294 U.S. 103, 113 . Moreover, should California refuse to grant petitioner a remedy to test the constitutionality of the Vagrancy Act, he could then seek relief in a United States district court. See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 . But my doubt about the availability of an adequate state remedy leads me to conclude that the wiser course here would be to vacate the appellate court's judgment for a clarification of the bases of its action. See State Tax Commission v. Van Cott, 306 U.S. 511 ; cf. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 . For even superficial examination of the California vagrancy statute and petitioner's trial under it will reveal the gravity of the constitutional questions which petitioner urges and which the appellate court left unconsidered and undecided. </s> Subsection 5 of 647 of the Penal Code of California provides that "Every idle, or lewd, or dissolute person, or associate of known thieves . . ." is a vagrant, punishable by fine of not more than $500 or by imprisonment of not more than six months, or both. 2 Petitioner was charged with and convicted only of being a "dissolute" person. The ambiguity and consequent broad reach of this crime of "dissoluteness" is patent. The trial court's efforts to reduce the ambiguity greatly increased it. The judge told the jury that petitioner was not accused of "any violation of any particular act" but with being a person of "a certain status" or "in a certain condition." His "character" alone was involved, since "vagrancy is a status [344 U.S. 357, 365] or a condition and it is not an act." Petitioner was therefore to be tried for a subjective "status," not the easiest thing in the world to prove or disprove. And petitioner's difficulty was not made easier by these additional statements to the jury: </s> "Vagrancy is a continuing offense. It differs from most other offenses in the fact that it is chronic rather than acute; that it continues after it is complete and subjects the offender to arrest at any time before he reforms. One is guilty of being a vagrant at any time and place where he is found, so long as the character remains unchanged, although then and there innocent of any act demonstrating his character. . . . His character, as I said before, is the ultimate question for you to decide." </s> The dictionary definition of dissolute given to the jury by the court described a crime of such nebulous amplitude that no person could know how to defend himself. The court said: </s> "Now, dissolute is defined as `loosed from restraint, unashamed, lawless, loose in morals and conduct, recklessly abandoned to sensual pleasures, profligate, wanton, lewd, debauched.' Now, the word `dissolute', as you see from this definition, covers many acts not necessarily confined to immorality. Other laxness and looseness and lawlessness may amount to dissoluteness." </s> During a nine-day trial the jury heard a number of witnesses who patently did not like what petitioner said in the many speeches he had been making in the park. There seems to be no doubt that his speeches chiefly involved political or economic questions and included attacks on the local police force. One witness who testified that petitioner had publicly accused him of being a thief also swore that he had heard petitioner advocate "force [344 U.S. 357, 366] and violence, stating that a change could not be brought about except by bullets." Other hostile witnesses testified to his use of intemperate language. A policeman swore that petitioner had prophesied that he "would not be given a fair trial" - a prophecy which I fear this record viewed as a whole does not entirely refute. There was also evidence that petitioner had solicited funds to aid him in carrying on his publicity work, and to help pay for his defense in numerous cases that were instituted against him in the municipal court. In one of these cases he had been charged with defacing a park bench of thick concrete by standing on it to make a speech. </s> It would seem a matter of supererogation to argue that the provision of this vagrancy statute on its face and as enforced against petitioner is too vague to meet the safeguarding standards of due process of law in this country. This would be true even were there no free speech question involved. And in that field we have said, </s> "It is settled that a statute so vague and indefinite, in form and as interpreted, as to permit within the scope of its language the punishment of incidents fairly within the protection of the guarantee of free speech is void, on its face, as contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment." Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509 . </s> The free speech question was so obviously involved in this vagrancy prosecution that the court charged the jury at length about free speech. He even submitted to them the question whether petitioner's speech constituted "a clear and present danger. . . ." </s> I adhere to the view that courts should be astute to examine and strike down dragnet legislation used to abridge public discussion of "views on political, social or economic questions." Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 , 163. </s> [Footnote 1 In Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255, 258 , we held that Kansas denied Cochran equal protection of the laws in refusing him privileges of appeal it afforded to others. To the same effect, Doud v. United States, 340 U.S. 206 . </s> [Footnote 2 A mere reading of the California vagrancy statute is sufficient to show its similarity to a New Jersey law held invalid for vagueness and ambiguity in Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 . </s> [344 U.S. 357, 367]

United States Supreme Court INS v. DELGADO(1984) No. 82-1271 Argued: January 11, 1984Decided: April 17, 1984 </s> Acting pursuant to warrants issued on a showing of probable cause that numerous unidentified illegal aliens were employed at a garment factory, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) conducted two "factory surveys" of the work force in search of illegal aliens. A third factory survey was conducted with the employer's consent at another garment factory. During each survey, which lasted from one to two hours, INS agents positioned themselves near the factory exits, while other agents moved systematically through the factory, approaching employees and, after identifying themselves, asking the employees from one to three questions relating to their citizenship. If an employee gave a credible reply that he was a United States citizen or produced his immigration papers, the agent moved on to another employee. During the survey, employees continued with their work and were free to walk around within the factory. Respondent employees - who were United States citizens or permanent resident aliens, and who had been questioned during the surveys - and their union filed actions, consolidated in Federal District Court, alleging that the factory surveys violated their Fourth Amendment rights, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The District Court granted summary judgment for the INS, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the surveys constituted a seizure of the entire work forces, and that the INS could not question an individual employee unless its agents had a reasonable suspicion that the employee was an illegal alien. </s> Held: </s> The factory surveys did not result in the seizure of the entire work forces, and the individual questioning of the respondent employees by INS agents concerning their citizenship did not amount to a detention or seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 215-221. </s> (a) Interrogation relating to one's identity or a request for identification by the police does not, by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure. Unless the circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave if he had not responded, such questioning does not result in a detention under the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 216-217. </s> (b) The entire work forces of the factories were not seized for the duration of the surveys here, even though INS agents were placed near [466 U.S. 210, 211] the exits of the factory sites. The record indicates that the agents' conduct consisted simply of questioning employees and arresting those they had probable cause to believe were unlawfully present in the factory. This conduct should not have given respondents, or any other citizens or aliens lawfully present in the factories, any reason to believe that they would be detained if they gave truthful answers to the questions put to them or if they simply refused to answer. If mere questioning did not constitute a seizure when it occurred inside the factory, it was no more a seizure when it occurred at the exits. Pp. 217-219. </s> (c) Since there was no seizure of the work forces by virtue of the method of conducting the surveys, the issue of individual questioning could be presented only if one of the respondent employees had in fact been seized or detained, but their deposition testimony showed that none were. They may only litigate what happened to them, and their description of the encounters with the INS agents showed that the encounters were classic consensual encounters rather than Fourth Amendment seizures. Pp. 219-221. </s> 681 F.2d 624, reversed. </s> REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 221. POWELL, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p. 221. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 225. </s> Deputy Solicitor General Frey argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Trott, Elliott Schulder, and Patty Merkamp Stemler. </s> Henry R. Fenton argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Gordon K. Hubel and Max Zimny. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union by David M. Brodsky, Burt Neuborne, and Charles S. Sims; and for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., et al. by Michael Kantor and Alan Diamond. </s> JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> In the course of enforcing the immigration laws, petitioner Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) enters employers' worksites to determine whether any illegal aliens [466 U.S. 210, 212] may be present as employees. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the "factory surveys" involved in this case amounted to a seizure of the entire work forces, and further held that the INS could not question individual employees during any of these surveys unless its agents had a reasonable suspicion that the employee to be questioned was an illegal alien. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624 (1982). We conclude that these factory surveys did not result in the seizure of the entire work forces, and that the individual questioning of the respondents in this case by INS agents concerning their citizenship did not amount to a detention or seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. </s> Acting pursuant to two warrants, in January and September 1977, the INS conducted a survey of the work force at Southern California Davis Pleating Co. (Davis Pleating) in search of illegal aliens. The warrants were issued on a showing of probable cause by the INS that numerous illegal aliens were employed at Davis Pleating, although neither of the search warrants identified any particular illegal aliens by name. A third factory survey was conducted with the employer's consent in October 1977, at Mr. Pleat, another garment factory. </s> At the beginning of the surveys several agents positioned themselves near the buildings' exits, while other agents dispersed throughout the factory to question most, but not all, employees at their work stations. The agents displayed badges, carried walkie-talkies, and were armed, although at no point during any of the surveys was a weapon ever drawn. Moving systematically through the factory, the agents approached employees and, after identifying themselves, asked them from one to three questions relating to their citizenship. If the employee gave a credible reply that he was a United States citizen, the questioning ended, and the agent moved on to another employee. If the employee gave an unsatisfactory [466 U.S. 210, 213] response or admitted that he was an alien, the employee was asked to produce his immigration papers. During the survey, employees continued with their work and were free to walk around within the factory. </s> Respondents are four employees questioned in one of the three surveys. 1 In 1978 respondents and their union representative, the International Ladies Garment Workers' Union, filed two actions, later consolidated, in the United States District Court for the Central District of California challenging the constitutionality of INS factory surveys and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Respondents argued that the factory surveys violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches or seizures and the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. </s> The District Court denied class certification and dismissed the union from the action for lack of standing, App. to Pet. for Cert. 58a-60a. In a series of cross-motions for partial summary judgment, the District Court ruled that respondents had no reasonable expectation of privacy in their work-places which conferred standing on them to challenge entry by the INS pursuant to a warrant or owner's consent. Id., at 49a-52a, 53a-55a, 56a-57a. In its final ruling the District Court addressed respondents' request for injunctive relief directed at preventing the INS from questioning them personally during any future surveys. The District Court, with no material facts in dispute, found that each of the four respondents was asked a question or questions by an INS agent during one of the factory surveys. Id., at 46a. Reasoning from this Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), that law enforcement officers may ask questions of anyone, the [466 U.S. 210, 214] District Court ruled that none of the respondents had been detained under the Fourth Amendment during the factory surveys, either when they were questioned or otherwise. App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a. Accordingly, it granted summary judgment in favor of the INS. 2 </s> The Court of Appeals reversed. Applying the standard first enunciated by a Member of this Court in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.), the Court of Appeals concluded that the entire work forces were seized for the duration of each survey, which lasted from one to two hours, because the stationing of agents at the doors to the buildings meant that "a reasonable worker `would have believed that he was not free to leave.'" 681 F.2d, at 634 (quoting United States v. Anderson, 663 F.2d 934, 939 (CA9 1981)). Although the Court of Appeals conceded that the INS had statutory authority to question any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or remain in the United States, see 66 Stat. 233, 8 U.S.C. 1357(a)(1), it further held that under the Fourth Amendment individual employees could be questioned only on the basis of a reasonable suspicion that a particular employee being questioned was an alien illegally in the country. 681 F.2d, at 639-645. A reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that a number of illegal aliens were working at a particular factory site was insufficient to justify questioning any individual employee. Id., at 643. Consequently, it also held that the individual questioning of respondents violated the Fourth Amendment because there had been no such reasonable suspicion or probable cause as to any of them. 3 </s> [466 U.S. 210, 215] </s> We granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, 461 U.S. 904 (1983), because it has serious implications for the enforcement of the immigration laws and presents a conflict with the decision reached by the Third Circuit in Babula v. INS, 665 F.2d 293 (1981). </s> The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all contact between the police and citizens, but is designed "to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals." United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976). Given the diversity of encounters between police officers and citizens, however, the Court has been cautious in defining the limits imposed by the Fourth Amendment on encounters between the police and citizens. As we have noted elsewhere: "Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves `seizures' of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a `seizure' has occurred." Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 19, n. 16. While applying such a test is relatively straightforward in a situation resembling a traditional arrest, see Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 -216 (1979), the protection against unreasonable seizures also extends to "seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest." United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). What has evolved from our cases is a determination that an initially consensual encounter between a police officer and a citizen can be transformed into a seizure or detention within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, "if, in view of all î the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." Mendenhall, supra, at 554 (footnote omitted); see Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983) (plurality opinion). [466 U.S. 210, 216] </s> Although we have yet to rule directly on whether mere questioning of an individual by a police official, without more, can amount to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, our recent decision in Royer, supra, plainly implies that interrogation relating to one's identity or a request for identification by the police does not, by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure. In Royer, when Drug Enforcement Administration agents found that the respondent matched a drug courier profile, the agents approached the defendant and asked him for his airplane ticket and driver's license, which the agents then examined. A majority of the Court believed that the request and examination of the documents were "permissible in themselves." Id., at 501 (plurality opinion); see id., at 523, n. 3 (opinion of REHNQUIST, J.). In contrast, a much different situation prevailed in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), when two policemen physically detained the defendant to determine his identity, after the defendant refused the officers' request to identify himself. The Court held that absent some reasonable suspicion of misconduct, the detention of the defendant to determine his identity violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure. Id., at 52. </s> What is apparent from Royer and Brown is that police questioning, by itself, is unlikely to result in a Fourth Amendment violation. While most citizens will respond to a police request, the fact that people do so, and do so without being told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the response. Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 231 -234 (1973). Unless the circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave if he had not responded, one cannot say that the questioning resulted in a detention under the Fourth Amendment. But if the person refuses to answer and the police take additional steps - such as those taken in Brown - to obtain an answer, then the Fourth Amendment imposes [466 U.S. 210, 217] some minimal level of objective justification to validate the detention or seizure. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S., at 554 ; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S., at 21 . </s> The Court of Appeals held that "the manner in which the factory surveys were conducted in this case constituted a seizure of the workforce" under the Fourth Amendment. 681 F.2d, at 634. While the element of surprise and the systematic questioning of individual workers by several INS agents contributed to the court's holding, the pivotal factor in its decision was the stationing of INS agents near the exits of the factory buildings. According to the Court of Appeals, the stationing of agents near the doors meant that "departures were not to be contemplated," and thus, workers were "not free to leave." Ibid. In support of the decision below, respondents argue that the INS created an intimidating psychological environment when it intruded unexpectedly into the workplace with such a show of officers. 4 Besides the stationing of agents near the exits, respondents add that the length of the survey and the failure to inform workers they were free to leave resulted in a Fourth Amendment seizure of the entire work force. 5 </s> [466 U.S. 210, 218] </s> We reject the claim that the entire work forces of the two factories were seized for the duration of the surveys when the INS placed agents near the exits of the factory sites. Ordinarily, when people are at work their freedom to move about has been meaningfully restricted, not by the actions of law enforcement officials, but by the workers' voluntary obligations to their employers. The record indicates that when these surveys were initiated, the employees were about their ordinary business, operating machinery and performing other job assignments. While the surveys did cause some disruption, including the efforts of some workers to hide, the record also indicates that workers were not prevented by the agents from moving about the factories. </s> Respondents argue, however, that the stationing of agents near the factory doors showed the INS's intent to prevent people from leaving. But there is nothing in the record indicating that this is what the agents at the doors actually did. The obvious purpose of the agents' presence at the factory doors was to insure that all persons in the factories were questioned. The record indicates that the INS agents' conduct in this case consisted simply of questioning employees and arresting those they had probable cause to believe were unlawfully present in the factory. This conduct should have given respondents no reason to believe that they would be detained if they gave truthful answers to the questions put to them or if they simply refused to answer. If mere questioning does not constitute a seizure when it occurs inside the factory, it is no more a seizure when it occurs at the exits. 6 </s> [466 U.S. 210, 219] </s> A similar conclusion holds true for all other citizens or aliens lawfully present inside the factory buildings during the surveys. The presence of agents by the exits posed no reasonable threat of detention to these workers while they walked throughout the factories on job assignments. Likewise, the mere possibility that they would be questioned if they sought to leave the buildings should not have resulted in any reasonable apprehension by any of them that they would be seized or detained in any meaningful way. Since most workers could have had no reasonable fear that they would be detained upon leaving, we conclude that the work forces as a whole were not seized. 7 </s> The Court of Appeals also held that "detentive questioning" of individuals could be conducted only if INS agents could articulate "objective facts providing investigators with a reasonable suspicion that each questioned person, so detained, is an alien illegally in this country." 681 F.2d, at 638. Under our analysis, however, since there was no seizure of the work forces by virtue of the method of conducting the factory surveys, the only way the issue of individual questioning could be presented would be if one of the named respondents had in fact been seized or detained. Reviewing the deposition testimony of respondents, we conclude that none were. </s> The questioning of each respondent by INS agents seems to have been nothing more than a brief encounter. None of the three Davis Pleating employees were questioned during the January survey. During the September survey at Davis Pleating, respondent Delgado was discussing the survey with another employee when two INS agents approached him and asked him where he was from and from what city. When Delgado informed them that he came from Mayaguez, Puerto [466 U.S. 210, 220] Rico, the agent made an innocuous observation to his partner and left. App. 94. Respondent Correa's experience in the September survey was similar. Walking from one part of the factory to another, Correa was stopped by an INS agent and asked where she was born. When she replied "Huntington Park, [California]," the agent walked away and Correa continued about her business. Id., at 115. Respondent Labonte, the third Davis Pleating employee, was tapped on the shoulder and asked in Spanish, "Where are your papers?" Id., at 138. Labonte responded that she had her papers and without any further request from the INS agents, showed the papers to the agents, who then left. Finally, respondent Miramontes, the sole Mr. Pleat employee involved in this case, encountered an agent en route from an office to her worksite. Questioned concerning her citizenship, Miramontes replied that she was a resident alien, and on the agent's request, produced her work permit. The agent then left. Id., at 120-121. </s> Respondents argue that the manner in which the surveys were conducted and the attendant disruption caused by the surveys created a psychological environment which made them reasonably afraid they were not free to leave. Consequently, when respondents were approached by INS agents and questioned concerning their citizenship and right to work, they were effectively detained under the Fourth Amendment, since they reasonably feared that refusing to answer would have resulted in their arrest. But it was obvious from the beginning of the surveys that the INS agents were only questioning people. Persons such as respondents who simply went about their business in the workplace were not detained in any way; nothing more occurred than that a question was put to them. While persons who attempted to flee or evade the agents may eventually have been detained for questioning, see id., at 50, 81-84, 91-93, respondents did not do so and were not in fact detained. The manner in which respondents were questioned, given its obvious purpose, could hardly result in a reasonable fear that respondents [466 U.S. 210, 221] were not free to continue working or to move about the factory. Respondents may only litigate what happened to them, and our review of their description of the encounters with the INS agents satisfies us that the encounters were classic consensual encounters rather than Fourth Amendment seizures. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980). </s> Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is </s> Reversed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote î ERRATA: Insert "of" after "all". </s> [Footnote 1 Respondents Herman Delgado, Ramona Correa, and Francisca Labonte worked at Davis Pleating, while Marie Miramontes, the fourth respondent, was employed by Mr. Pleat. Both Delgado and Correa are United States citizens, while Labonte and Miramontes are permanent resident aliens. </s> [Footnote 2 The District Court never ruled directly on respondents' Fifth Amendment claim, apparently reasoning that since respondents' Fourth Amendment rights had not been violated, their Fifth Amendment right had also not been violated. The Court of Appeals also never ruled on respondents' Fifth Amendment claim, and we decline to do so. </s> [Footnote 3 The Court of Appeals ruled that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification. In light of its disposition of respondents' Fourth Amendment claims, the Court of Appeals declined to [466 U.S. 210, 215] resolve the union's appeal from the District Court's determination that the union lacked standing to raise its members' Fourth Amendment claims. 681 F.2d, at 645, n. 24. </s> [Footnote 4 Although the issue was the subject of substantial discussion at oral argument, the INS does not contest that respondents have standing to bring this case. They allege the existence of an ongoing policy which violated the Fourth Amendment and which will be applied to their workplace in the future. Cf. Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974). Part of their argument is clearly based on the INS's detention of illegal aliens found working at the two factories. Respondents, however, can only premise their right to injunctive relief on their individual encounters with INS agents during the factory surveys. See infra, at 221. </s> [Footnote 5 Contrary to respondents' assertion, it also makes no difference in this case that the encounters took place inside a factory, a location usually not accessible to the public. The INS officers were lawfully present pursuant to consent or a warrant, and other people were in the area during the INS agents' questioning. Thus, the same considerations attending contacts between the police and citizens in public places should apply to the questions presented to the individual respondents here. </s> [Footnote 6 In her deposition respondent Miramontes described an incident that occurred during the October factory survey at Mr. Pleat, in which an INS agent stationed by an exit attempted to prevent a worker, presumably an illegal alien, from leaving the premises after the survey started. The worker walked out the door and when an agent tried to stop him, the worker pushed the agent aside and ran away. App. 125-126. An ambiguous, isolated incident such as this fails to provide any basis on which to conclude that respondents have shown an INS policy entitling them to injunctive relief. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); cf. Allee v. Medrano, supra; Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). </s> [Footnote 7 Respondents Delgado and Labonte both left the building during the INS survey, Delgado to load a truck and Labonte to observe INS activities outside the building. App. 98, 136. Neither of them stated in their depositions that the INS agents in any way restrained them from leaving the building, or even addressed any questions to them upon leaving. </s> JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring. </s> A trial has not yet been held in this case. The District Court entered summary judgment against respondents, and the Court of Appeals, in reversing, did not remand the case for trial but rather directed the District Court to enter summary judgment for respondents and a permanent injunction against petitioners. As the case comes to us, therefore, we must construe the record most favorably to petitioners, and resolve all issues of fact in their favor. Because I agree that this record is insufficient to establish that there is no genuine issue of fact on the question whether any of the respondents could have reasonably believed that he or she had been detained in some meaningful way, I join the opinion of the Court. </s> JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the result. </s> While the Court's opinion is persuasive, I find the question of whether the factory surveys conducted in this case resulted in any Fourth Amendment "seizures" to be a close one. The question turns on a difficult characterization of fact and law: whether a reasonable person in respondents' position would have believed he was free to refuse to answer the questions put to him by INS officers and leave the factory. I believe that the Court need not decide the question, however, because it is clear that any "seizure" that may have taken place was permissible under the reasoning of our decision in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). [466 U.S. 210, 222] </s> In that case, we held that stopping automobiles for brief questioning at permanent traffic checkpoints away from the Mexican border is consistent with the Fourth Amendment and need not be authorized by a warrant. 1 We assumed that the stops constituted "seizures" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, see id., at 546, n. 1, 556, but upheld them as reasonable. As in prior cases involving the apprehension of aliens illegally in the United States, we weighed the public interest in the practice at issue against the Fourth Amendment interest of the individual. See id., at 555. Noting the importance of routine checkpoint stops to controlling the flow of illegal aliens into the interior of the country, we found that the Government had a substantial interest in the practice. On the other hand, the intrusion on individual motorists was minimal: the stops were brief, usually involving only a question or two and possibly the production of documents. Moreover, they were public and regularized law enforcement activities vesting limited discretion in officers in the field. Weighing these considerations, we held that the stops and questioning at issue, as well as referrals to a slightly longer secondary inspection, might be made "in the absence of any individualized suspicion" that a particular car contained illegal aliens, id., at 562. </s> This case is similar. The Government's interest in using factory surveys is as great if not greater. According to an affidavit by the INS's Assistant District Director in Los Angeles contained in the record in this case, the surveys account for one-half to three-quarters of the illegal aliens identified and arrested away from the border every day in the Los Angeles District. App. 47. 2 In that District alone, over [466 U.S. 210, 223] 20,000 illegal aliens were arrested in the course of factory surveys in one year. Id., at 44. The surveys in this case resulted in the arrest of between 20% and 50% of the employees at each of the factories. 3 </s> We have noted before the dimensions of the immigration problem in this country. E. g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 -879 (1975); Martinez-Fuerte, supra, at 551-553. Recent estimates of the number of illegal aliens in this country range between 2 and 12 million, although the consensus appears to be that the number at any one time is between 3 and 6 million. 4 One of the main reasons they come - perhaps the main reason - is to seek employment. See App. 43; Martinez-Fuerte, supra, at 551; Select Committee, at 25, 38. Factory surveys strike directly at this cause, enabling the INS with relatively few agents to diminish the incentive for the dangerous passage across the border and to apprehend large numbers of those who come. Clearly, the Government interest in this enforcement technique is enormous. 5 </s> [466 U.S. 210, 224] </s> The intrusion into the Fourth Amendment interests of the employees, on the other hand, is about the same as it was in Martinez-Fuerte. The objective intrusion is actually less: there, cars often were stopped for up to five minutes, while here employees could continue their work as the survey progressed. They were diverted briefly to answer a few questions or to display their registration cards. It is true that the initial entry into the plant in a factory survey is a surprise to the workers, but the obviously authorized character of the operation, the clear purpose of seeking illegal aliens, and the systematic and public nature of the survey serve to minimize any concern or fright on the part of lawful employees. Moreover, the employees' expectation of privacy in the plant setting here, like that in an automobile, certainly is far less than the traditional expectation of privacy in one's residence. Therefore, for the same reasons that we upheld the checkpoint stops in Martinez-Fuerte without any individualized suspicion, I would find the factory surveys here to be reasonable. 6 </s> [Footnote 1 This case presents no question as to whether a warrant was required for the entry by the INS officers into the plants. As the majority notes, the INS obtained either a warrant or consent from the factory owners before entering the plants to conduct the surveys. </s> [Footnote 2 The Solicitor General informs us that the figure in text refers to 1977. For the country as a whole, the INS estimates from its internal records that factory surveys accounted in 1982 for approximately 60% of all illegal [466 U.S. 210, 223] aliens apprehended by the INS in nonborder locations. Brief for Petitioners 3-4, and n. 3. </s> [Footnote 3 During the course of the the first survey at Davis Pleating, 78 illegal aliens were arrested out of a work force of approximately 300. The second survey nine months later resulted in the arrest of 39 illegal aliens out of about 200 employees. The survey at Mr. Pleat resulted in the arrest of 45 illegal aliens out of approximately 90 employees. App. 51. </s> [Footnote 4 House Select Committee on Population, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., Legal and Illegal Immigration to the United States 2, 16-17 (Comm. Print 1978) (hereinafter Select Committee); see also Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S., at 878 (the INS in 1974 suggested that the number of illegal aliens might be as high as 10 to 12 million). </s> [Footnote 5 Despite the vast expenditures by the INS and other agencies to prevent illegal immigration and apprehend aliens illegally in the United States, and despite laws making it a crime for them to be here, our law irrationally continues to permit United States employers to hire them. Many employers actively recruit low-paid illegal immigrant labor, encouraging - with Government tolerance - illegal entry into the United States. See Select Committee, at 25. This incongruity in our immigration statutes is not calculated to increase respect for the rule of law. </s> [Footnote 6 The Court in Martinez-Fuerte also held that no particularized reason was necessary to refer motorists to the secondary inspection area for a slightly more intrusive "seizure." 428 U.S., at 563 -564. Similarly, I would hold in this case that in the context of an overall survey of a factory, no particularized suspicion is needed to justify the choice of those employees who are subjected to the minimal intrusion of the questioning here. The dissent's claim that INS agents have greater discretion to decide whom to question in factory surveys than they do at traffic checkpoints, post, at 237-238, neglects the virtually unlimited discretion to refer cars to the secondary inspection area that we approved in Martinez-Fuerte. </s> The dissent also suggests that a warrant requirement for factory surveys, and certain unspecified improvements, would make the surveys constitutional. Post, at 239. I note only that the Court in Martinez-Fuerte declined to impose a warrant requirement on the location of traffic checkpoints, 428 U.S., at 564 -566, and that the respondents here do not argue for such a requirement or for changes in the "duration and manner" of the surveys. I would not address the warrant question until it is fully briefed by both sides. [466 U.S. 210, 225] </s> JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part. </s> As part of its ongoing efforts to enforce the immigration laws, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) conducts "surveys" of those workplaces that it has reason to believe employ large numbers of undocumented aliens who may be subject to deportation. This case presents the question whether the INS's method of carrying out these "factory surveys" 1 violates the rights of the affected factory workers to be secure against unreasonable seizures of one's person as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. Answering that question, the Court today holds, first, that the INS surveys involved here did not result in the seizure of the entire factory work force for the complete duration of the surveys, ante, at 218-219, and, second, that the individual questioning of respondents by INS agents concerning their citizenship did not constitute seizures within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, ante, at 219-221. Although I generally agree with the Court's first conclusion, 2 I am convinced that a fair application of our prior decisions to the facts of this case [466 U.S. 210, 226] compels the conclusion that respondents were unreasonably seized by INS agents in the course of these factory surveys. </s> At first blush, the Court's opinion appears unremarkable. But what is striking about today's decision is its studied air of unreality. Indeed, it is only through a considerable feat of legerdemain that the Court is able to arrive at the conclusion that the respondents were not seized. The success of the Court's sleight of hand turns on the proposition that the interrogations of respondents by the INS were merely brief, "consensual encounters," ante, at 221, that posed no threat to respondents' personal security and freedom. The record, however, tells a far different story. </s> I </s> Contrary to the Court's suggestion, see ante, at 216, we have repeatedly considered whether and, if so, under what circumstances questioning of an individual by law enforcement officers may amount to a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See, e. g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). Of course, as these decisions recognize, the question does not admit of any simple answer. The difficulty springs from the inherent tension between our commitment to safeguarding the precious, and all too fragile, right to go about one's business free from unwarranted government interference, and our recognition that the police must be allowed some latitude in gathering information from those individuals who are willing to cooperate. Given these difficulties, it is perhaps understandable that our efforts to strike an appropriate balance have not produced uniform results. Nevertheless, the outline of what appears to be the appropriate inquiry has been traced over the years with some clarity. [466 U.S. 210, 227] </s> The Court launched its examination of this issue in Terry v. Ohio, supra, by explaining that "the Fourth Amendment governs `seizures' of the person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for crime - `arrests' in traditional terminology. It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has `seized' that person." Id., at 16 (emphasis added). Such a seizure, the Court noted, may be evidenced by either "physical force or show of authority" indicating that the individual's liberty has been restrained. Id., at 19, n. 16. The essential teaching of the Court's decision in Terry - that an individual's right to personal security and freedom must be respected even in encounters with the police that fall short of full arrest - has been consistently reaffirmed. In Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S., at 726 -727, for example, the Court confirmed that investigatory detentions implicate the protections of the Fourth Amendment and further explained that "while the police have the right to request citizens to answer voluntarily questions concerning unsolved crimes they have no right to compel them to answer." Id., at 727, n. 6. Similarly, in Brown v. Texas, supra, we overturned a conviction for refusing to stop and identify oneself to police, because, in making the stop, the police lacked any "reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual [was] involved in criminal activity." Id., at 51. The animating principle underlying this unanimous decision was that the Fourth Amendment protects an individual's personal security and privacy from unreasonable interference by the police, even when that interference amounts to no more than a brief stop and questioning concerning one's identity. </s> Although it was joined at the time by only one other Member of this Court, Part II-A of Justice Stewart's opinion in United States v. Mendenhall, supra, offered a helpful, preliminary distillation of the lessons of these cases. Noting [466 U.S. 210, 228] first that "as long as the person to whom questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy," Justice Stewart explained that "a person has been `seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." Id., at 554. The opinion also suggested that such circumstances might include "the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." Ibid. </s> A majority of the Court has since adopted that formula as the appropriate standard for determining when inquiries made by the police cross the boundary separating merely consensual encounters from forcible stops to investigate a suspected crime. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S., at 502 , (plurality opinion); id., at 511-512 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in result); id., at 514 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). This rule properly looks not to the subjective impressions of the person questioned but rather to the objective characteristics of the encounter which may suggest whether or not a reasonable person would believe that he remained free during the course of the questioning to disregard the questions and walk away. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 9.2, p. 52 (1978). The governing principles that should guide us in this difficult area were summarized in the Royer plurality opinion: </s> "[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a criminal prosecution his voluntary answers to such questions. Nor would the fact that the officer identifies himself as a police officer, without more, convert [466 U.S. 210, 229] the encounter into a seizure requiring some level of objective justification. The person approached, however, need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way. He may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen or answer does not, without more, furnish those grounds." 460 U.S., at 497 -498 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). </s> Applying these principles to the facts of this case, I have no difficulty concluding that respondents were seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when they were accosted by the INS agents and questioned concerning their right to remain in the United States. Although none of the respondents was physically restrained by the INS agents during the questioning, it is nonetheless plain beyond cavil that the manner in which the INS conducted these surveys demonstrated a "show of authority" of sufficient size and force to overbear the will of any reasonable person. Faced with such tactics, a reasonable person could not help but feel compelled to stop and provide answers to the INS agents' questions. The Court's efforts to avoid this conclusion are rooted more in fantasy than in the record of this case. The Court goes astray, in my view, chiefly because it insists upon considering each interrogation in isolation as if respondents had been questioned by the INS in a setting similar to an encounter between a single police officer and a lone passerby that might occur on a street corner. Obviously, once the Court begins with such an unrealistic view of the facts, it is only a short step to the equally fanciful conclusion that respondents acted voluntarily when they stopped and answered the agents' questions. </s> The surrounding circumstances in this case are far different from an isolated encounter between the police and a passerby on the street. Each of the respondents testified at length about the widespread disturbance among the workers [466 U.S. 210, 230] that was sparked by the INS surveys and the intimidating atmosphere created by the INS's investigative tactics. First, as the respondents explained, the surveys were carried out by surprise by relatively large numbers of agents, generally from 15 to 25, who moved systematically through the rows of workers who were seated at their work stations. See App. 77-78, 81-85, 102-103, 122-123. Second, as the INS agents discovered persons whom they suspected of being illegal aliens, they would handcuff these persons and lead them away to waiting vans outside the factory. See id., at 88, 140-141. Third, all of the factory exits were conspicuously guarded by INS agents, stationed there to prevent anyone from leaving while the survey was being conducted. See id., at 48, 82, 125-126, 144-145, 158. Finally, as the INS agents moved through the rows of workers, they would show their badges and direct pointed questions at the workers. In light of these circumstances, it is simply fantastic to conclude that a reasonable person could ignore all that was occurring throughout the factory and, when the INS agents reached him, have the temerity to believe that he was at liberty to refuse to answer their questions and walk away. </s> Indeed, the experiences recounted by respondents clearly demonstrate that they did not feel free either to ignore the INS agents or to refuse to answer the questions posed to them. For example, respondent Delgado, a naturalized American citizen, explained that he was standing near his work station when two INS agents approached him, identified themselves as immigration officers, showed him their badges, and asked him to state where he was born. Id., at 95. Delgado, of course, had seen all that was going on around him up to that point and naturally he responded. As a final reminder of who controlled the situation, one INS agent remarked as they were leaving Delgado that they would be coming back to check him out again because he spoke English too well. Id., at 94. Respondent Miramontes described her encounter with the INS in similar terms: "He [466 U.S. 210, 231] told me he was from Immigration, so when I showed him the [work permit] papers I saw his badge. If I hadn't [seen his badge], I wouldn't have shown them to him." Id., at 121 (emphasis added). She further testified that she was frightened during this interview because "normally you get nervous when you see everybody is scared, everybody is nervous." Ibid. Respondent Labontes testified that while she was sitting at her machine an immigration officer came up to her from behind, tapped her on the left shoulder and asked "Where are your papers?" Explaining her response to this demand, she testified: "I turned, and at the same time I didn't wish to identify myself. When I saw [the INS agents], I said, `Yes, yes, I have my papers.'" Id., at 138 (emphasis added). </s> In sum, it is clear from this testimony that respondents felt constrained to answer the questions posed by the INS agents, even though they did not wish to do so. That such a feeling of constraint was reasonable should be beyond question in light of the surrounding circumstances. Indeed, the respondents' testimony paints a frightening picture of people subjected to wholesale interrogation under conditions designed not to respect personal security and privacy, but rather to elicit prompt answers from completely intimidated workers. Nothing could be clearer than that these tactics amounted to seizures of respondents under the Fourth Amendment. 3 </s> [466 U.S. 210, 232] </s> II </s> The Court's eagerness to conclude that these interrogations did not represent seizures is to some extent understandable, of course, because such a conclusion permits the Court to avoid the imposing task of justifying these seizures on the basis of reasonable, objective criteria as required by the Fourth Amendment. </s> The reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the person, including those that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest. But because the intrusion upon an individual's personal security and privacy is limited in cases of this sort, we have explained that brief detentions may be justified on "facts that do not amount to the probable cause required for an arrest." United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1975). Nevertheless, our prior decisions also make clear that investigatory stops of the kind at issue here "must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity." United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). As the Court stated in Terry, the "demand for specificity in the information upon which police action is predicated is the central teaching of this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." 392 U.S., at 21 , n. 18. Repeatedly, we have insisted that police may not detain and interrogate an individual unless they have reasonable grounds for suspecting that the person is involved in some unlawful activity. In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, for instance, the Court held that "[Border Patrol] officers on roving patrol may stop vehicles only if they are aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the country." Id., at 884. See also Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 699 -700 (1981); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92 -93 (1979); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S., at 51 -52; Delaware [466 U.S. 210, 233] v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S., at 146 -149; Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S., at 726 -728; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S., at 16 -19. This requirement of particularized suspicion provides the chief protection of lawful citizens against unwarranted governmental interference with their personal security and privacy. </s> In this case, the individual seizures of respondents by the INS agents clearly were neither "based on specific, objective facts indicating that society's legitimate interests require[d] the seizure," nor "carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers." Brown v. Texas, supra, at 51. It is undisputed that the vast majority of the undocumented aliens discovered in the surveyed factories had illegally immigrated from Mexico. Nevertheless, the INS agents involved in this case apparently were instructed, in the words of the INS Assistant District Director in charge of the operations, to interrogate "virtually all persons employed by a company." App. 49. See also id., at 77, 85-86, 151-152, 155. Consequently, all workers, irrespective of whether they were American citizens, permanent resident aliens, or deportable aliens, were subjected to questioning by INS agents concerning their right to remain in the country. By their own admission, the INS agents did not selectively question persons in these surveys on the basis of any reasonable suspicion that the persons were illegal aliens. See id., at 55, 155. That the INS policy is so indiscriminate should not be surprising, however, since many of the employees in the surveyed factories who are lawful residents of the United States may have been born in Mexico, have a Latin appearance, or speak Spanish while at work. See id., at 57, 73. What this means, of course, is that the many lawful workers who constitute the clear majority at the surveyed workplaces are subjected to surprise questioning under intimidating circumstances by INS agents who have no reasonable basis for suspecting that they have [466 U.S. 210, 234] done anything wrong. To say that such an indiscriminate policy of mass interrogation is constitutional makes a mockery of the words of the Fourth Amendment. </s> Furthermore, even if the INS agents had pursued a firm policy of stopping and interrogating only those persons whom they reasonably suspected of being aliens, they would still have failed, given the particular circumstances of this case, to safeguard adequately the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment. The first and in my view insurmountable problem with such a policy is that, viewed realistically, it poses such grave problems of execution that in practice it affords virtually no protection to lawful American citizens working in these factories. This is so because, as the Court recognized in Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 886, there is no reliable way to distinguish with a reasonable degree of accuracy between native-born and naturalized citizens of Mexican ancestry on the one hand, and aliens of Mexican ancestry on the other. 4 See also Developments, Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1286, 1374-1375 (1983). Indeed, the record in this case clearly demonstrates this danger, since respondents Correa and Delgado, although both American citizens, were subjected to questioning during the INS surveys. [466 U.S. 210, 235] </s> Moreover, the mere fact that a person is believed to be an alien provides no immediate grounds for suspecting any illegal activity. Congress, of course, possesses broad power to regulate the admission and exclusion of aliens, see Kliendeinst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977), and resident aliens surely may be required to register with the INS and to carry proper identification, see 8 U.S.C. 1302, 1304(e). Nonetheless, as we held in Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S., at 883 -884, when the Executive Branch seeks to enforce such congressional policies, it may not employ enforcement techniques that threaten the constitutional rights of American citizens. In contexts such as these factory surveys, where it is virtually impossible to distinguish fairly between citizens and aliens, the threat to vital civil rights of American citizens would soon become intolerable if we simply permitted the INS to question persons solely on account of suspected alienage. Cf. id., at 884-886. Therefore, in order to protect both American citizens and lawful resident aliens, who are also protected by the Fourth Amendment, see Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973), the INS must tailor its enforcement efforts to focus only on those workers who are reasonably suspected of being illegal aliens. 5 </s> [466 U.S. 210, 236] </s> Relying upon United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), however, JUSTICE POWELL would hold that the interrogation of respondents represented a "reasonable" seizure under the Fourth Amendment, even though the INS agents lacked any particularized suspicion of illegal alienage to support the questioning, ante, at 224. In my view, reliance on that decision is misplaced. In Martinez-Fuerte, the Court held that when the intrusion upon protected privacy interests is extremely limited, the INS, in order to serve the pressing governmental interest in immigration enforcement, may briefly detain travelers at fixed checkpoints for questioning solely on the basis of "apparent Mexican ancestry." 428 U.S., at 563 . In so holding, the Court was careful to distinguish its earlier decision in Brignoni-Ponce, supra, which held that Border Patrol agents conducting roving patrols may not stop and question motorists solely on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry, and may instead make such stops only when their observations lead them "reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the country." Id., at 881. The "crucial distinction" between the roving patrols and the fixed checkpoints, as the Court later observed in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S., at 656 , was "the lesser intrusion upon the motorist's Fourth Amendment interests" caused by the checkpoint operations. Thus, as the Court explained in Martinez-Fuerte: "This objective intrusion - the stop itself, the questioning, and the visual inspection - also existed in roving-patrol stops. But we view checkpoint stops in a different light because the subjective intrusion - the generating of concern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers - is appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint stop." 428 U.S., at 558 . 6 </s> [466 U.S. 210, 237] </s> The limited departure from Terry's general requirement of particularized suspicion permitted in Martinez-Fuerte turned, therefore, largely on the fact that the intrusion upon motorists resulting from the checkpoint operations was extremely modest. In this case, by contrast, there are no equivalent guarantees that the privacy of lawful workers will not be substantially invaded by the factory surveys or that the workers will not be frightened by the INS tactics. Indeed, the opposite is true. First, unlike the fixed checkpoints that were upheld in Martinez-Fuerte in part because their location was known to motorists in advance, the INS factory surveys are sprung upon unsuspecting workers completely by surprise. Respondents testified that the sudden arrival of large numbers of INS agents created widespread fear and anxiety among most workers. See App. 89, 107, 116, 120-121, 129-130. Respondent Miramontes, for instance, explained that she was afraid during the surveys "[b]ecause if I leave and they think I don't have no papers and they shoot me or something. They see me leaving and they think I'm guilty." Id., at 127. 7 In Martinez-Fuerte, there was absolutely no evidence of widespread fear and anxiety similar to that adduced in this case. </s> Second, the degree of unfettered discretionary judgment exercised by the individual INS agents during the factory surveys is considerably greater than in the fixed checkpoint operations. The power of individual INS agents to decide who they will stop and question and who they will pass over contributes significantly to the feeling of uncertainty and [466 U.S. 210, 238] anxiety of the workers. See App. 86, 90, 129-130. Unlike the fixed checkpoint operation, there can be no reliable sense among the affected workers that the survey will be conducted in an orderly and predictable manner. Third, although the workplace obviously is not as private as the home, it is at the same time not without an element of privacy that is greater than in an automobile. All motorists expect that while on the highway they are subject to general police surveillance as part of the regular and expectable enforcement of traffic laws. For the average employee, however, the workplace encloses a small, recognizable community that is a locus of friendships, gossip, common effort, and shared experience. While at work, therefore, the average employee will not have the same sense of anonymity that is felt when one is driving on the public highways; instead, an employee will be known by co-workers and will recognize other employees as his or her fellows. This experience, common enough among all who work, forms the basis for a legitimate, albeit modest, expectation of privacy that cannot be indiscriminately invaded by government agents. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 -369 (1968) (employee has reasonable expectation of privacy in office space shared with other workers). The mere fact that the employer has consented to the entry of the INS onto his property does not mean that the workers' expectation of privacy evaporates. </s> Finally, there is no historical precedent for these kinds of surveys that would make them expectable or predictable. As the Court noted in Martinez-Fuerte, supra, at 560-561, n. 14, road checkpoints are supported to some extent by a long history of acceptance that diminishes substantially the concern and fear that such practices would elicit in the average motorist. But factory surveys of the kind conducted by the INS are wholly unprecedented, and their novelty can therefore be expected to engender a high degree of resentment and anxiety. In sum, although the governmental interest is obviously as substantial here as it was in Martinez-Fuerte, [466 U.S. 210, 239] the degree of intrusion upon the privacy rights of lawful workers is significantly greater. Accordingly, the quantum of suspicion required to justify such an intrusion must be correspondingly greater. </s> In my view, therefore, the only acceptable alternatives that would adequately safeguard Fourth Amendment values in this context are for the INS either (a) to adopt a firm policy of stopping and questioning only those workers who are reasonably suspected of being illegal aliens, or (b) to develop a factory survey program that is predictably and reliably less intrusive than the current scheme under review. The first alternative would satisfy the requirement of particularized suspicion enunciated in Terry - a principle that must control here because the specific conditions that permitted exception to that requirement in Martinez-Fuerte are simply not present. The second alternative would seek to redesign the factory survey techniques used by the INS in order to bring them more closely into line with the characteristics found in Martinez-Fuerte. Such a scheme might require the INS, before conducting a survey of all workers in a particular plant, to secure an administrative warrant based upon a showing that reasonable grounds exist for believing that a substantial number of workers employed at the factory are undocumented aliens subject to deportation, and that there are no practical alternatives to conducting such a survey. Cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). In addition, the surveys could be further tailored in duration and manner so as to be substantially less intrusive. </s> III </s> No one doubts that the presence of large numbers of undocumented aliens in this country creates law enforcement problems of titanic proportions for the INS. Nor does anyone question that this agency must be afforded considerable latitude in meeting its delegated enforcement responsibilities. I am afraid, however, that the Court has become so [466 U.S. 210, 240] mesmerized by the magnitude of the problem that it has too easily allowed Fourth Amendment freedoms to be sacrificed. Before we discard all efforts to respect the commands of the Fourth Amendment in this troubling area, however, it is worth remembering that the difficulties faced by the INS today are partly of our own making. </s> The INS methods under review in this case are, in my view, more the product of expedience than of prudent law enforcement policy. The Immigration and Nationality Act establishes a quota-based system for regulating the admission of immigrants to this country which is designed to operate primarily at our borders. See 8 U.S.C. 1151-1153, 1221-1225. See generally Developments, 96 Harv. L. Rev., at 1334-1369. With respect to Mexican immigration, however, this system has almost completely broken down. This breakdown is due in part, of course, to the considerable practical problems of patroling a 2,000-mile border; it is, however, also the result of our failure to commit sufficient resources to the border patrol effort. See Administration's Proposals on Immigration and Refugee Policy: Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary, and the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1981) (statement of Attorney General Smith); see also Developments, 96 Harv. L. Rev., at 1439. Furthermore, the Act expressly exempts American business that employ undocumented aliens from all criminal sanctions, 8 U.S.C. 1324(a), thereby adding to the already powerful incentives for aliens to cross our borders illegally in search of employment. 8 </s> [466 U.S. 210, 241] </s> In the face of these facts, it seems anomalous to insist that the INS must now be permitted virtually unconstrained discretion to conduct wide-ranging searches for undocumented aliens at otherwise lawful places of employment in the interior of the United States. What this position amounts to, I submit, is an admission that since we have allowed border enforcement to collapse and since we are unwilling to require American employers to share any of the blame, we must, as a matter of expediency, visit all of the burdens of this jury-rigged enforcement scheme on the privacy interests of completely lawful citizens and resident aliens who are subjected to these factory raids solely because they happen to work alongside some undocumented aliens. 9 The average American, as we have long recognized, see Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925), expects some interference with his or her liberty when seeking to cross the Nation's borders, but until today's decision no one would ever have expected the same treatment while lawfully at work in the country's interior. Because the conditions which spawned such expedient solutions are in no sense the fault of these [466 U.S. 210, 242] lawful workers, the Court, as the guardian of their constitutional rights, should attend to this problem with greater sensitivity before simply pronouncing the Fourth Amendment a dead letter in the context of immigration enforcement. The answer to these problems, I suggest, does not lie in abandoning our commitment to protecting the cherished rights secured by the Fourth Amendment, but rather may be found by reexamining our immigration policy. </s> I dissent. </s> [Footnote 1 The enforcement activities of the INS are divided between "border patrol" operations conducted along the border and its functional equivalents and "area control" operations conducted in the interior of the United States. The INS's area control operations are in turn divided into traffic control operations (such as maintaining fixed checkpoints on major highways) and factory surveys of the kind at issue in this case. </s> [Footnote 2 It seems to me that the Court correctly finds that there was no single continuing seizure of the entire work force from the moment that the INS agents first secured the factory exits until the completion of the survey. I join the Court's judgment in this respect because it is apparent that in all three factory surveys under review most of the employees were generally free while the survey was being conducted to continue working without interruption and to move about the workplace. Having said that, however, I should emphasize that I find the evidence concerning the conduct of the factorywide survey highly relevant to determining whether the individual respondents were seized. See infra, at 229-231. </s> [Footnote 3 Although respondents insist that the circumstances of these interrogations were sufficiently coercive to constitute a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment, they do not contend that these interviews were conducted under conditions that might be labeled "custodial"; they do not argue, therefore, that the questioning by INS agents posed any threat to the privilege against self-incrimination protected by the Fifth Amendment. Cf.Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Accordingly, it is not necessary to consider whether INS agents should be required to warn respondents of the possible incriminating consequences of providing answers to the agents' questions. </s> [Footnote 4 As we explained in Brignoni-Ponce: "Large numbers of native-born and naturalized citizens have the physical characteristics identified with Mexican ancestry, and even in the border area a relatively small proportion of them are aliens." 422 U.S. at 886. </s> Indeed, the proposition that INS agents, even those who have considerable experience in the field, will be able fairly and accurately to distinguish between Spanish-speaking persons of Mexican ancestry who are either native-born or naturalized citizens, and Spanish-speaking persons of Mexican ancestry who are aliens is both implausible and subject to discriminatory abuse. The protection of fundamental constitutional rights should not depend upon such unconstrained administrative discretion, for, as we have often observed, "[w]hen . . . a stop is not based on objective criteria, the risk of arbitrary and abusive police practices exceeds tolerable limits." Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979). </s> [Footnote 5 Of course, as the Government points out, see Brief for Petitioners 35-38, 287(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act provides that INS officers may, without a warrant, "interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or to remain in the United States." 66 Stat. 233, 8 U.S.C. 1357(a)(1). We have held, however, that broad statutory authority of this kind does not license the INS to employ unconstitutional enforcement methods. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S., at 272 -273. Because of that concern, the Court in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), expressly left open the question whether INS officers "may stop persons reasonably believed to be aliens when there is no reason to believe they are illegally in the country." Id., at 884, n. 9. In my view, given the particular constitutional dangers posed by the INS's present method of carrying out factory surveys, the exercise of the authority granted by 287(a)(1) must be limited to interrogations of only those persons reasonably believed to be in the country illegally. </s> [Footnote 6 Indeed, in Martinez-Fuerte, the Court repeatedly emphasized that, in contrast to the roving patrol stops, the fixed checkpoint operations are less likely to frighten motorists. This was so because "[m]otorists using these highways are not taken by surprise as they know . . . the location of the [466 U.S. 210, 237] checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere," and because the operations "both appear to and actually involve less discretionary enforcement activity." 428 U.S., at 559 . </s> [Footnote 7 See also United States Commission on Civil Rights, The Tarnished Golden Door: Civil Rights Issues in Immigration 90-91 (1980) (noting that "[t]estimony received by the Commission indicates that . . . INS area control operations do cause confusion and pandemonium among all factory employees, thereby disrupting a factory's operations and decreasing production"). </s> [Footnote 8 The enormous law enforcement problems resulting from this combination of practical difficulties in patrolling this border and the incentives for illegal aliens to secure employment have been noted by the Congress, see Hearings on Oversight of the Immigration and Naturalization Service before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International [466 U.S. 210, 241] Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); and also by a Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, see United States Immigration Policy and the National Interest, Final Report of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy 46, 61-62, 72-73 (1981). </s> [Footnote 9 In this regard, the views expressed in JUSTICE WHITE's concurring opinion in United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 915 (1975), are particularly pertinent: </s> "The entire [immigration enforcement] system, however, has been notably unsuccessful in deterring or stemming this heavy flow [of illegal immigration]; and its costs, including added burdens on the courts, have been substantial. Perhaps the Judiciary should not strain to accommodate the requirements of the Fourth Amendment to the needs of a system which at best can demonstrate only minimal effectiveness as long as it is lawful for business firms and others to employ aliens who are illegally in the country. This problem, which ordinary law enforcement has not been able to solve, essentially poses questions of national policy and is chiefly the business of Congress and the Executive Branch rather than the courts." </s> [466 U.S. 210, 243]

United States Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. LOCKE, GOVERNOR OF WASHINGTON, et al.(2000) No. 98-1701 Argued: December 7, 1999Decided: March 6, 2000 </s> After the supertanker Torrey Canyon spilled crude oil off the coast of England in 1967, both Congress, in the Port and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA), and the State of Washington enacted more stringent regulations for tankers and provided for more comprehensive remedies in the event of an oil spill. The ensuing question of federal pre-emption of the State's laws was addressed in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 . In 1989, the supertanker Exxon Valdez ran aground in Alaska, causing the largest oil spill in United States history. Again, both Congress and Washington responded. Congress enacted the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA). The State created a new agency and directed it to establish standards to provide the "best achievable protection" (BAP) from oil spill damages. That agency promulgated tanker design, equipment, reporting, and operating requirements. Petitioner International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko), a trade association of tanker operators, brought this suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against state and local officials responsible for enforcing the BAP regulations. Upholding the regulations, the District Court rejected Intertanko's arguments that the BAP standards invaded an area long pre-empted by the Federal Government. At the appeal stage, the United States intervened on Intertanko's behalf, contending that the District Court's ruling failed to give sufficient weight to the substantial foreign affairs interests of the Federal Government. The Ninth Circuit held that the State could enforce its laws, save one requiring vessels to install certain navigation and towing equipment, which was "virtually identical to" requirements declared pre-empted in Ray . </s> Held: Washington's regulations regarding general navigation watch procedures, crew English language skills and training, and maritime casualty reporting are pre-empted by the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme governing oil tankers; the case is remanded so the validity of other Washington regulations may be assessed in light of the considerable federal interest at stake. Pp. 6-25. </s> (a) The State has enacted legislation in an area where the federal interest has been manifest since the beginning of the Republic and is now well established. Congress has, beginning with the Tank Vessel Act of 1936, enacted a series of statutes pertaining to maritime tanker transports. These include the PWSA, Title I of which authorizes, but does not require, the Coast Guard to enact measures for controlling vessel traffic or for protecting navigation and the marine environment, 33 U.S.C. §1223(a), and Title II of which, as amended, requires the Coast Guard to issue regulations addressing the design, construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation, equipping, personnel qualification, and manning of covered vessels, 46 U.S.C. §3703(a). Congress later enacted OPA, Title I of which, among other things, imposes liability for both removal costs and damages on parties responsible for an oil spill, 33 U.S.C. §2702, and includes two saving clauses preserving the States' authority to impose additional liability, requirements, and penalties, §§2718(a) and (c). Congress has also ratified international agreements in this area, including the International Convention of Standards of Training Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW). Pp. 6-11. </s> (b) In Ray, the Court held that the PWSA and Coast Guard regulations promulgated under that Act pre-empted Washington's pilotage requirement, limitation on tanker size, and tanker design and construction rules. The Ray Court's interpretation of the PWSA is correct and controlling here. Its basic analytic structure explains why federal pre-emption analysis applies to the challenged regulations and allows scope and due recognition for the traditional authority of the States and localities to regulate some matters of local concern. In narrowing the pre-emptive effect given the PWSA in Ray , the Ninth Circuit placed more weight on OPA's saving clauses than they can bear. Like Title I of OPA, in which they are found, the saving clauses are limited to regulations governing liability and compensation for oil pollution, and do not extend to rules regulating vessel operation, design, or manning. Thus, the pre-emptive effect of the PWSA and its regulations is not affected by OPA, and Ray `s holding survives OPA's enactment undiminished. The Ray Court's prefatory observation that an "assumption" that the States' historic police powers were not to be superseded by federal law unless that was the clear and manifest congressional purpose does not mean that a presumption against pre-emption aids the Court's analysis here. An assumption of nonpre-emption is not triggered when the State regulates in an area where there has been a history of significant federal presence. The Ray Court held, among other things, that Congress, in PWSA Title I, preserved state authority to regulate the peculiarities of local waters, such as depth and narrowness, if there is no conflict with federal regulatory determinations, see 435 U.S., at 171 -172, 178, but further held that Congress, in PWSA Title II, mandated uniform federal rules on the subjects or matters there specified, id. , at 168. Thus, under Ray 's interpretation of the Title II provision now found at 46 U.S.C. §3703(a), only the Federal Government may regulate the design, construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation, equipping, personnel qualification, and manning of tankers. The Court today reaffirms Ray 's holding on this point. Congress has left no room for state regulation of these matters. See Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 . Although the Ray Court acknowledged that the existence of some overlapping coverage between the two PWSA titles may make it difficult to determine whether a pre-emption question is controlled by conflict pre-emption principles, applicable generally to Title I, or by field pre-emption rules, applicable generally to Title II, the Court declined to resolve every question by the greater pre-emptive force of Title II. Thus, conflict pre-emption will be applicable in some, although not all, cases. Useful inquiries in determining which title governs include whether the regulation in question is justified by conditions unique to a particular port or waterway, see Ray , supra , at 175, or whether it is of limited extraterritorial effect, not requiring the tanker to modify its primary conduct outside the specific body of water purported to justify the local rule, see id., at 159-160, 171. Pp. 11-20. </s> (c) The field pre-emption rule surrounding PWSA Title II and 46 U.S.C. §3703(a) and the superseding effect of additional federal statutes are illustrated by the pre-emption of four of Washington's tanker regulations, the attempted reach of which is well demonstrated by the briefs and record. First, the imposition of a series of training requirements on a tanker's crew does not address matters unique to Washington waters, but imposes requirements that control the staffing, operation, and manning of a tanker outside of those waters. The training and drill requirements pertain to "operation" and "personnel qualifications" and so are pre-empted by §3703(a). That training is a field reserved to the Federal Government is further confirmed by the circumstance that the STCW Convention addresses crew "training" and "qualification" requirements, and that the United States has enacted crew training regulations. Second, the imposition of English language proficiency requirements on a tanker's crew is not limited to governing local traffic or local peculiarities. It is pre-empted by §3703(a) as a "personnel qualification" and by 33 U.S.C. §1228(a)(7), which requires that any vessel operating in United States waters have at least one licensed deck officer on the navigation bridge who is capable of clearly understanding English. Third, Washington's general requirement that the navigation watch consist of at least two licensed deck officers, a helmsman, and a lookout is pre-empted as an attempt to regulate a tanker's "operation" and "manning" under §3703(a). Fourth, the requirement that vessels in Washington waters report certain marine casualties regardless of where in the world they occurred cannot stand in light of Coast Guard regulations on the same subject that Congress intended be the sole source of a vessel's reporting obligations, see 46 U.S.C. §§6101, 3717(a)(4). On remand, Washington may argue that certain of its regulations, such as its watch requirement in times of restricted visibility, are of limited extraterritorial effect, are necessary to address the peculiarities of Puget Sound, and therefore are not subject to Title II field pre-emption, but should instead be evaluated under Title I conflict pre-emption analysis. Pp. 20-24. </s> (d) It is preferable that petitioners' substantial arguments as to pre-emption of the remaining Washington regulations be considered by the Ninth Circuit or by the District Court within the framework this Court has herein discussed. The United States did not participate in these cases until appeal, and resolution of the litigation would benefit from the development of a full record by all interested parties. If, pending adjudication on remand, Washington threatens to begin enforcing its regulations, the lower courts would weigh any stay application under the appropriate legal standards in light of the principles discussed herein and with recognition of the national interests at stake. Ultimately, it is largely for Congress and the Coast Guard to confront whether their regulatory scheme, which demands a high degree of uniformity, is adequate. States, as well as environmental groups and local port authorities, will participate in the process. See 46 U.S.C. §3703(a). Pp. 24-25. </s> 148 F. 3d 1053, reversed and remanded. </s> Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. </s> UNITED STATES, PETITIONER </s> 98-1701 v. </s> GARY LOCKE, GOVERNOR OF WASHINGTON, etal. </s> INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT TANKER OWNERS (INTERTANKO), PETITIONER </s> 98-1706 v. </s> GARY LOCKE, GOVERNOR OF WASHINGTON, etal. </s> on writs of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit </s> [March 6, 2000] </s> Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The maritime oil transport industry presents ever-present, all too real dangers of oil spills from tanker ships, spills which could be catastrophes for the marine environment. After the supertanker Torrey Canyon spilled its cargo of 120,000 tons of crude oil off the coast of Cornwall, England, in 1967, both Congress and the State of Washington enacted more stringent regulations for these tankers and provided for more comprehensive remedies in the event of an oil spill. The ensuing question of federal pre-emption of the State's laws was addressed by the Court in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978). </s> In 1989, the supertanker Exxon Valdez ran aground in Prince William Sound, Alaska, and its cargo of more than 53 million gallons of crude oil caused the largest oil spill in United States history. Again, both Congress and the State of Washington responded. Congress enacted new statutory provisions, and Washington adopted regulations governing tanker operations and design. Today we must determine whether these more recent state laws can stand despite the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme governing oil tankers. Relying on the same federal statute that controlled the analysis in Ray , we hold that some of the State's regulations are pre-empted; as to the balance of the regulations, we remand the case so their validity may be assessed in light of the considerable federal interest at stake and in conformity with the principles we now discuss. </s> I </s> The State of Washington embraces some of the Nation's most significant waters and coastal regions. Its Pacific Ocean seacoast consists, in large part, of wave-exposed rocky headlands separated by stretches of beach. Washington borders as well on the Columbia River estuary, dividing Washington from Oregon. Two other large estuaries, Grays Harbor and Willapa Bay, are also within Washington's waters. Of special significance in this case is the inland sea of Puget Sound, a 2,500 square mile body of water consisting of inlets, bays, and channels. More than 200 islands are located within the sound, and it sustains fisheries and plant and animal life of immense value to the Nation and to the world. </s> Passage from the Pacific Ocean to the quieter Puget Sound is through the Strait of Juan de Fuca, a channel 12 miles wide and 65 miles long which divides Washington from the Canadian Province of British Columbia. The international boundary is located midchannel. Access to Vancouver, Canada's largest port, is through the strait. Traffic inbound from the Pacific Ocean, whether destined to ports in the United States or Canada, is routed through Washington's waters; outbound traffic, whether from a port in Washington or Vancouver, is directed through Canadian waters. The pattern had its formal adoption in a 1979 agreement entered by the United States and Canada. Agreement for a Cooperative Vessel Traffic Management System for the Juan de Fuca Region, 32 U.S.T. 377, T.I.A.S. No.9706. </s> In addition to holding some of our vital waters, Washington is the site of major installations for the Nation's oil industry and the destination or shipping point for huge volumes of oil and its end products. Refineries and product terminals are located adjacent to Puget Sound in ports including Cherry Point, Ferndale, Tacoma, and Anacortes. Canadian refineries are found near Vancouver on Burrard Inlet and the lower Fraser River. Crude oil is transported by sea to Puget Sound. Most is extracted from Alaska's North Slope reserve and is shipped to Washington on United States flag vessels. Foreign-flag vessels arriving from nations such as Venezuela and Indonesia also call at Washington's oil installations. </s> The bulk of oil transported on water is found in tankers, vessels which consist of a group of tanks contained in a ship-shaped hull, propelled by an isolated machinery plant at the stern. The Court described the increase in size and numbers of these ships close to three decades ago in Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 335 (1973), noting that the average vessel size increased from 16,000 tons during World War II to 76,000 tons in 1966. (The term "tons" refers to "deadweight tons," a way of measuring the cargo-carrying capacity of the vessels.) Between 1955 and 1968, the world tanker fleet grew from 2,500 vessels to 4,300. Ibid. By December 1973, 366 tankers in the world tanker fleet were in excess of 175,000 tons, see 1 M.Tusiani, The Petroleum Shipping Industry 79 (1996), and by 1998 the number of vessels considered "tankers" in the merchant fleets of the world numbered 6,739, see U.S. Dept. of Transp., Maritime Administration, Merchant Fleets of the World 1 (Oct. 1998). </s> The size of these vessels, the frequency of tanker operations, and the vast amount of oil transported by vessels with but one or two layers of metal between the cargo and the water present serious risks. Washington's waters have been subjected to oil spills and further threatened by near misses. In December 1984, for example, the tanker ARCO Anchorage grounded in Port Angeles Harbor and spilled 239,000 gallons of Alaskan crude oil. The most notorious oil spill in recent times was in Prince William Sound, Alaska, where the grounding of the Exxon Valdez released more than 11 million gallons of crude oil and, like the Torrey Canyon spill before it, caused public officials intense concern over the threat of a spill. </s> Washington responded by enacting the state regulations now in issue. The legislature created the Office of Marine Safety, which it directed to establish standards for spill prevention plans to provide "the best achievable protection [BAP] from damages caused by the discharge of oil." Wash. Rev. Code §88.46.040(3) (1994). The Office of Marine Safety then promulgated the tanker design, equipment, reporting, and operating requirements now subject to attack by petitioners. Wash. Admin. Code (WAC) §317-21-130 etseq. (1999). A summary of the relevant regulations, as described by the Court of Appeals, is set out in the Appendix, infra . </s> If a vessel fails to comply with the Washington rules, possible sanctions include statutory penalties, restrictions of the vessel's operations in state waters, and a denial of entry into state waters. Wash. Rev. Code. §§88.46.070, 88.46.080, 88.46.090 (1994). </s> Petitioner International Association of Independent Tanker Owners ("Intertanko") is a trade association whose 305 members own or operate more than 2,000 tankers of both United States and foreign registry. The organization represents approximately 80% of the world's independently owned tanker fleet; and an estimated 60% of the oil imported into the United States is carried on Intertanko vessels. The association brought this suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against state and local officials responsible for enforcing the BAP regulations. Groups interested in environmental preservation intervened in defense of the laws. Intertanko argued that Washington's BAP standards invaded areas long occupied by the Federal Government and imposed unique requirements in an area where national uniformity was mandated. Intertanko further contended that if local political subdivisions of every maritime nation were to impose differing regulatory regimes on tanker operations, the goal of national governments to develop effective international environmental and safety standards would be defeated. </s> Although the United States declined to intervene when the case was in the District Court, the governments of 13 ocean-going nations expressed concerns through a diplomatic note directed to the United States. Intertanko lodged a copy of the note with the District Court. The concerned governments represented that "legislation by the State of Washington on tanker personnel, equipment and operations would cause inconsistency between the regulatory regime of the US Government and that of an individual State of the US. Differing regimes in different parts of the US would create uncertainty and confusion. This would also set an unwelcome precedent for other Federally administered countries." Note Verbale from the Royal Danish Embassy to the U.S. Dep't of State 1 (June 14, 1996). </s> The District Court rejected all of Intertanko's arguments and upheld the state regulations. International Assn. of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v. Lowry, 947 F.Supp. 1484 (WD Wash. 1996). The appeal followed, and at that stage the United States intervened on Intertanko's behalf, contending that the District Court's ruling failed to give sufficient weight to the substantial foreign affairs interests of the Federal Government. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the State could enforce its laws, save the one requiring the vessels to install certain navigation and towing equipment. 148 F.3d 1220 (1998) (The Court of Appeals reasoned that this requirement, found in WAC §317-21-265, was "virtually identical to" requirements declared pre-empted in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978). 148 F.3d, at 1066. Over Judge Graber's dissent, the Court of Appeals denied petitions for rehearing enbanc. 159 F.3d 1220 (1998). Judge Graber, although unwilling, without further analysis, to conclude that the panel reached the wrong result, argued that the opinion was "incorrect in two exceptionally important respects: (1)The opinion places too much weight on two clauses in Title I of OPA 90 [The Oil Pollution Act of 1990] that limit OPA 90's preemptive effect. (2)Portions of the opinion that discuss the Coast Guard regulations are inconsistent with Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent." Id., at 1221. We granted certiorari and now reverse. 527 U.S. 1063 (1999). </s> II </s> The State of Washington has enacted legislation in an area where the federal interest has been manifest since the beginning of our Republic and is now well established. The authority of Congress to regulate interstate navigation, without embarrassment from intervention of the separate States and resulting difficulties with foreign nations, was cited in the Federalist Papers as one of the reasons for adopting the Constitution. E.g. , The Federalist Nos.44, 12, 64. In 1789, the First Congress enacted a law by which vessels with a federal certificate were entitled to "the benefits granted by any law of the United States." Act of Sept. 1, 1789, ch.11, §1, 1 Stat. 55. The importance of maritime trade and the emergence of maritime transport by steamship resulted in further federal licensing requirements enacted to promote trade and to enhance the safety of crew members and passengers. See Act of July 7, 1838, ch.191, 5 Stat. 304; Act of Mar.3, 1843, ch.94, 5 Stat. 626. In 1871, Congress enacted a comprehensive scheme of regulation for steam powered vessels, including provisions for licensing captains, chief mates, engineers, and pilots. Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch.100, 16 Stat. 440. </s> The Court in Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia ex rel. Soc. for Relief of Distressed Pilots, 12 How. 299 (1852), stated that there would be instances in which state regulation of maritime commerce is inappropriate even absent the exercise of federal authority, although in the case before it the Court found the challenged state regulations were permitted in light of local needs and conditions. Where Congress had acted, however, the Court had little difficulty in finding state vessel requirements were pre-empted by federal laws which governed the certification of vessels and standards of operation. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824), invalidated a New York law that attempted to grant a monopoly to operate steamboats on the ground it was inconsistent with the coasting license held by the vessel owner challenging the exclusive franchise. And in Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227 (1859), the Court decided that the federal license held by the vessel contained "the only guards and restraints, which Congress has seen fit to annex to the privileges of ships and vessels engaged in the coasting trade." Id. , at 241. The Court went on to explain that in such a circumstance, state laws on the subject must yield: "In every such case, the act of Congress or treaty is supreme; and the law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it." Id., at 243. </s> Against this background, Congress has enacted a series of statutes pertaining to maritime tanker transports and has ratified international agreements on the subject. We begin by referring to the principal statutes and international instruments discussed by the parties. </s> 1. The Tank Vessel Act. </s> The Tank Vessel Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 1889, enacted specific requirements for operation of covered vessels. The Act provided that "[i]n order to secure effective provisions against the hazards of life and property," additional federal rules could be adopted with respect to the "design and construction, alteration, or repair of such vessels," "the operation of such vessels," and "the requirements of the manning of such vessels and the duties and qualifications of the officers and crews thereof." The purpose of the Act was to establish "a reasonable and uniform set of rules and regulations concerning... vessels carrying the type of cargo deemed dangerous." H.R. Rep. No.2962, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1936). The Tank Vessel Act was the primary source for regulating tank vessels for the next 30 years, until the Torrey Canyon grounding led Congress to take new action. </s> 2. The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972. </s> Responding to the Torrey Canyon spill, Congress enacted the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA). The Act, as amended by the Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 1471, contains two somewhat overlapping titles, both of which may, as the Ray Court explained, preclude enforcement of state laws, though not by the same pre-emption analysis. TitleI concerns vessel traffic "in any port or place under the jurisdiction of the United States." 110 Stat. 3934, 33 U.S.C. §1223(a)(1) (1997 ed. Supp. III). Under TitleI, the Coast Guard may enact measures for controlling vessel traffic or for protecting navigation and the marine environment, but it is not required to do so. Ibid. </s> Title II does require the Coast Guard to issue regulations, regulations addressing the "design, construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation, equipping, personnel qualification, and manning of vessels... that may be necessary for increased protection against hazards to life and property, for navigation and vessel safety, and for enhanced protection of the marine environment." 46 U.S.C. §3703(a). </s> The critical provisions of the PWSA described above remain operative, but the Act has been amended, most significantly by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), 104 Stat. 484. OPA, enacted in response to the Exxon Valdez spill, requires separate discussion. </s> 3. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990. </s> The OPA contains nine titles, two having the most significance for these cases. TitleI is captioned "Oil Pollution Liability, and Compensation" and adds extensive new provisions to the United States Code. See 104 Stat. 2375, 33 U.S.C. §2701 etseq. (1994 ed. and Supp.III). TitleI imposes liability (for both removal costs and damages) on parties responsible for an oil spill. §2702. Other provisions provide defenses to, and limitations on, this liability. 33 U.S.C. §§2703, 2704. Of considerable importance to these cases are OPA's saving clauses, found in TitleI of the Act, §2718, and to be discussed below. </s> Title IV of OPA is entitled "Prevention and Removal." For the most part, it amends existing statutory provisions or instructs the Secretary of Transportation (whose departments include the Coast Guard) to take action under previous grants of rulemaking authority. For example, TitleIV instructs the Coast Guard to require reporting of marine casualties resulting in a "significant harm to the environment." 46 U.S.C. §6101(a)(5) (1994 ed. and Supp.V). Title IV further requires the Secretary to issue regulations to define those areas, including Puget Sound, on which single hulled tankers shall be escorted by other vessels. 104 Stat. 523. By incremental dates specified in the Act, all covered tanker vessels must have a double hull. 46 U.S.C. §3703a. </s> 4. Treaties and International Agreements. </s> The scheme of regulation includes a significant and intricate complex of international treaties and maritime agreements bearing upon the licensing and operation of vessels. We are advised by the United States that the international regime depends upon the principle of reciprocity. That is to say, the certification of a vessel by the government of its own flag nation warrants that the ship has complied with international standards, and vessels with those certificates may enter ports of the signatory nations. Brief for United States3. </s> Illustrative of treaties and agreements to which the United States is a party are the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, 32 U.S. T. 47, T.I.A.S. No.9700, the International Convention for Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, 17 I.L.M. 546, and the International Convention of Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, With Annex, 1978 (STCW), S.Treaty Doc. No.96-1, C.T.I.A. No.7624. </s> The United States argues that these treaties, as the supreme law of the land, have pre-emptive force over the state regulations in question here. We need not reach that issue at this stage of the case because the state regulations we address in detail below are pre-empted by federal statute and regulations. The existence of the treaties and agreements on standards of shipping is of relevance, of course, for these agreements give force to the longstanding rule that the enactment of a uniform federal scheme displaces state law, and the treaties indicate Congress will have demanded national uniformity regarding maritime commerce. See Ray , 435 U.S., at 166 (recognizing Congress anticipated "arriving at international standards for building tank vessels" and understanding "the Nation was to speak with one voice" on these matters). In later proceedings, if it is deemed necessary for full disposition of the case, it should be open to the parties to argue whether the specific international agreements and treaties are of binding, pre-emptive force. We do not reach those questions, for it may be that pre-emption principles applicable to the basic federal statutory structure will suffice, upon remand, for a complete determination. </s> III </s> In Ray v. Atlantic Richfield, supra, the Court was asked to review, in light of an established federal and international regulatory scheme, comprehensive tanker regulations imposed by the State of Washington. The Court held that the PWSA and Coast Guard regulations promulgated under that Act pre-empted a state pilotage requirement, Washington's limitation on tanker size, and tanker design and construction rules. </s> In these cases, petitioners relied on Ray to argue that Washington's more recent state regulations were preempted as well. The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that Ray retained little validity in light of subsequent action by Congress. We disagree. The Ray Court's interpretation of the PWSA is correct and controlling. Its basic analytic structure explains why federal pre-emption analysis applies to the challenged regulations and allows scope and due recognition for the traditional authority of the States and localities to regulate some matters of local concern. </s> At the outset, it is necessary to explain that the essential framework of Ray , and of the PWSA which it interpreted, are of continuing force, neither having been superseded by subsequent authority relevant to these cases. In narrowing the pre-emptive effect given the PWSA in Ray , the Court of Appeals relied upon OPA's saving clauses, finding in their language a return of authority to the States. TitleI of OPA contains two saving clauses, stating: </s> "(a) Preservation of State authorities... </s> "Nothing in this Act or the Act of March 3, 1851 shall-- </s> "(1) affect, or be construed or interpreted as pre-empting, the authority of any State or political subdivision thereof from imposing any additional liability or requirements with respect to-- </s> "(A) the discharge of oil or other pollution by oil within such State.... </s> . . . . . </s> "(c) Additional requirements and liabilities; penalties </s> "Nothing in this Act, the Act of March 3, 1851 (46 U.S.C. 183 et seq.), or section 9509 of [the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. 9509]), shall in any way affect, or be construed to affect, the authority of the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof-- </s> "(1) to impose additional liability or additional requirements </s> . . . . . </s> "relating to the discharge, or substantial threat of a discharge, of oil." 33 U.S.C. §2718. </s> The Court of Appeals placed more weight on the saving clauses than those provisions can bear, either from a textual standpoint or from a consideration of the whole federal regulatory scheme of which OPA is but a part. </s> The saving clauses are found in TitleI of OPA, captioned Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation and creating a liability scheme for oil pollution. In contrast to the Washington rules at issue here, TitleI does not regulate vessel operation, design, or manning. Placement of the saving clauses in TitleI of OPA suggests that Congress intended to preserve state laws of a scope similar to the matters contained in TitleI of OPA, not all state laws similar to the matters covered by the whole of OPA or to the whole subject of maritime oil transport. The evident purpose of the saving clauses is to preserve state laws which, rather than imposing substantive regulation of a vessel's primary conduct, establish liability rules and financial requirements relating to oil spills. See Gutierrez v. Ada , 528 U.S. ___, ___ (2000) (slip op., at 5) (words of a statute should be interpreted consistent with their neighbors to avoid giving unintended breadth to an Act of Congress). </s> Our conclusion is fortified by Congress' decision to limit the saving clauses by the same key words it used in declaring the scope of TitleI of OPA. TitleI of OPA permits recovery of damages involving vessels "from which oil is discharged, or which pos[e] the substantial threat of a discharge of oil." 33 U.S.C. §2702(a). The saving clauses, in parallel manner, permit States to impose liability or requirements "relating to the discharge, or substantial threat of a discharge, of oil." §2718(c). In its titles following TitleI, OPA addresses matters including licensing and certificates of registry, 104 Stat. 509; duties of senior licensed officers to relieve the master, id., at 511; manning standards for foreign vessels, id. , at 513; reporting of marine casualties, ibid.; minimum standards for plating thickness, id., at 515; tank vessel manning requirements, id. , at 517; and tank vessel construction standards, id. , at 517-518, among other extensive regulations. If Congress had intended to disrupt national uniformity in all of these matters, it would not have done so by placement of the saving clauses in TitleI. </s> The saving clauses are further limited in effect to "this Act, the Act of March 3, 1851 ... or section 9509 of the Internal Revenue Code." §2718(a) and (c). These explicit qualifiers are inconsistent with interpreting the saving clauses to alter the pre-emptive effect of the PWSA or regulations promulgated thereunder. The text of the statute indicates no intent to allow States to impose wide-ranging regulation of the at-sea operation of tankers. The clauses may preserve a State's ability to enact laws of a scope similar to TitleI, but do not extend to subjects addressed in the other titles of the Act or other acts. </s> Limiting the saving clauses as we have determined respects the established federal-state balance in matters of maritime commerce between the subjects as to which the States retain concurrent powers and those over which the federal authority displaces state control. We have upheld state laws imposing liability for pollution caused by oil spills. See Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc. , 411 U.S., at 325 . Our view of OPA's savings clauses preserves this important role for the States, which is unchallenged here. We think it quite unlikely that Congress would use a means so indirect as the savings clauses in Title I of OPA to upset the settled division of authority by allowing states to impose additional unique substantive regulation on the at-sea conduct of vessels. We decline to give broad effect to saving clauses where doing so would upset the careful regulatory scheme established by federal law. See, e.g. , Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 385 (1992); American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 227-28 (1998). </s> From the text of OPA and the long-established understanding of the appropriate balance between federal and state regulation of maritime commerce, we hold that the pre-emptive effect of the PWSA and regulations promulgated under it are not affected by OPA. We doubt Congress will be surprised by our conclusion, for the Conference Report on OPA shared our view that the statute "does not disturb the Supreme Court's decision in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. , 435 U.S. 151 (1978)." H.R. Conf. Rep. No.101-653, 101, p.122 (1990). The holding in Ray also survives the enactment of OPA undiminished, and we turn to a detailed discussion of that case. </s> As we mentioned above, the Ray Court confronted a claim by the operator of a Puget Sound refinery that federal law precluded Washington from enforcing laws imposing certain substantive requirements on tankers. The Ray Court prefaced its analysis of the state regulations with the following observation: </s> "The Court's prior cases indicate that when a State's exercise of its police power is challenged under the Supremacy Clause, `we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' Rice v. SantaFe Elevator Corp. , 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)." 435 U.S., at 157 . </s> The fragmentary quote from Rice does not support the scope given to it by the Court of Appeals or by respondents. </s> Ray quoted but a fragment of a much longer paragraph found in Rice . The quoted fragment is followed by extensive and careful qualifications to show the different approaches taken by the Court in various contexts. We need not discuss that careful explanation in detail, however. To explain the full intent of the Rice quotation, it suffices to quote in full the sentence in question and two sentences preceding it. The Rice opinion stated: "The question in each case is what the purpose of Congress was. Congress legislated here in a field which the States have traditionally occupied. So we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." 331 U.S., at 230 (citations omitted). </s> The qualification given by the word "so" and by the preceding sentences in Rice are of considerable consequence. As Rice indicates, an "assumption" of nonpre-emption is not triggered when the State regulates in an area where there has been a history of significant federal presence. See also Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) ("assumption" is triggered where "the field which Congress is said to have pre-empted has been traditionally occupied by the States"); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (citing Rice in case involving medical negligence, a subject historically regulated by the States). In Ray , and in the case before us, Congress has legislated in the field from the earliest days of the Republic, creating an extensive federal statutory and regulatory scheme. </s> The state laws now in question bear upon national and international maritime commerce, and in this area there is no beginning assumption that concurrent regulation by the State is a valid exercise of its police powers. Rather, we must ask whether the local laws in question are consistent with the federal statutory structure, which has as one of its objectives a uniformity of regulation for maritime commerce. No artificial presumption aids us in determining the scope of appropriate local regulation under the PWSA, which, as we discuss below, does preserve, in Title I of that Act, the historic role of the States to regulate local ports and waters under appropriate circumstances. At the same time, as we also discuss below, uniform, national rules regarding general tanker design, operation, and seaworthiness have been mandated by TitleII of the PWSA. </s> The Ray Court confirmed the important proposition that the subject and scope of TitleI of the PWSA allows a State to regulate its ports and waterways, so long as the regulation is based on "the peculiarities of local waters that call for special precautionary measures." 435 U.S., at 171 . TitleI allows state rules directed to local circumstances and problems, such as water depth and narrowness, idiosyncratic to a particular port or waterway. Ibid. There is no pre-emption by operation of TitleI itself if the state regulation is so directed and if the Coast Guard has not adopted regulations on the subject or determined that regulation is unnecessary or inappropriate. This principle is consistent with recognition of an important role for States and localities in the regulation of the Nation's waterways and ports. E.g. , Cooley , 12 How., at 319 (recognizing state authority to adopt plans "applicable to the local peculiarities of the ports within their limits"). It is fundamental in our federal structure that states have vast residual powers. Those powers, unless constrained or displaced by the existence of federal authority or by proper federal enactments, are often exercised in concurrence with those of the national government. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819). </s> As Ray itself made apparent, the States may enforce rules governed by TitleI of the PWSA unless they run counter to an exercise of federal authority. The analysis under TitleI of the PWSA, then, is one of conflict pre-emption, which occurs "when compliance with both state and federal law is impossible, or when the state law `stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objective of Congress.'" California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100-101 (1989) (citations omitted). In this context, Coast Guard regulations are to be given pre-emptive effect over conflicting state laws. City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1988) ("`[A] federal agency acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority may pre-empt state regulation' and hence render unenforceable state or local laws that are otherwise not inconsistent with federal law"). Ray defined the relevant inquiry for TitleI pre-emption as whether the Coast Guard has promulgated its own requirement on the subject or has decided that no such requirement should be imposed at all. 435 U.S., at 171 -172; see also, id. , at 178 ("`where failure of ... federal officials affirmatively to exercise their full authority takes on the character of a ruling that no such regulation is appropriate or approved pursuant to the policy of the statute,' States are not permitted to use their police power to enact such a regulation. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, </s> 330 U.S 767 , 774 (1947)"). Ray also recognized that, even in the context of a regulation related to local waters, a federal official with an overview of all possible ramifications of a particular requirement might be in the best position to balance all the competing interests. Id. , at 177. </s> While Ray explained that Congress, in Title I of the PWSA, preserved state authority to regulate the peculiarities of local waters if there was no conflict with federal regulatory determinations, the Court further held that Congress, in TitleII of the PWSA, mandated federal rules on the subjects or matters there specified, demanding uniformity. Id. , at 168 ("TitleII leaves no room for the States to impose different or stricter design requirements than those which Congress has enacted with the hope of having them internationally adopted or has accepted as the result of international accord. A state law in this area ... would frustrate the congressional desire of achieving uniform, international standards"). TitleII requires the Coast Guard to impose national regulations governing the general seaworthiness of tankers and their crews. Id., at 160. Under Ray 's interpretation of the TitleII PWSA provision now found at 46 U.S.C. §3703(a), only the Federal Government may regulate the "design, construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation, equipping, personnel qualification, and manning" of tanker vessels. </s> In Ray , this principle was applied to hold that Washington's tanker design and construction rules were pre-empted. Those requirements failed because they were within a field reserved for federal regulation under 46 U.S.C. §391a (1982 ed.), the predecessor to §3703(a). We reaffirm Ray 's holding on this point. Contrary to the suggestion of the Court of Appeals, the field of pre-emption established by §3703(a) cannot be limited to tanker "design" and "construction," terms which cannot be read in isolation from the other subjects found in that section. Title II of the PWSA covers "design, construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation, equipping, personnel qualification, and manning" of tanker vessels. Ibid. Congress has left no room for state regulation of these matters. See Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Dela Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982) (explaining field pre-emption). As the Ray court stated: "[T]he Supremacy Clause dictates that the federal judgment that a vessel is safe to navigate United States waters prevail over the contrary state judgment. Enforcement of the state requirements would at least frustrate what seems to us to be the evident congressional intention to establish a uniform federal regime controlling the design of oil tankers." 435 U.S., at 165 . </s> The existence of some overlapping coverage between the two titles of the PWSA may make it difficult to determine whether a pre-emption question is controlled by conflict pre-emption principles, applicable generally to TitleI, or by field pre-emption rules, applicable generally to TitleII. The Ray Court acknowledged the difficulty, but declined to resolve every question by the greater pre-emptive force of TitleII. We follow the same approach, and conflict pre-emption under TitleI will be applicable in some, although not all, cases. We recognize that the terms used in §3703(a) are quite broad. In defining their scope, and the scope of the resulting field pre-emption, it will be useful to consider the type of regulations the Secretary has actually promulgated under the section, as well as the section's list of specific types of regulation that must be included. Useful inquiries include whether the rule is justified by conditions unique to a particular port or waterway. See id., at 175 (a TitleI regulation is one "based on water depth in Puget Sound or on other local peculiarities"). Furthermore, a regulation within the State's residual powers will often be of limited extraterritorial effect, not requiring the tanker to modify its primary conduct outside the specific body of water purported to justify the local rule. Limited extraterritorial effect explains why Ray upheld a state rule requiring a tug escort for certain vessels, id., at 171, and why state rules requiring a registered vessel ( i.e., one involved in foreign trade) to take on a local pilot have historically been allowed, id., at 159-160. Local rules not pre-empted under Title II of the PWSA pose a minimal risk of innocent noncompliance, do not affect vessel operations outside the jurisdiction, do not require adjustment of systemic aspects of the vessel, and do not impose a substantial burden on the vessel's operation within the local jurisdiction itself. </s> IV </s> The field pre-emption rule surrounding Title II and §3703(a) and the superseding effect of additional federal statutes are illustrated by the pre-emption of four of Washington's tanker regulations. We address these because the attempted reach of the state rules is well demonstrated by the briefs and record before us; other parts of the state regulatory scheme can be addressed on remand. </s> First, Washington imposes a series of training requirements on a tanker's crew. WAC §317-21-230; see also Appendix, infra, at ___. A covered vessel is required to certify that its crew has "complete[d] a comprehensive training program approved by the [State]." The State requires the vessel's master to "be trained in shipboard management" and licensed deck officers to be trained in bridge resource management, automated radar plotting aids, shiphandling, crude oil washing, inert gas systems, cargo handling, oil spill prevention and response, and shipboard fire fighting. The state law mandates a series of "weekly," "monthly," and "quarterly" drills. </s> This state requirement under WAC §317-21-230 does not address matters unique to the waters of Puget Sound. On the contrary, it imposes requirements that control the staffing, operation, and manning of a tanker outside of Washington's waters. The training and drill requirements pertain to "operation" and "personnel qualifications" and so are pre-empted by 46 U.S.C. §3703(a). Our conclusion that training is a field reserved to the Federal Government receives further confirmation from the circumstance that the STCW Convention addresses "training" and "qualification" requirements of the crew, Art.VI), and that the United States has enacted crew training requirements. E.g., 46 CFR Pts. 10, 12, 13, 15 (1999). </s> The second Washington rule we find pre-empted is WAC §317-21-250; see also, Appendix, infra, at ___-___. Washington imposes English language proficiency requirements on a tanker's crew. This requirement will dictate how a tanker operator staffs the vessel even from the outset of the voyage, when the vessel may be thousands of miles from Puget Sound. It is not limited to governing local traffic or local peculiarities. The State's attempted rule is a "personnel qualification" pre-empted by §3703(a) of TitleII. In addition, there is another federal statute, 33 U.S.C. §1228(a)(7), on the subject. It provides: "[N]o vessel... shall operate in the navigable waters of the United States..., if such vessel... while underway, does not have at least one licensed deck officer on the navigation bridge who is capable of clearly understanding English." The statute may not be supplemented by laws enacted by the States without compromising the uniformity the federal rule itself achieves. </s> The third Washington rule we find invalid under field pre-emption is a navigation watch requirement in WAC §317-21-200. Washington has different rules for navigation watch, depending on whether the tanker is operating in restricted visibility or not. We mention the restricted visibility rule below, but now evaluate the requirement which applies in general terms and reads: "[T]he navigation watch shall consist of at least two licensed deck officers, a helmsman, and a lookout." The general watch requirement is not tied to the peculiarities of Puget Sound; it applies throughout Washington's waters and at all times. It is a general operating requirement and is pre-empted as an attempt to regulate a tanker's "operation" and "manning" under 33 U.S.C. §3703(a). </s> We have illustrated field pre-emption under §3703(a) by discussing three of Washington's rules which, under the current state of the record, we can determine cannot be enforced due to the assertion of federal authority found in that section. The parties discuss other federal statutory provisions and international agreements which also govern specific aspects of international maritime commerce. In appropriate circumstances, these also may have pre-emptive effect. </s> For example, the record before us reveals that a fourth state rule cannot stand in light of other sources of federal regulation of the same subject. Washington requires vessels that ultimately reach its waters to report certain marine casualties. WAC §317-21-130; see also Appendix, infra, at ___. The requirement applies to incidents (defined as a "collision," "allision," "near-miss incident," "marine casualty" of listed kinds, "accidental or intentional grounding," "failure of the propulsion or primary steering systems," "failure of a component or control system," "fire, flood, or other incident that affects the vessel's seaworthiness," and "spills of oil"), regardless of where in the world they might have occurred. A vessel operator is required by the state regulation to make a detailed report to the State on each incident, listing the date, location, and weather conditions. The report must also list the government agencies to whom the event was reported and must contain a "brief analysis of any known causes" and a "description of measures taken to prevent a reoccurrence." Ibid. </s> The State contends that its requirement is not pre-empted because it is similar to federal requirements. This is an incorrect statement of the law. It is not always a sufficient answer to a claim of pre-emption to say that state rules supplement, or even mirror, federal requirements. The Court observed this principle when Commerce Clause doctrine was beginning to take shape, holding in Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227 (1859), that Alabama could not require vessel owners to provide certain information as a condition of operating in state waters even though federal law also required the owner of the vessel "to furnish, under oath... all the information required by this State law." Id. , at 242. The appropriate inquiry still remains whether the purposes and objectives of the federal statutes, including the intent to establish a workable, uniform system, are consistent with concurrent state regulation. On this point, Justice Holmes' later observation is relevant: "[W]hen Congress has taken the particular subject matter in hand coincidence is as ineffective as opposition, and a state law is not to be declared a help because it attempts to go farther than Congress has seen fit to go." Charleston & Western Carolina R.Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604 (1915). </s> We hold that Congress intended that the Coast Guard regulations be the sole source of a vessel's reporting obligations with respect to the matters covered by the challenged state statute. Under 46 U.S.C. §6101, the Coast Guard "shall prescribe regulations on the marine casualties to be reported and the manner of reporting," and the statute lists the kinds of casualties that the regulations must cover. See also §3717(a)(4) (requiring the Secretary of Transportation to "establish a marine safety information system"). Congress did not intend its reporting obligations to be cumulative to those enacted by each political subdivision whose jurisdiction a vessel enters. The State's reporting requirement is a significant burden in terms of cost and the risk of innocent noncompliance. The Roanoke , 189 U.S. 185, 195 (1903) (the master of a vessel is in a position "such that it is almost impossible for him to acquaint himself with the laws of each individual State he may visit"). Furthermore, it affects a vessel operator's out-of-state obligations and conduct, where a State's jurisdiction and authority are most in doubt. The State reporting requirement under WAC §317-21-130 is pre-empted. </s> V </s> As to conflict pre-emption under Title I, Washington argues that certain of its regulations, such as its watch requirement in times of restricted visibility, are of limited extraterritorial effect and necessary to address the peculiarities of Puget Sound. On remand, the Court of Appeals or District Court should consider whether the remaining regulations are preempted under TitleI conflict pre-emption or TitleII field pre-emption, or are otherwise pre-empted by these Titles or under any other federal law or international agreement raised as possible sources of pre-emption. </s> We have determined that Washington's regulations regarding general navigation watch procedures, English language skills, training, and casualty reporting are pre-empted. Petitioners make substantial arguments that the remaining regulations are preempted as well. It is preferable that the remaining claims be considered by the Court of Appeals or by the District Court within the framework we have discussed. The United States did not participate in these cases until appeal. Resolution of these cases would benefit from the development of a full record by all interested parties. </s> We infer from the record that Washington is not now enforcing its regulations. If, pending adjudication of the case on remand, a threat of enforcement emerges, the Court of Appeals or the District Court would weigh any application for stay under the appropriate legal standards in light of the principles we have discussed and with recognition of the national interests at stake. </s> When one contemplates the weight and immense mass of oil ever in transit by tankers, the oil's proximity to coastal life, and its destructive power even if a spill occurs far upon the open sea, international, federal, and state regulation may be insufficient protection. Sufficiency, however, is not the question before us. The issue is not adequate regulation but political responsibility; and it is, in large measure, for Congress and the Coast Guard to confront whether their regulatory scheme, which demands a high degree of uniformity, is adequate. States, as well as environmental groups and local port authorities, will participate in the process. See 46 U.S.C. §3703(a) (requiring the Coast Guard to consider the views of "officials of State and local governments," "representative of port and harbor authorities," and "representatives of environmental groups" in arriving at national standards). </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT </s> "1. Event Reporting--WAC 317-21-130. Requires operators to report all events such as collisions, allisions and near-miss incidents for the five years preceding filing of a prevention plan, and all events that occur thereafter for tankers that operate in Puget Sound. </s> "2. Operating Procedures--[Watch Practices WAC-317-21-200.] Requires tankers to employ specific watch and lookout practices while navigating and when at anchor, and requires a bridge resource management system that is the `standard practice throughout the owner's or operator's fleet,' and which organizes responsibilities and coordinates communication between members of the bridge. </s> "3. Operating Procedures--Navigation WAC--317-21-205. Requires tankers in navigation in state waters to record positions every fifteen minutes, to write a comprehensive voyage plan before entering state waters, and to make frequent compass checks while under way. </s> "4. Operating Procedures--Engineering WAC--317-21-210. Requires tankers in state waters to follow specified engineering and monitoring practices. </s> "5. Operating Procedures--Prearrival Tests and Inspections WAC--317-21-215. Requires tankers to undergo a number of tests and inspections of engineering, navigation and propulsion systems twelve hours or less before entering or getting underway in state waters. </s> "6. Operating Procedures--Emergency Procedures WAC--317-21-220. Requires tanker masters to post written crew assignments and procedures for a number of shipboard emergencies. </s> "7. Operating Procedures--Events WAC--317-21-225. Requires that when an event transpires in state waters, such as a collision, allision or near miss incident, the operator is prohibited from erasing, discarding or altering the position plotting records and comprehensive written voyage plan. </s> "8. Personnel Policies, Training--WAC--317-21-230. Requires operators to provide a comprehensive training program for personnel that goes beyond that necessary to obtain a license or merchant marine document, and which includes instructions on a number of specific procedures. </s> "9. Personnel Policies--Illicit Drugs and Alcohol Use--WAC 317-21-235. Requires drug and alcohol testing and reporting. </s> "10. Personnel Policies--Personnel Evaluation--WAC 317-21-240. Requires operators to monitor the fitness for duty of crew members, and requires operators to at least annually provide a job performance and safety evaluation for all crew members on vessels covered by a prevention plan who serve for more than six months in a year. </s> "11. Personnel Policies--Work Hours WAC--317-21-245. Sets limitations on the number of hours crew members may work. </s> "12. Personnel Policies--Language WAC--317-21-250. Requires all licensed deck officers and the vessel master to be proficient in English and to speak a language understood by subordinate officers and unlicensed crew. Also requires all written instruction to be printed in a language understood by the licensed officers and unlicensed crew. </s> "13. Personnel Policies--Record Keeping WAC--317-21-255: Requires operators to maintain training records for crew members assigned to vessels covered by a prevention plan. </s> "14. Management WAC--317-21-260. Requires operators to implement management practices that demonstrate active monitoring of vessel operations and maintenance, personnel training, development, and fitness, and technological improvements in navigation. </s> "15. Technology WAC--317-21-265. Requires tankers to be equipped with global positioning system receivers, two separate radar systems, and an emergency towing system. </s> "16. Advance Notice of Entry and Safety Reports WAC--317-21-540. Requires at least twenty-four hours notice prior to entry of a tanker into state waters, and requires that the notice report any conditions that pose a hazard to the vessel or the marine environment." 148 F.3d, at 1053 (footnote omitted). </s> FOOTNOTES </s> Footnote 1 </s> Together with No. 98-1706, International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v. Locke, Governor of Washington, etal., also on certiorari to the same court.

United States Supreme Court ORDER OF CONDUCTORS v. SO. R. CO.(1950) No. 438 Argued: Decided: April 10, 1950 </s> A dispute arose between a railroad and a labor union as to the railroad's obligation under their collective-bargaining agreement to give conductors extra pay for certain services. The railroad refused the demand of the union and commenced a declaratory judgment action in a state court. The union thereafter filed a petition for hearing and award before the Adjustment Board under the Railway Labor Act. Held: The state court was without power to interpret the terms of the agreement and adjudicate the dispute. Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., ante, p. 239. Pp. 255-257. </s> 215 S. C. 280, 54 S. E. 2d 816, reversed. </s> In a declaratory judgment action brought by a railroad against a labor union, for adjudication of a dispute arising out of a collective-bargaining agreement between them, a state court interpreted the agreement and entered a declaratory judgment. The State Supreme Court affirmed. 215 S. C. 280, 54 S. E. 2d 816. This Court granted certiorari. 338 U.S. 899 . Reversed and remanded, p. 257. </s> V. C. Shuttleworth argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Harry E. Wilmarth and Frederick H. Horlbeck. </s> W. S. Macgill argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Nath B. Barnwell, Frank G. Tompkins, Henry L. Walker and Sidney S. Alderman. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case raises the same statutory question as Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., ante, p. 239. The petitioner, Order of Railway Conductors, is the only accredited bargaining representative of conductors employed by the respondent [339 U.S. 255, 256] Southern Railway. A dispute arose between certain conductors and the railroad concerning the railroad's obligation under the collective-bargaining agreement to give conductors extra pay for certain services. The claims of the conductors were referred to the union, which sought by negotiation to persuade the railroad to pay. The railroad refused, and thereafter prayed a South Carolina state court for a declaratory judgment interpreting the agreement as not requiring the claimed payments. The trial court first refused to exercise jurisdiction. Citing Order of Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561 , it held that state courts, like federal courts, should leave settlement of such disputes to the National Railroad Adjustment Board. The State Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state court did have power to interpret the bargaining agreement and adjudicate the dispute. 210 S. C. 121, 41 S. E. 2d 774. After a lengthy trial the lower court held that the collective agreement did not require the compensation sought by the conductors and entered the declaratory judgment requested. The Supreme Court affirmed. 215 S. C. 280, 54 S. E. 2d 816. </s> For reasons set out in the Slocum case, ante, p. 239, we hold that the South Carolina state court was without power to interpret the terms of this agreement and adjudicate the dispute. We discuss this case separately because it sharply points up the conflicts that could arise from state court intervention in railroad-union disputes. After the railroad had sued in the state court, the union filed a petition for hearing and award before the Adjustment Board. The state court nevertheless proceeded to adjudicate the dispute. Sustaining the state court's action would invite races of diligence whenever a carrier or union preferred one forum to the other. And if a carrier or a union could choose a court instead of the Board, the other party would be deprived of the privilege conferred by 3 First (i) of the Railway Labor Act, 48 [339 U.S. 255, 257] Stat. 1191, 45 U.S.C. 153 First (i), which provides that after negotiations have failed "either party" may refer the dispute to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board. </s> The judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> MR. JUSTICE REED is of the view that the decision below should be affirmed for the reasons set out in his dissent in Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., ante, p. 245. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> [339 U.S. 255, 258]

United States Supreme Court HAMPTON v. MOW SUN WONG(1976) No. 73-1596 Argued: January 13, 1975Decided: June 1, 1976 </s> The Civil Service Commission (CSC) regulation barring noncitizens, including lawfully admitted resident aliens, from employment in the federal competitive civil service held unconstitutional as depriving such resident aliens of liberty without due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 99-117. </s> (a) While overriding national interests may justify a citizenship requirement in the federal service even though an identical requirement may not be enforced by a State, the federal power over aliens is not so plenary that any agent of the Federal Government may arbitrarily subject all resident aliens to different substantive rules from those applied to citizens. When the Federal Government asserts an overriding national interest to justify a discriminatory rule that would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if adopted by a State, due process requires that there be a legitimate basis for presuming that the rule was actually intended to serve that interest. Pp. 99-105. </s> (b) While the CSC's policy of conditioning eligibility for employment in the federal civil service on citizenship has been considered by Congress in certain Appropriation Acts imposing various limitations on the classes of employees who may receive compensation from the Federal Government and by various Presidents in Executive Orders relating to the CSC's authority to establish standards for federal employment, those Appropriation Acts and Executive Orders cannot fairly be construed to evidence either approval or disapproval of the CSC regulation in question. Pp. 105-114. </s> (c) Assuming without deciding that an explicit determination by Congress or the President to exclude all noncitizens from the federal service would be adequately supported by the national interests of (1) providing the President with an expendable token for treaty negotiation purposes, (2) offering aliens an incentive to [426 U.S. 88, 89] become naturalized, and (3) having, for the sake of administrative convenience, one simple rule excluding all noncitizens from employment when citizenship is clearly an appropriate and legitimate requirement for some important and sensitive positions, such interests cannot provide an acceptable rationalization for such a determination by the CSC. The first two are not matters that properly concern the CSC. The third interest is likewise unacceptable, where it does not appear that the CSC fully evaluated the relative desirability of a simple exclusionary rule on the one hand or the value to the service of enlarging the pool of eligible employees on the other, and where it cannot be reasonably inferred that the administrative burden of establishing the job classifications for which citizenship is an appropriate requirement would be particularly onerous. More significantly, in view of the quality of the interest at stake, any fair balancing of the public interest in avoiding the wholesale deprivation of employment opportunities caused by the CSC's indiscriminate policy, as opposed to what may be nothing more than a hypothetical justification, requires rejection of administrative convenience as justification for the regulation. Pp. 114-116. </s> (d) Since alien residents are admitted as a result of decisions made by Congress and the President, implemented by the Immigration and Naturalization Service acting under the Attorney General, due process requires that the decision to deprive such residents of an important liberty be made either at a comparable level of government or, if it is to be permitted to be made by the CSC, that it be justified by reasons that are the proper concern of that agency. P. 116. </s> 500 F.2d 1031, affirmed. </s> STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, STEWART, MARSHALL, and POWELL, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a concurring statement, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 117. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., and WHITE and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 117. </s> Solicitor General Bork reargued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Hills, Louis F. Claiborne, Gerald P. Norton, and Bruno A. Ristau. [426 U.S. 88, 90] </s> Edward H. Steinman, by appointment of the Court, 423 U.S. 921 , reargued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were David C. Moon and Kenneth Hecht. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Robert Allen Sedler and Melvin L. Wulf for the American Civil Liberties Union; by Vilma S. Martinez and Sanford Jay Rosen for the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Educational Fund et al.; and by Sandigan et al. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Five aliens, lawfully and permanently residing in the United States, brought this litigation to challenge the validity of a policy, adopted and enforced by the Civil Service Commission and certain other federal agencies, which excludes all persons except American citizens and natives of American Samoa from employment in most positions subject to their respective jurisdictions. 1 Because the policy, the law, and the identity of the parties have changed somewhat since the litigation commenced, [426 U.S. 88, 91] we state the facts in detail before addressing the important question which we granted certiorari to resolve. 417 U.S. 944 . </s> I </s> Each of the five plaintiffs was denied federal employment solely because of his or her alienage. They were all Chinese residents of San Francisco and each was qualified for an available job. </s> After performing satisfactory work for the Post Office Department for 10 days, respondent Kae Cheong Lui was terminated because his personnel record disclosed that he was not a citizen. 2 Respondents Mow Sun Wong and Siu Hung Mok also demonstrated their ability to perform on the job; they both participated in the California Supplemental Training and Education Program (STEP) and were assigned to federal agencies until the STEP program ended. As a noncitizen, Mow Sun Wong, who had been an electrical engineer in China, was ineligible for employment as a janitor for the General Services Administration. Siu Hung Mok, who had 18 years' experience as a businessman in China, could not retain his job as a file clerk with the Federal Records Center of GSA. </s> Respondent Francene Lum was not permitted to take an examination for a position as evaluator of educational programs in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Her background included 15 years of teaching experience, a master's degree in education, and periods of graduate study at four universities. Anna Yu, the fifth plaintiff, who is not a respondent because she did not join in the appeal from the adverse decision of the District [426 U.S. 88, 92] Court, sought a position as a clerk-typist, but could not take the typing test because she was not a citizen. </s> Two of the plaintiffs, Mow Sun Wong and Siu Hung Mok, had filed declarations of intent to become citizens; the other three had not. They were all lawfully admitted, Francene Lum in 1946, Anna Yu in 1965, Siu Hung Mok and Kae Cheong Lui in 1968, and Mow Sun Wong in 1969. </s> On December 22, 1970, they commenced this class action in the Northern District of California. As defendants they named the Chairman and the Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission and the heads of the three agencies which had denied them employment. 3 </s> The complaint alleged that there are about four million aliens living in the United States; they face special problems in seeking employment because our culture, language, and system of government are foreign to them; about 300,000 federal jobs become available each year, but noncitizens are not permitted to compete for those jobs except in rare situations when citizens are not available or when a few positions exempted from the competitive civil service are being filled. Plaintiffs further alleged that the advantage given to citizens seeking federal civil service positions is arbitrary and violates the [426 U.S. 88, 93] Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 4 and Executive Order No. 11,478, 3 CFR 803 (1966-1970 Comp.), which forbids discrimination in federal employment on the basis of "national origin." The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief. </s> Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and plaintiffs filed motions for summary judgment supported by affidavits setting forth the facts stated above. The District Court rejected a challenge to its jurisdiction, 5 but ruled in favor of defendants on the merits. 333 F. Supp. 527. The District Court held that the reference to "national origin" in the Executive Order prohibited discrimination among citizens rather than discrimination between citizens and noncitizens. The court also rejected an argument that the Civil Service Commission regulation was inconsistent with 502 of the Public Works for Water, Pollution Control, and Power Development and Atomic Energy Commission Appropriation Act, 1970, which permitted payment to classes of persons who are made ineligible by the Civil Service regulation. 6 On that point the court said: </s> "The Commission has acted permissibly in relation [426 U.S. 88, 94] to the Appropriations Act in not opening up the civil service to all those whom Congress has indicated it would be willing to pay for their work." 333 F. Supp., at 531. </s> Finally, the District Court held that the Commission's discrimination against aliens was constitutional. The court noted that the federal power over aliens is "quite broad, almost plenary," and therefore the classification needed only a rational basis. Ibid. It identified two grounds upon which the President 7 could properly rely: First, that the formation of policy and its execution, at whatever level, should only be entrusted to United States citizens, or, alternatively, that "the Executive may intend that the economic security of its citizens be served by the reservation of competitive civil service positions to them, rather than to aliens." Id., at 532. </s> Four of the plaintiffs appealed. During the period of [426 U.S. 88, 95] over two years that the appeal was pending in the Ninth Circuit, we decided two cases that recognize the importance of protecting the employment opportunities of aliens. 8 In Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 , we held that a section of the New York Civil Service Law which provided that only United States citizens could hold permanent positions in the competitive class of the State's civil service violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; that Clause also provided the basis for our holding in In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 , decided on the same day, that Connecticut's exclusion of aliens from the practice of law was unconstitutional. </s> In this case, the Court of Appeals recognized that neither Sugarman nor Griffiths was controlling because the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on state power are not directly applicable to the Federal Government 9 and because Congress and the President have broad power over immigration and naturalization which the States do not possess. 10 Nevertheless, those decisions provided the Court of Appeals with persuasive reasons for rejecting the bases asserted by the defendants in the District Court as justifications for the Civil Service Commission's policy of discriminating against noncitizens. For we specifically held that the State's legitimate interest [426 U.S. 88, 96] in the undivided loyalty of the civil servant who participates directly in the formulation and execution of government policy, was inadequate to support a state restriction indiscriminately disqualifying the "sanitation man, class B," the typist, and the office worker, 413 U.S., at 641 -643; moreover, we expressly considered, and rejected, New York's contention that its special interest in the advancement and profit of its own citizens could justify confinement of the State's civil service to citizens of the United States, id., at 643-645. </s> The Court of Appeals reversed; it agreed with the District Court's analysis of the nonconstitutional issues, but held the regulation violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Although refusing to accept respondents' contention that the protection against federal discrimination provided by the Fifth Amendment is co-extensive with that applicable to the States under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court concluded that the Commission regulation which "sweeps indiscriminately excluding all aliens from all positions requiring the competitive Civil Service examination" could not be supported by justifications which related to only a small fraction of the positions covered by the rule. 500 F.2d 1031, 1037. Thus, the court accepted the argument that citizenship might properly be required in positions involving policymaking decisions, or in positions involving national security interests, but the court was unwilling to support an extraordinarily broad exclusion on such narrow shoulders. </s> Only the Chairman and the Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission petitioned for certiorari. Several of the nonpetitioning defendants have no responsibility for the establishment of standards which applicants for federal employment must meet; accordingly, their participation is not necessary. The former Postmaster [426 U.S. 88, 97] General is not now a necessary party for a different reason. </s> In 1971, after the litigation was commenced, Congress established a new Postal Service and removed its officers and employees from the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. 11 For the first three years of its existence the new Postal Service retained substantially the same citizenship requirement for employees as did the Civil Service Commission. 12 However, in 1974, without any additional statutory authority or direction, the Postal Service amended its regulation to make all noncitizens who have been accorded permanent resident alien status in the United States eligible for all positions except those at a high executive level or those expressly designated as [426 U.S. 88, 98] "sensitive." 13 Thus, although the case is not technically moot as regards the Postal Service, 14 that Service does not now have any interest in defending the challenged Civil Service regulation. </s> We granted certiorari to decide the following question presented by the petition: </s> "Whether a regulation of the United States Civil [426 U.S. 88, 99] Service Commission that bars resident aliens from employment in the federal competitive civil service is constitutional." </s> We now address that question. </s> II </s> Petitioners have chosen to argue on the merits a somewhat different question. In their brief, the petitioners rephrased the question presented as "[w]hether the Civil Service Commission's regulation . . . is within the constitutional powers of Congress and the President and hence not a constitutionally forbidden discrimination against aliens." 15 </s> This phrasing of the question assumes that the Commission regulation is one that was mandated by the Congress, the President, or both. On this assumption, the petitioners advance alternative arguments to justify the discrimination as an exercise of the plenary federal power over immigration and naturalization. First, the petitioners argue that the equal protection aspect of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is wholly inapplicable to the exercise of federal power over aliens, and therefore no justification for the rule is necessary. 16 Alternatively, the petitioners argue that the Fifth Amendment imposes only a slight burden of justification on the Federal Government, and that such a burden is easily met by several factors not considered by the District Court or the Court of Appeals. Before addressing these arguments, we first discuss certain limitations [426 U.S. 88, 100] which the Due Process Clause places on the power of the Federal Government to classify persons subject to its jurisdiction. </s> The federal sovereign, like the States, must govern impartially. The concept of equal justice under law is served by the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due process, as well as by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although both Amendments require the same type of analysis, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 , the Court of Appeals correctly stated that the two protections are not always coextensive. Not only does the language of the two Amendments differ, 17 but more importantly, there may be overriding national interests which justify selective federal legislation that would be unacceptable for an individual State. On the other hand, when a federal rule is applicable to only a limited territory, such as the District of Columbia, or an insular possession, and when there is no special national interest involved, the Due Process Clause has been construed as having the same significance as the Equal Protection Clause. 18 </s> In this case we deal with a federal rule having nationwide impact. The petitioners correctly point out that the paramount federal power over immigration and naturalization forecloses a simple extension of the holding in Sugarman as decisive of this case. 19 We agree [426 U.S. 88, 101] with the petitioners' position that overriding national interests may provide a justification for a citizenship requirement in the federal service even though an identical requirement may not be enforced by a State. 20 </s> We do not agree, however, with the petitioners' primary submission that the federal power over aliens is so plenary that any agent of the National Government may arbitrarily subject all resident aliens to different substantive rules from those applied to citizens. We recognize that the petitioners' argument draws support from both the federal and the political character of the power over immigration and naturalization. 21 </s> [426 U.S. 88, 102] Nevertheless, countervailing considerations require rejection of the extreme position advanced by the petitioners. </s> The rule enforced by the Commission has its impact on an identifiable class of persons who, entirely apart from the rule itself, are already subject to disadvantages not shared by the remainder of the community. 22 Aliens are not entitled to vote and, as alleged in the complaint, are often handicapped by a lack of familiarity with our language and customs. The added disadvantage resulting from the enforcement of the rule - ineligibility for employment in a major sector of the economy - is of sufficient significance to be characterized as a deprivation of an interest in liberty. 23 Indeed, we deal with a [426 U.S. 88, 103] rule which deprives a discrete class of persons of an interest in liberty on a wholesale basis. By reason of the Fifth Amendment, such a deprivation must be accompanied by due process. It follows that some judicial scrutiny of the deprivation is mandated by the Constitution. </s> Respondents argue that this scrutiny requires invalidation of the Commission rule under traditional equal protection analysis. It is true that our cases establish that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment authorizes that type of analysis of federal rules and therefore that the Clause has a substantive as well as a procedural aspect. However, it is not necessary to resolve respondents' substantive claim, if a narrower inquiry discloses that essential procedures have not been followed. </s> When the Federal Government asserts an overriding national interest as justification for a discriminatory rule which would violate the Equal Protection Clause if adopted by a State, due process requires that there be a legitimate basis for presuming that the rule was actually intended to serve that interest. If the agency which promulgates the rule has direct responsibility for fostering or protecting that interest, it may reasonably be presumed that the asserted interest was the actual predicate for the rule. That presumption would, of course, be fortified by an appropriate statement of reasons identifying the relevant interest. Alternatively, if the rule were expressly mandated by the Congress or the President, we might presume that any interest which might rationally be served by the rule did in fact give rise to its adoption. </s> In this case the petitioners have identified several [426 U.S. 88, 104] interests which the Congress or the President might deem sufficient to justify the exclusion of noncitizens from the federal service. They argue, for example, that the broad exclusion may facilitate the President's negotiation of treaties with foreign powers by enabling him to offer employment opportunities to citizens of a given foreign country in exchange for reciprocal concessions - an offer he could not make if those aliens were already eligible for federal jobs. Alternatively, the petitioners argue that reserving the federal service for citizens provides an appropriate incentive to aliens to qualify for naturalization and thereby to participate more effectively in our society. They also point out that the citizenship requirement has been imposed in the United States with substantial consistency for over 100 years and accords with international law and the practice of most foreign countries. Finally, they correctly state that the need for undivided loyalty in certain sensitive positions clearly justifies a citizenship requirement in at least some parts of the federal service, and that the broad exclusion serves the valid administrative purpose of avoiding the trouble and expense of classifying those positions which properly belong in executive or sensitive categories. 24 </s> The difficulty with all of these arguments except the last is that they do not identify any interest which can reasonably be assumed to have influenced the Civil Service Commission, the Postal Service, the General Services Administration, or the Department of Health, [426 U.S. 88, 105] Education, and Welfare in the administration of their respective responsibilities or, specifically, in the decision to deny employment to the respondents in this litigation. We may assume with the petitioners that if the Congress or the President had expressly imposed the citizenship requirement, it would be justified by the national interest in providing an incentive for aliens to become naturalized, or possibly even as providing the President with an expendable token for treaty negotiating purposes; but we are not willing to presume that the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, or any of the other original defendants, was deliberately fostering an interest so far removed from his normal responsibilities. Consequently, before evaluating the sufficiency of the asserted justification for the rule, it is important to know whether we are reviewing a policy decision made by Congress and the President or a question of personnel administration determined by the Civil Service Commission. </s> III </s> It is perfectly clear that neither the Congress nor the President has ever required the Civil Service Commission to adopt the citizenship requirement as a condition of eligibility for employment in the federal civil service. On the other hand, in view of the fact that the policy has been in effect since the Commission was created in 1883, it is fair to infer that both the Legislature and the Executive have been aware of the policy and have acquiesced in it. In order to decide whether such acquiescence should give the Commission rule the same support as an express statutory or Presidential command, it is appropriate to review the extent to which the policy has been given consideration by Congress or the President, and the nature of the authority specifically delegated to the Commission. [426 U.S. 88, 106] </s> The Commission was originally established pursuant to the Pendleton Civil Service Act of 1883. 25 That Act was a major piece of reform legislation designed to eliminate the abuses associated with the patronage system from much of the federal service. 26 Before that legislation was passed, the Senate considered and rejected a bill that would have expressly limited civil service appointment to citizens. 27 It is fair to summarize the relevant references to the citizenship requirement, however, as indicating that several Senators assumed that such a requirement would be imposed by the Commission, 28 and that the matter was in an area better handled by regulation than by statute. 29 </s> [426 U.S. 88, 107] </s> In its historical context, the assumption that only citizens would be employed in the federal service is easily understood. The new system of merit appointment, based on competitive examination, was replacing a patronage system in which appointment had often been treated as a method of rewarding support at the polls; since such rewards were presumably reserved for voters (or members of their families) who would necessarily be citizens, citizenship must have characterized most, if not all, federal employees at that time. The assumption that such a requirement would survive the enactment of the new statute is by no means equivalent to a considered judgment that it should do so. </s> Moreover, it must be acknowledged that in 1883 there was no doubt a greater inclination than we can now accept to regard "foreigners" as a somewhat less desirable class of persons than American citizens. A provincial attitude toward aliens may partially explain the assumption that they would not be employed in the federal service by the new Civil Service Commission. But since that attitude has been implicitly repudiated by our cases requiring that aliens be treated with the dignity and respect accorded to other persons, 30 and since that attitude did not affect the form of the legislation itself, we disregard it in our evaluation of Congress' participation in the decision to impose the citizenship requirement. </s> When the Commission was created, it immediately [426 U.S. 88, 108] adopted the citizenship requirement, and that fact was duly reported to Congress. 31 Congress has not thereafter repudiated, or even considered the desirability of repudiating, the Commission's policy. It has, however, in a number of its Appropriation Acts imposed various limitations on the classes of employees who may receive compensation from the Federal Government. These limitations give rise to conflicting inferences which may be illustrated by reference to five such Acts. </s> In 1938 Congressman Starnes offered an amendment to the pending appropriation bill 32 to provide that none of the authorized funds could be used to pay the compensation of any federal employee not a citizen of the United States. 33 The stated purpose of the amendment was to give preference to American citizens during a period of widespread unemployment. The amendment was accepted by the House without opposition. In the Senate, however, the restriction was modified to allow employment of any person owing allegiance to the United States, or who was then employed in the service of the United States, or who was needed because citizens with requisite experience and qualifications were not available. 34 In 1939 a similar provision was broadened further to allow compensation for aliens eligible for citizenship who had filed a declaration of intention to become citizens and also for certain Coast Guard veterans who were ineligible for United States citizenship. 35 In 1942 aliens who were [426 U.S. 88, 109] citizens of the Commonwealth of the Philippines were exempted from the prohibition, 36 in 1943 the exemption was extended to "nationals of those countries allied with the United States in the prosecution of the war," 37 and then in 1953 the exemption was also made applicable to permanently admitted aliens from the Baltic countries. 38 </s> In the District Court respondents argued that the exemptions from the limitations included in the Appropriations Acts had become so broad by 1969 as to constitute a congressional determination of policy repudiating the narrow citizenship requirement in the Commission rule. Though not controlling, there is force to this argument. On the other hand, the fact that Congress repeatedly identified citizenship as one appropriate classification of persons eligible for compensation for federal service implies a continuing interest in giving preference, for reasons unrelated to the efficiency of the federal service, to citizens over aliens. In our judgment, however, that fact is less significant than the fact that Congress has consistently authorized payment to a much broader class of potential employees than the narrow category of citizens and natives of American Samoa eligible under the Commission rule. Congress has regularly provided for compensation of any federal employee owing allegiance to the United States. Since it is settled that aliens may take an appropriate oath of allegiance, 39 the statutory category, though not precisely defined, is plainly more flexible and expansive than the Commission rule. Nevertheless, for present purposes we need merely conclude [426 U.S. 88, 110] that the Appropriations Acts cannot fairly be construed to evidence either congressional approval or disapproval of the specific Commission rule challenged in this case. </s> Our review of the relevant Executive Orders leads us to a similar conclusion with respect to the President's responsibility for the rule. The first Civil Service rules promulgated by President Arthur required every applicant for an examination to disclose his citizenship, as well as other information such as his name and address. 40 These rules did not expressly prescribe United States citizenship as a condition for eligibility. It may well be true, however, that the President, like the members of the Senate referred to above, assumed that the Commission would impose such a requirement. Moreover, we must assume that he also became aware of the requirement after the Commission adopted it. Nevertheless, there is a marked difference between acceptance by the President of a Commission rule to which no objection has been made and a decision made by the President himself. </s> Over the years the Commission revised its rules a number of times. Although it was Commission practice to require citizenship between 1883 and 1895, apparently the first time the requirement was expressly stated in a rule was in 1896. 41 In 1903 President Theodore Roosevelt amended the rule to permit persons who "owe allegiance to the United States" to qualify. 42 The amendment did not define that class of persons. The Commission [426 U.S. 88, 111] has explained that it was intended to apply to persons in Puerto Rico and the Philippines who then had the status of noncitizen nationals. The language of the amendment, however, would seem broad enough to cover any person willing to take an appropriate oath of allegiance. 43 </s> In 1906 President Roosevelt again amended the rule by adding an authorization to the Commission, in its discretion, to permit noncitizens to take examinations when "there is a lack of eligibles who are American citizens." 44 The amendment, however, provided that noncitizens should not be certified if eligible citizens were available. Although this amendment had the effect of increasing the employment opportunities of aliens, it unquestionably indicates that President Roosevelt then approved of a policy of giving preference to citizens. </s> The Executive Order which authorized the promulgation of the specific rule involved in this case was issued by President Eisenhower in 1954. In relevant part it provides: </s> "The [Civil Service] Commission is authorized to establish standards with respect to citizenship, age, education, training and experience, suitability, and physical and mental fitness, and for residence or other requirements which applicants must meet to be admitted to or rated in examinations." Exec. Order No. 10,577, 2.1 (a), 3 CFR 218, 219 (1954-1958 Comp.). [426 U.S. 88, 112] </s> This direction "to establish standards with respect to citizenship" is not necessarily a command to require citizenship as a general condition of eligibility for federal employment. Rather it is equally, if not more reasonably, susceptible of interpretation as a command to classify positions for which citizenship should be required. Even though such an interpretation might permit the Commission to decide that citizenship should be required for all federal positions, it would remain true that the decision to impose the requirement was made by the Commission rather than the President. That this is in fact the case is demonstrated by the elimination of the citizenship requirement for employment in the Postal Service which took place after this litigation commenced. Pursuant to a broad grant of authority comparable, in its generality and in its absence of any reference to a citizenship requirement, to that applicable to the Civil Service Commission, 45 the Postal Service originally [426 U.S. 88, 113] imposed such a requirement and then withdrew it. Neither the establishment nor the withdrawal of the requirement was either mandated or questioned by Congress or the President. </s> We have no doubt that the statutory directive which merely requires such regulations "as will best promote the efficiency of [the] Service," 5 U.S.C. 3301 (1), as well as the pertinent Executive Order, gives the Civil Service Commission the same discretion that the Postal Service has actually exercised; the Commission may either retain or modify the citizenship requirement without further authorization from Congress or the President. 46 We are therefore persuaded that our inquiry is whether the national interests which the Government identifies as justifications for the Commission rule are [426 U.S. 88, 114] interests on which that agency may properly rely in making a decision implicating the constitutional and social values at stake in this litigation. </s> We think the petitioners accurately stated the question presented in their certiorari petition. The question is whether the regulation of the United States Civil Service Commission is valid. We proceed to a consideration of that question, assuming, without deciding, that the Congress and the President have the constitutional power to impose the requirement that the Commission has adopted. </s> IV </s> It is the business of the Civil Service Commission to adopt and enforce regulations which will best promote the efficiency of the federal civil service. That agency has no responsibility for foreign affairs, for treaty negotiations, for establishing immigration quotas or conditions of entry, or for naturalization policies. Indeed, it is not even within the responsibility of the Commission to be concerned with the economic consequences of permitting or prohibiting the participation by aliens in employment opportunities in different parts of the national market. On the contrary, the Commission performs a limited and specific function. </s> The only concern of the Civil Service Commission is the promotion of an efficient federal service. 47 In general [426 U.S. 88, 115] it is fair to assume that its goal would be best served by removing unnecessary restrictions on the eligibility of qualified applicants for employment. With only one exception, the interests which the petitioners have put forth as supporting the Commission regulation at issue in this case are not matters which are properly the business of the Commission. That one exception is the administrative desirability of having one simple rule excluding all noncitizens when it is manifest that citizenship is an appropriate and legitimate requirement for some important and sensitive positions. Arguably, therefore, administrative convenience may provide a rational basis for the general rule. </s> For several reasons that justification is unacceptable in this case. The Civil Service Commission, like other administrative agencies, has an obligation to perform its responsibilities with some degree of expertise, and to make known the reasons for its important decisions. There is nothing in the record before us, or in matter of which we may properly take judicial notice, to indicate that the Commission actually made any considered evaluation of the relative desirability of a simple exclusionary rule on the one hand, or the value to the service of enlarging the pool of eligible employees on the other. Nor can we reasonably infer that the administrative burden of establishing the job classifications for which citizenship is an appropriate requirement would be a particularly onerous task for an expert in personnel matters; indeed, the Postal Service apparently encountered no particular difficulty in making such a classification. Of greater significance, however, is the quality of the interest at stake. Any fair balancing of the public interest in avoiding the wholesale deprivation of employment opportunities caused by the Commission's indiscriminate [426 U.S. 88, 116] policy, as opposed to what may be nothing more than a hypothetical justification, requires rejection of the argument of administrative convenience in this case. 48 </s> In sum, assuming without deciding that the national interests identified by the petitioners would adequately support an explicit determination by Congress or the President to exclude all noncitizens from the federal service, we conclude that those interests cannot provide an acceptable rationalization for such a determination by the Civil Service Commission. The impact of the rule on the millions of lawfully admitted resident aliens is precisely the same as the aggregate impact of comparable state rules which were invalidated by our decision in Sugarman. By broadly denying this class substantial opportunities for employment, the Civil Service Commission rule deprives its members of an aspect of liberty. Since these residents were admitted as a result of decisions made by the Congress and the President, implemented by the Immigration and Naturalization Service acting under the Attorney General of the United States, 49 due process requires that the decision to impose that deprivation of an important liberty be made either at a comparable level of government or, if it is to be permitted to be made by the Civil Service Commission, that it be justified by reasons which are properly the concern of that agency. We hold that 338.101 (a) of the Civil Service Commission Regulations has deprived these respondents [426 U.S. 88, 117] of liberty without due process of law and is therefore invalid. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The Civil Service Commission's regulations, 5 CFR 338.101 (1976), provide in pertinent part: </s> "(a) A person may be admitted to competitive examination only if he is a citizen of or owes permanent allegiance to the United States. </s> "(b) A person may be given appointment only if he is a citizen of or owes permanent allegiance to the United States. However, a noncitizen may be given (1) a limited executive assignment under section 305.509 of this chapter in the absence of qualified citizens or (2) an appointment in rare cases under section 316.601 of this chapter, unless the appointment is prohibited by statute." </s> Apparently the only persons other than citizens who owe permanent allegiance to the United States are noncitizen "nationals." See 8 U.S.C. 1101 (a) (21), (22), 1408. The Solicitor General has advised us that the Commission construes the phrase as covering only natives of American Samoa. Brief for Petitioners 81 n. 67. </s> [Footnote 2 The termination letter, dated October 19, 1970, read: </s> "Your personnel records indicate that you are not a citizen of the United States. Therefore, it is necessary to terminate your services effective close of business October 20/1970 in accordance with the Postal Manual Regulations 711.531." </s> [Footnote 3 The defendants named in the original complaint were Robert E. Hampton, Chairman, James E. Johnson, and L. J. Andolsek, Commissioners, Nicholas J. Oganovic, Executive Director, and Asa T. Briley, Regional Director, of the United States Civil Service Commission; Robert L. Kunzig, then Administrator, and Thomas Hannon, Regional Administrator, of the General Services Administration; Elliot Richardson, then Secretary, and Robert Coop, Regional Director, of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; and Winton Blount, then Postmaster General of the United States; Lim Poon Lee, Postmaster of the city and county of San Francisco; and Russel E. James, Regional Director of the United States Post Office Department. </s> [Footnote 4 The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides: </s> "No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ." </s> [Footnote 5 Judge Peckham held that jurisdiction was conferred by 28 U.S.C. 1331. He found no merit in the argument that there had been no waiver of sovereign immunity; he was also satisfied that the action is one which "arises under" the Constitution and laws of the United States and that each plaintiff's claim satisfied the jurisdictional amount. </s> [Footnote 6 Section 502 of the Act provides in pertinent part as follows: </s> "[N]o part of any appropriation contained in this or any other Act shall be used to pay the compensation of any officer or employee [426 U.S. 88, 94] of the Government of the United States (including any agency the majority of the stock of which is owned by the Government of the United States) whose post of duty is in continental United States unless such person (1) is a citizen of the United States, (2) is a person in the service of the United States on the date of enactment of this Act, who, being eligible for citizenship, had filed a declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United States prior to such date, (3) is a person who owes allegiance to the United States . . . ." 83 Stat. 336. </s> [Footnote 7 In using the term "Executive," it is clear that Judge Peckham intended to identify the President, rather than any of the defendant agency heads: </s> "It is quite rational and reasonable for the Executive, via a grant of power from the Legislature, to determine that the formation of policy and its execution, at whatever level, should be entrusted only to United States citizens. Moreover, as an alternative rational basis for the regulation herein, the Executive may intend that the economic security of its citizens be served by the reservation of competitive civil service positions to them, rather than to aliens." 333 F. Supp., at 532. </s> [Footnote 8 Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 , and In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 , were both decided on June 25, 1973. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 , was decided on June 14, 1971, only a few weeks before the District Court decision. </s> [Footnote 9 The Fourteenth Amendment, 1, provides: </s> "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." </s> [Footnote 10 Article I, 8, cl. 4, of the Constitution of the United States provides: </s> "The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization . . . ." </s> [Footnote 11 Pub. L. 91-375, 84 Stat. 719. The technical amendment to Title 5 removed the officers and employees of the Postal Service and Postal Rate Commission from the definitions of officers and employees who are subject to civil service. </s> [Footnote 12 During this period the Postal Service Personnel Handbook provided: </s> "317.3 Citizenship Requirements </s> ".31 Applicability </s> ".311 Except as provided in 317.312 below, only persons who are citizens of, or owe allegiance to the United States shall be given appointments in the Postal Service. Natives of American Samoa are the only noncitizens who, as a group, owe permanent allegiance to the United States. </s> ".312 Regional Postmasters General may approve individual appointments of noncitizen nationals under unusual circumstances such as when qualified citizens are not available. These appointments will be subject to the individual prior approval of the Regional Postmaster General. </s> ".32 Responsibility for Determining Citizenship </s> "The appointing officer is responsible for determining that all persons selected for appointment meet the citizenship requirement." Transmittal Letter 2, 8-18-72. </s> [Footnote 13 The Postal Bulletin issued on May 2, 1974 substituted the following "citizenship requirements" for those quoted in n. 12, supra: </s> "317.3 Citizenship Requirements </s> ".31 Noncitizens of the United States who have been accorded permanent resident alien status in the United States are eligible for appointment to all Postal Service positions other than positions in levels PES-20 and above, and positions designated by the Postal Service as sensitive. Natives of American Samoa are eligible for appointment to all Postal Service positions. Appointments of non-citizens to positions in levels PES-20 and above or to positions designated as sensitive can only be made with the prior approval of the appropriate Regional Postmaster General or an Assistant Post-master General, in headquarters. </s> ".32 The appointing officer may make his determination as to whether the appointee is a citizen of the United States on the basis of the eligible's sworn or affirmed statement, on Form 61, Appointment Affidavit, at the time of appointment. A noncitizen's permanent resident alien status shall be determined by reference to the appointee's Alien Registration Receipt Card (Form I-151), which the permanent resident alien is furnished by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. </s> ".33 The appointing officer is responsible for determining that all persons selected for appointment meet the requirements of sections 317.31 and 317.32. </s> "Regional and local postal officials should take appropriate measures to insure that announcements and forms conform to the new policy, and that prospective applicants for postal employment are given correct information concerning the policy." </s> [Footnote 14 Cf. United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 . The Postal Service, in modifying its citizenship regulations (n. 13, supra), specifically indicated that it was doing so "[a]s a result of recent Federal litigation." Postal Bull., May 2, 1974. p. 2. </s> [Footnote 15 Brief for Petitioners 2. </s> [Footnote 16 The petitioners state: </s> "Our primary submission is that the decision to limit employment of noncitizens in the federal competitive civil service is likewise a matter beyond the reach of the equal protection principle." Id., at 24-25. </s> [Footnote 17 Since the Due Process Clause appears in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, whereas the Equal Protection Clause does not, it is quite clear that the primary office of the latter differs from, and is additive to, the protection guaranteed by the former. </s> [Footnote 18 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 ; Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500 . </s> [Footnote 19 In that case we did not reach the question whether New York's citizenship restriction was in conflict with Congress' comprehensive regulation of immigration and naturalization, see 413 U.S., at 646 , where we cited Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S., at 376 -380, and we [426 U.S. 88, 101] were careful to avoid intimating any view on the question raised in the case now before us. We stated: </s> "We are aware that citizenship requirements are imposed in certain aspects of the federal service. See 5 U.S.C. 3301; Exec. Order No. 10577, 19 Fed. Reg. 7521, 2.1 (1954); 5 CFR 338.101, 302.203 (g) (1973); and, for example, Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriation Act, 1972, 602, Pub. L. 92-49, 85 Stat. 122, and Public Works Appropriations Act, 1971, 502, Pub. L. 91-439, 84 Stat. 902. In deciding the present case, we intimate no view as to whether these federal citizenship requirements are or are not susceptible of constitutional challenge. See Jalil v. Hampton, 148 U.S. App. D.C. 415, 460 F.2d 923, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972); Comment, Aliens and the Civil Service: A Closed Door?, 61 Geo. L. J. 207 (1972)." 413 U.S., at 646 n. 12. </s> [Footnote 20 It should, of course, be noted that in Sugarman we merely held that the flat ban on the employment of aliens in positions that had little if any relation to a State's legitimate interests could not withstand scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, and we were careful to point out that the holding did not preclude individualized determinations that particular persons could be refused employment on the basis of noncitizenship, or that citizenship could be required as a qualification for appropriately defined classes of positions. See id., at 646-647. </s> [Footnote 21 It is important to note that the authority to control immigration is not only vested solely in the Federal Government, rather than the States, see Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 , but also that the power over aliens is of a political character and therefore subject [426 U.S. 88, 102] only to narrow judicial review. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 , where Mr. Justice Gray, writing for the Court, stated: </s> "The power to exclude or to expel aliens, being a power affecting international relations, is vested in the political departments of the government, and is to be regulated by treaty or by act of Congress, and to be executed by the executive authority according to the regulations so established, except so far as the judicial department has been authorized by treaty or by statute, or is required by the paramount law of the Constitution, to intervene." </s> [Footnote 22 Some of these disadvantages stem directly from the Constitution itself, see Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S., at 651 -653 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). The legitimacy of the delineation of the affected class buttresses the conclusion that it is "a `discrete and insular' minority," see In re Griffiths, 413 U.S., at 721 and, of course, is consistent with the premise that the class is one whose members suffer special disabilities. </s> [Footnote 23 See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 -574, and cases cited. See also the statement for the Court by Mr. Justice Hughes in Truax v. Raich, supra, a case dealing with the employment opportunities of aliens: </s> "It requires no argument to show that the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the Amendment to secure. . . . If this could be refused solely upon [426 U.S. 88, 103] the ground of race or nationality, the prohibition of the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws would be a barren form of words." 239 U.S., at 41 . </s> [Footnote 24 We note, however, that the petitioners do not rely on the District Court's reasoning that the regulation might be justified as serving the economic security of United States citizens. Our discussion of the "special public interest" doctrine in Sugarman v. Dougall, supra, at 643-645, no doubt explains the petitioners' failure to press this argument in this case. We have no occasion, therefore, to decide when, if ever, that doctrine might justify federal legislation. </s> [Footnote 25 22 Stat. 403. </s> [Footnote 26 See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 149 ; H. Kaplan, The Law of Civil Service 1-11 (1958). </s> [Footnote 27 A companion bill introduced by Senator Dawes (S. 939) would have expressly provided that "appointments are open to competition to any citizen of the United States, male or female. . . . [V]acancies shall be filled by competitive examination open to all citizens, in conformity with the provisions of this act . . . ." Appendix to S. Rep. No. 576, 47th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1882). </s> The Senate Committee also eliminated, apparently as unnecessary, a preamble that referred to the desirability of allowing "so far as practicable all citizens" equal employment opportunities. See S. Rep. No. 576, supra, at XII; see also 14 Cong. Rec. 661 (1882). </s> [Footnote 28 See, e. g., the remarks of Senator Hawley: </s> "Of course it will not do to admit to examination everybody that applies for it. There will be requirements - anybody can think of a few in a moment - the applicant must be a citizen of the United States, he must be in fair physical health, he must be within reasonable limits as to age, he certainly must be able to read and write." Id., at 243. </s> [Footnote 29 It is noteworthy, however, that other grounds for exclusion from the federal service that would normally be governed by regulation were expressly identified in the statute itself. See 8 prohibiting the employment of persons habitually using intoxicating beverages to excess, and 9 prohibiting the employment of members of a family already adequately represented in public service. 22 Stat. 406. </s> [Footnote 30 Our recent opinion in In re Griffiths noted that from "its inception, our Nation welcomed and drew strength from the immigration of aliens." 413 U.S., at 719 . After referring to their self-evident contributions to the social and economic life of the country, and after reviewing the objectionable character of any classification based on alienage, we stated: "Resident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support the economy, serve in the Armed Forces, and contribute in myriad other ways to our society. It is appropriate that a State bear a heavy burden when it deprives them of employment opportunities." Id., at 722. </s> [Footnote 31 See the Instructions to Applicants Who Wish to Enter the United States Civil Service as reprinted on p. 83 of the Second Report of the U.S. Civil Service Commission (1885). </s> [Footnote 32 Independent Offices Appropriation Bill (H. R. 8837, 75th Cong., 3d Sess.). </s> [Footnote 33 83 Cong. Rec. 357. </s> [Footnote 34 Id., at 2424. </s> [Footnote 35 See House Manager's Report on the Conference on Amendment of the Senate to H. R. 8947, H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1981, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938). The provision appeared in several Appropriations Acts. See 52 Stat. 148, 289, 435, 1162. </s> [Footnote 36 56 Stat. 422. </s> [Footnote 37 57 Stat. 196. </s> [Footnote 38 67 Stat. 435. </s> [Footnote 39 See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S., at 726 n. 18. </s> [Footnote 40 Rule XI, Civil Service Rules, promulgated Nov. 7, 1883. First Report of the U.S. Civil Service Commission 47 (1884). </s> [Footnote 41 Rule V of the Civil Service Rules of May 6, 1896, expressly provided: "Every applicant for examination must be a citizen of the United States . . . ." See Thirteenth Report of the U.S. Civil Service Commission 57 (1897). </s> [Footnote 42 See Twentieth Report of the U.S. Civil Service Commission 48 (1904). </s> [Footnote 43 It is, of course, clear that one need not be a citizen in order to take in good conscience an oath to support the Constitution. See In re Griffiths, supra, at 726 n. 18. </s> [Footnote 44 Exec. Order No. 458 (June 13, 1906). Prior to that amendment, Executive Orders had been issued waiving the citizenship requirement in specific cases because of a lack of qualified citizens. See, e. g., Exec. Order No. 434 (Mar. 28, 1906). </s> [Footnote 45 The relevant portions of 39 U.S.C. 1001 read as follows: </s> " 1001. Appointment and status. </s> "(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, the Postal Service shall appoint all officers and employees of the Postal Service. </s> "(b) Officers and employees of the Postal Service (other than those individuals appointed under sections 202, 204, and 1001 (c) of this title) shall be in the postal career service, which shall be a part of the civil service. Such appointments and promotions shall be in accordance with the procedures established by the Postal Service. The Postal Service shall establish procedures, in accordance with this title, to assure its officers and employees meaningful opportunities for promotion and career development and to assure its officers and employees full protection of their employment rights by guaranteeing them an opportunity for a fair hearing on adverse actions, with representatives of their own choosing. </s> . . . . . </s> "(e) The Postal Service shall have the right, consistent with section 1003 and chapter 12 of this title and applicable laws, regulations, and collective-bargaining agreements - [426 U.S. 88, 113] </s> "(1) to direct officers and employees of the Postal Service in the performance of official duties; </s> "(2) to hire, promote, transfer, assign, and retain officers and employees in positions within the Postal Service, and to suspend, demote, discharge, or take other disciplinary action against such officers and employees; </s> "(3) to relieve officers and employees from duties because of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons; </s> "(4) to maintain the efficiency of the operations entrusted to it; </s> "(5) to determine the methods, means, and personnel by which such operations are to be conducted; </s> "(6) to prescribe a uniform dress to be worn by letter carriers and other designated employees; and </s> "(7) to take whatever actions may be necessary to carry out its mission in emergency situations." </s> [Footnote 46 Even if this conclusion were doubtful, in view of the consequences of the rule it would be appropriate to require a much more explicit directive from either Congress or the President before accepting the conclusion that the political branches of Government would consciously adopt a policy raising the constitutional questions presented by this rule. Cf. Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 345 ; Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 299 -300. </s> [Footnote 47 The Commission, of course, acts under the direction of the President. </s> Title 5 U.S.C. 3301 (1) provides: </s> "The President may - </s> "(1) prescribe such regulations for the admission of individuals into the civil service in the executive branch as will best promote the efficiency of that service; </s> Title 5 U.S.C. 1302 (a) provides: </s> "(a) The Civil Service Commission, subject to the rules prescribed by the President under this title for the administration of the competitive [426 U.S. 88, 115] service, shall prescribe regulations for, control, supervise, and preserve the records of, examinations for the competitive service." </s> [Footnote 48 We find no merit in the petitioners' argument that a more discriminating rule would inevitably breed litigation which in turn would enhance the administrative burden. For even though the argument of administrative convenience may not support a total exclusion, it would adequately support a rather broad classification of positions reflecting the considered judgment of an agency expert in personnel matters. For the classification itself would demonstrate that the Commission had at least considered the extent to which the imposition of the rule is consistent with its assigned mission. </s> [Footnote 49 See 8 U.S.C. 1103. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, concurring. </s> I join the Court's opinion with the understanding that there are reserved the equal protection questions that would be raised by congressional or Presidential enactment of a bar on employment of aliens by the Federal Government. </s> MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting. </s> The Court's opinion enunciates a novel conception of the procedural due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, and from this concept proceeds to evolve a doctrine of delegation of legislative authority which seems to me to be quite contrary to the doctrine established by a long and not hitherto questioned line of our decisions. Neither of the Court's innovations is completely without appeal in this particular case, but even if we were to treat the matter as an original question I think such appeal is outweighed by the potential mischief which the doctrine bids fair to make in other areas of the law. </s> I </s> At the outset it is important to recognize that the power of the federal courts is severely limited in the areas of immigration and regulation of aliens. As we reiterated recently in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972): </s> "`The power of Congress to exclude aliens altogether [426 U.S. 88, 118] from the United States, or to prescribe the terms and conditions upon which they may come to this country, and to have its declared policy in that regard enforced exclusively through executive officers, without judicial intervention, is settled by our previous adjudications.'" Quoting from Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 547 (1895). </s> It is also clear that the exclusive power of Congress to prescribe the terms and conditions of entry includes the power to regulate aliens in various ways once they are here. E. g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 69 -70 (1941). Indeed the Court, by holding that the regulation in question would presumptively have been valid if "expressly mandated by the Congress," ante, at 103, concedes the congressional power to exclude aliens from employment in the civil service altogether if it so desires or to limit their participation. </s> This broad congressional power is in some respects subject to procedural limitations imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. If an alien subject to deportation proceedings claims to be a citizen, he is entitled to a judicial determination of that claim. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922). If he lawfully obtains tenured Government employment, and is thereby protected against discharge except for cause, he is entitled to a hearing before being discharged. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). But neither an alien nor a citizen has any protected liberty interests in obtaining federal employment. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896 -899 (1961). Nor in the absence of some form of statutory tenure is a Government employee entitled to a hearing prior to discharge, for "government employment, in the absence of legislation, can be revoked at the will of the appointing officer." [426 U.S. 88, 119] Id., at 896. See also Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959). </s> The Court, however, seems to overlook this limitation on judicial power in justifying judicial intervention by holding: </s> "The rule enforced by the Commission has its impact on an identifiable class of persons who, entirely apart from the rule itself, are already subject to disadvantages not shared by the remainder of the community." Ante, at 102. </s> This is a classic equal protection analysis such as formed the basis of the Court's holding in Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 641 (1973), that States could not bar aliens from the state civil service. Sugarman specifically did not decide whether similar restrictions by the Federal Government would violate equal protection principles (as applied to the Federal Government by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)). </s> However, while positing an equal protection problem, the Court does not rely on an equal protection analysis, conceding that "overriding national interests may provide a justification for a citizenship requirement in the federal service even though an identical requirement may not be enforced by a State." Ante, at 101. Thus the Court seems to agree that the Equal Protection Clause does not provide a basis for invalidating this denial of federal civil service employment. The Court instead inexplicably melds together the concepts of equal protection and procedural and substantive due process to produce the following holding: </s> "The added disadvantage resulting from the enforcement of the rule - ineligibility for employment in a major sector of the economy - is of sufficient significance to be characterized as a deprivation of [426 U.S. 88, 120] an interest in liberty. Indeed, we deal with a rule which deprives a discrete class of persons of an interest in liberty on a wholesale basis. By reason of the Fifth Amendment, such a deprivation must be accompanied by due process." Ante, at 102-103 (footnote omitted). </s> The meaning of this statement in the Court's opinion is not immediately apparent. As already noted, there is no general "liberty" interest in either acquiring federal employment or, in the absence of a statutory tenure, in retaining it, so that the person who is denied employment or who is discharged may insist upon a due process hearing. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915), is cited by the Court to support the proposition that there is a "liberty" interest at stake here. But to the extent that the holding of that case remains unmodified by Cafeteria Workers, supra, it deals with a substantive liberty interest which may not be arbitrarily denied by legislative enactment; that interest is closely akin to the interest of the aliens asserted in Sugarman, supra, and In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973). Since the Court declines to pass upon the claim asserted by respondents based upon those cases, it is difficult to see how Truax is relevant to its analysis. </s> There is a liberty interest in obtaining public employment which is protected against procedural deprivation in certain circumstances, as the Court's citation to Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 -574 (1972), ante, at 102 n. 23, indicates. But the cases cited in that passage from Roth, cases such as Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957), and Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U.S. 96 (1963), are distinguishable from the present case in at least two respects. In the first place they were both efforts by States, not to deny public employment, but to go further [426 U.S. 88, 121] and proscribe the right to practice one's chosen profession in the private sector of the economy. Even more importantly, the vice found in each of those cases was the failure of the State to grant a "full prior hearing," 408 U.S., at 574 . </s> But in the case presently before the Court, there is simply no issue which would require a hearing in order to establish any matter of disputed fact. All of the respondents freely concede that they are aliens. Their claim is not that they were entitled to a hearing in order to establish the fact that they were citizens, or to establish some other relevant fact; indeed they request no hearing for any purpose. Petitioners assert that due to respondents' alienage they are barred from federal employment, and respondents simply contend that they may not be. </s> Yet the Court does not decide this issue, but proceeds instead to hold that procedural due process includes not only a shield against arbitrary action but a scalped with which one may dissect the administrative organization of the Federal Government. </s> "When the Federal Government asserts an overriding national interest as justification for a discriminatory rule which would violate the Equal Protection Clause if adopted by a State, due process requires that there be a legitimate basis for presuming that the rule was actually intended to serve that interest." Ante, at 103. </s> But the "overriding national interest" asserted by the petitioners is not a specific interest in excluding these particular aliens from the civil service, but a general interest in formulating policies toward aliens. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952). As such it is not necessary for the petitioners to demonstrate why they chose to exclude aliens from the civil service. [426 U.S. 88, 122] To require them to do so is to subject the Government to the same type of equal protection analysis to which the States are subject under Sugarman v. Dougall, supra, a result which the Court specifically abjures. Ante, at 100-101. What the Court seems to do is to engraft notions of due process onto the case law from this Court dealing with the delegation by Congress of its legislative authority to administrative agencies. </s> In two cases decided in the October Term 1934 the Court held that Congress "is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is . . . vested" by Art. I, 1, of the Constitution. Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935). Panama Rfg. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). Nothing in either of those opinions, the only cases in which delegations to administrative agencies have been struck down, suggested any reliance upon the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and it seems a fair statement to say that the Court has not seen fit during the 40 years following these decisions to enlarge in the slightest their relatively narrow holdings. </s> Not only is such reliance unjustified by prior decisions of this Court as to the scope of the due process guarantee, but it flies in the face of those cases which hold that the manner in which policies concerning aliens are made within the political branches of the government is not subject to judicial scrutiny. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954). 1 </s> [426 U.S. 88, 123] </s> II </s> The sole ground by which such procedures may properly be challenged is to argue that there was an improper delegation of authority, which has not previously been thought to depend upon the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause. </s> The Court, while not shaping its argument in these terms seems to hold that the delegation here was faulty. Yet, it seems to me too clear to admit of argument that under the traditional standards governing the delegation of authority the Civil Service Commission was fully empowered to act in the manner in which it did in this case. </s> Congress, in the Civil Service Act, 5 U.S.C. 3301, delegated to the President the power to </s> "(1) prescribe such regulations for the admission of individuals into the civil service in the executive branch as will best promote the efficiency of that service; [and] </s> "(2) ascertain the fitness of applicants as to age, health, character, knowledge, and ability for the employment sought . . . ." 2 </s> The President, acting under this grant of authority as well as the "authority vested in [him] by the Constitution," promulgated Executive Order No. 10,577, 3 CFR 218 (1954-1958 Comp.), in which he authorized the Civil Service Commission </s> "to establish standards with respect to citizenship, age, education . . . and for residence or other requirements which applicants must meet to be admitted to or rated in examinations." Id., 2.1 (a), p. 219. [426 U.S. 88, 124] </s> Acting pursuant to this authority the Civil Service Commission then promulgated the regulations in question which exclude aliens from examination for or appointment to (except under certain special circumstances) the civil service. </s> Both Congress and the President thus took a power which they possessed and, instead of exercising it directly, chose to delegate it. This is the process by which all federal regulations are promulgated and to forbid it would be to necessarily dismantle the entire structure of the Executive Branch. But the majority does not challenge the procedure as to all cases. Rather, the challenge seems to be leveled only at policies which "rais[e] . . . constitutional questions." Ante, at 113 n. 46. In those cases it becomes necessary for the agency, which was concededly acting within the scope of its delegated power, to provide reasons which will justify its actions in the eyes of the courts. </s> But, as previously discussed, such a holding overlooks the basic principle that a decision to exclude aliens from the civil service is a political decision reserved to Congress, the wisdom of which may not be challenged in the courts. Once it is determined that the agency in question was properly delegated the power by Congress to make decisions regarding citizenship of prospective civil servants, then the reasons for which that power was exercised are as foreclosed from judicial scrutiny as if Congress had made the decision itself. The fact that Congress has delegated a power does not provide a back door through which to attack a policy which would otherwise have been immune from attack. 3 </s> [426 U.S. 88, 125] </s> For this Court to hold, ante, at 114, that the agency chosen by Congress, through the President, to effectuate its policies, has "no responsibility" in that area is to interfere in an area in which the Court itself clearly has "no responsibility": the organization of the Executive Branch. Congress, through the President, obviously gave responsibility in this area to the Civil Service Commission. The wisdom of that delegation is not for us to evaluate. Finally I note that, though there is no requirement that it do so, it would appear that, contrary to the Court's assertion, Congress has in fact spoken directly to this issue. In 502 of the Public Works for Water, Pollution Control, and Power Development and Atomic Energy Commission Appropriation Act, 1970, 83 Stat. 336 (discussed by the Court, ante, at 93-94), Congress provided that no compensation will be paid to any employee of the Government who is not (1) a citizen, (2) "a person in the service of the United States on the date of enactment of this Act, who, being eligible for citizenship, had filed a declaration of intention to become a citizen" or (3) a person who "owes allegiance to the United States." </s> Since respondents are not citizens the question arises as to which of the other categories they fit into. The effective date of the Act was December 11, 1969. Yet according to the record, none of the respondents was employed until August 1970 and one, Lum, was never employed by the Government. [426 U.S. 88, 126] </s> At the time of their discharge none of the respondents had declared their loyalty to the United States. While it is not clear what it means to "owe allegiance," it must mean something, and there has been no assertion by respondents that they qualified. Indeed, in June 1971, after the litigation was begun, Mow Sun Wong and Sin Hung Mok filed affidavits with the District Court asserting: "I owe allegiance to the United States." This would seem to imply that, at the time of their discharge, they did not qualify under the statute. </s> III </s> Since I do not believe that the Court is correct in concluding that the regulation promulgated by the Civil Service Commission is invalid because of any lack of authority in the Commission to promulgate the rule, I must address the question of whether "the national interests" identified by the petitioners would adequately support a "determination . . . to exclude all noncitizens from the federal service." Ante, at 116. This question was saved in both Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973), and in In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973), and I agree with the Court that "the paramount federal power over immigration and naturalization forecloses a simple extension of the holding in Sugarman as decisive of this case." Ante, at 100. </s> "For reasons long recognized as valid, the responsibility for regulating the relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has been committed to the political branches of the Federal Government." Mathews v. Diaz, ante, at 81. </s> "[A]ny policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government. [426 U.S. 88, 127] Such matters are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference." Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S., at 588 -589, quoted in Mathews v. Diaz, ante, at 81 n. 17. </s> See also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S., at 765 -767; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 -713 (1893). </s> I conclude therefore that Congress, in the exercise of its political judgment, could have excluded aliens from the civil service. The fact that it chose, in a separate political decision, to allow the Civil Service Commission to make this determination does not render the governmental policy any less "political" and, consequently, does not render it any more subject to judicial scrutiny under the reasoning of Diaz, ante, p. 67. The regulations here, enforced without question for nearly a century, do not infringe upon any constitutional right of these respondents. I would therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. </s> [Footnote 1 In Galvan the Court held that congressional policies "pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right to remain here are peculiarly concerned with the political conduct of government." 347 U.S., at 531 . As such, the only judicial review of those policies is to insure that the Government has respected the demands of procedural due process not whether the policies themselves are constitutionally valid. </s> [Footnote 2 Also, 5 U.S.C. 1302 directly authorized the Civil Service Commission, subject to rules prescribed by the President, to "prescribe regulations for . . . examinations for the competitive service." </s> [Footnote 3 In Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948), the Court approved a delegation of authority from Congress through the President to the Attorney General to deport any "alien enemies" whom the Attorney General deemed to be "dangerous to the public peace and [426 U.S. 88, 125] safety of the United States." Presidential Proclamation No. 2655, 59 Stat. 870 (1945). The Court held that the "Attorney General was the President's voice and conscience. A war power of the President not subject to judicial review is not transmuted into a judicially reviewable action because the President chooses to have that power exercised within narrower limits than Congress authorized." 335 U.S., at 165 -166. </s> [426 U.S. 88, 128]

United States Supreme Court McNEIL v. DIRECTOR, PATUXENT INSTITUTION(1972) No. 71-5144 Argued: April 20, 1972Decided: June 19, 1972 </s> Petitioner, who was given a five-year sentence, was referred under an ex parte order to the Patuxent Institution for examination to determine whether he should be committed for an indefinite term as a defective delinquent. In this proceeding for post-conviction relief he challenges his confinement after expiration of that sentence as violative of due process. Respondent contends that petitioner's continued confinement is justified until petitioner cooperates with the examining psychiatrists and thus facilitates an assessment of his condition. The trial court denied relief, holding that a person confined under Maryland's Defective Delinquency Law may be detained until the statutory procedures for examination and report have been completed, regardless of whether or not the criminal sentence has expired. Held: In the circumstances of this case, it is a denial of due process to continue to hold petitioner on the basis of an ex parte order committing him to observation without the procedural safeguards commensurate with a long-term commitment, Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 ; and without affording him those safeguards his further detention cannot be justified as analogous to confinement for civil contempt or for any other reason. Pp. 247-252. </s> Reversed. </s> MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. DOUGLAS, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 252. </s> E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., by appointment of the Court, 404 U.S. 1057 , argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Peter F. Rousselot and Richard B. Ruge. </s> Henry R. Lord, Deputy Attorney General of Maryland, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Francis B. Burch, Attorney General, and Edward F. Borgerding, Donald R. Stutman, Josef Rosenblatt, [407 U.S. 245, 246] and Harry A. E. Taylor, Assistant Attorneys General. </s> MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Edward McNeil was convicted of two assaults in 1966, and sentenced to five years' imprisonment. Instead of committing him to prison, the sentencing court referred him to the Patuxent Institution for examination, to determine whether he should be committed to that institution for an indeterminate term under Maryland's Defective Delinquency Law. Md. Ann. Code, Art. 31B (1971). No such determination has yet been made, his sentence has expired, and his confinement continues. The State contends that he has refused to cooperate with the examining psychiatrists, that they have been unable to make any valid assessment of his condition, and that consequently he may be confined indefinitely until he cooperates and the institution has succeeded in making its evaluation. He claims that when his sentence expired, the State lost its power to hold him, and that his continued detention violates his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. We agree. </s> I </s> The Maryland Defective Delinquency Law provides that a person convicted of any felony, or certain misdemeanors, may be committed to the Patuxent Institution for an indeterminate period, if it is judicially determined that he is a "defective delinquent." A defective delinquent is defined as </s> "an individual who, by the demonstration of persistent aggravated antisocial or criminal behavior, evidences a propensity toward criminal activity, and who is found to have either such intellectual deficiency or emotional unbalance, or both, as to clearly [407 U.S. 245, 247] demonstrate an actual danger to society so as to require such confinement and treatment, when appropriate, as may make it reasonably safe for society to terminate the confinement and treatment." Md. Ann. Code, Art. 31B, 5. </s> Defective-delinquency proceedings are ordinarily instituted immediately after conviction and sentencing; they may also be instituted after the defendant has served part of his prison term. 6 (b), 6 (c). 1 In either event, the process begins with a court order committing the prisoner to Patuxent for a psychiatric examination. 6 (b), 6 (d). The institution is required to submit its report to the court within a fixed period of time. 7 (a). 2 If the report recommends commitment, then a hearing must be promptly held, with a jury trial if requested by the prisoner, to determine whether he should be committed as a defective delinquent. 8. If he is so committed, then the commitment operates to suspend the prison sentence previously imposed. 9 (b). </s> In Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, post, p. 355, several prisoners who had been committed [407 U.S. 245, 248] as defective delinquents sought to challenge various aspects of the criteria and procedures that resulted in their commitment; we granted certiorari in that case together with this one, in order to consider together these challenges to the Maryland statutory scheme. For various reasons we decline today to reach those questions, see Murel, supra. But Edward McNeil presents a much more stark and simple claim. He has never been committed as a defective delinquent, and thus he has no cause to challenge the criteria and procedures that control a defective-delinquency hearing. His confinement rests wholly on the order committing him for examination, in preparation for such a commitment hearing. That order was made, not on the basis of an adversary hearing, but on the basis of an ex parte judicial determination that there was "reasonable cause to believe that the Defendant may be a Defective Delinquent." 3 Petitioner does not challenge in this Court the power of the sentencing court to issue such an order in the first instance, but he contends that the State's power to hold him on the basis of that order has expired. He filed a petition for state post-conviction relief on this ground, inter alia, pursuant to Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, 645A. The trial court denied relief, holding that "[a] person referred to Patuxent under Section 6, Article 31B for the purpose of determining whether or not he is a defective delinquent may be detained in Patuxent until the procedures for such determination have been completed regardless of whether or not the criminal sentence [407 U.S. 245, 249] has expired." App. 35-36. The Court of Appeals of Maryland denied leave to appeal. App. 37-38. We granted certiorari, 404 U.S. 999 (1971). </s> II </s> The State of Maryland asserts the power to confine petitioner indefinitely, without ever obtaining a judicial determination that such confinement is warranted. Respondent advances several distinct arguments in support of that claim. </s> A. First, respondent contends that petitioner has been committed merely for observation, and that a commitment for observation need not be surrounded by the procedural safeguards (such as an adversary hearing) that are appropriate for a final determination of defective delinquency. Were the commitment for observation limited in duration to a brief period, the argument might have some force. But petitioner has been committed "for observation" for six years, and on respondent's theory of his confinement there is no reason to believe it likely that he will ever be released. A confinement that is in fact indeterminate cannot rest on procedures designed to authorize a brief period of observation. </s> We recently rejected a similar argument in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), when the State sought to confine indefinitely a defendant who was mentally incompetent to stand trial on his criminal charges. The State sought to characterize the commitment as temporary, and on that basis to justify reduced substantive and procedural safeguards. We held that because the commitment was permanent in its practical effect, it required safeguards commensurate with a long-term commitment. Id., at 723-730. The other half of the Jackson argument is equally relevant here. If the commitment is properly regarded as a short-term confinement with a limited purpose, as the respondent suggests, then lesser safeguards [407 U.S. 245, 250] may be appropriate, but by the same token, the duration of the confinement must be strictly limited. "[D]ue process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed." Id., at 738. Just as that principle limits the permissible length of a commitment on account of incompetence to stand trial, so it also limits the permissible length of a commitment "for observation." We need not set a precise time limit here; it is noteworthy, however, that the Maryland statute itself limits the observation period to a maximum of six months. While the state courts have apparently construed the statute to permit extensions of time, see n. 2, supra, nevertheless the initial legislative judgment provides a useful benchmark. In this case it is sufficient to note that the petitioner has been confined for six years, and there is no basis for anticipating that he will ever be easier to examine than he is today. In these circumstances, it is a denial of due process to continue to hold him on the basis of an ex parte order committing him for observation. </s> B. A second argument advanced by the respondent relies on the claim that petitioner himself prevented the State from holding a hearing on his condition. Respondent contends that, by refusing to talk to the psychiatrists, petitioner has prevented them from evaluating him, and has made it impossible for the State to go forward with evidence at a hearing. Thus, it is argued, his continued confinement is analogous to civil contempt; he can terminate the confinement and bring about a hearing at any time by talking to the examining psychiatrists, and the State has the power to induce his cooperation by confining him. </s> Petitioner claims that he has a right under the Fifth Amendment to withhold cooperation, a claim we need not consider here. But putting that claim to one side, there [407 U.S. 245, 251] is nevertheless a fatal flaw in the respondent's argument. For if confinement is to rest on a theory of civil contempt, then due process requires a hearing to determine whether petitioner has in fact behaved in a manner that amounts to contempt. At such a hearing it could be ascertained whether petitioner's conduct is willful, or whether it is a manifestation of mental illness, for which he cannot fairly be held responsible. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Civil contempt is coercive in nature, and consequently there is no justification for confining on a civil contempt theory a person who lacks the present ability to comply. Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56 (1948). Moreover, a hearing would provide the appropriate forum for resolution of petitioner's Fifth Amendment claim. Finally, if the petitioner's confinement were explicitly premised on a finding of contempt, then it would be appropriate to consider what limitations the Due Process Clause places on the contempt power. The precise contours of that power need not be traced here. It is enough to note that petitioner has been confined, potentially for life, although he has never been determined to be in contempt by a procedure that comports with due process. The contempt analogy cannot justify the State's failure to provide a hearing of any kind. </s> C. Finally, respondent suggests that petitioner is probably a defective delinquent, because most noncooperators are. Hence, it is argued, his confinement rests not only on the purposes of observation, and of penalizing contempt, but also on the underlying purposes of the Defective Delinquency Law. But that argument proves too much. For if the Patuxent staff members were prepared to conclude, on the basis of petitioner's silence and their observations of him over the years, that petitioner is a defective delinquent, then it is not true that he has prevented them from evaluating him. On that theory, [407 U.S. 245, 252] they have long been ready to make their report to the court, and the hearing on defective delinquency could have gone forward. </s> III </s> Petitioner is presently confined in Patuxent without any lawful authority to support that confinement. His sentence having expired, he is no longer within the class of persons eligible for commitment to the Institution as a defective delinquent. Accordingly, he is entitled to be released. The judgment below is reversed, and the mandate shall issue forthwith. </s> Reversed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 But not after he has served all of it. The statute has always provided that no examination may be ordered or held if the person has been released from custody; since 1971 it has also prohibited the examination if the person is within six months of the expiration of sentence, 6 (c), as amended in 1971. The State asserts that about 98% of the referrals to Patuxent are made immediately after conviction. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27; see Respondent's Brief 82 n. 33. </s> [Footnote 2 The statute originally required the report to be submitted within six months, or before expiration of sentence, whichever later occurs. Since 1971, it has required a report within six months, or three months before expiration of sentence, whichever first occurs. 7 (a), as amended in 1971. The state courts have construed the statute to permit extension of the allowable time, however, in the case of a noncooperative defendant who resists examination. State v. Musgrove, 241 Md. 521, 217 A. 2d 247 (1966); Mullen v. Director, 6 Md. App. 120, 250 A. 2d 281 (1969). </s> [Footnote 3 Brief for Petitioner 6 n. 5; see Art. 31B, 6 (b): request for examination is made to court "on any knowledge or suspicion of the presence of defective delinquency in such person." It appears that in this case the trial court issued the order sua sponte; prior to sentencing, the court had ordered a psychiatric evaluation by its own medical officer, who in turn recommended referral to Patuxent for further evaluation and treatment. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring. </s> This is an action in the Maryland courts for post-conviction relief which was denied, with no court making a report of its decision. The case is here on a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted. 404 U.S. 999 . I concur in reversing the judgment below. </s> McNeil was tried and convicted in a Maryland court for assault on a public officer and for assault with intent to rape. He took the stand and denied he had committed the offenses. He had had no prior criminal record. The sentencing judge asked for a psychiatric evaluation of the accused, though neither side at the trial had raised or suggested any psychiatric issues. A medical officer examined him and recommended that he be considered for evaluation and treatment at Patuxent Institution, a state psychiatric agency. </s> The court sentenced McNeil to "not more than five years" to prison in Hagerstown 1 and, without modifying [407 U.S. 245, 253] or suspending that sentence, ordered him referred to Patuxent. Under Maryland law a defendant convicted of any felony or certain misdemeanors may be referred to Patuxent for determination whether he is a "defective delinquent." Md. Ann. Code, Art. 31B (1971). A "defective delinquent" is defined in Art. 31B, 5, as "an individual who, by the demonstration of persistent aggravated antisocial or criminal behavior, evidences a propensity toward criminal activity, and who is found to have either such intellectual deficiency or emotional unbalance, or both, as to clearly demonstrate an actual danger to society so as to require such confinement and treatment, when appropriate, as may make it reasonably safe for society to terminate the confinement and treatment." </s> Under Art. 31B, the staff - which includes a psychiatrist, a psychologist, and a physician - shall examine the person and "state their findings" as to defective delinquency in a written report to the court. Art. 31B, 7 (a). And it is provided that once transferred to Patuxent, the person in question shall remain there "until such time as the procedures . . . for the determination of whether or not said person is a defective delinquent have been completed, without regard to whether or not the criminal sentence to which he was last sentenced has expired." 2 Art. 31B, 6 (e) (Supp. 1971). </s> The examination normally entails psychiatric interviews and evaluation, psychological tests, sociological and [407 U.S. 245, 254] social work studies, and review of past history and records, including police, juvenile, penal, and hospital records. Personal interviews include a series of questions to elicit and to determine the past criminal record, and antisocial and criminal behavior of the individual. </s> If the report shows that he should not be classified as a defective delinquent, he is retained in custody under his original sentence with full credit given for the time confined at Patuxent. Art. 31B, 7 (a) (Supp. 1971). If the report says that he should be classified as a defective delinquent, a hearing is held, at which the defendant is entitled to counsel and a trial by jury. Art. 31B, 8. </s> McNeil, though confined at Patuxent beyond the term of five years for which he was sentenced, has never had such a hearing, for he has never been declared a "defective delinquent." 3 He has not been so declared and on the other hand has not been cleared, because he has refused on at least 15 separate occasions to submit to the psychiatric tests and questions. Nor has he received in the interim any rehabilitative treatment or training. The State, indeed, intends to keep him there indefinitely, as long as he refuses to submit to psychiatric or psychological examinations. 4 </s> McNeil's refusal to submit to that questioning is not quixotic; it is based on his Fifth Amendment right to be [407 U.S. 245, 255] silent. McNeil remains confined without any hearing whatsoever as to whether he has a propensity toward criminal activity and without any hope of having a hearing unless he surrenders his right against self-incrimination. 5 </s> The Fifth Amendment prohibition against compulsory self-incrimination is applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 . The protection extends to refusal to answer questions [407 U.S. 245, 256] where the person "has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer." Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 ; see Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 . The questioning of McNeil is in a setting and has a goal pregnant with both potential and immediate danger. To be labeled a "defective delinquent," McNeil must have demonstrated a "persistent aggravated antisocial or criminal behavior" and "a propensity toward criminal activity." Art. 31B, 5. </s> McNeil was repeatedly interrogated not only about the crime for which he was convicted but for many other alleged antisocial incidents going back to his sophomore year in high school. One staff member after interviewing McNeil reported: "He adamantly and vehemently denies, despite the police reports, that he was involved in the offense"; "Further questioning revealed that he had stolen some shoes but he insisted that he did not know that they were stolen . . ."; "but in the tenth grade he was caught taking some milk and cookies from the cafeteria"; "He consistently denies his guilt in all these offenses"; "He insisted that he was not present at the purse snatching"; "He was adamant in insisting on this version of the offense despite the police report which was in the brief and which I had available and discussed with him"; "He continued his denial into a consideration of a juvenile offense . . ."; "He denies the use of all drugs and narcotics"; ". . . I explained to him that it might be of some help to him if we could understand why he did such a thing but this was to no avail." Brief for Petitioner 36 n. 43. </s> Some of the questioning of McNeil was at a time when his conviction was on direct appeal or when he was seeking post-conviction relief. Concessions or confessions obtained might be useful to the State on a retrial or might vitiate post-conviction relief. Moreover, the privilege extends to every "link in a chain of evidence [407 U.S. 245, 257] sufficient to connect" the person with a crime. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S., at 13 . Whether or not a grant of immunity would give the needed protection in this context is irrelevant, because we are advised that there is no such immunity under state laws. </s> Finally, the refusal to answer results in severe sanctions, contrary to the constitutional guarantee. </s> First, the staff refuses to diagnose him, no matter how much information they may have, unless he talks. The result is that he never receives a hearing and remains at Patuxent indefinitely. </s> Second, if there is no report on him, he remains on the receiving tier indefinitely and receives no treatment. </s> Third, if he talks and a report is made and he is committed as a "defective delinquent," he is no longer confined for any portion of the original sentence. Art. 31B, 9 (b). If he does not talk, McNeil's sentence continues to run until it expires and yet he is kept at Patuxent indefinitely. We are indeed advised by the record in the Murel case that 20% of Patuxent inmates at that time were serving beyond their expired sentences and of those paroled between 1955 and 1965, 46% had served beyond their expired sentences. </s> Whatever the Patuxent procedures may be called - whether civil or criminal - the result under the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment is the same. As we said in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49 -50, there is the threat of self-incrimination whenever there is "a deprivation of liberty;" and there is such a deprivation whatever the name of the institution, if a person is held against his will. </s> It is elementary that there is a denial of due process when a person is committed or, as here, held without a hearing and opportunity to be heard. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 ; Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 . </s> McNeil must be discharged forthwith. </s> [Footnote 1 Under Maryland law that sentence was subject to statutory reductions for good behavior, industrial or agricultural work, and satisfactory progress in education and vocational courses. Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, 700 (1971). </s> McNeil would have been eligible for parole after one-fourth of the term or a little over one year. </s> [Footnote 2 At the time of McNeil's referral, the Act required that the report be filed no later than six months from the date he was transferred to Patuxent or before expiration of his sentence, whichever last occurred. Md. Ann. Code, Art. 31B, 7 (a) (1957 ed., Supp. 1966). An amendment effective July 1, 1971, required that the report be filed no later than six months from the date he was transferred to Patuxent or three months before expiration of his sentence, whichever occurs first. Art. 31B, 7 (a) (Supp. 1971). </s> [Footnote 3 Detention beyond the expiration of court-imposed sentences occurs in Communist China where "public security organs [have] the authority to impose as well as administer punishment" and "the discretionary power to extend the duration of imprisonment beyond the original sentences." Shao-chuan Leng, Justice in Communist China 34 (1967). </s> [Footnote 4 In the District Court proceedings in Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, post, p. 355, Dr. Boslow, the Director of Patuxent, testified: </s> "[The Court] . . . Take the case of a person who is referred for diagnosis and he fails, let us say, 100 per cent, to cooperate; [407 U.S. 245, 255] he won't talk to anybody, he won't undergo any tests, he won't participate, though I don't think he gets group therapy. </s> "[Dr. Boslow] No, sir. </s> "[The Court] But he will do absolutely nothing and will take no advantage of whatever opportunity if any there may be. </s> "He, therefore, assuming that the law is valid, and assuming that the administration in that respect is supportable, could he remain there indefinitely unclassified? Is that correct? </s> "[Dr. Boslow] Under the present state of things, yes." </s> [Footnote 5 As stated in a provocative and searching study in Virginia: </s> "Certainly, a prisoner is not entitled to all the constitutional rights enjoyed by free citizens, but the burden of showing what restrictions are necessary for the preservation of prison order should fall upon prison officials. Widespread, sweeping denials of freedom should not be tolerated. Ideally, the legislative and executive branches of government should decide the extent to which liberty must be denied. No organ of government is better suited than the legislature to consider the penological developments of the last few decades in order to determine the extent to which restrictive practices are warranted. But after legislative command or in its absence, the courts must decide whether the balance of competing interests effected by legislative compromise or executive fiat comports with specific constitutional guarantees and traditional notions of due process. In this context the `hands-off doctrine' has no place. The judiciary functions as more than a final arbiter; it has a responsibility for educating the public and, where it fails to act, it functions to legitimize the status quo. The simple failure of the courts to review prison conditions blunts the success of important constitutional inquiries, impedes the flow of information and encourages abuse." Hirschkop & Millemann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 Va. L. Rev. 795, 835-837 (1969). </s> [407 U.S. 245, 258]

United States Supreme Court COLD METAL PROCESS CO. v. UNITED CO.(1956) No. 76 Argued: February 28, 1956Decided: June 11, 1956 </s> In a multiple claims action, the Federal District Court, pursuant to Rule 54 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended in 1946, expressly determined that there was no just reason for delay and expressly directed entry of judgment on one of the claims. The unadjudicated claim was a counterclaim arising in part out of the same transactions and occurrences as the adjudicated claim. Held: The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291 to entertain an appeal from the judgment. Pp. 446-453. </s> (a) Rule 54 (b), as amended, treats counterclaims, whether "compulsory" or "permissive," like other multiple claims. P. 452. </s> (b) Under amended Rule 54 (b), the relationship of the adjudicated claims to the unadjudicated claims is one of the factors which the District Court can consider in the exercise of its discretion. P. 452. </s> (c) That the order in this case is appealable at a time when it would not have been appealable prior to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or under Rule 54 (b) in its original form, does not mean that Rule 54 (b), as amended, is invalid. Pp. 452-453. </s> (d) Amended Rule 54 (b) meets the needs and problems of modern judicial administration by adjusting the unit for appeal to fit multiple claims actions, while retaining a right of judicial review over the discretion exercised by the District Court in determining when there is no just reason for delay. P. 453. </s> (e) Rule 54 (b), as amended, does not impair the statutory concept of finality embraced in 28 U.S.C. 1291, and it is within the rulemaking power of this Court. P. 453. </s> 221 F.2d 115, affirmed. </s> William H. Webb argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Clarence B. Zewadski and William Wallace Booth. </s> Jo. Baily Brown argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Julian Miller. [351 U.S. 445, 446] </s> MR. JUSTICE BURTON delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This is a multiple claims action in which the District Court entered a judgment disposing of but one claim. Pursuant to Rule 54 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended in 1946, 1 that court expressly determined that there was no just reason for delay and expressly directed the entry of judgment. Thereupon, an appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals, and the issue before us is whether the latter court has jurisdiction to entertain that appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1291, 2 although an unadjudicated counterclaim awaits disposition in the District Court. The issue is comparable to that decided in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, ante, at 427, except that here the unadjudicated claim is a counterclaim arising in part out of the same transactions and occurrences as the adjudicated claim. By applying the reasoning used in the Sears case, we reach a like conclusion here and uphold the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. </s> While the counterclaim arises in part out of the same transactions as does the adjudicated claim, it was filed long after the principal proceeding was begun, and is in the nature of an action ancillary to the principal proceeding and bears a separate case number. Upon request of both parties, the District Court has removed the counterclaim from the trial calendar, without prejudice to either party, leaving it subject to reinstatement for trial at any time by order of the court upon its own initiative, or upon request of either party after reasonable notice. A brief review of the entire proceedings and a disclosure of its subject matter throws light on the relationship between the adjudicated claim and the counterclaim. [351 U.S. 445, 447] </s> In 1927, petitioner, The Cold Metal Process Company, an Ohio corporation, and United Engineering & Foundry Company, a Pennsylvania corporation, entered into a contract for the purpose of securing a patent in the name of Cold Metal relating to a certain type of steel rolling mill and of granting to United an exclusive license to make, use and sell mills under such patent. To that end, the parties contributed claims under their respective patent applications and it was agreed that the license should be granted when the patent was issued. The parties also agreed to try, by negotiation, to determine the amount of the payment by United for the license. If the parties could not agree on that point, the subject was to be submitted to arbitration in a manner specified in the contract. 3 </s> In 1930, the patent was issued but Cold Metal refused to treat the 1927 contract as conferring an exclusive license on United. Cold Metal maintained that United was not a licensee until the amount due Cold Metal had been determined and paid. United, on the other hand, treated the contract as an enforceable exclusive license under which the license fee was to be determined later. </s> After litigation not now material, 4 Cold Metal, in 1934, instituted the present proceeding, Equity No. 2991, against United in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Cold Metal asked (1) for an injunction restraining United from prosecuting certain suits, pending in Ohio and elsewhere, founded upon United's claim of exclusive rights under the patent, and (2) for determination of the amount to be paid by United under the 1927 contract. The court declined to issue a preliminary injunction, 9 F. Supp. 994, but Cold Metal appealed from such denial and, in 1935, obtained [351 U.S. 445, 448] a reversal directing the injunction to be issued, 79 F.2d 666. </s> In 1936, Cold Metal, in line with the foregoing results, filed a supplemental complaint asking that the 1927 contract be "cancelled, revoked and annulled" and that United be enjoined from further operations under the patent. However, in 1938, the District Court, after trial, held the contract valid and enforceable, and directed an accounting before a master. 83 F. Supp. 914. </s> Cold Metal appealed but, in 1939, the Court of Appeals reversed its 1935 decision and largely sustained United's position. It ordered that the injunction against United's infringement suits be dissolved and held that the 1927 contract created a valid and enforceable exclusive license in favor of United. It also stated that the master could determine, from an "understanding" between the parties as shown by the record, the amount due from United under the 1927 contract. 107 F.2d 27. </s> In 1941, United asked leave to file an amended answer and counterclaim, complaining that Cold Metal's recent acts were inconsistent with the 1939 judgment of the Court of Appeals. In 1942, the District Court denied that motion on the ground that it could carry out only the existing mandate of the Court of Appeals. 43 F. Supp. 375. It suggested, however, that the injunction sought by United in its counterclaim should be the subject matter of another action, and that United could assert, before the master, Cold Metal's breaches of the 1927 contract. In 1943, the District Court modified its 1938 decree to make it conform to the Court of Appeals' order of 1939. It also appointed a master to determine not only the amount due Cold Metal from United for its past operations, but the payments to be made on licensed mills in the future. </s> In 1949, United refilled its claims as an "Ancillary Cross Complaint" in Civil Action No. 7744. United sought, [351 U.S. 445, 449] inter alia, (1) to enjoin the prosecution of infringement suits by Cold Metal against parties using mills under licenses granted by United, (2) to require Cold Metal to account for any funds it had collected for the use of such mills within the field of United's exclusive license, and (3) to set off those funds from any payment or royalty that might be due from United to Cold Metal under the 1927 contract. In 1950, the District Court dismissed the cross complaint on the ground that it was not ancillary to Equity No. 2991. 92 F. Supp. 596. However, in 1951, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court. It held that United's cross complaint was, in reality, a counterclaim, ancillary to Equity No. 2991, and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the District Court. 190 F.2d 217. The Court of Appeals reviewed the previous course of the proceedings and pointed out that the claims now made by United in this counterclaim are entirely dependent upon the 1939 decision of that court, 107 F.2d 27, which upheld the validity of United's exclusive license. </s> Into this situation, in 1954, came the master's report on the accounting in Equity No. 2991. It listed the licensed mills, fixed the compensation payable under the 1927 contract, and found that United's license had existed from 1930 to 1947 and that United's customers were duly licensed to use the patented mills. It also held that certain United mills were exempt from royalty, that Cold Metal had failed to respect the license or to perform all of its obligations under the 1927 contract, but that United owed Cold Metal a substantial sum under it. </s> In 1955, the District Court approved the master's report in all respects and entered judgment against United for $387,650, with interest at 6% from the date of filing of the report. Both parties appealed. Cold Metal at once moved to dismiss United's appeal on the ground that the District Court had not made the certification required by Rule 54 (b). With permission of the Court of Appeals, [351 U.S. 445, 450] the District Court then amended its judgment to add such certification. 5 </s> Again both parties appealed. Again Cold Metal moved to dismiss United's appeal from the amended judgment because the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to entertain it. This time the motion was denied with a per curiam opinion in which the Court of Appeals said "We think the determination made under the circumstances of this case is the very kind of thing Rule 54 (b) was written to provide for. We see no violation of discretion on the part of the district judge in entering it." 221 F.2d 115. </s> Accordingly, on October 3, 1955, in the Court of Appeals, the parties argued their respective appeals on their merits in Equity No. 2991. However, before any decision was rendered on the merits, we granted certiorari upon Cold Metal's petition questioning the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to entertain the appeal. 350 U.S. 819 . We agree with the Court of Appeals that [351 U.S. 445, 451] this is the very kind of case for which amended Rule 54 (b) was designed. The appealability of the adjudicated claim is upheld so that the merits of the existing judgment may be determined at this stage of the proceedings. </s> Prior to the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1939, it may well have been true that the Court of Appeals would not, at this stage, have had jurisdiction over United's appeal. Under the single judicial unit theory of finality which was then recognized, the Court of Appeals would have been without jurisdiction until United's counterclaim also had been decided by the District Court. That would have been so even if the counterclaim did not arise out of the same transaction and occurrence as Cold Metal's claim. 6 However, as stated in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, ante, Rule 54 (b), in its original form, modified the judicial unit theory in respect to multiple claims actions. Accordingly, under that rule, it is likely that if United's counterclaim qualified as "permissive," 7 rather than as "compulsory," 8 the Court of Appeals would have had jurisdiction to entertain [351 U.S. 445, 452] the appeal now before us. 9 This conclusion follows from the fact that the test of appealability under the original rule was whether the adjudicated claims were separate from, and independent of, the unadjudicated claims. See Reeves v. Beardall, 316 U.S. 283 . </s> However, as set forth in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, ante, that test led to uncertainty, of which the present case might have been an example. 10 The amended rule overcomes that difficulty and, under its terms, we need not decide whether United's counterclaim is compulsory or permissive. The amended rule, in contrast to the rule in its original form, treats counterclaims, whether compulsory or permissive, like other multiple claims. It provides that "When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, the [district] court may direct the entry of a final judgment upon one or more but less than all of the claims . . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) Counterclaims and cross-claims are thus equated with the others. See Bendix Aviation Corp. v. Glass, 195 F.2d 267 (C. A. 3d Cir.). Therefore, under the amended rule, the relationship of the adjudicated claims to the unadjudicated claims is one of the factors which the District Court can consider in the exercise of its discretion. If the District Court certifies a final order on a claim which arises out of the same transaction and occurrence as pending claims, and the Court of Appeals is satisfied that there has been no abuse of discretion, the order is appealable. </s> The reasoning and the result in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, ante, is dispositive of this case. The order appealed from finally adjudicates Cold Metal's claim for relief, and the Court of Appeals has held that the trial [351 U.S. 445, 453] court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the absence of just reasons for delay. That this order is appealable at a time when it would not have been appealable prior to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or under Rule 54 (b) in its original form, does not mean that Rule 54 (b), as amended, is invalid. It applies only to a final decision of one or more claims for relief. The amended rule meets the needs and problems of modern judicial administration by adjusting the unit for appeal to fit multiple claims actions, while retaining a right of judicial review over the discretion exercised by the District Court in determining when there is no just reason for delay. This does not impair the statutory concept of finality embraced in 1291, and, as held in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, ante, is within the rulemaking power of this Court. </s> Affirmed. </s> [For opinion of MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, joined by MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting in this case, but concurring in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, see ante, p. 439.] </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 For text, see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, ante, at 434-435. </s> [Footnote 2 For text, see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, ante, at 431. </s> [Footnote 3 The entire agreement appears in 107 F.2d 27, 28-29, n. 1. </s> [Footnote 4 See 3 F. Supp. 120, 68 F.2d 564, cert. denied, 291 U.S. 675 , all relating to Equity No. 2506. </s> [Footnote 5 The amendment included an express determination that there was "no just reason for delay in entering an order and final judgment disposing of the issues raised by the Report of the Special Master . . . ." This was done after a hearing during which the District Court said "I think, so far as this Court is concerned, without a decision by the Court of Appeals on that report [of the special master], that we would just be wandering in an area where we couldn't see our way out if we tried any other issue until this case is decided." After the master's report was filed, and before objections to it had been filed, counsel for each side jointly informed the court that they desired to dispose of the master's report before trying the issues in the pending (counterclaim) Civil Action No. 7744, and that the final action on the master's report might even make it undesirable to try that action. The court, thereupon, continued, sine die, the pretrial conference it had scheduled in Civil Action No. 7744, and removed the case from the trial calendar, without prejudice to either party and subject to reinstatement. That is the present status of the "counterclaim." </s> [Footnote 6 See Ayres v. Carver, 17 How. 591; Bowker v. United States, 186 U.S. 135 ; General Electric Co. v. Marvel Rare Metals Co., 287 U.S. 430 ; Toomey v. Toomey, 80 U.S. App. D.C. 77, 149 F.2d 19. </s> [Footnote 7 Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 13 (b), defines a "permissive" counterclaim as follows: "A pleading may state as a counterclaim any claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim." </s> [Footnote 8 Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 13 (a), defines a compulsory counterclaim as follows: "A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, except that such a claim need not be so stated if at the time the action was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending action." </s> [Footnote 9 See Audi Vision, Inc. v. RCA Mfg. Co., 136 F.2d 621 (C. A. 2d Cir.); Toomey v. Toomey, supra. </s> [Footnote 10 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, ante, at 433-434. </s> [351 U.S. 445, 454]

United States Supreme Court GRIFFIN v. CALIFORNIA(1965) No. 202 Argued: March 9, 1965Decided: April 28, 1965 </s> Comment to the jury by a prosecutor in a state criminal trial upon a defendant's failure to testify as to matters which he can reasonably be expected to deny or explain because of facts within his knowledge or by the court that the defendant's silence under those circumstances evidences guilt violates the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 . Pp. 610-615. </s> 60 Cal. 2d 182, 383 P.2d 432, reversed. </s> Morris Lavine argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. </s> Albert W. Harris, Jr., Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Arlo E. Smith, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Derald E. Granberg, Deputy Attorney General. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Petitioner was convicted of murder in the first degree after a jury trial in a California court. He did not testify at the trial on the issue of guilt, though he did testify at the separate trial 1 on the issue of penalty. The trial court instructed the jury on the issue of guilt, stating [380 U.S. 609, 610] that a defendant has a constitutional right not to testify. But it told the jury: 2 </s> "As to any evidence or facts against him which the defendant can reasonably be expected to deny or explain because of facts within his knowledge, if he does not testify or if, though he does testify, he fails to deny or explain such evidence, the jury may take that failure into consideration as tending to indicate the truth of such evidence and as indicating that among the inferences that may be reasonably drawn therefrom those unfavorable to the defendant are the more probable." </s> It added, however, that no such inference could be drawn as to evidence respecting which he had no knowledge. It stated that failure of a defendant to deny or explain the evidence of which he had knowledge does not create a presumption of guilt nor by itself warrant an inference of guilt nor relieve the prosecution of any of its burden of proof. </s> Petitioner had been seen with the deceased the evening of her death, the evidence placing him with her in the alley where her body was found. The prosecutor made much of the failure of petitioner to testify: </s> "The defendant certainly knows whether Essie Mae had this beat up appearance at the time he left her apartment and went down the alley with her. </s> "What kind of a man is it that would want to have sex with a woman that beat up if she was beat up at the time he left? [380 U.S. 609, 611] </s> "He would know that. He would know how she got down the alley. He would know how the blood got on the bottom of the concrete steps. He would know how long he was with her in that box. He would know how her wig got off. He would know whether he beat her or mistreated her. He would know whether he walked away from that place cool as a cucumber when he saw Mr. Villasenor because he was conscious of his own guilt and wanted to get away from that damaged or injured woman. </s> "These things he has not seen fit to take the stand and deny or explain. </s> "And in the whole world, if anybody would know, this defendant would know. </s> "Essie Mae is dead, she can't tell you her side of the story. The defendant won't." </s> The death penalty was imposed and the California Supreme Court affirmed. 60 Cal. 2d 182, 383 P.2d 432. The case is here on a writ of certiorari which we granted, 377 U.S. 989 , to consider whether comment on the failure to testify violated the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment which we made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 , decided after the Supreme Court of California had affirmed the present conviction. 3 </s> [380 U.S. 609, 612] </s> If this were a federal trial, reversible error would have been committed. Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60 , so holds. It is said, however, that the Wilson decision rested not on the Fifth Amendment, but on an Act of Congress, now 18 U.S.C. 3481. 4 That indeed is the fact, as the opinion of the Court in the Wilson case states. And see Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 50 , n. 6; [380 U.S. 609, 613] Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 294 . But that is the beginning, not the end, of our inquiry. The question remains whether, statute or not, the comment rule, approved by California, violates the Fifth Amendment. </s> We think it does. It is in substance a rule of evidence that allows the State the privilege of tendering to the jury for its consideration the failure of the accused to testify. No formal offer of proof is made as in other situations; but the prosecutor's comment and the court's acquiescence are the equivalent of an offer of evidence and its acceptance. The Court in the Wilson case stated: </s> ". . . the act was framed with a due regard also to those who might prefer to rely upon the presumption of innocence which the law gives to every one, and not wish to be witnesses. It is not every one who can safely venture on the witness stand though entirely innocent of the charge against him. Excessive timidity, nervousness when facing others and attempting to explain transactions of a suspicious character, and offences charged against him, will often confuse and embarrass him to such a degree as to increase rather than remove prejudices against him. It is not every one, however honest, who would, therefore, willingly be placed on the witness stand. The statute, in tenderness to the weakness of those who from the causes mentioned might refuse to ask to be a witness, particularly when they may have been in some degree compromised by their association with others, declares that the failure of the defendant in a criminal action to request to be a witness shall not create any presumption against him." 149 U.S., p. 66. </s> If the words "Fifth Amendment" are substituted for "act" and for "statute," the spirit of the Self-Incrimination [380 U.S. 609, 614] Clause is reflected. For comment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the "inquisitorial system of criminal justice," Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 , which the Fifth Amendment outlaws. 5 It is a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly. It is said, however, that the inference of guilt for failure to testify as to facts peculiarly within the accused's knowledge is in any event natural and irresistible, and that comment on the failure does not magnify that inference into a penalty for asserting a constitutional privilege. People v. Modesto, 62 Cal. 2d 436, 452-453, 398 P.2d 753, 762-763. What the jury may infer, given no help from the court, is one thing. What it may infer when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused into evidence against him is quite another. That the inference [380 U.S. 609, 615] of guilt is not always so natural or irresistible is brought out in the Modesto opinion itself: </s> "Defendant contends that the reason a defendant refuses to testify is that his prior convictions will be introduced in evidence to impeach him ([Cal.] Code Civ. Proc. 2051) and not that he is unable to deny the accusations. It is true that the defendant might fear that his prior convictions will prejudice the jury, and therefore another possible inference can be drawn from his refusal to take the stand." Id., p. 453, 398 P.2d, p. 763. </s> We said in Malloy v. Hogan, supra, p. 11, that "the same standards must determine whether an accused's silence in either a federal or state proceeding is justified." We take that in its literal sense and hold that the Fifth Amendment, in its direct application to the Federal Government, and in its bearing on the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt. 6 </s> Reversed. </s> THE CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 See Penal Code 190.1, providing for separate trials on the two issues. </s> [Footnote 2 Article I, 13, of the California Constitution provides in part: ". . . in any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure to explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against him may be commented upon by the court and by counsel, and may be considered by the court or the jury." </s> [Footnote 3 The California Supreme Court later held in People v. Modesto, 62 Cal. 2d 436, 398 P.2d 753, that its "comment" rule squared with Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 . The overwhelming consensus of the States, however, is opposed to allowing comment on the defendant's failure to testify. The legislatures or courts of 44 States have recognized that such comment is, in light of the privilege against self-incrimination, "an unwarrantable line of argument." State v. Howard, 35 S. C. 197, 203, 14 S. E. 481, 483. See 8 Wigmore, Evidence 2272, n. 2 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961 and 1964 Supp.). Of the six States which permit comment, two, California and Ohio, give this permission by means of an explicit constitutional qualification of the [380 U.S. 609, 612] privilege against self-incrimination. Cal. Const., Art. I 13; Ohio Const., Art. I, 10. New Jersey permits comment, State v. Corby, 28 N. J. 106, 145 A. 2d 289; cf. State v. Garvin, 44 N. J. 268, 208 A. 2d 402; but its constitution contains no provision embodying the privilege against self-incrimination (see Laba v. Newark Bd. of Educ., 23 N. J. 364, 389, 129 A. 2d 273, 287; State v. White, 27 N. J. 158, 168-169, 142 A. 2d 65, 70). The absence of an express constitutional privilege against self-incrimination also puts Iowa among the six. See State v. Ferguson, 226 Iowa 361, 372-373, 283 N. W. 917, 923. Connecticut permits comment by the judge but not by the prosecutor. State v. Heno, 119 Conn. 29, 174 A. 181. New Mexico permits comment by the prosecutor but holds that the accused is then entitled to an instruction that "the jury shall indulge no presumption against the accused because of his failure to testify." N. M. Stat. Ann. 41-12-19; State v. Sandoval, 59 N. M. 85, 279 P.2d 850. </s> [Footnote 4 Section 3481 reads as follows: "In trial of all persons charged with the commission of offenses against the United States and in all proceedings in courts martial and courts of inquiry in any State, District, Possession or Territory, the person charged shall, at his own request, be a competent witness. His failure to make such request shall not create any presumption against him." June 25, 1948, c. 645, 62 Stat. 833. The legislative history shows that 18 U.S.C. 3481 was designed, inter alia, to bar counsel for the prosecution from commenting on the defendant's refusal to testify. Mr. Frye of Maine, spokesman for the bill, said, "That is the law of Massachusetts, and we propose to adopt it as a law of the United States." 7 Cong. Rec. 385. The reference was to Mass. Stat. 1866, c. 260, now Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., c. 233, 20, cl. Third (1959), which is almost identical with 18 U.S.C. 3481. See also Commonwealth v. Harlow, 110 Mass. 411; Commonwealth v. Scott, 123 Mass. 239; Opinion of the Justices, 300 Mass. 620, 15 N. E. 2d 662. </s> [Footnote 5 Our decision today that the Fifth Amendment prohibits comment on the defendant's silence is no innovation, for on a previous occasion a majority of this Court indicated their acceptance of this proposition. In Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 , the question was, as here, whether the Fifth Amendment proscribed California's comment practice. The four dissenters (BLACK, DOUGLAS, Murphy and Rutledge, JJ.) would have answered this question in the affirmative. A fifth member of the Court, Justice Frankfurter, stated in a separate opinion: "For historical reasons a limited immunity from the common duty to testify was written into the Federal Bill of Rights, and I am prepared to agree that, as part of that immunity, comment on the failure of an accused to take the witness stand is forbidden in federal prosecutions." Id., p. 61. But, though he agreed with the dissenters on this point, he also agreed with Justices Vinson, Reed, Jackson, and Burton that the Fourteenth Amendment did not make the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment applicable to the States; thus he joined the opinion of the Court which so held (the Court's opinion assumed that the Fifth Amendment barred comment, but it expressly disclaimed any intention to decide the point. Id., p. 50). </s> [Footnote 6 We reserve decision on whether an accused can require, as in Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287 , that the jury be instructed that his silence must be disregarded. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring. </s> I agree with the Court that within the federal judicial system the Fifth Amendment bars adverse comment by federal prosecutors and judges on a defendant's failure to take the stand in a criminal trial, a right accorded him by that amendment. And given last Term's decision in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 , that the Fifth Amendment applies [380 U.S. 609, 616] to the States in all its refinements, I see no legitimate escape from today's decision and therefore concur in it. I do so, however, with great reluctance, since for me the decision exemplifies the creeping paralysis with which this Court's recent adoption of the "incorporation" doctrine is infecting the operation of the federal system. See my opinion concurring in the result in Pointer v. Texas, ante, p. 400, at 408. </s> While I would agree that the accusatorial rather than inquisitorial process is a fundamental part of the "liberty" guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, my Brother STEWART in dissent, post, p. 617, fully demonstrates that the no-comment rule "might be lost, and justice still be done," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 . As a "non-fundamental" part of the Fifth Amendment (cf. my opinion concurring in the result in Pointer, at 409), I would not, but for Malloy, apply the no-comment rule to the States. </s> Malloy put forward a single argument for applying the Fifth Amendment, as such, to the States: </s> "It would be incongruous to have different standards determine the validity of a claim of privilege . . ., depending on whether the claim was asserted in a state or federal court. Therefore, the same standards must determine whether an accused's silence in either a federal or state proceeding is justified." Malloy v. Hogan, supra, at 11. (Emphasis added.) </s> My answer then ( 378 U.S., at 27 ) and now is that "incongruity," within the limits of fundamental fairness, is at the heart of our federal system. The powers and responsibilities of the State and Federal Governments are not congruent, and under the Constitution they are not intended to be. </s> It has also recently been suggested that measuring state procedures against standards of fundamental fairness as reflected in such landmark decisions as Twining v. New [380 U.S. 609, 617] Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 , and Palko v. Connecticut, supra, "would require this Court to intervene in the state judicial process with considerable lack of predictability and with a consequent likelihood of considerable friction," Pointer v. Texas, supra, at 413-414 (concurring opinion of GOLDBERG, J.). This approach to the requirements of federalism, not unlike that evinced by the Court in Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 , apparently leads, in cases like this, to the conclusion that the way to eliminate friction with state judicial systems is not to attempt a working harmony, but to override them altogether. </s> Although compelled to concur in this decision, I am free to express the hope that the Court will eventually return to constitutional paths which, until recently, it has followed throughout its history. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE WHITE joins, dissenting. </s> The petitioner chose not to take the witness stand at his trial upon a charge of first-degree murder in a California court. Article I, 13, of the California Constitution establishes a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination and further provides: </s> "[I]n any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure to explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against him may be commented upon by the court and by counsel, and may be considered by the court or the jury." </s> In conformity with this provision, the prosecutor in his argument to the jury emphasized that a person accused of crime in a public forum would ordinarily deny or explain the evidence against him if he truthfully could do so. 1 Also in conformity with this California constitutional [380 U.S. 609, 618] provision, the judge instructed the jury in the following terms: </s> "It is a constitutional right of a defendant in a criminal trial that he may not be compelled to testify. Thus, whether or not he does testify rests entirely in his own decision. As to any evidence or facts against him which the defendant can reasonably be expected to deny or explain because of facts within his knowledge, if he does not testify, or if, though he does testify, he fails to deny or explain such evidence, the jury may take that failure into consideration as tending to indicate the truth of such evidence and as indicating that among the inferences that may be reasonably drawn therefrom those unfavorable to the defendant are the more probable. In this connection, however, it should be noted that if a defendant does not have the knowledge that he would need to deny or to explain any certain evidence against him, it would be unreasonable to draw an inference unfavorable to him because of his failure to deny or to explain such evidence. The failure of a defendant to deny or explain evidence against him does not create a presumption of guilt or by itself warrant an inference of guilt, nor does it relieve the prosecution of its burden of proving every essential element of the crime and the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt." </s> The jury found the petitioner guilty as charged, and his conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of California. 2 </s> [380 U.S. 609, 619] </s> No claim is made that the prosecutor's argument or the trial judge's instructions to the jury in this case deprived the petitioner of due process of law as such. This Court long ago decided that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not of its own force forbid this kind of comment on a defendant's failure to testify. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 ; Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 . The Court holds, however, that the California constitutional provision violates the Fifth Amendment's injunction that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself," an injunction which the Court less than a year ago for the first time found was applicable to trials in the courts of the several States. </s> With both candor and accuracy, the Court concedes that the question before us is one of first impression here. 3 It is a question which has not arisen before, because until last year the self-incrimination provision of the Fifth Amendment had been held to apply only to federal proceedings, and in the federal judicial system the matter has been [380 U.S. 609, 620] covered by a specific Act of Congress which has been in effect ever since defendants have been permitted to testify at all in federal criminal trials. 4 See Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287 ; Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60 ; Adamson v. California, supra. </s> We must determine whether the petitioner has been "compelled . . . to be a witness against himself." Compulsion is the focus of the inquiry. Certainly, if any compulsion be detected in the California procedure, it is of a dramatically different and less palpable nature than that involved in the procedures which historically gave rise to the Fifth Amendment guarantee. When a suspect was brought before the Court of High Commission or the Star Chamber, he was commanded to answer whatever was asked of him, and subjected to a far-reaching and deeply probing inquiry in an effort to ferret out some unknown and frequently unsuspected crime. He declined to answer on pain of incarceration, banishment, or mutilation. And if he spoke falsely, he was subject to further punishment. Faced with this formidable array of alternatives, his decision to speak was unquestionably coerced. 5 </s> Those were the lurid realities which lay behind enactment of the Fifth Amendment, a far cry from the subject matter of the case before us. I think that the Court in this case stretches the concept of compulsion beyond all reasonable bounds, and that whatever compulsion may exist derives from the defendant's choice not to testify, not from any comment by court or counsel. In support of its conclusion that the California procedure does compel the accused to testify, the Court has only this to say: "It is a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly." Exactly what the penalty [380 U.S. 609, 621] imposed consists of is not clear. It is not, as I understand the problem, that the jury becomes aware that the defendant has chosen not to testify in his own defense, for the jury will, of course, realize this quite evident fact, even though the choice goes unmentioned. Since comment by counsel and the court does not compel testimony by creating such an awareness, the Court must be saying that the California constitutional provision places some other compulsion upon the defendant to incriminate himself, some compulsion which the Court does not describe and which I cannot readily perceive. </s> It is not at all apparent to me, on any realistic view of the trial process, that a defendant will be at more of a disadvantage under the California practice than he would be in a court which permitted no comment at all on his failure to take the witness stand. How can it be said that the inferences drawn by a jury will be more detrimental to a defendant under the limiting and carefully controlling language of the instruction here involved than would result if the jury were left to roam at large with only its untutored instincts to guide it, to draw from the defendant's silence broad inferences of guilt? The instructions in this case expressly cautioned the jury that the defendant's failure to testify "does not create a presumption of guilt or by itself warrant an inference of guilt"; it was further admonished that such failure does not "relieve the prosecution of its burden of proving every essential element of the crime," and finally the trial judge warned that the prosecution's burden remained that of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." Whether the same limitations would be observed by a jury without the benefit of protective instructions shielding the defendant is certainly open to real doubt. </s> Moreover, no one can say where the balance of advantage might lie as a result of the attorneys' discussion of the matter. No doubt the prosecution's argument will seek to encourage the drawing of inferences unfavorable to the [380 U.S. 609, 622] defendant. However, the defendant's counsel equally has an opportunity to explain the various other reasons why a defendant may not wish to take the stand, and thus rebut the natural if uneducated assumption that it is because the defendant cannot truthfully deny the accusations made. </s> I think the California comment rule is not a coercive device which impairs the right against self-incrimination, but rather a means of articulating and bringing into the light of rational discussion a fact inescapably impressed on the jury's consciousness. The California procedure is not only designed to protect the defendant against unwarranted inferences which might be drawn by an uninformed jury; it is also an attempt by the State to recognize and articulate what it believes to be the natural probative force of certain facts. Surely no one would deny that the State has an important interest in throwing the light of rational discussion on that which transpires in the course of a trial, both to protect the defendant from the very real dangers of silence and to shape a legal process designed to ascertain the truth. </s> The California rule allowing comment by counsel and instruction by the judge on the defendant's failure to take the stand is hardly an idiosyncratic aberration. The Model Code of Evidence, and the Uniform Rules of Evidence both sanction the use of such procedures. 6 The practice has been endorsed by resolution of the American Bar Association and the American Law Institute, 7 and has the support of the weight of scholarly opinion. 8 </s> [380 U.S. 609, 623] </s> The formulation of procedural rules to govern the administration of criminal justice in the various States is properly a matter of local concern. We are charged with no general supervisory power over such matters; our only legitimate function is to prevent violations of the Constitution's commands. California has honored the constitutional command that no person shall "be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." The petitioner was not compelled to testify, and he did not do so. But whenever in a jury trial a defendant exercises this constitutional right, the members of the jury are bound to draw inferences from his silence. No constitution can prevent the operation of the human mind. Without limiting instructions, the danger exists that the inferences drawn by the jury may be unfairly broad. Some States have permitted this danger to go unchecked, by forbidding any comment at all upon the defendant's failure to take the witness stand. 9 Other States have dealt with this danger in a variety of ways, as the Court's opinion indicates. Ante, note 3, at pp. 611-612. Some might differ, as a matter of policy, with the way California has chosen to deal with the problem, or even disapprove of the judge's specific instructions in this case. 10 But, so long as the constitutional command is obeyed. such matters of state policy are not for this Court to decide. </s> I would affirm the judgment. </s> [Footnote 1 See the excerpt from the prosecutor's argument quoted in the Court's opinion, ante, pp. 610-611. </s> [Footnote 2 60 Cal. 2d 182, 383 P.2d 432. As this case was decided before Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 , the California Supreme Court did not give plenary consideration to the question now before us; however, that court has since upheld the federal constitutionality of the California comment rule in a thoroughly reasoned opinion by Chief Justice Traynor. People v. Modesto, 62 Cal. 2d 436, 398 P.2d 753. </s> [Footnote 3 In the Adamson case, the present question was not reached because the majority ruled that the Fifth Amendment is not applicable to the States. Mr. Justice Reed's opinion made clear that the California rule was only assumed to contravene the Fifth Amendment, "without any intention . . . of ruling upon the issue." The dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS read the majority opinion as "strongly imply[ing] that the Fifth Amendment does not, of itself, bar comment upon failure to testify," but they considered the case on the majority's assumption, thereby giving no approval to that assumption, even in dictum. That no such approval was given by this dissenting opinion is further made evident by the fact that Mr. Justice Murphy and Mr. Justice Rutledge, also in dissent, felt it necessary to make what they characterized as an "addition," an expression of their view that the guarantee against self-incrimination had been violated in the case. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in concurring, also indicated that he was prepared to agree that the Fifth Amendment barred comment, thus bringing to three the members of the Court who, in dicta, took the view embraced by the Court today. </s> [Footnote 4 20 Stat. 30, as amended, now 18 U.S.C. 3481. </s> [Footnote 5 See generally 8 Wigmore, Evidence 2250 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). </s> [Footnote 6 Model Code of Evidence, Rule 201 (1942); Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 23 (4) (1953). </s> [Footnote 7 56 A. B. A. Rep. 137-159 (1931); 59 A. B. A. Rep. 130-141 (1934); 9 Proceedings A. L. I. 202, 203 (1931). </s> [Footnote 8 See Bruce, The Right to Comment on the Failure of the Defendant to Testify, 31 Mich. L. Rev. 226; Dunmore, Comment on Failure of Accused to Testify, 26 Yale L. J. 464; Hadley, Criminal Justice in America, 11 A. B. A. J. 674, 677; Hiscock, Criminal Law and Procedure [380 U.S. 609, 623] in New York, 26 Col. L. Rev. 253, 258-262; Note, Comment on Defendant's Failure to Take the Stand, 57 Yale L. J. 145. </s> [Footnote 9 See, e. g., State v. Pearce, 56 Minn. 226, 57 N. W. 652; Tines v. Commonwealth, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1233, 77 S. W. 363; Hanks v. Commonwealth, 248 Ky. 203, 58 S. W. 2d 394. </s> [Footnote 10 It should be noted that the defendant's counsel did not request any additions to the instructions which would have brought out other possible reasons which might have influenced the defendant's decision not to become a witness. The California Constitution does not in terms prescribe what form of instruction should be given and the petitioner has not argued that another form would have been denied. </s> [380 U.S. 609, 624]

United States Supreme Court McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, et al. v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION et al.(2003) No. 02-1674 Argued: September 8, 2003Decided: December 10, 2003 </s> The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), which amended the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), the Communications Act of 1934, and other portions of the United States Code, is the most recent of nearly a century of federal enactments designed "to purge national politics of what [is] conceived to be the pernicious influence of 'big money' campaign contributions." United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 572. In enacting BCRA, Congress sought to address three important developments in the years since this Court's landmark decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (per curiam):the increased importance of "soft money," the proliferation of "issue ads," and the disturbing findings of a Senate investigation into campaign practices related to the 1996 federal elections. </s> With regard to the first development, prior to BCRA, FECA's disclosure requirements and source and amount limitations extended only to so-called "hard money" contributions made for the purpose of influencing an election for federal office. Political parties and candidates were able to circumvent FECA's limitations by contributing "soft money"--money as yet unregulated under FECA--to be used for activities intended to influence state or local elections; for mixed-purpose activities such as get-out-the-vote (GOTV) drives and generic party advertising; and for legislative advocacy advertisements, even if they mentioned a federal candidate's name, so long as the ads did not expressly advocate the candidate's election or defeat. With regard to the second development, parties and candidates circumvented FECA by using "issue ads" that were specifically intended to affect election results, but did not contain "magic words," such as "Vote Against Jane Doe," which would have subjected the ads to FECA's restrictions. Those developments were detailed in a 1998 Senate Committee Report summarizing an investigation into the 1996 federal elections, which concluded that the soft-money loophole had led to a meltdown of the campaign finance system; and discussed potential reforms, including a soft-money ban and restrictions on sham issue advocacy by nonparty groups. </s> Congress enacted many of the committee's proposals in BCRA: Title I regulates the use of soft money by political parties, officeholders, and candidates; Title II primarily prohibits corporations and unions from using general treasury funds for communications that are intended to, or have the effect of, influencing federal election outcomes; and Titles III, IV, and V set out other requirements. Eleven actions challenging BCRA's constitutionality were filed. A three-judge District Court held some parts of BCRA unconstitutional and upheld others. The parties challenging the law are referred to here as plaintiffs, and those who intervened in support of the law are intervenor-defendants. Held:The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. 251 F.Supp. 2d 176, 251 F.Supp. 2d 948, affirmed in part and reversed in part. Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor delivered the Court's opinion with respect to BCRA Titles I and II, concluding that the statute's two principal, complementary features--Congress' effort to plug the soft-money loophole and its regulation of electioneering communications--must be upheld in the main. Pp. 23-118. </s> 1.New FECA §323 survives plaintiffs' facial First Amendment challenge. Pp. 23-77. </s> (a)In evaluating §323, the Court applies the less rigorous standard of review applicable to campaign contribution limits under Buckley and its progeny. Such limits are subject only to "closely drawn" scrutiny, see 459 U.S. 197, 208. The less rigorous review standard shows proper deference to Congress' ability to weigh competing constitutional interests in an area in which it enjoys particular expertise, and provides it with sufficient room to anticipate and respond to concerns about circumvention of regulations designed to protect the political process' integrity. Finally, because Congress, in its lengthy deliberations leading to BCRA's enactment, properly relied on Buckley and its progeny, stare decisis considerations, buttressed by the respect that the Legislative and Judicial Branches owe one another, provide additional powerful reasons for adhering to the analysis of contribution limits the Court has consistently followed since Buckley. The Court rejects plaintiffs' argument that the type of speech and associational burdens that §323 imposes are fundamentally different from the burdens that accompanied Buckley's contribution limits. Pp. 24-32. </s> (b)New FECA §323(a)--which forbids national party committees and their agents to "solicit, receive, ... direct ... , or spend any funds ... that are not subject to [FECA's] limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements," 2 U.S.C.A. §§441i(a)(1), (2)--does not violate the First Amendment. Pp. 32-52. </s> (1)The governmental interest underlying §323(a)--preventing the actual or apparent corruption of federal candidates and officeholders--constitutes a sufficiently important interest to justify contribution limits. That interest is not limited to the elimination of quid pro quo, cash-for-votes exchanges, see Buckley, supra, at 28, but extends also to "undue influence on an officeholder's judgment, and the appearance of such influence," Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 441 (Colorado II). These interests are sufficient to justify not only contribution limits themselves, but also laws preventing the circumvention of such limits. Id., at 456. While the quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments varies with the novelty or plausibility of the justification raised, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391, the idea that large contributions to a national party can corrupt or create the appearance of corruption of federal candidates and officeholders is neither novel nor implausible, see, e.g., Buckley, supra, at 38. There is substantial evidence in these cases to support Congress' determination that such contributions of soft money give rise to corruption and the appearance of corruption. For instance, the record is replete with examples of national party committees' peddling access to federal candidates and officeholders in exchange for large soft-money donations. Pp. 32-45. </s> (2)Section §323(a) is not impermissibly overbroad because it subjects all funds raised and spent by national parties to FECA's hard-money source and amount limits, including, e.g., funds spent on purely state and local elections in which no federal office is at stake. The record demonstrates that the close relationship between federal officeholders and the national parties, as well as the means by which parties have traded on that relationship, have made all large soft-money contributions to national parties suspect, regardless of how those funds are ultimately used. The Government's strong interests in preventing corruption, and particularly its appearance, are thus sufficient to justify subjecting all donations to national parties to FECA's source, amount, and disclosure limitations. Pp. 45-47. </s> (3)Nor is §323(a)'s prohibition on national parties' soliciting or directing soft-money contributions substantially overbroad. That prohibition's reach is limited, in that it bars only soft-money solicitations by national party committees and party officers acting in their official capacities; the committees themselves remain free to solicit hard money on their own behalf or that of state committees and state and local candidates and to contribute hard money to state committees and candidates. Plaintiffs argue unpersuasively that the solicitation ban's overbreadth is demonstrated by §323(e), which allows federal candidates and officeholders to solicit limited amounts of soft money from individual donors under certain circumstances. The differences between §§323(a) and 323(e) are without constitutional significance, see National Right to Work, 459 U.S., at 210, reflecting Congress' reasonable and expert judgments about national committees' functions and their interactions with officeholders. Pp. 47-48. </s> (4)Section 323(a) is not substantially overbroad with respect to the speech and associational rights of minor parties, even though the latter may have slim prospects for electoral success. It is reasonable to require that all parties and candidates follow the same rules designed to protect the electoral process's integrity. Buckley, 424 U.S., at 34-35. A nascent or struggling minor party can bring an as-applied challenge if §323(a) prevents it from amassing the resources necessary to engage in effective advocacy. Id., at 21. Pp. 48-51. </s> (5)Plaintiffs' argument that §323(a) unconstitutionally interferes with the ability of national committees to associate with state and local committees is unpersuasive because it hinges on an unnaturally broad reading of the statutory terms "spend," "receive," "direct," and "solicit." Nothing on §323(a)'s face prohibits national party officers from sitting down with state and local party committees or candidates to plan and advise how to raise and spend soft money, so long as the national officers do not personally spend, receive, direct, or solicit soft money. Pp. 51-52. </s> (c)On its face, new FECA §323(b)--which prohibits state and local party committees from using soft money for activities affecting federal elections, 2 U.S.C.A. §442i(b)--is closely drawn to match the important governmental interest of preventing corruption and its appearance. Pp. 52-66. </s> (1)Recognizing that the close ties between federal candidates and state party committees would soon render §323(a)'s anticorruption measures ineffective if state and local committees remained available as a conduit for soft-money donations, Congress designed §323(b) to prevent donors from contributing nonfederal funds to such committees to help finance "Federal election activity," which is defined to encompass (1) voter registration activity during the 120 days before a federal election; (2) voter identification, GOTV, and generic campaign activity "conducted in connection with an election in which a [federal] candidate ... appears on the ballot"; (3) any "public communication" that "refers to a clearly identified [federal] candidate" and "promotes," "supports," "attacks," or "opposes" such a candidate; and (4) the services of a state committee employee who dedicates more than 25% of his or her compensated time to "activities in connection with a Federal election," 2 U.S.C.A. §§431(20)(A)(i-iv). All activities that fall within this definition must be funded with hard money. §441i(b)(1). The Levin Amendment carves out an exception to this general rule, allowing state and local party committees to pay for certain federal election activities--namely, activities falling within categories (1) and (2) above that either do not refer to "a clearly identified candidate for Federal office," or, if they involve broadcast communications, refer "solely to a clearly identified candidate for State or local office," §§441i(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii)--with an allocated ratio of hard money and so-called "Levin funds." Levin funds are subject only to state regulation, but for two additional restrictions. First, no contributor can donate more than $10,000 per year to a single committee's Levin account. §441i(b)(2)(B)(iii). Second, both Levin funds and the allocated portion of hard money to pay for such activities must be raised by the state or local committee that spends them, though the committee can team up with other national, state, or local committees to solicit the hard-money portion. §§441i(b)(2)(B)(iv), 441i(b)(2)(C). Pp. 52-55. </s> (2)In addressing soft-money contributions to state committees, Congress both drew a conclusion and made a prediction. It concluded from the record that soft money's corrupting influence insinuates itself into the political process not only through national party committees, but also through state committees, which function as an alternate avenue for precisely the same corrupting forces. Indeed, the evidence shows that both candidates and parties already ask donors who have reached their direct contribution limit to donate to state committees. Congress' reasonable prediction, based on the history of campaign finance regulation, was that donors would react to §323(a) by directing soft-money contributions to state committees for the purpose of influencing federal candidates and elections, and that federal candidates would be just as indebted to these contributors as they had been to those who had formerly contributed to the national parties. Preventing corrupting activity from shifting wholesale to state committees and thereby eviscerating FECA clearly qualifies as an important governmental interest. Pp. 55-57. </s> (3)Plaintiffs argue unpersuasively that, even if §323(b) serves a legitimate interest, its restrictions are so unjustifiably burdensome and overbroad that they cannot be considered "closely drawn" to match the Government's objectives. Pp. 57-66. </s> (i)Section 323(b) is not substantially overbroad. Although §323(b) captures some activities that affect state campaigns for nonfederal offices, these are the same activities that were covered by the FEC's pre-BCRA allocation rules, and so had to be funded in part by hard money because they affected both federal and state elections. As a practical matter, BCRA merely codifies the FEC's allocation regime principles while justifiably adjusting the applicable formulas in order to restore the efficacy of FECA's longstanding restriction on contributions to state and local committees for the purpose of influencing federal elections. By limiting its reach to "Federal election activities," §323(b) is narrowly focused on regulating contributions that directly benefit federal candidates and thus pose the greatest risk of corruption or its appearance. The first two categories of "Federal election activity"--voter registration efforts and voter identification, GOTV, and generic campaign activities conducted in connection with a federal election--clearly capture activities that confer a substantial benefit on federal candidates by getting like-minded voters to the polls. If a voter registration drive does not specifically mention a federal candidate, state committees can take advantage of the Levin Amendment's higher contribution limits and relaxed source restrictions. Moreover, because the record demonstrates abundantly that the third category of "Federal election activity," "public communication[s]" that promote or attack a federal candidate, directly affects the election in which that candidate is participating, application of §323(b)'s contribution caps to such communications is closely drawn to the anticorruption interest it is intended to address. Finally, Congress' interest in preventing circumvention of §323(b)'s other restrictions justifies the requirement of the fourth category of "Federal election activity" that federal funds be used to pay any state or local party employee who spends more than 25% of his or her compensated time on activities connected with a federal election. Pp. 58-63. </s> (ii)The Levin Amendment does not unjustifiably burden association among party committees by forbidding transfers of Levin funds among state parties, transfers of hard money to fund the allocable federal portion of Levin expenditures, and joint fundraising of Levin funds by state parties. While preserving parties' associational freedom is important, not every minor restriction on parties' otherwise unrestrained ability to associate is of constitutional dimension. See Colorado II, 533 U.S., at 450, n. 11. Given the delicate and interconnected regulatory scheme at issue here, any associational burdens imposed by the Levin Amendment restrictions are far outweighed by the need to prevent circumvention of the entire scheme. Pp. 63-65. </s> (iii)The evidence supporting the argument that the Levin Amendment prevents parties from amassing the resources needed to engage in effective advocacy is speculative. The history of campaign finance regulation proves that political parties are extraordinarily flexible in adapting to new restrictions on their fundraising abilities. Moreover, the mere fact that §323(b) may reduce the money available to state and local parties to fund federal election activities is largely inconsequential. The question is not whether the amount available over previous election cycles is reduced, but whether the reduction is so radical as to drive the sound of the recipient's voice below the level of notice. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S., at 397. If state or local parties can make such a showing, as-applied challenges remain available. Pp. 65-66. </s> (d)New FECA §323(d)--which forbids national, state, and local party committees and their agents to "solicit any funds for, or make or direct any donations" to §501(c) tax exempt organizations that make expenditures in connection with a federal election, and to §527 political organizations "other than a political committee, a State, district, or local committee of a political party, or the authorized campaign committee of a candidate for State or local office," 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(d)--is not facially invalid. Pp. 66-73. </s> (1)Section 323(d)'s restriction on solicitations is a valid anti-circumvention measure. Absent this provision, national, state, and local party committees would have significant incentives to mobilize their formidable fundraising apparatuses, including the peddling of access to federal officeholders, into the service of like-minded tax-exempt organizations that conduct activities benefiting their candidates. All of the corruption and the appearance of corruption attendant on the operation of those fundraising apparatuses would follow. Plaintiffs' argument that §323(d)'s solicitations ban cannot be squared with §323(e), which allows federal candidates and officeholders to solicit limited soft-money donations to tax-exempt organizations engaged in federal election activities, is not persuasive. If §323(d)'s solicitation restriction is otherwise valid, it is not rendered unconstitutional by the mere fact that Congress chose not to regulate the activities of another group as stringently as it might have. See National Right to Work, 459 U.S., at 210. Furthermore, the difference between the two provisions is explained by the fact that national party officers, unlike federal candidates and officeholders, remain free to solicit soft money on behalf of nonprofit organizations in their individual capacities. Given §323(e)'s tight content, source, and amount restrictions on soft-money solicitations by federal candidates and officeholders, as well as the less rigorous standard of review, §323(e)'s greater solicitation allowances do not render §323(d)'s solicitation restriction facially invalid. Pp. 67-71. </s> (2)Section 323(d)'s restriction on donations to qualifying §501(c) or §527 organizations is a valid anticircumvention measure insofar as it prohibits donations of funds not already raised in compliance with FECA. Absent such a restriction, state and local party committees could accomplish directly what the antisolicitation restrictions prevent them from doing indirectly--raising large sums of soft money to launder through tax-exempt organizations engaging in federal election activities. Although the ban raises overbreadth concerns if read to restrict donations from a party's federal account--i.e., funds already raised in compliance with FECA's source, amount, and disclosure limitations--these concerns do not require that the facial challenge be sustained, given this Court's obligation to construe a statute, if possible, in such a way as to avoid constitutional questions, see, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62. Because the record does not compel the conclusion that Congress intended "donations" to include donations from a party's hard-money account, and because of the constitutional infirmities such an interpretation would raise, the Court narrowly construes §323(d)'s ban to apply only to donations of funds not raised in compliance with FECA. Pp. 71-73. </s> (e)New FECA §323(e)--which, with many exceptions, forbids federal candidates and officeholders to "solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or spend" soft money in connection with federal elections, 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(e)(1)(A), and limits their ability to do so for state and local elections, §441i(e)(1)(B)--does not violate the First Amendment. No party seriously questions the constitutionality of the general ban on soft-money donations directly to federal candidates and officeholders and their agents. By severing the most direct link to the soft-money donor, the ban is closely drawn to prevent the corruption or the appearance of corruption of federal candidates and officeholders. The solicitation restrictions are valid anticircumvention measures. Even before BCRA's passage, federal candidates and officeholders solicited donations to state and local parties, as well as tax-exempt organizations, in order to help their own, as well as their party's, electoral cause. See Colorado II, 533 U.S., at 458. The incentives to do so will only increase with Title I's restrictions on the raising and spending of soft money by national, state, and local parties. Section 323(e) addresses these concerns while accommodating the individual speech and associational rights of federal candidates and officeholders. Pp. 74-77. </s> (f)New FECA §323(f)--which forbids state and local candidates or officeholders to raise and spend soft money to fund ads and other "public communications" that promote or attack federal candidates, 2 U.S.C. §442i(f)--is a valid anticircumvention provision. The section places no cap on the funds that such candidates can spend on any activity, but, rather, limits only the source and amount of contributions that they can draw on to fund expenditures that directly impact federal elections. And, by regulating only contributions used to fund "public communications," the section focuses narrowly on those soft-money donations with the greatest potential to corrupt or give rise to the appearance of corruption of federal candidates and officeholders. Plaintiffs' principal arguments against the section--(1) that the definition of "public communications" as communications that support or attack a clearly identified federal candidate is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; and (2) that soft-money contributions to state and local candidates for "public communications" do not corrupt or appear to corrupt federal candidates--are rejected. Pp. 77-78. </s> 2.Several plaintiffs argue unpersuasively that BCRA Title I exceeds Congress' Election Clause authority to "make or alter" rules governing federal elections, U.S. Const., Art. I, §4, and violates constitutional federalism principles by impairing the States' authority to regulate their own elections. In examining federal Acts for Tenth Amendment infirmity, the Court focuses on whether States and state officials are commandeered to carry out federal regulatory schemes. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898. By contrast, Title I only regulates private parties' conduct, imposing no requirements upon States or state officials. And, because it does not expressly pre-empt state legislation, Title I leaves States free to enforce their own restrictions on state electoral campaign financing. Moreover, while this Court has policed the absolute boundaries of Congress' Article I power, see, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, plaintiffs offer no reason to believe that Congress has overstepped its Elections Clause power in enacting BCRA. Indeed, as already found, Title I is closely drawn to match Congress' important interest in preventing the corruption or the appearance of corruption of federal candidates and officeholders. That interest is sufficient to ground Congress' exercise of its Elections Clause power. Pp. 79-80. </s> 3.Also rejected is the argument that BCRA Title I violates equal protection by discriminating against political parties in favor of special interest groups, which remain free to raise soft money to fund voter registration, GOTV activities, mailings, and broadcast advertising (other than electioneering communications). First, BCRA actually favors political parties in many ways, e.g., by allowing party committees to receive individual contributions substantially exceeding FECA limits on contributions to nonparty political committees. More importantly, Congress is fully entitled to consider the salient, real-world differences between parties and interest groups when crafting a campaign finance regulation system, see National Right to Work, 459 U.S., at 210, including the fact that parties have influence and power in the legislature vastly exceeding any interest group's. Taken seriously, plaintiffs' equal protection arguments would call into question not just BCRA Title I, but much of FECA's pre-existing structure. Pp. 82-85. </s> 4.Accordingly, the judgment below is affirmed insofar as it upheld §§323(e) and 323(f) and reversed insofar as it invalidated §§323(a), 323(b), and 323(d). P. 82. </s> 5.The District Court's judgment is affirmed to the extent that it upheld the disclosure requirements in amended FECA §304 and rejected the facial attack on the provisions relating to donors of $1,000 or more, but reversed to the extent that it invalidated FECA §304(f)(5). Pp. 82-95. </s> (a)BCRA §201 comprehensively amends FECA §304, which requires political committees to file detailed periodic financial reports with the FEC. The narrowing construction adopted in Buckley limited FECA's disclosure requirement to communications expressly advocating the election or defeat of particular candidates. BCRA adopts a new term, "electioneering communication," which encompasses any "broadcast, cable, or satellite communication" that clearly identifies a candidate for federal office, airs within a specific time period (e.g., within 60 days of a general election and 30 days of a primary), and is targeted to the relevant electorate. 2 U.S.C.A. §434(f)(3)(A)(i). BCRA also amends §304 to provide disclosure requirements for persons who fund electioneering communications (and BCRA §203 amends FECA §316(b)(2) to extend those requirements to corporations and labor unions). </s> Plaintiffs challenge the new term's constitutionality as it applies to both disclosures and expenditures, arguing primarily that Buckley drew a constitutionally mandated line between express advocacy and so-called issue advocacy, and that speakers have an inviolable First Amendment right to engage in the latter category of speech. However, a plain reading of Buckley and Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (MCFL), shows that the express advocacy restriction is a product of statutory interpretation, not a constitutional command. Both the concept of express advocacy and the class of magic words were born of an effort to avoid constitutional problems of vagueness and overbreadth in the statute before the Buckley Court. Consistent with the principle that a constitutional rule should never be formulated more broadly than required by the facts to which it is to be applied, Buckley and MCFL were specific to the statutory language before the Court and in no way drew a constitutional boundary that forever fixed the permissible scope of provisions regulating campaign-related speech. The notion that the First Amendment erects a rigid barrier between express and issue advocacy also cannot be squared with this Court's longstanding recognition that the presence or absence of magic words cannot meaningfully distinguish electioneering speech from a true issue ad. Buckley's express advocacy line has not aided the legislative effort to combat real or apparent corruption, and Congress enacted BCRA to correct the flaws it found. Finally, because the components of new FECA §304(f)(3)'s definition of "electioneering communication" are both easily understood and objectively determinable, the vagueness objection that persuaded the Buckley Court to limit FECA's reach to express advocacy is inapposite here. Pp. 82-88. </s> (b)With regard to plaintiffs' other concerns about the use of the phrase "electioneering communication," the District Court correctly rejected their submission that new FECA §304 unnecessarily requires disclosure of the names of persons who contributed $1,000 or more to the individual or group paying for the communication, but erred in finding §304(f)(5) invalid because it mandates disclosure of executory contracts for communications that have not yet aired. Because the important state interests identified in Buckley--providing the electorate with information, deterring actual corruption and avoiding its appearance, and gathering data necessary to enforce more substantive electioneering restrictions--apply in full to BCRA, Buckley amply supports application of FECA §304's disclosure requirements to the entire range of "electioneering communications." Buckley also forecloses a facial attack on the new §304 provision that requires disclosure of the names of persons who contribute $1,000 or more to segregated funds or spend more than $10,000 in a calendar year on electioneering communications. Under Buckley's standard of proof, the evidence here did not establish the requisite reasonable probability of harm to any plaintiff group or its members resulting from compelled disclosure. However, the rejection of this facial challenge does not foreclose possible future challenges to particular applications of that disclosure requirement. </s> This Court is also unpersuaded by plaintiffs' challenge to new FECA §304(f)(5)'s requirement regarding the disclosure of executory contracts. The new provision mandates disclosure only when a person makes disbursements totaling more than $10,000 in any calendar year to pay for electioneering communications. Given the relatively short time frames in which such communications are made, the interest in assuring that disclosures are made in time to provide relevant information to voters is significant. Yet fixing the deadline for filing disclosure statements based on the date when aggregate disbursements exceed $10,000 would open a significant loophole without the advance disclosure requirement, for political supporters could avoid preelection disclosures about ads slated to run during a campaign's final weeks simply by making a preelection downpayment of less than $10,000, with the balance payable after the election. The record contains little evidence of any harm that might flow from the requirement's enforcement, and the District Court's speculation about such harm cannot outweigh the public interest in ensuring full disclosure before an election actually takes place. Pp. 88-95. </s> 6.The District Court's judgment is affirmed insofar as it held that plaintiffs advanced no basis for finding unconstitutional BCRA §202, which amends FECA §315(a)(7)(C) to provide that disbursements for electioneering communications that are coordinated with a candidate or party will be treated as contributions to, and expenditures by, that candidate or party, 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(a)(7)(C). That provision clarifies the scope of §315(a)(7)(B), which provides that expenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of a candidate or party constitute contributions. BCRA pre-empts a possible claim that the term "expenditure" in §315(a)(7)(B) is limited to spending for express advocacy. Because Buckley's narrow interpretation of that term was only a statutory limitation on Congress' power to regulate federal elections, there is no reason why Congress may not treat coordinated disbursements for electioneering communications in the same way it treats other coordinated expenditures. Pp. 96-97. </s> 7.The District Court's judgment is affirmed to the extent that it upheld the constitutionality of new FECA §316(b)(2), and reversed to the extent that it invalidated any part of that section. BCRA §203 extends to all "electioneering communications" FECA §316(b)(2)'s restrictions on the use of corporate and union general treasury funds. 2 U.S.C.A. §441b(b)(2). Because those entities may still organize and administer segregated funds, or PACs, for such communications, the provision is a regulation of, not a ban on, expression. Beaumont, 539 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 15). This Court's consideration of plaintiffs' claim that the expanded regulation is both overinclusive and underinclusive is informed by the conclusion that the distinction between express advocacy and so-called issue advocacy is not constitutionally compelled. Thus, the Court examines the degree to which BCRA burdens First Amendment expression and evaluates whether a compelling governmental interest justifies that burden. Plaintiffs have not carried their burden of proving that new FECA §316(b)(2) is overbroad. They argue that the justifications that adequately support regulation of express advocacy do not apply to significant quantities of speech encompassed by the electioneering communications definition. That argument fails to the extent that issue ads broadcast during the 30- and 60-day periods preceding federal primary and general elections are the functional equivalent of express advocacy. The justifications for regulating express advocacy apply equally to those ads if they have an electioneering purpose, which the vast majority do. Also rejected is plaintiffs' argument that new FECA §316(b)(2)'s segregated-fund requirement is underinclusive because it does not apply to print or Internet advertising. The record here reflects that corporations and unions used soft money to finance a virtual torrent of televised election-related ads during the relevant period. Congress justifiably concluded that remedial legislation was needed to stanch that flow of money. Finally, §304(f)(3)(B)(i), which excludes news items and commentary from the electioneering communications definition, is wholly consistent with First Amendment principles as applied to the media. Pp. 97-103. </s> 8.The District Court's judgment is affirmed to the extent that it upheld new FECA §316(c)(6), as limited to nonprofit entities that are not so-called MCFL organizations. BCRA §204, which adds §316(c)(6), 2 U.S.C.A. §441b(c)(2), extends to nonprofit corporations the prohibition on the use of general treasury funds to pay for electioneering communications. This Court upheld a similar restriction in Beaumont, supra, except as it applied to organizations that are formed for the express purpose of promoting political ideas, have no shareholders, are not established by a business corporation or labor union, and do not accept contributions from those entities, MCFL, 479 U.S., at 264. The same constitutional objection to applying the pre-BCRA restrictions to such organizations necessarily applies with equal force to FECA §316(c)(6). That §316(c)(6) does not, on its face, exempt MCFL organizations is not a sufficient reason to invalidate it. This Court presumes that the legislators were fully aware that the provision could not apply to MCFL-type entities, and the Government concedes that it does not. As so construed, the provision is plainly valid. Pp. 103-106. </s> 9.Because this Court has already found BCRA §201's executory contract disclosure requirement constitutional, plaintiffs' challenge to a similar disclosure requirement in BCRA §212, which added FECA §304(g), 2 U.S.C.A. §434, is essentially moot. Pp. 106-107. </s> 10.The District Court's judgment is affirmed to the extent that it invalidated BCRA §213, which amends FECA §315(d)(4) to require political parties to choose between coordinated and independent expenditures during the postnomination, preelection period. 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(d)(4). That provision places an unconstitutional burden on the parties' right to make unlimited independent expenditures. Although the category of burdened speech is limited to independent expenditures for express advocacy--and therefore is relatively small--it plainly is entitled to First Amendment protection. The governmental interest in requiring parties to avoid using magic words is not sufficient to support the burden imposed by §315(d)(4). The fact that the provision is cast as a choice rather than an outright prohibition on independent expenditures does not make it constitutional. Pp. 107-114. </s> 11.The District Court's judgment is affirmed to the extent that it rejected plaintiffs' challenges to BCRA §214, which adds FECA §315(a)(7)(B)(ii), 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(a)(7)(b)(ii). FECA §315(a)(7)(B)(i) long has provided that expenditures that are controlled by or coordinated with a candidate will be treated as contributions to the candidate. BCRA §214(a) extends that rule to expenditures coordinated with political parties; and §§214 (b) and (c) direct the FEC to promulgate new regulations that do not "require agreement or formal collaboration to establish coordination," 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(a) note. FECA §315(a)(7)(B)(ii) is not overbroad simply because it permits a finding of coordination in the absence of a pre-existing agreement. Congress has always treated expenditures made after a wink or nod as coordinated. Nor does the absence of an agreement requirement render §315(a)(7)(B)(ii) unconstitutionally vague. An agreement has never been required under §315(a)(7)(B)(i), which uses precisely the same language as the new provision to address coordination with candidates, and which has survived without constitutional challenge for almost three decades. Plaintiffs have provided no evidence that that the definition has chilled political speech, and have made no attempt to explain how an agreement requirement would prevent the FEC from engaging in what they fear will be intrusive and politically motivated investigations. Finally, in this facial challenge to BCRA, plaintiffs' challenge to §§214(b) and (c) is not ripe to the extent that they allege constitutional infirmities in the FEC's new regulations rather than the statute. Pp. 114-119. </s> The Chief Justice delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to miscellaneous BCRA Title III and IV provisions, concluding that the District Court's judgment with respect to these provisions must be affirmed. Pp.2-11. </s> 1.The plaintiffs' challenges to BCRA §305, §307, and the millionaire provisions are nonjusticiable. Pp.2-8. </s> (a)The McConnell plaintiffs lack standing to challenge BCRA §305, which amends the federal Communications Act of 1934 requirement that, 45 days before a primary or 60 days before a general election, broadcast stations sell air time to a qualified candidate at their "lowest unit charge," 47 U.S.C. §315(b). Section 305's amendment, in turn, denies a candidate the benefit of that charge in specified circumstances. 47 U.S.C.A. §§315(b)(2)(A), (C). Senator McConnell's testimony that he plans to run ads critical of his opponents and had run them in the past is too remote temporally to satisfy the Article III standing requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate an "injury in fact" that is "actual or imminent," Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155, 158, given that the lowest unit charge requirement is not available until 45 days before a primary, that Senator McConnell's current term does not expire until 2009, and that, therefore, the earliest day he could be affected by §305 is 45 days before the 2008 Republican primary election. Pp.2-4. </s> (b)The Adams and Paul plaintiffs lack standing to challenge BCRA §307, which amends FECA §315(a)(1) to increase and index for inflation certain contribution limits. Neither injury alleged by the Adams plaintiffs, a group of voters, voter organizations, and candidates, is sufficient to confer standing. First, their assertion that §307 deprives them of an equal ability to participate in the election process based on their economic status does not satisfy the standing requirement that a plaintiff's alleged injury be an invasion of a concrete and particularized legally protected interest, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, since political "free trade" does not necessarily require that all who participate in the political marketplace do so with exactly equal resources, e.g., MCFL, 529 U.S. 765, 771, since, even if the Court were to strike down BCRA §307's increases and indexes, as they ask, both FECA's contribution limits and an exemption for institutional news media would remain unchanged. Pp.4-8. </s> (c)The Adams plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the so-called "millionaire provisions," BCRA §§304, 315, and 316, which provide for a series of staggered increases in otherwise applicable contribution-to-candidate limits if the candidate's opponent spends a triggering amount of his personal funds, and eliminate the coordinated expenditure limits in certain circumstances. Because these plaintiffs allege the same injuries that they alleged with regard to BCRA §307, they fail to state a cognizable injury that is fairly traceable to BCRA. Additionally, none of them is a candidate in an election affected by the millionaire provisions, and it would be purely conjectural to assume that any of them ever will be. P.8. </s> 2.The District Court's decision upholding BCRA §311's expansion of FECA §318(a) to include mandatory electioneering-communications-disbursements disclosure is affirmed because such inclusion bears a sufficient relationship to the important governmental interest of "shed[ding] the light of publicity" on campaign financing, Buckley, 424 U.S., at 81. Assuming, as the Court must, that FECA §318 is valid both to begin with and as amended by BCRA §311's amendments other than the electioneering-communications inclusion, the latter inclusion is not itself unconstitutional. P.9. </s> 3.BCRA §318--which forbids individuals "17 years old or younger" to make contributions to candidates and political parties, 2 U.S.C.A. §441k--violates the First Amendment rights of minors, see, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511-513. Because limitations on an individual's political contributions impinge on the freedoms of expression and association, see Buckley, 424 U.S., at 20-22, the Court applies heightened scrutiny to such a limitation, asking whether it is justified by a "sufficiently important interest" and "closely drawn" to avoid unnecessary abridgment of the First Amendment, see e.g., post, at 25-26 (joint opinion of Stevens and O'Connor, JJ.). The Government offers scant evidence for its assertion that §318 protects against corruption by conduit--i.e., donations by parents through their minor children to circumvent contribution limits applicable to the parents. Absent a more convincing case of the claimed evil, this interest is simply too attenuated for §318 to withstand heightened scrutiny. See Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S., at 391. Even assuming, arguendo, the Government advances an important interest, the provision is overinclusive, as shown by the States' adoption of more tailored approaches. Pp.9-11. </s> 4.Because the FEC clearly has standing, the Court need not address whether the intervenor-defendants, whose position here is identical to the FEC's, were properly granted intervention pursuant to, inter alia, BCRA §403(b). See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 431-432, n.19. P.11. </s> Justice Breyer delivered the Court's opinion with respect to BCRA Title V--§504 of which amends the Communications Act of 1934 to require broadcasters to keep publicly available records of politically related broadcasting requests, 47 U.S.C.A. §315(e)--concluding that the portion of the judgment below invalidating §504 as facially violative of the First Amendment must be reversed. Pp.2-15. </s> 1.Section 504's "candidate request" requirements--which call for broadcasters to keep records of broadcast requests "made by or on behalf of any ... candidate," 47 U.S.C.A. §315(e)(1)(A)--are upheld. They are virtually identical to those contained in a longstanding FCC regulation. The McConnell plaintiffs' argument that the requirements are intolerably burdensome and invasive is rejected. The FCC has consistently estimated that its regulation imposes upon a licensee a comparatively small additional administrative burden. Moreover, the §504 requirement is supported by significant governmental interests in verifying that licensees comply with their obligations to allow political candidates "equal time," 47 U.S.C. §315(a), and to sell such time at the "lowest unit charge," §315(b); in evaluating whether they are processing candidate requests in an evenhanded fashion to help assure broadcasting fairness, §315(a); in making the public aware of how much candidates spend on broadcast messages; 2 U.S.C.A. §434; and in providing an independently compiled set of data for verifying candidates' compliance with BCRA's and FECA's disclosure requirements and source limitations, ibid. Because the Court cannot, on the present record, find the longstanding FCC regulation unconstitutional, it cannot strike down BCRA §504's "candidate request" provision, which simply embodies the regulation in a statute, thereby blocking any agency attempt to repeal it. Pp.3-7. </s> 2.Because §504's "candidate request" requirements are constitutional, its "election message" requirements--which serve similar governmental interests and impose only a small incremental burden in requiring broadcasters to keep records of requests (made by anyone) to broadcast "message[s]" that refer either to a "legally qualified candidate" or to "any election to Federal office," 47 U.S.C.A. §§315(e)(1)(B)(i), (ii)--must be constitutional as well. Pp.8-9. </s> 3.BCRA §504's "issue request" requirements--which call for broadcasters to keep records of requests (made by anyone) to broadcast "message[s]" related to a "national legislative issue of public importance," 47 U.S.C.A. §315(e)(1)(B)(iii), or a "political matter of national importance," §315(e)(1)(B)--survive the McConnell plaintiffs' facial challenge. These recordkeeping requirements seem likely to help determine whether broadcasters are fulfilling their obligations under the FCC's regulations to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on important public issues or whether they too heavily favor entertainment, discriminating against public affairs broadcasts. The plaintiffs' claim that the above-quoted statutory language is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad is unpersuasive, given that it is no more general than language Congress has used to impose other obligations upon broadcasters and is roughly comparable to other BCRA language upheld in this litigation. Whether the "issue request" requirements impose disproportionate administrative burdens will depend on how the FCC interprets and applies them. The parties remain free to challenge the provisions, as interpreted by the FCC's regulations, or as otherwise applied. Without the greater information any such challenge will likely provide, the Court cannot say that the provisions' administrative burdens are so great, or their justifications so minimal, as to warrant finding them facially unconstitutional. Similarly, the argument that the "issue request" requirement will force the purchasers to disclose information revealing their political strategies to opponents does not show that BCRA §504 is facially unconstitutional, but the plaintiffs remain free to raise this argument when §504 is applied. Pp.9-12. Stevens and O'Connor, JJ., delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to BCRA Titles I and II, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV, in which O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined, in which Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined except with respect to BCRA §305, and in which Thomas, J., joined with respect to BCRA §§304, 305, 307, 316, 319, and 403(b). Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to BCRA Title V, in which Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV, dissenting with respect to BCRA Titles I and V, and concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect to BCRA Title II. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV, except for BCRA §§311 and 318, concurring in the result with respect to BCRA §318, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect to BCRA Title II, and dissenting with respect to BCRA Titles I, V, and §311, in which opinion Scalia, J., joined as to Parts I, II-A, and II-B. Kennedy, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect to BCRA Titles I and II, in which Rehnquist, C.J., joined, in which Scalia, J., joined except to the extent the opinion upholds new FECA §323(e) and BCRA §202, and in which Thomas, J., joined with respect to BCRA §213. Rehnquist, C.J., filed an opinion dissenting with respect to BCRA Titles I and V, in which Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion dissenting with respect to BCRA §305, in which Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., joined. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1674v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1675v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1676v. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal.; </s> JOHN McCAIN, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1702v. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal.; </s> REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1727v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC., etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1733v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, APPELLANTS </s> 02-1734v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1740v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> RON PAUL, UNITED STATES CONGRESSMAN, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1747v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1753v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1755v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1756v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal. on appeals from the united states district court for the district of columbia [December 10, 2003] </s> Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to BCRA Titles I and II.** </s> The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), 116 Stat. 81, contains a series of amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), 86 Stat. 11, as amended, 2 U.S.C.A. §431 et seq. (main ed. and Supp. 2003), the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1088, as amended, 47 U.S.C.A. §315, and other portions of the United States Code, 18 U.S.C.A. §607 (Supp. 2003), 36 U.S.C.A. §§510-511, that are challenged in these cases.1 In this opinion we discuss Titles I and II of BCRA. The opinion of the Court delivered by The Chief Justice, post, p.___, discusses Titles III and IV, and the opinion of the Court delivered by Justice Breyer, post, p. ___, discusses Title V. I </s> More than a century ago the "sober-minded Elihu Root" advocated legislation that would prohibit political contributions by corporations in order to prevent "'the great aggregations of wealth, from using their corporate funds, directly or indirectly,'" to elect legislators who would "'vote for their protection and the advancement of their interests as against those of the public.'" United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 571 (1957) (quoting E. Root, Addresses on Government and Citizenship 143 (R. Bacon & J. Scott eds. 1916)). In Root's opinion, such legislation would "'strik[e] at a constantly growing evil which has done more to shake the confidence of the plain people of small means of this country in our political institutions than any other practice which has ever obtained since the foundation of our Government.'" 352 U.S., at 571. The Congress of the United States has repeatedly enacted legislation endorsing Root's judgment. BCRA is the most recent federal enactment designed "to purge national politics of what was conceived to be the pernicious influence of 'big money' campaign contributions." Id., at 572. As Justice Frankfurter explained in his opinion for the Court in Automobile Workers, the first such enactment responded to President Theodore Roosevelt's call for legislation forbidding all contributions by corporations "'to any political committee or for any political purpose.'" Ibid. (quoting 40 Cong. Rec. 96 (1906)). In his annual message to Congress in December 1905, President Roosevelt stated that "'directors should not be permitted to use stockholders' money'" for political purposes, and he recommended that "'a prohibition'" on corporate political contributions "'would be, as far as it went, an effective method of stopping the evils aimed at in corrupt practices acts.'" 352 U.S., at 352. The resulting 1907 statute completely banned corporate contributions of "money ... in connection with" any federal election. Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864. Congress soon amended the statute to require the public disclosure of certain contributions and expenditures and to place "maximum limits on the amounts that congressional candidates could spend in seeking nomination and election." Automobile Workers, supra, at 575-576. </s> In 1925 Congress extended the prohibition of "contributions" "to include 'anything of value,' and made acceptance of a corporate contribution as well as the giving of such a contribution a crime." Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209 (1982) (citing Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 1925, §§301, 313, 43 Stat. 1070, 1074). During the debates preceding that amendment, a leading Senator characterized "'the apparent hold on political parties which business interests and certain organizations seek and sometimes obtain by reason of liberal campaign contributions'" as "'one of the great political evils of the time.'" Automobile Workers, supra, at 576 (quoting 65 Cong. Rec. 9507-9508 (1924)). We upheld the amended statute against a constitutional challenge, observing that "[t]he power of Congress to protect the election of President and Vice President from corruption being clear, the choice of means to that end presents a question primarily addressed to the judgment of Congress." Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 547 (1934). </s> Congress' historical concern with the "political potentialities of wealth" and their "untoward consequences for the democratic process," Automobile Workers, supra, at 577-578, has long reached beyond corporate money. During and shortly after World War II, Congress reacted to the "enormous financial outlays" made by some unions in connection with national elections. 352 U.S., at 579. Congress first restricted union contributions in the Hatch Act, 18 U.S.C. §610,2 and it later prohibited "union contributions in connection with federal elections ... altogether." National Right to Work, supra, at 209 (citing War Labor Disputes Act (Smith-Connally Anti-Strike Act), ch. 144, §9, 57 Stat. 167). Congress subsequently extended that prohibition to cover unions' election-related expenditures as well as contributions, and it broadened the coverage of federal campaigns to include both primary and general elections. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136. See Automobile Workers, supra, at 578-584. During the consideration of those measures, legislators repeatedly voiced their concerns regarding the pernicious influence of large campaign contributions. See 93 Cong. Rec. 3428, 3522 (1947); H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); S.Rep. No. 1, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1947); H.R. Rep. No. 2093, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1945). As we noted in a unanimous opinion recalling this history, Congress' "careful legislative adjustment of the federal election laws, in a 'cautious advance, step by step,' to account for the particular legal and economic attributes of corporations and labor organizations warrants considerable deference." National Right to Work, 352 U.S., at 209 (citations omitted). </s> In early 1972 Congress continued its steady improvement of the national election laws by enacting FECA, 86 Stat. 3. As first enacted, that statute required disclosure of all contributions exceeding $100 and of expenditures by candidates and political committees that spent more than $1,000 per year. Id., at 11-19. It also prohibited contributions made in the name of another person, id., at 19, and by Government contractors, id., at 10. The law ratified the earlier prohibition on the use of corporate and union general treasury funds for political contributions and expenditures, but it expressly permitted corporations and unions to establish and administer separate segregated funds (commonly known as political action committees, or PACs) for election-related contributions and expenditures. Id., at 12-13.3 See Pipefitters v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 409-410 (1972). </s> As the 1972 presidential elections made clear, however, FECA's passage did not deter unseemly fundraising and campaign practices. Evidence of those practices persuaded Congress to enact the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat. 1263. Reviewing a constitutional challenge to the amendments, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit described them as "by far the most comprehensive ... reform legislation [ever] passed by Congress concerning the election of the President, Vice-President and members of Congress." Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 831 (1975) (en banc) (per curiam). </s> The 1974 amendments closed the loophole that had allowed candidates to use an unlimited number of political committees for fundraising purposes and thereby to circumvent the limits on individual committees' receipts and disbursements. They also limited individual political contributions to any single candidate to $1,000 per election, with an overall annual limitation of $25,000 by any contributor; imposed ceilings on spending by candidates and political parties for national conventions; required reporting and public disclosure of contributions and expenditures exceeding certain limits; and established the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to administer and enforce the legislation. Id., at 831-834. </s> The Court of Appeals upheld the 1974 amendments almost in their entirety.4 It concluded that the clear and compelling interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process provided a sufficient basis for sustaining the substantive provisions of the Act. Id., at 841. The court's opinion relied heavily on findings that large contributions facilitated access to public officials5 and described methods of evading the contribution limits that had enabled contributors of massive sums to avoid disclosure. Id., at 837-841.6 </s> The Court of Appeals upheld the provisions establishing contribution and expenditure limitations on the theory that they should be viewed as regulations of conduct rather than speech. Id., at 840-841 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-377 (1968)). This Court, however, concluded that each set of limitations raised serious--though different--concerns under the First Amendment. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-23 (1976) (per curiam). We treated the limitations on candidate and individual expenditures as direct restraints on speech, but we observed that the contribution limitations, in contrast, imposed only "a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communication." Id., at 20-21. Considering the "deeply disturbing examples" of corruption related to candidate contributions discussed in the Court of Appeals' opinion, we determined that limiting contributions served an interest in protecting "the integrity of our system of representative democracy." Id., at 26-27. In the end, the Act's primary purpose--"to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions"--provided "a constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1,000 contribution limitation." Id., at 26. </s> We prefaced our analysis of the $1,000 limitation on expenditures by observing that it broadly encompassed every expenditure "'relative to a clearly identified candidate.'" Id., at 39 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §608(e)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV)). To avoid vagueness concerns we construed that phrase to apply only to "communications that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office." 424 U.S., at 42-44. We concluded, however, that as so narrowed, the provision would not provide effective protection against the dangers of quid pro quo arrangements, because persons and groups could eschew expenditures that expressly advocated the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate while remaining "free to spend as much as they want to promote the candidate and his views." Id., at 45. We also rejected the argument that the expenditure limits were necessary to prevent attempts to circumvent the Act's contribution limits, because FECA already treated expenditures controlled by or coordinated with the candidate as contributions, and we were not persuaded that independent expenditures posed the same risk of real or apparent corruption as coordinated expenditures. Id., at 46-47. We therefore held that Congress' interest in preventing real or apparent corruption was inadequate to justify the heavy burdens on the freedoms of expression and association that the expenditure limits imposed. </s> We upheld all of the disclosure and reporting requirements in the Act that were challenged on appeal to this Court after finding that they vindicated three important interests: providing the electorate with relevant information about the candidates and their supporters; deterring actual corruption and discouraging the use of money for improper purposes; and facilitating enforcement of the prohibitions in the Act. Id., at 66-68. In order to avoid an overbreadth problem, however, we placed the same narrowing construction on the term "expenditure" in the disclosure context that we had adopted in the context of the expenditure limitations. Thus, we construed the reporting requirement for persons making expenditures of more than $100 in a year "to reach only funds used for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate." Id., at 80 (footnote omitted). </s> Our opinion in Buckley addressed issues that primarily related to contributions and expenditures by individuals, since none of the parties challenged the prohibition on contributions by corporations and labor unions. We noted, however, that the statute authorized the use of corporate and union resources to form and administer segregated funds that could be used for political purposes. Id., at 28-29, n.31; see also n.3, supra. </s> Three important developments in the years after our decision in Buckley persuaded Congress that further legislation was necessary to regulate the role that corporations, unions, and wealthy contributors play in the electoral process. As a preface to our discussion of the specific provisions of BCRA, we comment briefly on the increased importance of "soft money," the proliferation of "issue ads," and the disturbing findings of a Senate investigation into campaign practices related to the 1996 federal elections. Soft Money </s> Under FECA, "contributions" must be made with funds that are subject to the Act's disclosure requirements and source and amount limitations. Such funds are known as "federal" or "hard" money. FECA defines the term "contribution," however, to include only the gift or advance of anything of value "made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office." 2 U.S.C. §431(8)(A)(i) (emphasis added). Donations made solely for the purpose of influencing state or local elections are therefore unaffected by FECA's requirements and prohibitions. As a result, prior to the enactment of BCRA, federal law permitted corporations and unions, as well as individuals who had already made the maximum permissible contributions to federal candidates, to contribute "nonfederal money"--also known as "soft money"--to political parties for activities intended to influence state or local elections. Shortly after Buckley was decided, questions arose concerning the treatment of contributions intended to influence both federal and state elections. Although a literal reading of FECA's definition of "contribution" would have required such activities to be funded with hard money, the FEC ruled that political parties could fund mixed-purpose activities--including get-out-the-vote drives and generic party advertising--in part with soft money.7 In 1995 the FEC concluded that the parties could also use soft money to defray the costs of "legislative advocacy media advertisements," even if the ads mentioned the name of a federal candidate, so long as they did not expressly advocate the candidate's election or defeat. FEC Advisory Op. 1995-25. </s> As the permissible uses of soft money expanded, the amount of soft money raised and spent by the national political parties increased exponentially. Of the two major parties' total spending, soft money accounted for 5% ($21.6 million) in 1984, 11% ($45 million) in 1988, 16% ($80 million) in 1992, 30% ($272 million) in 1996, and 42% ($498 million) in 2000.8 The national parties transferred large amounts of their soft money to the state parties, which were allowed to use a larger percentage of soft money to finance mixed-purpose activities under FEC rules.9 In the year 2000, for example, the national parties diverted $280 million--more than half of their soft money--to state parties. </s> Many contributions of soft money were dramatically larger than the contributions of hard money permitted by FECA. For example, in 1996 the top five corporate soft-money donors gave, in total, more than $9 million in nonfederal funds to the two national party committees.10 In the most recent election cycle the political parties raised almost $300 million--60% of their total soft-money fundraising--from just 800 donors, each of which contributed a minimum of $120,000.11 Moreover, the largest corporate donors often made substantial contributions to both parties.12 Such practices corroborate evidence indicating that many corporate contributions were motivated by a desire for access to candidates and a fear of being placed at a disadvantage in the legislative process relative to other contributors, rather than by ideological support for the candidates and parties.13 </s> Not only were such soft-money contributions often designed to gain access to federal candidates, but they were in many cases solicited by the candidates themselves. Candidates often directed potential donors to party committees and tax-exempt organizations that could legally accept soft money. For example, a federal legislator running for reelection solicited soft money from a supporter by advising him that even though he had already "contributed the legal maximum" to the campaign committee, he could still make an additional contribution to a joint program supporting federal, state, and local candidates of his party.14 Such solicitations were not uncommon.15 </s> The solicitation, transfer, and use of soft money thus enabled parties and candidates to circumvent FECA's limitations on the source and amount of contributions in connection with federal elections. Issue Advertising </s> In Buckley we construed FECA's disclosure and reporting requirements, as well as its expenditure limitations, "to reach only funds used for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate." 424 U.S., at 80 (footnote omitted). As a result of that strict reading of the statute, the use or omission of "magic words" such as "Elect John Smith" or "Vote Against Jane Doe" marked a bright statutory line separating "express advocacy" from "issue advocacy." See id., at 44, n. 52. Express advocacy was subject to FECA's limitations and could be financed only using hard money. The political parties, in other words, could not use soft money to sponsor ads that used any magic words, and corporations and unions could not fund such ads out of their general treasuries. So-called issue ads, on the other hand, not only could be financed with soft money, but could be aired without disclosing the identity of, or any other information about, their sponsors. While the distinction between "issue" and express advocacy seemed neat in theory, the two categories of advertisements proved functionally identical in important respects. Both were used to advocate the election or defeat of clearly identified federal candidates, even though the so-called issue ads eschewed the use of magic words.16 Little difference existed, for example, between an ad that urged viewers to "vote against Jane Doe" and one that condemned Jane Doe's record on a particular issue before exhorting viewers to "call Jane Doe and tell her what you think."17 Indeed, campaign professionals testified that the most effective campaign ads, like the most effective commercials for products such as Coca-Cola, should, and did, avoid the use of the magic words.18 Moreover, the conclusion that such ads were specifically intended to affect election results was confirmed by the fact that almost all of them aired in the 60 days immediately preceding a federal election.19 Corporations and unions spent hundreds of millions of dollars of their general funds to pay for these ads,20 and those expenditures, like soft-money donations to the political parties, were unregulated under FECA. Indeed, the ads were attractive to organizations and candidates precisely because they were beyond FECA's reach, enabling candidates and their parties to work closely with friendly interest groups to sponsor so-called issue ads when the candidates themselves were running out of money.21 </s> Because FECA's disclosure requirements did not apply to so-called issue ads, sponsors of such ads often used misleading names to conceal their identity. "Citizens for Better Medicare," for instance, was not a grassroots organization of citizens, as its name might suggest, but was instead a platform for an association of drug manufacturers.22 And "Republicans for Clean Air," which ran ads in the 2000 Republican Presidential primary, was actually an organization consisting of just two individuals--brothers who together spent $25 million on ads supporting their favored candidate.23 </s> While the public may not have been fully informed about the sponsorship of so-called issue ads, the record indicates that candidates and officeholders often were. A former Senator confirmed that candidates and officials knew who their friends were and "sometimes suggest[ed] that corporations or individuals make donations to interest groups that run 'issue ads.'"24 As with soft-money contributions, political parties and candidates used the availability of so-called issue ads to circumvent FECA's limitations, asking donors who contributed their permitted quota of hard money to give money to nonprofit corporations to spend on "issue" advocacy.25 Senate Committee Investigation </s> In 1998 the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs issued a six-volume report summarizing the results of an extensive investigation into the campaign practices in the 1996 federal elections. The report gave particular attention to the effect of soft money on the American political system, including elected officials' practice of granting special access in return for political contributions. The committee's principal findings relating to Democratic Party fundraising were set forth in the majority's report, while the minority report primarily described Republican practices. The two reports reached consensus, however, on certain central propositions. They agreed that the "soft money loophole" had led to a "meltdown" of the campaign finance system that had been intended "to keep corporate, union and large individual contributions from influencing the electoral process."26 One Senator stated that "the hearings provided overwhelming evi-dence that the twin loopholes of soft money and bogus issue advertising have virtually destroyed our campaign finance laws, leaving us with little more than a pile of legal rubble."27 </s> The report was critical of both parties' methods of raising soft money, as well as their use of those funds. It concluded that both parties promised and provided special access to candidates and senior Government officials in exchange for large soft-money contributions. The Committee majority described the White House coffees that rewarded major donors with access to President Clinton,28 and the courtesies extended to an international businessman named Roger Tamraz, who candidly acknowledged that his donations of about $300,000 to the DNC and to state parties were motivated by his interest in gaining the Federal Government's support for an oil-line project in the Caucasus.29 The minority described the promotional materials used by the RNC's two principal donor programs, "Team 100" and the "Republican Eagles," which promised "special access to high-ranking Republican elected officials, including governors, senators, and representatives."30 One fundraising letter recited that the chairman of the RNC had personally escorted a donor on appointments that "'turned out to be very significant in legislation affecting public utility holding companies'" and made the donor "'a hero in his industry.'"31 </s> In 1996 both parties began to use large amounts of soft money to pay for issue advertising designed to influence federal elections. The Committee found such ads highly problematic for two reasons. Since they accomplished the same purposes as express advocacy (which could lawfully be funded only with hard money), the ads enabled unions, corporations, and wealthy contributors to circumvent protections that FECA was intended to provide. Moreover, though ostensibly independent of the candidates, the ads were often actually coordinated with, and controlled by, the campaigns.32 The ads thus provided a means for evading FECA's candidate contribution limits. </s> The report also emphasized the role of state and local parties. While the FEC's allocation regime permitted national parties to use soft money to pay for up to 40% of the costs of both generic voter activities and issue advertising, they allowed state and local parties to use larger percentages of soft money for those purposes.33 For that reason, national parties often made substantial transfers of soft money to "state and local political parties for 'generic voter activities' that in fact ultimately benefit[ed] federal candidates because the funds for all practical purposes remain[ed] under the control of the national committees." The report concluded that "[t]he use of such soft money thus allow[ed] more corporate, union treasury, and large contributions from wealthy individuals into the system."34 </s> The report discussed potential reforms, including a ban on soft money at the national and state party levels and restrictions on sham issue advocacy by nonparty groups.35 The majority expressed the view that a ban on the raising of soft money by national party committees would effectively address the use of union and corporate general treasury funds in the federal political process only if it required that candidate-specific ads be funded with hard money.36 The minority similarly recommended the elimination of soft-money contributions to political parties from individuals, corporations, and unions, as well as "reforms addressing candidate advertisements masquerading as issue ads."37 II </s> In BCRA, Congress enacted many of the committee's proposed reforms. BCRA's central provisions are designed to address Congress' concerns about the increasing use of soft money and issue advertising to influence federal elections. Title I regulates the use of soft money by political parties, officeholders, and candidates. Title II primarily prohibits corporations and labor unions from using general treasury funds for communications that are intended to, or have the effect of, influencing the outcome of federal elections. Section 403 of BCRA provides special rules for actions challenging the constitutionality of any of the Act's provisions. 2 U.S.C. A. §437h note (Supp. 2003). Eleven such actions were filed promptly after the statute went into effect in March 2002. As required by §403, those actions were filed in the District Court for the District of Columbia and heard by a three-judge court. Section 403 directed the District Court to advance the cases on the docket and to expedite their disposition "to the greatest possible extent." The court received a voluminous record compiled by the parties and ultimately delivered a decision embodied in a two-judge per curiam opinion and three separate, lengthy opinions, each of which contained extensive commentary on the facts and a careful analysis of the legal issues. 251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (2003). The three judges reached unanimity on certain issues but differed on many. Their judgment, entered on May 1, 2003, held some parts of BCRA unconstitutional and upheld others. 251 F.Supp. 2d 948. </s> As authorized by §403, all of the losing parties filed direct appeals to this Court within 10 days. 2 U.S.C.A. §437h note. On June 5, 2003, we noted probable jurisdiction and ordered the parties to comply with an expedited briefing schedule and present their oral arguments at a special hearing on September 8, 2003. 539 U.S. ___. To simplify the presentation, we directed the parties challenging provisions of BCRA to proceed first on all issues, whether or not they prevailed on any issue in the District Court. Ibid. Mindful of §403's instruction that we expedite our disposition of these appeals to the greatest extent possible, we also consider each of the issues in order. Accordingly, we first turn our attention to Title I of BCRA. III </s> Title I is Congress' effort to plug the soft-money loophole. The cornerstone of Title I is new FECA §323(a), which prohibits national party committees and their agents from soliciting, receiving, directing, or spending any soft money. 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(a) (Supp. 2003).38 In short, §323(a) takes national parties out of the soft-money business. The remaining provisions of new FECA §323 largely reinforce the restrictions in §323(a). New FECA §323(b) prevents the wholesale shift of soft-money influence from national to state party committees by prohibiting state and local party committees from using such funds for activities that affect federal elections. 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(b). These "Federal election activit[ies]," defined in new FECA §301(20)(A), are almost identical to the mixed-purpose activities that have long been regulated under the FEC's pre-BCRA allocation regime. 2 U.S.C.A. §431(20)(A). New FECA §323(d) reinforces these soft-money restrictions by prohibiting political parties from soliciting and donating funds to tax-exempt organizations that engage in electioneering activities. 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(d). New FECA §323(e) restricts federal candidates and officeholders from receiving, spending, or soliciting soft money in connection with federal elections and limits their ability to do so in connection with state and local elections. 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(e). Finally, new FECA §323(f) prevents circumvention of the restrictions on national, state, and local party committees by prohibiting state and local candidates from raising and spending soft money to fund advertisements and other public communications that promote or attack federal candidates. 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(f). </s> Plaintiffs mount a facial First Amendment challenge to new FECA §323, as well as challenges based on the Elections Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I, §4, principles of federalism, and the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause. We address these challenges in turn. A </s> In Buckley and subsequent cases, we have subjected restrictions on campaign expenditures to closer scrutiny than limits on campaign contributions. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. ___, ___ (2003) (slip op., at 14); see also Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-388 (2000); Buckley, 424 U.S., at 19. In these cases we have recognized that contribution limits, unlike limits on expenditures, "entai[l] only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communication." Id., at 20; see also, e.g., Beaumont, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 14); Shrink Missouri, supra, at 386-388. In Buckley we said that: "A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support. The quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of the contribution, since the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing. At most, the size of the contribution provides a very rough index of the intensity of the contributor's support for the candidate. A limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a candidate or campaign organization thus involves little direct restraint on his political communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues. While contributions may result in political expression if spent by a candidate or an association to present views to the voters, the transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor." 424 U.S., at 21 (footnote omitted). </s> Because the communicative value of large contributions inheres mainly in their ability to facilitate the speech of their recipients, we have said that contribution limits impose serious burdens on free speech only if they are so low as to "preven[t] candidates and political committees from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy." Ibid. </s> We have recognized that contribution limits may bear "more heavily on the associational right than on freedom to speak," Shrink Missouri, supra, at 388, since contributions serve "to affiliate a person with a candidate" and "enabl[e] like-minded persons to pool their resources," Buckley, 424 U.S., at 22. Unlike expenditure limits, however, which "preclud[e] most associations from effectively amplifying the voice of their adherents," contribution limits both "leave the contributor free to become a member of any political association and to assist personally in the association's efforts on behalf of candidates," and allow associations "to aggregate large sums of money to promote effective advocacy." Ibid. The "overall effect" of dollar limits on contributions is "merely to require candidates and political committees to raise funds from a greater number of persons." Id., at 21-22. Thus, a contribution limit involving even "'significant interference'" with associational rights is nevertheless valid if it satisfies the "lesser demand" of being "'closely drawn'" to match a "'sufficiently important interest.'" Beaumont, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 15) (quoting Shrink Missouri, supra, at 387-388).39 </s> Our treatment of contribution restrictions reflects more than the limited burdens they impose on First Amendment freedoms. It also reflects the importance of the interests that underlie contribution limits--interests in preventing "both the actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and the eroding of public confidence in the electoral process through the appearance of corruption." National Right to Work, 533 U.S. 431, 440-441 (2001) (Colorado II). We have said that these interests directly implicate "'the integrity of our electoral process, and, not less, the responsibility of the individual citizen for the successful functioning of that process.'" National Right to Work, supra, at 208 (quoting Automobile Workers, 352 U.S., at 570). Because the electoral process is the very "means through which a free society democratically translates political speech into concrete governmental action," Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S., at 401 (Breyer, J., concurring), contribution limits, like other measures aimed at protecting the integrity of the process, tangibly benefit public participation in political debate. For that reason, when reviewing Congress' decision to enact contribution limits, "there is no place for a strong presumption against constitutionality, of the sort often thought to accompany the words 'strict scrutiny.'" Id., at 400 (Breyer, J., concurring). The less rigorous standard of review we have applied to contribution limits (Buckley's "closely drawn" scrutiny) shows proper deference to Congress' ability to weigh competing constitutional interests in an area in which it enjoys particular expertise. It also provides Congress with sufficient room to anticipate and respond to concerns about circumvention of regulations designed to protect the integrity of the political process. </s> Our application of this less rigorous degree of scrutiny has given rise to significant criticism in the past from our dissenting colleagues. See, e.g., Shrink Missouri, 518 U.S. 604, 635-644 (1996) (Colorado I) (Thomas, J., dissenting). We have rejected such criticism in previous cases for the reasons identified above. We are also mindful of the fact that in its lengthy deliberations leading to the enactment of BCRA, Congress properly relied on the recognition of its authority contained in Buckley and its progeny. Considerations of stare decisis, buttressed by the respect that the Legislative and Judicial Branches owe to one another, provide additional powerful reasons for adhering to the analysis of contribution limits that the Court has consistently followed since Buckley was decided. See Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991).40 </s> Like the contribution limits we upheld in Buckley, §323's restrictions have only a marginal impact on the ability of contributors, candidates, officeholders, and parties to engage in effective political speech. Beaumont, 539 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 14). Complex as its provisions may be, §323, in the main, does little more than regulate the ability of wealthy individuals, corporations, and unions to contribute large sums of money to influence federal elections, federal candidates, and federal officeholders. </s> Plaintiffs contend that we must apply strict scrutiny to §323 because many of its provisions restrict not only contributions but also the spending and solicitation of funds raised outside of FECA's contribution limits. But for purposes of determining the level of scrutiny, it is irrelevant that Congress chose in §323 to regulate contributions on the demand rather than the supply side. See, e.g., National Right to Work, supra, at 206-211 (upholding a provision restricting PACs' ability to solicit funds). The relevant inquiry is whether the mechanism adopted to implement the contribution limit, or to prevent circumvention of that limit, burdens speech in a way that a direct restriction on the contribution itself would not. That is not the case here. </s> For example, while §323(a) prohibits national parties from receiving or spending nonfederal money, and §323(b) prohibits state party committees from spending nonfederal money on federal election activities, neither provision in any way limits the total amount of money parties can spend. 2 U.S.C.A. §§441i(a), (b) (Supp. 2003). Rather, they simply limit the source and individual amount of donations. That they do so by prohibiting the spending of soft money does not render them expenditure limitations.41 </s> Similarly, the solicitation provisions of §323(a) and §323(e), which restrict the ability of national party committees, federal candidates, and federal officeholders to solicit nonfederal funds, leave open ample opportunities for soliciting federal funds on behalf of entities subject to FECA's source and amount restrictions. Even §323(d), which on its face enacts a blanket ban on party solicitations of funds to certain tax-exempt organizations, nevertheless allows parties to solicit funds to the organizations' federal PACs. 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(d). As for those organizations that cannot or do not administer PACs, parties remain free to donate federal funds directly to such organizations, and may solicit funds expressly for that purpose. See infra, at 72-73 (construing §323(d)'s restriction on donations by parties to apply only to donations from a party committee's nonfederal or soft-money account). And as with §323(a), §323(d) places no limits on other means of endorsing tax-exempt organizations or any restrictions on solicitations by party officers acting in their individual capacities. 2 U.S.C.A. §§441i(a), (d). </s> Section 323 thus shows "due regard for the reality that solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for particular views." Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980). The fact that party committees and federal candidates and officeholders must now ask only for limited dollar amounts or request that a corporation or union contribute money through its PAC in no way alters or impairs the political message "intertwined" with the solicitation. Cf. Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N. C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988) (treating solicitation restriction that required fundraisers to disclose particular information as a content-based regulation subject to strict scrutiny because it "necessarily alter[ed] the content of the speech"). And rather than chill such solicitations, as was the case in Schaumburg, the restriction here tends to increase the dissemination of information by forcing parties, candidates, and officeholders to solicit from a wider array of potential donors. As with direct limits on contributions, therefore, §323's spending and solicitation restrictions have only a marginal impact on political speech.42 </s> Finally, plaintiffs contend that the type of associational burdens that §323 imposes are fundamentally different from the burdens that accompanied Buckley's contribution limits, and merit the type of strict scrutiny we have applied to attempts to regulate the internal processes of political parties. E.g., California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 573-574 (2000). In making this argument, plaintiffs greatly exaggerate the effect of §323, contending that it precludes any collaboration among national, state, and local committees of the same party in fundraising and electioneering activities. We do not read the provisions in that way. See infra, at 51-52. Section 323 merely subjects a greater percentage of contributions to parties and candidates to FECA's source and amount limitations. Buckley has already acknowledged that such limitations "leave the contributor free to become a member of any political association and to assist personally in the association's efforts on behalf of candidates." 424 U.S., at 22. The modest impact that §323 has on the ability of committees within a party to associate with each other does not independently occasion strict scrutiny. None of this is to suggest that the alleged associational burdens imposed on parties by §323 have no place in the First Amendment analysis; it is only that we account for them in the application, rather than the choice, of the appropriate level of scrutiny.43 </s> With these principles in mind, we apply the less rigorous scrutiny applicable to contribution limits to evaluate the constitutionality of new FECA §323. Because the five challenged provisions of §323 implicate different First Amendment concerns, we discuss them separately. We are mindful, however, that Congress enacted §323 as an integrated whole to vindicate the Government's important interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption. New FECA §323(a)'s Restrictions on National Party Committees </s> The core of Title I is new FECA §323(a), which provides that "national committee[s] of a political party ... may not solicit, receive, or direct to another person a contribution, donation, or transfer of funds or any other thing of value, or spend any funds, that are not subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act." 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(a)(1) (Supp. 2003). The prohibition extends to "any officer or agent acting on behalf of such a national committee, and any entity that is directly or indirectly established, financed, or maintained, or controlled by such a national committee." §441(a)(2). The main goal of §323(a) is modest. In large part, it simply effects a return to the scheme that was approved in Buckley and that was subverted by the creation of the FEC's allocation regime, which permitted the political parties to fund federal electioneering efforts with a combination of hard and soft money. See supra, at 11-13, and n.7. Under that allocation regime, national parties were able to use vast amounts of soft money in their efforts to elect federal candidates. Consequently, as long as they directed the money to the political parties, donors could contribute large amounts of soft money for use in activities designed to influence federal elections.44 New §323(a) is designed to put a stop to that practice. 1.Governmental Interests Underlying New FECA§323(a) </s> The Government defends §323(a)'s ban on national parties' involvement with soft money as necessary to prevent the actual and apparent corruption of federal candidates and officeholders. Our cases have made clear that the prevention of corruption or its appearance constitutes a sufficiently important interest to justify political contribution limits. We have not limited that interest to the elimination of cash-for-votes exchanges. In Buckley, we expressly rejected the argument that antibribery laws provided a less restrictive alternative to FECA's contribution limits, noting that such laws "deal[t] with only the most blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influence government action." 424 U.S., at 28. Thus, "[i]n speaking of 'improper influence' and 'opportunities for abuse' in addition to 'quid pro quo arrangements,' we [have] recognized a concern not confined to bribery of public officials, but extending to the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors." Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S., at 389; see also Colorado II, 533 U.S., at 441 (acknowledging that corruption extends beyond explicit cash-for-votes agreements to "undue influence on an officeholder's judgment"). Of "almost equal" importance has been the Government's interest in combating the appearance or perception of corruption engendered by large campaign contributions. Buckley, supra, at 27; see also Shrink Missouri, supra, at 390; Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-497 (1985). Take away Congress' authority to regulate the appearance of undue influence and "the cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance." Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S., at 390; see also id., at 401 (Breyer, J., concurring). And because the First Amendment does not require Congress to ignore the fact that "candidates, donors, and parties test the limits of the current law," Colorado II, 533 U.S., at 457, these interests have been sufficient to justify not only contribution limits themselves, but laws preventing the circumvention of such limits, id., at 456 ("[A]ll Members of the Court agree that circumvention is a valid theory of corruption"). </s> "The quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty or the plausibility of the justification raised." Shrink Missouri, supra, at 391. The idea that large contributions to a national party can corrupt or, at the very least, create the appearance of corruption of federal candidates and officeholders is neither novel nor implausible. For nearly 30 years, FECA has placed strict dollar limits and source restrictions on contributions that individuals and other entities can give to national, state, and local party committees for the purpose of influencing a federal election. The premise behind these restrictions has been, and continues to be, that contributions to a federal candidate's party in aid of that candidate's campaign threaten to create--no less than would a direct contribution to the candidate--a sense of obligation. See Buckley, supra, at 38 (upholding FECA's $25,000 limit on aggregate yearly contributions to a candidate, political committee, and political party committee as a "quite modest restraint ... to prevent evasion of the $1,000 contribution limitation" by, among other things, "huge contributions to the candidate's political party"). This is particularly true of contributions to national parties, with which federal candidates and officeholders enjoy a special relationship and unity of interest. This close affiliation has placed national parties in a unique position, "whether they like it or not," to serve as "agents for spending on behalf of those who seek to produce obligated officeholders." Colorado II, supra, at 452; see also Shrink Missouri, supra, at 406 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[Respondent] asks us to evaluate his speech claim in the context of a system which favors candidates and officeholders whose campaigns are supported by soft money, usually funneled through political parties" (emphasis added)). As discussed below, rather than resist that role, the national parties have actively embraced it. </s> The question for present purposes is whether large soft-money contributions to national party committees have a corrupting influence or give rise to the appearance of corruption. Both common sense and the ample record in these cases confirm Congress' belief that they do. As set forth above, supra, at 11-13, and n.7, the FEC's allocation regime has invited widespread circumvention of FECA's limits on contributions to parties for the purpose of influencing federal elections. Under this system, corporate, union, and wealthy individual donors have been free to contribute substantial sums of soft money to the national parties, which the parties can spend for the specific purpose of influencing a particular candidate's federal election. It is not only plausible, but likely, that candidates would feel grateful for such donations and that donors would seek to exploit that gratitude.45 </s> The evidence in the record shows that candidates and donors alike have in fact exploited the soft-money loophole, the former to increase their prospects of election and the latter to create debt on the part of officeholders, with the national parties serving as willing intermediaries. Thus, despite FECA's hard-money limits on direct contributions to candidates, federal officeholders have commonly asked donors to make soft-money donations to national and state committees "solely in order to assist federal campaigns," including the officeholder's own. 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 472 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting declaration of Wade Randlett, CEO, Dashboard Technology ¶ ;¶ ;6-9 (hereinafter Randlett Decl.), App. 713-714); see also 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 471-473, 478-479 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 842-843 (Leon, J.). Parties kept tallies of the amounts of soft money raised by each officeholder, and "the amount of money a Member of Congress raise[d] for the national political committees often affect[ed] the amount the committees g[a]ve to assist the Member's campaign." Id., at 474-475 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Donors often asked that their contributions be credited to particular candidates, and the parties obliged, irrespective of whether the funds were hard or soft. Id., at 477-478 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 824, 847 (Leon, J.). National party committees often teamed with individual candidates' campaign committees to create joint fundraising committees, which enabled the candidates to take advantage of the party's higher contribution limits while still allowing donors to give to their preferred candidate. Id., at 478 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 847-848 (Leon, J.); see also App. 1286 (Krasno & Sorauf Expert Report (characterizing the joint fundraising committee as one "in which Senate candidates in effect rais[e] soft money for use in their own races")). Even when not participating directly in the fundraising, federal officeholders were well aware of the identities of the donors: National party committees would distribute lists of potential or actual donors, or donors themselves would report their generosity to officeholders. 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 487-488 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) ("[F]or a Member not to know the identities of these donors, he or she must actively avoid such knowledge, as it is provided by the national political parties and the donors themselves"); id., at 853-855 (Leon, J.). </s> For their part, lobbyists, CEOs, and wealthy individuals alike all have candidly admitted donating substantial sums of soft money to national committees not on ideological grounds, but for the express purpose of securing influence over federal officials. For example, a former lobbyist and partner at a lobbying firm in Washington, D.C., stated in his declaration: "'You are doing a favor for somebody by making a large [soft-money] donation and they appreciate it. Ordinarily, people feel inclined to reciprocate favors. Do a bigger favor for someone--that is, write a larger check--and they feel even more compelled to reciprocate. In my experience, overt words are rarely exchanged about contributions, but people do have understandings.'" Id., at 493 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting declaration of Robert Rozen, partner, Ernst & Young ¶ ;14; see 8-R Defs. Exhs., Tab 33).46 </s> Particularly telling is the fact that, in 1996 and 2000, more than half of the top 50 soft-money donors gave substantial sums to both major national parties, leaving room for no other conclusion but that these donors were seeking influence, or avoiding retaliation, rather than promoting any particular ideology. See, e.g., 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 508-510 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (citing Mann Expert Report Tbls. 5-6); 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 509 ("'Giving soft money to both parties, the Republicans and the Democrats, makes no sense at all unless the donor feels that he or she is buying access.'" (quoting declaration of former Sen. Dale Bumpers ¶ ;15, App. 175)).47 </s> The evidence from the federal officeholders' perspective is similar. For example, one former Senator described the influence purchased by nonfederal donations as follows: "'Too often, Members' first thought is not what is right or what they believe, but how it will affect fundraising. Who, after all, can seriously contend that a $100,000 donation does not alter the way one thinks about--and quite possibly votes on--an issue?... When you don't pay the piper that finances your campaigns, you will never get any more money from that piper. Since money is the mother's milk of politics, you never want to be in that situation.'" 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 481 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting declaration of former Sen. Alan Simpson ¶ ;10 (hereinafter Simpson Decl.), App. 811); 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 851 (Leon, J.) (same). </s> See also id., at 489 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) ("'The majority of those who contribute to political parties do so for business reasons, to gain access to influential Members of Congress and to get to know new Members." (quoting Hickmott Decl., Exh. A, ¶ ;46)). By bringing soft-money donors and federal candidates and officeholders together, "[p]arties are thus necessarily the instruments of some contributors whose object is not to support the party's message or to elect party candidates across the board, but rather to support a specific candidate for the sake of a position on one narrow issue, or even to support any candidate who will be obliged to the contributors." Colorado II, 533 U.S., at 451-452. </s> Plaintiffs argue that without concrete evidence of an instance in which a federal officeholder has actually switched a vote (or, presumably, evidence of a specific instance where the public believes a vote was switched), Congress has not shown that there exists real or apparent corruption. But the record is to the contrary. The evidence connects soft money to manipulations of the legislative calendar, leading to Congress' failure to enact, among other things, generic drug legislation, tort reform, and tobacco legislation. See, e.g., 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 482 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 852 (Leon, J.); App. 390-394 (declaration of Sen. John McCain ¶ ;¶ ;5, 8-11 (hereinafter McCain Decl.)); App. 811 (Simpson Decl. ¶ ;10) ("Donations from the tobacco industry to Republicans scuttled tobacco legislation, just as contributions from the trial lawyers to Democrats stopped tort reform"); App. 805 (declaration of former Sen. Paul Simon ¶ ;¶ ;13-14). To claim that such actions do not change legislative outcomes surely misunderstands the legislative process. </s> More importantly, plaintiffs conceive of corruption too narrowly. Our cases have firmly established that Congress' legitimate interest extends beyond preventing simple cash-for-votes corruption to curbing "undue influence on an officeholder's judgment, and the appearance of such influence." Colorado II, supra, at 441. Many of the "deeply disturbing examples" of corruption cited by this Court in Buckley, 424 U.S., at 27, to justify FECA's contribution limits were not episodes of vote buying, but evidence that various corporate interests had given substantial donations to gain access to high-level government officials. See Buckley, 519 F.2d, at 821, 839-840, n.36; nn. 5-6, supra. Even if that access did not secure actual influence, it certainly gave the "appearance of such influence." Colorado II, supra, at 441; see also 519 F. 2d, at 838. </s> The record in the present case is replete with similar examples of national party committees peddling access to federal candidates and officeholders in exchange for large soft-money donations. See 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 492-506 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). As one former Senator put it: "'Special interests who give large amounts of soft money to political parties do in fact achieve their objectives. They do get special access. Sitting Senators and House Members have limited amounts of time, but they make time available in their schedules to meet with representatives of business and unions and wealthy individuals who gave large sums to their parties. These are not idle chit-chats about the philosophy of democracy.... Senators are pressed by their benefactors to introduce legislation, to amend legislation, to block legislation, and to vote on legislation in a certain way.'" Id., at 496 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting declaration of former Sen. Warren Rudman ¶ ;7 (hereinafter Rudman Decl.), App. 742); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 858 (Leon, J.) (same). </s> So pervasive is this practice that the six national party committees actually furnish their own menus of opportunities for access to would-be soft-money donors, with increased prices reflecting an increased level of access. For example, the DCCC offers a range of donor options, starting with the $10,000-per-year Business Forum program, and going up to the $100,000-per-year National Finance Board program. The latter entitles the donor to bimonthly conference calls with the Democratic House leadership and chair of the DCCC, complimentary invitations to all DCCC fundraising events, two private dinners with the Democratic House leadership and ranking members, and two retreats with the Democratic House leader and DCCC chair in Telluride, Colorado, and Hyannisport, Massachusetts. Id., at 504-505 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); see also id., at 506 (describing records indicating that DNC offered meetings with President in return for large donations); id., at 502-503 (describing RNC's various donor programs); id., at 503-504 (same for NRSC); id., at 500-503 (same for DSCC); id., at 504 (same for NRCC). Similarly, "the RNC's donor programs offer greater access to federal office holders as the donations grow larger, with the highest level and most personal access offered to the largest soft money donors." Id., at 500-503 (finding, further, that the RNC holds out the prospect of access to officeholders to attract soft-money donations and encourages officeholders to meet with large soft-money donors); accord, id., at 860-861 (Leon, J.). </s> Despite this evidence and the close ties that candidates and officeholders have with their parties, Justice Kennedy would limit Congress' regulatory interest only to the prevention of the actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption "inherent in" contributions made directly to, contributions made at the express behest of, and expenditures made in coordination with, a federal officeholder or candidate. Post, at 8-10, 15. Regulation of any other donation or expenditure--regardless of its size, the recipient's relationship to the candidate or officeholder, its potential impact on a candidate's election, its value to the candidate, or its unabashed and explicit intent to purchase influence--would, according to Justice Kennedy, simply be out of bounds. This crabbed view of corruption, and particularly of the appearance of corruption, ignores precedent, common sense, and the realities of political fundraising exposed by the record in this litigation.48 </s> Justice Kennedy's interpretation of the First Amendment would render Congress powerless to address more subtle but equally dispiriting forms of corruption. Just as troubling to a functioning democracy as classic quid pro quo corruption is the danger that officeholders will decide issues not on the merits or the desires of their constituencies, but according to the wishes of those who have made large financial contributions valued by the officeholder. Even if it occurs only occasionally, the potential for such undue influence is manifest. And unlike straight cash-for-votes transactions, such corruption is neither easily detected nor practical to criminalize. The best means of prevention is to identify and to remove the temptation. The evidence set forth above, which is but a sampling of the reams of disquieting evidence contained in the record, convincingly demonstrates that soft-money contributions to political parties carry with them just such temptation. </s> Justice Kennedy likewise takes too narrow a view of the appearance of corruption. He asserts that only those transactions with "inherent corruption potential," which he again limits to contributions directly to candidates, justify the inference "that regulating the conduct will stem the appearance of real corruption." Post, at 14.49 In our view, however, Congress is not required to ignore historical evidence regarding a particular practice or to view conduct in isolation from its context. To be sure, mere political favoritism or opportunity for influence alone is insufficient to justify regulation. Post, at 12-14. As the record demonstrates, it is the manner in which parties have sold access to federal candidates and officeholders that has given rise to the appearance of undue influence. Implicit (and, as the record shows, sometimes explicit) in the sale of access is the suggestion that money buys influence. It is no surprise then that purchasers of such access unabashedly admit that they are seeking to purchase just such influence. It was not unwarranted for Congress to conclude that the selling of access gives rise to the appearance of corruption. </s> In sum, there is substantial evidence to support Congress' determination that large soft-money contributions to national political parties give rise to corruption and the appearance of corruption. 2.New FECA §323(a)'s Restriction on Spending and Receiving Soft Money </s> Plaintiffs and The Chief Justice contend that §323(a) is impermissibly overbroad because it subjects all funds raised and spent by national parties to FECA's hard-money source and amount limits, including, for example, funds spent on purely state and local elections in which no federal office is at stake.50 Post, 2-5 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Such activities, The Chief Justice asserts, pose "little or no potential to corrupt ... federal candidates or officeholders." Post, at 5 (dissenting opinion). This observation is beside the point. Section 323(a), like the remainder of §323, regulates contributions, not activities. As the record demonstrates, it is the close relationship between federal officeholders and the national parties, as well as the means by which parties have traded on that relationship, that have made all large soft-money contributions to national parties suspect. As one expert noted, "'[t]here is no meaningful distinction between the national party committees and the public officials who control them.'" 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 468-469 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting Mann Expert Report 29). The national committees of the two major parties are both run by, and largely composed of, federal officeholders and candidates. Indeed, of the six national committees of the two major parties, four are composed entirely of federal officeholders. Ibid. The nexus between national parties and federal officeholders prompted one of Title I's framers to conclude: "Because the national parties operate at the national level, and are inextricably intertwined with federal officeholders and candidates, who raise the money for the national party committees, there is a close connection between the funding of the national parties and the corrupting dangers of soft money on the federal political process. The only effective way to address this [soft-money] problem of corruption is to ban entirely all raising and spending of soft money by the national parties." 148 Cong. Rec. H409 (Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Rep. Shays). </s> Given this close connection and alignment of interests, large soft-money contributions to national parties are likely to create actual or apparent indebtedness on the part of federal officeholders, regardless of how those funds are ultimately used. </s> This close affiliation has also placed national parties in a position to sell access to federal officeholders in exchange for soft-money contributions that the party can then use for its own purposes. Access to federal officeholders is the most valuable favor the national party committees are able to give in exchange for large donations. The fact that officeholders comply by donating their valuable time indicates either that officeholders place substantial value on the soft-money contribution themselves, without regard to their end use, or that national committees are able to exert considerable control over federal officeholders. See, e.g., App. 1196-1198 (Expert Report of Donald P. Green, Yale University) ("Once elected to legislative office, public officials enter an environment in which political parties-in-government control the resources crucial to subsequent electoral success and legislative power. Political parties organize the legislative caucuses that make committee assignments"); App. 1298 (Krasno & Sorauf Expert Report) (indicating that officeholders' re-election prospects are significantly influenced by attitudes of party leadership). Either way, large soft-money donations to national party committees are likely to buy donors preferential access to federal officeholders no matter the ends to which their contributions are eventually put. As discussed above, Congress had sufficient grounds to regulate the appearance of undue influence associated with this practice. The Government's strong interests in preventing corruption, and in particular the appearance of corruption, are thus sufficient to justify subjecting all donations to national parties to the source, amount, and disclosure limitations of FECA.51 3.New FECA §323(a)'s Restriction on Soliciting or Directing Soft Money </s> Plaintiffs also contend that §323(a)'s prohibition on national parties' soliciting or directing soft-money contributions is substantially overbroad. The reach of the solicitation prohibition, however, is limited. It bars only solicitations of soft money by national party committees and by party officers in their official capacities. The committees remain free to solicit hard money on their own behalf, as well as to solicit hard money on behalf of state committees and state and local candidates.52 They also can contribute hard money to state committees and to candidates. In accordance with FEC regulations, furthermore, officers of national parties are free to solicit soft money in their individual capacities, or, if they are also officials of state parties, in that capacity. See 67 Fed. Reg. 49083 (2002). This limited restriction on solicitation follows sensibly from the prohibition on national committees' receiving soft money. The same observations that led us to approve the latter compel us to reach the same conclusion regarding the former. A national committee is likely to respond favorably to a donation made at its request regardless of whether the recipient is the committee itself or another entity. This principle accords with common sense and appears elsewhere in federal laws. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §201(b)(2) (prohibition on public officials "demand[ing] [or] seek[ing] ... anything of value personally or for any other person or entity ..." (emphasis added)); 5 CFR §2635.203(f)(2) (2003) (restriction on gifts to federal employees encompasses gifts "[g]iven to any other person, including any charitable organization, on the basis of designation, recommendation, or other specification by the employee"). </s> Plaintiffs argue that BCRA itself demonstrates the overbreadth of §323(a)'s solicitation ban. They point in particular to §323(e), which allows federal candidates and officeholders to solicit limited amounts of soft money from individual donors under certain circumstances. Compare 2 U.S.C.A §441i(a) with §441i(e) (Supp. 2003). The differences between §§323(a) and 323(e), however, are without constitutional significance. We have recognized that "the 'differing structures and purposes' of different entities 'may require different forms of regulation in order to protect the integrity of the electoral process,'" National Right to Work, 479 U.S. 238, 258, n.11 (1986) (MCFL); Buckley, 424 U.S., at 105. The differences between the two provisions reflect Congress' reasonable judgments about the function played by national committees and the interactions between committees and officeholders, subjects about which Members of Congress have vastly superior knowledge. 4.New FECA §323(a)'s Application to Minor Parties </s> The McConnell and political party plaintiffs contend that §323(a) is substantially overbroad and must be stricken on its face because it impermissibly infringes the speech and associational rights of minor parties such as the Libertarian National Committee, which, owing to their slim prospects for electoral success and the fact that they receive few large soft-money contributions from corporate sources, pose no threat of corruption comparable to that posed by the RNC and DNC. In Buckley, we rejected a similar argument concerning limits on contributions to minor-party candidates, noting that "any attempt to exclude minor parties and independents en masse from the Act's contribution limitations overlooks the fact that minor-party candidates may win elective office or have a substantial impact on the outcome of an election." 424 U.S., at 34-35. We have thus recognized that the relevance of the interest in avoiding actual or apparent corruption is not a function of the number of legislators a given party manages to elect. It applies as much to a minor party that manages to elect only one of its members to federal office as it does to a major party whose members make up a majority of Congress. It is therefore reasonable to require that all parties and all candidates follow the same set of rules designed to protect the integrity of the electoral process. We add that nothing in §323(a) prevents individuals from pooling resources to start a new national party. Post, at 5 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Only when an organization has gained official status, which carries with it significant benefits for its members, will the proscriptions of §323(a) apply. Even then, a nascent or struggling minor party can bring an as-applied challenge if §323(a) prevents it from "amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy." Buckley, supra, at 21. 5.New FECA §323(a)'s Associational Burdens </s> Finally, plaintiffs assert that §323(a) is unconstitutional because it impermissibly interferes with the ability of national committees to associate with state and local committees. By way of example, plaintiffs point to the Republican Victory Plans, whereby the RNC acts in concert with the state and local committees of a given State to plan and implement joint, full-ticket fundraising and electioneering programs. See App. 693, 694-697 (declaration of John Peschong, RNC Western Reg. Political Dir. (describing the Republican Victory Plans)). The political parties assert that §323(a) outlaws any participation in Victory Plans by RNC officers, including merely sitting down at a table and engaging in collective decisionmaking about how soft money will be solicited, received, and spent. Such associational burdens, they argue, are too great for the First Amendment to bear. We are not persuaded by this argument because it hinges on an unnaturally broad reading of the terms "spend," "receive," "direct," and "solicit." 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(a) (Supp. 2003). Nothing on the face of §323(a) prohibits national party officers, whether acting in their official or individual capacities, from sitting down with state and local party committees or candidates to plan and advise how to raise and spend soft money. As long as the national party officer does not personally spend, receive, direct, or solicit soft money, §323(a) permits a wide range of joint planning and electioneering activity. Intervenor-defendants, the principal drafters and proponents of the legislation, concede as much. Brief for Intervenor-Defendants Sen. John McCain etal. in No. 02-1674 etal., p.22 ("BCRA leaves parties and candidates free to coordinate campaign plans and activities, political messages, and fundraising goals with one another"). The FEC's current definitions of §323(a)'s terms are consistent with that view. See, e.g., 11 CFR §300.2(m) (2002) (defining "solicit" as "to ask ... another person" (emphasis added)); §300.2(n) (defining "direct" as "to ask a person who has expressed an intent to make a contribution . . . to make that contribution ... including through a conduit or intermediary" (emphasis added)); §300.2(c) (laying out the factors that determine whether an entity will be considered to be controlled by a national committee). </s> Given the straightforward meaning of this provision, Justice Kennedy is incorrect that "[a] national party's mere involvement in the strategic planning of fundraising for a state ballot initiative" or its assistance in developing a state party's Levin-money fundraising efforts risks a finding that the officers are in "'indirect control'" of the state party and subject to criminal penalties. Post, at 5-6. Moreover, §323(a) leaves national party committee officers entirely free to participate, in their official capacities, with state and local parties and candidates in soliciting and spending hard money; party officials may also solicit soft money in their unofficial capacities. </s> Accordingly, we reject the plaintiffs' First Amendment challenge to new FECA §323(a). New FECA §323(b)'s Restrictions on State and Local Party Committees </s> In constructing a coherent scheme of campaign finance regulation, Congress recognized that, given the close ties between federal candidates and state party committees, BCRA's restrictions on national committee activity would rapidly become ineffective if state and local committees remained available as a conduit for soft-money donations.53 Section 323(b) is designed to foreclose wholesale evasion of §323(a)'s anticorruption measures by sharply curbing state committees' ability to use large soft-money contributions to influence federal elections. The core of §323(b) is a straightforward contribution regulation: It prevents donors from contributing nonfederal funds to state and local party committees to help finance "Federal election activity." 2 U.S.CA. §441i(b)(1) (Supp. 2003). The term "Federal election activity" encompasses four distinct categories of electioneering: (1) voter registration activity during the 120 days preceding a regularly scheduled federal election; (2) voter identification, get-out-the-vote (GOTV), and generic campaign activity54 that is "conducted in connection with an election in which a candidate for Federal office appears on the ballot"; (3) any "public communication"55 that "refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office" and "promotes," "supports," "attacks," or "opposes" a candidate for that office; and (4) the services provided by a state committee employee who dedicates more than 25% of his or her time to "activities in connection with a Federal election." §§431(20)(A)(i)-(iv). The Act explicitly excludes several categories of activity from this definition: public communications that refer solely to nonfederal candidates;56 contributions to nonfederal candidates;57 state and local political conventions; and the cost of grassroots campaign materials like bumper stickers that refer only to state candidates. §431(20)(B). All activities that fall within the statutory definition must be funded with hard money. §441i(b)(1). Section 323(b)(2), the so-called Levin Amendment, carves out an exception to this general rule. A refinement on the pre-BCRA regime that permitted parties to pay for certain activities with a mix of federal and nonfederal funds, the Levin Amendment allows state and local party committees to pay for certain types of federal election activity with an allocated ratio of hard money and "Levin funds"--that is, funds raised within an annual limit of $10,000 per person. 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(b)(2). Except for the $10,000 cap and certain related restrictions to prevent circumvention of that limit, §323(b)(2) leaves regulation of such contributions to the States.58 </s> The scope of the Levin Amendment is limited in two ways. First, state and local parties can use Levin money to fund only activities that fall within categories (1) and (2) of the statute's definition of federal election activity--namely, voter registration activity, voter identification drives, GOTV drives, and generic campaign activities. 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(b)(2)(A). And not all of these activities qualify: Levin funds cannot be used to pay for any activities that refer to "a clearly identified candidate for Federal office"; they likewise cannot be used to fund broadcast communications unless they refer "solely to a clearly identified candidate for State or local office." §§441i(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). </s> Second, both the Levin funds and the allocated portion of hard money used to pay for such activities must be raised entirely by the state or local committee that spends them. §441i(b)(2)(B)(iv). This means that a state party committee cannot use Levin funds transferred from other party committees to cover the Levin funds portion of a Levin Amendment expenditure. It also means that a state party committee cannot use hard money transferred from other party committees to cover the hard-money portion of a Levin Amendment expenditure. Furthermore, national committees, federal candidates, and federal officeholders generally may not solicit Levin funds on behalf ofstate committees, and state committees may not team up to raise Levin funds. §441i(b)(2)(C). They can, however, jointly raise the hard money used to make Levin expenditures. 1.Governmental Interests Underlying New FECA§323(b) </s> We begin by noting that, in addressing the problem of soft-money contributions to state committees, Congress both drew a conclusion and made a prediction. Its conclusion, based on the evidence before it, was that the corrupting influence of soft money does not insinuate itself into the political process solely through national party committees. Rather, state committees function as an alternate avenue for precisely the same corrupting forces.59 Indeed, both candidates and parties already ask donors who have reached the limit on their direct contributions to donate to state committees.60 There is at least as much evidence as there was in Buckley that such donations have been made with the intent--and in at least some cases the effect--of gaining influence over federal officeholders.61 Section 323(b) thus promotes an important governmental interest by confronting the corrupting influence that soft-money donations to political parties already have. Congress also made a prediction. Having been taught the hard lesson of circumvention by the entire history of campaign finance regulation, Congress knew that soft-money donors would react to §323(a) by scrambling to find another way to purchase influence. It was "neither novel nor implausible," Shrink Missouri, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994), particularly when, as here, those predictions are so firmly rooted in relevant history and common sense. Preventing corrupting activity from shifting wholesale to state committees and thereby eviscerating FECA clearly qualifies as an important governmental interest. 2.New FECA §323(b)'s Tailoring </s> Plaintiffs argue that even if some legitimate interest might be served by §323(b), the provision's restrictions are unjustifiably burdensome and therefore cannot be considered "closely drawn" to match the Government's objectives. They advance three main contentions in support of this proposition. First, they argue that the provision is substantially overbroad because it federalizes activities that pose no conceivable risk of corrupting or appearing to corrupt federal officeholders. Second, they argue that the Levin Amendment imposes an unconstitutional burden on the associational rights of political parties. Finally, they argue that the provision prevents them from amassing the resources they need to engage in effective advocacy. We address these points in turn. a.§323(b)'s Application to Federal Election Activity </s> Plaintiffs assert that §323(b) represents a new brand of pervasive federal regulation of state-focused electioneering activities that cannot possibly corrupt or appear to corrupt federal officeholders and thus goes well beyond Congress' concerns about the corruption of the federal electoral process. We disagree. It is true that §323(b) captures some activities that affect state campaigns for nonfederal offices. But these are the same sorts of activities that already were covered by the FEC's pre-BCRA allocation rules, and thus had to be funded in part by hard money, because they affect federal as well as state elections. See 11 CFR §106.5 (2002). As a practical matter, BCRA merely codifies the principles of the FEC's allocation regime while at the same time justifiably adjusting the formulas applicable to these activities in order to restore the efficacy of FECA's longtime statutory restriction--approved by the Court and eroded by the FEC's allocation regime--on contributions to state and local party committees for the purpose of influencing federal elections. See 2 U.S.C. §§431(8)(A), 441a(a)(1)(C); see also Buckley, 453 U.S. 182 (1981) (upholding FECA's $5,000 limit on contributions to multicandidate political committees). </s> Like the rest of Title I, §323(b) is premised on Congress' judgment that if a large donation is capable of putting a federal candidate in the debt of the contributor, it poses a threat of corruption or the appearance of corruption. As we explain below, §323(b) is narrowly focused on regulating contributions that pose the greatest risk of this kind of corruption: those contributions to state and local parties that can be used to benefit federal candidates directly. Further, these regulations all are reasonably tailored, with various temporal and substantive limitations designed to focus the regulations on the important anti-corruption interests to be served. We conclude that §323(b) is a closely-drawn means of countering both corruption and the appearance of corruption. </s> The first two categories of "Federal election activity," voter registration efforts, §301(20)(A)(i), and voter identification, GOTV, and generic campaign activities conducted in connection with a federal election, §301(20)(A)(ii), clearly capture activity that benefits federal candidates. Common sense dictates, and it was "undisputed" below, that a party's efforts to register voters sympathetic to that party directly assist the party's candidates for federal office. 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 460 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). It is equally clear that federal candidates reap substantial rewards from any efforts that increase the number of like-minded registered voters who actually go to the polls.62 See, e.g., id., at 459 ("'[The evidence] shows quite clearly that a campaign that mobilizes residents of a highly Republican precinct will produce a harvest of votes for Republican candidates for both state and federal offices. A campaign need not mention federal candidates to have a direct effect on voting for such a candidate.... [G]eneric campaign activity has a direct effect on federal elections'" (quoting Green Expert Report 14)). Representatives of the four major congressional campaign committees confirmed that they "'transfe[r] federal and nonfederal money to state and/or local party committees for'" both voter registration and get-out-the-vote activities, and that "'[t]hese efforts have a significant effect on the election of federal candidates.'" 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 459, 461 (citationsomitted). </s> The record also makes quite clear that federal officeholders are grateful for contributions to state and local parties that can be converted into GOTV-type efforts. See id., at 459 (quoting a letter thanking a California Democratic Party donor and noting that CDP's voter registration and GOTV efforts would help "'increase the number of Californian Democrats in the United States Congress'" and "'deliver California's 54 electoral votes'" to the Democratic presidential candidate). </s> Because voter registration, voter identification, GOTV, and generic campaign activity all confer substantial benefits on federal candidates, the funding of such activities creates a significant risk of actual and apparent corruption. Section 323(b) is a reasonable response to that risk. Its contribution limitations are focused on the subset of voter registration activity that is most likely to affect the election prospects of federal candidates: activity that occurs within 120 days before a federal election. And if the voter registration drive does not specificallymention a federal candidate, state committees can take advantage of the Levin Amendment's higher contribution limits and relaxed source restrictions. 2 U.S.C.A. §§441i(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) (Supp. 2003). Similarly, the contribution limits applicable to §301(20)(A)(ii) activities target only those voter identification, GOTV, and generic campaign efforts that occur "in connection with an election in which a candidate for a Federal office appears on the ballot." 2 U.S.C.A. §431(20)(A)(ii). Appropriately, in implementing this subsection, the FEC has categorically excluded all activity that takes place during the run-up to elections when no federal office is at stake.63 Furthermore, state committees can take advantage of the Levin Amendment's higher contribution limits to fund any §301(A)(20)(i) and §301(A)(20)(ii) activities that do not specifically mention a federal candidate. 2 U.S.C.A. §§441i(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). The prohibition on the use of soft money in connection with these activities is therefore closely drawn to meet the sufficiently important governmental interests of avoiding corruption and its appearance. </s> "Public communications" that promote or attack a candidate for federal office--the third category of "Federal election activity," §301(20)(A)(iii)--also undoubtedly have a dramatic effect on federal elections. Such ads were a prime motivating force behind BCRA's passage. See 3 1998 Senate Report 4535 (additional views of Sen. Collins) ("[T]he hearings provided overwhelming evidence that the twin loopholes of soft money and bogus issue advertising have virtually destroyed our campaign finance laws, leaving us with little more than a pile of legal rubble"). As explained below, any public communication that promotes or attacks a clearly identified federal candidate directly affects the election in which he is participating. The record on this score could scarcely be more abundant. Given the overwhelming tendency of public communications, as carefully defined in §301(20)(A)(iii), to benefit directly federal candidates, we hold that application of §323(b)'s contribution caps to such communications is also closely drawn to the anticorruption interest it is intended to address.64 </s> As for the final category of "Federal election activity," §301(20)(A)(iv), we find that Congress' interest in preventing circumvention of §323(b)'s other restrictions justifies the requirement that state and local parties spend federal funds to pay the salary of any employee spending more than 25% of his or her compensated time on activities in connection with a federal election. In the absence of this provision, a party might use soft money to pay for the equivalent of a full-time employee engaged in federal electioneering, by the simple expedient of dividing the federal workload among multiple employees. Plaintiffs have suggested no reason for us to strike down this provision. Accordingly, we give "deference to [the] congressional determination of the need for [this] prophylactic rule." National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S., at 500. b.Associational Burdens Imposed by the LevinAmendment </s> Plaintiffs also contend that §323(b) is unconstitutional because the Levin Amendment unjustifiably burdens association among party committees by forbidding transfers of Levin funds among state parties, transfers of hard money to fund the allocable federal portion of Levin expenditures, and joint fundraising of Levin funds by state parties. We recognize, as we have in the past, the importance of preserving the associational freedom of parties. See, e.g., California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000); Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989). But not every minor restriction on parties' otherwise unrestrained ability to associate is of constitutional dimension. See Colorado II, 533 U.S., at 450, n. 11. As an initial matter, we note that state and local parties can avoid these associational burdens altogether by forgoing the Levin Amendment option and electing to pay for federal election activities entirely with hard money. But in any event, the restrictions on the use, transfer, and raising of Levin funds are justifiable anticircumvention measures. Without the ban on transfers of Levin funds among state committees, donors could readily circumvent the $10,000 limit on contributions to a committee's Levin account by making multiple $10,000 donations to various committees that could then transfer the donations to the committee of choice.65 The same anticircumvention goal undergirds the ban on joint solicitation of Levin funds. Without this restriction, state and local committees could organize "all hands" fundraisers at which individual, corporate, or union donors could make large soft-money donations to be divided between the committees. In that case, the purpose, if not the letter, of §323(b)(2)'s $10,000 limit would be thwarted: Donors could make large, visible contributions at fundraisers, which would provide ready means for corrupting federal officeholders. Given the delicate and interconnected regulatory scheme at issue here, any associational burdens imposed by the Levin Amendment restrictions are far outweighed by the need to prevent circumvention of the entire scheme. </s> Section 323(b)(2)(B)(iv)'s apparent prohibition on the transfer of hard money by a national, state, or local committee to help fund the allocable hard-money portion of a separate state or local committee's Levin expenditures presents a closer question. 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(b)(2)(B)(iv) (Supp. 2003). The Government defends the restriction as necessary to prevent the donor committee, particularly a national committee, from leveraging the transfer of federal money to wrest control over the spending of the recipient committee's Levin funds. This purported interest is weak, particularly given the fact that §323(a) already polices attempts by national parties to engage in such behavior. See 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(a)(2) (extending §323(a)'s restrictions to entities controlled by national party committees). However, the associational burdens posed by the hard-money transfer restriction are so insubstantial as to be de minimis. Party committees, including national party committees, remain free to transfer unlimited hard money so long as it is not used to fund Levin expenditures. State and local party committees can thus dedicate all "homegrown" hard money to their Levin activities while relying on outside transfers to defray the costs of other hard-money expenditures. Given the strong anticircumvention interest vindicated by §323(b)(2)(B)(iv)'s restriction on the transfer of Levin funds, we will not strike down the entire provision based upon such an attenuated claim of associational infringement. c.New FECA §323(b)'s Impact on Parties' Abilityto Engage in Effective Advocacy </s> Finally, plaintiffs contend that §323(b) is unconstitutional because its restrictions on soft-money contributions to state and local party committees will prevent them from engaging in effective advocacy. As Judge Kollar-Kotelly noted, the political parties' evidence regarding the impact of BCRA on their revenues is "speculative and not based on any analysis." 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 524. If the history of campaign finance regulation discussed above proves anything, it is that political parties are extraordinarily flexible in adapting to new restrictions on their fundraising abilities. Moreover, the mere fact that §323(b) may reduce the relative amount of money available to state and local parties to fund federal election activities is largely inconsequential. The question is not whether §323(b) reduces the amount of funds available over previous election cycles, but whether it is "so radical in effect as to ... drive the sound of [the recipient's] voice below the level of notice." Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S., at 397. If indeed state or local parties can make such a showing, as-applied challenges remain available. We accordingly conclude that §323(b), on its face, is closely drawn to match the important governmental interests of preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption. New FECA §323(d)'s Restrictions on Parties' Solicitations for, and Donations to, Tax-Exempt Organizations </s> Section 323(d) prohibits national, state, and local party committees, and their agents or subsidiaries, from "solicit[ing] any funds for, or mak[ing] or direct[ing] any donations" to, any organization established under §501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code66 that makes expenditures in connection with an election for federal office, and any political organizations established under §527 "other than a political committee, a State, district, or local committee of a political party, or the authorized campaign committee of a candidate for State or local office."67 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(d) (Supp. 2003). The District Court struck down the provision on its face. We reverse and uphold §323(d), narrowly construing the section's ban on donations to apply only to the donation of funds not raised in compliance with FECA. 1.New FECA §323(d)'s Regulation of Solicitations </s> The Government defends §323(d)'s ban on solicitations to tax-exempt organizations engaged in political activity as preventing circumvention of Title I's limits on contributions of soft money to national, state, and local party committees. That justification is entirely reasonable. The history of Congress' efforts at campaign finance reform well demonstrates that "candidates, donors, and parties test the limits of the current law." Colorado II, 533 U.S., at 457. Absent the solicitation provision, national, state, and local party committees would have significant incentives to mobilize their formidable fundraising apparatuses, including the peddling of access to federal officeholders, into the service of like-minded tax-exempt organizations that conduct activities benefiting their candidates.68 All of the corruption and appearance of corruption attendant on the operation of those fundraising apparatuses would follow. Donations made at the behest of party committees would almost certainly be regarded by party officials, donors, and federal officeholders alike as benefiting the party as well as its candidates. Yet, by soliciting the donations to third-party organizations, the parties would avoid FECA's source-and-amount limitations, as well as its disclosure restrictions. See 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 348 (Henderson, J.) (citing various declarations demonstrating that, prior to BCRA, most tax-exempt organizations did not disclose the source or amount of contributions); id., at 521 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (same). Experience under the current law demonstrates that Congress' concerns about circumvention are not merely hypothetical. Even without the added incentives created by Title I, national, state, and local parties already solicit unregulated soft-money donations to tax-exempt organizations for the purpose of supporting federal electioneering activity. See, e.g., 3 1998 Senate Report 4013 ("In addition to direct contributions from the RNC to nonprofit groups, the senior leadership of the RNC helped to raise funds for many of the coalition's nonprofit organizations"); id., at 5983 (minority views) ("Tax-exempt 'issue advocacy' groups and other conduits were systematically used to circumvent federal campaign finance laws"); 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 517 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 848 (Leon, J.). Parties and candidates have also begun to take advantage of so-called "politician 527s," which are little more than soft-money fronts for the promotion of particular federal officeholders and their interests. See id., at 519 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) ("'Virtually every member of Congress in a formal leadership position has his or her own 527 group.... In all, Public Citizen found 63 current members of Congress who have their own 527s'" (quoting Public Citizen Congress Watch, Congressional Leaders' Soft Money Accounts Show Need for Campaign Finance Reform Bills, Feb. 26, 2002, p. 6)); 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 849-850 (Leon, J.). These 527s have been quite successful at raising substantial sums of soft money from corporate interests, as well as from the national parties themselves. See id., at 519-520 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (finding that 27 industries had each donated over $100,000 in a single year to the top 25 politician 527 groups and that the DNC was the single largest contributor to politician 527 groups (citing Public Citizen Congress Watch, supra, at 10-11)); 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 850 (Leon, J.) (same). Given BCRA's tighter restrictions on the raising and spending of soft money, the incentives for parties to exploit such organizations will only increase. </s> Section 323(d)'s solicitation restriction is closely drawn to prevent political parties from using tax-exempt organizations as soft-money surrogates. Though phrased as an absolute prohibition, the restriction does nothing more than subject contributions solicited by parties to FECA's regulatory regime, leaving open substantial opportunities for solicitation and other expressive activity in support of these organizations. First, and most obviously, §323(d) restricts solicitations only to those §501(c) groups "mak[ing] expenditures or disbursements in connection with an election for Federal office," 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(d)(1) (Supp. 2003), and to §527 organizations, which by definition engage in partisan political activity, §441i(d)(2); 26 U.S.C. §527(e). Second, parties remain free to solicit hard-money contributions to a §501(c)'s federal PAC, as well as to §527 organizations that already qualify as federal PACs.69 Third, §323(d) allows parties to endorse qualifying organizations in ways other than direct solicitations of unregulated donations. For example, with respect to §501(c) organizations that are prohibited from administering PACs, parties can solicit hard-money donations to themselves for the express purpose of donating to these organizations. See supra, at 72-73. Finally, as with §323(a), §323(d) in no way restricts solicitations by party officers acting in their individual capacities. 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(d) (extending restrictions to solicitations and donations made by "an officer or agent acting on behalf of any such party committee" (emphasis added)). </s> In challenging §323(d)'s ban on solicitations, plaintiffs renew the argument they made with respect to §323(a)'s solicitation restrictions: that it cannot be squared with §323(e), which allows federal candidates and officeholders to solicit limited donations of soft money to tax-exempt organizations that engage in federal election activities. Compare 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(d) with §441i(e)(4). But if §323(d)'s restrictions on solicitations are otherwise valid, they are not rendered unconstitutional by the mere fact that Congress chose not to regulate the activities of another group as stringently as it might have. See National Right to Work, 384 U.S. 641, 656-657 (1966). In any event, the difference between the two provisions is fully explained by the fact that national party officers, unlike federal candidates and officeholders, are able to solicit soft money on behalf of nonprofit organizations in their individual capacities. Section 323(e), which is designed to accommodate the individual associational and speech interests of candidates and officeholders in lending personal support to nonprofit organizations, also places tight content, source, and amount restrictions on solicitations of soft money by federal candidates and officeholders. Given those limits, as well as the less rigorous standard of review, the greater allowances of §323(e) do not render §323(d)'s solicitation restriction facially invalid. 2.New FECA §323(d)'s Regulation of Donations </s> Section 323(d) also prohibits national, state, and local party committees from making or directing "any donatio[n]" to qualifying §501(c) or §527 organizations. 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(d) (Supp. 2003). The Government again defends the restriction as an anticircumvention measure. We agree insofar as it prohibits the donation of soft money. Absent such a restriction, state and local party committees could accomplish directly what the antisolicitation restrictions prevent them from doing indirectly--namely, raising large sums of soft money to launder through tax-exempt organizations engaging in federal election activities. Because the party itself would be raising and collecting the funds, the potential for corruption would be that much greater. We will not disturb Congress' reasonable decision to close that loophole, particularly given a record demonstrating an already robust practice of parties' making such donations. See 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 517-518 (Kollar-Kotelly); id., at 848-849 (Leon, J.). The prohibition does raise overbreadth concerns if read to restrict donations from a party's federal account--i.e., funds that have already been raised in compliance with FECA's source, amount, and disclosure limitations. Parties have many valid reasons for giving to tax-exempt organizations, not the least of which is to associate themselves with certain causes and, in so doing, to demonstrate the values espoused by the party. A complete ban on donations prevents parties from making even the "general expression of support" that a contribution represents. Buckley, 424 U.S., at 21. At the same time, prohibiting parties from donating funds already raised in compliance with FECA does little to further Congress' goal of preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption of federal candidates and officeholders. </s> The Government asserts that the restriction is necessary to prevent parties from leveraging their hard money to gain control over a tax-exempt group's soft money. Even if we accepted that rationale, it would at most justify a dollar limit, not a flat ban. Moreover, any legitimate concerns over capture are diminished by the fact that the restrictions set forth in §§323(a) and (b) apply not only to party committees, but to entities under their control. See 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(a)(2) (extending prohibitions on national party committees to "any entity that is directly or indirectly established, financed, maintained, or controlled by such a national committee" (emphasis added)); §441i(b)(1) (same for state and local party committees). </s> These observations do not, however, require us to sustain plaintiffs' facial challenge to §323(d)'s donation restriction. "When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and ... a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided." Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932); see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 331 (1988); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769, n. 24 (1982). Given our obligation to avoid constitutional problems, we narrowly construe §323(d)'s ban to apply only to donations of funds not raised in compliance with FECA. This construction is consistent with the concerns animating Title I, whose purpose is to plug the soft-money loophole. Though there is little legislative history regarding BCRA generally, and almost nothing on §323(d) specifically, the abuses identified in the 1998 Senate report regarding campaign finance practices involve the use of nonprofit organizations as conduits for large soft-money donations. See, e.g., 3 1998 Senate Report 4565 ("The evidence indicates that the soft-money loophole is fueling many of the campaign abuses investigated by the Committee.... Soft money also supplied the funds parties used to make contributions to tax-exempt groups, which in turn used the funds to pay for election-related activities"); id., at 4568-4569 (describing as an "egregious exampl[e]" of misuse a $4.6 million donation of nonfederal funds by the RNC to Americans for Tax Reform, which the organization spent on "direct mail and phone bank operations to counter anti-Republican advertising"). We have found no evidence that Congress was concerned about, much less that it intended to prohibit, donations of money already fully regulated by FECA. Given Title I's exclusive focus on abuses related to soft money, we would expect that if Congress meant §323(d)'s restriction to have this dramatic and constitutionally questionable effect, it would say so explicitly. Because there is nothing that compels us to conclude that Congress intended "donations" to include transfers of federal money, and because of the constitutional infirmities such an interpretation would raise, we decline to read §323(d) in that way. Thus, political parties remain free to make or direct donations of money to any tax-exempt organization that has otherwise been raised in compliance with FECA. New FECA §323(e)'s Restrictions on Federal Candidates and Officeholders </s> New FECA §323(e) regulates the raising and soliciting of soft money by federal candidates and officeholders. 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(e) (Supp. 2003). It prohibits federal candidates and officeholders from "solicit[ing], receiv[ing], direct[ing], transfer[ing], or spend[ing]" any soft money in connection with federal elections. §441i(e)(1)(A). It also limits the ability of federal candidates and officeholders to solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or spend soft money in connection with state and local elections. §441i(e)(1)(B).70 Section 323(e)'s general prohibition on solicitations admits of a number of exceptions. For instance, federal candidates and officeholders are permitted to "attend, speak, or be a featured guest" at a state or local party fundraising event. 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(e)(3). Section 323(e) specifically provides that federal candidates and officeholders may make solicitations of soft money to §501(c) organizations whose primary purpose is not to engage in "Federal election activit[ies]" as long as the solicitation does not specify how the funds will be spent, 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(e)(4)(A); to §501(c) organizations whose primary purpose is to engage in "Federal election activit[ies]" as long as the solicitations are limited to individuals and the amount solicited does not exceed $20,000 per year per individual, 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(e)(4)(B); and to §501(c) organizations for the express purpose of carrying out such activities, again so long as the amount solicited does not exceed $20,000 per year per individual, 2 U.S.C.A. §441(e)(4)(B). </s> No party seriously questions the constitutionality of §323(e)'s general ban on donations of soft money made directly to federal candidates and officeholders, their agents, or entities established or controlled by them. Even on the narrowest reading of Buckley, a regulation restricting donations to a federal candidate, regardless of the ends to which those funds are ultimately put, qualifies as a contribution limit subject to less rigorous scrutiny. Such donations have only marginal speech and associational value, but at the same time pose a substantial threat of corruption. By severing the most direct link between the soft-money donor and the federal candidate, §323(e)'s ban on donations of soft money is closely drawn to prevent the corruption or the appearance of corruption of federal candidates and officeholders. </s> Section 323(e)'s restrictions on solicitations are justified as valid anticircumvention measures. Large soft-money donations at a candidate's or officeholder's behest give rise to all of the same corruption concerns posed by contributions made directly to the candidate or officeholder. Though the candidate may not ultimately control how the funds are spent, the value of the donation to the candidate or officeholder is evident from the fact of the solicitation itself. Without some restriction on solicitations, federal candidates and officeholders could easily avoid FECA's contribution limits by soliciting funds from large donors and restricted sources to like-minded organizations engaging in federal election activities. As the record demonstrates, even before the passage of BCRA, federal candidates and officeholders had already begun soliciting donations to state and local parties, as well as tax-exempt organizations, in order to help their own, as well as their party's, electoral cause. See Colorado II, 533 U.S., at 458 (quoting fundraising letter from a Congressman explaining to contributor that "'you are at the limit of what you can directly contribute to my campaign,' but 'you can further help my campaign by assisting the Colorado Republican Party'"); 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 479-480 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (surveying evidence of federal officeholders' soliciting funds to state and local parties); id., at 848 (Leon, J.) (same); id., at 518 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (surveying evidence of federal officeholders' soliciting funds for nonprofits for electioneering purposes); id., at 849 (Leon, J.) (same). The incentives to do so, at least with respect to solicitations to tax-exempt organizations, will only increase with Title I's restrictions on the raising and spending of soft money by national, state, and local parties. </s> Section 323(e) addresses these concerns while accommodating the individual speech and associational rights of federal candidates and officeholders. Rather than place an outright ban on solicitations to tax-exempt organizations, §323(e)(4) permits limited solicitations of soft money. 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(e)(4). This allowance accommodates individuals who have long served as active members of nonprofit organizations in both their official and individual capacities. Similarly, §§323(e)(1)(B) and 323(e)(3) preserve the traditional fundraising role of federal officeholders by providing limited opportunities for federal candidates and officeholders to associate with their state and local colleagues through joint fundraising activities. 2 U.S.C.A. §§441i(e)(1)(B), 441i(e)(3). Given these many exceptions, as well as the substantial threat of corruption or its appearance posed by donations to or at the behest of federal candidates and officeholders, §323(e) is clearly constitutional. We accordingly uphold §323(e) against plaintiffs' First Amendment challenge. New FECA §323(f)'s Restrictions on State Candidates and Officeholders </s> The final provision of Title I is new FECA §323(f). 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(f) (Supp. 2003). Section 323(f) generally prohibits candidates for state or local office, or state or local officeholders, from spending soft money to fund "public communications" as defined in §301(20)(A)(iii)--i.e., a communication that "refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office ... and that promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate for that office." 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(f)(1); §431(20)(A)(iii). Exempted from this restriction are communications made in connection with an election for state or local office which refer only to the state or local candidate or officeholder making the expenditure or to any other candidate for the same state or local office. §441i(f)(2). Section 323(f) places no cap on the amount of money that state or local candidates can spend on any activity. Rather, like §§323(a) and 323(b), it limits only the source and amount of contributions that state and local candidates can draw on to fund expenditures that directly impact federal elections. And, by regulating only contributions used to fund "public communications," §323(f) focuses narrowly on those soft-money donations with the greatest potential to corrupt or give rise to the appearance of corruption of federal candidates and officeholders. </s> Plaintiffs advance two principal arguments against §323(f). We have already rejected the first argument, that the definition of "public communications" in new FECA §301(20)(A)(iii) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. See supra, 62, n.64. We add only that, plaintiffs' and Justice Kennedy's contrary reading notwithstanding, post, at 34, this provision does not prohibit a state or local candidate from advertising that he has received a federal officeholder's endorsement.71 </s> The second argument, that soft-money contributions to state and local candidates for "public communications" do not corrupt or appear to corrupt federal candidates, ignores both the record in this litigation and Congress' strong interest in preventing circumvention of otherwise valid contribution limits. The proliferation of sham issue ads has driven the soft-money explosion. Parties have sought out every possible way to fund and produce these ads with soft money: They have labored to bring them under the FEC's allocation regime; they have raised and transferred soft money from national to state party committees to take advantage of favorable allocation ratios; and they have transferred and solicited funds to tax-exempt organizations for production of such ads. We will not upset Congress' eminently reasonable prediction that, with these other avenues no longer available, state and local candidates and officeholders will become the next conduits for the soft-money funding of sham issue advertising. We therefore uphold §323(f) against plaintiffs' First Amendment challenge.72 B </s> Several plaintiffs contend that Title I exceeds Congress' Election Clause authority to "make or alter" rules governing federal elections, U.S. Const., Art. I, §4, and, by impairing the authority of the States to regulate their own elections, violates constitutional principles of federalism. In examining congressional enactments for infirmity under the Tenth Amendment, this Court has focused its attention on laws that commandeer the States and state officials in carrying out federal regulatory schemes. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). By contrast, Title I of BCRA only regulates the conduct of private parties. It imposes no requirements whatsoever upon States or state officials, and, because it does not expressly pre-empt state legislation, it leaves the States free to enforce their own restrictions on the financing of state electoral campaigns. It is true that Title I, as amended, prohibits some fundraising tactics that would otherwise be permitted under the laws of various States, and that it may therefore have an indirect effect on the financing of state electoral campaigns. But these indirect effects do not render BCRA unconstitutional. It is not uncommon for federal law to prohibit private conduct that is legal in some States. See, e.g., United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483 (2001). Indeed, such conflict is inevitable in areas of law that involve both state and federal concerns. It is not in and of itself a marker of constitutional infirmity. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 392 (1879). Of course, in maintaining the federal system envisioned by the Founders, this Court has done more than just prevent Congress from commandeering the States. We have also policed the absolute boundaries of congressional power under Article I. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). But plaintiffs offer no reason to believe that Congress has overstepped its Elections Clause power in enacting BCRA. Congress has a fully legitimate interest in maintaining the integrity of federal officeholders and preventing corruption of federal electoral processes through the means it has chosen. Indeed, our above analysis turns on our finding that those interests are sufficient to satisfy First Amendment scrutiny. Given that finding, we cannot conclude that those interests are insufficient to ground Congress' exercise of its Elections Clause power. See Morrison, supra, at 607 (respect owed to coordinate branches "demands that we invalidate a congressional enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds"). C </s> Finally, plaintiffs argue that Title I violates the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it discriminates against political parties in favor of special interest groups such as the National Rifle Association (NRA), American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and Sierra Club. As explained earlier, BCRA imposes numerous restrictions on the fundraising abilities of political parties, of which the soft-money ban is only the most prominent. Interest groups, however, remain free to raise soft money to fund voter registration, GOTV activities, mailings, and broadcast advertising (other than electioneering communications). We conclude that this disparate treatment does not offend the Constitution. As an initial matter, we note that BCRA actually favors political parties in many ways. Most obviously, party committees are entitled to receive individual contributions that substantially exceed FECA's limits on contributions to nonparty political committees; individuals can give $25,000 to political party committees whereas they can give a maximum of $5,000 to nonparty political committees. In addition, party committees are entitled in effect to contribute to candidates by making coordinated expenditures, and those expenditures may greatly exceed the contribution limits that apply to other donors. See 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(d) (Supp. 2003). </s> More importantly, however, Congress is fully entitled to consider the real-world differences between political parties and interest groups when crafting a system of campaign finance regulation. See National Right to Work, 459 U.S., at 210. Interest groups do not select slates of candidates for elections. Interest groups do not determine who will serve on legislative committees, elect congressional leadership, or organize legislative caucuses. Political parties have influence and power in the legislature that vastly exceeds that of any interest group. As a result, it is hardly surprising that party affiliation is the primary way by which voters identify candidates, or that parties in turn have special access to and relationships with federal officeholders. Congress' efforts at campaign finance regulation may account for these salient differences. Taken seriously, appellants' equal protection arguments would call into question not just Title I of BCRA, but much of the pre-existing structure of FECA as well. We therefore reject those arguments. </s> Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court insofar as it upheld §§323(e) and 323(f). We reverse the judgment of the District Court insofar as it invalidated §§323(a), 323(b), and 323(d). IV </s> Title II of BCRA, entitled "Noncandidate Campaign Expenditures," is divided into two subtitles: "Electioneering Communications" and "Independent and Coordinated Expenditures." We consider each challenged section of these subtitles in turn. BCRA §201's Definition of "Electioneering Communication" </s> The first section of Title II, §201, comprehensively amends FECA §304, which requires political committees to file detailed periodic financial reports with the FEC. The amendment coins a new term, "electioneering communication," to replace the narrowing construction of FECA's disclosure provisions adopted by this Court in Buckley. As discussed further below, that construction limited the coverage of FECA's disclosure requirement to communications expressly advocating the election or defeat of particular candidates. By contrast, the term "electioneering communication" is not so limited, but is defined to encompass any "broadcast, cable, or satellite communication" that "(I) refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office; </s> "(II) is made within-- </s> "(aa) 60 days before a general, special, or runoff election for the office sought by the candidate; or </s> "(bb) 30 days before a primary or preference election, or a convention or caucus of a political party that has authority to nominate a candidate, for the office sought by the candidate; and </s> "(III) in the case of a communication which refers to a candidate other than President or Vice President, is targeted to the relevant electorate." 2 U.S.C.A. §434(f)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. 2003).73 </s> New FECA §304(f)(3)(C) further provides that a communication is "'targeted to the relevant electorate'" if it "can be received by 50,000 or more persons" in the district or State the candidate seeks to represent. 2 U.S.C.A. §434(f)(3)(C). </s> In addition to setting forth this definition, BCRA's amendments to FECA §304 specify significant disclosure requirements for persons who fund electioneering communications. BCRA's use of this new term is not, however, limited to the disclosure context: A later section of the Act (BCRA §203, which amends FECA §316(b)(2)) restricts corporations' and labor unions' funding of electioneering communications. Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of the new term as it applies in both the disclosure and the expenditure contexts. </s> The major premise of plaintiffs' challenge to BCRA's use of the term "electioneering communication" is that Buckley drew a constitutionally mandated line between express advocacy and so-called issue advocacy, and that speakers possess an inviolable First Amendment right to engage in the latter category of speech. Thus, plaintiffs maintain, Congress cannot constitutionally require disclosure of, or regulate expenditures for, "electioneering communications" without making an exception for those "communications" that do not meet Buckley's definition of express advocacy. </s> That position misapprehends our prior decisions, for the express advocacy restriction was an endpoint of statutory interpretation, not a first principle of constitutional law. In Buckley we began by examining then-18 U.S.C. §608(e)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), which restricted expenditures "'relative to a clearly identified candidate,'" and we found that the phrase "'relative to'" was impermissibly vague. 424 U.S., at 40-42. We concluded that the vagueness deficiencies could "be avoided only by reading §608(e)(1) as limited to communications that include explicit words of advocacy of election or defeat of a candidate."74 Id., at 43. We provided examples of words of express advocacy, such as "'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' ... 'defeat,' [and] 'reject,'" id., at 44, n. 52, and those examples eventually gave rise to what is now known as the "magic words" requirement. </s> We then considered FECA's disclosure provisions, including 2 U.S.C. §431(f) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), which defined "'expenditur[e]'" to include the use of money or other assets "'for the purpose of ... influencing'" a federal election. Buckley, 424 U.S., at 77. Finding that the "ambiguity of this phrase" posed "constitutional problems," ibid., we noted our "obligation to construe the statute, if that can be done consistent with the legislature's purpose, to avoid the shoals of vagueness," id., at 77-78 (citations omitted). "To insure that the reach" of the disclosure requirement was "not impermissibly broad, we construe[d] 'expenditure' for purposes of that section in the same way we construed the terms of §608(e)--to reach only funds used for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate." Id., at 80 (footnote omitted). </s> Thus, a plain reading of Buckley makes clear that the express advocacy limitation, in both the expenditure and the disclosure contexts, was the product of statutory interpretation rather than a constitutional command.75 In narrowly reading the FECA provisions in Buckley to avoid problems of vagueness and overbreadth, we nowhere suggested that a statute that was neither vague nor overbroad would be required to toe the same express advocacy line. Nor did we suggest as much in MCFL, 479 U.S. 238 (1986), in which we addressed the scope of another FECA expenditure limitation and confirmed the understanding that Buckley's express advocacy category was a product of statutory construction.76 </s> In short, the concept of express advocacy and the concomitant class of magic words were born of an effort to avoid constitutional infirmities. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979) (citing Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804)). We have long "rigidly adhered" to the tenet "'never to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied,'" United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960) (citation omitted), for "[t]he nature of judicial review constrains us to consider the case that is actually before us," James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 547 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Consistent with that principle, our decisions in Buckley and MCFL were specific to the statutory language before us; they in no way drew a constitutional boundary that forever fixed the permissible scope of provisions regulating campaign-related speech. </s> Nor are we persuaded, independent of our precedents, that the First Amendment erects a rigid barrier between express advocacy and so-called issue advocacy. That notion cannot be squared with our longstanding recognition that the presence or absence of magic words cannot meaningfully distinguish electioneering speech from a true issue ad. See Buckley, supra, at 45. Indeed, the unmistakable lesson from the record in this litigation, as all three judges on the District Court agreed, is that Buckley's magic-words requirement is functionally meaningless. 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 303-304 (Henderson, J.); id., at 534 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 875-879 (Leon, J.). Not only can advertisers easily evade the line by eschewing the use of magic words, but they would seldom choose to use such words even if permitted.77 And although the resulting advertisements do not urge the viewer to vote for or against a candidate in so many words, they are no less clearly intended to influence the election.78 Buckley's express advocacy line, in short, has not aided the legislative effort to combat real or apparent corruption, and Congress enacted BCRA to correct the flaws it found in the existing system. </s> Finally we observe that new FECA §304(f)(3)'s definition of "electioneering communication" raises none of the vagueness concerns that drove our analysis in Buckley. The term "electioneering communication" applies only (1) to a broadcast (2) clearly identifying a candidate for federal office, (3) aired within a specific time period, and (4) targeted to an identified audience of at least 50,000 viewers or listeners. These components are both easily understood and objectively determinable. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-114 (1972). Thus, the constitutional objection that persuaded the Court in Buckley to limit FECA's reach to express advocacy is simply inapposite here. BCRA §201's Disclosure Requirements </s> Having rejected the notion that the First Amendment requires Congress to treat so-called issue advocacy differently from express advocacy, we turn to plaintiffs' other concerns about the use of the term "electioneering communication" in amended FECA §304's disclosure provisions. Under those provisions, whenever any person makes disbursements totaling more than $10,000 during any calendar year for the direct costs of producing and airing electioneering communications, he must file a statement with the FEC identifying the pertinent elections and all persons sharing the costs of the disbursements. 2 U.S.C.A. §§434(f)(2)(A), (B), and (D) (Supp. 2003). If the disbursements are made from a corporation's or labor union's segregated account,79 or by a single individual who has collected contributions from others, the statement must identify all persons who contributed $1,000 or more to the account or the individual during the calendar year. §§434(f)(2)(E), (F). The statement must be filed within 24 hours of each "disclosure date"--a term defined to include the first date and all subsequent dates on which a person's aggregate undisclosed expenses for electioneering communications exceed $10,000 for that calendar year. §§434(f)(1), (2) and (4). Another subsection further provides that the execution of a contract to make a disbursement is itself treated as a disbursement for purposes of FECA's disclosure requirements. §434(f)(5). In addition to the failed argument that BCRA's amendments to FECA §304 improperly extend to both express and issue advocacy, plaintiffs challenge amended FECA §304's disclosure requirements as unnecessarily (1) requiring disclosure of the names of persons who contributed $1,000 or more to the individual or group that paid for a communication, and (2) mandating disclosure of executory contracts for communications that have not yet aired. The District Court rejected the former submission but accepted the latter, finding invalid new FECA §304(f)(5), which governs executory contracts. Relying on BCRA's severability provision,80 the court held that invalidation of the executory contracts subsection did not render the balance of BCRA's amendments to FECA §304 unconstitutional. 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 242 (per curiam). </s> We agree with the District Court that the important state interests that prompted the Buckley Court to uphold FECA's disclosure requirements--providing the electorate with information, deterring actual corruption and avoiding any appearance thereof, and gathering the data necessary to enforce more substantive electioneering restrictions--apply in full to BCRA.81 Accordingly, Buckley amply supports application of FECA §304's disclosure requirements to the entire range of "electioneering communications." As the authors of the District Court's per curiam opinion concluded after reviewing evidence concerning the use of purported "issue ads" to influence federal elections: "The factual record demonstrates that the abuse of the present law not only permits corporations and labor unions to fund broadcast advertisements designed to influence federal elections, but permits them to do so while concealing their identities from the public. BCRA's disclosure provisions require these organizations to reveal their identities so that the public is able to identify the source of the funding behind broadcast advertisements influencing certain elections. Plaintiffs' disdain for BCRA's disclosure pro-visions is nothing short of surprising. Plaintiffs chal-lenge BCRA's restrictions on electioneering communications on the premise that they should be permitted to spend corporate and labor union general treasury funds in the sixty days before the federal elections on broadcast advertisements, which refer to federal candidates, because speech needs to be 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.' McConnell Br. at 44 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). Curiously, Plaintiffs want to preserve the ability to run these advertisements while hiding behind dubious and misleading names like: 'The Coalition-Americans Working for Real Change' (funded by business organizations opposed to organized labor), 'Citizens for Better Medicare' (funded by the pharmaceutical industry), 'Republicans for Clean Air' (funded by brothers Charles and Sam Wyly). Findings ¶ ;¶ ;44, 51, 52. Given these tactics, Plaintiffs never satisfactorily answer the question of how 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' speech can occur when organizations hide themselves from the scrutiny of the voting public. McConnell Br. at 44. Plaintiffs' argument for striking down BCRA's disclosure provisions does not reinforce the precious First Amendment values that Plaintiffs argue are trampled by BCRA, but ignores the competing First Amendment interests of individual citizens seeking to make informed choices in the political marketplace." 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 237. </s> The District Court was also correct that Buckley forecloses a facial attack on the new provision in §304 that requires disclosure of the names of persons contributing $1,000 or more to segregated funds or individuals that spend more than $10,000 in a calendar year on electioneering communications. Like our earlier decision in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958),82 Buckley recognized that compelled disclosures may impose an unconstitutional burden on the freedom to associate in support of a particular cause. Nevertheless, Buckley rejected the contention that FECA's disclosure requirements could not constitutionally be applied to minor parties and independent candidates because the Government's interest in obtaining information from such parties was minimal and the danger of infringing their rights substantial. In Buckley, unlike NAACP, we found no evidence that any party had been exposed to economic reprisals or physical threats as a result of the compelled disclosures. Buckley, 424 U.S., at 69-70. We acknowledged that such a case might arise in the future, however, and addressed the standard of proof that would then apply: "We recognize that unduly strict requirements of proof could impose a heavy burden, but it does not follow that a blanket exemption for minor parties is necessary. Minor parties must be allowed sufficient flexibility in the proof of injury to assure a fair consideration of their claim. The evidence offered need show only a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of a party's contributors' names will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties." Id., at 74. </s> A few years later we used that standard to resolve a minor party's challenge to the constitutionality of the State of Ohio's disclosure requirements. We held that the First Amendment prohibits States from compelling disclosures that would subject identified persons to "threats, harassment, and reprisals," and that the District Court's findings had established a "reasonable probability" of such a result.83 Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 100 (1982). </s> In this litigation the District Court applied Buckley's evidentiary standard and found--consistent with our conclusion in Buckley, and in contrast to that in Brown--that the evidence did not establish the requisite "reasonable probability" of harm to any plaintiff group or its members. The District Court noted that some parties had expressed such concerns, but it found a "lack of specific evidence about the basis for these concerns." 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 247 (per curiam). We agree, but we note that, like our refusal to recognize a blanket exception for minor parties in Buckley, our rejection of plaintiffs' facial challenge to the requirement to disclose individual donors does not foreclose possible future challenges to particular applications of that requirement. </s> We also are unpersuaded by plaintiffs' challenge to new FECA §304(f)(5), which requires disclosure of executory contracts for electioneering communications: "Contracts to disburse </s> "For purposes of this subsection, a person shall be treated as having made a disbursement if the person has executed a contract to make the disbursement." 2 U.S.C.A. §434(f)(5) (Supp. 2003). </s> In our view, this provision serves an important purpose the District Court did not advance. BCRA's amendments to FECA §304 mandate disclosure only if and when a person makes disbursements totaling more than $10,000 in any calendar year to pay for electioneering communications. Plaintiffs do not take issue with the use of a dollar amount, rather than the number or dates of the ads, to identify the time when a person paying for electioneering communications must make disclosures to the FEC. Nor do they question the need to make the contents of parties' disclosure statements available to curious voters in advance of elections. Given the relatively short time frames in which electioneering communications are made, the interest in assuring that disclosures are made promptly and in time to provide relevant information to voters is unquestionably significant. Yet fixing the deadline for filing disclosure statements based on the date when aggregate disbursements exceed $10,000 would open a significant loophole if advertisers were not required to disclose executory contracts. In the absence of that requirement, political supporters could avoid preelection disclosures concerning ads slated to run during the final week of a campaign simply by making a preelection downpayment of less than $10,000, with the balance payable after the election. Indeed, if the advertiser waited to pay that balance until the next calendar year then, as long as the balance did not itself exceed $10,000, the advertiser might avoid the disclosure requirements completely. </s> The record contains little evidence identifying any harm that might flow from the enforcement of §304(f)(5)'s "advance" disclosure requirement. The District Court speculated that disclosing information about contracts "that have not been performed, and may never be performed, may lead to confusion and an unclear record upon which the public will evaluate the forces operating in the political marketplace." 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 241 (per curiam). Without evidence relating to the frequency of nonperformance of executed contracts, such speculation cannot outweigh the public interest in ensuring full disclosure before an election actually takes place. It is no doubt true that §304(f)(5) will sometimes require the filing of disclosure statements in advance of the actual broadcast of an advertisement.84 But the same would be true in the absence of an advance disclosure requirement, if a television station insisted on advance payment for all of the ads covered by a contract. Thus, the possibility that amended §304 may sometimes require disclosures prior to the airing of an ad is as much a function of the use of disbursements (rather than the date of an ad) to trigger the disclosure requirement as it is a function of §304(f)(5)'s treatment of executory contracts. </s> As the District Court observed, amended FECA §304's disclosure requirements are constitutional because they "'d[o] not prevent anyone from speaking.'" Ibid. (quoting Brief for FEC in Opposition in No. 02-582 etal. (DC), p.112). Moreover, the required disclosures "'would not have to reveal the specific content of the advertisements, yet they would perform an important function in informing the public about various candidates' supporters before election day.'" 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 241 (quoting Brief for FEC in Opposition, supra, at 112) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court insofar as it upheld the disclosure requirements in amended FECA §304 and rejected the facial attack on the provisions relating to donors of $1,000 or more, and reverse that judgment insofar as it invalidated FECA §304(f)(5). BCRA §202's Treatment of "Coordinated Communications" as Contributions </s> Section 202 of BCRA amends FECA §315(a)(7)(C) to provide that disbursements for "electioneering communication[s]" that are coordinated with a candidate or party will be treated as contributions to, and expenditures by, that candidate or party. 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(a)(7)(C) (Supp. 2003).85 The amendment clarifies the scope of the preceding subsection, §315(a)(7)(B), which states more generally that "expenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of" a candidate or party will constitute contributions. 2 U.S.C. §§441a(a)(7)(B)(i)-(ii). In Buckley we construed the statutory term "expenditure" to reach only spending for express advocacy. 424 U.S., at 40-43, and n. 52 (addressing 18 U.S.C. §608(e)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), which placed a $1,000 cap on expenditures "'relative to a clearly identified candidate'"). BCRA §202 pre-empts a possible claim that §315(a)(7)(B) is similarly limited, such that coordinated expenditures for communications that avoid express advocacy cannot be counted as contributions. As we explained above, see supra, at 83-86, Buckley's narrow interpretation of the term "expenditure" was not a constitutional limitation on Congress' power to regulate federal elections. Accordingly, there is no reason why Congress may not treat coordinated disbursements for electioneering communications in the same way it treats all other coordinated expenditures. We affirm the judgment of the District Court insofar as it held that plaintiffs had advanced "no basis for finding Section 202 unconstitutional." 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 250. BCRA §203's Prohibition of Corporate and Labor Disbursements for Electioneering Communications </s> Since our decision in Buckley, Congress' power to prohibit corporations and unions from using funds in their treasuries to finance advertisements expressly advocating the election or defeat of candidates in federal elections has been firmly embedded in our law. The ability to form and administer separate segregated funds authorized by FECA §316, 2 U.S.C.A. §441b (main ed. and Supp. 2003), has provided corporations and unions with a constitutionally sufficient opportunity to engage in express advocacy. That has been this Court's unanimous view,86 and it is not challenged in this litigation. Section 203 of BCRA amends FECA §316(b)(2) to extend this rule, which previously applied only to express advocacy, to all "electioneering communications" covered by the definition of that term in amended FECA §304(f)(3), discussed above. 2 U.S.C.A. §441b(b)(2) (Supp. 2003).87 Thus, under BCRA, corporations and unions may not use their general treasury funds to finance electioneering communications, but they remain free to organize and administer segregated funds, or PACs, for that purpose. Because corporations can still fund electioneering communications with PAC money, it is "simply wrong" to view the provision as a "complete ban" on expression rather than a regulation. Beaumont, 539 U.S., at ___, ___ (slip op., at 15). As we explained in Beaumont: "The PAC option allows corporate political participation without the temptation to use corporate funds for political influence, quite possibly at odds with the sentiments of some shareholders or members, and it lets the government regulate campaign activity through registration and disclosure, see [2 U.S.C.] §§432-434, without jeopardizing the associational rights of advocacy organizations' members." Id., at ___ (slip op., at 16) (citation omitted). </s> See also Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658 (1990). </s> Rather than arguing that the prohibition on the use of general treasury funds is a complete ban that operates as a prior restraint, plaintiffs instead challenge the expanded regulation on the grounds that it is both overbroad and underinclusive. Our consideration of plaintiffs' challenge is informed by our earlier conclusion that the distinction between express advocacy and so-called issue advocacy is not constitutionally compelled. In that light, we must examine the degree to which BCRA burdens First Amendment expression and evaluate whether a compelling governmental interest justifies that burden. Id., at 657. The latter question--whether the state interest is compelling--is easily answered by our prior decisions regarding campaign finance regulation, which "represent respect for the 'legislative judgment that the special characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly careful regulation.'" Beaumont, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 8) (quoting National Right to Work, 459 U.S., at 209-210). We have repeatedly sustained legislation aimed at "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas." Austin, supra, at 660; see Beaumont, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 7-8); National Right to Work, supra, at 209-210. Moreover, recent cases have recognized that certain restrictions on corporate electoral involvement permissibly hedge against "'circumvention of [valid] contribution limits.'" Beaumont, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 7) (quoting Colorado II, 533 U.S., at 456, and n.18.) </s> In light of our precedents, plaintiffs do not contest that the Government has a compelling interest in regulating advertisements that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate for federal office. Nor do they contend that the speech involved in so-called issue advocacy is any more core political speech than are words of express advocacy. After all, "the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office," Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971), and "[a]dvocacy of the election or defeat of candidates for federal office is no less entitled to protection under the First Amendment than the discussion of political policy generally or advocacy of the passage or defeat of legislation." Buckley, 424 U.S., at 48. Rather, plaintiffs argue that the justifications that adequately support the regulation of express advocacy do not apply to significant quantities of speech encompassed by the definition of electioneering communications. </s> This argument fails to the extent that the issue ads broadcast during the 30- and 60-day periods preceding federal primary and general elections are the functional equivalent of express advocacy. The justifications for the regulation of express advocacy apply equally to ads aired during those periods if the ads are intended to influence the voters' decisions and have that effect. The precise percentage of issue ads that clearly identified a candidate and were aired during those relatively brief preelection time spans but had no electioneering purpose is a matter of dispute between the parties and among the judges on the District Court. See 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 307-312 (Henderson, J.); id., at 583-587 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 796-798 (Leon, J.). Nevertheless, the vast majority of ads clearly had such a purpose. Annenberg Report 13-14; App. 1330-1348 (Krasno & Sorauf Expert Report); 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 573-578 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 826-827 (Leon, J.). Moreover, whatever the precise percentage may have been in the past, in the future corporations and unions may finance genuine issue ads during those time frames by simply avoiding any specific reference to federal candidates, or in doubtful cases by paying for the ad from a segregated fund.88 </s> We are therefore not persuaded that plaintiffs have carried their heavy burden of proving that amended FECA §316(b)(2) is overbroad. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). Even if we assumed that BCRA will inhibit some constitutionally protected corporate and union speech, that assumption would not "justify prohibiting all enforcement" of the law unless its application to protected speech is substantial, "not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to the scope of the law's plainly legitimate applications." Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. ___, ___ (2003) (slip op., at 5-6). Far from establishing that BCRA's application to pure issue ads is substantial, either in an absolute sense or relative to its application to election-related advertising, the record strongly supports the contrary conclusion. </s> Plaintiffs also argue that FECA §316(b)(2)'s segregated-fund requirement for electioneering communications is underinclusive because it does not apply to advertising in the print media or on the Internet. 2 U.S.C.A. §434(f)(3)(A) (Supp. 2003). The records developed in this litigation and by the Senate Committee adequately explain the reasons for this legislative choice. Congress found that corporations and unions used soft money to finance a virtual torrent of televised election-related ads during the periods immediately preceding federal elections, and that remedial legislation was needed to stanch that flow of money. 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 569-573 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 799 (Leon, J.); 3 1998 Senate Report 4465, 4474-4481; 5 id., at 7521-7525. As we held in Buckley, "reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind." 424 U.S., at 105 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). One might just as well argue that the electioneering communication definition is underinclusive because it leaves advertising 61 days in advance of an election entirely unregulated. The record amply justifies Congress' line drawing. </s> In addition to arguing that §316(b)(2)'s segregated-fund requirement is underinclusive, some plaintiffs contend that it unconstitutionally discriminates in favor of media companies. FECA §304(f)(3)(B)(i) excludes from the definition of electioneering communications any "communication appearing in a news story, commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station, unless such facilities are owned or controlled by any political party, political committee, or candidate." 2 U.S.C.A. §434(f)(3)(B)(i) (Supp. 2003). Plaintiffs argue this provision gives free rein to media companies to engage in speech without resort to PAC money. Section 304(f)(3)(B)(i)'s effect, however, is much narrower than plaintiffs suggest. The provision excepts news items and commentary only; it does not afford carte blanche to media companies generally to ignore FECA's provisions. The statute's narrow exception is wholly consistent with First Amendment principles. "A valid distinction ... exists between corporations that are part of the media industry and other corporations that are not involved in the regular business of imparting news to the public." Austin, 494 U.S., at 668. Numerous federal statutes have drawn this distinction to ensure that the law "does not hinder or prevent the institutional press from reporting on, and publishing editorials about, newsworthy events." Ibid. (citations omitted); see, e.g., 2 U.S.C. §431(9)(B)(i) (exempting news stories, commentaries, and editorials from FECA's definition of "expenditure"); 15 U.S.C. §§1801-1804 (providing a limited antitrust exemption for newspapers); 47 U.S.C. §315(a) (excepting newscasts, news interviews, and news documentaries from the requirement that broadcasters provide equal time to candidates for public office).89 </s> We affirm the District Court's judgment to the extent that it upheld the constitutionality of FECA §316(b)(2); to the extent that it invalidated any part of §316(b)(2), we reverse the judgment. BCRA §204's Application to Nonprofit Corporations </s> Section 204 of BCRA, which adds FECA §316(c)(6), applies the prohibition on the use of general treasury funds to pay for electioneering communications to not-for-profit corporations.90 Prior to the enactment of BCRA, FECA required such corporations, like business corporations, to pay for their express advocacy from segregated funds rather than from their general treasuries. Our recent decision in Federal Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. ___ (2003), confirmed that the requirement was valid except insofar as it applied to a sub-category of corporations described as "MCFL organizations," as defined by our decision in MCFL, 479 U.S. 238 (1986).91 The constitutional objection to applying FECA's segregated-fund requirement to so-called MCFL organizations necessarily applies with equal force to FECA §316(c)(6). Our decision in MCFL related to a carefully defined category of entities. We identified three features of the organization at issue in that case that were central to our holding: "First, it was formed for the express purpose of promoting political ideas, and cannot engage in business activities. If political fundraising events are expressly denominated as requests for contributions that will be used for political purposes, including direct expenditures, these events cannot be considered business activities. This ensures that political resources reflect political support. Second, it has no shareholders or other persons affiliated so as to have a claim on its assets or earnings. This ensures that persons connected with the organization will have no economic disincentive for disassociating with it if they disagree with its political activity. Third, MCFL was not established by a business corporation or a labor union, and it is its policy not to accept contributions from such entities. This prevents such corporations from serving as conduits for the type of direct spending that creates a threat to the political marketplace." Id., at 264. </s> That FECA §316(c)(6) does not, on its face, exempt MCFL organizations from its prohibition is not a sufficient reason to invalidate the entire section. If a reasonable limiting construction "has been or could be placed on the challenged statute" to avoid constitutional concerns, we should embrace it. Broadrick, 487 U.S. 879, 896 (1988); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-697 (1979). Indeed, the Government itself concedes that §316(c)(6) does not apply to MCFL organizations. As so construed, the provision is plainly valid. See Austin, 494 U.S., at 661-665 (holding that a segregated-fund requirement that did not explicitly carve out an MCFL exception could apply to a nonprofit corporation that did not qualify for MCFL status). </s> Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court upholding §316(c)(6) as so limited is affirmed. BCRA §212's Reporting Requirement for $1,000 Expenditures </s> Section 212 of BCRA amends FECA §304 to add a new disclosure requirement, FECA §304(g), which applies to persons making independent expenditures of $1,000 or more during the 20-day period immediately preceding an election. Like FECA §304(f)(5), discussed above, new §304(g) treats the execution of a contract to make a disbursement as the functional equivalent of a payment for the goods or services covered by the contract.92 In challenging this provision, plaintiffs renew the argument we rejected in the context of §304(f)(5): that they have a constitutional right to postpone any disclosure until after the performance of the services purchased by their expenditure. The District Court held that the challenge to FECA §304(g) was not ripe because the FEC has issued regulations "provid[ing] Plaintiffs with the exact remedy they seek"--that is, specifically declining to "require disclosure of independent express advocacy expenditures prior to their 'publi[c] disseminat[ion].'" 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 251, and n.85 (per curiam) (citing 68 Fed. Reg. 404, 452 (2003) (codified at 11 CFR §§109.10(c), (d) (2003))). We are not certain that a regulation purporting to limit the range of circumstances in which a speech-burdening statute will be enforced can render nonjusticiable a facial challenge to the (concededly broader) underlying statute. Nevertheless, we need not separately address the constitutionality of §304(g), for our ruling as to BCRA §201, see supra, at 82-89, renders the issue essentially moot. BCRA §213's Requirement that Political Parties Choose Between Coordinated and Independent Expenditures After Nominating a Candidate </s> Section 213 of BCRA amends FECA §315(d)(4) to impose certain limits on party spending during the postnomination, preelection period.93 At first blush, the text of §315(d)(4)(A) appears to require political parties to make a straightforward choice between using limited coordinated expenditures or unlimited independent expenditures to support their nominees. All three judges on the District Court concluded that the provision placed an unconstitutional burden on the parties' right to make unlimited independent expenditures. 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 388 (Henderson, J.); id., at 650-651 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.), id., at 805-808 (Leon, J.). In the end, we agree with that conclusion but believe it important to identify certain complexities in the text of §315(d)(4) that affect our analysis of the issue. Section 315 of FECA sets forth various limitations on contributions and expenditures by individuals, political parties, and other groups. Section 315(a)(2) restricts "contributions" by parties to $5,000 per candidate. 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(a)(2). Because §315(a)(7) treats expenditures that are coordinated with a candidate as contributions to that candidate, 2 U.S.C.A. §441(a)(7) (Supp. 2003), the $5,000 limit also operates as a cap on parties' coordinated expenditures. Section 315(d), however, provides that, "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law with respect to limitations on expenditures or limitations on contributions," political parties may make "expenditures" in support of their candidates under a formula keyed to the voting-age population of the candidate's home State or, in the case of a candidate for President, the voting-age population of the United States. 2 U.S.C.A. §§441a(d)(1)-(3) (main ed. and Supp. 2003).94 In the year 2000, that formula permitted expenditures ranging from $33,780 to $67,650 for House of Representatives races, and from $67,650 to $1.6 million for Senate races. Colorado II, 533 U.S., at 439, n.3. We held in Colorado I that parties have a constitutional right to make unlimited independent expenditures, and we invalidated §315(d) to the extent that it restricted such expenditures. As a result of that decision, §315(d) applies only to coordinated expenditures, replacing the $5,000 cap on contributions set out in §315(a)(2) with the more generous limitations prescribed by §§315(d)(1)-(3). We sustained that limited application in Colorado II, supra. </s> Section 213 of BCRA amends §315(d) by adding a new paragraph (4). New §315(d)(4)(A) provides that, after a party nominates a candidate for federal office, it must choose between two spending options. Under the first option, a party that "makes any independent expenditure (as defined in section [301(17)])" is thereby barred from making "any coordinated expenditure under this subsection." 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(d)(4)(A)(i) (Supp. 2003). The phrase "this subsection" is a reference to subsection (d) of §315. Thus, the consequence of making an independent expenditure is not a complete prohibition of any coordinated expenditure: Although the party cannot take advantage of the increased spending limits under §§315(d)(1)-(3), it still may make up to $5,000 in coordinated expenditures under §315(a)(2). As the difference between $5,000 and $1.6 million demonstrates, however, that is a significant cost to impose on the exercise of a constitutional right. </s> The second option is the converse of the first. It provides that a party that makes any coordinated expenditure "under this subsection" (i.e., one that exceeds the ordinary $5,000 limit) cannot make "any independent expenditure (as defined in section [301(17)]) with respect to the candidate." 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(d)(4)(A)(ii). Section 301(17) defines "'independent expenditure'" to mean a non-coordinated expenditure "expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate." 2 U.S.C.A. §431(17)(A).95 Therefore, as was true of the first option, the party's choice is not as stark as it initially appears: The consequence of the larger coordinated expenditure is not a complete prohibition of any independent expenditure, but the forfeiture of the right to make independent expenditures for express advocacy. As we explained in our discussion of the provisions relating to electioneering communications, supra, at 83-87, express advocacy represents only a tiny fraction of the political communications made for the purpose of electing or defeating candidates during a campaign. Regardless of which option parties choose, they remain free to make independent expenditures for the vast majority of campaign ads that avoid the use of a few magic words. </s> In sum, the coverage of new FECA §315(d)(4) is much more limited than it initially appears. A party that wishes to spend more than $5,000 in coordination with its nominee is forced to forgo only the narrow category of independent expenditures that make use of magic words. But while the category of burdened speech is relatively small, it plainly is entitled to First Amendment protection. See Buckley, 424 U.S., at 44-45, 48. Under §315(d)(4), a political party's exercise of its constitutionally protected right to engage in "core First Amendment expression," id., at 48, results in the loss of a valuable statutory benefit that has been available to parties for many years. To survive constitutional scrutiny, a provision that has such consequences must be supported by a meaningful governmental interest. </s> The interest in requiring political parties to avoid the use of magic words is not such an interest. We held in Buckley that a $1,000 cap on expenditures that applied only to express advocacy could not be justified as a means of avoiding circumvention of contribution limits or preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption because its restrictions could easily be evaded: "So long as persons and groups eschew expenditures that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, they are free to spend as much as they want to promote the candidate and his views." Id., at 45. The same is true in this litigation. Any claim that a restriction on independent express advocacy serves a strong Government interest is belied by the overwhelming evidence that the line between express advocacy and other types of election-influencing expression is, for Congress' purposes, functionally meaningless. Indeed, Congress enacted the new "electioneering communication[s]" provisions precisely because it recognized that the express advocacy test was woefully inadequate at capturing communications designed to influence candidate elections. In light of that recognition, we are hard pressed to conclude that any meaningful purpose is served by §315(d)(4)'s burden on a party's right to engage independently in express advocacy. </s> The Government argues that §315(d)(4) nevertheless is constitutional because it is not an outright ban (or cap) on independent expenditures, but rather offers parties a voluntary choice between a constitutional right and a statutory benefit. Whatever merit that argument might have in the abstract, it fails to account for new §315(d)(4)(B), which provides: "For purposes of this paragraph, all political committees established and maintained by a national political party (including all congressional campaign committees) and all political committees established and maintained by a State political party (including any subordinate committee of a State committee) shall be considered to be a single political committee." 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(d)(4)(B) (Supp. 2003). </s> Given that provision, it simply is not the case that each party committee can make a voluntary and independent choice between exercising its right to engage in independent advocacy and taking advantage of the increased limits on coordinated spending under §§315(d)(1)-(3). Instead, the decision resides solely in the hands of the first mover, such that a local party committee can bind both the state and national parties to its chosen spending option.96 It is one thing to say that Congress may require a party committee to give up its right to make independent expenditures if it believes that it can accomplish more with coordinated expenditures. It is quite another thing, however, to say that the RNC must limit itself to $5,000 in coordinated expenditures in support of its presidential nominee if any state or local committee first makes an independent expenditure for an ad that uses magic words. That odd result undermines any claim that new §315(d)(4) can withstand constitutional scrutiny simply because it is cast as a voluntary choice rather than an outright prohibition on independent expenditures. </s> The portion of the judgment of the District Court invalidating BCRA §213 is affirmed. BCRA §214's Changes in FECA's Provisions Covering Coordinated Expenditures </s> Ever since our decision in Buckley, it has been settled that expenditures by a noncandidate that are "controlled by or coordinated with the candidate and his campaign" may be treated as indirect contributions subject to FECA's source and amount limitations. 424 U.S., at 46. Thus, FECA §315(a)(7)(B)(i) long has provided that "expenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents, shall be considered to be a contribution to such candidate." 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (Supp. 2003). Section 214(a) of BCRA creates a new FECA §315(a)(7)(B)(ii) that applies the same rule to expenditures coordinated with "a national, State, or local committee of a political party." 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(a)(7)(B)(ii).97 Sections 214(b) and (c) direct the FEC to repeal its current regulations98 and to promulgate new regulations dealing with "coordinated communications" paid for by persons other than candidates or their parties. Subsection (c) provides that the new "regulations shall not require agreement or formal collaboration to establish coordination." 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(a) note. Plaintiffs do not dispute that Congress may apply the same coordination rules to parties as to candidates. They argue instead that new FECA §315(a)(7)(B)(ii) and its implementing regulations are overbroad and unconstitutionally vague because they permit a finding of coordination even in the absence of an agreement. Plaintiffs point out that political supporters may be subjected to criminal liability if they exceed the contribution limits with expenditures that ultimately are deemed coordinated. Thus, they stress the importance of a clear definition of "coordination" and argue any definition that does not hinge on the presence of an agreement cannot provide the "precise guidance" that the First Amendment demands. Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States etal., Appellant in No. 02-1756, p. 48. As plaintiffs readily admit, that argument reaches beyond BCRA, calling into question FECA's pre-existing provisions governing expenditures coordinated with candidates. </s> We are not persuaded that the presence of an agreement marks the dividing line between expenditures that are coordinated--and therefore may be regulated as indirect contributions--and expenditures that truly are independent. We repeatedly have struck down limitations on expenditures "made totally independently of the candidate and his campaign," Buckley, 424 U.S., at 47, on the ground that such limitations "impose far greater restraints on the freedom of speech and association" than do limits on contributions and coordinated expenditures, id., at 44, while "fail[ing] to serve any substantial governmental interest in stemming the reality or appearance of corruption in the electoral process," id., at 47-48. See also Colorado I, 518 U.S., at 613-614 (striking down limit on expenditure made by party officials prior to nomination of candidates and without any consultation with potential nominees). We explained in Buckley: "Unlike contributions, ... independent expenditures may well provide little assistance to the candidate's campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive. The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate." 424 U.S., at 47. </s> Thus, the rationale for affording special protection to wholly independent expenditures has nothing to do with the absence of an agreement and everything to do with the functional consequences of different types of expenditures. Independent expenditures "are poor sources of leverage for a spender because they might be duplicative or counterproductive from a candidate's point of view." Colorado II, 533 U.S., at 446. By contrast, expenditures made after a "wink or nod" often will be "as useful to the candidate as cash." Id., at 442, 446. For that reason, Congress has always treated expenditures made "at the request or suggestion of" a candidate as coordinated.99 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (Supp. 2003). A supporter easily could comply with a candidate's request or suggestion without first agreeing to do so, and the resulting expenditure would be "'virtually indistinguishable from [a] simple contributio[n],'" Colorado II, supra, at 444-445. Therefore, we cannot agree with the submission that new FECA §315(a)(7)(B)(ii) is overbroad because it permits a finding of coordination or cooperation notwithstanding the absence of a pre-existing agreement. </s> Nor are we persuaded that the absence of an agreement requirement renders §315(a)(7)(B)(ii) unconstitutionally vague. An agreement has never been required to support a finding of coordination with a candidate under §315(a)(7)(B)(i), which refers to expenditures made "in cooperation, consultation, or concer[t] with, or at the request or suggestion of" a candidate. Congress used precisely the same language in new §315(a)(7)(B)(ii) to address expenditures coordinated with parties. FECA's longstanding definition of coordination "delineates its reach in words of common understanding." Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 616 (1968). Not surprisingly, therefore, the relevant statutory language has survived without constitutional challenge for almost three decades. Although that fact does not insulate the definition from constitutional scrutiny, it does undermine plaintiffs' claim that the language of §315(a)(7)(B)(ii) is intolerably vague. Plaintiffs do not present any evidence that the definition has chilled political speech, whether between candidates and their supporters or by the supporters to the general public. See Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (noting risk that vague statutes may chill protected expression). And, although plaintiffs speculate that the FEC could engage in intrusive and politically motivated investigations into alleged coordination, they do not even attempt to explain why an agreement requirement would solve that problem. Moreover, the only evidence plaintiffs have adduced regarding the enforcement of the coordination provision during its 27-year history concerns three investigations in the late 1990's into groups on different sides of the political aisle. Such meager evidence does not support the claim that §315(a)(7)(B)(ii) will "foster 'arbitrary and discriminatory application.'" Buckley, supra, at 41, n. 48 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 339 U.S. 382, 412 (1950), and is not unconstitutionally vague. </s> Finally, portions of plaintiffs' challenge to BCRA §214 focus on the regulations the FEC has promulgated under §214(c). 11 CFR §109.21 (2003). As the District Court explained, issues concerning the regulations are not appropriately raised in this facial challenge to BCRA, but must be pursued in a separate proceeding. Thus, we agree with the District Court that plaintiffs' challenge to §§214(b) and (c) is not ripe to the extent that the alleged constitutional infirmities are found in the implementing regulations rather than the statute itself. </s> The portions of the District Court judgment rejecting plaintiffs' challenges to BCRA §214 are affirmed. V </s> Many years ago we observed that "[t]o say that Congress is without power to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard ... an election from the improper use of money to influence the result is to deny to the nation in a vital particular the power of self protection." Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S., at 545. We abide by that conviction in considering Congress' most recent effort to confine the ill effects of aggregated wealth on our political system. We are under no illusion that BCRA will be the last congressional statement on the matter. Money, like water, will always find an outlet. What problems will arise, and how Congress will respond, are concerns for another day. In the main we uphold BCRA's two principal, complementary features: the control of soft money and the regulation of electioneering communications. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the District Court's judgment with respect to Titles I and II. It is so ordered. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1674v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1675v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1676v. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal.; </s> JOHN McCAIN, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1702v. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal.; </s> REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1727v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC., etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1733v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, APPELLANTS </s> 02-1734v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1740v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> RON PAUL, UNITED STATES CONGRESSMAN, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1747v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1753v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1755v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1756v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal. on appeals from the united states district court for the district of columbia [December 10, 2003] </s> Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV.** </s> This opinion addresses issues involving miscellaneous Title III and IV provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), 116 Stat. 81. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the District Court with respect to these provisions. BCRA §305 </s> BCRA §305 amends the federal Communications Act of 1934 (Communications Act) §315(b), 48 Stat. 1088, as amended, 86 Stat. 4, which requires that, 45 days before a primary or 60 days before a general election, broadcast stations must sell a qualified candidate the "lowest unit charge of the station for the same class and amount of time for the same period," 47 U.S.C. §315(b). Section 305's amendment, in turn, denies a candidate the benefit of that lowest unit charge unless the candidate "provides written certification to the broadcast station that the candidate (and any authorized committee of the candidate) shall not make any direct reference to another candidate for the same office," or the candidate, in the manner prescribed in BCRA §305(a)(3), clearly identifies herself at the end of the broadcast and states that she approves of the broadcast. 47 U.S.C.A. §§315(b)(2)(A), (C) (Supp. 2003). The McConnell plaintiffs challenge §305. They argue that Senator McConnell's testimony that he plans to run advertisements critical of his opponents in the future and that he had run them in the past is sufficient to establish standing. We think not. </s> Article III of the Constitution limits the "judicial power" to the resolution of "cases" and "controversies." One element of the "bedrock" case-or-controversy requirement is that plaintiffs must establish that they have standing to sue. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997). On many occasions, we have reiterated the three requirements that constitute the "'irreducible constitutional minimum'" of standing. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000). First, a plaintiff must demonstrate an "injury in fact," which is "concrete," "distinct and palpable," and "actual or imminent." Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Second, a plaintiff must establish "a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of--the injury has to be 'fairly trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] some third party not before the court.'" Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992) (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)). Third, a plaintiff must show the "'substantial likelihood' that the requested relief will remedy the alleged injury in fact." Stevens, supra, at 771. </s> As noted above, §305 amended the Communication Act's requirements with respect to the lowest unit charge for broadcasting time. But this price is not available to qualified candidates until 45 days before a primary election or 60 days before a general election. Because Senator McConnell's current term does not expire until 2009, the earliest day he could be affected by §305 is 45 days before the Republican primary election in 2008. This alleged injury in fact is too remote temporally to satisfy Article III standing. See Whitmore, supra, at 158 ("A threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); see also Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must show he is "'immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury' as [a] result" of the challenged conduct). Because we hold that the McConnell plaintiffs lack standing to challenge §305, we affirm the District Court's dismissal of the challenge to BCRA §305. BCRA §307 </s> BCRA §307, which amends §315(a)(1) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), 86 Stat. 3, as added, 90 Stat. 487, increases and indexes for inflation certain FECA contribution limits. The Adams and Paul plaintiffs challenge §307 in this Court. Both groups contend that they have standing to sue. Again, we disagree. The Adams plaintiffs, a group consisting of voters, organizations representing voters, and candidates, allege two injuries, and argue each is legally cognizable, "as established by case law outlawing electoral discrimination based on economic status ... and upholding the right to an equally meaningful vote ...." Brief for Appellants Adams et al. in No. 02-1740, p.31. </s> First, they assert that the increases in hard money limits enacted by §307 deprive them of an equal ability to participate in the election process based on their economic status. But, to satisfy our standing requirements, a plaintiff's alleged injury must be an invasion of a concrete and particularized legally protected interest. Lujan, supra, at 560. We have noted that "[a]lthough standing in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff's contention that particular conduct is illegal, ... it often turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We have never recognized a legal right comparable to the broad and diffuse injury asserted by the Adams plaintiffs. Their reliance on this Court's voting rights cases is misplaced. They rely on cases requiring nondiscriminatory access to the ballot and a single, equal vote for each voter. See, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974) (invalidating a statute requiring a ballot-access fee fixed at a percentage of the salary for the office sought because it unconstitutionally burdened the right to vote); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666-668 (1966) (invalidating a state poll tax because it effectively denied the right to vote). </s> None of these plaintiffs claims a denial of equal access to the ballot or the right to vote. Instead, the plaintiffs allege a curtailment of the scope of their participation in the electoral process. But we have noted that "[p]olitical 'free trade' does not necessarily require that all who participate in the political marketplace do so with exactly equal resources." Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976) (per curiam) (rejecting the asserted government interest of "equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections" to justify the burden on speech presented by expenditure limits). This claim of injury by the Adams plaintiffs is, therefore, not to a legally cognizable right. </s> Second, the Adams plaintiffs-candidates contend that they have suffered a competitive injury. Their candidates "do not wish to solicit or accept large campaign contributions as permitted by BCRA" because "[t]hey believe such contributions create the appearance of unequal access and influence." Adams Complaint ¶ ;53. As a result, they claim that BCRA §307 puts them at a "fundraising disadvantage," making it more difficult for them to compete in elections. See id., ¶ ;56. </s> The second claimed injury is based on the same premise as the first: BCRA §307's increased hard money limits allow plaintiffs-candidates' opponents to raise more money, and, consequently, the plaintiffs-candidates' ability to compete or participate in the electoral process is diminished. But they cannot show that their alleged injury is "fairly traceable" to BCRA §307. See Lujan, supra, at 562. Their alleged inability to compete stems not from the operation of §307, but from their own personal "wish" not to solicit or accept large contributions, i.e., their personal choice. Accordingly, the Adams plaintiffs fail here to allege an injury in fact that is "fairly traceable" to BCRA. </s> The Paul plaintiffs maintain that BCRA §307 violates the Freedom of Press Clause of the First Amendment. They contend that their political campaigns and public interest advocacy involve traditional press activities and that, therefore, they are protected by the First Amendment's guarantee of the freedom of press. The Paul plaintiffs argue that the contribution limits imposed by BCRA §307, together with the individual and political action committee contribution limitations of FECA §315, impose unconstitutional editorial control upon candidates and their campaigns. The Paul plaintiffs argue that by imposing economic burdens upon them, but not upon the institutional media, see 2 U.S.C. §431(9)(B)(i) (exempting "any news story, commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication, unless such facilities are owned or controlled by any political party, political committee, or candidate" from the definition of expenditure), BCRA §307 and FECA §315 violate the freedom of the press. </s> The Paul plaintiffs cannot show the "'substantial likelihood' that the requested relief will remedy [their] alleged injury in fact," Stevens, 523 U.S. 83, 105-110 (1998). </s> For the reasons above, we affirm the District Court's dismissal of the Adams and Paul plaintiffs' challenges to BCRA §307 for lack of standing. BCRA §§304, 316, and 319 </s> BCRA §§304 and 316, which amend FECA §315, and BCRA §319, which adds FECA §315A, collectively known as the "millionaire provisions," provide for a series of staggered increases in otherwise applicable contribution-to-candidate limits if the candidate's opponent spends a triggering amount of his personal funds.1 The provisions also eliminate the coordinated expenditure limits in certain circumstances.2 In their challenge to the millionaire provisions, the Adams plaintiffs allege the same injuries that they alleged with regard to BCRA §307. For the reasons discussed above, they fail to allege a cognizable injury that is "fairly traceable" to BCRA. Additionally, as the District Court noted, "none of the Adams plaintiffs is a candidate in an election affected by the millionaire provisions--i.e., one in which an opponent chooses to spend the triggering amount in his own funds--and it would be purely 'conjectural' for the court to assume that any plaintiff ever will be." 251 F.Supp. 2d 176, 431 (DC 2003) (case below) (Henderson, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S., at 560). We affirm the District Court's dismissal of the Adams plaintiffs' challenge to the millionaire provisions for lack of standing. BCRA §311 </s> FECA §318 requires that certain communications "authorized" by a candidate or his political committee clearly identify the candidate or committee or, if not so authorized, identify the payor and announce the lack of authorization. 2 U.S.C.A. §441d (main ed. and Supp. 2003). BCRA §311 makes several amendments to FECA §318, among them the expansion of this identification regime to include disbursements for "electioneering communications" as defined in BCRA §201. The McConnell and Chamber of Commerce plaintiffs challenge BCRA §311 by simply noting that §311, along with all of the "electioneering communications" provisions of BCRA, is unconstitutional. We disagree. We think BCRA §311's inclusion of electioneering communications in the FECA §318 disclosure regime bears a sufficient relationship to the important governmental interest of "shed[ding] the light of publicity" on campaign financing. Buckley, 424 U.S., at 81. Assuming as we must that FECA §318 is valid to begin with, and that FECA §318 is valid as amended by BCRA §311's amendments other than the inclusion of electioneering communications, the challenged inclusion of electioneering communications is not itself unconstitutional. We affirm the District Court's decision upholding §311's expansion of FECA §318(a) to include disclosure of disbursements for electioneering communications. BCRA §318 </s> BCRA §318, which adds FECA §324, prohibits individuals "17 years old or younger" from making contributions to candidates and contributions or donations to political parties. 2 U.S.C.A. §441k (Supp. 2003). The McConnell and Echols plaintiffs challenge the provision; they argue that §318 violates the First Amendment rights of minors. We agree. Minors enjoy the protection of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511-513 (1969). Limitations on the amount that an individual may contribute to a candidate or political committee impinge on the protected freedoms of expression and association. See Buckley, supra, at 20-22. When the Government burdens the right to contribute, we apply heightened scrutiny. See ante, at 25-26 (joint opinion of Stevens and O'Connor, JJ.) ("[A] contribution limit involving even 'significant interference' with associational rights is nevertheless valid if it satisfies the 'lesser demand' of being 'closely drawn' to match a 'sufficiently important interest.'" (quoting Federal Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. ___, ___ (2003) (slip op., at 15)). We ask whether there is a "sufficiently important interest" and whether the statute is "closely drawn" to avoid unnecessary abridgment of First Amendment freedoms. Ante, at 25-26; Buckley, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000) ("The quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised"). </s> Even assuming, arguendo, the Government advances an important interest, the provision is overinclusive. The States have adopted a variety of more tailored approaches--e.g., counting contributions by minors against the total permitted for a parent or family unit, imposing a lower cap on contributions by minors, and prohibiting contributions by very young children. Without deciding whether any of these alternatives is sufficiently tailored, we hold that the provision here sweeps too broadly. We therefore affirm the District Court's decision striking down §318 as unconstitutional. BCRA §403(b) </s> The National Right to Life plaintiffs argue that the District Court's grant of intervention to the intervenor-defendants, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) and BCRA §403(b), must be reversed because the intervenor-defendants lack Article III standing. It is clear, however, that the Federal Election Commission (FEC) has standing, and therefore we need not address the standing of the intervenor-defendants, whose position here is identical to the FEC's. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 431-432, n.19 (1998); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986). Cf. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68-69, n.21 (1986) (reserving the question for another day). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court's judgment finding the plaintiffs' challenges to BCRA §305, §307, and the millionaire provisions nonjusticiable, striking down as unconstitutional BCRA §318, and upholding BCRA §311. The judgment of the District Court is Affirmed. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1674v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1675v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1676v. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal.; </s> JOHN McCAIN, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1702v. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal.; </s> REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1727v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC., etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1733v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, APPELLANTS </s> 02-1734v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1740v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> RON PAUL, UNITED STATES CONGRESSMAN, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1747v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1753v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1755v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1756v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal. on appeals from the united states district court for the district of columbia [December 10, 2003] </s> Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to BCRA Title V.** </s> We consider here the constitutionality of §504 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), amending the Communications Act of 1934. That section requires broadcasters to keep publicly available records of politically related broadcasting requests. 47 U.S.C.A. §315(e) (Supp. 2003). The McConnell plaintiffs, who include the National Association of Broadcasters, argue that §504 imposes onerous administrative burdens, lacks any offsetting justification, and consequently violates the First Amendment. For similar reasons, the three judges on the District Court found BCRA §504 unconstitutional on its face. 251 F.Supp. 2d 176, 186 (DC 2003) (per curiam) (case below). We disagree, and we reverse that determination. I </s> BCRA §504's key requirements are the following: (1) A "candidate request" requirement calls for broadcasters to keep records of broadcast requests "made by or on behalf of" any "legally qualified candidate for public office." 47 U.S.C.A. §315(e)(1)(A) (Supp. 2003). </s> (2) An "election message request" requirement calls for broadcasters to keep records of requests (made by anyone) to broadcast "message[s]" that refer either to a "legally qualified candidate" or to "any election to Federal office." §§315(e)(1)(B)(i), (ii). </s> (3) An "issue request" requirement calls for broadcasters to keep records of requests (made by anyone) to broadcast "message[s]" related to a "national legislative issueof public importance," §315(e)(1)(B)(iii), or otherwise relating to a "political matter of national importance," §315(e)(1)(B). </s> We shall consider each provision in turn. II </s> BCRA §504's "candidate request" requirements are virtually identical to those contained in a regulation that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) promulgated as early as 1938 and which with slight modifications the FCC has maintained in effect ever since. 47 CFR §73.1943 (2002); compare 3 Fed. Reg. 1692 (1938) (47 CFR §36a4); 13 Fed. Reg. 7486 (1948) (47 CFR §§3.190(d), 3.290(d), 3.690(d)); 17 Fed. Reg. 4711 (1952) (47 CFR §3.590(d)); 19 Fed. Reg. 5949 (1954); 23 Fed. Reg. 7817 (1958); 28 Fed. Reg. 13593 (1963) (47 CFR §73.120(d)); 43 Fed. Reg. 32795 (1978) (47 CFR §73.1940(d)); 57 Fed. Reg. 210 (1992) (47 CFR §73.1943). See generally Brief in Opposition to Motion of Appellee National Association of Broadcasters for Summary Affirmance in No. 02-1676, pp.9-10 (hereinafter Brief Opposing Summary Affirmance). In its current form the FCC regulation requires broadcast licensees to "keep" a publicly available file "of all requests for broadcast time made by or on behalf of a candidate for public office," along with a notation showing whether the request was granted, and (if granted) a history that includes "classes of time," "rates charged," and when the "spots actually aired." 47 CFR §73.1943(a) (2002); §76.1701(a) (same for cable systems). These regulation-imposed requirements mirror the statutory requirements imposed by BCRA §504 with minor differences which no one here challenges. Compare 47 CFR §73.1943 with 47 U.S.C.A. §315(e)(2) (see Appendix, infra). </s> The McConnell plaintiffs argue that these requirements are "intolerabl[y]" "burdensome and invasive." Brief for Appellants/Cross-Appellees Senator Mitch McConnell etal. in No. 02-1674 etal., p. 74 (hereinafter Brief for McConnell Plaintiffs). But we do not see how that could be so. The FCC has consistently estimated that its "candidate request" regulation imposes upon each licensee an additional administrative burden of six to seven hours of work per year. See 66 Fed. Reg. 37468 (2001); id., at 18090; 63 Fed. Reg. 26593 (1998); id., at 10379; 57 Fed. Reg. 18492 (1992); see also 66 Fed. Reg. 29963 (2001) (total annual burden of one hour per cable system). That burden means annual costs of a few hundred dollars at most, a microscopic amount compared to the many millions of dollars of revenue broadcasters receive from candidates who wish to advertise. </s> Perhaps for this reason, broadcasters in the past did not strongly oppose the regulation or its extension. Cf., e.g., 17 Fed. Reg. 4711 (1952) ("No comments adverse to the adoption of the proposed rule have been received"); 43 Fed. Reg. 32794 (1978) (no adverse comments). Indeed in 1992, "CBS" itself "suggest[ed]" that the candidate file "include a record of all requests for time." 57 Fed. Reg. 206 (1992); cf. 63 Fed. Reg. 49493 (1998) (FCC "not persuaded that the current retention period [two years] is overly burdensome to licensees"). </s> In any event, as the FCC wrote in an analogous context, broadcaster recordkeeping requirements "'simply run with the territory.'" 40 Fed. Reg. 18398 (1975). Broadcasters must keep and make publicly available numerous records. See 47 CFR §73.3526 (2002) (general description of select recordkeeping requirements for commercial stations); see also §§73.1202, 73.3526(e)(9)(i) (retention of all "written comments and suggestions [including letters and e-mail] received from the public regarding operation of the station" for three years); §73.1212(e) (sponsorship identification records, including the identification of a sponsoring entity's executive officers and board-level members when sponsoring "political matter or matter involving the discussion of a controversial issue of public importance"); §73.1840 (retention of station logs); §73.1942 (candidate broadcast records); §73.2080 (equal employment oppor-tunities records); §§73.3526(e)(11)(i), (e)(12) ("list of programs that have provided the station's most significant treatment of community issues during the preceding three month period," including "brief narrative describing [the issues, and] time, date, duration, and title"); §§73.3526(e)(11)(ii), (iii) (reports of children's program, and retention of records sufficient to substantiate "compliance with the commercial limits on children's programming"); §73.3613(a) (network affiliation contracts); §§73.3613(b), 73.3615, 73.3526(e)(5) (ownership-related reports); §73.3613(c) ("[m]anagement consultant agreements"); §73.3613(d) ("[t]ime brokerage agreements"). Compared to these longstanding recordkeeping requirements, an additional six to seven hours is a small drop in a very large bucket. The McConnell plaintiffs also claim that the "candidate requests" requirement fails significantly to further any important governmental interest. Brief for McConnell Plaintiffs 74. But, again, we cannot agree. The FCC has pointed out that "[t]hese records are necessary to permit political candidates and others to verify that licensees have complied with their obligations relating to use of their facilities by candidates for political office" pursuant to the "equal time" provision of 47 U.S.C. §315(a). 63 Fed. Reg. 49493 (1998). They also help the FCC determine whether broadcasters have violated their obligation to sell candidates time at the "lowest unit charge." 47 U.S.C. §315(b). As reinforced by BCRA, the "candidate request" requirements will help the FCC, the Federal Election Commission, and "the public to evaluate whether broadcasters are processing [candidate] requests in an evenhanded fashion," Brief Opposing Summary Affirmance 9, thereby helping to assure broadcasting fairness. 47 U.S.C. §315(a); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). They will help make the public aware of how much money candidates may be prepared to spend on broadcast messages. 2 U.S.C.A. §434 (main ed. and Supp. 2003); see ante, at 87-93 (joint opinion of Stevens and O'Connor, JJ.) (hereinafter joint opinion). And they will provide an independently compiled set of data for purposes of verifying candidates' compliance with the disclosure requirements and source limitations of BCRA and the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. 2 U.S.C.A. §434; cf. Adventure Communications, Inc. v. Kentucky Registry of Election Finance, 191 F.3d 429, 433 (CA4 1999) (candidate compliance verification); 63 Fed. Reg. 49493 (1998) (FCC finding record retention provision provides public with "necessary and adequate access"). We note, too, that the FCC's regulatory authority is broad. Red Lion, supra, at 380 ("broad" mandate to assure broadcasters operate in public interest); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943) (same). And we have previously found broad governmental authority for agency information demands from regulated entities. Compare United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-643 (1950); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946); Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408, 414-415 (1984). </s> The Chief Justice suggests that the Government has not made these particular claims. But it has--though succinctly--for it has cross-referenced the relevant regulatory rules. Compare post, at 12-13 (opinion of Rehnquist, C. J.), with Brief Opposing Summary Affirmance; Brief for McConnell Plaintiffs 73-74; Brief for FEC etal. in No. 02-1674 etal., pp. 132-133. And succinctness through cross-reference was necessary given our procedural requirement that the Government set forth in a 140-page brief all its arguments concerning each of the 20 BCRA provisions here under contest. 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 186-188. </s> In sum, given the Government's reference to the 65-year-old FCC regulation and the related considerations we have mentioned, we cannot accept the argument that the constitutionality of the "candidate request" provision lacks evidentiary support. The challengers have made no attempt to explain away the FCC's own contrary conclusions and the mass of evidence in related FCC records and proceedings. E.g., 57 Fed. Reg. 189 (1992); cf. supra, at 4-5; ante, at 117-118 (joint opinion) (upholding BCRA's coordination provision based, in part, on prior experience under similar provision). Because we cannot, on the present record, find the longstanding FCC regulation unconstitutional, we likewise cannot strike down the "candidate request" provision in BCRA §504; for the latter simply embodies the regulation in a statute, thereby blocking any agency attempt to repeal it. III </s> BCRA §504's "election message request" requirements call for broadcasters to keep records of requests (made by any member of the public) to broadcast a "message" about "a legally qualified candidate" or "any election to Federal office." 47 U.S.C.A. §§315(e)(1)(B)(i), (ii) (Supp. 2003). Although these requirements are somewhat broader than the "candidate request" requirement, they serve much the same purposes. A candidate's supporters or opponents account for many of the requests to broadcast "message[s]" about a "candidate." Requests to broadcast messages about an "election" may include messages that favor one candidate or another, along with other messages that may be more neutral. Given the nature of many of the messages, recordkeeping can help both the regulatory agencies and the public evaluate broadcasting fairness, and determine the amount of money that individuals or groups, supporters or opponents, intend to spend to help elect a particular candidate. Cf. ante, at 100-101 (joint opinion) (upholding stringent restrictions on all election-time advertising that refers to a candidate because such advertising will often convey message of support or opposition). Insofar as the request is to broadcast neutral material about a candidate or election, the disclosure can help the FCC carry out other statutory functions, for example, determining whether a broadcasting station is fulfilling its licensing obligation to broadcast material important to the community and the public. 47 U.S.C. §315(a) ("obligation ... to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance"); 47 CFR §73.1910 (2002); §§73.3526(e)(11)(i), (e)(12) (recordkeeping requirements for issues important to the community). </s> For reasons previously discussed, supra, at 4-5, and on the basis of the material presented, we cannot say that these requirements will impose disproportionate administrative burdens. They ask the broadcaster to keep information about the disposition of the request, and information identifying the individual or company requesting the broadcast time (name, address, contact information, or, if the requester is not an individual, the names of company officials). 47 U.S.C.A. §315(e)(2) (Supp. 2003). Insofar as the "request" is made by a candidate's "supporters," the "candidate request" regulation apparently already requires broadcasters to keep such records. 43 Fed. Reg. 32794 (1978). Regardless, the information should prove readily available, for the individual requesting a broadcast must provide it to the broadcaster should the broadcaster accept the request. 47 CFR §73.1212(e) (2002). And as we have previously pointed out, the recordkeeping requirements do not reach significantly beyond other FCCrecordkeeping rules, for example, those requiring broadcasting licensees to keep material showing com-pliance with their license-related promises to broad-cast material on issues of public importance. See, e.g., §§73.3526(e)(11)(i), (e)(12) (recordkeeping requirements for issues important to the community); supra, at 4-5 (collecting regulations); Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413, 1421-1422 (CADC 1983) (describing FCC rules, in force during 1960-1981, that required nonentertainment programming in 14 specific areas and mandated publicly available records detailing date, time, source, and description to substantiate compliance). If, as we have held, the "candidate request" requirements are constitutional, supra, at 7, the "election message" requirements, which serve similar governmental interests and impose only a small incremental burden, must be constitutional as well. IV </s> The "issue request" requirements call for broadcasters to keep records of requests (made by any member of the public) to broadcast "message[s]" about "a national legislative issue of public importance" or "any political matter of national importance." 47 U.S.C.A. §§315(e)(1)(B), (e)(1)(B)(iii) (Supp. 2003). These recordkeeping requirements seem likely to help the FCC determine whether broadcasters are carrying out their "obligations to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance," 47 CFR §73.1910 (2002), and whether broadcasters are too heavily favoring entertainment, and discriminating against broadcasts devoted to public affairs, see ibid.; 47 U.S.C §315(a); Red Lion, 395 U.S., at 380. The McConnell plaintiffs claim that the statutory language--"political matter of national importance" or "national legislative issue of public importance"--is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. Brief for McConnell Plaintiffs 74-75. But that language is no more general than the language that Congress has used to impose other obligations upon broadcasters. Compare 47 U.S.C.A. §315(e)(1)(B) (Supp. 2003) ("political matter of national importance") and §315(e)(1)(B)(iii) ("national legislative issue of public importance") (both added by BCRA §504), with 47 U.S.C. §315(a) ("obligation ... to operate in the public interest" and to afford reasonable opportunity for discussion of "issues of public importance"); §317(a)(2) (FCC disclosure requirements relating to any "political program" or "discussion of any controversial issue"); cf. 47 CFR §73.1212(e) (2002) ("political matter or ... a controversial issue of public importance"); and 9 Fed. Reg. 14734 (1944) ("public controversial issues"); ante, at 117-118 (joint opinion) (noting that the experience under longstanding regulations undermines claims of chilling effect). And that language is also roughly comparable to other language in BCRA that we uphold today. E.g., ante, at 61-62, and n.64 (joint opinion) (upholding 2 U.S.C.A. §431(20)(A)(iii) (Supp. 2003) ("public communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office ... and that promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate for that office")), ante, at 117-118 (upholding 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(a)(7)(B)(ii) (Supp. 2003) (counting as coordinated disbursements that are made "in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of [a political party]") against challenge and noting that an "agreement" is not necessary for precision). </s> Whether these requirements impose disproportionate administrative burdens is more difficult to say. On the one hand, the burdens are likely less heavy than many that other FCC regulations have imposed, for example, the burden of keeping and disclosing "[a]ll written comments and suggestions" received from the public, including every e-mail. 47 CFR §§73.1202, 73.3526(e)(9) (2002); see also supra, at 4-5. On the other hand, the burdens are likely heavier than those imposed by BCRA §504's other provisions, previously discussed. </s> The regulatory burden, in practice, will depend on how the FCC interprets and applies this provision. The FCC has adequate legal authority to write regulations that may limit, and make more specific, the provision's potential linguistic reach. 47 U.S.C. §315(d). It has often ameliorated regulatory burdens by interpretation in the past, and there is no reason to believe it will not do so here. See 14 FCC Rcd. 4653, ¶ ;25 (1999) (relaxing the recordkeeping requirements in respect to cable systems that serve fewer than 5,000 subscribers); 14 FCC Rcd. 11121, ¶ ;¶ ;20-22 (1999) (requiring candidates to inspect the political file at a station rather than requiring licensees to send out photocopies of the files to candidates upon telephone request). The parties remain free to challenge the provisions, as interpreted by the FCC in regulations, or as otherwise applied. Any such challenge will likely provide greater information about the provisions' justifications and administrative burdens. Without that additional information, we cannot now say that the burdens are so great, or the justifications so minimal, as to warrant finding the provisions unconstitutional on their face. </s> The McConnell plaintiffs and The Chief Justice make one final claim. They say that the "issue request" requirement will force them to disclose information that will reveal their political strategies to opponents, perhaps prior to a broadcast. See post, at 14-15 (dissenting opinion). We are willing to assume that the Constitution includes some form of protection against premature disclosure of campaign strategy--though, given the First Amendment interest in free and open discussion of campaign issues, we make this assumption purely for argument's sake. Nonetheless, even on that assumption we do not see how BCRA §504 can be unconstitutional on its face. </s> For one thing, the statute requires disclosure of names, addresses, and the fact of a request; it does not require disclosure of substantive campaign content. See 47 U.S.C.A. §315(e)(2) (Supp. 2003). For another, the statutory words "as soon as possible," §315(e)(3), would seem to permit FCC disclosure-timing rules that would avoid any premature disclosure that the Constitution itself would forbid. Further, the plaintiffs do not point to--and our own research cannot find--any specific indication of such a "strategy-disclosure" problem arising during the past 65 years in respect to the existing FCC "candidate request" requirement, where the strategic problem might be expected to be more acute. Finally, we today reject an analogous facial attack--premised on speculations of "advance disclosure"--on a similar BCRA provision. See ante, at 94 (joint opinion). Thus, the "strategy disclosure" argument does not show that BCRA §504 is unconstitutional on its face, but the plaintiffs remain free to raise this argument when §504 is applied. V </s> The Chief Justice makes two important arguments in response to those we have set forth. First, he says that we "approac[h] §504 almost exclusively from the perspective of the broadcast licensees, ignoring the interests of candidates and other purchasers, whose speech and association rights are affected." Post, at 11 (dissenting opinion). The Chief Justice is certainly correct in emphasizing the importance of the speech interests of candidates and other potential speakers, but we have not ignored their First Amendment "perspective." To the contrary, we have discussed the speakers' interests together with the broadcasters' interests because the two sets of interests substantially overlap. For example, the speakers' vagueness argument is no different from the broadcasters', and it fails for the same reasons, e.g., the fact that BCRA §504's language is just as definite and precise as other language that we today uphold. See supra, at 10. </s> We have separately discussed the one and only speech-related claim advanced on behalf of candidates (or other speakers) that differs from the claims set forth by the broadcasters. See supra, at 11-12. This is the claim that the statute's disclosure requirements will require candidates to reveal their political strategies to opponents. We just said, and we now repeat, that BCRA §504 can be applied, in a significant number of cases, without requiring any such political-strategy disclosure--either because disclosure in many cases will not create any such risk or because the FCC may promulgate rules requiring disclosure only after any such risk disappears, or both. </s> Moreover, candidates (or other speakers) whom §504 affects adversely in this way (or in other ways) remain free to challenge the lawfulness of FCC implementing regulations and to challenge the constitutionality of §504 as applied. To find that the speech-related interests of candidates and others may be vindicated in an as-applied challenge is not to "ignor[e]" those interests. </s> Second, The Chief Justice says that "the Government, in its brief, proffers no interest whatever to support §504 as a whole," adding that the existence of "pre-existing unchallenged agency regulations imposing similar disclosure requirements" cannot "compel the conclusion that §504 is constitutional," nor somehow "relieve the Government of its burden of advancing a constitutionally sufficient justification for §504." Post, at 12-13 (dissenting opinion). </s> Again The Chief Justice is correct in saying that the mere existence of similar FCC regulation-imposed requirements--even if unchallenged for at least 65 years--cannot prove that those requirements are constitutional. But the existence of those regulations means that we must read beyond the briefs in this case before holding those requirements unconstitutional. Before evaluating the relevant burdens and justifications, we must at least become acquainted with the FCC's own view of the matter. We must follow the Government's regulation-related references to the relevant regulatory records, related FCC regulatory conclusions, and the FCC's enforcement experience. We must take into account, for example, the likelihood that the reason there is "nothing in the record that indicates licensees have treated purchasers unfairly," post, at 13 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting), is that for many decades similar FCC regulations have made that unfair treatment unlawful. And, if we are to avoid disrupting related agency law, we must evaluate what we find in agency records and related experience before holding this similar statutory provision unconstitutional on its face. </s> Even a superficial examination of those relevant agency materials reveals strong supporting justifications, and a lack of significant administrative burdens. And any additional burden that the statute, viewed facially, imposes upon interests protected by the First Amendment seems slight compared to the strong enforcement-related interests that it serves. Given the FCC regulations and their history, the statutory requirements must survive a facial attack under any potentially applicable First Amendment standard, including that of heightened scrutiny. </s> That is why the regulations are relevant. That is why the brevity of the Government's discussion here cannot be determinative. That is why we fear that The Chief Justice's contrary view would lead us into an unfortunate--and at present unjustified--revolution in communications law. And that is why we disagree with his dissent. </s> The portion of the judgment of the District Court invalidating BCRA §504 is reversed. </s> It is so ordered. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT </s> Title 47 U.S.C.A. §315(e) (Supp. 2003), as amended by BCRA §504, provides: "Political record "(1) In general </s> "A licensee shall maintain, and make available for public inspection, a complete record of a request to purchase broadcast time that-- </s> "(A) is made by or on behalf of a legally qualified candidate for public office; or </s> "(B) communicates a message relating to any political matter of national importance, including-- </s> "(i) a legally qualified candidate; </s> "(ii) any election to Federal office; or </s> "(iii) a national legislative issue of public importance. </s> "(2) Contents of record </s> "A record maintained under paragraph (1) shall contain information regarding-- </s> "(A) whether the request to purchase broadcast time is accepted or rejected by the licensee; </s> "(B) the rate charged for the broadcast time; </s> "(C) the date and time on which the communication is aired; </s> "(D) the class of time that is purchased; </s> "(E) the name of the candidate to which the communication refers and the office to which the candidate is seeking election, the election to which the communication refers, or the issue to which the communication refers (as applicable); </s> "(F) in the case of a request made by, or on behalf of, a candidate, the name of the candidate, the authorized committee of the candidate, and the treasurer of such committee; and </s> "(G) in the case of any other request, the name of the person purchasing the time, the name, address, and phone number of a contact person for such person, and a list of the chief executive officers or members of the executive committee or of the board of directors of such person. </s> "(3) Time to maintain file </s> "The information required under this subsection shall be placed in a political file as soon as possible and shall be retained by the licensee for a period of not less than 2 years." </s> Title 47 CFR §73.1943 (2002) provides: "Political file. </s> "(a) Every licensee shall keep and permit public inspection of a complete and orderly record (political file) of all requests for broadcast time made by or on behalf of a candidate for public office, together with an appropriate notation showing the disposition made by the licensee of such requests, and the charges made, if any, if the request is granted. The 'disposition' includes the schedule of time purchased, when spots actually aired, the rates charged, and the classes of time purchased. </s> "(b) When free time is provided for use by or on behalf of candidates, a record of the free time provided shall be placed in the political file. </s> "(c) All records required by this paragraph shall be placed in the political file as soon as possible andshall be retained for a period of two years. As soonas possible means immediately absent unusualcircumstances." </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1674v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1675v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1676v. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal.; </s> JOHN McCAIN, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1702v. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal.; </s> REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1727v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC., etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1733v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, APPELLANTS </s> 02-1734v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1740v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> RON PAUL, UNITED STATES CONGRESSMAN, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1747v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1753v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1755v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1756v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal. on appeals from the united states district court for the district of columbia [December 10, 2003] </s> Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting with respect to BCRA Titles I and V.** </s> Although I join Justice Kennedy's opinion in full, I write separately to highlight my disagreement with the Court on Title I of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), 116 Stat. 81, and to dissent from the Court's opinion upholding §504 of Title V. I </s> The issue presented by Title I is not, as the Court implies, whether Congress can permissibly regulate campaign contributions to candidates, de facto or otherwise, or seek to eliminate corruption in the political process. Rather, the issue is whether Congress can permissibly regulate much speech that has no plausible connection to candidate contributions or corruption to achieve those goals. Under our precedent, restrictions on political contributions implicate important First Amendment values and are constitutional only if they are "closely drawn" to reduce the corruption of federal candidates or the appearance of corruption. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976) (per curiam). Yet, the Court glosses over the breadth of the restrictions, characterizing Title I of BCRA as "do[ing] little more that regulat[ing] the ability of wealthy individuals, corporations, and unions to contribute large sums of money to influence federal elections, federal candidates, and federal officeholders." Ante, at 28 (joint opinion of Stevens and O'Connor, JJ.). Because, in reality, Title I is much broader than the Court allows, regulating a good deal of speech that does not have the potential to corrupt federal candidates and officeholders, I dissent. The lynchpin of Title I, new FECA §323(a), prohibits national political party committees from "solicit[ing]," "receiv[ing]," "direct[ing] to another person," and "spend[ing]" any funds not subject to federal regulation, even if those funds are used for nonelection related activities. 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(a)(1) (Supp. 2003). The Court concludes that such a restriction is justified because under FECA, "donors have been free to contribute substantial sums of soft money to the national parties, which the parties can spend for the specific purpose of influencing a particular candidate's federal election." Ante, at 36. Accordingly, "[i]t is not only plausible, but likely, that candidates would feel grateful for such donations and that donors would seek to exploit that gratitude." Ibid. But the Court misses the point. Certainly "infusions of money into [candidates'] campaigns," Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985), can be regulated, but §323(a) does not regulate only donations given to influence a particular federal election; it regulates all donations to national political committees, no matter the use to which the funds are put. </s> The Court attempts to sidestep the unprecedented breadth of this regulation by stating that the "close relationship between federal officeholders and the national parties" makes all donations to the national parties "suspect." Ante, at 45. But a close association with others, especially in the realm of political speech, is not a surrogate for corruption; it is one of our most treasured First Amendment rights. See California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000); Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 225 (1989); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214 (1986). The Court's willingness to impute corruption on the basis of a relationship greatly infringes associational rights and expands Congress' ability to regulate political speech. And there is nothing in the Court's analysis that limits congressional regulation to national political parties. In fact, the Court relies in part on this closeness rationale to regulate nonprofit organizations. Ante, at 47-48, n.51. Who knows what association will be deemed too close to federal officeholders next. When a donation to an organization has no potential to corrupt a federal officeholder, the relationship between the officeholder and the organization is simply irrelevant. </s> The Court fails to recognize that the national political parties are exemplars of political speech at all levels of government, in addition to effective fundraisers for federal candidates and officeholders. For sure, national political party committees exist in large part to elect federal candidates, but as a majority of the District Court found, they also promote coordinated political messages and participate in public policy debates unrelated to federal elections, promote, even in off-year elections, state and local candidates and seek to influence policy at those levels, and increase public participation in the electoral process. See 251 F.Supp. 2d 176, 334-337 (DC 2003) (per curiam) (Henderson, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); id., at 820-821 (Leon, J.). Indeed, some national political parties exist primarily for the purpose of expressing ideas and generating debate. App. 185-186 (declaration of Stephen L. Dasbach et al. ¶ ;11 (describing Libertarian Party)). </s> As these activities illustrate, political parties often foster speech crucial to a healthy democracy, 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 820 (Leon, J.), and fulfill the need for like-minded individuals to ban together and promote a political philosophy, see Jones, supra, at 574; Eu, supra, at 225. When political parties engage in pure political speech that has little or no potential to corrupt their federal candidates and officeholders, the government cannot constitutionally burden their speech any more than it could burden the speech of individuals engaging in these same activities. E.g., National Conservative Political Action Comm., supra, at 496-497; Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 297-298 (1981); Buckley, 424 U.S., at 27. Notwithstanding the Court's citation to the numerous abuses of FECA, under any definition of "exacting scrutiny," the means chosen by Congress, restricting all donations to national parties no matter the purpose for which they are given or are used, are not "closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms," id., at 25. </s> BCRA's overinclusiveness is not limited to national political parties. To prevent the circumvention of the ban on the national parties' use of nonfederal funds, BCRA extensively regulates state parties, primarily state elections, and state candidates. For example, new FECA §323(b), by reference to new FECA §§301(20)(A)(i)-(ii), prohibits state parties from using nonfederal funds1 for general partybuilding activities such as voter registration, voter identification, and get out the vote for state candidates even if federal candidates are not mentioned. See 2 U.S.C.A. §§441i(b), 431(20)(A)(i)-(ii) (Supp. 2003). New FECA §323(d) prohibits state and local political party committees, like their national counterparts, from soliciting and donating "any funds" to nonprofit organizations such as the National Rifle Association or the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). See 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(d). And, new FECA §323(f) requires a state gubernatorial candidate to abide by federal funding restrictions when airing a television ad that tells voters that, if elected, he would oppose the President's policy of increased oil and gas exploration within the State because it would harm the environment. See 2 U.S.C.A. §§441i(f), 431(20)(A)(iii) (regulating "public communication[s] that refe[r] to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office (regardless of whether a candidate for State or local office is also mentioned or identified) and that ... attacks or opposes a candidate for that office"). </s> Although these provisions are more focused on activities that may affect federal elections, there is scant evidence in the record to indicate that federal candidates or officeholders are corrupted or would appear corrupted by donations for these activities. See 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 403, 407, 416, 422 (Henderson, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); id., at 779-780, 791 (Leon, J.); see also Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 616 (1996) (plurality opinion) (noting that "the opportunity for corruption posed by [nonfederal contributions for state elections, get-out-the-vote, and voter registration activities] is, at best, attenuated"). Nonetheless, the Court concludes that because these activities benefit federal candidates and officeholders, see ante, at 59 or prevent the circumvention of pre-existing or contemporaneously enacted restrictions,2 see ante, at 57, 67, 71, 78, it must defer to the "'predictive judgments of Congress,'" ante, at 57 (quoting Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994)). </s> Yet the Court cannot truly mean what it says. Newspaper editorials and political talk shows benefit federal candidates and officeholders every bit as much as a generic voter registration drive conducted by a state party; there is little doubt that the endorsement of a major newspaper affects federal elections, and federal candidates and officeholders are surely "grateful," ante, at 60, for positive media coverage. I doubt, however, the Court would seriously contend that we must defer to Congress' judgment if it chose to reduce the influence of political endorsements in federal elections.3 See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 247, 250 (1974) (holding unconstitutional a state law that required newspapers to provide "right to reply" to any candidate who was personally or professionally assailed in order to eliminate the "abuses of bias and manipulative reportage" by the press). </s> It is also true that any circumvention rationale ultimately must rest on the circumvention itself leading to the corruption of federal candidates and officeholders. See Buckley, 424 U.S., at 38 (upholding restrictions on funds donated to national political parties "for the purpose of influencing any election for a Federal office" because they were prophylactic measures designed "to prevent evasion" of the contribution limit on candidates). All political speech that is not sifted through federal regulation circumvents the regulatory scheme to some degree or another, and thus by the Court's standard would be a "loophole" in the current system.4 Unless the Court would uphold federal regulation of all funding of political speech, a rationale dependent on circumvention alone will not do. By untethering its inquiry from corruption or the appearance of corruption, the Court has removed the touchstone of our campaign finance precedent and has failed to replace it with any logical limiting principle. </s> But such an untethering is necessary to the Court's analysis. Only by using amorphous language to conclude a federal interest, however vaguely defined, exists can the Court avoid the obvious fact that new FECA §§323(a), (b), (d), and (f) are vastly overinclusive. Any campaign finance law aimed at reducing corruption will almost surely affect federal elections or prohibit the circumvention of federal law, and if broad enough, most laws will generally reduce some appearance of corruption. Indeed, it is precisely because broad laws are likely to nominally further a legitimate interest that we require Congress to tailor its restrictions; requiring all federal candidates to self-finance their campaigns would surely reduce the appearance of donor corruption, but it would hardly be constitutional. In allowing Congress to rely on general principles such as affecting a federal election or prohibiting the circumvention of existing law, the Court all but eliminates the "closely drawn" tailoring requirement and meaningful judicial review. </s> No doubt Congress was convinced by the many abuses of the current system that something in this area must be done. Its response, however, was too blunt. Many of the abuses described by the Court involve donations that were made for the "purpose of influencing a federal election," and thus are already regulated. See Buckley, supra. Congress could have sought to have the existing restrictions enforced or to enact other restrictions that are "closely drawn" to its legitimate concerns. But it should not be able to broadly restrict political speech in the fashion it has chosen. Today's decision, by not requiring tailored restrictions, has significantly reduced the protection for political speech having little or nothing to do with corruption or the appearance of corruption. II </s> BCRA §504 amends §315 of the Communications Act to require broadcast licensees to maintain and disclose records of any request to purchase broadcast time that "is made by or on behalf of a legally qualified candidate for public office" or that "communicates a message relating to any political matter of national importance," including communications relating to "a legally qualified candidate," "any election to Federal office," and "a national legislative issue of public importance." BCRA §504; 47 U.S.C.A. §315(e)(1) (Supp. 2003).5 This section differs from other BCRA disclosure sections because it requires broadcast licensees to disclose requests to purchase broadcast time rather than requiring purchasers to disclose their disbursements for broadcast time. See, e.g., BCRA §201. The Court concludes that §504 "must survive a facial attack under any potentially applicable First Amendment standard, including that of heightened scrutiny." Ante, at 15 (opinion of Breyer, J.). I disagree. This section is deficient because of the absence of a sufficient governmental interest to justify disclosure of mere requests to purchase broadcast time, as well as purchases themselves. The Court approaches §504 almost exclusively from the perspective of the broadcast licensees, ignoring the interests of candidates and other purchasers, whose speech and association rights are affected by §504. See, e.g., ante, at 5 (noting that broadcasters are subject to numerous recordkeeping requirements); ante, at 7 (opining that this Court has recognized "broad governmental authority for agency information demands from regulated entities"); ante, at 8-9 ("[W]e cannot say that these requirements will impose disproportionate administrative burdens"). An approach that simply focuses on whether the administrative burden is justifiable is untenable. Because §504 impinges on core First Amendment rights, it is subject to a more demanding test than mere rational-basis review. The Court applies the latter by asking essentially whether there is any conceivable reason to support §504. See ante, at 8 (discussing the ways in which the disclosure "can help" the FCC and the public); ante, at 10 (noting that the "recordkeeping requirements seem likely to help the FCC" enforce the fairness doctrine). </s> Required disclosure provisions that deter constitutionally protected association and speech rights are subject to heightened scrutiny. See Buckley, 424 U.S., at 64. When applying heightened scrutiny, we first ask whether the Government has asserted an interest sufficient to justify the disclosure of requests to purchase broadcast time. Ibid.; see ante, at 89 (joint opinion of Stevens and O'Connor, JJ.) (concluding that the important state interests the Buckley Court held justified FECA's disclosure requirements apply to BCRA §201's disclosure requirement). But the Government, in its brief, proffers no interest whatever to support §504 as a whole. </s> Contrary to the Court's suggestion, ante, at 7 (opinion of Breyer, J.), the Government's brief does not succinctly present interests sufficient to support §504. The two paragraphs that the Court relies on provide the following: "As explained in the government's brief in opposition to the motion for summary affirmance on this issue filed by plaintiff National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), longstanding FCC regulations impose disclosure requirements with respect to the sponsorship of broadcast matter 'involving the discussion of a controversial issue of public importance.' 47 C.F.R. 73.1212(d) and (e) (2002); see 47 C.F.R. 76.1701(d) (2002) (same standard used in disclosure regulation governing cablecasting). By enabling viewers and listeners to identify the persons actually responsible for communications aimed at a mass audience, those regulations assist the public in evaluating the message transmitted. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 792 n.32 ('Identification of the source of advertising may be required ... so that the people will be able to evaluate the arguments to which they are being subjected.'). </s> "The range of information required to be disclosed under BCRA §504 is comparable to the disclosures mandated by pre-existing FCC rules. Compare 47 U.S.C. 315(e)(2)(G) (added by BCRA §504), with 47 C.F.R. 73.1212(e) and 76.1701(d) (2002). Plaintiffs do not attempt to show that BCRA §504's requirements are more onerous than the FCC's longstanding rules, nor do they contend that the pre-existing agency regulations are themselves unconstitutional. See generally 02-1676 Gov't Br. in Opp. to Mot. of NAB for Summ. Aff. 4-9. Because BCRA §504 is essentially a codification of established and unchallenged regulatory requirements, plaintiffs' First Amendment claim should be rejected." Brief for FEC etal. in No. 02-1674 etal., pp.132-133; ante, at 7. </s> While these paragraphs attempt to set forth a justification for the new Communications Act §315(e)(1)(B), discussed below, I fail to see any justification for BCRA §504 in its entirety. Nor do I find persuasive the Court's and the Government's argument that pre-existing unchallenged agency regulations imposing similar disclosure requirements compel the conclusion that §504 is constitutional and somehow relieve the Government of its burden of advancing a constitutionally sufficient justification for §504. </s> At oral argument, the Government counsel indicated that one of the interests supporting §504 in its entirety stems from the fairness doctrine, Tr. of Oral Arg. 192, which in general imposes an obligation on licensees to devote a "reasonable percentage" of broadcast time to issues of public importance in a way that reflects opposing views. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). Assuming, arguendo, this latter-day assertion should be considered, I think the District Court correctly noted that there is nothing in the record that indicates licensees have treated purchasers unfairly. 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 812 (Leon, J.). In addition, this interest seems wholly unconnected to the central purpose of BCRA, and it is not at all similar to the governmental interestsin Buckley that we found to be "sufficiently importantto outweigh the possibility of infringement," 424 U.S., at 66. </s> As to the disclosure requirements involving "any political matter of national importance" under the new Communications Act §315(e)(1)(B), the Government suggests that the disclosure enables viewers to evaluate the message transmitted.6 First, insofar as BCRA §504 requires reporting of "request[s for] broadcast time" as well as actual broadcasts, it is not supported by this goal. Requests that do not mature into actual purchases will have no viewers, but the information may allow competitors or adversaries to obtain information regarding organizational or political strategies of purchasers. Second, even as to broadcasts themselves, in this noncandidate-related context, this goal is a far cry from the Government interests endorsed in Buckley, which were limited to evaluating and preventing corruption of federal candidates. Ibid.; see also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 354 (1995). </s> As to disclosure requirements with respect to candidates under the new Communications Act §315(e)(1)(A), BCRA §504 significantly overlaps with §201, which is today also upheld by this Court, ante, at 87-95 (joint opinion of Stevens and O'Connor, JJ.), and requires purchasers of "electioneering communications" to disclose a wide array of information, including the amount of each disbursement and the elections to which electioneering communications pertain. While I recognize that there is this overlap, §504 imposes a different burden on the purchaser's First Amendment rights: as noted above, §201 is limited to purchasers' disclosure of disbursements for electioneering communications, whereas §504 requires broadcast licensees' disclosure of requests for broadcast time by purchasers. Not only are the purchasers' requests, which may never result in an actual advertisement, subject to the disclosure requirements, but §504 will undoubtedly result in increased costs of communication because the licensees will shift the costs of the onerous disclosure and recordkeeping requirements to purchasers. The Government fails to offer a reason for the separate burden and apparent overlap. </s> The Government cannot justify, and for that matter, has not attempted to justify, its requirement that "request[s for] broadcast" time be publicized. On the record before this Court, I cannot even speculate as to a governmental interest that would allow me to conclude that the disclosure of "requests" should be upheld. Such disclosure risks, inter alia, allowing candidates and political groups the opportunity to ferret out a purchaser's political strategy and, ultimately, unduly burdens the First Amendment freedoms of purchasers. </s> Absent some showing of a Government interest served by §504 and in light of the breadth of disclosure of "requests," I must conclude that §504 fails to satisfy First Amendment scrutiny. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1674v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1675v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1676v. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal.; </s> JOHN McCAIN, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1702v. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal.; </s> REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1727v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC., etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1733v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, APPELLANTS </s> 02-1734v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1740v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> RON PAUL, UNITED STATES CONGRESSMAN, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1747v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1753v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1755v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1756v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal. on appeals from the united states district court for the district of columbia [December 10, 2003] </s> Justice Stevens, dissenting with respect to §305.** </s> The Chief Justice, writing for the Court, concludes that the McConnell plaintiffs lack standing to challenge §305 of BCRA because Senator McConnell cannot be affected by the provision until "45 days before the Republican primary election in 2008." Ante, at 4. I am not persuaded that Article III's case-or-controversy requirement imposes such a strict temporal limit on our jurisdiction. By asserting that he has run attack ads in the past, that he plans to run such ads in his next campaign, and that §305 will adversely affect his campaign strategy, Senator McConnell has identified a "concrete," "'distinct,'" and "'actual'" injury, Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990). That the injury is distant in time does not make it illusory. The second prong of the standing inquiry--whether the alleged injury is fairly traceable to the defendants' challenged action and not the result of a third party's independent choices†--poses a closer question. Section 305 does not require broadcast stations to charge a candidate higher rates for unsigned ads that mention the candidate's opponent. Rather, the provision simply permits stations to charge their normal rates for such ads. Some stations may take advantage of this regulatory gap and adopt pricing schemes that discriminate between the kind of ads that Senator McConnell has run in the past and those that strictly comply with §305. It is also possible, however, that instead of incurring the transaction costs of policing candidates' compliance with §305, stations will continue to charge the same rates for attack ads as for all other campaign ads. In the absence of any record evidence that stations will uniformly choose to charge Senator McConnell higher rates for the attack ads he proposes to run in 2008, it is at least arguable that his alleged injury is not traceable to BCRA §305. Nevertheless, I would entertain plaintiffs' challenge to §305 on the merits and uphold the section. Like BCRA §§201, 212, and 311, §305 serves an important--and constitutionally sufficient--informational purpose. Moreover, §305's disclosure requirements largely overlap those of §311, and plaintiffs identify no reason why any candidate already in compliance with §311 will be harmed by the marginal additional burden of complying with §305. Indeed, I am convinced that "the important governmental interest of 'shed[ding] the light of publicity' on campaign financing," invoked above in connection with §311, ante, at 9 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.), would suffice to support a legislative provision expressly requiring all sponsors of attack ads to identify themselves in their ads. That §305 seeks to achieve the same purpose indirectly, by withdrawing a statutory benefit, does not render the provision any less sound. </s> Finally, I do not regard §305 as a constitutionally suspect "viewpoint-based regulation." Brief for Appellants/Cross-Appellees Senator Mitch McConnell etal. in No. 02-1674 etal., p. 67. Like BCRA's other disclosure requirements, §305 evenhandedly regulates speech based on its electioneering content. Although the section reaches only ads that mention opposing candidates, it applies equally to all such ads. Disagreement with one's opponent obviously expresses a "viewpoint," but §305 treats that expression exactly like the opponent's response. </s> In sum, I would uphold §305. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1674v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1675v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1676v. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal.; </s> JOHN McCAIN, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1702v. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal.; </s> REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1727v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC., etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1733v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, APPELLANTS </s> 02-1734v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1740v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> RON PAUL, UNITED STATES CONGRESSMAN, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1747v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1753v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1755v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1756v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal. on appeals from the united states district court for the district of columbia [December 10, 2003] </s> Justice Scalia, concurring with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV, dissenting with respect to BCRA Titles I and V, and concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect to BCRA Title II. </s> With respect to Titles I, II, and V: I join in full the dissent of The Chief Justice; I join the opinion of Justice Kennedy, except to the extent it upholds new §323(e) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) and §202 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) in part; and because I continue to believe that Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), was wrongly decided, I also join Parts I, II-A, and II-B of the opinion of Justice Thomas. With respect to Titles III and IV, I join The Chief Justice's opinion for the Court. Because these cases are of such extraordinary importance, I cannot avoid adding to the many writings a few words of my own. </s> This is a sad day for the freedom of speech. Who could have imagined that the same Court which, within the past four years, has sternly disapproved of restrictions upon such inconsequential forms of expression as virtual child pornography, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002), tobacco advertising, Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001), dissemination of illegally intercepted communications, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001), and sexually explicit cable programming, United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000), would smile with favor upon a law that cuts to the heart of what the First Amendment is meant to protect: the right to criticize the government. For that is what the most offensive provisions of this legislation are all about. We are governed by Congress, and this legislation prohibits the criticism of Members of Congress by those entities most capable of giving such criticism loud voice: national political parties and corporations, both of the commercial and the not-for-profit sort. It forbids pre-election criticism of incumbents by corporations, even not-for-profit corporations, by use of their general funds; and forbids national-party use of "soft" money to fund "issue ads" that incumbents find so offensive. </s> To be sure, the legislation is evenhanded: It similarly prohibits criticism of the candidates who oppose Members of Congress in their reelection bids. But as everyone knows, this is an area in which evenhandedness is not fairness. If all electioneering were evenhandedly prohibited, incumbents would have an enormous advantage. Likewise, if incumbents and challengers are limited to the same quantity of electioneering, incumbents are favored. In other words, any restriction upon a type of campaign speech that is equally available to challengers and incumbents tends to favor incumbents. </s> Beyond that, however, the present legislation targets for prohibition certain categories of campaign speech that are particularly harmful to incumbents. Is it accidental, do you think, that incumbents raise about three times as much "hard money"--the sort of funding generally not restricted by this legislation--as do their challengers? See FEC, 1999-2000 Financial Activity of All Senateand House Campaigns (Jan. 1, 1999-Dec. 31, 2000) (last modified on May 15, 2001), http://www.fec.gov/press/ 051501congfinact/tables/allcong2000.xls (all Internet ma-terials as visited Dec. 4, 2003, and available in Clerk of Court's case file). Or that lobbyists (who seek the favor of incumbents) give 92 percent of their money in "hard" contributions? See U.S. Public Interest Research Group (PIRG), The Lobbyist's Last Laugh: How K Street Lob-byists Would Benefit from the McCain-Feingold Cam-paign Finance Bill 3 (July 5, 2001), http://www.pirg.org/democracy/democracy.asp?id2=5068. Is it an oversight, do you suppose, that the so-called "millionaire provisions" raise the contribution limit for a candidate running against an individual who devotes to the campaign (as challengers often do) great personal wealth, but do not raise the limit for a candidate running against an individual who devotes to the campaign (as incumbents often do) a massive election "war chest"? See BCRA §§304, 316, and 319. And is it mere happenstance, do you estimate, that national-party funding, which is severely limited by the Act, is more likely to assist cash-strapped challengers than flush-with-hard-money incumbents? See A. Gierzynski & D.Breaux, The Financing Role of Parties, in Campaign Finance in State Legislative Elections 195-200 (J. Thompson & S.Moncrief eds. 1998). Was it unintended, by any chance, that incumbents are free personally to receive some soft money and even to solicit it for other organizations, while national parties are not? See new FECA §§323(a) and (e). </s> I wish to address three fallacious propositions that might be thought to justify some or all of the provisions of this legislation--only the last of which is explicitly embraced by the principal opinion for the Court, but all of which underlie, I think, its approach to these cases. (a) Money is Not Speech </s> It was said by congressional proponents of this legislation, see 143 Cong. Rec. 20746 (1997) (remarks of Sen. Boxer), 145 Cong. Rec. S12612 (Oct. 14, 1999) (remarks of Sen. Cleland), 147 Cong. Rec. S2436 (Mar. 19, 2001) (remarks of Sen. Dodd), with support from the law reviews, see, e.g., Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 Yale L.J. 1001 (1976), that since this legislation regulates nothing but the expenditure of money for speech, as opposed to speech itself, the burden it imposes is not subject to full First Amendment scrutiny; the government may regulate the raising and spending of campaign funds just as it regulates other forms of conduct, such as burning draft cards, see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), or camping out on the National Mall, see Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). That proposition has been endorsed by one of the two authors of today's principal opinion: "The right to use one's own money to hire gladiators, [and] to fund 'speech by proxy,' ... [are] property rights . . . not entitled to the same protection as the right to say what one pleases." Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 399 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring). Until today, however, that view has been categorically rejected by our jurisprudence. As we said in Buckley, 424 U.S., at 16, "this Court has never suggested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment." Our traditional view was correct, and today's cavalier attitude toward regulating the financing of speech (the "exacting scrutiny" test of Buckley, see ibid., is not uttered in any majority opinion, and is not observed in the ones from which I dissent) frustrates the fundamental purpose of the First Amendment. In any economy operated on even the most rudimentary principles of division of labor, effective public communication requires the speaker to make use of the services of others. An author may write a novel, but he will seldom publish and distribute it himself. A freelance reporter may write a story, but he will rarely edit, print, and deliver it to subscribers. To a government bent on suppressing speech, this mode of organization presents opportunities: Control any cog in the machine, and you can halt the whole apparatus. License printers, and it matters little whether authors are still free to write. Restrict the sale of books, and it matters little who prints them. Predictably, repressive regimes have exploited these principles by attacking all levels of the production and dissemination of ideas. See, e.g., Printing Act of 1662, 14 Car. II, c. 33, §§1, 4, 7 (punishing printers, importers, and booksellers); Printing Act of 1649, 2 Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum 245, 246, 250 (punishing authors, printers, booksellers, importers, and buyers). In response to this threat, we have interpreted the First Amendment broadly. See, e.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 65, n.6 (1963) ("The constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press embraces the circulation of books as well as their publication..."). </s> Division of labor requires a means of mediating exchange, and in a commercial society, that means is supplied by money. The publisher pays the author for the right to sell his book; it pays its staff who print and assemble the book; it demands payments from booksellers who bring the book to market. This, too, presents opportunities for repression: Instead of regulating the various parties to the enterprise individually, the government can suppress their ability to coordinate by regulating their use of money. What good is the right to print books without a right to buy works from authors? Or the right to publish newspapers without the right to pay deliverymen? The right to speak would be largely ineffective if it did not include the right to engage in financial transactions that are the incidents of its exercise. </s> This is not to say that any regulation of money is a regulation of speech. The government may apply general commercial regulations to those who use money for speech if it applies them evenhandedly to those who use money for other purposes. But where the government singles out money used to fund speech as its legislative object, it is acting against speech as such, no less than if it had targeted the paper on which a book was printed or the trucks that deliver it to the bookstore. </s> History and jurisprudence bear this out. The best early examples derive from the British efforts to tax the press after the lapse of licensing statutes by which the press was first regulated. The Stamp Act of 1712 imposed levies on all newspapers, including an additional tax for each advertisement. 10 Anne, c. 18, §113. It was a response to unfavorable war coverage, "obvious[ly] ... designed to check the publication of those newspapers and pamphlets which depended for their sale on their cheapness and sensationalism." F.Siebert, Freedom of the Press in England, 1476-1776, pp.309-310 (1952). It succeeded in killing off approximately half the newspapers in England in its first year. Id., at 312. In 1765, Parliament applied a similar Act to the Colonies. 5 Geo. III, c. 12, §1. The colonial Act likewise placed exactions on sales and advertising revenue, the latter at 2s. per advertisement, which was "by any standard . . . excessive, since the publisher himself received only from 3 to 5s. and still less for repeated insertions." A. Schlesinger, Prelude to Independence: The Newspaper War on Britain, 1764-1776, p.68 (1958). The founding generation saw these taxes as grievous incursions on the freedom of the press. See, e.g., 1 D.Ramsay, History of the American Revolution 61-62 (L. Cohen ed. 1990); J.Adams, A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law (1765), reprinted in 3 Life and Works of John Adams 445, 464 (C.Adams ed. 1851). See generally Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245-249 (1936); Schlesinger, supra, at 67-84. </s> We have kept faith with the Founders' tradition by prohibiting the selective taxation of the press. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983) (ink and paper tax); Grosjean, supra (advertisement tax). And we have done so whether the tax was the product of illicit motive or not. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., supra, at 592. These press-taxation cases belie the claim that regulation of money used to fund speech is not regulation of speech itself. A tax on a newspaper's advertising revenue does not prohibit anyone from saying anything; it merely appropriates part of the revenue that a speaker would otherwise obtain. That is even a step short of totally prohibiting advertising revenue--which would be analogous to the total prohibition of certain campaign-speech contributions in the presentcases. Yet it is unquestionably a violation of the First Amendment. </s> Many other cases exemplify the same principle that an attack upon the funding of speech is an attack upon speech itself. In Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980), we struck down an ordinance limiting the amount charities could pay their solicitors. In Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991), we held unconstitutional a state statute that appropriated the proceeds of criminals' biographies for payment to the victims. And in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995), we held unconstitutional a university's discrimination in the disbursement of funds to speakers on the basis of viewpoint. Most notable, perhaps, is our famous opinion in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), holding that paid advertisements in a newspaper were entitled to full First Amendment protection: "Any other conclusion would discourage newspapers from carrying 'editorial advertisements' of this type, and so might shut off an important outlet for the promulgation of information and ideas by persons who do not themselves have access to publishing facilities--who wish to exercise their freedom of speech even though they are not members of the press. The effect would be to shackle the First Amendment in its attempt to secure 'the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources.'" Id., at 266 (citations omitted). </s> This passage was relied on in Buckley for the point that restrictions on the expenditure of money for speech are equivalent to restrictions on speech itself. 424 U.S., at 16-17. That reliance was appropriate. If denying protection to paid-for speech would "shackle the First Amendment," so also does forbidding or limiting the right to pay for speech. </s> It should be obvious, then, that a law limiting the amount a person can spend to broadcast his political views is a direct restriction on speech. That is no different from a law limiting the amount a newspaper can pay its editorial staff or the amount a charity can pay its leafletters. It is equally clear that a limit on the amount a candidate can raise from any one individual for the purpose of speaking is also a direct limitation on speech. That is no different from a law limiting the amount a publisher can accept from any one shareholder or lender, or the amount a newspaper can charge any one advertiser or customer. (b) Pooling Money is Not Speech </s> Another proposition which could explain at least some of the results of today's opinion is that the First Amendment right to spend money for speech does not include the right to combine with others in spending money for speech. Such a proposition fits uncomfortably with the concluding words of our Declaration of Independence: "And for the support of this Declaration, . . . we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor." (Emphasis added.) The freedom to associate with others for the dissemination of ideas--not just by singing or speaking in unison, but by pooling financial resources for expressive purposes--is part of the freedom of speech. "Our form of government is built on the premise that every citizen shall have the right to engage in political expression and association. This right was enshrined in the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights. Exercise of these basic freedoms in America has traditionally been through the media of political associations. Any interference with the freedom of a party is simultaneously an interference with the freedom of its adherents." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963) (internal quotation marks omitted). </s> "The First Amendment protects political association as well as political expression. The constitutional right of association explicated in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958), stemmed from the Court's recognition that '[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association.' Subsequent decisions have made clear that the First and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee '"freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas,"' ...." Buckley, supra, at 15. </s> We have said that "implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment" is "a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984). That "right to associate . . . in pursuit" includes the right to pool financial resources. </s> If it were otherwise, Congress would be empowered to enact legislation requiring newspapers to be sole proprietorships, banning their use of partnership or corporate form. That sort of restriction would be an obvious violation of the First Amendment, and it is incomprehensible why the conclusion should change when what is at issue is the pooling of funds for the most important (and most perennially threatened) category of speech: electoral speech. The principle that such financial association does not enjoy full First Amendment protection threatens the existence of all political parties. (c) Speech by Corporations Can Be Abridged </s> The last proposition that might explain at least some of today's casual abridgment of free-speech rights is this: that the particular form of association known as a corporation does not enjoy full First Amendment protection. Of course the text of the First Amendment does not limit its application in this fashion, even though "[b]y the end of the eighteenth century the corporation was a familiar figure in American economic life." C. Cooke, Corporation, Trust and Company 92 (1951). Nor is there any basis in reason why First Amendment rights should not attach to corporate associations--and we have said so. In First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), we held unconstitutional a state prohibition of corporate speech designed to influence the vote on referendum proposals. We said: "[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest that the State could silence their proposed speech. It is the type of speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than an individual. The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual." Id., at 776-777 (internal quotation marks, footnotes, and citations omitted). </s> In NAACP v. Button, supra, at 428-429, 431, we held that the NAACP could assert First Amendment rights "on its own behalf, . . . though a corporation," and that the activities of the corporation were "modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments." In Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986), we held unconstitutional a state effort to compel corporate speech. "The identity of the speaker," we said, "is not decisive in determining whether speech is protected. Corporations and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the 'discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas' that the First Amendment seeks to foster." And in Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, we held unconstitutional FECA's limitation upon independent corporate expenditures. </s> The Court changed course in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), upholding a state prohibition of an independent corporate expenditure in support of a candidate for state office. I dissented in that case, see id., at 679, and remain of the view that it was error. In the modern world, giving the government power to exclude corporations from the political debate enables it effectively to muffle the voices that best represent the most significant segments of the economy and the most passionately held social and political views. People who associate--who pool their financial resources--for purposes of economic enterprise overwhelmingly do so in the corporate form; and with increasing frequency, incorporation is chosen by those who associate to defend and promote particular ideas--such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Rifle Association, parties to these cases. Imagine, then, a government that wished to suppress nuclear power--or oil and gas exploration, or automobile manufacturing, or gun ownership, or civil liberties--and that had the power to prohibit corporate advertising against its proposals. To be sure, the individuals involved in, or benefited by, those industries, or interested in those causes, could (given enough time) form political action committees or other associations to make their case. But the organizational form in which those enterprises already exist, and in which they can most quickly and most effectively get their message across, is the corporate form. The First Amendment does not in my view permit the restriction of that political speech. And the same holds true for corporate electoral speech: A candidate should not be insulated from the most effective speech that the major participants in the economy and major incorporated interest groups can generate. </s> But what about the danger to the political system posed by "amassed wealth"? The most direct threat from that source comes in the form of undisclosed favors and payoffs to elected officials--which have already been criminalized, and will be rendered no more discoverable by the legislation at issue here. The use of corporate wealth (like individual wealth) to speak to the electorate is unlikely to "distort" elections--especially if disclosure requirements tell the people where the speech is coming from. The premise of the First Amendment is that the American people are neither sheep nor fools, and hence fully capable of considering both the substance of the speech presented to them and its proximate and ultimate source. If that premise is wrong, our democracy has a much greater problem to overcome than merely the influence of amassed wealth. Given the premises of democracy, there is no such thing as too much speech. </s> But, it is argued, quite apart from its effect upon the electorate, corporate speech in the form of contributions to the candidate's campaign, or even in the form of independent expenditures supporting the candidate, engenders an obligation which is later paid in the form of greater access to the officeholder, or indeed in the form of votes on particular bills. Any quid-pro-quo agreement for votes would of course violate criminal law, see 18 U.S.C. §201, and actual payoff votes have not even been claimed by those favoring the restrictions on corporate speech. It cannot be denied, however, that corporate (like noncorporate) allies will have greater access to the officeholder, and that he will tend to favor the same causes as those who support him (which is usually why they supported him). That is the nature of politics--if not indeed human nature--and how this can properly be considered "corruption" (or "the appearance of corruption") with regard to corporate allies and not with regard to other allies is beyond me. If the Bill of Rights had intended an exception to the freedom of speech in order to combat this malign proclivity of the officeholder to agree with those who agree with him, and to speak more with his supporters than his opponents, it would surely have said so. It did not do so, I think, because the juice is not worth the squeeze. Evil corporate (and private affluent) influences are well enough checked (so long as adequate campaign-expenditure disclosure rules exist) by the politician's fear of being portrayed as "in the pocket" of so-called moneyed interests. The incremental benefit obtained by muzzling corporate speech is more than offset by loss of the information and persuasion that corporate speech can contain. That, at least, is the assumption of a constitutional guarantee which prescribes that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech. </s> But let us not be deceived. While the Government's briefs and arguments before this Court focused on the horrible "appearance of corruption," the most passionate floor statements during the debates on this legislation pertained to so-called attack ads, which the Constitution surely protects, but which Members of Congress analogized to "crack cocaine," 144 Cong. Rec. S868 (Feb. 24, 1998) (remarks of Sen. Daschle), "drive-by shooting[s]," id., at S879 (remarks of Sen. Durbin), and "air pollution," 143 Cong. Rec. 20505 (1997) (remarks of Sen. Dorgan). There is good reason to believe that the ending of negative campaign ads was the principal attraction of the legislation. A Senate sponsor said, "I hope that we will not allow our attention to be distracted from the real issues at hand--how to raise the tenor of the debate in our elections and give people real choices. No one benefits from negative ads. They don't aid our Nation's political dialog." Id., at 20521-20522 (remarks of Sen. McCain). He assured the body that "[y]ou cut off the soft money, you are going to see a lot less of that [attack ads]. Prohibit unions and corporations, and you will see a lot less of that. If you demand full disclosure for those who pay for those ads, you are going to see a lot less of that . . . ." 147 Cong. Rec. S3116 (Mar. 29, 2001) (remarks of Sen. McCain). See also, e.g., 148 Cong. Rec. S2117 (Mar. 20, 2002) (remarks of Sen. Cantwell) ("This bill is about slowing the ad war. . . . It is about slowing political advertising and making sure the flow of negative ads by outside interest groups does not continue to permeate the airwaves"); 143 Cong. Rec. 20746 (1997) (remarks of Sen. Boxer) ("These so-called issues ads are not regulated at all and mention candidates by name. They directly attack candidates without any accountability. It is brutal.... We have an opportunity in the McCain-Feingold bill to stop that . . ."); 145 Cong. Rec. S12606-S12607 (Oct. 14, 1999) (remarks of Sen. Wellstone) ("I think these issue advocacy ads are a nightmare. I think all of us should hate them.... [By passing the legislation], [w]e could get some of this poison politics off television"). </s> Another theme prominent in the legislative debates was the notion that there is too much money spent on elections. The first principle of "reform" was that "there should be less money in politics." 147 Cong. Rec. S3236 (Apr. 2, 2001) (remarks of Sen. Murray). "The enormous amounts of special interest money that flood our political system have become a cancer in our democracy." 148 Cong. Rec. S2151 (Mar. 20, 2002) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy). "[L]arge sums of money drown out the voice of the average voter." 148 Cong. Rec. H373 (Feb. 13, 2002) (remarks of Rep. Langevin). The system of campaign finance is "drowning in money." Id., at H404 (remarks of Rep. Menendez). And most expansively: "Despite the ever-increasing sums spent on campaigns, we have not seen an improvement in campaign discourse, issue discussion or voter education. More money does not mean more ideas, more substance or more depth. Instead, it means more of what voters complain about most. More 30-second spots, more negativity and an increasingly longer campaign period." 148 Cong. Rec. S2150 (Mar. 20, 2002) (remarks of Sen. Kerry). </s> Perhaps voters do detest these 30-second spots--though I suspect they detest even more hour-long campaign-debate interruptions of their favorite entertainment programming. Evidently, however, these ads do persuade voters, or else they would not be so routinely used by sophisticated politicians of all parties. The point, in any event, is that it is not the proper role of those who govern us to judge which campaign speech has "substance" and "depth" (do you think it might be that which is least damaging to incumbents?) and to abridge the rest. </s> And what exactly are these outrageous sums frittered away in determining who will govern us? A report prepared for Congress concluded that the total amount, in hard and soft money, spent on the 2000 federal elections was between $2.4 and $2.5 billion. J. Cantor, CRS Report for Congress, Campaign Finance in the 2000 Federal Elections: Overview and Estimates of the Flow of Money (2001). All campaign spending in the United States, including state elections, ballot initiatives, and judicial elections, has been estimated at $3.9 billion for 2000, Nelson, Spending in the 2000 Elections, in Financing the 2000 Election 24, Tbl. 2-1 (D. Magleby ed. 2002), which was a year that "shattered spending and contribution records," id., at 22. Even taking this last, larger figure as the benchmark, it means that Americans spent about half as much electing all their Nation's officials, state and federal, as they spent on movie tickets ($7.8 billion); about a fifth as much as they spent on cosmetics and perfume ($18.8 billion); and about a sixth as much as they spenton pork (the nongovernmental sort) ($22.8 billion). See U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Tbl. 2.6U (Col. AS; Rows 356, 214, and 139), http:// www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/206u.csv. If our democracy is drowning from this much spending, it cannot swim. * * * Which brings me back to where I began: This litigation is about preventing criticism of the government. I cannot say for certain that many, or some, or even any, of the Members of Congress who voted for this legislation did so not to produce "fairer" campaigns, but to mute criticism of their records and facilitate reelection. Indeed, I will stipulate that all those who voted for the Act believed they were acting for the good of the country. There remains the problem of the Charlie Wilson Phenomenon, named after Charles Wilson, former president of General Motors, who is supposed to have said during the Senate hearing on his nomination as Secretary of Defense that "what's good for General Motors is good for the country."** Those in power, even giving them the benefit of the greatest good will, are inclined to believe that what is good for them is good for the country. Whether in prescient recognition of the Charlie Wilson Phenomenon, or out of fear of good old-fashioned, malicious, self-interested manipulation, "[t]he fundamental approach of the First Amendment . . . was to assume the worst, and to rule the regulation of political speech 'for fairness' sake' simply out of bounds." Austin, 494 U.S., at 693 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Having abandoned that approach to a limited extent in Buckley, we abandon it much further today. </s> We will unquestionably be called upon to abandon it further still in the future. The most frightening passage in the lengthy floor debates on this legislation is the following assurance given by one of the cosponsoring Senators to his colleagues: "This is a modest step, it is a first step, it is an essential step, but it does not even begin to address, in some ways, the fundamental problems that exist with the hard money aspect of the system." 148 Cong. Rec. S2101 (Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. Feingold). </s> The system indeed. The first instinct of power is the retention of power, and, under a Constitution that requires periodic elections, that is best achieved by the suppression of election-time speech. We have witnessed merely the second scene of Act I of what promises to be a lengthy tragedy. In scene 3 the Court, having abandoned most of the First Amendment weaponry that Buckley left intact, will be even less equipped to resist the incumbents' writing of the rules of political debate. The federal election campaign laws, which are already (as today's opinions show) so voluminous, so detailed, so complex, that no ordinary citizen dare run for office, or even contribute a significant sum, without hiring an expert advisor in the field, can be expected to grow more voluminous, more detailed, and more complex in the years to come--and always, always, with the objective of reducing the excessive amount of speech. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1674v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1675v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1676v. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal.; </s> JOHN McCAIN, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1702v. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal.; </s> REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1727v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC., etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1733v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, APPELLANTS </s> 02-1734v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1740v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> RON PAUL, UNITED STATES CONGRESSMAN, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1747v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1753v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1755v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1756v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal. on appeals from the united states district court for the district of columbia [December 10, 2003] </s> Justice Thomas, concurring with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV, except for BCRA §§311 and 318, concurring in the result with respect to BCRA §318, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect to BCRA Title II, and dissenting with respect to BCRA Titles I, V, and §311.** </s> The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." Nevertheless, the Court today upholds what can only be described as the most significant abridgment of the freedoms of speech and association since the Civil War. With breathtaking scope, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), directly targets and constricts core political speech, the "primary object of First Amendment protection." Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 410-411 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Because "the First Amendment 'has its fullest and most urgent application' to speech uttered during a campaign for political office," Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)), our duty is to approach these restrictions "with the utmost skepticism" and subject them to the "strictest scrutiny." Shrink Missouri, supra, at 412 (Thomas, J., dissenting). </s> In response to this assault on the free exchange of ideas and with only the slightest consideration of the appropriate standard of review or of the Court's traditional role of protecting First Amendment freedoms, the Court has placed its imprimatur on these unprecedented restrictions. The very "purpose of the First Amendment [is] to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). Yet today the fundamental principle that "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market," Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting), is cast aside in the purported service of preventing "corruption," or the mere "appearance of corruption." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976) (per curiam). Apparently, the marketplace of ideas is to be fully open only to defamers, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); nude dancers, Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (plurality opinion); pornographers, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002); flag burners, United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); and cross burners, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. ___ (2003). </s> Because I cannot agree with the treatment given by Justice Stevens' and Justice O'Connor's opinion (hereinafter joint opinion) to speech that is "indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society," Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103 (1940), I respectfully dissent. I also dissent from Justice Breyer's opinion upholding BCRA §504. I join The Chief Justice's opinion in regards to BCRA §§304, 305, 307, 316, 319, and 403(b); concur in the result as to §318; and dissent from the opinion as to §311. I also fully agree with Justice Kennedy's discussion of §213 and join that portion of his opinion. Post, at 37-38. I A </s> "[C]ampaign finance laws are subject to strict scrutiny," Federal Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. ___, ___ (2003) (slip op., at 1) (Thomas, J., dissenting), and thus Title I must satisfy that demanding standard even if it were (incorrectly) conceived of as nothing more than a contribution limitation. The defendants do not even attempt to defend Title I under this standard, and for good reason: The various restrictions imposed by Title I are much less narrowly tailored to target only corrupting or problematic donations than even the contribution limits in Shrink Missouri. See 518 U.S. 604, 641-644 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (Colorado I). And, as I have previously noted, it is unclear why "[b]ribery laws [that] bar precisely the quid pro quo arrangements that are targeted here" and "disclosure laws" are not "less restrictive means of addressing [the Government's] interest in curtailing corruption." Shrink Missouri, supra, at 428. The joint opinion not only continues the errors of Buckley v. Valeo, by applying a low level of scrutiny to contribution ceilings, but also builds upon these errors by expanding the anticircumvention rationale beyond reason. Admittedly, exploitation of an anticircumvention concept has a long pedigree, going back at least to Buckley itself. Buckley upheld a $1,000 contribution ceiling as a way to combat both the "actuality and appearance of corruption." 424 U.S., at 26. The challengers in Buckley contended both that bribery laws represented "a less restrictive means of dealing with 'proven and suspected quid pro quo arrangements,'" id., at 27, and that the $1,000 contribution ceiling was overbroad as "most large contributors do not seek improper influence over a candidate's position or an officeholder's action," id., at 29. The Court rejected the first argument on the grounds that "laws making criminal the giving and taking of bribes deal with only the most blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influence governmental action," id., at 27-28, and rejected the second on the grounds that "it [is] difficult to isolate suspect contributions," id., at 30.1 But a broadly drawn bribery law2 would cover even subtle and general attempts to influence government officials corruptly, eliminating the Court's first concern. And, an effective bribery law would deter actual quid pro quos and would, in all likelihood, eliminate any appearance of corruption in the system. </s> Hence, at root, the Buckley Court was concerned that bribery laws could not be effectively enforced to prevent quid pro quos between donors and officeholders, and the only rational reading of Buckley is that it approved the $1,000 contribution ceiling on this ground. The Court then, however, having at least in part concluded that individual contribution ceilings were necessary to prevent easy evasion of bribery laws, proceeded to uphold a separate contribution limitation, using, as the only justification, the "prevent[ion] [of] evasion of the $1,000 contribution limitation." Id., at 38. The need to prevent circumvention of a limitation that was itself an anticircumvention measure led to the upholding of another significant restriction on individuals' freedom of speech. </s> The joint opinion now repeats this process. New Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) §323(a), 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(a) (Supp. 2003), is intended to prevent easy circumvention of the (now) $2,000 contribution ceiling. The joint opinion even recognizes this, relying heavily on evidence that, for instance, "candidates and donors alike have in fact exploited the soft-money loophole, the former to increase their prospects of election and the latter to create debt on the part of officeholders, with the national parties serving as willing intermediaries." Ante, at 36. The joint opinion upholds §323(a), in part, on the grounds that it had become too easy to circumvent the $2,000 cap by using the national parties as go-betweens. </s> And the remaining provisions of new FECA §323 are upheld mostly as measures preventing circumvention of other contribution limits, including §323(a), ante, at 55-57 (§323(b)); ante, at 66-69 (§323(d)); ante, at 75 (§323(e)); ante, at 77-78 (§323(f)), which, as I have already explained, is a second-order anticircumvention measure. The joint opinion's handling of §323(f) is perhaps most telling, as it upholds §323(f) only because of "Congress' eminently reasonable prediction that ... state and local candidates and officeholders will become the next conduits for the soft-money funding of sham issue advertising." Ante, at 78 (emphasis added). That is, this Court upholds a third-order anticircumvention measure based on Congress' anticipation of circumvention of these second-order anticircumvention measures that might possibly, at some point in the future, pose some problem. </s> It is not difficult to see where this leads. Every law has limits, and there will always be behavior not covered by the law but at its edges; behavior easily characterized as "circumventing" the law's prohibition. Hence, speech regulation will again expand to cover new forms of "circumvention," only to spur supposed circumvention of the new regulations, and so forth. Rather than permit this never-ending and self-justifying process, I would require that the Government explain why proposed speech restrictions are needed in light of actual Government interests, and, in particular, why the bribery laws are not sufficient. B </s> But Title I falls even on the joint opinion's terms. This Court has held that "[t]he quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised." Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S., at 391. And three Members of today's majority have observed that "the opportunity for corruption" presented by "[u]nregulated 'soft money' contributions" is "at best, attenuated." Colorado I, 518 U.S., at 616 (opinion of Breyer, J., joined by O'Connor and Souter, JJ.). Such an observation is quite clearly correct. A donation to a political party is a clumsy method by which to influence a candidate, as the party is free to spend the donation however it sees fit, and could easily spend the money as to provide no help to the candidate. And, a soft-money donation to a party will be of even less benefit to a candidate, "because of legal restrictions on how the money may be spent." Brief for FEC etal. in No. 02-1674 etal., p.43. It follows that the defendants bear an especially heavy empirical burden in justifying Title I. The evidence cited by the joint opinion does not meet this standard and would barely suffice for anything more than rational-basis review. The first category of the joint opinion's evidence is evidence that "federal officeholders have commonly asked donors to make soft-money donations to national and state committees solely in order to assist federal campaigns, including the officeholder's own." Ante, at 36 (internal quotation marks omitted). But to the extent that donors and federal officeholders have collaborated so that donors could give donations to a national party committee "for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office," the alleged soft-money donation is in actuality a regular "contribution" as already defined and regulated by FECA. See 2 U.S.C. §431(8)(A)(i). Neither the joint opinion nor the defendants present evidence that enforcement of pre-BCRA law has proved to be impossible, ineffective, or even particularly difficult. </s> The second category is evidence that "lobbyists, CEOs, and wealthy individuals" have "donat[ed] substantial sums of soft money to national committees not on ideological grounds, but for the express purpose of securing influence over federal officials." Ante, at 37. Even if true (and the cited evidence consists of nothing more than vague allegations of wrongdoing), it is unclear why existing bribery laws could not address this problem. Again, neither the joint opinion nor the defendants point to evidence that the enforcement of bribery laws has been or would be ineffective. If the problem has been clear and widespread, as the joint opinion suggests, I would expect that convictions, or at least prosecutions, would be more frequent. </s> The third category is evidence characterized by the joint opinion as "connect[ing] soft money to manipulations of the legislative calendar, leading to Congress' failure to enact, among other things, generic drug legislation, tort reform, and tobacco legislation." Ante, at 40. But the evidence for this is no stronger than the evidence that there has been actual vote buying or vote switching for soft money. The joint opinion's citations to the record do not stand for the propositions that they claim. For instance, the McCain declaration does not provide any evidence of any exchange of legislative action for donations of any kind (hard or soft).3 Neither do the Simpson or Simon declarations, with perhaps one exception effectively addressed by Justice Kennedy's opinion.4 See post, at 18-19. In fact, the findings by two of the District Court's judges confirm that the evidence of any quid pro quo corruption is exceedingly weak, if not nonexistent. See 251 F.Supp. 2d 176, 349-352 (DC 2003) (Henderson, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); id., at 851-853 (Leon, J.). The evidence cited by the joint opinion is properly described as "at best, [the Members of Congress'] personal conjecture regarding the impact of soft money donations on the voting practices of their present and former colleagues." Id., at 852 (Leon, J.). </s> The joint opinion also places a substantial amount of weight on the fact that "in 1996 and 2000, more than half of the top 50 soft-money donors gave substantial sums to both major national parties," and suggests that this fact "leav[es] room for no other conclusion but that these donors were seeking influence, or avoiding retaliation, rather than promoting any particular ideology." Ante, at 38 (emphasis in original). But that is not necessarily the case. The two major parties are not perfect ideological opposites, and supporters or opponents of certain policies or ideas might find substantial overlap between the two parties. If donors feel that both major parties are in general agreement over an issue of importance to them, it is unremarkable that such donors show support for both parties. This commonsense explanation surely belies the joint opinion's too-hasty conclusion drawn from a relatively innocent fact. </s> The Court today finds such sparse evidence sufficient. This cannot be held to satisfy even the "relatively complaisant review" of Beaumont, 539 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 14), unless, as it appears, the Court intends to abdicate entirely its role.5 II </s> The Court is not content with "balanc[ing] away First Amendment freedoms," Shrink Missouri, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)). Today's holding continues a disturbing trend: the steady decrease in the level of scrutiny applied to restrictions on core political speech. See Buckley, supra, at 16 (First Amendment requires "exacting scrutiny"); Shrink Missouri, supra, at 387 (applying "Buckley's standard of scrutiny"); Beaumont, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 14) (referencing "relatively complaisant review").6 Although this trend is most obvious in the review of contribution limits, it has now reached what even this Court today would presumably recognize as a direct restriction on core political speech: limitations on independent expenditures. A </s> Of course, by accepting Congress' expansion of what constitutes "coordination" for purposes of treating expenditures as limitations, the Court can pretend that it is, in fact, still only restricting primarily "contributions." I need not say much about this illusion. I have already discussed how the language used in new FECA §315(a)(7)(B)(ii) is, even under Buckley's framework, overly broad and restricts fully protected speech. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 467-468 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (Colorado II). The particular language used, "expenditures made by any person ... in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, a national, State, or local committee of a political party," BCRA §214(a)(2), captures expenditures with "no constitutional difference" from "a purely independent one." Id., at 468 (Thomas, J., dissenting).7 And new FECA §315(a)(7)(C), although using the neutral term "coordinated," certainly has the purpose of "clarif[ying] the scope of the preceding subsection, §315(a)(7)(B)," ante, at 95 (joint opinion), and thus should be read to be as expansive as the overly broad language in §315(a)(7)(B). Hence, it too is unconstitutional. B </s> As for §§203 and 204, the Court rests its decision on another vast expansion of the First Amendment framework described in Buckley, this time of the Court's, rather than Congress', own making. In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659-660 (1990), the Court recognized a "different type of corruption" from the "'financial quid pro quo'": the "corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas." The only effect, however, that the "immense aggregations" of wealth will have (in the context of independent expenditures) on an election is that they might be used to fund communications to convince voters to select certain candidates over others. In other words, the "corrosive and distorting effects" described in Austin are that corporations, on behalf of their shareholders, will be able to convince voters of the correctness of their ideas. Apparently, winning in the marketplace of ideas is no longer a sign that "the ultimate good" has been "reached by free trade in ideas," or that the speaker has survived "the best test of truth" by having "the thought ... get itself accepted in the competition of the market." Abrams, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978) ("[T]he fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it"); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N. Y., 360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959) ("[I]n the realm of ideas [the Constitution] protects expression which is eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing"). Because Austin's definition of "corruption" is incompatible with the First Amendment, I would overturn Austin and hold that the potential for corporations and unions to influence voters, via independent expenditures aimed at convincing these voters to adopt particular views, is not a form of corruption justifying any state regulation or suppression. Without Austin's peculiar variation of "corruption," §§203 and 204 are supported by no compelling government interest. The joint opinion does not even argue that these provisions address quid pro quo corruption.8 And the shareholder protection rationale is equally unavailing. The "shareholder invests in a corporation of his own volition and is free to withdraw his investment at any time and for any reason," Bellotti, supra, at 794, n.34. Hence, no compelling interest can be found in protecting minority shareholders from the corporation's use of its general treasury, especially where, in other contexts, "equally important and controversial corporate decisions are made by management or by a predetermined percentage of the shareholders." Ibid. C </s> I must now address an issue on which I differ from all of my colleagues: the disclosure provisions in BCRA §201, now contained in new FECA §304(f). The "historical evidence indicates that Founding-era Americans opposed attempts to require that anonymous authors reveal their identities on the ground that forced disclosure violated the 'freedom of the press.'" McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 361 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).9 Indeed, this Court has explicitly recognized that "the interest in having anonymous works enter the marketplace of ideas unquestionably outweighs any public interest in requiring disclosure as a condition of entry," and thus that "an author's decision to remain anonymous ... is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment." Id., at 342. The Court now backs away from this principle, allowing the established right to anonymous speech to be stripped away based on the flimsiest of justifications. The only plausible interest asserted by the defendants to justify the disclosure provisions is the interest in providing "information" about the speaker to the public. But we have already held that "[t]he simple interest in providing voters with additional relevant information does not justify a state requirement that a writer make statements or disclosures she would otherwise omit." Id., at 348. Of course, Buckley upheld the disclosure requirement on expenditures for communications using words of express advocacy based on this informational interest. 424 U.S., at 81. And admittedly, McIntyre purported to distinguish Buckley. McIntyre, supra, at 355-356. But the two ways McIntyre distinguished Buckley--one, that the disclosure of "an expenditure and its use, without more, reveals far less information [than a forced identification of the author of a pamphlet,]" 514 U.S., at 355; and two, that in candidate elections, the "Government can identify a compelling state interest in avoiding the corruption that might result from campaign expenditures," id., at 356--are inherently implausible. The first is simply wrong. The revelation of one's political expenditures for independent communications about candidates can be just as revealing as the revelation of one's name on a pamphlet for a noncandidate election. See also id., at 384 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The second was outright rejected in Buckley itself, where the Court concluded that independent expenditures did not create any substantial risk of real or apparent corruption. 424 U.S., at 47. Hence, the only reading of McIntyre that remains consistent with the principles it contains is that it overturned Buckley to the extent that Buckley upheld a disclosure requirement solely based on the governmental interest in providing information to the voters. </s> The right to anonymous speech cannot be abridged based on the interests asserted by the defendants. I would thus hold that the disclosure requirements of BCRA §201 are unconstitutional. Because of this conclusion, the so-called advance disclosure requirement of §201 necessarily falls as well.10 D </s> I have long maintained that Buckley was incorrectly decided and should be overturned. See Colorado II, 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (MCFL), it is, or at least was, clear that any regulation of political speech beyond communications using words of express advocacy is unconstitutional. Hence, even under the joint opinion's framework, most of Title II is unconstitutional, as both the "primary definition" and "backup definition" of "electioneering communications" cover a significant number of communications that do not use words of express advocacy. 2 U.S.C.A. §434(f)(3)(A) (Supp. 2003).11 In Buckley, the Court was presented with the ambiguous language "'any expenditure ... relative to a clearly identified candidate.'" 424 U.S., at 41. The Court noted that the "use of so indefinite a phrase as 'relative to' a candidate fails to clearly mark the boundary between permissible and impermissible speech." Ibid. Hence, the Court read the phrase to mean "advocating the election or defeat of a candidate." Id., at 42 (internal quotation marks omitted). But this construction did not complete the vagueness inquiry. As the Court observed: "[T]he distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may often dissolve in practical application. Candidates, especially incumbents, are intimately tied to public issues involving legislative proposals and governmental actions. Not only do candidates campaign on the basis of their positions on various public issues, but campaigns themselves generate issues of public interest." Ibid. </s> The Court then recognized that the constitutional issues raised by the provision "can be avoided only by reading §608(e)(1) as limited to communications that include explicit words of advocacy of election or defeat of a candidate." Id., at 43. </s> The joint opinion argues that Buckley adopted this narrow reading only to avoid addressing a constitutional question. "[T]he concept of express advocacy and the concomitant class of magic words were born of an effort to avoid constitutional infirmities," concludes the joint opinion after examining the language of Buckley. Ante, at 85. This ignores the fact that the Court then struck down the expenditure limitation precisely because it was too narrow: "The exacting interpretation of the statutory language necessary to avoid unconstitutional vagueness thus undermines the limitation's effectiveness as a loophole-closing provision by facilitating circumvention by those seeking to exert improper influence upon a candidate or officeholder. It would naively underestimate the ingenuity and resourcefulness of persons and groups desiring to buy influence to believe that they would have much difficulty devising expenditures that skirted the restriction on express advocacy of election or defeat but nevertheless benefited the candidate's campaign. Yet no substantial societal interest would be served by a loophole-closing provision designed to check corruption that permitted unscrupulous persons and organizations to expend unlimited sums of money in order to obtain improper influence over candidates for elective office." 424 U.S., at 45. </s> Far from saving the provision from constitutional doubt, the Court read the provision in such a way as to guarantee its unconstitutionality. If there were some possibility that regulation of communications without words of express advocacy were constitutional, the provision would have to have been read to include these communications, and the constitutional question addressed head on.12 Indeed, the exceedingly narrow reading of the relevant language in Buckley is far from mandated by the text; it is, in fact, a highly strained reading. "'[A]ny expenditure ... relative to a clearly identified candidate,'" id., at 41, would be better read to cover, for instance, any expenditure for an advertisement aired close to an election that is "intended to influence the voters' decisions and ha[s] that effect," a standard apparently endorsed by the joint opinion as being sufficiently "equivalent" to express advocacy to justify its regulation. Ante, at 99-100. By deliberately adopting a strained and narrow reading of the statutory text and then striking down the provision in question for being too narrow, the Court made clear that regulation of nonexpress advocacy was strictly forbidden. </s> This reading is confirmed by other portions of Buckley and by other cases. For instance, in limiting FECA's disclosure provisions to expenditures involving express advocacy, the Court noted that it gave such a narrowing interpretation "[t]o insure that the reach of [the disclosure provision] is not impermissibly broad." 424 U.S., at 80 (emphasis added). If overbreadth were a concern in limiting the scope of a disclosure provision, it surely was equally a concern in the limitation of an actual cap on expenditures. And, in MCFL, the Court arguably eliminated any ambiguity remaining in Buckley when it explicitly stated that the narrowing interpretations taken in Buckley were necessary "in order to avoid problems of overbreadth." MCFL, 479 U.S., at 248. The joint opinion's attempt to explain away MCFL's uncomfortable language is unpersuasive. The joint opinion emphasizes that the MCFL Court "held that a 'similar construction' must apply to the expenditure limitation," as if that somehow proved its point. Ante, at 85, n.76 (emphasis in original). The fact that the MCFL Court said this does not establish anything, of course; adopting a narrow construction of a statute "in order to avoid problems of overbreadth," 479 U.S., at 248, is perfectly consistent with a holding that, lacking the narrowing construction, the statute would be overly broad, i.e., unconstitutional. </s> The defendants' principal argument in response is that "it would be bizarre to conclude that the Constitution permits Congress to prohibit the use of corporate or union general treasury funds for electioneering advertisements, but that the only standard that it can constitutionally use (express advocacy) is one that misses the vast majority (88.6 percent) of advertisements that candidates themselves use for electioneering." Brief for FEC etal. in No. 02-1674 etal., p.103 (emphasis in original). </s> The joint opinion echoes this, stating that the express advocacy line "cannot be squared with our longstanding recognition that the presence or absence of magic words cannot meaningfully distinguish electioneering speech from a true issue ad." Ante, at 86. First, the presence of the "magic words" does differentiate in a meaningful way between categories of speech. Speech containing the "magic words" is "unambiguously campaign related," Buckley, supra, at 81, while speech without these words is not. Second, it is far from bizarre to suggest that (potentially regulable) speech that is in practice impossible to differentiate from fully protected speech must be fully protected. It is, rather, part and parcel of First Amendment first principles. See, e.g., Free Speech Coalition, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (rejecting suggestion that "the constitutional protection for a free press applies only to the exposition of ideas" as the "line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that basic right," noting that "[w]hat is one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine"). This principle clearly played a significant role in Buckley itself, see 424 U.S., at 42 (after noting that "the distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may often dissolve in practical application," holding that the "express advocacy" standard must be adopted as the interpretation of the relevant language in FECA). The express-advocacy line was drawn to ensure the protection of the "discussion of issues and candidates," not out of some strange obsession of the Court to create meaningless lines. And the joint opinion misses the point when it notes that "Buckley's express advocacy line, in short, has not aided the legislative effort to combat real or apparent corruption." Ante, at 86-87. Buckley did not draw this line solely to aid in combating real or apparent corruption, but rather also to ensure the protection of speech unrelated to election campaigns.13 </s> Nor is this to say that speech with words of express advocacy is somehow less protected, as the joint opinion claims. Ante, at 99. The Court in Buckley recognized an informational interest that justified the imposition of a disclosure requirement on campaign-related speech. See 424 U.S., at 81. This interest is not implicated with regard to speech that is unrelated to an election campaign. Hence, it would be unconstitutional to impose such a disclosure requirement on non-election-related speech. And, as "the distinction between discussion of issues and candidates ... may often dissolve in practical application," id., at 42, the only way to prevent the unjustified burdening of nonelection speech is to impose the regulation only on speech that is "unambiguously campaign related," id., at 81, i.e., speech using words of express advocacy. Hence, speech that uses words of express advocacy is protected under the same standard, strict scrutiny, as all other forms of speech. The only difference is that, under Buckley, there is a governmental interest supporting some regulation of those using words of express advocacy not present in other forms of speech. * * * </s> The chilling endpoint of the Court's reasoning is not difficult to foresee: outright regulation of the press. None of the rationales offered by the defendants, and none of the reasoning employed by the Court, exempts the press. "This is so because of the difficulty, and perhaps impossibility, of distinguishing, either as a matter of fact or constitutional law, media corporations from [nonmedia] corporations." Bellotti, 435 U.S., at 796 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Media companies can run procandidate editorials as easily as nonmedia corporations can pay for advertisements. Candidates can be just as grateful to media companies as they can be to corporations and unions. In terms of "the corrosive and distorting effects" of wealth accumulated by corporations that has "little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas," Austin, 494 U.S., at 660, there is no distinction between a media corporation and a nonmedia corporation.14 Media corporations are influential. There is little doubt that the editorials and commentary they run can affect elections. Nor is there any doubt that media companies often wish to influence elections. One would think that the New York Times fervently hopes that its endorsement of Presidential candidates will actually influence people. What is to stop a future Congress from determining that the press is "too influential," and that the "appearance of corruption" is significant when media organizations endorse candidates or run "slanted" or "biased" news stories in favor of candidates or parties? Or, even easier, what is to stop a future Congress from concluding that the availability of unregulated media corporations creates a loophole that allows for easy "circumvention" of the limitations of the current campaign finance laws?15 Indeed, I believe that longstanding and heretofore unchallenged opinions such as Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), are in peril. There, the Court noted that "[c]hains of newspapers, national newspapers, national wire and news services, and one-newspaper towns, are the dominant features of a press that has become noncompetitive and enormously powerful and influential in its capacity to manipulate popular opinion and change the course of events." Id., at 249. Despite expressing some sympathy for those arguing for a legally created "right of access" to encourage diversity in viewpoints in the media, the Court struck down such laws, noting that these laws acted both to suppress speech and to "intru[de] into the function of editors" by interfering with "the exercise of editorial control and judgment." Id., at 257-258. Now, supporters of such laws need only argue that the press' "capacity to manipulate popular opinion" gives rise to an "appearance of corruption," especially when this capacity is used to promote a particular candidate or party. After drumming up some evidence,16 laws regulating media outlets in their issuance of editorials would be upheld under the joint opinion's reasoning (a result considered so beyond the pale in Miami Herald Publishing that the Court there used it as a reductio ad absurdum against the right-of-access law being addressed, see id., at 256). Nor is there anything in the joint opinion that would prevent Congress from imposing the Fairness Doctrine, not just on radio and television broadcasters, but on the entire media. See Red Lion Broadcasting, 395 U.S., at 369 (defining the "fairness doctrine" as a "requirement that discussion of public issues be presented ... and that each side of those issues must be given fair coverage"). </s> Hence, "the freedom of the press," described as "one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty," 1 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 335 (___ ed. 1876) (declaration of Rhode Island upon the ratification of the Constitution),17 could be next on the chopping block. Although today's opinion does not expressly strip the press of First Amendment protection, there is no principle of law or logic that would prevent the application of the Court's reasoning in that setting. The press now operates at the whim of Congress. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1674v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1675v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1676v. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal.; </s> JOHN McCAIN, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1702v. </s> MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR, etal.; </s> REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1727v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC., etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1733v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, APPELLANTS </s> 02-1734v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1740v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> RON PAUL, UNITED STATES CONGRESSMAN, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1747v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1753v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1755v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal.; </s> CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, etal., APPELLANTS </s> 02-1756v. </s> FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, etal. on appeals from the united states district court for the district of columbia [December 10, 2003] </s> Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect to BCRA Titles I and II.** </s> The First Amendment guarantees our citizens the right to judge for themselves the most effective means for the expression of political views and to decide for themselves which entities to trust as reliable speakers. Significant portions of Titles I and II of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA or Act) constrain that freedom. These new laws force speakers to abandon their own preference for speaking through parties and organizations. And they provide safe harbor to the mainstream press, suggesting that the corporate media alone suffice to alleviate the burdens the Act places on the rights and freedoms of ordinary citizens. </s> Today's decision upholding these laws purports simply to follow Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), and to abide by stare decisis, see ante, at 27 (joint opinion of Stevens and O'Connor, JJ. (hereinafter Court or majority)); but the majority, to make its decision work, must abridge free speech where Buckley did not. Buckley did not authorize Congress to decide what shapes and forms the national political dialogue is to take. To reach today's decision, the Court surpasses Buckley's limits and expands Congress' regulatory power. In so doing, it replaces discrete and respected First Amendment principles with new, amorphous, and unsound rules, rules which dismantle basic protections for speech. </s> A few examples show how BCRA reorders speech rights and codifies the Government's own preferences for certain speakers. BCRA would have imposed felony punishment on Ross Perot's 1996 efforts to build the Reform Party. Compare Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) §§309(d)(1)(A), 315(a)(1)(B), and 323(a)(1) (prohibiting, by up to five years' imprisonment, any individual from giving over $25,000 annually to a national party), with Spending By Perot, The Houston Chronicle, Dec. 13, 1996, p.43 (reporting Perot's $8 million founding contribution to the Reform Party). BCRA makes it a felony for an environmental group to broadcast an ad, within 60 days of an election, exhorting the public to protest a Congressman's impending vote to permit logging in national forests. See BCRA §203. BCRA escalates Congress' discrimination in favor of the speech rights of giant media corporations and against the speech rights of other corporations, both profit and nonprofit. Compare BCRA §203, with Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659-660 (1990) (first sanctioning this type of discrimination). </s> To the majority, all this is not only valid under the First Amendment but also is part of Congress' "steady improvement of the national election laws." Ante, at 6. We should make no mistake. It is neither. It is the codification of an assumption that the mainstream media alone can protect freedom of speech. It is an effort by Congress to ensure that civic discourse takes place only through the modes of its choosing. And BCRA is only the beginning, as its congressional proponents freely admit: "This is a modest step, it is a first step, it is an essential step, but it does not even begin to address, in some ways, the fundamental problems that exist with the hard money aspect of the system." 148 Cong. Rec. S2101 (Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. Feingold). </s> Id., at S2097 (statement of Sen. Wellstone) ("[P]assing this legislation ... will whet people's appetite for more"); id.,at S2101 (statement of Sen. Boxer) ("[T]his bill is notthe be-all or the end-all, but it is a strong start"); id., at S2152 (statement of Sen. Corzine) ("[T]his should not and will not be the last time campaign finance reform is debated on the Senate floor. We have many more important campaign finance issues to explore"); id., at S2157 (statement of Sen. Torricelli) ("Make [BCRA] the beginning of a reform, not the end of reform"); id., at H442 (Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Rep. Doggett) ("Mr. Chairman, if [BCRA] has any defect, it is that it does too little, not too much"). </s> Our precedents teach, above all, that Government cannot be trusted to moderate its own rules for suppression of speech. The dangers posed by speech regulations have led the Court to insist upon principled constitutional lines and a rigorous standard of review. The majority now abandons these distinctions and limitations. </s> With respect, I dissent from the majority opinion upholding BCRA Titles I and II. I concur in the judgment as to BCRA §213 and new FECA §323(e) and concur in the judgment in part and dissent in part as to BCRA §§201, 202, and 214. I. TITLE I AND COORDINATION PROVISIONS </s> Title I principally bans the solicitation, receipt, transfer and spending of soft money by the national parties (new FECA §323(a), 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(a) (Supp. 2003)). It also bans certain uses of soft money by state parties (new FECA §323(b)); the transfer of soft money from national parties to nonprofit groups (new FECA §323(d)); the solicitation, receipt, transfer, and spending of soft money by federal candidates and officeholders (new FECA §323(e)); and certain uses of soft money by state candidates (new FECA §323(f)). These provisions, and the other provisions with which this opinion is principally concerned, are set out in full, see Appendix, infra. Even a cursory review of the speech and association burdens these laws create makes their First Amendment infirmities obvious: Title I bars individuals with shared beliefs from pooling their money above limits set by Congress to form a new third party. See new FECA §323(a). </s> Title I bars national party officials from soliciting or directing soft money to state parties for use on a state ballot initiative. This is true even if no federal office appears on the same ballot as the state initiative. See new FECA §323(a). </s> A national party's mere involvement in the strategic planning of fundraising for a state ballot initiative risks a determination that the national party is exercising "indirect control" of the state party. If that determination is made, the state party must abide by federal regulations. And this is so even if the federal candidate on the ballot, if there is one, runs unopposed or is so certain of election that the only voter interest is in the state and local campaigns. See new FECA §323(a). </s> Title I compels speech. Party officials who want to engage in activity such as fundraising must now speak magic words to ensure the solicitation cannot be interpreted as anything other than a solicitation for hard, not soft, money. See ibid. </s> Title I prohibits the national parties from giving any sort of funds to nonprofit entities, even federally regulated hard money, and even if the party hoped to sponsor the interest group's exploration of a particular issue in advance of the party's addition of it to their platform. See new FECA §323(d). </s> By express terms, Title I imposes multiple different forms of spending caps on parties, candidates, and their agents. See new FECA §§323(a), (e), and (f). </s> Title I allows state parties to raise quasi-soft money Levin funds for use in activities that might affect a federal election; but the Act prohibits national parties from assisting state parties in developing and executing these fundraising plans, even when the parties seek only to advance state election interests. See new FECA §323(b). </s> Until today's consolidated cases, the Court has accepted but two principles to use in determining the validity of campaign finance restrictions. First is the anticorruption rationale. The principal concern, of course, is the agreement for a quid pro quo between officeholders (or candidates) and those who would seek to influence them. The Court has said the interest in preventing corruption allows limitations on receipt of the quid by a candidate or officeholder, regardless of who gives it or of the intent of the donor or officeholder. See Buckley, 459 U.S. 197, 201-211 (1982). </s> The majority today opens with rhetoric that suggests a conflation of the anticorruption rationale with the corporate speech rationale. See ante, at 3-6 (hearkening back to, among others, Elihu Root and his advocacy against the use of corporate funds in political campaigning). The conflation appears designed to cast the speech regulated here as unseemly corporate speech. The effort, however, is unwarranted, and not just because money is not per se the evil the majority thinks. Most of the regulations at issue, notably all of the Title I soft money bans and the Title II coordination provisions, do not draw distinctions based on corporate or union status. Referring to the corporate speech rationale as if it were the linchpin of the case, when corporate speech is not primarily at issue, adds no force to the Court's analysis. Instead, the focus must be on Buckley's anticorruption rationale and the First Amendment rights of individual citizens. A. Constitutionally Sufficient Interest </s> In Buckley, the Court held that one, and only one, interest justified the significant burden on the right of association involved there: eliminating, or preventing, actual corruption or the appearance of corruption stemming from contributions to candidates. "It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act's primary purpose--to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions--in order to find a constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1,000 contribution limitation." 424 U.S., at 26. </s> See also ibid. (concluding this corruption interest was sufficiently "significant" to sustain "closely drawn" interference with protected First Amendment rights). </s> In parallel, Buckley concluded the expenditure limitations in question were invalid because they did not advance that same interest. See id., at 47-48 ("[T]he independent expenditure ceiling thus fails to serve any substantial governmental interest in stemming the reality or appearance of corruption in the electoral process"); see also id., at 45, 46. </s> Thus, though Buckley subjected expenditure limits to strict scrutiny and contribution limits to less exacting review, it held neither could withstand constitutional challenge unless it was shown to advance the anticorruption interest. In these consolidated cases, unless Buckley is to be repudiated, we must conclude that the regulations further that interest before considering whether they are closely drawn or narrowly tailored. If the interest is not advanced, the regulations cannot comport with the Constitution, quite apart from the standard of review. </s> Buckley made clear, by its express language and its context, that the corruption interest only justifies regulating candidates' and officeholders' receipt of what we can call the "quids" in the quid pro quo formulation. The Court rested its decision on the principle that campaign finance regulation that restricts speech without requiring proof of particular corrupt action withstands constitutional challenge only if it regulates conduct posing a demonstrable quid pro quo danger: "To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined." Id., at 26-27. </s> See also id., at 45 ("[A]ssuming, arguendo, that large independent expenditures pose the same dangers of actual or apparent quid pro quo arrangements as do large contributions ..."). That Buckley rested its decision on this quid pro quo standard is not a novel observation. We have held this was the case: "The exception [of contribution limits being justified under the First Amendment] relates to the perception of undue influence of large contributions to a candidate: 'To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined.'" Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 297 (1981) (quoting Buckley, supra, at 26-27). See also Federal Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. ___ (2003) (furthering this anticorruption rationaleby upholding limits on contributions given directly to candidates); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (same). </s> Despite the Court's attempt to rely on language from cases like Shrink Missouri to establish that the standard defining corruption is broader than conduct that presents a quid pro quo danger, see ante, at 43, n. 48, in those cases the Court in fact upheld limits on conduct possessing quid pro quo dangers, and nothing more. See also infra, 12. For example, the Shrink Missouri Court's distinguishing of what was at issue there and quid pro quo, in fact, shows only that it used the term quid pro quo to refer to actual corrupt, vote-buying exchanges, as opposed to interactions that possessed quid pro quo potential even if innocently undertaken. Thus, the Court said: "[W]e spoke in Buckley of the perception of corruption 'inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions' to candidates for public office . . . as a source of concern "almost equal" to quid pro quo improbity." 528 U.S., at 390 (citations omitted). </s> Thus, the perception of corruption that the majority now asserts is somehow different from the quid pro quo potential discussed in this opinion, was created by an exchange featuring quid pro quo potential--contributions directly to a candidate. </s> In determining whether conduct poses a quid pro quo danger the analysis is functional. In Buckley, the Court confronted an expenditure limitation provision that capped the amount of money individuals could spend on any activity intended to influence a federal election (i.e., it reached to both independent and coordinated expenditures). See 424 U.S., at 46-47. The Court concluded that though the limitation reached both coordinated and independent expenditures, there were other valid FECA provisions that barred coordinated expenditures. Hence, the limit at issue only added regulation to independent expenditures. On that basis it concluded the provision was unsupported by any valid corruption interest. The conduct to which it added regulation (independent expenditures) posed no quid pro quo danger. See ibid. </s> Placing Buckley's anticorruption rationale in the context of the federal legislative power yields the following rule: Congress' interest in preventing corruption provides a basis for regulating federal candidates' and officeholders' receipt of quids, whether or not the candidate or officeholder corruptly received them. Conversely, the rule requires the Court to strike down campaign finance regulations when they do not add regulation to "actual or apparent quid pro quo arrangements." Id., at 45. </s> The Court ignores these constitutional bounds and in effect interprets the anticorruption rationale to allow regulation not just of "actual or apparent quid pro quo arrangements," ibid., but of any conduct that wins goodwill from or influences a Member of Congress. It is not that there is any quarrel between this opinion and the majority that the inquiry since Buckley has been whether certain conduct creates "undue influence." See ante, at 40-41. On that we agree. The very aim of Buckley's standard, however, was to define undue influence by reference to the presence of quid pro quo involving the officeholder. The Court, in contrast, concludes that access, without more, proves influence is undue. Access, in the Court's view, has the same legal ramifications as actual or apparent corruption of officeholders. This new definition of corruption sweeps away all protections for speech that lie in its path. </s> The majority says it is not abandoning our cases in this way, but its reasoning shows otherwise: "More importantly, plaintiffs conceive of corruption too narrowly. Our cases have firmly established that Congress' legitimate interest extends beyond preventing simple cash-for-votes corruption to curbing 'undue influence on an officeholder's judgment, or the appearance of such influence.' [Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001) (Colorado II)]. Many of the 'deeply disturbing examples' of corruption cited by this Court in Buckley to justify FECA's contribution limits were not episodes of vote buying, but evidence that various corporate interests had given substantial donations to gain access to high-level government officials. Even if that access did not secure actual influence, it certainly gave the 'appearance of such influence.' Colorado II, supra, at 441; see also [Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 838 (CADC 1975)]. </s> "The record in the present case is replete with similar examples of national party committees peddling access to federal candidates and officeholdersin exchange for large soft-money donations. See [251 F.Supp. 2d 176, 492-506 (DC 2003) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.)]." Ante, at 40-41. </s> The majority notes that access flowed from the regulated conduct at issue in Buckley and its progeny, then uses that fact as the basis for concluding that access peddling by the parties equals corruption by the candidates. That conclusion, however, is tenable only by a quick and subtle shift, and one that breaks new ground: The majority ignores the quid pro quo nature of the regulated conduct central to our earlier decisions. It relies instead solely on the fact that access flowed from the conduct. </s> To ignore the fact that in Buckley the money at issue was given to candidates, creating an obvious quid pro quo danger as much as it led to the candidates also providing access to the donors, is to ignore the Court's comments in Buckley that show quid pro quo was of central importance to the analysis. See 424 U.S., at 26-27, 45. The majority also ignores that in Buckley, and ever since, those party contributions that have been subject to congressional limit were not general party-building contributions but were only contributions used to influence particular elections. That is, they were contributions that flowed to a particular candidate's benefit, again posing a quid pro quo danger. And it ignores that in Colorado II, the party spending was that which was coordinated with a particular candidate, thereby implicating quid pro quo dangers. In all of these ways the majority breaks the necessary tether between quid and access and assumes that access, all by itself, demonstrates corruption and so can support regulation. See also ante, at 47 ("[L]arge soft-money donations to national party committees are likely to buy donors preferential access to federal officeholders no matter the ends to which their contributions are eventually put"). </s> Access in itself, however, shows only that in a general sense an officeholder favors someone or that someone has influence on the officeholder. There is no basis, in law or in fact, to say favoritism or influence in general is the same as corrupt favoritism or influence in particular. By equating vague and generic claims of favoritism or influence with actual or apparent corruption, the Court adopts a definition of corruption that dismantles basic First Amendment rules, permits Congress to suppress speech in the absence of a quid pro quo threat, and moves beyond the rationale that is Buckley's very foundation. </s> The generic favoritism or influence theory articulated by the Court is at odds with standard First Amendment analyses because it is unbounded and susceptible to no limiting principle. Any given action might be favored by any given person, so by the Court's reasoning political loyalty of the purest sort can be prohibited. There is no remaining principled method for inquiring whether a campaign finance regulation does in fact regulate corruption in a serious and meaningful way. We are left to defer to a congressional conclusion that certain conduct creates favoritism or influence. </s> Though the majority cites common sense as the foundation for its definition of corruption, see ante, at 35, 43, in the context of the real world only a single definition of corruption has been found to identify political corruption successfully and to distinguish good political responsiveness from bad--that is quid pro quo. Favoritism and influence are not, as the Government's theory suggests, avoidable in representative politics. It is in the nature of an elected representative to favor certain policies, and, by necessary corollary, to favor the voters and contributors who support those policies. It is well understood that a substantial and legitimate reason, if not the only reason, to cast a vote for, or to make a contribution to, one candidate over another is that the candidate will respond by producing those political outcomes the supporter favors. Democracy is premised on responsiveness. Quid pro quo corruption has been, until now, the only agreed upon conduct that represents the bad form of responsiveness and presents a justiciable standard with a relatively clear limiting principle: Bad responsiveness may be demonstrated by pointing to a relationship between an official and a quid. </s> The majority attempts to mask its extension of Buckley under claims that BCRA prevents the appearance of corruption, even if it does not prevent actual corruption, since some assert that any donation of money to a political party is suspect. See ante, at 40-42. Under Buckley's holding that Congress has a valid "interest in stemming the reality or appearance of corruption," 424 U.S., at 47-48, however, the inquiry does not turn on whether some persons assert that an appearance of corruption exists. Rather, the inquiry turns on whether the Legislature has established that the regulated conduct has inherent corruption potential, thus justifying the inference that regulating the conduct will stem the appearance of real corruption. Buckley was guided and constrained by this analysis. In striking down expenditure limits the Court in Buckley did not ask whether people thought large election expenditures corrupt, because clearly at that time many persons, including a majority of Congress and the President, did. See id., at 25 ("According to the parties and amici, the primary interest served . . . by the Act as a whole, is the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption"). Instead, the Court asked whether the Government had proved that the regulated conduct, the expenditures, posed inherent quid pro quo corruption potential. See id., at 46. </s> The Buckley decision made this analysis even clearer in upholding contribution limitations. It stated that even if actual corrupt contribution practices had not been proved, Congress had an interest in regulating the appearance of corruption that is "inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions." Id., at 27 (discussing contributions to candidates). See also id., at 28, 30. The quid pro quo nature of candidate contributions justified the conclusion that the contributions pose inherent corruption potential; and this in turn justified the conclusion that their regulation would stem the appearance of real corruption. </s> From that it follows that the Court today should not ask, as it does, whether some persons, even Members of Congress, conclusorily assert that the regulated conduct appears corrupt to them. Following Buckley, it should instead inquire whether the conduct now prohibited inherently poses a real or substantive quid pro quo danger, so that its regulation will stem the appearance of quid pro quo corruption. 1. New FECA §§323(a), (b), (d), and (f) </s> Sections 323(a), (b), (d), and (f), 2 U.S.C.A. §§441i(a), (b), (d), and (f) (Supp. 2003), cannot stand because they do not add regulation to conduct that poses a demonstrable quid pro quo danger. They do not further Buckley's corruption interest. The majority, with a broad brush, paints §323(a) as aimed at limiting contributions possessing federal officeholder corruption potential. From there it would justify §323's remaining provisions as necessary complements to ensure the national parties cannot circumvent §323(a)'s prohibitions. The broad brush approach fails, however, when the provisions are reviewed under Buckley's proper definition of corruption potential. </s> On its face §323(a) does not regulate federal candidates' or officeholders' receipt of quids because it does not regulate contributions to, or conduct by, candidates or officeholders. See BCRA §101(a) (setting out new FECA §323(a): National parties may not "solicit, receive, or direct to another person ... or spend any [soft money]"). </s> The realities that underlie the statute, furthermore, do not support the majority's interpretation. Before BCRA's enactment, parties could only use soft money for a candidate's "benefit" (e.g., through issue ads, which all parties now admit may influence elections) independent of that candidate. And, as discussed later, §323(e) validly prohibits federal candidate and officeholder solicitation of soft money party donations. See infra, at 31. Section 323(a), therefore, only adds regulation to soft money party donations not solicited by, or spent in coordination with, a candidate or officeholder. </s> These donations (noncandidate or officeholder solicited soft money party donations that are independently spent) do not pose the quid pro quo dangers that provide the basis for restricting protected speech. Though the government argues §323(a) does regulate federal candidates' and officeholders' receipt of quids, it bases its argument on this flawed reasoning: (1) "[F]ederal elected officeholders are inextricably linked to their political parties," Brief for Appellees/Cross Appellants FEC etal. in No. 02-1674 etal., p.21; cf. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 626 (1996) (Colorado I) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part). </s> (2) All party receipts must be connected to, and must create, corrupt donor favoritism among theseofficeholders. </s> (3) Therefore, regulation of party receipts equals regulation of quids to the party's officeholders. </s> The reasoning is flawed because the Government's reliance on reasoning parallel to the Colorado I concurrence only establishes the first step in its chain of logic: that a party is a proxy for its candidates generally. It does not establish the second step: that as a proxy for its candidates generally, all moneys the party receives (not just candidate solicited-soft money donations, or donations used in coordinated activity) represent quids for all the party's candidates and officeholders. The Government's analysis is inconsistent with what a majority of the Justices, in different opinions, have said. </s> Justice Thomas' dissent in Colorado II, 533 U.S., at 476-477, taken together with Justice Breyer's opinion announcing the judgment of the Court in Colorado I, rebuts the second step of the Government's argument. Justice Thomas demonstrated that a general party-candidate corruption linkage does not exist. As he pointed out: "The dearth of evidence [of such corruption] is unsurprising in light of the unique relationship between a political party and its candidates: 'The very aim of a political party is to influence its candidate's stance on issues and, if the candidate takes office or is reelected, his votes.' If coordinated expenditures help achieve this aim, the achievement 'does not ... constitute "a subversion of the political process."'" Colorado II,supra, at 476-477 (citations omitted). </s> Justice Breyer reached the same conclusion about the corrupting effect general party receipts could have on particular candidates, though on narrower grounds. He concluded that independent party conduct lacks quid pro quo corruption potential. See Colorado I, 518 U.S., at 617-618; id., at 617 ("If anything, an independent [party] expenditure made possible by a $20,000 donation, but controlled and directed by a party rather than the donor, would seem less likely to corrupt than the same (or a much larger) independent expenditure made directly by that donor"); id., at 616 ("[T]he opportunity for corruption posed by [soft money] contributions is, at best, attenuated" because they may not be used for the purposes of influencing a federal election under FECA). </s> These opinions establish that independent party activity, which by definition includes independent receipt and spending of soft money, lacks a possibility for quid pro quo corruption of federal officeholders. This must be all the more true of a party's independent receipt and spending of soft money donations neither directed to nor solicited by a candidate. </s> The Government's premise is also unsupported by the record before us. The record confirms that soft money party contributions, without more, do not create quid pro quo corruption potential. As a conceptual matter, generic party contributions may engender good will from a can-didate or officeholder because, as the Government says: "[A]Member of Congress can be expected to feel a natural temptation to favor those persons who have helped the 'team,'" Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants FEC etal. in No. 02-1674 etal., p.33. Still, no Member of Congress testified this favoritism changed voting behavior. </s> The piece of record evidence the Government puts forward on this score comes by way of deposition testimony from former Senator Simon and Senator Feingold. See 251 F.Supp. 2d 176, 482 (DC 2003) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Senator Simon reported an unidentified colleague indicated frustration with Simon's opposition to legislation that would benefit a party contributor on the grounds that "'we've got to pay attention to who is buttering our bread'" and testified he did not think there was any question "'this'" (i.e., "donors getting their way") was why the legislation passed. See App. 805. Senator Feingold, too, testified an unidentified colleague suggested he support the legislation because "'they [i.e., the donor] just gave us [i.e., the party] $100,000.'" 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 482 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). </s> That evidence in fact works against the Government. These two testifying Senators expressed disgust toward the favoring of a soft money giver, and not the good will one would have expected under the Government's theory. That necessarily undercuts the inference of corruption the Government would have us draw from the evidence. </s> Even more damaging to the Government's argument from the testimony is the absence of testimony that the Senator who allegedly succumbed to corrupt influence had himself solicited soft money from the donor in question. Equally, there is no indication he simply favored the company with his vote because it had, without any involvement from him, given funds to the party to which he belonged. This fact is crucial. If the Senator himself had been the solicitor of the soft money funds in question, the incident does nothing more than confirm that Congress' efforts at campaign finance reform ought to be directed to conduct that implicates quid pro quo relationships. Only if there was some evidence that the officeholder had not solicited funds from the donor could the Court extrapolate from this episode that general party contributions function as quids, inspiring corrupt favoritism among party members. The episode is the single one of its type reported in the record and does not seem sufficient basis for major incursions into settled practice. Given the Government's claim that the corrupt favoritism problem is widespread, its inability to produce more than a single instance purporting to illustrate the point demonstrates the Government has not fairly characterized the general attitudes of Members towards soft money donors from whom they have not solicited. </s> Other aspects of the record confirm the Government has not produced evidence that Members corruptly favor soft money donors to their party as a per se matter. Most testimony from which the Government would have the Court infer corruption is testimony that Members are rewarded by their parties for soliciting soft money. See id., at 438-521 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). This says nothing about how Members feel about a party's soft money donors from whom they have not solicited. Indeed, record evidence on this point again cuts against the Government: "'As a Member of the Senate Finance Committee, I experienced the pressure first hand. On several occasions when we were debating important tax bills, I needed a police escort to get into the Finance Committee hearing room because so many lobbyists were crowding the halls, trying to get one last chance to make their pitch to each Senator. Senators generally knew which lobbyist represented the interests of which large donor. I was often glad that I limited the amount of soft money fundraising I did and did not take PAC contributions, because it would be extremely difficult not to feel beholden to these donors otherwise.'" Id., at 482 (testimony of former Senator Boren; see 6-R Defs. Exhs., Tab 8, ¶ ;8). </s> Thus, one of the handful of Senators on whom the Government relies to make its case candidly admits the pressure of appeasing soft money donors derives from the Members' solicitation of donors, not from those donors' otherwise giving to their party. </s> In light of all this, §323(a) has no valid anticorruption interest. The anticircumvention interests the Government offers in defense of §§323(b), (d), and (f) must also fall with the interests asserted to justify §323(a). Any anticircumvention interest can be only as compelling as the interest justifying the underlying regulation. </s> None of these other sections has an independent justifying interest. Section 323(b), for example, adds regulation only to activity undertaken by a state party. In the District Court two of the three judges found as fact that particular state and local parties exist primarily to participate in state and local elections, that they spend the majority of their resources on those elections, and that their voter registration and Get Out The Vote (GOTV) activities, in particular, are directed primarily at state and local elections. See 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 301-302 (Henderson, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); id., at 837-840 (Leon, J.). These findings, taken together with BCRA's other, valid prohibitions barring coordination with federal candidates or officeholders and their soft money solicitation, demonstrate that §323(b) does not add regulation to conduct that poses a danger of a federal candidate's or officeholder's receipt of quids. </s> Even §323(b)'s narrowest regulation, which bans state party soft money funded ads that (1) refer to a clearly identified federal candidate, and (2) either support or attack any candidate for the office of the clearly mentioned federal candidate, see new FECA §301(20)(A)(iii), fails the constitutional test. The ban on conduct that by the statute's own definition may serve the interest of a federal candidate suggests to the majority that it is conduct that poses quid pro quo danger for federal candidates or officeholders. Yet, even this effect--considered after excising the coordination and candidate-solicited funding aspects elsewhere prohibited by BCRA §§202 and 214(a) and new FECA §323(a)--poses no danger of a federal candidate's or officeholder's receipt of a quid. That conduct is no different from an individual's independent expenditure referring to and supporting a clearly identified candidate--and this poses no regulable danger. </s> Section 323(d), which governs relationships between the national parties and nonprofit groups, fails for similar reasons. It is worth noting that neither the record nor our own experience tells us how significant these funds transfers are at this time. It is plain, however, that the First Amendment ought not to be manipulated to permit Congress to forbid a political party from aiding other speakers whom the party deems more effective in addressing discrete issues. One of the central flaws in BCRA is that Congress is determining what future course the creation of ideas and the expression of views must follow. Its attempt to foreclose new and creative partnerships for speech, as illustrated here, is consistent with neither the traditions nor principles of our Free Speech guarantee, which insists that the people, and not the Congress, decide what modes of expression are the most legitimate and effective. </s> The majority's upholding §323(d) is all the more unsettling because of the way it ignores the Act as Congress wrote it. Congress said national parties "shall not solicit any funds for, or make or direct any donations to" §501(c) nonprofit organizations that engage in federal election activity or to §527 political committees. The Court, however, reads out the word "any" and construes the words "funds" and "donations" to mean "soft money funds" and "soft money donations." See ante, at 72 ("This construction is consistent with the concerns animating Title I, whose purpose is to plug the soft-money loophole"). The Court's statutory amendment may be consistent with its anti-soft-money rationale; it is not, however, consistent with the plain and unavoidable statutory text Congress has given us. Even as construed by the Court, moreover, it is invalid. </s> The majority strains to save the provision from what must seem to it an unduly harsh First Amendment. It does so by making a legislative determination Congress chose not to make: to prefer hard money to soft money within the construct of national party relationships with nonprofit groups. Congress gave no indication of a preference to regulate either hard money or soft in this context. Rather, it simply proscribed all transfers of money between the two organizations and all efforts by the national parties to raise any money on the nonprofit groups' behalf. The question the Court faces is not which part of a text to sever and strike, but whether Congress can prohibit such transfers altogether. The answer, as the majority recognizes, is no. See ante, at 71 ("[P]rohibiting parties from donating funds already raised in compliance with FECA does little to further Congress' goal of preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption of federal candidates and officeholders"). </s> Though §323(f) in effect imposes limits on candidate contributions, it does not address federal candidate and officeholder contributions. Yet it is the possibility of federal officeholder quid pro quo corruption potential that animates Buckley's rule as it relates to Acts of Congress (as opposed to Acts of state legislatures). See 424 U.S., at 13 ("The constitutional power of Congress to regulate federal elections is well established"). </s> When one recognizes that §§323(a), (b), (d), and (f) do not serve the interest the anticorruption rationale contemplates, Title I's entirety begins to look very much like an incumbency protection plan. See J. Miller, Monopoly Politics 84-101 (1999) (concluding that regulations limiting election fundraising and spending constrain challengers more than incumbents). That impression is worsened by the fact that Congress exempted its officeholders from the more stringent prohibitions imposed on party officials. Compare new FECA §323(a) with new FECA §323(e). Section 323(a) raises an inflexible bar against soft money solicitation, in any way, by parties or party officials. Section 323(e), in contrast, enacts exceptions to the rule for federal officeholders (the very centerpiece of possible corruption), and allows them to solicit soft money for various uses and organizations. </s> The law in some respects even weakens the regulation of federal candidates and officeholders. Under former law, officeholders were understood to be limited to receipt of hard money by their campaign committees. See 2 U.S.C. §§431, 441a (setting out the pre-BCRA FECA regime). BCRA, however, now allows them and their campaign committees to receive soft money that fits the hard money source and amount restrictions, so long as the officeholders direct that money on to other nonfederal candidates. See new FECA §323(e)(1)(B). The majority's characterization of this weakening of the regime as "tightly constrain[ing]" candidates, ante, at 73, n.70, is a prime example of its unwillingness to confront Congress' own interest or the persisting fact that the regulations violate First Amendment freedoms. The more lenient treatment accorded to incumbency-driven politicians than to party officials who represent broad national constituencies must render all the more suspect Congress' claim that the Act's sole purpose is to stop corruption. The majority answers this charge by stating the obvious, that "§323(e) applies to both officeholders and candidates." Ante, at 78, n. 72. The controlling point, of course, is the practical burden on challengers. That the prohibition applies to both incumbents and challengers in no way establishes that it burdens them equally in that regard. Name recognition and other advantages held by incumbents ensure that as a general rule incumbents will be advantaged by the legislation the Court today upholds. The Government identifies no valid anticorruption interest justifying §§323(a), (b), (d), and (f). The very nature of the restrictions imposed by these provisions makes one all the more skeptical of the Court's explanation of the interests at stake. These provisions cannot stand under the First Amendment. 2. New FECA §323(e) </s> Ultimately, only one of the challenged Title I provisions satisfies Buckley's anticorruption rationale and the First Amendment's guarantee. It is §323(e). This provision is the sole aspect of Title I that is a direct and necessary regulation of federal candidates' and officeholders' receipt of quids. Section 323(e) governs "candidate[s], individual[s] holding Federal office, agent[s] of a candidate or an individual holding Federal office, or an entity directly or indirectly established, financed, maintained or controlled by or acting on behalf of 1 or more candidates or individuals holding Federal office." 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(e) (Supp. 2003). These provisions, and the regulations that follow, limit candidates' and their agents' solicitation of soft money. The regulation of a candidate's receipt of funds furthers a constitutionally sufficient interest. More difficult, however, is the question whether regulation of a candidate's solicitation of funds also furthers this interest if the funds are given to another. I agree with the Court that the broader solicitation regulation does further a sufficient interest. The making of a solicited gift is a quid both to the recipient of the money and to the one who solicits the payment (by granting his request). Rules governing candidates' or officeholders' solicitation of contributions are, therefore, regulations governing their receipt of quids. This regulation fits under Buckley's anticorruption rationale. B. Standard of Review </s> It is common ground between the majority and this opinion that a speech-suppressing campaign finance regulation, even if supported by a sufficient Government interest, is unlawful if it cannot satisfy our designated standard of review. See ante, at 24-27. In Buckley, we applied "closely drawn" scrutiny to contribution limitations and strict scrutiny to expenditure limitations. Compare 424 U.S., at 25, with id., at 44-45. Against that backdrop, the majority assumes that because Buckley applied the rationale in the context of contribution and expenditure limits, its application gives Congress and the Court the capacity to classify any challenged campaign finance regulation as either a contribution or an expenditure limit. Thus, it first concludes Title I's regulations are contributions limits and then proceeds to apply the lesser scrutiny. "Complex as its provisions may be, §323, in the main, does little more than regulate the ability of wealthy individuals, corporations, and unions to contribute large sums of money to influence federal elections, federal candidates, and federal officeholders." Ante, at 28. </s> Though the majority's analysis denies it, Title I's dynamics defy this facile, initial classification. </s> Title I's provisions prohibit the receipt of funds; and in most instances, but not all, this can be defined as a contribution limit. They prohibit the spending of funds; and in most instances this can be defined as an expenditure limit. They prohibit the giving of funds to nonprofit groups; and this falls within neither definition as we have ever defined it. Finally, they prohibit fundraising activity; and the parties dispute the classification of this regulation (the challengers say it is core political association, while the Government says it ultimately results only in a limit on contribution receipts). </s> The majority's classification overlooks these competing characteristics and exchanges Buckley's substance for a formulaic caricature of it. Despite the parties' and the majority's best efforts on both sides of the question, it ignores reality to force these regulations into one of the two legal categories as either contribution or expenditure limitations. Instead, these characteristics seem to indicate Congress has enacted regulations that are neither contribution nor expenditure limits, or are perhaps both at once. </s> Even if the laws could be classified in broad terms as only contribution limits, as the majority is inclined to do, that still leaves the question what "contribution limits" can include if they are to be upheld under Buckley. Buckley's application of a less exacting review to contribution limits must be confined to the narrow category of money gifts that are directed, in some manner, to a candidate or officeholder. Any broader definition of the category contradicts Buckley's quid pro quo rationale and overlooks Buckley's language, which contemplates limits on contributions to a candidate or campaign committee in explicit terms. See 424 U.S., at 13 (applying less exacting review to "contribution ... limitations in the Act prohibit[ing] individuals from contributing more than $25,000 in a single year or more than $1,000 to any single candidate for an election campaign"); id., at 45 ("[T]he contribution limitations' [apply a] total ban on the giving of large amounts of money to candidates"). See also id., at 20, 25, 28. </s> The Court, it must be acknowledged, both in Buckley and on other occasions, has described contribution limits due some more deferential review in less than precise terms. At times it implied that donations to political parties would also qualify as contributions whose limitation too would be subject to less exacting review. See id., at 23-24, n.24 ("[T]he general understanding of what constitutes a political contribution[:] Funds provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an intermediary constitute a contribution"). See also Federal Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S., at ___ (2003) (slip op., at 14) ("'[C]ontributions may result in political expression if spent by a candidate or an association'"). </s> These seemingly conflicting statements are best reconciled by reference to Buckley's underlying rationale for applying less exacting review. In a similar, but more imperative, sense proper application of the standard of review to regulations that are neither contribution nor expenditure limits (or which are both at once) can only be determined by reference to that rationale. </s> Buckley's underlying rationale is this: Less exacting review applies to Government regulations that "significantly interfere" with First Amendment rights of association. But any regulation of speech or associational rights creating "markedly greater interference" than such significant interference receives strict scrutiny. Unworkable and ill advised though it may be, Buckley unavoidably sets forth this test: "Even a '"significant interference" with protected rights of political association' may be sustained if the State demonstrates [1] a sufficiently important interest and [2] employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms. Cousins v. Wigoda, [419 U.S. 477, 488 (1975)]; NAACP v. Button, [371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)]; Shelton v. Tucker [364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)]." 424 U.S., at 25. </s> "The markedly greater burden on basic freedoms [referring to 'the freedom of speech and association'] caused by [expenditure limits] thus cannot be sustained simply by invoking the interest in maximizing the effectiveness of the less intrusive contribution limitations. Rather, the constitutionality of [the expenditure limits] turns on whether the governmental interests advanced in its support satisfy the exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations on core First Amendment rights of political expression." Id., at 44-45.† </s> The majority, oddly enough, first states this standard with relative accuracy, but then denies it. Compare: "The relevant inquiry [in determining the level of scrutiny] is whether the mechanism adopted to implement the contribution limit, or to prevent circumvention of that limit, burdens speech in a way that a direct restriction on the contribution itself would not," ante, at 28-29, with: </s> "None of this is to suggest that the alleged associational burdens imposed on parties by §323 have no place in the First Amendment analysis. It is only that we account for them in the application, rather than the choice, of the appropriate level of scrutiny." Ante, at 31. </s> The majority's attempt to separate out how burdens on speech rights and burdens on associational rights affect the standard of review is misguided. It is not even true to Buckley's unconventional test. Buckley, as shown in the quotations above, explained the lower standard of review by reference to the level of burden on associational rights, and it explained the need for a higher standard of review by reference to the higher burdens on both associational and speech rights. In light of Buckley's rationale, and in light of this Court's ample precedent affirming that burdens on speech necessitate strict scrutiny review, see 424 U.S., at 44-45 ("[E]xacting scrutiny [applies] to limitations on core First Amendment rights of political expression"), "closely drawn" scrutiny should be employed only in review of a law that burdens rights of association, and only where that burden is significant, not markedly greater. Since the Court professes not to repudiate Buckley, it was right first to say we must determine how significant a burden BCRA's regulations place on First Amendment rights, though it should have specified that the rights implicated are those of association. Its later denial of that analysis flatly contradicts Buckley. </s> The majority makes Buckley's already awkward and imprecise test all but meaningless in its application. If one is viewing BCRA through Buckley's lens, as the majority purports to do, one must conclude the Act creates markedly greater associational burdens than the significant burden created by contribution limitations and, unlike contribution limitations, also creates significant burdens on speech itself. While BCRA contains federal contribution limitations, which significantly burden association, it goes even further. The Act entirely reorders the nature of relations between national political parties and their candidates, between national political parties and state and local parties, and between national political parties and nonprofit organizations. </s> The many and varied aspects of Title I's regulations impose far greater burdens on the associational rights of the parties, their officials, candidates, and citizens than do regulations that do no more than cap the amount of money persons can contribute to a political candidate or committee. The evidence shows that national parties have a long tradition of engaging in essential associational activities, such as planning and coordinating fundraising with state and local parties, often with respect to elections that are not federal in nature. This strengthens the conclusion that the regulations now before us have unprecedented impact. It makes impossible, moreover, the contrary conclusion--which the Court's standard of review determination necessarily implies--that BCRA's soft money regulations will not much change the nature of association between parties, candidates, nonprofit groups, and the like. Similarly, Title I now compels speech by party officials. These officials must be sure their words are not mistaken for words uttered in their official capacity or mistaken for soliciting prohibited soft, and not hard, money. Few interferences with the speech, association, and free expression of our people are greater than attempts by Congress to say which groups can or cannot advocate a cause, or how they must do it. </s> Congress has undertaken this comprehensive reordering of association and speech rights in the name of enforcing contribution limitations. Here, however, as in Buckley, "[t]he markedly greater burden on basic freedoms caused by [BCRA's pervasive regulation] cannot be sustained simply by invoking the interest in maximizing the effectiveness of the less intrusive contribution limitations." Id., at 44-45. BCRA fundamentally alters, and thereby burdens, protected speech and association throughout our society. Strict scrutiny ought apply to review of its constitutionality. Under strict scrutiny, the congressional scheme, for the most part, cannot survive. This is all but acknowledged by the Government, which fails even to argue that strict scrutiny could be met. 1. New FECA §323(e) </s> Because most of the Title I provisions discussed so far do not serve a compelling or sufficient interest, the standard of review analysis is only dispositive with respect to new FECA §323(e). As to §323(e), 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(e) (Supp. 2003), I agree with the Court that this provision withstands constitutional scrutiny. Section 323(e) is directed solely to federal candidates and their agents; it does not ban all solicitation by candidates, but only their solicitation of soft money contributions; and it incorporates important exceptions to its limits (candidates may receive, solicit, or direct funds that comply with hard money standards; candidates may speak at fundraising events; candidates may solicit or direct unlimited funds to organizations not involved with federal election activity; and candidates may solicit or direct up to $20,000 per individual per year for organizations involved with certain federal election activity (e.g., GOTV, voter registration)). These provisions help ensure that the law is narrowly tailored to satisfy First Amendment requirements. For these reasons, I agree §323(e) is valid. 2. New FECA §§323(a), (b), (d), and (f) </s> Though these sections do not survive even the first test of serving a constitutionally valid interest, it is necessary as well to examine the vast overbreadth of the remainder of Title I, so the import of the majority's holding today is understood. Sections 323(a), (b), (d), and (f), 2 U.S.C.A. §§441i(a), (b), (d), and (f) (Supp. 2003), are not narrowly tailored, cannot survive strict scrutiny, and cannot even be considered closely drawn, unless that phrase is emptied of all meaning. First, the sections all possess fatal overbreadth. By regulating conduct that does not pose quid pro quo dangers, they are incursions on important categories of protected speech by voters and party officials. </s> At the next level of analytical detail, §323(a) is overly broad as well because it regulates all national parties, whether or not they present candidates in federal elections. It also regulates the national parties' solicitation and direction of funds in odd-numbered years when only state and local elections are at stake. </s> Likewise, while §323(b) might prohibit some state party conduct that would otherwise be undertaken in conjunction with a federal candidate, it reaches beyond that to a considerable range of campaign speech by the state parties on nonfederal issues. A state or local party might want to say: "The Democratic slate for state assembly opposes President Bush's tax policy .... Elect the Republican slate to tell Washington, D.C. we don't want higher taxes." Section 323(b) encompasses this essential speech and prohibits it equally with speech that poses a federal officeholder quid quo pro danger. </s> Other predictable political circumstances further demonstrate §323(b)'s overbreadth. It proscribes the use of soft money for all state party voter registration efforts occurring within 120 days of a federal election. So, the vagaries of election timing, not any real interest related to corruption, will control whether state parties can spend nonfederally regulated funds on ballot efforts. This overreaching contradicts important precedents that recognize the need to protect political speech for campaigns related to ballot measures. See generally Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. 290 (1981); First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). </s> Section 323(b) also fails the narrow tailoring requirement because less burdensome regulatory options were available. The Government justifies the provision as an attempt to stop national parties from circumventing the soft money allocation constraints they faced under the prior FECA regime. We are told that otherwise the national parties would let the state parties spend money on their behalf. If, however, the problem were avoidance of allocation rates, Congress could have made any soft money transferred by a national party to a state party subject to the allocation rates that governed the national parties' similar use of the money. </s> Nor is §323(d) narrowly tailored. The provision, proscribing any solicitation or direction of funds, prohibits the parties from even distributing or soliciting regulated money (i.e., hard money). It is a complete ban on this category of speech. To prevent circumvention of contribution limits by imposing a complete ban on contributions is to burden the circumventing conduct more severely than the underlying suspect conduct could be burdened. </s> By its own terms, the statute prohibits speech that does not implicate federal elections. The provision prohibits any transfer to a §527 organization, irrespective of whether the organization engages in federal election activity. This is unnecessary, as well, since Congress enacted a much narrower provision in §323(a)(2) to prevent circumvention by the parties via control of other organizations. Section 323(a)(2) makes "any entity that is directly or indirectly . . . controlled by" the national parties subject to the same §323(a) prohibitions as the parties themselves. 2 U.S.C.A. §441i (Supp. 2003). </s> Section 323(f), too, is not narrowly tailored or even close to it. It burdens a substantial body of speech and expression made entirely independent of any federal candidate. The record, for example, contains evidence of Alabama Attorney General Pryor's reelection flyers showing a picture of Pryor shaking hands with President Bush and stating: "Bush appointed Pryor to be Alabama co-chairman of the George W. Bush for President campaign." A host of circumstances could make such statements advisable for state candidates to use without any coordination with a federal candidate. Section 323(f) incorporates no distinguishing feature, such as an element of coordination, to ensure First Amendment protected speech is not swept up within its bounds. </s> Compared to the narrowly tailored effort of §323(e), which addresses in direct and specific terms federal candidates' and officeholders' quest for dollars, these sections cast a wide net not confined to the critical categories of federal candidate or officeholder involvement. They are not narrowly tailored; they are not closely drawn; they flatly violate the First Amendment; and even if they do encompass some speech that poses a regulable quid pro quo danger, that little assurance does not justify or permit a regime which silences so many legitimate voices in this protected sphere. C. Coordination Provisions </s> Other BCRA Title II sections require analysis alongside the provisions of Title I, for they, too, are regulations that principally operate within the ambit of Buckley's anticorruption principle. BCRA §§202 and 214 are two of these provisions. They involve the Act's new definition of coordination. BCRA §213 is another. It institutes a new system in which the parties are forced to choose between two different types of relationships with their candidates. 1. </s> I agree with the majority that §§214(b) and (c) do not merit our review because they are not now justiciable. See ante, at 118. I disagree, however, with the majority's view that §214(a), §214's sole justiciable provision, is valid. Nor can I agree that §202 is valid in its entirety. Section 214(a) amends FECA to define, as hard money contributions to a political party, expenditures an individual makes in concert with the party. See ante, at 114. This provision, in my view, must fall. As the earlier discussion of Title I explains, individual contributions to the political parties cannot be capped in the soft money context. Since an individual's soft money contributions to a party may not be limited, it follows with even greater force that an individual's expenditure of money, coordinated with the party for activities on which the party could spend unlimited soft money, cannot be capped. </s> This conclusion emerges not only from an analysis of Title I but also from Colorado I. There, Justice Breyer's opinion announcing the judgment of the Court concluded political parties had a constitutional right to engage in independent advocacy on behalf of a candidate. 518 U.S. 604 (1996). That parties can spend unlimited soft money on this activity follows by necessary implication. A political party's constitutional right to spend money on advocacy independent of a candidate is burdened by §214(a) in a direct and substantial way. The statute commands the party to refrain from coordinating with an individual engaging in advocacy even if the individual is acting independently of the candidate. </s> Section 202 functions in a manner similar to the operation of §214(a). It directs that when persons make "electioneering communications," see new FECA §304(f)(3), 2 U.S.C.A. §434(f)(3) (Supp. 2003), in a coordinated fashion with a candidate or a party, the coordinated communication expense must be treated as a hard money contribution by the person to that candidate or party. The trial court erroneously believed it needed to determine whether §304's definition of electioneering communications was itself unconstitutional to assess this provision. While a statutory definition may lead to an unconstitutional result under one application, it may lead to a constitutional result under another. Compare infra, at 35-36; infra, at 38, with infra, at 63-66. It is unhelpful to talk in terms of the definition being unconstitutional or constitutional when the only relevant question is whether, as animated by a substantive prohibition, here §202, the definition leads to unconstitutional results. The other Title II provisions that employ §304's electioneering communication definition are analyzed below, within the context of the corporate speech rationale and the disclosure provisions. Section 202, however, must be judged under the anticorruption rationale because it does not distinguish according to corporate or union status, and it does not involve disclosure requirements. Section 202 simply limits the speech of all "persons." </s> Section 202 does satisfy Buckley's anticorruption rationale in one respect: It treats electioneering communications expenditures made by a person in coordination with a candidate as hard money contributions to that candidate. For many of the same reasons that §323(e) is valid, §202, in this single way, is valid: it regulates conduct that poses a quid pro quo danger--satisfaction of a candidate'srequest. </s> Insofar as §202 regulates coordination with a political party, however, it suffers from the same flaws as §214(a). Congress has instructed us, as much as possible, to sever any infirm portions of statutory text from the valid parts, see BCRA §401. Following that instruction, I would uphold §202's text as to its candidate coordination regulation (the first clause of new FECA §315(a)(7)(C)(ii), 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(a)(7)(C)(ii) (Supp. 2003), but rule invalid its text that applies the coordination provision to political parties. </s> This provision includes an "advance contracts" aspect as well. That aspect of the provision, on its own, would be invalid, for many of the reasons discussed below with respect to the advance disclosure requirements embodied in BCRA §§201 and 212. See infra, at 38-39. 2. </s> The final aspect of BCRA that implicates Buckley's anticorruption rationale is §213, the forced choice provision. The majority concludes §213 violates the Constitution. I agree and write on this aspect of the case to point out that the section's unlawfulness flows not from the unique contours of the statute that settle how much political parties may spend on their candidate's campaign, see ante, at 109-113, but from its raw suppression of constitutionally protected speech. Section 213 unconstitutionally forces the parties to surrender one of two First Amendment rights. We affirmed that parties have a constitutionally protected right to make independent expenditures in Colorado I. I continue to believe, moreover, that even under Buckley a political party has a protected right to make coordinated expenditures with its candidates. See Colorado II, 478 U.S. 109, 144-145 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). This role would be undermined in the absence of a party's ability to coordinate with candidates. Cf. Colorado I, supra, at 629 (parties can "give effect to their views only by selecting and supporting candidates") (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part). Section 213's command that the parties abandon one First Amendment right or the other offends the Constitution even more than a command that a person choose between a First Amendment right and a statutory right. II. TITLE II PROVISIONS A. Disclosure Provisions </s> BCRA §201, which requires disclosure of electioneering communications, including those coordinated with the party but independent of the candidate, does not substantially relate to a valid interest in gathering data about compliance with contribution limits or in deterring corruption. Contra, ante, at 89. As the above analysis of Title I demonstrates, Congress has no valid interest in regulating soft money contributions that do not pose quid pro quo corruption potential. In the absence of a valid basis for imposing such limits the effort here to ensure compliance with them and to deter their allegedly corrupting effects cannot justify disclosure. The regulation does substantially relate to the other interest the majority details, however. See ibid. This assures its constitutionality. For that reason, I agree with the Court's judgment upholding the disclosure provisions contained in §201 of Title II, with one exception. Section 201's advance disclosure requirement--the aspect of the provision requiring those who have contracted to speak to disclose their speech in advance--is, in my view, unconstitutional. Advance disclosure imposes real burdens on political speech that post hoc disclosure does not. It forces disclosure of political strategy by revealing where ads are to be run and what their content is likely to be (based on who is running the ad). It also provides an opportunity for the ad buyer's opponents to dissuade broadcasters from running ads. See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees National Right to Life Committee, Inc., etal. in No. 02-1733 etal., pp. 44-46, and nn. 42-43. Against those tangible additional burdens, the Government identifies no additional interest uniquely served by advance disclosure. If Congress intended to ensure that advertisers could not flout these disclosure laws by running an ad before the election, but paying for it afterwards, see ante, at 93-94, then Congress should simply have required the disclosure upon the running of the ad. Burdening the First Amendment further by requiring advance disclosure is not a constitutionally acceptable alternative. To the extent §201 requires advance disclosure, it finds no justification in its subordinating interests and imposes greater burdens than the First Amendment permits. </s> Section 212, another disclosure provision, likewise incorporates an advance disclosure requirement. The plaintiffs challenge only this advance disclosure requirement, and not the broader substance of this section. The majority concludes this challenge is not ripe. I disagree. </s> The statute commands advance disclosure. The FEC has issued a regulation under §212 that, by its terms,does not implement this particular requirement. See68 Fed. Reg. 404, 452 (2003) (to be codified at 11 CFR §109.10(c)(d)). Adoption of a regulation that does not implement the statute to its full extent does not erase the statutory requirement. This is not a case in which a statute is ambiguous and the agency interpretation can be relied upon to avoid a statutory obligation that is uncertain or arguable. The failure of the regulation at this point to require advance disclosure is of no moment. Contra, 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 251 (per curiam). The validity of §212 is an issue presented for our determination; it is ripe; and the advance disclosure requirement, for the reasons given when discussing the parallel provision under §201, is unconstitutional. Contra, ante, at 106 (declining to address the ripeness question in light of the majority's rejection of the challenge to advance notice in §201). B. BCRA §203 </s> The majority permits a new and serious intrusion on speech when it upholds §203, the key provision in Title II that prohibits corporations and labor unions from using money from their general treasury to fund electioneering communications. The majority compounds the error made in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), and silences political speech central to the civic discourse that sustains and informs our democratic pro-cesses. Unions and corporations, including nonprofit corporations, now face severe criminal penalties for broadcasting advocacy messages that "refe[r] to a clearly identified candidate," 2 U.S.C.A. §431(20)(A)(iii) (Supp. 2003), in an election season. Instead of extending Austin to suppress new and vibrant voices, I would overrule it and return our campaign finance jurisprudence to principles consistent with the First Amendment. 1. </s> The Government and the majority are right about one thing: The express-advocacy requirement, with its list of magic words, is easy to circumvent. The Government seizes on this observation to defend BCRA §203, arguing it will prevent what it calls "sham issue ads" that are really to the same effect as their more express counterparts. Ante, at 78, 85-87. What the Court and the Government call sham, however, are the ads speakers find most effective. Unlike express ads that leave nothing to the imagination, the record shows that issues ads are preferred by almost all candidates, even though politicians, unlike corporations, can lawfully broadcast express ads if they so choose. It is a measure of the Government's disdain for protected speech that it would label as a sham the mode of communication sophisticated speakers choose because it is the most powerful. The Government's use of the pejorative label should not obscure §203's practical effect: It prohibits a mass communication technique favored in the modern political process for the very reason that it is the most potent. That the Government would regulate it for this reason goes only to prove the illegitimacy of the Government's purpose. The majority's validation of it is not sustainable under accepted First Amendment principles. The problem is that the majority uses Austin, a decision itself unfaithful to our First Amendment precedents, to justify banning a far greater range of speech. This has it all backwards. If protected speech is being suppressed, that must be the end of the inquiry. </s> The majority's holding cannot be reconciled with First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), which invalidated a Massachusetts law prohibiting banks and business corporations from making expenditures "for the purpose of" influencing referendum votes on issues that do not "materially affect" their business interests. Id., at 767. Bellotti was decided in the face of the same arguments on which the majority now relies. Corporate participation, the Government argued in Bellotti, "would exert an undue influence on the outcome of a referendum vote." Id., at 789. The influence, presumably, was undue because "immense aggregations of wealth" were facilitated by the "unique state-conferred corporate structure." Austin, 494 U.S., at 660. With these "state-created advantages," id., at 659, corporations would "drown out other points of view" and "destroy the confidence of the people in the democratic process." Bellotti, 435 U.S., at 789. Bellotti rejected these arguments in emphatic terms: "To be sure, corporate advertising may influence the outcome of the vote; this would be its purpose. But the fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it: The Constitution 'protects expression which is eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing.' Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S., at 689.... '[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment....' Buckley, 424 U.S., at 48-49." Id., at 790-791. </s> Bellotti similarly dismissed the argument that the prohibition was necessary to "protec[t] corporate shareholders" "by preventing the use of corporate resources in furtherance of views with which some shareholders may disagree." Id., at 792-793. Among other problems, the statute was overinclusive: "[It] would prohibit a corporation from supporting or opposing a referendum proposal even if its shareholders unanimously authorized the contribution or expenditure.... Acting through their power to elect the board of directors or to insist upon protective provisions in the corporation's charter, shareholders normally are presumed competent to protect their own interests.... [M]inority shareholders generally have access to the judicial remedy of a derivative suit to challenge corporate disbursements .... Assuming, arguendo, that protection of shareholders is a 'compelling' interest under the circumstances of this case, we find 'no substantially relevant correlation between the governmental interest asserted and the State's effort' to prohibit appellants from speaking." Id., at 794-795. </s> See also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (providing analogous protections to union members). </s> Austin turned its back on this holding, not because the Bellotti Court had overlooked the Government's interest in combating quid pro quo corruption, but because a new majority decided to recognize "a different type of corruption," Austin, 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (MCFL), the prohibition extends even to nonprofit corporations organized to promote a point of view. Aside from its disregard of precedents, the majority's ready willingness to equate corruption with all organizations adopting the corporate form is a grave insult to nonprofit and for-profit corporations alike, entities that have long enriched our civic dialogue. </s> Austin was the first and, until now, the only time our Court had allowed the Government to exercise the power to censor political speech based on the speaker's corporate identity. The majority's contrary contention is simply incorrect. Contra, ante, at 96-97 ("Since our decision in Buckley, Congress' power to prohibit corporations and unions from using funds in their treasuries to finance advertisements expressly advocating the election or defeat of candidates in federal elections has been firmly embedded in our law"). I dissented in Austin, 494 U.S., at 695, and continue to believe that the case represents an indefensible departure from our tradition of free and robust debate. Two of my colleagues joined the dissent, including a member of today's majority. Ibid. (O'Connor and Scalia, JJ.). See also id., at 679 (Scalia, J., dissenting). </s> To be sure, Bellotti concerns issue advocacy, whereas Austin is about express advocacy. This distinction appears to have accounted for the position of at least two members of the Court. See 494 U.S., at 675-676 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The Michigan law . . . prohibits corporations from using treasury funds only for making independent expenditures in support of, or in opposition to, any candidate in state elections. A corporation remains free ... to use general treasury funds to support an initiative proposal in a state referendum" (citation omitted)); id., at 678 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[T]here is a vast difference between lobbying and debating public issues on the one hand, and political campaigns for election to public office on the other"). The distinction, however, between independent expenditures for commenting on issues, on the one hand, and supporting or opposing a candidate, on the other, has no First Amendment significance apart from Austin's arbitrary line. </s> Austin was based on a faulty assumption. Contrary to Justice Stevens' proposal that there is "vast difference between lobbying and debating public issues on the one hand, and political campaigns for election to public office on the other," ibid., there is a general recognition now that discussions of candidates and issues are quite often intertwined in practical terms. See, e.g., Brief for Intervenor-Defendants Senator John McCain etal. in No. 02-1674 etal., p.42 ("'[The] legal ... wall between issue advocacy and political advocacy ... is built of the same sturdy material as the emperor's clothing. Everyone sees it. No one believes it'" (quoting the chair of the Political Action Committee (PAC) of the National Rifle Association (NRA))). To abide by Austin's repudiation of Bellotti on the ground that Bellotti did not involve express advocacy is to adopt a fiction. Far from providing a rationale for expanding Austin, the evidence in these consolidated cases calls for its reexamination. Just as arguments about immense aggregations of corporate wealth and concerns about protecting shareholders and union members do not justify a ban on issue ads, they cannot sustain a ban on independent expenditures for express ads. In holding otherwise, Austin "forced a substantial amount of political speech underground" and created a species of covert speech incompatible with our free and open society. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov-ernment PAC, 528 U.S., at 406 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). </s> The majority not only refuses to heed the lessons of experience but also perpetuates the conflict Austin created with fundamental First Amendment principles. Buckley foresaw that "the distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may often dissolve in practical application," 424 U.S., at 42; see also id., at 45. It recognized that "'[p]ublic discussion of public issues which also are campaign issues readily and often unavoidably draws in candidates and their positions, their voting records and other official conduct.'" Id., at 42, n.50. Hence, "'[d]iscussions of those issues, and as well more positive efforts to influence public opinion on them, tend naturally and inexorably to exert some influence on voting at elections.'" Ibid. In glossing over Austin's opposite--and false--assumption that express advocacy is different, the majority ignores reality and elevates a distinction rejected by Buckley in clear terms. </s> Even after Buckley construed the statute then before the Court to reach only express advocacy, it invalidated limits on independent expenditures, observing that "[a]dvocacy of the election or defeat of candidates for federal office is no less entitled to protection under the First Amendment than the discussion of political policy generally or advocacy of the passage or defeat of legislation." 447 U.S. 530 (1980). </s> Continued adherence to Austin, of course, cannot be justified by the corporate identity of the speaker. Not only does this argument fail to account for Bellotti, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). The exemption for broadcast media companies, moreover, makes the First Amendment problems worse, not better. See Austin, 494 U.S., at 712 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("An independent ground for invalidating this statute is the blanket exemption for media corporations. . . . All corporations communicate with the public to some degree, whether it is their business or not; and communication is of particular importance for nonprofit corporations"); see also id., at 690-691 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Amassed corporate wealth that regularly sits astride the ordinary channels of information is much more likely to produce the New Corruption (too much of one point of view) than amassed corporate wealth that is generally busy making money elsewhere"). In the end the majority can supply no principled basis to reason away Austin's anomaly. Austin's errors stand exposed, and it is our duty to say so. </s> I surmise that even the majority, along with the Government, appreciates these problems with Austin. That is why it invents a new justification. We are now told that "the government also has a compelling interest in insulating federal elections from the type of corruption arising from the real or apparent creation of political debts." Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants FEC etal. in No. 02-1674 etal., p.88. "[E]lectioneering communications paid for with the general treasury funds of labor unions and corporations," the Government warns, "endea[r] those entities to elected officials in a way that could be perceived by the public as corrupting." See 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 622-623 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (stating the Government's position). </s> This rationale has no limiting principle. Were we to accept it, Congress would have the authority to outlaw even pure issue ads, because they, too, could endear their sponsors to candidates who adopt the favored positions. Taken to its logical conclusion, the alleged Government interest "in insulating federal elections from ... the real or apparent creation of political debts" also conflicts with Buckley. If a candidate feels grateful to a faceless, impersonal corporation for making independent expenditures, the gratitude cannot be any less when the money came from the CEO's own pocket. Buckley, however, struck down limitations on independent expenditures and rejected the Government's corruption argument absent evidence of coordination. See 424 U.S., at 51. The Government's position would eviscerate the line between expenditures and contributions and subject both to the same "complaisant review under the First Amendment." Federal Election Committee v. Beaumont, 539 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 14). Complaisant or otherwise, we cannot cede authority to the Legislature to do with the First Amendment as it pleases. Since Austin is inconsistent with the First Amendment, its extension diminishes the First Amendment even further. For this reason §203 should be held unconstitutional. 2. </s> Even under Austin, BCRA §203 could not stand. All parties agree strict scrutiny applies; §203, however, is far from narrowly tailored. The Government is unwilling to characterize §203 as a ban, citing the possibility of funding electioneering communications out of a separate segregated fund. This option, though, does not alter the categorical nature of the prohibition on the corporation. "[T]he corporation as a corporation is prohibited from speaking." Austin, 494 U.S., at 681, n. (Scalia, J., dissenting). What the law allows--permitting the corporation "to serve as the founder and treasurer of a different association of individuals that can endorse or oppose political candidates"--"is not speech by the corporation." Ibid. </s> Our cases recognize the practical difficulties corporations face when they are limited to communicating through PACs. The majority need look no further than MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, for an extensive list of hurdles PACs have to confront: "Under [2 U.S.C.] §432 [(1982 ed.)], [MCFL] must appoint a treasurer, §432(a); ensure that contributions are forwarded to the treasurer within 10 or 30 days of receipt, depending on the amount of contribution, §432(b)(2); see that its treasurer keeps an account of every contribution regardless of amount, the name and address of any person who makes a contribution in excess of $50, all contributions received from political committees, and the name and address of any person to whom a disbursement is made regardless of amount, §432(c); and preserve receipts for all disbursements over $200 and all records for three years, §§432(c), (d). Under §433, MCFL must file a statement of organization containing its name, address, the name of its custodian of records, and its banks, safety deposit boxes, or other depositories, §§433(a), (b); must report any change in the above information within 10 days, §433(c); and may dissolve only upon filing a written statement that it will no longer receive any contributions nor make disbursements, and that it has no outstanding debts or obligations, §433(d)(1). </s> "Under §434, MCFL must file either monthly reports with the FEC or reports on the following schedule: quarterly reports during election years, a pre-election report no later than the 12th day before an election, a postelection report within 30 days after an election, and reports every 6 months during nonelection years. §§434(a)(4)(A), (B). These reports must contain information regarding the amount of cash on hand; the total amount of receipts, detailed by 10 different categories; the identification of each political committee and candidate's authorized or affiliated committee making contributions, and any persons making loans, providing rebates, refunds, dividends, or interest or any other offset to operating expenditures in an aggregate amount over $200; the total amount of all disbursements, detailed by 12 different categories; the names of all authorized or affiliated committees to whom expenditures aggregating over $200 have been made; persons to whom loan repayments or refunds have been made; the total sum of all contributions, operating expenses, outstanding debts and obligations, and the settlement terms of the retirement of any debt or obligation. §434(b). In addition, MCFL may solicit contributions for its separate segregated fund only from its 'members,' §§441b(b)(4)(A), (C), which does not include those persons who have merely contributed to or indicated support for the organization in the past." Id., at 253-254. </s> These regulations are more than minor clerical requirements. Rather, they create major disincentives for speech, with the effect falling most heavily on smaller entities that often have the most difficulty bearing the costs of compliance. Even worse, for an organization that has not yet set up a PAC, spontaneous speech that "refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office" becomes impossible, even if the group's vital interests are threatened by a piece of legislation pending before Congress on the eve of a federal election. See Brief for Appellants Chamber of Commerce of the United States etal. in No. 02-1756 etal., p.37. Couple the litany of administrative burdens with the categorical restriction limiting PACs' solicitation activities to "members," and it is apparent that PACs are inadequate substitutes for corporations in their ability to engage in unfettered expression. </s> Even if the newly formed PACs manage to attract members and disseminate their messages against these heavy odds, they have been forced to assume a false identity while doing so. As the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) points out, political committees are regulated in minute detail because their primary purpose is to influence federal elections. "The ACLU and thousands of other organizations like it," however, "are not created for this purpose and therefore should not be required to operate as if they were." Reply Brief for Appellant ACLU in No. 02-1734 etal., p.15. A requirement that coerces corporations to adopt alter egos in communicating with the public is, by itself, sufficient to make the PAC option a false choice for many civic organizations. Forcing speech through an artificial "secondhand endorsement structure...debases the value of the voice of nonprofit corporate speakers ... [because] PAC's are interim, adhoc organizations with little continuity or responsibility." Austin, 494 U.S., at 708-709 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In contrast, their sponsoring organizations "have a continuity, a stability, and an influence" that allows "their members and the public at large to evaluate their ... credibility." Id., at 709. </s> The majority can articulate no compelling justification for imposing this scheme of compulsory ventriloquism. If the majority is concerned about corruption and distortion of the political process, it makes no sense to diffuse the corporate message and, under threat of criminal penalties, to compel the corporation to spread the blame to its adhoc intermediary. </s> For all these reasons, the PAC option cannot advance the Government's argument that the provision meets the test of strict scrutiny. See, e.g., id., at 657-660; MCFL, 479 U.S. 238; see also United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826 (2000) ("When the purpose and design of a statute is to regulate speech by reason of its content, special consideration or latitude is not accorded to the Government merely because the law can somehow be described as a burden rather than outright suppression"). </s> Once we turn away from the distraction of the PAC option, the provision cannot survive strict scrutiny. Under the primary definition, §203 prohibits unions and corporations from funding from their general treasury any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which-- "(I) refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office; </s> "(II) is made within-- </s> "(aa) 60 days before a general, special, or runoff election for the office sought by the candidate; or </s> "(bb) 30 days before a primary or preference election, or a convention or caucus of a political partythat has authority to nominate a candidate, for the office sought by the candidate; and </s> "(III) in the case of a communication which refers to a candidate for an office other than President or Vice President, is targeted to the relevant electorate." 2 U.S.C.A. §434f(3)(A)(i) (Supp. 2003). </s> The prohibition, with its crude temporal and geographic proxies, is a severe and unprecedented ban on protected speech. As discussed at the outset, suppose a few Senators want to show their constituents in the logging industry how much they care about working families and propose a law, 60 days before the election, that would harm the environment by allowing logging in national forests. Under §203, a nonprofit environmental group would be unable to run an ad referring to these Senators in their districts. The suggestion that the group could form and fund a PAC in the short time required for effective participation in the political debate is fanciful. For reasons already discussed, moreover, an adhoc PAC would not be as effective as the environmental group itself in gaining credibility with the public. Never before in our history has the Court upheld a law that suppresses speech to this extent. </s> The group would want to refer to these Senators, either by name or by photograph, not necessarily because an election is at stake. It might be supposed the hypothetical Senators have had an impeccable environmental record, so the environmental group might have no previous or present interest in expressing an opinion on their candidacies. Or, the election might not be hotly contested in some of the districts, so whatever the group says would have no practical effect on the electoral outcome. The ability to refer to candidates and officeholders is important because it allows the public to communicate with them on issues of common concern. Section 203's sweeping approach fails to take into account this significant free speech interest. Under any conventional definition of overbreadth, it fails to meet strict scrutiny standards. It forces electioneering communications sponsored by an environmental group to contend with faceless and nameless opponents and consign their broadcast, as the NRA well puts it, to a world where politicians who threaten the environment must be referred to as "'He Whose Name Cannot Be Spoken.'" Reply Brief for Appellants NRA etal. in No. 02-1675 etal., p.19. </s> In the example above, it makes no difference to §203 or to the Court that the bill sponsors may have such well-known ideological biases that revealing their identity would provide essential instruction to citizens on whether the policy benefits them or their community. Nor does it make any difference that the names of the bill sponsors, perhaps through repetition in the news media, have become so synonymous with the proposal that referring to these politicians by name in an ad is the most effective way to communicate with the public. Section 203 is a comprehensive censor: On the pain of a felony offense, the ad must not refer to a candidate for federal office during the crucial weeks before an election. </s> We are supposed to find comfort in the knowledge that the ad is banned under §203 only if it "is targeted to the relevant electorate," defined as communications that can be received by 50,000 or more persons in the candidate's district. See 2 U.S.C.A. §434(f)(3)(C) (Supp. 2003). This Orwellian criterion, however, is analogous to a law, unconstitutional under any known First Amendment theory, that would allow a speaker to say anything he chooses, so long as his intended audience could not hear him. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-765 (1972) (discussing the "First Amendment right to receive information and ideas" (internal quotation marks omitted)). A central purpose of issue ads is to urge the public to pay close attention to the candidate's platform on the featured issues. By banning broadcast in the very district where the candidate is standing for election, §203 shields information at the heart of the First Amendment from precisely those citizens who most value the right to make a responsible judgment at the voting booth. </s> In defending against a facial attack on a statute with substantial overbreadth, it is no answer to say that corporations and unions may bring as-applied challenges on a case-by-case basis. When a statute is as out of bounds as §203, our law simply does not force speakers to "undertake the considerable burden (and sometimes risk) of vindicating their rights through case-by-case litigation." Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. ___, ___ (2003) (slip op., at 5). If they instead "abstain from protected speech," they "har[m] not only themselves but society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas." Ibid. Not the least of the ill effects of today's decision is that our overbreadth doctrine, once a bulwark of protection for free speech, has now been manipulated by the Court to become but a shadow of its former self. </s> In the end the Government and intervenor-defendants cannot dispute the looseness of the connection between §203 and the Government's proffered interest in stemming corruption. At various points in their briefs, they drop all pretense that the electioneering ban bears a close relation to anticorruption purposes. Instead, they defend §203 on the ground that the targeted ads "may influence," are "likely to influence," or "will in all likelihood have the effect of influencing" a federal election. See Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants FEC etal. in No. 02-1674 etal., pp.14, 24, 84, 92-93, 94; Brief for Intervenor-Defendants Senator John McCain etal. in No. 02-1674 etal., pp.42-43. The mere fact that an ad may, in one fashion or another, influence an election is an insufficient reason for outlawing it. I should have thought influencing elections to be the whole point of political speech. Neither strict scrutiny nor any other standard the Court has adopted to date permits outlawing speech on the ground that it might influence an election, which might lead to greater access to politicians by the sponsoring organization, which might lead to actual corruption or the appearance of corruption. Settled law requires a real and close connection between end and means. The attenuated causation the majority endorses today is antithetical to the concept of narrow tailoring. 3. </s> As I would invalidate §203 under the primary definition, it is necessary to add a few words about the backup provision. As applied in §203, the backup definition prohibits corporations and unions from financing from their general treasury funds "any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate for that office (regardless of whether the communication expressly advocates a vote for or against a candidate) and which also is suggestive of no plausible meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate." 2 U.S.C.A. §434f(3)(A)(ii) (Supp. 2003). </s> The prohibition under the backup has much of the same imprecision as the ban under the primary definition, though here there is even more overbreadth. Unlike the primary definition, the backup contains no temporal or geographic limitation. Any broadcast, cable, or satellite communications--not just those aired within a certain blackout period and received by a certain segment of the population--are prohibited, provided they "promote," "support," "attack," or "oppose" a candidate. There is no showing that such a permanent and ubiquitous restriction meets First Amendment standards for the relationship between means and ends. </s> The backup definition is flawed for the further reason that it is vague. The crucial words--"promotes," "support," "attack," "oppose"--are nowhere defined. In this respect the backup is similar to the provision in the Federal Election Campaign Act that Buckley held to be unconstitutionally vague. Cf. 424 U.S., at 39-44 ("'No person may make any expenditure ... relative to a clearly identified candidate during a calendar year which, when added to all other expenditures made by such person during the year advocating the election or defeat of such candidate, exceeds $1,000'"). </s> The statutory phrase "suggestive of no plausible meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate" cannot cure the overbreadth or vagueness of the backup definition. Like other key terms in the provision, these words are not defined. The lack of guidance presents serious problems of uncertainty. If "plausible" means something close to "reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances," speakers will be provided with an insufficient degree of protection and will, as a result, engage in widespread self-censorship to avoid severe criminal penalties. </s> Given the statute's vagueness, even defendants' own experts disagree among themselves about whether specific ads fall within the prohibition. Hence, people "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at [the backup definition's] meaning and differ as to its application," Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). For these reasons, I would also invalidate the ban on electioneering communication under the backup definition. 4. </s> Before concluding the analysis on Title II, it is necessary to add a few words about the majority's analysis of §204. The majority attempts to minimize the damage done under §203 by construing §204 (the Wellstone Amendment) to incorporate an exception for MCFL-type corporations. See MCFL, 479 U.S. 238. Section 204, however, does no such thing. As even the majority concedes, the provision "does not, on its face, exempt MCFL organizations from its prohibition." Ante, at 105. Although we normally presume that legislators would not deliberately enact an unconstitutional statute, that presumption is inapplicable here. There is no ambiguity regarding what §204 is intended to accomplish. Enacted to supersede the Snowe-Jeffords Amendment that would have carved out precisely this exception for MCFL corporations, §204 was written to broaden BCRA's scope to include issue-advocacy groups. See, e.g., App. to Brief for Appellants NRA etal. in No. 02-1675 etal., pp.65a, 67a (Sen. Wellstone) ("[I]ndividuals with all this wealth" will "make their soft money contributions to these sham issue ads run by all these ... organizations, which under this loophole can operate with impunity" to run "poisonous ads." I have an amendment that ... make[s] sure ... this big money doesn't get [through]"). Instead of deleting the Snowe-Jeffords Amendment from the bill, however, the Wellstone Amendment was inserted in a separate section to preserve severability. Were we to indulge the presumption that Congress understood the law when it legislated, the Wellstone Amendment could be understood only as a frontal challenge to MCFL. Even were I to agree with the majority's interpretation of §204, however, my analysis of Title II remains unaffected. The First Amendment protects the right of all organizations, not just a subset of them, to engage in political speech. See Austin, 494 U.S., at 700-701 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The First Amendment does not permit courts to exercise speech suppression authority denied to legislatures"). 5. </s> Title II's vagueness and overbreadth demonstrate Congress' fundamental misunderstanding of the First Amendment. The Court, it must be said, succumbs to the same mistake. The majority begins with a denunciation of direct campaign contributions by corporations and unions. It then uses this rhetorical momentum as its leverage to uphold the Act. The problem, however, is that Title II's ban on electioneering communications covers general commentaries on political issues and is far removed from laws prohibiting direct contributions from corporate and union treasuries. The severe First Amendment burden of this ban on independent expenditures requires much stronger justifications than the majority offers. See Buckley, supra, at 23. The hostility toward corporations and unions that infuses the majority opinion is inconsistent with the viewpoint neutrality the First Amendment demands of all Government actors, including the members of this Court. Corporations, after all, are the engines of our modern economy. They facilitate complex operations on which the Nation's prosperity depends. To say these entities cannot alert the public to pending political issues that may threaten the country's economic interests is unprecedented. Unions are also an established part of the national economic system. They, too, have their own unique insights to contribute to the political debate, but the law's impact on them is just as severe. The costs of the majority's misplaced concerns about the "corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth," Austin, supra, at 660, moreover, will weigh most heavily on budget-strapped nonprofit entities upon which many of our citizens rely for political commentary and advocacy. These groups must now choose between staying on the sidelines in the next election or establishing a PAC against their institutional identities. PACs are a legal construct sanctioned by Congress. They are not necessarily the means of communication chosen and preferred by the citizenry. In the same vein the Court is quite incorrect to suggest that the mainstream press is a sufficient palliative for the novel and severe constraints this law imposes on the political process. The Court should appreciate the dynamic contribution diverse groups and associations make to the intellectual and cultural life of the Nation. It should not permit Congress to foreclose or restrict those groups from participating in the political process by constraints not applicable to the established press. CONCLUSION </s> The First Amendment underwrites the freedom to experiment and to create in the realm of thought and speech. Citizens must be free to use new forms, and new forums, for the expression of ideas. The civic discourse belongs to the people and the Government may not prescribe the means used to conduct it. The First Amendment commands that Congress "shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." The command cannot be read to allow Congress to provide for the imprisonment of those who attempt to establish new political parties and alter the civic discourse. Our pluralistic society is filled with voices expressing new and different viewpoints, speaking through modes and mechanisms that must be allowed to change in response to the demands of an interested public. As communities have grown and technology has evolved, concerted speech not only has become more effective than a single voice but also has become the natural preference and efficacious choice for many Americans. The Court, upholding multiple laws that suppress both spontaneous and concerted speech, leaves us less free than before. Today's decision breaks faith with our tradition of robust and unfettered debate. </s> For the foregoing reasons, with respect, I dissent from the Court's decision upholding the main features of Titles I and II. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF KENNEDY, J. BCRA §101(a), 116 Stat. 81, which sets forth new FECA §323, 2 U.S.C.A. §441i (Supp. 2003), provides: "SEC. 323. SOFT MONEY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. </s> "(a) NATIONAL COMMITTEES.-- </s> "(1) IN GENERAL.--A national committee of a political party (including a national congressional campaign committee of a political party) may not solicit, receive, or direct to another person a contribution, donation, or transfer of funds or any other thing of value, or spend any funds, that are not subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act. </s> "(2) APPLICABILITY.--The prohibition established by paragraph (1) applies to any such national committee, any officer or agent acting on behalf of such a national committee, and any entity that is directly or indirectly established, financed, maintained, or controlled by such a national committee. </s> "(b) STATE, DISTRICT, AND LOCAL COMMITTEES.-- </s> "(1) IN GENERAL.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), an amount that is expended or disbursed for Federal election activity by a State, district, or local committee of a political party (including an entity that is directly or indirectly established, financed, maintained, or controlled by a State, district, or local committee of a political party and an officer or agent acting on behalf of such committee or entity), or by an association or similar group of candidates for State or local office or of individuals holding State or local office, shall be made from funds subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act. </s> "(2) APPLICABILITY.-- </s> "(A) IN GENERAL.--Notwithstanding clause (i) or (ii) of section 301(20)(A), and subject to subparagraph (B), paragraph (1) shall not apply to any amount expended or disbursed by a State, district, or local committee of a political party for an activity described in either such clause to the extent the amounts expended or disbursed for such activity are allocated (under regulations prescribed by the Commission) among amounts-- </s> "(i) which consist solely of contributions subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act (other than amounts described in subparagraph (B)(iii)); and </s> "(ii) other amounts which are not subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act (other than any requirements of this subsection). </s> "(B) CONDITIONS.--Subparagraph (A) shall only apply if-- </s> "(i) the activity does not refer to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office; </s> "(ii) the amounts expended or disbursed are not for the costs of any broadcasting, cable, or satellite communication, other than a communication which refers solely to a clearly identified candidate for State or local office; </s> "(iii) the amounts expended or disbursed which are described in subparagraph (A)(ii) are paid from amounts which are donated in accordance with State law and which meet the requirements of subparagraph (C), except that no person (including any person established, financed, maintained, or controlled by such person) may donate more than $10,000 to a State, district, or local committee of a political party in a calendar year for such expenditures or disbursements; and </s> "(iv) the amounts expended or disbursed are made solely from funds raised by the State, local, or district committee which makes such expenditure or disbursement, and do not include any funds provided to such committee from-- </s> "(I) any other State, local, or district committee of any State party, </s> "(II) the national committee of a political party (including a national congressional campaign committee of a political party), </s> "(III) any officer or agent acting on behalf of any committee described in subclause (I) or (II), or </s> "(IV) any entity directly or indirectly established, financed, maintained, or controlled by any committee described in subclause (I) or (II). </s> "(C) PROHIBITING INVOLVEMENT OF NATIONAL PARTIES, FEDERAL CANDIDATES AND OFFICEHOLDERS, AND STATE PARTIES ACTING JOINTLY.--Notwithstanding subsection (e) (other than subsection (e)(3)), amounts specifically authorized to be spent under subparagraph (B)(iii) meet the requirements of this subparagraph only if the amounts-- </s> "(i) are not solicited, received, directed, transferred, or spent by or in the name of any person described in subsection (a) or (e); and </s> "(ii) are not solicited, received, or directed through fundraising activities conducted jointly by 2 or more State, local, or district committees of any political party or their agents, or by a State, local, or district committee of a political party on behalf of the State, local, or district committee of a political party or its agent in one or more other States. </s> "(c) FUNDRAISING COSTS.--An amount spent by a person described in subsection (a) or (b) to raise funds that are used, in whole or in part, for expenditures and disbursements for a Federal election activity shall be made from funds subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act. </s> "(d) TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS.--A national, State, district, or local committee of a political party (including a national congressional campaign committee of a political party), an entity that is directly or indirectly established, financed, maintained, or controlled by any such national, State, district, or local committee or its agent, and an officer or agent acting on behalf of any such party committee or entity, shall not solicit any funds for, or make or direct any donations to-- </s> "(1) an organization that is described in section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from taxation under section 501(a) of such Code (or has submitted an application for determination of tax exempt status under such section) and that makes expenditures or disbursements in connection with an election for Federal office (including expenditures or disbursements for Federal election activity); or </s> "(2) an organization described in section 527 of such Code (other than a political committee, a State, district, or local committee of a political party, or the authorized campaign committee of a candidate for State or local office). </s> "(e) FEDERAL CANDIDATES.-- </s> "(1) IN GENERAL.--A candidate, individual holding Federal office, agent of a candidate or an individual holding Federal office, or an entity directly or indirectly established, financed, maintained or controlled by or acting on behalf of 1 or more candidates or individuals holding Federal office, shall not-- </s> "(A) solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or spend funds in connection with an election for Federal office, including funds for any Federal election activity, unless the funds are subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act; or </s> "(B) solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or spend funds in connection with any election other than an election for Federal office or disburse funds in connection with such an election unless the funds-- </s> "(i) are not in excess of the amounts permitted with respect to contributions to candidates and political committees under paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of section 315(a); and </s> "(ii) are not from sources prohibited by this Act from making contributions in connection with an election for Federal office. </s> "(2) STATE LAW.--Paragraph (1) does not apply to the solicitation, receipt, or spending of funds by an individual described in such paragraph who is or was also a candidate for a State or local office solely in connection with such election for State or local office if the solicitation, receipt, or spending of funds is permitted under State law and refers only to such State or local candidate, or to any other candidate for the State or local office sought by such candidate, or both. </s> "(3) FUNDRAISING EVENTS.--Notwithstanding paragraph (1) or subsection (b)(2)(C), a candidate or an individual holding Federal office may attend, speak, or be a featured guest at a fundraising event for a State, district, or local committee of a political party. </s> "(4) PERMITTING CERTAIN SOLICITATIONS.-- </s> "(A) GENERAL SOLICITATIONS.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this subsection, an individual described in paragraph (1) may make a general solicitation of funds on behalf of any organization that is described in section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from taxation under section 501(a) of such Code (or has submitted an application for determination of tax exempt status under such section) (other than an entity whose principal purpose is to conduct activities described in clauses (i) and (ii) of section 301(20)(A)) where such solicitation does not specify how the funds will or should be spent. </s> "(B) CERTAIN SPECIFIC SOLICITATIONS.--In addition to the general solicitations permitted under subparagraph (A), an individual described in paragraph (1) may make a solicitation explicitly to obtain funds for carrying out the activities described in clauses (i) and (ii) of section 301(20)(A), or for an entity whose principal purpose is to conduct such activities, if-- </s> "(i) the solicitation is made only to individuals; and </s> "(ii) the amount solicited from any individual during any calendar year does not exceed $20,000. </s> "(f) STATE CANDIDATES.-- </s> "(1) IN GENERAL.--A candidate for State or local office, individual holding State or local office, or an agent of such a candidate or individual may not spend any funds for a communication described in section 301(20)(A)(iii) unless the funds are subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act. </s> "(2) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN COMMUNICATIONS.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply to an individual described in such paragraph if the communication involved is in connection with an election for such State or local office and refers only to such individual or to any other candidate for the State or local office held or sought by such individual, or both." BCRA §101(b), adds a definition of "federal election activity" to FECA §301, 2 U.S.C.A. §431(20) (Supp. 2003), which provides as follows: "(20) FEDERAL ELECTION ACTIVITY.-- </s> "(A) IN GENERAL.--The term 'Federal election activity' means-- </s> "(i) voter registration activity during the period that begins on the date that is 120 days before the date a regularly scheduled Federal election is held and ends on the date of the election; </s> "(ii) voter identification, get-out-the-vote activity, or generic campaign activity conducted in connection with an election in which a candidate for Federal office appears on the ballot (regardless of whether a candidate for State or local office also appears on the ballot); </s> "(iii) a public communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office (regardless of whether a candidate for State or local office is also mentioned or identified) and that promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate for that office (regardless of whether the communication expressly advocates a vote for or against a candidate); or </s> "(iv) services provided during any month by an employee of a State, district, or local committee of a political party who spends more than 25 percent of that individual's compensated time during that month on activities in connection with a Federal election. </s> "(B) EXCLUDED ACTIVITY.--The term 'Federal election activity' does not include an amount expended or disbursed by a State, district, or local committee of a political party for-- </s> "(i) a public communication that refers solely to a clearly identified candidate for State or local office, if the communication is not a Federal election activity described in subparagraph (A)(i) or (ii); </s> "(ii) a contribution to a candidate for State or local office, provided the contribution is not designated to pay for a Federal election activity described in subparagraph (A); </s> "(iii) the costs of a State, district, or local political convention; and </s> "(iv) the costs of grassroots campaign materials, including buttons, bumper stickers, and yard signs, that name or depict only a candidate for State or local office." Title 2 U.S.C.A. §§441b(a) and (b)(1)-(2) (Supp. 2003), as amended by BCRA §203, provide: "(a) It is unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by authority of any law of Congress, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election to any political office, or in connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any political office, or for any corporation whatever, or any labor organization, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election at which presidential and vice presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, Congress are to be voted for, or in connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any of the foregoing offices, or for any candidate, political committee, or other person knowingly to accept or receive any contribution prohibited by this section, or any officer or any director of any corporation or any national bank or any officer of any labor organization to consent to any contribution or expenditure by the corporation, national bank, or labor organization, as the case may be, prohibited by this section. </s> "(b)(1) For the purposes of this section the term "labor organization" means any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work. </s> "(2) For purposes of this section and section 79l(h) of Title 15, the term "contribution or expenditure" includes a contribution or expenditure, as those terms are defined in section 431 of this title, and also includes any direct or indirect payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money, or any services, or anything of value (except a loan of money by a national or State bank made in accordance with the applicable banking laws and regulations and in the ordinary course of business) to any candidate, campaign committee, or political party or organization, in connection with any election to any of the offices referred to in this section or for any applicable electioneering communication, but shall not include (A) communications by a corporation to its stockholders and executive or administrative personnel and their families or by a labor organization to its members and their families on any subject; (B) nonpartisan registration and get-out-the-vote campaigns by a corporation aimed at its stockholders and executive or administrative personnel and their families, or by a labor organization aimed at its members and their families; and (C) the establishment, administration, and solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes by a corporation, labor organization, membership organization, cooperative, or corporation without capital stock." </s> FOOTNOTESFootnote *Together with No. 02-1675, National Rifle Association et al. v. Federal Election Commission et al., No. 02-1676, Federal Election Commission et al. v. McConnell, United States Senator, et al., No. 02-1702, McCain, United States Senator, et al. v. McConnell, United States Senator, et al., No. 02-1727, Republican National Committee et al. v. Federal Election Commission et al., No. 02-1733, National Right to Life Committee, Inc., et al. v. Federal Election Commission et al., No. 02-1734, American Civil Liberties Union v. Federal Election Commission et al., No. 02-1740, Adams et al. v. Federal Election Commission et al., No. 02-1747, Paul, United States Congressman, et al. v. Federal Election Commission et al., No. 02-1753, California Democratic Party et al. v. Federal Election Commission et al., No. 02-1755, American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al. v. Federal Election Commission et al., and No. 02-1756, Chamber of Commerce of the United States et al. v. Federal Election Commission et al., also on appeal from the same court. FOOTNOTESFootnote **Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join this opinion in its entirety. Footnote 1The parties to the litigation are described in the findings of the District Court. 251 F.Supp. 2d 176, 221-226 (DC 2003) (per curiam). For the sake of clarity, we refer to the parties who challenged the law in the District Court as the "plaintiffs," referring to specific plaintiffs by name where necessary. We refer to the parties who intervened in defense of the law as the "intervenor-defendants." Footnote 2The Hatch Act also limited both the amount political committees could expend and the amount they could receive in contributions. Act of July 19, 1940, ch. 640, 54 Stat. 767. Senator Bankhead, in offering the amendment from the Senate floor, said: </s> "'We all know that money is the chief source of corruption. We all know that large contributions to political campaigns not only put the political party under obligation to the large contributors, who demand pay in the way of legislation, but we also know that large sums of money are used for the purpose of conducting expensive campaigns through the newspapers and over the radio; in the publication of all sorts of literature, true and untrue; and for the purpose of paying the expenses of campaigners sent out into the country to spread propaganda, both true and untrue.'" United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 577-578 (1957) (quoting 86 Cong. Rec. 2720 (1940)). Footnote 3As a general rule, FECA permits corporations and unions to solicit contributions to their PACs from their shareholders or members, but not from outsiders. 2 U.S.C. §§441b(b)(4)(A), (C); see Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 198-199, and n. 1 (1982). Footnote 4The court held that one disclosure provision was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 832 (CADC 1975) (en banc) (per curiam) (invalidating 2 U.S.C. §437a (1970 ed., Supp. V)). No appeal was taken from that holding. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 10, n. 7 (1976) (per curiam). Footnote 5The Court of Appeals found: </s> "Large contributions are intended to, and do, gain access to the elected official after the campaign for consideration of the contributor's particular concerns. Senator Mathias not only describes this but also the corollary, that the feeling that big contributors gain special treatment produces a reaction that the average American has no significant role in the political process." Buckley, 519 F.2d, at 838 (footnotes omitted). </s> The court also noted: </s> "Congress found and the District Court confirmed that such contributions were often made for the purpose of furthering business or private interests by facilitating access to government officials or influencing governmental decisions, and that, conversely, elected officials have tended to afford special treatment to large contributors. See S. Rep. No. 93-689, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5; Findings I, ¶ ;¶ ;108, 110, 118, 170." Id., at 838, n. 32. </s> Citing further evidence of corruption, the court explained: </s> "The disclosures of illegal corporate contributions in 1972 included the testimony of executives that they were motivated by the perception that this was necessary as a 'calling card, something that would get us in the door and make our point of view heard,' Hearings before the Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5442 (1973) (Ashland Oil Co.--Orin Atkins, Chairman) or 'in response to pressure for fear of a competitive disadvantage that might result,' id. at 5495, 5514 (American Airlines--George Spater, former chairman); see Findings I, ¶ ;105. The record before Congress was replete with specific examples of improper attempts to obtain governmental favor in return for large campaign contributions. See Findings I, ¶ ;¶ ;159-64." Id., at 839, n. 37. Footnote 6The court cited the intricate scheme of the American Milk Producers, Inc., as an example of the lengths to which contributors went to avoid their duty to disclose: </s> "Since the milk producers, on legal advice, worked on a $2500 limit per committee, they evolved a procedure, after consultation in November 1970 with Nixon fund raisers, to break down [their $2 million donation] into numerous smaller contributions to hundreds of committees in various states which could then hold the money for the President's reelection campaign, so as to permit the producers to meet independent reporting requirements without disclosure." Id., at 839, n.36. </s> The milk producers contributed large sums to the Nixon campaign "in order to gain a meeting with White House officials on price supports." Ibid. Footnote 7In 1977 the FEC promulgated a rule allowing parties to allocate their administrative expenses "on a reasonable basis" between accounts containing funds raised in compliance with FECA and accounts containing nonfederal funds, including corporate and union donations. 11 CFR §102.6(a)(2). In advisory opinions issued in 1978 and 1979, the FEC allowed parties similarly to allocate the costs of voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives between federal and nonfederal accounts. FEC Advisory Op. 1978-10; FEC Advisory Op. 1979-17. See 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 195-197 (per curiam). </s> In 1990 the FEC clarified the phrase "on a reasonable basis" by promulgating fixed allocation rates. 11 CFR §106.5 (1991). The regulations required the Republican National Committee (RNC) and Democratic National Committee (DNC) to pay for at least 60% of mixed-purpose activities (65% in presidential election years) with funds from their federal accounts. §106.5(b)(2). By contrast, the regulations required state and local committees to allocate similar expenditures based on the ratio of federal to nonfederal offices on the State's ballot, §106.5(d)(1), which in practice meant that they could expend a substantially greater proportion of soft money than national parties to fund mixed-purpose activities affecting both federal and state elections. See 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 198-199 (per curiam). Footnote 81 Defs. Exhs., Tab 1, Tbl. 2 (report of Thomas E. Mann, Chair & Sr. Fellow, Brookings Institution (hereinafter Mann Expert Report)); 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 197-201 (per curiam). Footnote 9Mann Expert Report 26; 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 441 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Footnote 10Id., at 494 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Footnote 11Mann Expert Report 24. Footnote 12In the 2000 election cycle, 35 of the 50 largest soft-money donors gave to both parties; 28 of the 50 gave more than $100,000 to both parties. Mann Expert Report Tbl. 6; see also 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 509 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 785, n. 77 (Leon, J.). Footnote 13A former chief executive officer of a large corporation explained: </s> "Business and labor leaders believe, based on their experience, that disappointed Members, and their party colleagues, may shun or disfavor them because they have not contributed. Equally, these leaders fear that if they refuse to contribute (enough), competing interests who do contribute generously will have an advantage in gaining access to and influencing key Congressional leaders on matters of importance to the company or union." App. 283, ¶ ;9 (declaration of Gerald Greenwald, United Airlines (hereinafter Greenwald Decl.)). </s> Amici Curiae Committee for Economic Development and various business leaders attest that corporate soft-money contributions are "coerced and, at bottom, wholly commercial" in nature, and that "[b]usiness leaders increasingly wish to be freed from the grip of a system in which they fear the adverse consequences of refusing to fill the coffers of the major parties." Brief for Committee for Economic Development etal. as Amici Curiae 28. Footnote 14See 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 480 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 842 (Leon, J.). Footnote 15See id., at 479-480 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 842-843 (Leon, J.). One former party official explained to the District Court: </s> "'Once you've helped a federal candidate by contributing hard money to his or her campaign, you are sometimes asked to do more for the candidate by making donations of hard and/or soft money to the national party committees, the relevant state party (assuming it can accept corporate contributions), or an outside group that is planning on doing an independent expenditure or issue advertisement to help the candidate's campaign.'" Id., at 479 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Footnote 16Id., at 532-537 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 875-879 (Leon, J.). As the former chair of one major advocacy organization's PAC put it, "'[i]t is foolish to believe there is any practical difference between issue advocacy and advocacy of a political candidate. What separates issue advocacy and political advocacy is a line in the sand drawn on a windy day.'" Id., at 536-537 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting Tanya K. Metaksa, Opening Remarks at the American Assn. of Political Consultants Fifth General Session on "Issue Advocacy," Jan. 17, 1997, p.2); 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 878-879 (Leon, J.) (same). Footnote 17Id., at 304 (Henderson, J., concurring in judgment in part anddissenting in part); id., at 534 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 875-879 (Leon, J.). Footnote 18It is undisputed that very few ads--whether run by candidates, parties, or interest groups--used words of express advocacy. Id., at 303 (Henderson, J.); id., at 529 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 874 (Leon, J.). In the 1998 election cycle, just 4% of candidate advertisements used magic words; in 2000, that number was a mere 5%. App. 1334 (report of Jonathan S. Krasno, Yale University, & Frank J. Sorauf, University of Minnesota, pp. 53-54 (hereinafter Krasno & Sorauf Expert Report); see 1 Defs. Exhs., Tab 2, pp. 53-54). Footnote 19251 F.Supp. 2d, at 564, and n.6 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (citing report of Kenneth M. Goldstein, University of Wisconsin-Madison, App. A, Tbl. 16; see 3-R Defs. Exhs., Tab 7); Tr. of Oral Arg. 202-203; see also 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 305 (Henderson, J.). Footnote 20The spending on electioneering communications climbed dramatically during the last decade. In the 1996 election cycle, $135 to $150 million was spent on multiple broadcasts of about 100 ads. In the next cycle (1997-1998), 77 organizations aired 423 ads at a total cost between $270 and $340 million. By the 2000 election, 130 groups spent over an estimated $500 million on more than 1,100 different ads. Two out of every three dollars spent on issue ads in the 2000 cycle were attributable to the two major parties and six major interest groups. Id., at 303-304 (Henderson, J.) (citing Annenberg Public Policy Center, Issue Advertising in the 1999-2000 Election Cycle 1-15 (2001) (hereinafter Annenberg Report); see 38 Defs. Exhs., Tab 22); 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 527 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (same); id., at 879 (Leon, J.) (same). Footnote 21Id., at 540 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting internal AFL-CIO Memorandum from Brian Weeks to Mike Klein, "Electronic Buy for Illinois Senator," (Oct. 9, 1996), AFL-CIO 005244); 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 886 (Leon, J.) (same). Footnote 22The association was known as the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA). Id., at 232 (per curiam). Footnote 23Id., at 232-233. Other examples of mysterious groups included "Voters for Campaign Truth," "Aretino Industries," "Montanans for Common Sense Mining Laws," "American Seniors, Inc.," "American Family Voices," App. 1355 (Krasno & Sorauf Expert Report 71-77), and the "Coalition to Make our Voices Heard," 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 538 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Some of the actors behind these groups frankly acknowledged that "'in some places it's much more effective to run an ad by the 'Coalition to Make Our Voices Heard' than it is to say paid for by 'the men and women of the AFL-CIO.'" Ibid. (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting report of David B. Magleby, Brigham Young University 18-19 (hereinafter Magleby Expert Report), App. 1484-1485). Footnote 24251 F.Supp. 2d, at 518-519 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Footnote 25Id., at 478-479 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (citing declaration of Robert Hickmott, Senior V.P., Smith-Free Group, ¶ ;8 (hereinafter Hickmott Decl.); see 6-R Defs. Exhs., Tab 19, ¶ ;8). Footnote 26S. Rep. No. 105-167, vol. 4, p.4611 (1998) (hereinafter 1998 Senate Report); 5 id., at 7515. Footnote 273 id., at 4535 (additional views of Sen. Collins). Footnote 281 id., at 41-42, 195-200. The report included a memorandum written by the DNC finance chairman suggesting the use of White House coffees and "overnights" to give major donors "quality time" with the President, and noted that the guests accounted for $26.4 million in contributions. Id., at 194, 196. Footnote 292 id., at 2913-2914, 2921. Despite concerns about Tamraz's background and a possible conflict with United States foreign policy interests, he was invited to six events attended by the President. Id., at 2920-2921. Similarly, the minority noted that in exchange for Michael Kojima's contribution of $500,000 to the 1992 President's Dinner, he and his wife had been placed at the head table with President and Mrs. Bush. Moreover, Kojima received several additional meetings with the President, other administration officials, and United States embassy officials. 4 id., at 5418, 5422, 5428. Footnote 30The former requires an initial contribution of $100,000, and $25,000 for each of the next three years; the latter requires annual contributions of $15,000. 5 id., at 7968. Footnote 31Id., at 7971. Footnote 321 id., at 49; 3 id., at 3997-4006. Footnote 33Id., at 4466. Footnote 34Ibid. Footnote 35Id., at 4468-4470, 4480-4481, 4491-4494. Footnote 36Id., at 4492. Footnote 376 id., at 9394. Footnote 38The national party committees of the two major political parties are: the Republican National Committee (RNC); the Democratic National Committee (DNC); the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC); the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC); the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC); and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC). 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 468 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Footnote 39Justice Kennedy accuses us of engaging in a sleight of hand by conflating "unseemly corporate speech" with the speech of political parties and candidates, and then adverting to the "corporate speech rationale as if it were the linchpin of the litigation." Post, at 7 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). This is incorrect. The principles set forth here and relied upon in assessing Title I are the same principles articulated in Buckley and its progeny that regulations of contributions to candidates, parties, and political committees are subject to less rigorous scrutiny than direct restraints on speech--including "unseemly corporate speech." Footnote 40Since our decision in Buckley, we have consistently applied less rigorous scrutiny to contribution restrictions aimed at the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption. See, e.g., 453 U.S. 182, 195-196 (1981) (plurality opinion) (applying less rigorous scrutiny to FECA's $5,000 limit on contributions to multicandidate political committees); National Right to Work, 533 U.S. 431, 456 (2001) (applying less rigorous scrutiny to expenditures coordinated with a candidate); Federal Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S.___, ___ (2003) (slip op., at 14-15) (applying less rigorous scrutiny to provisions intended to prevent circumvention of otherwise valid contribution limits). Footnote 41Indeed, Congress structured §323(b) in such a way as to free individual, corporate, and union donations to state committees for nonfederal elections from federal source and amount restrictions. Footnote 42Justice Kennedy's contention that less rigorous scrutiny applies only to regulations burdening political association, rather than political speech, misreads Buckley. In Buckley, we recognized that contribution limits burden both protected speech and association, though they generally have more significant impacts on the latter. 528 U.S. 377, 388 (2000) ("While we did not [in Buckley] attempt to parse [the] distinctions between the speech and association standards of scrutiny for contribution limits, we did make it clear that those restrictions bore more heavily on the associational right than on [the] freedom to speak. We consequently proceeded on the understanding that a contribution limitation surviving a claim of associational abridgment would survive a speech challenge as well, and we held the standard satisfied by the contribution limits under review." (citation omitted)). It is thus simply untrue in the campaign finance context that all "burdens on speech necessitate strict scrutiny review." Post, at 29. Footnote 43Justice Kennedy is no doubt correct that the associational burdens imposed by a particular piece of campaign-finance regulation may at times be so severe as to warrant strict scrutiny. Ibid. In light of our interpretation of §323(a), however, see infra, at 46-47, §323 does not present such a case. As Justice Kennedy himself acknowledges, even "significant interference" with "protected rights of association" are subject to less rigorous scrutiny. Beaumont, 539 U.S., at _____ (slip op., at 15); see post, at 28. There is thus nothing inconsistent in our decision to account for the particular associational burdens imposed by §323(a) when applying the appropriate level of scrutiny. Footnote 44The fact that the post-1990 explosion in soft-money spending on federal electioneering was accompanied by a series of efforts in Congress to clamp down on such uses of soft money (culminating, of course, in BCRA) underscores the fact that the FEC regulations permitted more than Congress, in enacting FECA, had ever intended. See J. Cantor, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress: Campaign Finance Legislation in the 101st Congress (1990) (9 bills seeking to limit the influence of soft money introduced); J. Cantor, CRS Report for Congress: Campaign Finance Legislation in the 102nd Congress (1991) (10 such bills introduced); J. Cantor, CRS Report for Congress: Campaign Finance Legislation in the 103rd Congress (1993) (16 bills); J. Cantor, CRS Report for Congress: Campaign Finance Legislation in the 104th Congress (1996) (18 bills); see also 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 201-206 (per curiam) (discussing legislative efforts to curb soft money in 105th and subsequent Congresses). Footnote 45Justice Kennedy contends that the plurality's observation in Colorado I that large soft-money donations to a political party pose little threat of corruption "establish[es] that" such contributions are not corrupting. Post, at 17-18 (citing Colorado I, 518 U.S. 604, 616, 617-618 (1996)). The cited dictum has no bearing on the present case. Colorado I addressed an entirely different question--namely, whether Congress could permissibly limit a party's independent expenditures--and did so on an entirely different set of facts. It also had before it an evidentiary record frozen in 1990--well before the soft-money explosion of the 1990's. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 839 F.Supp. 1448, 1451 (Colo. 1993). Footnote 46Other business leaders agreed. For example, the chairman of the board and CEO of a major toy company explained: </s> "'Many in the corporate world view large soft money donations as a cost of doing business. ... I remain convinced that in some of the more publicized cases, federal officeholders actually appear to have sold themselves and the party cheaply. They could have gotten even more money, because of the potential importance of their decisions to the affected business.'" 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 491 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting declaration of Alan G. Hassenfeld, CEO, Hasbro, Inc., ¶ ;16; see 6-R Defs. Exhs., Tab 17). </s> Similarly the chairman emeritus of a major airline opined: </s> "'Though a soft money check might be made out to a political party, labor and business leaders know that those checks open the doors of the offices of individual and important Members of Congress and the Administration.... Labor and business leaders believe--based on experience and with good reason--that such access gives them an opportunity to shape and affect governmental decisions and that their ability to do so derives from the fact that they have given large sums of money to the parties.'" 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 498 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting Greenwald Decl. ¶ ;12, App. 283-284, ¶ ;10); 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 858-859 (Leon, J.) (same). Footnote 47Even more troubling is evidence in the record showing that national parties have actively exploited the belief that contributions purchase influence or protection to pressure donors into making contributions. As one CEO explained: </s> "'[I]f you're giving a lot of soft money to one side, the other side knows. For many economically-oriented donors, there is a risk in giving to only one side, because the other side may read through FEC reports and have staff or a friendly lobbyist call and indicate that someone with interests before a certain committee has had their contributions to the other side noticed. They'll get a message that basically asks: 'Are you sure you want to be giving only to one side? Don't you want to have friends on both sides of the aisle?' If your interests are subject to anger from the other side of the aisle, you need to fear that you may suffer a penalty if you don't give.... [D]uring the 1990's, it became more and more acceptable to call someone, saying you saw he gave to this person, so he should also give to you or the person's opponent.'" Id., at 510 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting Randlett Decl. ¶ ;12, App. 715); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 868 (Leon, J.) (same). Footnote 48In addition to finding no support in our recent cases, see, e.g., Colorado II, 453 U.S. 182 (1981), we upheld FECA's $5,000 limit on contributions to multicandidate political committees. It is no answer to say that such limits were justified as a means of preventing individuals from using parties and political committees as pass-throughs to circumvent FECA's $1,000 limit on individual contributions to candidates. Given FECA's definition of "contribution," the $5,000 and $25,000 limits restricted not only the source and amount of funds available to parties and political committees to make candidate contributions, but also the source and amount of funds available to engage in express advocacy and numerous other noncoordinated expenditures. If indeed the First Amendment prohibited Congress from regulating contributions to fund the latter, the otherwise-easy-to-remedy exploitation of parties as pass-throughs (e.g., a strict limit on donations that could be used to fund candidate contributions) would have provided insufficient justification for such overbroad legislation. Footnote 49At another point, describing our "flawed reasoning," Justice Kennedy seems to suggest that Congress' interest in regulating the appearance of corruption extends only to those contributions that actually "create ... corrupt donor favoritism among ... officeholders." Post, at 16. This latter formulation would render Congress' interest in stemming the appearance of corruption indistinguishable from its interest in preventing actual corruption. Footnote 50In support of this claim, the political party plaintiffs assert that, in 2001, the RNC spent $15.6 million of nonfederal funds (30% of the nonfederal amount raised that year) on purely state and local election activity, including contributions to state and local candidates, transfers to state parties, and direct spending. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 102-103 (statement of counsel Bobby R. Burchfield); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 336-337 (Henderson, J.); id., at 464-465 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 830 (Leon, J.). Footnote 51The close relationship of federal officeholders and candidates to their parties answers not only The Chief Justice's concerns about §323(a), but also his fear that our analysis of §323's remaining provisions bespeaks no limiting principle. Post, at 6-7 (dissenting opinion). As set forth in our discussion of those provisions, the record demonstrates close ties between federal officeholders and the state and local committees of their parties. That close relationship makes state and local parties effective conduits for donors desiring to corrupt federal candidates and officeholders. Thus, in upholding §§323(b), (d), and (f), we rely not only on the fact that they regulate contributions used to fund activities influencing federal elections, but also that they regulate contributions to or at the behest of entities uniquely positioned to serve as conduits for corruption. We agree with The Chief Justice that Congress could not regulate financial contributions to political talk show hosts or newspaper editors on the sole basis that their activities conferred a benefit on the candidate. Post, at 7 (dissenting opinion). Footnote 52Plaintiffs claim that the option of soliciting hard money for state and local candidates is an illusory one, since several States prohibit state and local candidates from establishing multiple campaign accounts, which would preclude them from establishing separate accounts for federal funds. See Cal. Fair Pol. Practs. Comm'n Advisory Op. A-91-448 (Dec. 16, 1991), 1991 WL 772902; Colo. Const., Art. XXVIII, §2(3); Iowa Code §56.5A (Supp. 2003); and Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3517.10(J) (Anderson Supp. 2002). Plaintiffs maintain that §323(a) combines with these state laws to make it impossible for state and local candidates to receive hard-money donations. But the challenge we are considering is a facial one, and on its face §323(a) permits solicitations. The fact that a handful of States might interfere with the mechanism Congress has chosen for such solicitations is an argument that may be addressed in an as-applied challenge. Footnote 53Even opponents of campaign finance reform acknowledged that "a prohibition of soft money donations to national party committees alone would be wholly ineffective." The Constitution and Campaign Reform: Hearings on S. 522 before the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, 106th Cong., 2d Sess., 301 (2000) (statement of Bobby R. Burchfield, Partner, Covington & Burling). Footnote 54Generic campaign activity promotes a political party rather than a specific candidate. 2 U.S.C.A. §431(21). Footnote 55A public communication is "a communication by means of any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication, newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising facility, mass mailing, or telephone bank to the general public, or any other form of general public political advertising." §431(22). Footnote 56So long as the communication does not constitute voter registration, voter identification, GOTV, or generic campaign activity. §431(20)(B)(i). Footnote 57Unless the contribution is earmarked for federal election activity. §431(20)(B)(ii). Footnote 58The statute gives the FEC responsibility for setting the allocation ratio. §441i(b)(2)(A); see also 11 CFR §300.33(b) (2003) (defining allocation ratios). Footnote 59One former Senator noted: </s> "'The fact is that much of what state and local parties do helps to elect federal candidates. The national parties know it; the candidates know it; the state and local parties know it. If state and local parties can use soft money for activities that affect federal elections, then the problem will not be solved at all. The same enormous incentives to raise the money will exist; the same large contributions by corporations, unions, and wealthy individuals will be made; the federal candidates who benefit from state party use of these funds will know exactly whom their benefactors are; the same degree of beholdenness and obligation will arise; the same distortions on the legislative process will occur; and the same public cynicism will erode the foundations of our democracy--except it will all be worse in the public's mind because a perceived reform was undercut once again by a loophole that allows big money into the system.'" 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 467 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting Rudman Decl. ¶ ;19, App. 746). Footnote 60E.g., 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 479 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) ("'It is ... not uncommon for the RNC to put interested donors in touch with various state parties. This often occurs when a donor has reached his or her federal dollar limits to the RNC, but wishes to make additional contributions to the state party'" (quoting declaration of Thomas Josefiak, RNC Chief Counsel ¶ ;68, App 308)); see also Colorado II, 533 U.S., at 458 (quoting Congressman Wayne Allard's Aug. 27, 1996, fundraising letter informing the recipient that "'you are at the limit of what you can directly contribute to my campaign,'" but "'you can further help my campaign by assisting the Colorado Republican Party'"); 251 F. Supp 2d, at 454 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) ("'Both political parties have found spending soft money with its accompanying hard money match through their state parties to work smoothly, for the most part, and state officials readily acknowledge they are simply 'pass throughs' to the vendors providing the broadcast ads or direct mail'" (quoting Magleby Expert Report 37, App. 1510-1511.)). Footnote 61The 1998 Senate Report found that, in exchange for a substantial donation to state Democratic committees and candidates, the DNC arranged meetings for the donor with the President and other federal officials. 1 1998 Senate Report 43-44; 2 id., at 2907-2931; 5 id., at 7519. That same Report also detailed how Native American tribes that operated casinos made sizable soft-money contributions to state Democratic committees in apparent exchange for access and influence. 1 id., at 44-46; 2 id., at 3167-3194; see also McCain Decl., Exh. I (Weisskopf, The Busy Back-Door Men, Time, Mar. 31, 1997, p. 40)). Footnote 62Since voter identification is a necessary precondition of any GOTV program, the findings regarding GOTV funding obviously apply with equal force to the funding of voter identification efforts. Footnote 63With respect to GOTV, voter identification, and other generic campaign activity, the FEC has interpreted §323(b) to apply only to those activities conducted after the earliest filing deadline for access to the federal election ballot or, in States that do not conduct primaries, after January 1 of even-numbered years. 11 CFR §100.24(a)(1) (2002). Any activities conducted outside of those periods are completely exempt from regulation under §323(b). Of course, this facial challenge does not present the question of the FEC regulations' constitutionality. But the fact that the statute provides this basis for the FEC reasonably to narrow §301(20)(A)(ii) further calls into question plaintiffs' claims of facial overbreadth. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). Footnote 64We likewise reject the argument that §301(20)(A)(iii) is unconstitutionally vague. The words "promote," "oppose," "attack," and "support" clearly set forth the confines within which potential party speakers must act in order to avoid triggering the provision. These words "provide explicit standards for those who apply them" and "give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109 (1972). This is particularly the case here, since actions taken by political parties are presumed to be in connection with election campaigns. See Buckley, 413 U.S. 548, 580 (1973). Footnote 65Any doubts that donors would engage in such a seemingly complex scheme are put to rest by the record evidence in Buckley itself. See n.6, supra (setting forth the Court of Appeals' findings regarding the efforts of milk producers to obtain a meeting with White House officials). Footnote 66Section 501(c) organizations are groups generally exempted from taxation under the Internal Revenue Code. 26 U.S.C. §501(a). These include §501(c)(3) charitable and educational organizations, as well as §501(c)(4) social welfare groups. Footnote 67Section 527 "political organizations" are, unlike §501(c) groups, organized for the express purpose of engaging in partisan political activity. They include any "party, committee, association, fund, or other organization (whether or not incorporated) organized and operated primarily for the purpose of directly or indirectly accepting contributions or making expenditures" for the purpose of "influencing or attempting to influence the selection, nomination, or appointment of any individual for Federal, State, or local public office." 26 U.S.C. §527(e). Footnote 68The record shows that many of the targeted tax-exempt organizations engage in sophisticated and effective electioneering activities for the purpose of influencing federal elections, including waging broadcast campaigns promoting or attacking particular candidates and conducting large-scale voter registration and GOTV drives. For instance, during the final weeks of the 2000 presidential campaign, the NAACP's National Voter Fund registered more than 200,000 people, promoted a GOTV hotline, ran three newspaper print ads, and made several direct mailings. 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 348-349 (Henderson, J.). The NAACP reports that the program turned out one million additional African-American voters and increased turnout over 1996 among targeted groups by 22% in New York, 50% in Florida, and 140% in Missouri. Ibid. The effort, which cost $10 million, was funded primarily by a $7 million contribution from an anonymous donor. Id., at 349 (citing cross-examination of Donald P. Green, Yale University 15-20, Exh. 3; see I Defs. Refiling Trs. on Pub. Record); 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 522 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (same); id., at 851 (Leon, J.) (same); see also id., at 349 (Henderson, J.) (stating that in 2000 the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League (NARAL) spent $7.5 million and mobilized 2.1 million pro-choice voters (citing declaration of Mary Jane Gallagher, Exec. V. P., NARAL, 8, App. 271-272, ¶ ;24)); 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 522 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (same). Footnote 69Notably, the FEC has interpreted §323(d)(2) to permit state, district, and local party committees to solicit donations to §527 organizations that are state-registered PACs, that support only state or local candidates, and that do not make expenditures or disbursements in connection with federal elections. 11 CFR §300.37(a)(3)(iv) (2003). The agency determined that this interpretation of "political committee"--at least with respect to state, district, and local committees--was consistent with BCRA's fundamental purpose of prohibiting soft money from being used in connection with federal elections. 67 Fed. Reg. 49106 (2002). Footnote 70Section 323(e)(1)(B) tightly constrains the ability of federal candidates and officeholders to solicit or spend nonfederal money in connection with state or local elections. Contributions cannot exceed FECA's analogous hard-money contribution limits or come from prohibited sources. In effect, §323(e)(1)(B) doubles the limits on what individuals can contribute to or at the behest of federal candidates and officeholders, while restricting the use of the additional funds to activities not related to federal elections. If the federal candidate or officeholder is also a candidate for state or local office, he or she may solicit, receive, and spend an unlimited amount of nonfederal money in connection with that election, subject only to state regulation and the requirement that such solicitation or expenditures refer only to the relevant state or local office. 2 U.S.C.A. §441i(e)(2). Footnote 71See 148 Cong. Rec. S2143 (Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. Feingold) (Section 323(f) does not prohibit "spending non-federal money to run advertisements that mention that [state or local candidates] have been endorsed by a Federal candidate or say that they identify with a position of a named Federal candidate, so long as those advertisements do not support, attack, promote or oppose the Federal candidate"). Footnote 72Justice Kennedy faults our "unwillingness" to confront that "Title I's entirety ... look[s] very much like an incumbency protection plan," citing §323(e), which provides officeholders and candidates with greater opportunities to solicit soft money than §§323(a) and (d) permit party officers. Post, at 23-24. But, §323(e) applies to both officeholders and candidates and allows only minimally greater opportunities for solicitation out of regard for the fact that candidates and officeholders, unlike party officers, can never step out of their official roles. Supra, at 70-71; 42 U.S.C.A. §441i(e). Any concern that Congress might opportunistically pass campaign-finance regulation for self-serving ends is taken into account by the applicable level of scrutiny. Congress must show concrete evidence that a particular type of financial transaction is corrupting or gives rise to the appearance of corruption and that the chosen means of regulation are closely drawn to address that real or apparent corruption. It has done so here. At bottom, Justice Kennedy has long disagreed with the basic holding of Buckley and its progeny that less rigorous scrutiny--which shows a measure of deference to Congress in an area where it enjoys particular expertise--applies to assess limits on campaign contributions. Colorado II, 533 U.S., at 465 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (joining Justice Thomas for the proposition that "Buckley should be overrruled" (citation omitted)); Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S., at 405-410 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Footnote 73BCRA also provides a "backup" definition of "electioneering communication," which would become effective if the primary definition were "held to be constitutionally insufficient by final judicial decision to support the regulation provided herein." 2 U.S.C.A. §434(f)(3)(A)(ii). We uphold all applications of the primary definition and accordingly have no occasion to discuss the backup definition. Footnote 74We then held that, so construed, the expenditure restriction did not advance a substantial government interest, because independent express advocacy did not pose a danger of real or apparent corruption, and the line between express advocacy and other electioneering activities was easily circumvented. Concluding that §608(e)(1)'s heavy First Amendment burden was not justified, we invalidated the provision. Buckley, 424 U.S., at 45-48. Footnote 75Our adoption of a narrowing construction was consistent with our vagueness and overbreadth doctrines. See Broadrick, 413 U.S., at 613; Grayned, 408 U.S., at 108-114. Footnote 76The provision at issue in MCFL--2 U.S.C. §441b (1982 ed.)--required corporations and unions to use separate segregated funds, rather than general treasury moneys, on expenditures made "'in connection with'" a federal election. MCFL, 479 U.S., at 241. We noted that Buckley had limited the statutory term "'expenditure'" to words of express advocacy "in order to avoid problems of overbreadth." 479 U.S., at 248. We held that "a similar construction" must apply to the expenditure limitation before us in MCFL and that the reach of 2 U.S.C. §441b was therefore constrained to express advocacy. 479 U.S., at 249 (emphasis added). Footnote 77As one major-party political consultant testified, "'it is rarely advisable to use such clumsy words as "vote for" or "vote against."'" 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 305 (Henderson, J.) (quoting declaration of Douglas L. Bailey, founder, Bailey, Deardourff & Assoc., 1-2, App. 24, ¶ ;3). He explained: "'All advertising professionals understand that the most effective advertising leads the viewer to his or her own conclusion without forcing it down their throat.'" 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 305 (Henderson, J.). Other political professionals and academics confirm that the use of magic words has become an anachronism. See id., at 531 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting declaration of Raymond D. Strother, Pres., Strother/Duffy/Strother ¶ ;4, 9 Defs. Exhs., Tab 40); see Unsealed Pp. Vol., Tab 7); App. 1334-1335 (Krasno & Sorauf Expert Report)); see also 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 305 (Henderson, J.); id., at 532 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 875-76 (Leon, J.). Footnote 78One striking example is an ad that a group called "Citizens for Reform" sponsored during the 1996 Montana congressional race, in which Bill Yellowtail was a candidate. The ad stated: </s> "Who is Bill Yellowtail? He preaches family values but took a swing at his wife. And Yellowtail's response? He only slapped her. But 'her nose was not broken.' He talks law and order ... but is himself a convicted felon. And though he talks about protecting children, Yellowtail failed to make his own child support payments--then voted against child support enforcement. Call Bill Yellowtail. Tell him to support family values." 5 1998 Senate Report 6305 (minority views). </s> The notion that this advertisement was designed purely to discuss the issue of family values strains credulity. Footnote 79As discussed below, infra, at 97-103, BCRA §203 bars corporations and labor unions from funding electioneering communications with money from their general treasuries, instead requiring them to establish a "separate segregated fund" for such expenditures. 2 U.S.C.A. §441b(b)(2). Footnote 80Section 401 of BCRA provides: </s> "If any provision of this Act or amendment made by this Act . . ., or the application of a provision or amendment to any person or circumstance, is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act and amendments made by this Act, and the application of the provisions and amendment to any person or circumstance, shall not be affected by the holding." 2 U.S.C.A. §454 note. Footnote 81The disclosure requirements that BCRA §201 added to FECA §304 are actually somewhat less intrusive than the comparable requirements that have long applied to persons making independent expenditures. For example, the previous version of §304 required groups making independent expenditures to identify donors who contributed more than $200. 2 U. S. C. §434(c)(2)(C) (2000 ed.). The comparable requirement in the amendments applies only to donors of $1,000 or more. 2 U.S.C.A. §§434(f)(2)(E), (F) (Supp. 2003). Footnote 82NAACP v. Alabama arose out of a judgment holding the NAACP in contempt for refusing to produce the names and addresses of its members and agents in Alabama. The NAACP "made an uncontroverted showing that on past occasions revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file members ha[d] exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility." 357 U.S., at 462. We thought it apparent that the compelled disclosure would "affect adversely" the NAACP and its members' ability "to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs which they admittedly have the right to advocate." Id., at 462-463. Under these circumstances, we concluded that Alabama's interest in determining whether the NAACP was doing business in the State was plainly insufficient to justify its production order. Id., at 464-466. Footnote 83We stated: </s> "The District Court properly applied the Buckley test to the facts of this case. The District Court found 'substantial evidence of both governmental and private hostility toward and harassment of [Socialist Workers Party (SWP)] members and supporters.' Appellees introduced proof of specific incidents of private and government hostility toward the SWP and its members within the four years preceding the trial. These incidents, many of which occurred in Ohio and neighboring States, included threatening phone calls and hate mail, the burning of SWP literature, the destruction of SWP members' property, police harassment of a party candidate, and the firing of shots at an SWP office. There was also evidence that in the 12-month period before trial 22 SWP members, including 4 in Ohio, were fired because of their party membership. Although appellants contend that two of the Ohio firings were not politically motivated, the evidence amply supports the District Court's conclusion that 'private hostility and harassment toward SWP members make it difficult for them to maintain employment.' The District Court also found a past history of Government harassment of the SWP." Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1982) (paragraph break omitted). Footnote 84We cannot judge the likelihood that this will occur, as the record contains little if any description of the contractual provisions that commonly govern payments for electioneering communications. Nor does the record contain any evidence relating to Justice Kennedy's speculation, post, at 39-40, that advance disclosure may disadvantage an advertiser. Footnote 85New FECA §315(a)(7)(C) reads as follows: </s> "if -- </s> "(i) any person makes, or contracts to make, any disbursement for any electioneering communication (within the meaning of section 434(f)(3) of this title); and </s> "(ii) such disbursement is coordinated with a candidate or an authorized committee of such candidate, a Federal, State, or local political party or committee thereof, or an agent or official of any such candidate, party, or committee; </s> such disbursement or contracting shall be treated as a contribution to the candidate supported by the electioneering communication or that candidate's party and as an expenditure by that candidate or that candidate's party. . . ." 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(a)(7)(C). Footnote 86We have explained: </s> "The statutory purpose of §441b ... is to prohibit contributions or expenditures by corporations or labor organizations in connection with federal elections. 2 U.S.C. §441b(a). The section, however, permits some participation of unions and corporations in the federal electoral process by allowing them to establish and pay the administrative expenses of 'separate segregated fund[s],' which may be 'utilized for political purposes.' 2 U.S.C. §441b(b)(2)(C). The Act restricts the operations of such segregated funds, however, by making it unlawful for a corporation to solicit contributions to a fund established by it from persons other than its 'stockholders and their families and its executive or administrative personnel and their families.' 2 U.S.C. §441b(b)(4)(A)." National Right to Work, 459 U.S., at 201-202. Footnote 87The amendment is straightforward. Prior to BCRA, FECA §316(a) made it "unlawful ... for any corporation whatever, or any labor organization, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with" certain federal elections. 2 U.S.C. §441b(a) (2000 ed.). BCRA amends FECA §316(b)(2)'s definition of the term "contribution or expenditure" to include "any applicable electioneering communication." 2 U.S.C.A. §441b(b)(2) (Supp. 2003). Footnote 88As Justice Kennedy emphasizes in dissent, post, at 44-45, we assume that the interests that justify the regulation of campaign speech might not apply to the regulation of genuine issue ads. The premise that apparently underlies Justice Kennedy's principal submission is a conclusion that the two categories of speech are nevertheless entitled to the same constitutional protection. If that is correct, Justice Kennedy must take issue with the basic holding in Buckley and, indeed, with our recognition in First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), that unusually important interests underlie the regulation of corporations' campaign-related speech. In Bellotti we cited Buckley, among other cases, for the proposition that "[p]reserving the integrity of the electoral process, preventing corruption, and 'sustain[ing] the active, alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of the government' are interests of the highest importance." 514 U.S. 334 (1995). Footnote 89In a different but somewhat related argument, one set of plaintiffs contends that political campaigns and issue advocacy involve press activities, and that BCRA therefore interferes with speakers' rights under the Freedom of the Press Clause. U.S. Const., Amdt. 1. We affirm the District Court's conclusion that this contention lacks merit. Footnote 90The statutory scheme is somewhat complex. In its provision dealing with "Rules Relating to Electioneering Communications," BCRA §203(c)(2) (adding FECA §316(c)(2)) makes a blanket exception for designated nonprofit organizations, which reads as follows: </s> "Exception </s> "Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the term 'applicable electioneering communication' does not include a communication by a section 501(c)(4) organization or a political organization (as defined in section 527(e)(1) of Title 26) made under section 434(f)(2)(E) or (F) of this title if the communication is paid for exclusively by funds provided directly by individuals who are United States citizens or nationals or lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as defined in section 1101(a)(20) of Title 8). For purposes of the preceding sentence, the term 'provided directly by individuals' does not include funds the source of which is an entity described in subsection (a) of this section." 2 U.S.C.A. §441b(c)(2) (Supp. 2003). </s> BCRA §204, however, amends FECA §316(c) to exclude "targeted communications" from that exception. New FECA §316(c)(6) states that the §316(c)(2) exception "shall not apply in the case of a targeted communication that is made by an organization described" in §316(b)(2). 2 U.S.C.A. ¶ ;441b(c)(6)(A). Subparagraph (B) then defines the term "targeted communication" for the purpose of the provision as including all electioneering communications. The parties and the judges on the District Court have assumed that amended FECA §316(c)(6) completely canceled the exemption for nonprofit corporations set forth in §316(c)(2). 251 F.Supp. 2d, at 804 (Leon, J.) ("Section 204 completely cancels out the exemption for all nonprofit corporations provided by Section 203"). Footnote 91"[A] unanimous Court in National Right to Work did not think the regulatory burdens on PACs, including restrictions on their ability to solicit funds, rendered a PAC unconstitutional as an advocacy corporation's sole avenue for making political contributions. See 459 U.S., at 201-202. There is no reason to think the burden on advocacy corporations is any greater today, or to reach a different conclusion here." Beaumont, 539 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 16). Footnote 92New FECA §304(g) provides: </s> "Time for reporting certain expenditures </s> "(1) Expenditures aggregating $1,000 </s> "(A) Initial report </s> "A person (including a political committee) that makes or contracts to make independent expenditures aggregating $1,000 or more after the 20th day, but more than 24 hours, before the date of an election shall file a report describing the expenditures within 24 hours. </s> "(B) Additional reports </s> "After a person files a report under subparagraph (A), the person shall file an additional report within 24 hours after each time the person makes or contracts to make independent expenditures aggregating an additional $1,000 with respect to the same election as that to which the initial report relates." 2 U.S.C.A. §434 (Supp. 2003). Footnote 93New FECA §315(d)(4) reads as follows: </s> "Independent versus coordinated expenditures by party </s> "(A) In general </s> "On or after the date on which a political party nominates a candidate, no committee of the political party may make-- </s> "(i) any coordinated expenditure under this subsection with respect to the candidate during the election cycle at any time after it makes any independent expenditure (as defined in section 431(17) of this title) with respect to the candidate during the election cycle; or </s> "(ii) any independent expenditure (as defined in section 431(17) of this title) with respect to the candidate during the election cycle at any time after it makes any coordinated expenditure under this subsection with respect to the candidate during the election cycle. </s> "(B) Application </s> "For purposes of this paragraph, all political committees established and maintained by a national political party (including all congressional campaign committees) and all political committees established and maintained by a State political party (including any subordinate committee of a State committee) shall be considered to be a single political committee. </s> "(C) Transfers </s> "A committee of a political party that makes coordinated expenditures under this subsection with respect to a candidate shall not, during an election cycle, transfer any funds to, assign authority to make coordinated expenditures under this subsection to, or receive a transfer of funds from, a committee of the political party that has made or intends to make an independent expenditure with respect to the candidate." 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(d)(4) (Supp. 2003). Footnote 94After exempting political parties from the general contribution and expenditure limitations of the statute, 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(d)(1), FECA §315(d) imposes the following substitute limitations on party spending: </s> "(2) The national committee of a political party may not make any expenditure in connection with the general election campaign of any candidate for President of the United States who is affiliated with such party which exceeds an amount equal to 2 cents multiplied by the voting age population of the United States (as certified under subsection (e) of this section). Any expenditure under this paragraph shall be in addition to any expenditure by a national committee of a political party serving as the principal campaign committee of a candidate for office of President of the United States. </s> "(3) The national committee of a political party, or a State committee of a political party, including any subordinate committee of a State committee, may not make any expenditure in connection with the general election campaign of a candidate for Federal office in a State who is affiliated with such party which exceeds-- </s> "(A) in the case of a candidate for election to the office of Senator, or of Representative from a State which is entitled to only one Representative, the greater of-- </s> "(i) 2 cents multiplied by the voting age population of the State (as certified under subsection (e) of this section); or </s> "(ii) $20,000; and </s> "(B) in the case of a candidate for election to the officer of Representative, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner in any other State, $10,000." 2 U.S.C. §§441a(d)(2)-(3). Footnote 95As amended by BCRA,§301(17) provides: </s> "Independent expenditure </s> "The term 'independent expenditure' means an expenditure by a person-- </s> "(A) expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate; and </s> "(B) that is not made in concert or cooperation with or at the request or suggestion of such candidate, the candidate's authorized political committee, or their agents, or a political party committee or its agents." 2 U.S.C.A. §431(17) (Supp. 2003). </s> The version of the definition prior to its amendment by BCRA also included the phrase "expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate." 2 U.S.C. §431(17) (2000 ed.). That definition had been adopted in 1976, presumably to reflect the narrowing construction that the Court adopted in Buckley. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, 90 Stat. 475. Footnote 96Although the District Court and all the parties to this litigation endorse the interpretation set forth in the text, it is not clear that subparagraph (B) should be read so broadly: The reference to "a State" instead of "the States" suggests that Congress meant to distinguish between committees associated with the party for each State (which would be grouped together by State, with each grouping treated as a single committee for purposes of the choice) and committees associated with a national party (which would likewise be grouped together and treated as a separate political committee). We need not resolve the interpretive puzzle, however, because even under the more limited reading a local party committee would be able to tie the hands of a state committee or other local committees in the same State. Footnote 97The italicized portion of the following partial quotation of FECA §315(a)(7) was added by §214 of BCRA: </s> "For purposes of this subsection-- </s> "(A) contributions to a named candidate made to any political committee authorized by such candidate to accept contributions on his behalf shall be considered to be contributions made to such candidate; </s> "(B)(i) expenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents, shall be considered to be a contribution to such candidate; </s> "(ii) expenditures made by any person (other than a candidate or candidate's authorized committee) in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, a national, State, or local committee of a political party, shall be considered to be contributions made to such party committee ...." 2 U.S.C.A. §441a(a)(7) (Supp. 2003). Footnote 98Pre-BCRA FEC regulations defined coordinated expenditures to include expenditures made "[a]t the request or suggestion of" a candidate or party; communications in which a candidate or party "exercised control or decision-making authority over the content, timing, location, mode, intended audience, volume of distribution, or frequency of placement"; and communications produced "[a]fter substantial discussion or negotiation" with a party or candidate, "the result of which is collaboration or agreement." 11 CFR §100.23(c)(2) (2001). Footnote 99Contrary to plaintiffs' contention, the statutory framework was not significantly different at the time of our decision in Buckley. The relevant provision, 18 U.S.C. §608(e)(1), treated as coordinated any expenditures "authorized or requested by the candidate." (Emphasis added.) And the legislative history, on which we relied for "guidance in differentiating individual expenditures that are contributions ... from those treated as independent expenditures," described as "independent" an expenditure made by a supporter "'completely on his own, and not at the request or suggestion of the candidate or his agen[t].'" 424 U.S., at 46-47, n. 53 (quoting S.Rep. No. 93-689, p.18 (1974)). FOOTNOTESFootnote **Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Souter join this opinion in its entirety. Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join this opinion, except with respect to BCRA §305. Justice Thomas joins this opinion with respect to BCRA §§304, 305, 307, 316, 319, and 403(b). Footnote 1To qualify for increased candidate contribution limits, the "opposition personal funds amount," which depends on expenditures by a candidate and her self-financed opponent, must exceed a "threshold amount." 2 U.S.C.A. §§441a(i)(1)(D), 441a-1(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 2003). Footnote 2If the "opposition personal funds amount" is at least 10 times the "threshold amount" in a Senate race, or exceeds $350,000 in a House of Representatives race, the coordinated party expenditure limits do not apply. §§441a(i)(1)(C)(iii), 441a-1(a)(1)(C). Footnote 3Although some examples were presented to the District Court, 251 F.Supp. 2d 176, 588-590 (2003) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.), none were offered to this Court. FOOTNOTESFootnote **Justice Stevens, Justice O'Connor, Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsburg join this opinion in its entirety. FOOTNOTESFootnote **Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy join this opinion in itsentirety. Footnote 1The Court points out that state parties may use Levin funds for certain activities. Levin funds, however, are still federal restrictions on speech, even if they are less onerous than the restrictions placed on national parties. Footnote 2Ironically, in the Court's view, Congress cannot be trusted to exercise judgment independent of its parties' large donors in its usual voting decisions because donations may be used to further its members' reelection campaigns, but yet must be deferred to when it passes a comprehensive regulatory regime that restricts election-related speech. It seems to me no less likely that Congress would create rules that favor its Members' reelection chances, than be corrupted by the influx of money to its political parties, which may in turn be used to fund a portion of the Members' reelection campaigns. Footnote 3The Court's suggestion that the "close relationship" between federal officeholders and state and local political parties in some way excludes the media from its rationale is unconvincing, see ante, at 24, n.15 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, concurring in result in part, and dissenting in part), particularly because such a relationship may be proved with minimal evidence. Indeed, although the Court concludes that local political parties have a "close relationship" with federal candidates, thus warranting greater congressional regulation, I am unaware of any evidence in the record that indicates that local political parties have any relationship with federal candidates. Footnote 4BCRA does not even close all of the "loopholes" that currently exist. Nonprofit organizations are currently able to accept, without disclosing, unlimited donations for voter registration, voter identification, and get-out-the-vote activities, and the record indicates that such organizations already receive large donations, sometimes in the millions of dollars, for these activities, 251 F.Supp. 2d 176, 323 (DC 2003) (Henderson, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the NAACP Voter Fund received a single, anonymous $7 million donation for get-out-the-vote activities). There is little reason why all donations to these nonprofit organizations, no matter the purpose for which the money is used, will deserve any more protection than the Court provides state parties if Congress decides to regulate them. And who knows what the next "loophole" will be. Footnote 5Section 315(e), as amended by BCRA §504, provides: </s> "Political record </s> "(1) In general </s> "A licensee shall maintain, and make available for public inspection, a complete record of a request to purchase broadcast time that-- </s> "(A) is made by or on behalf of a legally qualified candidate for public office; or </s> "(B) communicates a message relating to any political matter of national importance, including-- </s> "(i) a legally qualified candidate; </s> "(ii) any election to Federal office; or </s> "(iii) a national legislative issue of public importance. </s> "(2) Contents of record </s> "A record maintained under paragraph (1) shall contain information regarding-- </s> "(A) whether the request to purchase broadcast time is accepted or rejected by the licensee; </s> "(B) the rate charged for the broadcast time; </s> "(C) the date and time on which the communication is aired; </s> "(D) the class of time that is purchased; </s> "(E) the name of the candidate to which the communication refers and the office to which the candidate is seeking election, the election to which the communication refers, or the issue to which the communication refers (as applicable); </s> "(F) in the case of a request made by, or on behalf of, a candidate, the name of the candidate, the authorized committee of the candidate, and the treasurer of such committee; and </s> "(G) in the case of any other request, the name of the person purchasing the time, the name, and phone number of a contact person for such person, and a list of the chief executive officers or members of the executive committee or of the board of directors of such person. </s> "(3) Time to maintain file </s> "The information required under this subsection shall be placed in a political file as soon as possible and shall be retained by the licensee for a period of not less than 2 years." Footnote 6Communications relating to candidates will be covered by the new Communications Act §315(e)(1)(A), so, in this context, we must consider, for example, the plaintiff-organizations, which may attemptto use the broadcast medium to convey a message espoused by the organizations. FOOTNOTESFootnote **Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer join this opinion in itsentirety. Footnote †Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992). FOOTNOTESFootnote **It is disillusioning to learn that the fabled quote is inaccurate. Wilson actually said: "[F]or years I thought what was good for our country was good for General Motors, and vice versa. The difference did not exist." Hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1953). FOOTNOTESFootnote **Justice Scalia joins Parts I, II-A, and II-B of this opinion. Footnote 1The Court also rejected an overbreadth challenge, reasoning that "Congress was justified in concluding that the interest in safeguarding against the appearance of impropriety requires that the opportunity for abuse inherent in the process of raising large monetary contributions be eliminated." Buckley, 424 U.S., at 30. But this justification was inextricably intertwined with the Court's concern over the difficulty of isolating suspect contributions. If it were easy to isolate suspect contributions, and if bribery laws could be quickly and effectively enforced, then there would be no "opportunity for abuse inherent in the process," ibid., and hence no need for an otherwise overbroad contribution ceiling. Footnote 2Arguably, the current antibribery statute, 18 U.S.C. §201, is broad enough to cover the unspecified other "attempts ... to influence governmental action" that the Buckley Court seemed worried about. 424 U.S., at 28. Footnote 3Indeed, the principal contents of Senator McCain's declaration are his complaints that several bills he supported were defeated. The Senator also suggests, without evidence, that there had been some connection between the defeat of his favored policy outcomes and certain soft-money donors. See, e.g., App. 393-394, ¶ ;10 (declaration of Sen. John McCain ¶ ;10) (noting Democratic "parliamentary procedural device" used to block one of Senator McCain's proposed amendments to the Sarbanes-Oxley corporate governance bill). The possibility that his favored policy outcomes lost due to lack of public support, or because the opponents of the amendment honestly believed it would do harm to the public, does not appear to be addressed. Footnote 4Former Senators Simpson and Simon both seem to have the same response as Senator McCain, see n.3, supra, in having their favored interests voted down, and similarly do not consider alternative explanations for the failure of their proposals. See App. 811, ¶ ;11 (declaration of former Sen. Alan Simpson ¶ ;11); App. 805, ¶ ;14 (declaration of former Sen. Paul Simon ¶ ;14). Footnote 5Because there is not an iota of evidence supporting the Government's asserted interests in BCRA §318, I concur in the Court's conclusion that this provision is unconstitutional. Footnote 6The joint opinion continues yet another disturbing trend: the application of a complaisant level of scrutiny under the guise of "strict scrutiny." See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. ___ (2003). Footnote 7This is doubly so now that the Court has decided that there is no constitutional need for the showing even of an "agreement" in order to transform an expenditure into a "coordinated expenditur[e]" and hence into a contribution for FECA purposes. Ante, at 115-117 (joint opinion). Footnote 8The National Rifle Association (NRA) plaintiffs compellingly state that "[a]s a measure designed to prevent official corruption, of either the quid pro quo or the 'gratitude' variety, Title II ... makes no more sense than a bribery statute requiring corporations to pay for their bribes using funds from PACs." Brief for Appellants NRA etal. in No. 02-1675, pp.24-25. And, regarding the appearance of corruption: "Defendants' own witnesses concede that the public's perceptions of ads is not affected in the slightest by whether they are purchased with general treasury funds or with PAC money." Id., at 25. Footnote 9The fact that the Founders located the right to anonymous speech in the "freedom of the press" is of no moment, as "it makes little difference in terms of our analysis, which seeks to determine only whether the First Amendment, as originally understood, protects anonymous writing." McIntyre, 514 U.S., at 360 (Thomas, J., concurring). Footnote 10BCRA §212(a) is also unconstitutional. Although the plaintiffs only challenge the advance disclosure requirement of §212(a), by requiring disclosure of communications using express advocacy, the entire reporting requirement is unconstitutional for the same reasons that §201 is unconstitutional. Consequently, it follows that the advance disclosure provision is unconstitutional. </s> BCRA §§311 and 504 also violate the First Amendment. By requiring any television or radio advertisement that satisfies the definition of "electioneering communication" to include the identity of the sponsor, and even a "full-screen view of a representative of the political committee or other person making the statement" in the case of a television advertisement, new FECA §318, §311 is a virtual carbon copy of the law at issue in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (the only difference being the irrelevant distinction between a printed pamphlet and a television or radio advertisement). And §504 not only has the precise flaws of §201, but also sweeps broadly as well, covering any "message relating to any political matter of national importance, including ... a national legislative issue of public importance." Hence, both §§311 and 504 should be struck down. Footnote 11The Court, in upholding most of its provisions by concluding that the "express advocacy" limitation derived by Buckley is not a constitutionally mandated line, has, in one blow, overturned every Court of Appeals that has addressed this question (except, perhaps, one). See Clifton v. FEC, 114 F.3d 1309, 1312 (CA1 1997); Vermont Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376, 387 (CA2 2000); FEC v. Christian Action Network, Inc., 110 F.3d 1049, 1064 (CA4 1997); Chamber of Commerce v. Moore, 288 F.3d 187, 193 (CA5 2000); Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Williams, 187 F.3d 963, 968-970 (CA8 1999); Citizens for Responsible Govt. State Political Action Comm. v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1187 (CA10 2000). The one possible exception is the Ninth Circuit. See FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 862-863 (1987). Footnote 12After all, the constitutional avoidance doctrine counsels us to adopt constructions of statutes to "avoid decision of constitutional questions," not to deliberately create constitutional questions. United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 373 (1971); see also United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909). Footnote 13This very case is an excellent example of why such a bright-line rule is necessary. The Court, having "rejected the notion that the First Amendment requires Congress to treat so-called issue advocacy differently from express advocacy," ante, at 87-88, proceeds to uphold significant new restrictions on speech that is, in every sense of the word, pure issue-related speech. The Court abandons the bright-line rule, and now subjects political speech of virtually any kind to the risk of regulation by Congress. Footnote 14Chief Justice Burger presciently commented on precisely this point in First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 796-797 (1978) (citations omitted): </s> "In terms of 'unfair advantage in the political process' and 'corporate domination of the electoral process,' it could be argued that such media conglomerates as I describe pose a much more realistic threat to valid interests than do appellants and similar entities not regularly concerned with shaping popular opinion on public issues. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, [418 U.S. 241 (1974)]. In Tornillo, for example, we noted the serious contentions advanced that a result of the growth of modern media empires 'has been to place in a few hands the power to inform the American people and shape public opinion.' 418 U.S., at 250." Footnote 15It appears that "circumvention" of the campaign finance laws by exploiting media exemptions is already being planned by one of the plaintiffs in this litigation. See Theimer, NRA Seeks Status as News Outlet, Washington Post A09 (Dec. 7, 2003) (reporting that the NRA is looking to acquire a broadcast outlet and seeking to be classified as a news organization). Footnote 16Given the quality of the evidence the Court relies upon to uphold Title I, the evidence should not be hard to come by. See Kane & Preston, Fox Chief on Hot Seat, Roll Call (June 12, 2003) ("GOP leaders such as House Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R-Texas) have labeled CNN as the 'Communist News Network' and the 'Clinton News Network'--suggesting they only presented the liberal viewpoint and that of former President Clinton"); Jones, Fox News Moves from the Margins to the Mainstream, Shorenstein Center, Harvard (Dec. 1, 2002) (quoting Al Gore as describing Fox News and the Washington Times as "part and parcel of the Republican Party"). Footnote 17See also 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 151 (1769) ("The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state"). FOOTNOTESFootnote **The Chief Justice joins this opinion in its entirety. Justice Scalia joins this opinion except to the extent it upholds new FECA §323(e)and BCRA §202. Justice Thomas joins this opinion with respect to BCRA §213. Footnote †See also Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. ___, ___ (2003) (slip op., at 14) ("[T]he basic premise we have followed in setting First Amendment standards for reviewing political financial restrictions [is that] the level of scrutiny is based on the importance of the 'political activity at issue' to effective speech or political association"); California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 582 (2000) ("We can think of no heavier burden on a political party's associational freedom. Proposition 198 is therefore unconstitutional unless it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest").

United States Supreme Court GRAVER MFG. CO. v. LINDE CO.(1950) No. 2 Argued: March 30, 1950Decided: May 29, 1950 </s> 1. This Court affirms the finding of the two courts below that, under the doctrine of equivalents, certain flux claims of Jones patent No. 2,043,960, for an electric welding process and for fluxes, or compositions, to be used therewith were infringed. Pp. 606-612. </s> 2. The essence of the doctrine of equivalents is that one may not practice a fraud on a patent. P. 608. </s> 3. The doctrine of equivalents is founded on the theory that, if two devices do the same work in substantially the same way and accomplish substantially the same result, they are the same, even though they differ in name, form or shape. Pp. 608-609. </s> 4. In determining equivalents, consideration must be given to the purpose for which an ingredient is used in a patent, the qualities it has when combined with other ingredients, the functions which it is intended to perform, and whether persons reasonably skilled in the art would have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the patent with one that was. P. 609. </s> 5. A finding of equivalence is a determination of fact to be made by the trial court; and the trial court's decision should not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. Pp. 609-610. </s> 6. On the record in this case, involving a claim of a combination of alkaline earth metal silicate and calcium fluoride, the trial court was justified in finding that the substitution in the accused composition of manganese silicate (which is not an alkaline earth metal [339 U.S. 605, 606] silicate) for magnesium silicate (which is an alkaline earth metal silicate), where the two compositions were substantially identical in operation and result, was so insubstantial, in view of the technology and the prior art, that the patent was infringed under the doctrine of equivalents. Pp. 610-612. </s> The history of the case is summarized in the first paragraph of the opinion. On the aspect of the case involved in the rehearing, the prior decision of this Court is adhered to, p. 612. </s> Thomas v. Koykka argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were John F. Oberlin, Ashley M. Van Duzer, James R. Stewart and Charles L. Byron. </s> John T. Cahill and Richard R. Wolfe argued the cause for respondent. With them on the brief were James A. Fowler, Jr. and Loftus E. Becker. </s> MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Linde Air Products Co., owner of the Jones patent for an electric welding process and for fluxes to be used therewith, brought an action for infringement against Lincoln and the two Graver companies. The trial court held four flux claims valid and infringed and certain other flux claims and all process claims invalid. 75 U.S. P. Q. 231. The Court of Appeals affirmed findings of validity and infringement as to the four flux claims but reversed the trial court and held valid the process claims and the remaining contested flux claims. 167 F.2d 531. We granted certiorari, 335 U.S. 810 , and reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it reversed that of the trial court, and reinstated the District Court decree. 336 U.S. 271 . Rehearing was granted, limited to the question of infringement of the four valid flux claims and to the applicability of the doctrine of equivalents to findings of fact in this case. 337 U.S. 910 . [339 U.S. 605, 607] </s> At the outset it should be noted that the single issue before us is whether the trial court's holding that the four flux claims have been infringed will be sustained. Any issue as to the validity of these claims was unanimously determined by the previous decision in this Court and attack on their validity cannot be renewed now by reason of limitation on grant of rehearing. The disclosure, the claims, and the prior art have been adequately described in our former opinion and in the opinions of the courts below. </s> In determining whether an accused device or composition infringes a valid patent, resort must be had in the first instance to the words of the claim. If accused matter falls clearly within the claim, infringement is made out and that is the end of it. </s> But courts have also recognized that to permit imitation of a patented invention which does not copy every literal detail would be to convert the protection of the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing. Such a limitation would leave room for - indeed encourage - the unscrupulous copyist to make unimportant and insubstantial changes and substitutions in the patent which, though adding nothing, would be enough to take the copied matter outside the claim, and hence outside the reach of law. One who seeks to pirate an invention, like one who seeks to pirate a copyrighted book or play, may be expected to introduce minor variations to conceal and shelter the piracy. Outright and forthright duplication is a dull and very rare type of infringement. To prohibit no other would place the inventor at the mercy of verbalism and would be subordinating substance to form. It would deprive him of the benefit of his invention and would foster concealment rather than disclosure of inventions, which is one of the primary purposes of the patent system. [339 U.S. 605, 608] </s> The doctrine of equivalents evolved in response to this experience. The essence of the doctrine is that one may not practice a fraud on a patent. Originating almost a century ago in the case of Winans v. Denmead, 15 How. 330, it has been consistently applied by this Court and the lower federal courts, and continues today ready and available for utilization when the proper circumstances for its application arise. "To temper unsparing logic and prevent an infringer from stealing the benefit of an invention" 1 a patentee may invoke this doctrine to proceed against the producer of a device "if it performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result." Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 . The theory on which it is founded is that "if two devices do the same work in substantially the same way, and accomplish substantially the same result, they are the same, even though they differ in name, form, or shape." Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 . The doctrine operates not only in favor of the patentee of a pioneer or primary invention, but also for the patentee of a secondary invention consisting of a combination of old ingredients which produce new and useful results, Imhaeuser v. Buerk, 101 U.S. 647, 655 , although the area of equivalence may vary under the circumstances. See Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 414 -415, and cases cited; Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. 516, 556; Gould v. Rees, 15 Wall. 187, 192. The wholesome realism of this doctrine is not always applied in favor of a patentee but is sometimes used against him. Thus, where a device is so far changed in principle from a patented article that it performs the same or a similar function in a substantially different way, but nevertheless falls within the [339 U.S. 605, 609] literal words of the claim, the doctrine of equivalents may be used to restrict the claim and defeat the patentee's action for infringement. Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 568 . In its early development, the doctrine was usually applied in cases involving devices where there was equivalence in mechanical components. Subsequently, however, the same principles were also applied to compositions, where there was equivalence between chemical ingredients. Today the doctrine is applied to mechanical or chemical equivalents in compositions or devices. See discussions and cases collected in 3 Walker on Patents (Deller's ed. 1937) 489-492; Ellis, Patent Claims (1949) 59-60. </s> What constitutes equivalency must be determined against the context of the patent, the prior art, and the particular circumstances of the case. Equivalence, in the patent law, is not the prisoner of a formula and is not an absolute to be considered in a vacuum. It does not require complete identity for every purpose and in every respect. In determining equivalents, things equal to the same thing may not be equal to each other and, by the same token, things for most purposes different may sometimes be equivalents. Consideration must be given to the purpose for which an ingredient is used in a patent, the qualities it has when combined with the other ingredients, and the function which it is intended to perform. An important factor is whether persons reasonably skilled in the art would have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the patent with one that was. </s> A finding of equivalence is a determination of fact. Proof can be made in any form: through testimony of experts or others versed in the technology; by documents, including texts and treatises; and, of course, by the disclosures of the prior art. Like any other issue of fact, final determination requires a balancing of credibility, [339 U.S. 605, 610] persuasiveness and weight of evidence. It is to be decided by the trial court and that court's decision, under general principles of appellate review, should not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. Particularly is this so in a field where so much depends upon familiarity with specific scientific problems and principles not usually contained in the general storehouse of knowledge and experience. </s> In the case before us, we have two electric welding compositions or fluxes: the patented composition, Unionmelt Grade 20, and the accused composition, Lincolnweld 660. The patent under which Unionmelt is made claims essentially a combination of alkaline earth metal silicate and calcium fluoride; Unionmelt actually contains, however, silicates of calcium and magnesium, two alkaline earth metal silicates. Lincolnweld's composition is similar to Unionmelt's, except that it substitutes silicates of calcium and manganese - the latter not an alkaline earth metal - for silicates of calcium and magnesium. In all other respects, the two compositions are alike. The mechanical methods in which these compositions are employed are similar. They are identical in operation and produce the same kind and quality of weld. </s> The question which thus emerges is whether the substitution of the manganese which is not an alkaline earth metal for the magnesium which is, under the circumstances of this case, and in view of the technology and the prior art, is a change of such substance as to make the doctrine of equivalents inapplicable; or conversely, whether under the circumstances the change was so insubstantial that the trial court's invocation of the doctrine of equivalents was justified. </s> Without attempting to be all-inclusive, we note the following evidence in the record: Chemists familiar with the two fluxes testified that manganese and magnesium were similar in many of their reactions (R. 287, 669). There is testimony by a metallurgist that alkaline earth [339 U.S. 605, 611] metals are often found in manganese ores in their natural state and that they serve the same purpose in the fluxes (R. 831-832); and a chemist testified that "in the sense of the patent" manganese could be included as an alkaline earth metal (R. 297). Much of this testimony was corroborated by reference to recognized texts on inorganic chemistry (R. 332). Particularly important, in addition, were the disclosures of the prior art, also contained in the record. The Miller patent, No. 1,754,566, which preceded the patent in suit, taught the use of manganese silicate in welding fluxes (R. 969, 971). Manganese was similarly disclosed in the Armor patent, No. 1,467,825, which also described a welding composition (R. 1346). And the record contains no evidence of any kind to show that Lincolnweld was developed as the result of independent research or experiments. </s> It is not for this Court to even essay an independent evaluation of this evidence. This is the function of the trial court. And, as we have heretofore observed, "To no type of case is this . . . more appropriately applicable than to the one before us, where the evidence is largely the testimony of experts as to which a trial court may be enlightened by scientific demonstrations. This trial occupied some three weeks, during which, as the record shows, the trial judge visited laboratories with counsel and experts to observe actual demonstrations of welding as taught by the patent and of the welding accused of infringing it, and of various stages of the prior art. He viewed motion pictures of various welding operations and tests and heard many experts and other witnesses." 336 U.S. 271, 274 -275. </s> The trial judge found on the evidence before him that the Lincolnweld flux and the composition of the patent in suit are substantially identical in operation and in result. He found also that Lincolnweld is in all respects equivalent to Unionmelt for welding purposes. And he concluded that "for all practical purposes, manganese silicate [339 U.S. 605, 612] can be efficiently and effectually substituted for calcium and magnesium silicates as the major constituent of the welding composition." These conclusions are adequately supported by the record; certainly they are not clearly erroneous. 2 </s> It is difficult to conceive of a case more appropriate for application of the doctrine of equivalents. The disclosures of the prior art made clear that manganese silicate was a useful ingredient in welding compositions. Specialists familiar with the problems of welding compositions understood that manganese was equivalent to and could be substituted for magnesium in the composition of the patented flux and their observations were confirmed by the literature of chemistry. Without some explanation or indication that Lincolnweld was developed by independent research, the trial court could properly infer that the accused flux is the result of imitation rather than experimentation or invention. Though infringement was not literal, the changes which avoid literal infringement are colorable only. We conclude that the trial court's judgment of infringement respecting the four flux claims was proper, and we adhere to our prior decision on this aspect of the case. </s> Affirmed. </s> MR. JUSTICE MINTON took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 L. Hand in Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, 168 F.2d 691, 692. </s> [Footnote 2 Rule 52 (a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in part: "Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses." </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS concurs, dissenting. </s> I heartily agree with the Court that "fraud" is bad, "piracy" is evil, and "stealing" is reprehensible. But in [339 U.S. 605, 613] this case, where petitioners are not charged with any such malevolence, these lofty principles do not justify the Court's sterilization of Acts of Congress and prior decisions, none of which are even mentioned in today's opinion. </s> The only patent claims involved here describe respondent's product as a flux "containing a major proportion of alkaline earth metal silicate." The trial court found that petitioners used a flux "composed principally of manganese silicate." Finding also that "manganese is not an alkaline earth metal," the trial court admitted that petitioners' flux did not "literally infringe" respondent's patent. Nevertheless it invoked the judicial "doctrine of equivalents" to broaden the claim for "alkaline earth metals" so as to embrace "manganese." On the ground that "the fact that manganese is a proper substitute . . . is fully disclosed in the specification" of respondent's patent, it concluded that "no determination need be made whether it is a known chemical fact outside the teachings of the patent that manganese is an equivalent . . . ." Since today's affirmance unquestioningly follows the findings of the trial court, this Court necessarily relies on what the specifications revealed. 1 In so doing, it violates a direct mandate of Congress without even discussing that mandate. </s> R. S. 4888, as amended, 35 U.S.C. 33, provides that an applicant "shall particularly point out and distinctly claim the part, improvement, or combination which he claims as his invention or discovery." We have held in this very case that this statute precludes invoking the specifications to alter a claim free from ambiguous language, since "it is the claim which measures the grant [339 U.S. 605, 614] to the patentee." 2 Graver Mfg. Co. v. Linde Co., 336 U.S. 271, 277 . What is not specifically claimed is dedicated to the public. See, e. g., Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350, 352 . For the function of claims under R. S. 4888, as we have frequently reiterated, is to exclude from the patent monopoly field all that is not specifically claimed, whatever may appear in the specifications. See, e. g., Marconi Wireless Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 23 , and cases there cited. Today the Court tacitly rejects those cases. It departs from the underlying principle which, as the Court pointed out in White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51 , forbids treating a patent claim "like a nose of wax which may be turned and twisted in any direction, by merely referring to the specification, so as to make it include something more than, or something different from, what its words express. . . . The claim is a statutory requirement, prescribed for the very purpose of making the patentee define precisely what his invention is; and it is unjust to the public, as well as an evasion of the law, to construe it in a manner different from the plain import of its terms." Giving this patentee the benefit of a grant that it did not precisely claim is no less "unjust to the public" and no less an evasion of R. S. 4888 merely because done in the name of the "doctrine of equivalents." </s> In seeking to justify its emasculation of R. S. 4888 by parading potential hardships which literal enforcement might conceivably impose on patentees who had for some reason failed to claim complete protection for their discoveries, the Court fails even to mention the program for alleviation of such hardships which Congress itself [339 U.S. 605, 615] has provided. 35 U.S.C. 64 authorizes reissue of patents where a patent is "wholly or partly inoperative" due to certain errors arising from "inadvertence, accident, or mistake" of the patentee. And while the section does not expressly permit a patentee to expand his claim, this Court has reluctantly interpreted it to justify doing so. Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350, 353 -354. That interpretation, however, was accompanied by a warning that "Reissues for the enlargement of claims should be the exception and not the rule." Id. at 355. And Congress was careful to hedge the privilege of reissue by exacting conditions. It also entrusted the Patent Office, not the courts, with initial authority to determine whether expansion of a claim was justified, 3 and barred suits for retroactive infringement based on such expansion. Like the Court's opinion, this congressional plan adequately protects patentees from "fraud," "piracy," and "stealing." Unlike the Court's opinion, it also protects businessmen from retroactive infringement suits and judicial expansion of a monopoly sphere beyond that which a patent expressly authorizes. The plan is just, fair, and reasonable. In effect it is nullified by this decision undercutting what [339 U.S. 605, 616] the Court has heretofore recognized as wise safeguards. See Milcor Steel Co. v. Fuller Co., 316 U.S. 143, 148 . One need not be a prophet to suggest that today's rhapsody on the virtue of the "doctrine of equivalents" will, in direct contravention of the Miller case, supra, make enlargement of patent claims the "rule" rather than the "exception." </s> Whatever the merits of the "doctrine of equivalents" where differences between the claims of a patent and the allegedly infringing product are de minimis, colorable only, and without substance, that doctrine should have no application to the facts of this case. For the differences between respondent's welding substance and petitioners' claimed flux were not nearly so slight. The claims relied upon here did not involve any mechanical structure or process where invention lay in the construction or method rather than in the materials used. Rather they were based wholly on using particular materials for a particular purpose. Respondent's assignors experimented with several metallic silicates, including that of manganese. According to the specifications (if these are to be considered) they concluded that while several were "more or less efficacious in our process, we prefer to use silicates of the alkaline earth metals." Several of their claims which this Court found too broad to be valid encompassed manganese silicate; the only claims found valid did not. Yet today the Court disregards that crucial deficiency, holding those claims infringed by a composition of which 88.49% by weight is manganese silicate. </s> In view of the intense study and experimentation of respondent's assignors with manganese silicate, it would be frivolous to contend that failure specifically to include that substance in a precise claim was unintentional. Nor does respondent attempt to give that or any other explanation for its omission. But the similar use of manganese in prior expired patents, referred to in the Court's opinion, raises far more than a suspicion that its elimination [339 U.S. 605, 617] from the valid claims stemmed from fear that its inclusion by name might result in denial or subsequent invalidation of respondent's patent. </s> Under these circumstances I think petitioners had a right to act on the belief that this Court would follow the plain mandates of Congress that a patent's precise claims mark its monopoly boundaries, and that expansion of those claims to include manganese could be obtained only in a statutory reissue proceeding. The Court's ruling today sets the stage for more patent "fraud" and "piracy" against business than could be expected from faithful observance of the congressionally enacted plan to protect business against judicial expansion of precise patent claims. Hereafter a manufacturer cannot rely on what the language of a patent claims. He must be able, at the peril of heavy infringement damages, to forecast how far a court relatively unversed in a particular technological field will expand the claim's language after considering the testimony of technical experts in that field. To burden business enterprise on the assumption that men possess such a prescience bodes ill for the kind of competitive economy that is our professed goal. </s> The way specific problems are approached naturally has much to do with the decisions reached. A host of prior cases, to some of which I have referred, have treated the 17-year monopoly authorized by valid patents as a narrow exception to our competitive enterprise system. For that reason, they have emphasized the importance of leaving business men free to utilize all knowledge not preempted by the precise language of a patent claim. E. g., Sontag Stores Co. v. Nut Co., 310 U.S. 281 , and cases there cited. In the Sontag case Mr. Justice McReynolds, speaking for a unanimous Court, said in part: "In the case under consideration the patentee might have included in the application for the original patent, claims broad enough to embrace petitioner's accused machine, but did not. [339 U.S. 605, 618] This `gave the public to understand' that whatever was not claimed `did not come within his patent and might rightfully be made by anyone.'" Id. at 293. </s> The Court's contrary approach today causes it to retreat from this sound principle. The damages retroactively assessed against petitioners for what was authorized until today are but the initial installment on the cost of that retreat. </s> [Footnote 1 For this reason the tidbits of evidence painstakingly selected from the record by this Court have no significance, since the trial court avowedly did not look beyond the specifications themselves. </s> [Footnote 2 This Court's approval of the trial judge's resort to specifications is ironic as well as unfortunate. In its original opinion this Court rejected respondent's contention that the very language invoked here to support infringement should be applied to validate a claim otherwise too broad to be upheld. 336 U.S. 271, 277 . </s> [Footnote 3 "This provision was inserted in the law for the purpose of relieving the courts from the duty of ascertaining the exact invention of the patentee by inference and conjecture, derived from a laborious examination of previous inventions, and a comparison thereof with that claimed by him. This duty is now cast upon the Patent Office. There his claim is, or is supposed to be, examined, scrutinized, limited, and made to conform to what he is entitled to. If the office refuses to allow him all that he asks, he has an appeal. But the courts have no right to enlarge a patent beyond the scope of its claim as allowed by the Patent Office, or the appellate tribunal to which contested applications are referred. When the terms of a claim in a patent are clear and distinct (as they always should be), the patentee, in a suit brought upon the patent, is bound by it. Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568 ." Keystone Bridge Co. v. Phoenix Iron Co., 95 U.S. 274, 278 . </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting. </s> The Court applies the doctrine of equivalents in a way which subverts the constitutional and statutory scheme for the grant and use of patents. </s> The claims of the patent are limited to a flux "containing a major proportion of alkaline earth metal silicate." Manganese silicate, the flux which is held to infringe, is not an alkaline earth metal silicate. It was disclosed in the application and then excluded from the claims. It therefore became public property. See Mahn v. Harwood, 112 U.S. 354, 361 . It was, to be sure, mentioned in the specifications. But the measure of the grant is to be found in the claims, not in the specifications. Milcor Steel Co. v. Fuller Co., 316 U.S. 143, 145 , 146. The specifications can be used to limit but never to expand the claim. See McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 . </s> The Court now allows the doctrine of equivalents to erase those time-honored rules. Moreover, a doctrine which is said to protect against practicing "a fraud on a patent" is used to extend a patent to a composition which could not be patented. For manganese silicate had been covered by prior patents, now expired. Thus we end with a strange anomaly: a monopoly is obtained on an unpatented and unpatentable article. </s> [339 U.S. 605, 619]

United States Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. LOVASCO(1977) No. 75-1844 Argued: Decided: June 9, 1977 </s> More than 18 months after federal criminal offenses were alleged to have occurred, respondent was indicated for committing them. Beyond an investigative report made a month after the crimes were committed, little additional information was developed in the following 17 months. Claiming that the preindictment delay, during which material defense testimony had been lost, deprived him of due process, respondent moved to dismiss the indictment. The District Court, which found that the delay had not been explained or justified and was unnecessary and prejudicial to respondent, granted the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the delay, which it found was solely attributable to the Government's hope that other participants in the crime would be discovered, was unjustified. Held: The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the District Court's dismissal of the indictment. Pp. 788-797. </s> (a) Although the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment is applicable only after a person has been accused of a crime and statutes of limitations provide "`the primary guarantee against bringing overly stale criminal charges,'" United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 , those statutes do not fully define a defendant's rights with respect to events antedating the indictment, and the Due Process Clause has a limited role to play in protecting against oppressive delay. Pp. 788-789. </s> (b) While proof of prejudice makes a due process claim ripe for adjudication, it does not automatically validate such a claim, and the reasons for the delay must also be considered. Pp. 789-790. </s> (c) To prosecute a defendant following good-faith investigative delay, as apparently existed in this case, does not deprive him of due process even if his defense might have been somewhat prejudiced by the lapse of time. Prosecutors are under no duty to file charges as soon as probable cause exists but before they are satisfied that they will be able to establish a suspect's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Nor is there a constitutional requirement that charges must be filed after there is sufficient evidence to prove such guilt but before the investigation is complete. An immediate arrest or indictment might impair the prosecutors' ability to continue the investigation or obtain additional indictments, [431 U.S. 783, 784] would pressure prosecutors into resolving doubtful cases in favor of early (and possibly unwarranted) prosecutions, and would preclude full consideration of the desirability of not prosecuting in particular cases. Pp. 790-796. </s> 532 F.2d 59, reversed. </s> MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 797. </s> John P. Rupp argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Thornburgh, Deputy Solicitor General Frey, Jerome M. Feit, and Robert H. Plaxico. </s> Louis Gilden argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. </s> MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> We granted certiorari in this case to consider the circumstances in which the Constitution requires that an indictment be dismissed because of delay between the commission of an offense and the initiation of prosecution. </s> I </s> On March 6, 1975, respondent was indicted for possessing eight firearms stolen from the United States mails, and for dealing in firearms without a license. The offenses were alleged to have occurred between July 25 and August 31, 1973, more than 18 months before the indictment was filed. Respondent moved to dismiss the indictment due to the delay. </s> The District Court conducted a hearing on respondent's motion at which the respondent sought to prove that the delay was unnecessary and that it had prejudiced his defense. In an effort to establish the former proposition, respondent presented a Postal Inspector's report on his investigation that was prepared one month after the crimes were committed, [431 U.S. 783, 785] and a stipulation concerning the post-report progress of the probe. The report stated, in brief, that within the first month of the investigation respondent had admitted to Government agents that he had possessed and then sold five of the stolen guns, and that the agents had developed strong evidence linking respondent to the remaining three weapons. 1 The report also stated, however, that the agents had been unable to confirm or refute respondent's claim that he had found the guns in his car when he returned to it after visiting his son, a mail handler, at work. 2 The stipulation into which the Assistant United States Attorney entered indicated that little additional information concerning the crimes was uncovered in the 17 months following the preparation of the Inspector's report. 3 </s> To establish prejudice to the defense, respondent testified that he had lost the testimony of two material witnesses due to the delay. The first witness, Tom Stewart, died more than a year after the alleged crimes occurred. At the hearing [431 U.S. 783, 786] respondent claimed that Stewart had been his source for two or three of the guns. The second witness, respondent's brother, died in April 1974, eight months after the crimes were completed. Respondent testified that his brother was present when respondent called Stewart to secure the guns, and witnessed all of respondent's sales. Respondent did not state how the witnesses would have aided the defense had they been willing to testify. 4 </s> The Government made no systematic effort in the District Court to explain its long delay. The Assistant United States Attorney did expressly disagree, however, with defense counsel's suggestion that the investigation had ended after the Postal Inspector's report was prepared. App. 9-10. The prosecutor also stated that it was the Government's theory that respondent's son, who had access to the mail at the rail-road terminal from which the guns were "possibly stolen," id., at 17, was responsible for the thefts, id., at 13. 5 Finally, the prosecutor elicited somewhat cryptic testimony from the Postal Inspector indicating that the case "as to these particular weapons involves other individuals"; that information had been presented to a grand jury "in regard to this case other than . . . [on] the day of the indictment itself"; and that he had spoken to the prosecutors about the case on four or five occasions. Id., at 20. </s> Following the hearing, the District Court filed a brief opinion and order. The court found that by October 2, 1973, the date of the Postal Inspector's report, "the Government had [431 U.S. 783, 787] all the information relating to defendant's alleged commission of the offenses charged against him," and that the 17-month delay before the case was presented to the grand jury "had not been explained or justified" and was "unnecessary and unreasonable." The court also found that "[a]s a result of the delay defendant has been prejudiced by reason of the death of Tom Stewart, a material witness on his behalf." Pet. for Cert. 14a. Accordingly, the court dismissed the indictment. </s> The Government appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. In its brief the Government explained the months of inaction by stating: </s> "[T]here was a legitimate Government interest in keeping the investigation open in the instant case. The defendant's son worked for the Terminal Railroad and had access to mail. It was the Government's position that the son was responsible for the theft and therefore further investigation to establish this fact was important. </s> ". . . Although the investigation did not continue on a full time basis, there was contact between the United States Attorney's office and the Postal Inspector's office throughout . . . and certain matters were brought before a Federal Grand Jury prior to the determination that the case should be presented for indictment . . . ." Brief for United States in No. 75-1852 (CA8), pp. 5-6. </s> The Court of Appeals accepted the Government's representation as to the motivation for the delay, but a majority of the court nevertheless affirmed the District Court's finding that the Government's actions were "unjustified, unnecessary, and unreasonable." 532 F.2d 59, 61 (1976). The majority also found that respondent had established that his defense had been impaired by the loss of Stewart's testimony because it understood respondent to contend that "were Stewart's testimony available it would support [respondent's] claim that he did not know that the guns were stolen from the United States [431 U.S. 783, 788] mails." Ibid. The court therefore affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the three possession counts by a divided vote. 6 </s> We granted certiorari, 429 U.S. 884 , and now reverse. 7 </s> II </s> In United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971), this Court considered the significance, for constitutional purposes, of a lengthy preindictment delay. We held that as far as the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment is concerned, such delay is wholly irrelevant, since our analysis of the language, history, and purposes of the Clause persuaded us that only "a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge . . . engage the particular protections" of [431 U.S. 783, 789] that provision. Id., at 320. 8 We went on to note that statutes of limitations, which provide predictable, legislatively enacted limits on prosecutorial delay, provide "`the primary guarantee against bringing overly stale criminal charges.'" Id., at 322, quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 122 (1966). But we did acknowledge that the "statute of limitations does not fully define [defendants'] rights with respect to the events occurring prior to indictment," 404 U.S., at 324 , and that the Due Process Clause has a limited role to play in protecting against oppressive delay. </s> Respondent seems to argue that due process bars prosecution whenever a defendant suffers prejudice as a result of preindictment delay. To support that proposition respondent relies on the concluding sentence of the Court's opinion in Marion where, in remanding the case, we stated that "[e]vents of the trial may demonstrate actual prejudice, but at the present time appellees' due process claims are speculative and premature." Id., at 326. But the quoted sentence establishes only that proof of actual prejudice makes a due process claim concrete and ripe for adjudication, not that it makes the claim automatically valid. Indeed, two pages earlier in the opinion we expressly rejected the argument respondent advances here: </s> "[W]e need not . . . determine when and in what circumstances actual prejudice resulting from preaccusation delays requires the dismissal of the prosecution. Actual [431 U.S. 783, 790] prejudice to the defense of a criminal case may result from the shortest and most necessary delay; and no one suggests that every delay-caused detriment to a defendant's case should abort a criminal prosecution." Id., at 324-325. (Footnotes omitted.) </s> Thus Marion makes clear that proof of prejudice is generally a necessary but not sufficient element of a due process claim, and that the due process inquiry must consider the reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused. </s> The Court of Appeals found that the sole reason for the delay here was "a hope on the part of the Government that others might be discovered who may have participated in the theft . . . ." 532 F.2d, at 61. It concluded that this hope did not justify the delay, and therefore affirmed the dismissal of the indictment. But the Due Process Clause does not permit courts to abort criminal prosecutions simply because they disagree with a prosecutor's judgment as to when to seek an indictment. Judges are not free, in defining "due process," to impose on law enforcement officials our "personal and private notions" of fairness and to "disregard the limits that bind judges in their judicial function." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170 (1952). Our task is more circumscribed. We are to determine only whether the action complained of - here, compelling respondent to stand trial after the Government delayed indictment to investigate further - violates those "fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions," Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935), and which define "the community's sense of fair play and decency," Rochin v. California, supra, at 173. See also Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 526 (1973); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941); Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884). </s> It requires no extended argument to establish that prosecutors do not deviate from "fundamental conceptions of [431 U.S. 783, 791] justice" when they defer seeking indictments until they have probable cause to believe an accused is guilty; indeed it is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to recommend an indictment on less than probable cause. 9 It should be equally obvious that prosecutors are under no duty to file charges as soon as probable cause exists but before they are satisfied they will be able to establish the suspect's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. To impose such a duty "would have a deleterious effect both upon the rights of the accused and upon the ability of society to protect itself," United States v. Ewell, supra, at 120. From the perspective of potential defendants, requiring prosecutions to commence when probable cause is established is undesirable because it would increase the likelihood of unwarranted charges being filed, and would add to the time during which defendants stand accused but untried. 10 These costs are by no means insubstantial since, as we recognized in Marion, a formal accusation may "interfere with the defendant's liberty, . . . disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends." 404 U.S., at 320 . From the perspective of law enforcement officials, a requirement of immediate prosecution upon probable cause is equally unacceptable because it could make obtaining proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt impossible [431 U.S. 783, 792] by causing potentially fruitful sources of information to evaporate before they are fully exploited. 11 And from the standpoint of the courts, such a requirement is unwise because it would cause scarce resources to be consumed on cases that prove to be insubstantial, or that involve only some of the responsible parties or some of the criminal acts. 12 Thus, no one's interests would be well served by compelling prosecutors to initiate prosecutions as soon as they are legally entitled to do so. 13 </s> It might be argued that once the Government has assembled sufficient evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it should be constitutionally required to file charges promptly, even if its investigation of the entire criminal transaction is not complete. Adopting such a rule, however, would have many of the same consequences as adopting a rule requiring immediate prosecution upon probable cause. </s> First, compelling a prosecutor to file public charges as soon as the requisite proof has been developed against one [431 U.S. 783, 793] participant on one charge would cause numerous problems in those cases in which a criminal transaction involves more than one person or more than one illegal act. In some instances, an immediate arrest or indictment would impair the prosecutor's ability to continue his investigation, thereby preventing society from bringing lawbreakers to justice. In other cases, the prosecutor would be able to obtain additional indictments despite an early prosecution, but the necessary result would be multiple trials involving a single set of facts. Such trials place needless burdens on defendants, law enforcement officials, and courts. </s> Second, insisting on immediate prosecution once sufficient evidence is developed to obtain a conviction would pressure prosecutors into resolving doubtful cases in favor of early - and possibly unwarranted - prosecutions. The determination of when the evidence available to the prosecution is sufficient to obtain a conviction is seldom clear-cut, and reasonable persons often will reach conflicting conclusions. In the instant case, for example, since respondent admitted possessing at least five of the firearms, the primary factual issue in dispute was whether respondent knew the guns were stolen as required by 18 U.S.C. 1708. Not surprisingly, the Postal Inspector's report contained no direct evidence bearing on this issue. The decision whether to prosecute, therefore, required a necessarily subjective evaluation of the strength of the circumstantial evidence available and the credibility of respondent's denial. Even if a prosecutor concluded that the case was weak and further investigation appropriate, he would have no assurance that a reviewing court would agree. To avoid the risk that a subsequent indictment would be dismissed for preindictment delay, the prosecutor might feel constrained to file premature charges, with all the disadvantages that would entail. 14 </s> [431 U.S. 783, 794] </s> Finally, requiring the Government to make charging decisions immediately upon assembling evidence sufficient to establish guilt would preclude the Government from giving full consideration to the desirability of not prosecuting in particular cases. The decision to file criminal charges, with the awesome consequences it entails, requires consideration of a wide range of factors in addition to the strength of the Government's case, in order to determine whether prosecution would be in the public interest. 15 Prosecutors often need more information than proof of a suspect's guilt, therefore, before deciding whether to seek an indictment. Again the instant case provides a useful illustration. Although proof of the identity of the mail thieves was not necessary to convict respondent of the possessory crimes with which he was charged, it might have been crucial in assessing respondent's culpability, as distinguished from his legal guilt. If, for example, further investigation were to show that respondent had no role in or advance knowledge of the theft and simply [431 U.S. 783, 795] agreed, out of paternal loyalty, to help his son dispose of the guns once respondent discovered his son had stolen them, the United States Attorney might have decided not to prosecute, especially since at the time of the crime respondent was over 60 years old and had no prior criminal record. 16 Requiring prosecution once the evidence of guilt is clear, however, could prevent a prosecutor from awaiting the information necessary for such a decision. </s> We would be most reluctant to adopt a rule which would have these consequences absent a clear constitutional command to do so. We can find no such command in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In our view, investigative delay is fundamentally unlike delay undertaken by the Government solely "to gain tactical advantage over the accused," United States v. Marion, 404 U.S., at 324 , precisely because investigative delay is not so one-sided. 17 Rather than deviating from elementary standards of "fair play and decency," a prosecutor abides by them if he refuses to seek indictments until he is completely satisfied that he should prosecute and will be able promptly to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Penalizing prosecutors who defer action for these reasons would subordinate the goal of "orderly expedition" to that of "mere speed," Smith v. United States, [431 U.S. 783, 796] 360 U.S. 1, 10 (1959). This the Due Process Clause does not require. We therefore hold that to prosecute a defendant following investigative delay does not deprive him of due process, even if his defense might have been somewhat prejudiced by the lapse of time. </s> In the present case, the Court of Appeals stated that the only reason the Government postponed action was to await the results of additional investigation. Although there is, unfortunately, no evidence concerning the reasons for the delay in the record, the court's "finding" is supported by the prosecutor's implicit representation to the District Court, and explicit representation to the Court of Appeals, that the investigation continued during the time that the Government deferred taking action against respondent. The finding is, moreover, buttressed by the Government's repeated assertions in its petition for certiorari, its brief, and its oral argument in this Court, "that the delay was caused by the government's efforts to identify persons in addition to respondent who may have participated in the offenses." Pet. for Cert. 14. 18 We must assume that these statements by counsel have been made in good faith. In light of this explanation, it follows that compelling respondent to stand trial would not be fundamentally unfair. The Court of Appeals therefore erred in affirming the District Court's decision dismissing the indictment. </s> III </s> In Marion we conceded that we could not determine in the abstract the circumstances in which preaccusation delay would require dismissing prosecutions. 404 U.S., at 324 . More than five years later, that statement remains true. Indeed, in the intervening years so few defendants have established that they were prejudiced by delay that neither this Court [431 U.S. 783, 797] nor any lower court has had a sustained opportunity to consider the constitutional significance of various reasons for delay. 19 We therefore leave to the lower courts, in the first instance, the task of applying the settled principles of due process that we have discussed to the particular circumstances of individual cases. We simply hold that in this case the lower courts erred in dismissing the indictment. </s> Reversed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The report indicated that the person to whom respondent admitted selling five guns had told Government agents that respondent had actually sold him eight guns which he, in turn, had sold to one Martin Koehnken. The report also indicated that Koehnken had sold three of these guns to undercover federal agents and that a search of his house had uncovered four others. Finally the report stated that the eighth gun was sold by one David Northdruft (or Northdurft) to Government agents, and that Northdruft claimed Koehnken had sold him the gun. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, respondent for the first time admitted that he had possessed and sold eight guns. </s> [Footnote 2 The only contrary evidence came from respondent's purchaser who told the Government investigators that he knew the guns were "hot." </s> [Footnote 3 In March 1975, the Inspector learned of another person who claimed to have purchased a gun from respondent. App. 18. At the hearing the parties disagreed as to whether this evidence would have been admissible since it did not involve any of the guns to which the indictment related. Id., at 9-10. In any event, the Assistant United States Attorney stated that the decision to prosecute was made before this additional piece of evidence was received. Id., at 19. </s> [Footnote 4 Respondent admitted that he had not mentioned Stewart to the Postal Inspector when he was questioned about his source of the guns. He explained that this was because Stewart "was a bad tomato" and "was liable to take a shot at me if I told [on] him." Id., at 13. Respondent also conceded that he did not mention either his brother's or Stewart's illness or death to the Postal Inspector on the several occasions in which respondent called the Inspector to inquire about the status of the probe. </s> [Footnote 5 The Inspector's report had stated that there was no evidence establishing the son's responsibility for the thefts. </s> [Footnote 6 The court unanimously reversed the dismissal of a fourth count of the indictment charging respondent with dealing in firearms without a license since respondent had not alleged that the missing witnesses could have provided exculpatory evidence on this charge. </s> [Footnote 7 In addition to challenging the Court of Appeals' holding on the constitutional issue, the United States argues that the District Court should have deferred action on the motion to dismiss until after trial, at which time it could have assessed any prejudice to the respondent in light of the events at trial. This argument, however, was not raised in the District Court or in the Court of Appeals. Absent exceptional circumstances, we will not review it here. See, e. g., Duignan v. United States, 274 U.S. 195, 200 (1927); Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317, 330 (1967). At oral argument, the Government seemed to suggest that its failure to raise the procedural question in its brief in the Court of Appeals should be excused because the proceedings in that court were "skewed" by the fact that the District Court had based its dismissal solely on Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 48 (b), and because the issue was raised by the Government in its petition for rehearing. Tr. of Oral Arg. 7-8, 51. But even assuming that the basis for the District Court's dismissal could have "skewed" appellate proceedings regarding the procedural question, the fact is that the opening paragraph of the argument in the Government's brief below recognized that the only issue before the court was a due process question, [431 U.S. 783, 789] and the remainder of the brief treated that question on the merits. And even after the Court of Appeals issued its decision based solely on the Due Process Clause, the Government's petition for rehearing did not squarely raise the procedural issue as an alternative ground for rehearing the case en banc. </s> [Footnote 8 Marion also holds that Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 48 (b), which permits district courts to dismiss indictments due to preindictment or postindictment delay, is "limited to post-arrest situations." 404 U.S., at 319 . Since respondent was not arrested until after he was indicted, the District Court plainly erred in basing its decision on this Rule. </s> [Footnote 9 ABA Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-103 (A) (1969); ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, The Prosecution Function 3.9 (App. Draft 1971). </s> [Footnote 10 To the extent that the period between accusation and trial has been strictly limited by legislative action, see, e. g., Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 2076, 18 U.S.C. 3161 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. V), compelling immediate prosecutions upon probable cause would not add to the time during which defendants stand accused, but would create a risk of guilty persons escaping punishment simply because the Government was unable to move from probable cause to guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in the short time available to it. Even absent a statute, of course, the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment imposes restraints on the length of post-accusation delay. </s> [Footnote 11 Cf. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 431 (1976) (POWELL, J., concurring) ("Good police practice often requires postponing an arrest, even after probable cause has been established, in order to place the suspect under surveillance or otherwise develop further evidence necessary to prove guilt to a jury"). </s> [Footnote 12 Defendants also would be adversely affected by trials involving less than all of the criminal acts for which they are responsible, since they likely would be subjected to multiple trials growing out of the same transaction or occurrence. </s> [Footnote 13 See also Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966), quoted in United States v. Marion, 404 U.S., at 325 n. 18: "There is no constitutional right to be arrested. The police are not required to guess at their peril the precise moment at which they have probable cause to arrest a suspect, risking a violation of the Fourth Amendment if they act too soon, and a violation of the Sixth Amendment if they wait too long. Law enforcement officers are under no constitutional duty to call a halt to a criminal investigation the moment they have the minimum evidence to establish probable cause, a quantum of evidence which may fall far short of the amount necessary to support a criminal conviction." </s> [Footnote 14 In addition, if courts were required to decide in every case when the prosecution should have commenced, it would be necessary for them to [431 U.S. 783, 794] trace the day-by-day progress of each investigation. Maintaining daily records would impose an administrative burden on prosecutors, and reviewing them would place an even greater burden on the courts. See also United States v. Marion, supra, at 321 n. 13. </s> [Footnote 15 See, e. g., The Prosecution Function, supra, n. 9, at 3.9 (b): "The prosecutor is not obliged to present all charges which the evidence might support. The prosecutor may in some circumstances and for good cause consistent with the public interest decline to prosecute, notwithstanding that evidence may exist which would support a conviction. Illustrative of the factors which the prosecutor may properly consider in exercising his discretion are: "(i) the prosecutor's reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact guilty; "(ii) the extent of the harm caused by the offense; "(iii) the disproportion of the authorized punishment in relation to the particular offense or the offender; "(iv) possible improper motives of a complainant; "(v) reluctance of the victim to testify; "(vi) cooperation of the accused in the apprehension or conviction of others; "(vii) availability and likelihood of prosecution by another jurisdiction." </s> [Footnote 16 Of course, in this case further investigation proved unavailing and the United States Attorney ultimately decided to prosecute based solely on the Inspector's report. But this fortuity cannot transform an otherwise permissible delay into an impermissible one. </s> [Footnote 17 In Marion we noted with approval that the Government conceded that a "tactical" delay would violate the Due Process Clause. The Government renews that concession here, Brief for United States 32, and expands it somewhat by stating: "A due process violation might also be made out upon a showing of prosecutorial delay incurred in reckless disregard of circumstances, known to the prosecution; suggesting that there existed an appreciable risk that delay would impair the ability to mount an effective defense," id., at 32-33, n. 25. As the Government notes, however, there is no evidence of recklessness here. </s> [Footnote 18 See also Pet. for Cert. 4, 8; Brief for United States 3, 8, 38; Tr. of Oral Arg. 4, 7, 10, 47. </s> [Footnote 19 Professor Amsterdam has catalogued some of the noninvestigative reasons for delay: "[P]roof of the offense may depend upon the testimony of an undercover informer who maintains his `cover' for a period of time before surfacing to file charges against one or more persons with whom he has dealt while disguised. . . . [I]f there is more than one possible charge against a suspect, some of them may be held back pending the disposition of others, in order to avoid the burden upon the prosecutor's office of handling charges that may turn out to be unnecessary to obtain the degree of punishment that the prosecutor seeks. There are many other motives for delay, of course, including some sinister ones, such as a desire to postpone the beginning of defense investigation, or the wish to hold a `club' over the defendant. "Additional reasons for delay may be partly or completely beyond the control of the prosecuting authorities. Offenses may not be immediately reported; investigation may not immediately identify the offender; an identified offender may not be immediately apprehendable. . . . [A]n indictment may be delayed for weeks or even months until the impaneling of the next grand jury. It is customary to think of these delays as natural and inevitable . . . but various prosecutorial decisions - such as the assignment of manpower and priorities among investigations of known offenses - may also affect the length of such delays." Speedy Criminal Trial: Rights and Remedies, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 525, 527-728 (1975). See also Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 45 -46, n. 9 (1970) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). </s> MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. </s> If the record presented the question which the Court decides today, I would join its well-reasoned opinion. I am unable [431 U.S. 783, 798] to do so because I believe our review should be limited to the facts disclosed by the record developed in the District Court and the traditional scope of review we have exercised with regard to issues of fact. </s> After a thorough hearing on the respondent's motion to dismiss the indictment for prejudicial preindictment delay - a hearing at which both sides were given every opportunity to submit evidence concerning the question - the District Court found that "[t]he Government's delay ha[d] not been explained or justified and [was] unnecessary and unreasonable." On appeal, the Court of Appeals concurred, noting that the District Court's determination was "supported by the evidence." 532 F.2d 59, 60-61 (CA8 1976). These concurrent findings of fact make it improper, in my judgment, for this Court to make its own determination that "the Government postponed action . . . to await the results of additional investigation," ante, at 796. 1 </s> That determination is not supported by the record. 2 The [431 U.S. 783, 799] majority opinion correctly points out that there was "no evidence concerning the reasons for delay in the record," and yet proceeds to accept as fact the representations in the Government's briefs to the Court of Appeals and to this Court that "`the delay was caused by the government's efforts to identify persons in addition to respondent who may have participated in the offenses.'" Ibid. This finding of a continuing investigation, which forms the foundation of the majority opinion, comes from statements of counsel made during the appellate process. As we have said of other unsworn statements which were not part of the record and therefore could not have been considered by the trial court: "Manifestly, [such statements] cannot be properly considered by us in the disposition of [a] case." Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 -158, n. 16. While I do not question the good faith of Government counsel, it is not the business of appellate courts to make decisions on the basis of unsworn matter not incorporated in a formal record. </s> The findings of the District Court, as approved by the Court of Appeals, establish four relevant propositions: (1) this is a routine prosecution; (2) after the Government assembled all of the evidence on which it expects to establish respondent's guilt, it waited almost 18 months to seek an indictment; (3) the delay was prejudicial to respondent's defense; and (4) no reason whatsoever explains the delay. We may reasonably infer that the prosecutor was merely busy with other matters that he considered more important than this case. </s> The question presented by those facts is not an easy one. Nevertheless, unless we are to conclude that the Constitution imposes no constraints on the prosecutor's power to postpone the filing of formal charges to suit his own convenience, I believe we must affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. A contrary position "can be tenable only if one assumes that the constitutional right to a fair hearing includes no right [431 U.S. 783, 800] whatsoever to a prompt hearing." Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 91 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). The requirement of speedy justice has been part of the Anglo-American common-law tradition since the Magna Carta. See id., at 92 n. 5. It came to this country and was embodied in the early state constitutions, see the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, Part I, Art. XI, and later in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As applied to this case, in which respondent made numerous anxious inquiries of the Postal Inspectors concerning whether he would be indicted, in which the delay caused substantial prejudice to the respondent, and in which the Government has offered no justification for the delay, the right to speedy justice should be honored. </s> If that right is not honored in a case of this kind, the basic values which the Framers intended to protect by the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a speedy trial, and which motivated Congress to enact the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, will become nothing more than managerial considerations for the prosecutor to manipulate. </s> I respectfully dissent. </s> [Footnote 1 It is a settled rule of this Court that we will not review concurrent findings of fact by two courts "`in the absence of a very obvious and exceptional showing of error.'" Berenyi v. Immigration Director, 385 U.S. 630, 635 , citing Graver Mfg. Co. v. Linde Co., 336 U.S. 271, 275 . Mr. Justice Jackson has called this a "seasoned and wise rule . . . ." Comstock v. Group of Investors, 335 U.S. 211, 214 . </s> [Footnote 2 An examination of the transcript of the District Court hearing reveals that the Government produced no evidence as to why the indictment was delayed. The Government stipulated that it proceeded before the grand jury only on evidence collected some 17 months before the presentation and that no additional evidence had caused it to proceed. Although the Court of Appeals surmised that "[n]o reason existed for the delay except a hope on the part of the Government that others might be discovered who may have participated in the theft[s] . . .," 532 F.2d, at 61, even this assumption is not borne out by the record of the District Court hearing. Although not under oath, the prosecuting attorney indicated that the Government theorized that the guns in question came from the respondent's son, who worked at a freight terminal and would have had access to the mails. Yet even this theory was never shown to be the cause of the delay. Not even the prosecuting attorney stated as much. </s> [431 U.S. 783, 801]

United States Supreme Court TONY & SUSAN ALAMO FOUNDATION v. SEC'Y OF LABOR(1985) No. 83-1935 Argued: March 25, 1985Decided: April 23, 1985 </s> Petitioner Foundation is a nonprofit religious organization that derives its income largely from the operation of commercial businesses staffed by the Foundation's "associates," most of whom were drug addicts, derelicts, or criminals before their rehabilitation by the Foundation. These workers receive no cash salaries, but the Foundation provides them with food, clothing, shelter, and other benefits. The Secretary of Labor filed an action in Federal District Court against the Foundation and petitioner officers thereof, alleging violations of the minimum wage, overtime, and recordkeeping provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (Act). The District Court held that the Foundation was an "enterprise" within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. 203(r), which defines that term as "the related activities performed . . . by any person or persons for a common business purpose," that the Foundation's businesses serve the general public in competition with ordinary commercial enterprises, and that under the "economic reality" test of employment the associates were "employees" of the Foundation protected by the Act. The court rejected petitioners' arguments that application of the Act to the Foundation violated the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed as to liability. </s> Held: </s> 1. The Foundation's businesses constitute an "enterprise" within the meaning of the Act and are not beyond the Act's reach because of the Foundation's religious character. This Court has consistently construed the Act liberally in recognition that broad coverage is essential to accomplish the goal of outlawing from interstate commerce goods produced under conditions that fall below minimum standards of decency. The Act contains no express or implied exception for commercial activities conducted by religious or other nonprofit organizations, and the Labor Department has consistently interpreted the Act to reach such businesses. And this interpretation is supported by the legislative history. Pp. 295-299. </s> 2. The Foundation's associates are "employees" within the meaning of the Act, because they work in contemplation of compensation. Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148 , distinguished. The fact that [471 U.S. 290, 291] the associates themselves protest coverage under the Act is not dispositive, since the test of employment under the Act is one of "economic reality." And the fact that the compensation is primarily in the form of benefits rather than cash is immaterial in this context, such benefits simply being wages in another form. Pp. 299-303. </s> 3. Application of the Act to the Foundation does not infringe on rights protected by the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. The Free Exercise Clause does not require an exemption from a governmental program unless, at a minimum, inclusion in the program actually burdens the claimant's freedom to exercise religious rights. Here, since the Act does not require the payment of cash wages and the associates received wages in the form of benefits in exchange for working in the Foundation's businesses, application of the Act works little or no change in the associates' situation; they may simply continue to be paid in the form of benefits. But even if they were paid in cash and their religious beliefs precluded them from accepting the statutory amount, there is nothing in the Act to prevent them from voluntarily returning the amounts to the Foundation. And since the Act's recordkeeping requirements apply only to commercial activities undertaken with a "business purpose," they would have no impact on petitioners' own evangelical activities or on individuals engaged in volunteer work for other religious organizations. Pp. 303-306. </s> 722 F.2d 397, affirmed. </s> WHITE, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. </s> Roy Gean, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Roy Gean III. </s> Charles Fried argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Michael W. McConnell, Karen I. Ward, Sandra Lord, and Barbara J. Johnson. * </s> [Footnote * Burt Neuborne and Charles S. Sims filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae urging affirmance. </s> JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The threshold question in this case is whether the minimum wage, overtime, and recordkeeping requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat. 1060, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., apply to workers engaged in the commercial [471 U.S. 290, 292] activities of a religious foundation, regardless of whether those workers consider themselves "employees." A secondary question is whether application of the Act in this context violates the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. </s> I </s> The Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation is a nonprofit religious organization incorporated under the laws of California. Among its primary purposes, as stated in its Articles of Incorporation, are to "establish, conduct and maintain an Evangelistic Church; to conduct religious services, to minister to the sick and needy, to care for the fatherless and to rescue the fallen, and generally to do those things needful for the promotion of Christian faith, virtue, and charity." 1 The Foundation does not solicit contributions from the public. It derives its income largely from the operation of a number of commercial businesses, which include service stations, retail clothing and grocery outlets, hog farms, roofing and electrical construction companies, a recordkeeping company, a motel, and companies engaged in the production and distribution of candy. 2 These activities have been supervised by petitioners Tony and Susan Alamo, president and secretary-treasurer of the Foundation, respectively. 3 The businesses are staffed largely by the Foundation's "associates," most of whom were drug addicts, derelicts, or criminals before their conversion and rehabilitation by the Foundation. These workers receive no cash salaries, but the Foundation provides them with food, clothing, shelter, and other benefits. [471 U.S. 290, 293] </s> In 1977, the Secretary of Labor filed an action against the Foundation, the Alamos, and Larry La Roche, who was then the Foundation's vice president, alleging violations of the minimum wage, overtime, and recordkeeping provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(b), 207(a), 211(c), 215(a)(2), (a)(5), with respect to approximately 300 associates. 4 The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas held that the Foundation was an "enterprise" within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. 203(r), which defines that term as "the related activities performed . . . by any person or persons for a common business purpose." 567 F. Supp. 556 (1983). The District Court found that despite the Foundation's incorporation as a nonprofit religious organization, its businesses were "engaged in ordinary commercial activities in competition with other commercial businesses." Id., at 573. </s> The District Court further ruled that the associates who worked in these businesses were "employees" of the Alamos and of the Foundation within the meaning of the Act. The associates who had testified at trial had vigorously protested the payment of wages, asserting that they considered themselves volunteers who were working only for religious and evangelical reasons. Nevertheless, the District Court found that the associates were "entirely dependent upon the Foundation for long periods." Although they did not expect compensation in the form of ordinary wages, the District Court found, they did expect the Foundation to provide them "food, shelter, clothing, transportation and medical benefits." Id., at 562. These benefits were simply wages in another form, and under the "economic reality" test of employment, see Goldberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc., 366 U.S. 28 , [471 U.S. 290, 294] 33 (1961), 5 the associates were employees. The District Court also rejected petitioners' arguments that application of the Act to the Foundation violated the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment, and the court found no evidence that the Secretary had engaged in unconstitutional discrimination against petitioners in bringing this suit. 6 </s> The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court's holding as to liability, but vacated and remanded as to the appropriate remedy. 722 F.2d 397 (1984). 7 The Court of Appeals emphasized that the businesses operated by the Foundation serve the general public, in competition with other entrepreneurs. Under the "economic reality" test, the court held, </s> "it would be difficult to conclude that the extensive commercial enterprise operated and controlled by the foundation was nothing but a religious liturgy engaged in bringing good news to a pagan world. By entering the economic arena and trafficking in the marketplace, the foundation has subjected itself to the standards Congress has prescribed for the benefit of employees. The [471 U.S. 290, 295] requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act apply to its laborers." Id., at 400. </s> Like the District Court, the Court of Appeals also rejected petitioners' constitutional claims. We granted certiorari, 469 U.S. 915 (1984), and now affirm. </s> II </s> In order for the Foundation's commercial activities to be subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act, two conditions must be satisfied. First, the Foundation's businesses must constitute an "[e]nterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce." 29 U.S.C. 203(s). 8 Second, the associates must be "employees" within the meaning of the Act. While the statutory definition is exceedingly broad, see United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 362 -363 (1945), it does have its limits. An individual who, "without promise or expectation of compensation, but solely for his personal purpose or pleasure, worked in activities carried on by other persons either for their pleasure or profit," is outside the sweep of the Act. Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947). 9 </s> A </s> Petitioners contend that the Foundation is not an "enterprise" within the meaning of the Act because its activities are [471 U.S. 290, 296] not performed for "a common business purpose." 10 In support of this assertion, petitioners point to the fact that the Internal Revenue Service has certified the Foundation as tax-exempt under 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3), which exempts "any . . . foundation . . . organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes." 11 </s> The Court has consistently construed the Act "liberally to apply to the furthest reaches consistent with congressional direction," Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Associates, 358 U.S. 207, 211 (1959), recognizing that broad coverage is essential to accomplish the goal of outlawing from interstate commerce goods produced under conditions that fall below minimum standards of decency. Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 516 (1950). 12 The statute contains no express or implied exception for commercial activities conducted by religious or other nonprofit organizations, 13 </s> [471 U.S. 290, 297] and the agency charged with its enforcement has consistently interpreted the statute to reach such businesses. The Labor Department's regulation defining "business purpose," which is entitled to considerable weight in construing the Act, explicitly states: </s> "Activities of eleemosynary, religious, or educational organization [sic] may be performed for a business purpose. Thus, where such organizations engage in ordinary commercial activities, such as operating a printing and publishing plant, the business activities will be treated under the Act the same as when they are performed by the ordinary business enterprise." 29 CFR 779.214 (1984). </s> See also Marshall v. Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, 458 F. Supp. 709 (Mass. 1978); Marshall v. Elks Club of Huntington, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 957, 967-968 (SD W. Va. 1977). Cf. Mitchell v. Pilgrim Holiness Church Corp., 210 F.2d 879 (CA7), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1013 (1954). </s> The legislative history of the Act supports this administrative and judicial gloss. When the Act was broadened in 1961 to cover "enterprises" as well as individuals, the Senate Committee Report indicated that the activities of nonprofit groups were excluded from coverage only insofar as they were not performed for a "business purpose." 14 Some illumination of congressional intent is provided by the debate on a proposed floor amendment that would have specifically excluded from the definition of "employer," see 29 U.S.C. 203(d), organizations qualifying for tax exemption under [471 U.S. 290, 298] 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3). 15 The floor manager of the bill opposed the amendment because it might have been interpreted to "g[o] beyond the language of the [Committee] report" by excluding a "profitmaking corporation or company" owned by "an eleemosynary institution." 16 The proponent of the failed amendment countered that it would not have excluded "a church which has a business operation on the side." 17 There was thus broad congressional consensus that ordinary commercial businesses should not be exempted from the Act simply because they happened to be owned by religious or other nonprofit organizations. 18 </s> Petitioners further contend that the various businesses they operate differ from "ordinary" commercial businesses because they are infused with a religious purpose. The businesses minister to the needs of the associates, they contend, both by providing rehabilitation and by providing them with food, clothing, and shelter. In addition, petitioners argue, the businesses function as "churches in disguise" - vehicles [471 U.S. 290, 299] for preaching and spreading the gospel to the public. See Brief for Petitioners 27-28. The characterization of petitioners' businesses, however, is a factual question resolved against petitioners by both courts below, and therefore barred from review in this Court "absent the most exceptional circumstances." 19 The lower courts clearly took account of the religious aspects of the Foundation's endeavors, and were correct in scrutinizing the activities at issue by reference to objectively ascertainable facts concerning their nature and scope. Both courts found that the Foundation's businesses serve the general public in competition with ordinary commercial enterprises, see 722 F.2d, at 400; 567 F. Supp., at 573, and the payment of substandard wages would undoubtedly give petitioners and similar organizations an advantage over their competitors. It is exactly this kind of "unfair method of competition" that the Act was intended to prevent, see 29 U.S.C. 202(a)(3), and the admixture of religious motivations does not alter a business' effect on commerce. </s> B </s> That the Foundation's commercial activities are within the Act's definition of "enterprise" does not, as we have noted, end the inquiry. An individual may work for a covered enterprise and nevertheless not be an "employee." In Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148 (1947), the Court held that individuals being trained as railroad yard brakemen - individuals who unquestionably worked in "the kind of activities covered by the Act" 20 - were not "employees." The trainees enrolled in a course lasting approximately seven or eight days, during which time they did some actual work [471 U.S. 290, 300] under close supervision. If, after completion of the training period, the trainees obtained permanent employment with the railroad, they received a retroactive allowance of four dollars for each day of the course. Otherwise, however, they neither received or expected any remuneration. Id., at 150. The Court held that, despite the comprehensive nature of the Act's definitions, 21 they were "obviously not intended to stamp all persons as employees who, without any express or implied compensation agreement, might work for their own advantage on the premises of another." The trainees were in much the same position as students in a school. Considering that the trainees' employment did not "contemplate . . . compensation," and accepting the findings that the railroads received "`no immediate advantage' from any work done by the trainees," the Court ruled that the trainees did not fall within the definition of "employee." Id., at 153. </s> Relying on the affidavits and testimony of numerous associates, petitioners contend that the individuals who worked in the Foundation's businesses, like the trainees in Portland Terminal, expected no compensation for their labors. It is true that the District Court found that the Secretary had "failed to produce any past or present associate of the Foundation who viewed his work in the Foundation's various commercial businesses as anything other than `volunteering' his services to the Foundation." 567 F. Supp., at 562. An associate characterized by the District Court as typical "testified convincingly that she considered her work in the Foundation's businesses as part of her ministry," and that she did not work for material rewards. Ibid. This same [471 U.S. 290, 301] associate also testified that "no one ever expected any kind of compensation, and the thought is totally vexing to my soul." App. 79. </s> Nevertheless, these protestations, however sincere, cannot be dispositive. The test of employment under the Act is one of "economic reality," see Goldberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc., 366 U.S., at 33 , and the situation here is a far cry from that in Portland Terminal. Whereas in Portland Terminal, the training course lasted a little over a week, in this case the associates were "entirely dependent upon the Foundation for long periods, in some cases several years." 567 F. Supp., at 562. Under the circumstances, the District Court's finding that the associates must have expected to receive in-kind benefits - and expected them in exchange for their services - is certainly not clearly erroneous. 22 Under Portland Terminal, a compensation agreement may be "implied" as well as "express," 330 U.S., at 152 , and the fact that the compensation was received primarily in the form of benefits rather than cash is in this context immaterial. These benefits are, as the District Court stated, wages in another form. 23 </s> [471 U.S. 290, 302] </s> That the associates themselves vehemently protest coverage under the Act makes this case unusual, 24 but the purposes of the Act require that it be applied even to those who would decline its protections. If an exception to the Act were carved out for employees willing to testify that they performed work "voluntarily," employers might be able to use superior bargaining power to coerce employees to make such assertions, or to waive their protections under the Act. Cf. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981); Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945). Such exceptions to coverage would affect many more people than those workers directly at issue in this case and would be likely to exert a general downward pressure on wages in competing businesses. As was observed in Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244, 252 -254 (1945), it was there essential to uphold the Wage and Hour Administrator's authority to ban industrial homework in the embroideries industry, because "if the prohibition cannot be made, the floor for the entire industry falls and the right of the homeworkers and the employers to be free from the prohibition destroys the right of the much larger number of factory workers to receive the minimum wage." </s> Nor is there any reason to fear that, as petitioners assert, coverage of the Foundation's business activities will lead to coverage of volunteers who drive the elderly to church, serve church suppers, or help remodel a church home for the needy. See Brief for Petitioners 24-25. The Act reaches only the "ordinary commercial activities" of religious organizations, 29 CFR 779.214 (1984), and only those who engage in those activities in expectation of compensation. [471 U.S. 290, 303] Ordinary volunteerism is not threatened by this interpretation of the statute. 25 </s> III </s> Petitioners further contend that application of the Act infringes on rights protected by the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. Specifically, they argue that imposition of the minimum wage and recordkeeping requirements will violate the rights of the associates to freely exercise their religion 26 and the right of the Foundation to be free of excessive government entanglement in its affairs. Neither of these contentions has merit. </s> It is virtually self-evident that the Free Exercise Clause does not require an exemption from a governmental program unless, at a minimum, inclusion in the program actually burdens the claimant's freedom to exercise religious rights. See, e. g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 256 -257 (1982); Thomas v. Review Board, Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717 -718 (1981). Petitioners claim that the receipt of "wages" would violate the religious convictions of the associates. 27 The Act, however, does not require [471 U.S. 290, 304] the payment of cash wages. Section 203(m) defines "wage" to include "the reasonable cost . . . of furnishing [an] employee with board, lodging, or other facilities." See n. 23, supra. Since the associates currently receive such benefits in exchange for working in the Foundation's businesses, application of the Act will work little or no change in their situation: the associates may simply continue to be paid in the form of benefits. The religious objection does not appear to be to receiving any specified amount of wages. Indeed, petitioners and the associates assert that the associates' standard of living far exceeds the minimum. 28 Even if the Foundation were to pay wages in cash, or if the associates' beliefs precluded them from accepting the statutory amount, there is nothing in the Act to prevent the associates from returning the amounts to the Foundation, provided that they do so voluntarily. 29 We therefore fail to perceive how application of the Act would interfere with the associates' right to [471 U.S. 290, 305] freely exercise their religious beliefs. Cf. United States v. Lee, supra, at 257. </s> Petitioners also argue that application of the Act's record-keeping requirements would have the "primary effect" of inhibiting religious activity and would foster "`an excessive government entanglement with religion,'" thereby violating the Establishment Clause. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 -613 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). 30 The Act merely requires a covered employer to keep records "of the persons employed by him and of the wages, hours, and other conditions and practices of employment maintained by him." 29 U.S.C. 211(c). Employers must also preserve these records and "make such reports therefrom from time to time to the Administrator as he shall prescribe." Ibid. These requirements apply only to commercial activities undertaken with a "business purpose," and would therefore have no impact on petitioners' own evangelical activities or on individuals engaged in volunteer work for other religious organizations. And the routine and factual inquiries required by 211(c) bear no resemblance to the kind of government surveillance the Court has previously held to pose an intolerable risk of government entanglement with religion. 31 The Establishment Clause does not exempt religious organizations from such secular governmental activity as fire inspections and building and zoning regulations, see Lemon, supra, at 614, and the recordkeeping requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act, while [471 U.S. 290, 306] perhaps more burdensome in terms of paperwork, are not significantly more intrusive into religious affairs. 32 </s> IV </s> The Foundation's commercial activities, undertaken with a "common business purpose," are not beyond the reach of the Fair Labor Standards Act because of the Foundation's religious character, and its associates are "employees" within the meaning of the Act because they work in contemplation of compensation. Like other employees covered by the Act, the associates are entitled to its full protection. Furthermore, application of the Act to the Foundation's commercial activities is fully consistent with the requirements of the First Amendment. The judgment below is accordingly </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 App. to Brief for Petitioners 2. </s> [Footnote 2 The District Court found that the Foundation operates 4 businesses in California, 30 businesses in Arkansas, 3 businesses in Tennessee, and a motel in Tempe, Arizona. See 567 F. Supp. 556, 559-561 (WD Ark. 1983). The Foundation also receives income from the donations of its associates. Id., at 562. </s> [Footnote 3 Susan Alamo was named as a defendant and as a petitioner in this Court, but died after the suit was filed. </s> [Footnote 4 The Secretary also charged petitioners with failing to pay overtime wages to certain "outside" employees. The District Court made findings regarding these claims, all but one of which were upheld by the Court of Appeals. The parties have not sought review of that portion of the judgment. </s> [Footnote 5 See also United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713 (1947); Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729 (1947). </s> [Footnote 6 The District Court enjoined petitioners from failing to comply with the Act and ordered that all former associates and others who had worked in the businesses covered by the Act be advised of their eligibility to submit a claim to the Secretary. The Secretary was to submit a proposed finding of back wages due each claimant, "less applicable benefits" that had been provided by the Foundation. 567 F. Supp., at 577. The Secretary appealed the remedial portions of the District Court's order. </s> [Footnote 7 See n. 6, supra. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court should have calculated back wages due instead of requiring associates to initiate backpay proceedings. 722 F.2d, at 404-405. On remand, in an unpublished order, the District Court identified specific associates due back wages and ordered the Secretary to submit a proposed judgment. Following this Court's grant of a writ of certiorari, the District Court "administratively terminate[d]" the action pending this Court's decision. Brief for Respondent 12, n. 8. </s> [Footnote 8 Employment may be covered under the Act pursuant to either "individual" or "enterprise" coverage. Prior to the introduction of enterprise coverage in 1961, the only individuals covered under the Act were those engaged directly in interstate commerce or in the production of goods for interstate commerce. Enterprise coverage substantially broadened the scope of the Act to include any employee of an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce, as defined by the Act. The Secretary did not proceed on the basis that the associates are within the scope of individual coverage. </s> [Footnote 9 The Court of Appeals omitted this second step of the inquiry, although it mentioned in passing that the associates expected to receive and were dependent on the in-kind benefits. 722 F.2d, at 399. The District Court's findings on this question are sufficiently clear, however, that a remand is unnecessary. </s> [Footnote 10 Section 203(r) defines "enterprise" in pertinent part as "the related activities performed (either through unified operation or common control) by any person or persons for a common business purpose, and includes all such activities whether performed in one or more establishments or by one or more corporate or other organizational units including departments of an establishment operated through leasing arrangements, but shall not include the related activities performed for such enterprise by an independent contractor." </s> Petitioners do not dispute that the Foundation's various activities are performed "through . . . common control." Nor do they quarrel with the District Court's finding that the Foundation's annual gross volume of sales exceeds $250,000, as required by 203(s)(1). See 567 F. Supp., at 561. </s> [Footnote 11 The Internal Revenue Service has apparently not determined whether petitioners' commercial activities are "unrelated business" subject to taxation under 26 U.S.C. 511-513. See App. to Brief for Petitioners 14; Tr. of Oral Arg. 30. </s> [Footnote 12 See also Goldberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc., 366 U.S. 28 (1961); Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947); United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360 (1945). </s> [Footnote 13 Cf. Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S., at 517 (exemptions from the Act are "narrow and specific," implying that "employees not thus exempted . . . remain within the Act"). </s> [Footnote 14 The Senate Committee Report, in discussing the "common business purpose" requirement, states: </s> "[T]he definition would not include eleemosynary, religious, or educational organizations not operated for profit. The key word in the definition which supports this conclusion is the word `business.' Activities of organizations of the type referred to, if they are not operated for profit, are not activities performed for a `business' purpose." S. Rep. No. 1744, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 28 (1960). </s> [Footnote 15 106 Cong. Rec. 16704 (1960). </s> [Footnote 16 Ibid. (remarks of Sen. Kennedy). </s> [Footnote 17 Id., at 16703 (remarks of Sen. Goldwater). The following year, when the expansion of the Fair Labor Standards Act was again considered and this time enacted, Senator Curtis proposed the same amendment that Senator Goldwater had unsuccessfully introduced. The amendment was once more rejected. Senator McNamara, Chairman of the Senate Education and Labor Committee, opposed the amendment on the ground that it would remove from the protection of the Act employees of nonprofit organizations who were engaged in "activities which compete with private industry to such a degree that the competition would have a very adverse effect on private industry . . . . [W]hen such industry comes into competition in the marketplace with private industry, we say that their work is not charitable organization work." 107 Cong. Rec. 6255 (1961). See also H. R. Rep. No. 75, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1961); S. Rep. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 41 (1961). </s> [Footnote 18 Because we perceive no "significant risk" of an infringement on First Amendment rights, see infra, at 303-306, we do not require any clearer expression of congressional intent to regulate these activities. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979). </s> [Footnote 19 Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 512 , n. 6 (1980). </s> [Footnote 20 330 U.S., at 150 . Since Walling was decided before the advent of "enterprise coverage," see n. 8, supra, the Court's remark must have been premised on the fact that railroad brakemen work directly in interstate commerce. </s> [Footnote 21 The Act defines "employ" as including "to suffer or permit to work" and "employee" as (with certain exceptions not relevant here) "any individual employed by an employer." 29 U.S.C. 203(g), (e). See Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S., at 728 ; Rosenwasser, 323 U.S., at 362 -363, and n. 3 (quoting Sen. Black as stating that the term "employee" had been given "the broadest definition that has ever been included in any one act," 81 Cong. Rec. 7657 (1935)). </s> [Footnote 22 Former associates called by the Secretary as witnesses testified that they had been "fined" heavily for poor job performance, worked on a "commission" basis, and were prohibited from obtaining food from the cafeteria if they were absent from work - even if the absence was due to illness or inclement weather. App. 148-149, 146, 153, 218-219. These former associates also testified that they sometimes worked as long as 10 to 15 hours per day, 6 or 7 days per week. This testimony was contradicted in part by petitioners' witnesses, who were current associates. See 567 F. Supp., at 562. Even their testimony, however, was somewhat ambiguous. Ann Elmore, for example, testified that the thought of receiving compensation was "vexing to [her] soul." But in the same paragraph, in answer to a question as to whether she expected the benefits, she stated that "the benefits are just a matter of - of course, we went out and we worked for them." App. 78-79. </s> [Footnote 23 The Act defines "wage" as including board, food, lodging, and similar benefits customarily furnished by the employer to the employees. As the [471 U.S. 290, 302] District Court recognized, an employer is entitled to credit for the reasonable cost of these benefits. 567 F. Supp., at 563, 577; see 29 U.S.C. 203(m). </s> [Footnote 24 Cf. Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125 (Mass. 1982); Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367 (RI 1978), aff'd, 602 F.2d 458 (CA1 1979) (FLSA claims brought by former church members). </s> [Footnote 25 The Solicitor General states that in determining whether individuals have truly volunteered their services, the Department of Labor considers a variety of factors, including the receipt of any benefits from those for whom the services are performed, whether the activity is a less than fulltime occupation, and whether the services are of the kind typically associated with volunteer work. The Department has recognized as volunteer services those of individuals who help to minister to the comfort of the sick, elderly, indigent, infirm, or handicapped, and those who work with retarded or disadvantaged youth. See Brief for Respondent 4-5, and n. 3. </s> [Footnote 26 Petitioner Larry La Roche is an associate and a former vice-president of the Foundation. The Foundation also has standing to raise the free exercise claims of the associates, who are members of the religious organization as well as employees under the Act. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 458 -459 (1958). But cf. Donovan v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 573 F. Supp. 320, 325-326 (WD Va. 1983). </s> [Footnote 27 Petitioners point to the following testimony by two associates deemed representative by the District Court: [471 U.S. 290, 304] </s> "And no one ever expected any kind of compensation, and the thought is totally vexing to my soul. It would defeat my whole purpose." App. 79 (testimony of Ann Elmore). </s> "I believe it would be offensive to me to even be considered to be forced to take a wage. . . . I believe it offends my right to worship God as I choose." Id., at 62-63 (testimony of Bill Levy). </s> Petitioners also argue that the recordkeeping requirements of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 211, will burden the exercise of the associates' religious beliefs. This claim rests on a misreading of the Act. Section 211 imposes recordkeeping requirements on the employer, not on the employees. </s> [Footnote 28 See App. 62, 89 (testimony of Bill Levy and Edward Mick); Brief for Petitioners 33. The actual value of the benefits provided to associates - a matter of heated dispute below - was determined by the District Court to average somewhat over $200 a month per associate. 567 F. Supp., at 566-570. </s> [Footnote 29 Counsel for petitioners stated at oral argument that the associates would either fail to claim the backpay that was due them or simply return it to the Foundation. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25, 46. Counsel argued that this fact undermined the Secretary's argument that he had a "compelling interest" in applying the Act, but it is also indicative of how slight a change application of the Act would effect in the current state of affairs. </s> [Footnote 30 Under the Lemon test, the criteria to be used in determining whether a statute violates the Establishment Clause are whether the statute has a secular legislative purpose; whether its primary effect is one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and whether it fosters excessive government entanglement with religion. 403 U.S., at 612 -613. No one here contends that the Fair Labor Standards Act has anything other than secular purposes. </s> [Footnote 31 See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Cf. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). </s> [Footnote 32 Petitioners also argue that application of the Act to them denies them equal protection of the laws because the Foundation's treatment of its associates is no different from the Government's treatment of its own volunteer workers, such as those enrolled in the ACTION program. The respondent aptly characterizes this claim as "frivolous." Brief for Respondent 46. The activities of federal volunteers are directly supervised by the Government, unlike the activities of those alleged to be volunteering their services to private entities. Furthermore, work in Government volunteer programs is "limited to activities which would not otherwise be performed by employed workers and which will not supplant the hiring of or result in the displacement of employed workers." 42 U.S.C. 5044(a). Thus, Congress could rationally have concluded that minimum wage coverage of such volunteers is required neither for the protection of the volunteers themselves nor for the prevention of unfair competition with private employers. Petitioners have identified no reason to scrutinize the Government's classification under any stricter standard. The District Court found no evidence that the Department was acting on the basis of hostility to petitioners' religious beliefs. 567 F. Supp., at 574. </s> [471 U.S. 290, 307]

United States Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. CENTENNIAL SAVINGS BANK FSB(1991) No. 89-1926 Argued: January 15, 1991Decided: April 17, 1991 </s> During the 1981 tax year, respondent Centennial Savings Bank FSB exchanged participation interests in a set of mortgage loans for interests in a different set of mortgage loans held by another lender. All of the loans were secured by residential properties and had a face value substantially higher than their fair market value. In a separate set of transactions, Centennial collected early withdrawal penalties from customers who prematurely terminated their certificates of deposit (CD's). In its 1981 federal income tax return, Centennial claimed a deduction for the difference between the face value of the mortgage interests it surrendered and the fair market value of the mortgage interests it received. It also treated the early withdrawal penalties it received as "income from the discharge . . . of indebtedness" excludable from gross income under 26 U.S.C. 108(a)(1)(C) (1982 ed.). After the Internal Revenue Service disallowed the deduction of the losses associated with the mortgages and determined that Centennial was required to declare the early withdrawal penalties as income, Centennial paid the deficiencies and filed a refund action in the District Court. The court entered a judgment for petitioner United States on the mortgage exchange issue and for Centennial on the early withdrawal penalty issue. The Court of Appeals reversed the mortgage exchange ruling, but affirmed the early withdrawal penalty holding. </s> Held: </s> 1. Centennial realized tax-deductible losses when it exchanged mortgage interests with the other lender. Cottage Savings Assn. v. Commissioner, ante, p. 554. P. 578-579. </s> 2. The early withdrawal penalties collected by Centennial were not excludable from income under 108(a)(1). A debtor realizes income from the "discharge of indebtedness" only when the income results from the forgiveness of, or release from, an obligation to repay assumed by the debtor at the outset of the debtor-creditor relationship. Here, the depositors who prematurely closed their accounts and incurred penalties did not forgive or release any repayment obligation on the part of Centennial, which paid exactly what it was obligated to pay according to the [499 U.S. 573, 574] terms of the agreements entered into at the time the CD's were established. This reading best comports with 108's purpose, which is to mitigate the effect of treating a discharge of indebtedness as income so that the prospect of immediate tax liability will not discourage businesses from taking advantage of opportunities to repurchase or liquidate their debts at less than face value. A debtor who negotiates in advance the circumstances in which he will liquidate the debt is in a position to anticipate his need for cash with which to pay the resulting income tax and can negotiate the terms of the anticipated liquidation accordingly. Moreover, in this case, Centennial was committed to releasing the deposits at the sole election of the depositors. Thus, unlike a debtor considering the negotiation of an adjustment of the terms of a duty to repay, Centennial had no discretion to take the tax effects of a transaction into account before liquidating its obligation at less than face value. Pp. 579-584. </s> 887 F.2d 595 (CA5 1989), affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. </s> MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and STEVENS, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ., joined, in Parts I and III of which WHITE, J., joined, and in Part III of which BLACKMUN, J., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which WHITE, J., joined, ante, p. 568. </s> Acting Solicitor General Roberts argued the cause for the United States. With him on briefs were Assistant Attorney General Peterson, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Clifford M. Sloan, Richard Farber, and Bruce R. Ellisen. </s> Michael F. Duhl argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Mark L. Perlis, Frederic W. Hickman, Alfred J. T. Byrne, Colleen B. Bombardier, and Daniel R. Richards. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Federal National Mortgage Association by Joseph Angland, Felix B. Laughlin, David C. Garlock, Richard F. Neel, Jr., Caryl S. Bernstein, Carolyn J. A. Swift, and Michel A. Daze; for Main Line Federal Savings Bank et al. by Zachary P. Alexander; and for United States League of Savings Institutions by Richard L. Bacon. [499 U.S. 573, 575] </s> JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. * </s> In this case, we consider two questions relating to the federal income tax liability of respondent Centennial Savings Bank FSB (Centennial). The first is whether Centennial realized deductible losses when it exchanged its interests in one group of residential mortgage loans for another lender's interests in a different group of residential mortgage loans. The second is whether penalties collected by Centennial for the premature withdrawal of federally insured certificates of deposit (CD's) constituted "income by reason of the discharge . . . of indebtedness" excludable from gross income under 26 U.S.C. 108(a)(1)(C) (1982 ed.). The Court of Appeals answered both questions affirmatively. We agree with the Court of Appeals that Centennial's mortgage exchange gave rise to an immediately deductible loss, but we reverse the Court of Appeals' determination that Centennial was entitled to exclude from its taxable income the early withdrawal penalties collected from its depositors. </s> I </s> Centennial is a mutual savings and loan institution (S & L) formerly regulated by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). 1 At issue in this case are two sets of transactions involving Centennial in the 1981 tax year. </s> The first was Centennial's exchange of "90% participation interests" in a set of mortgage loans held by Centennial for "90% participation interests" in a different set of mortgage loans held by the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA). 2 Secured by residential properties located primarily [499 U.S. 573, 576] in northern Texas, Centennial's 420 loans had a face value of approximately $8.5 million and a fair market value of approximately $5.7 million; FNMA's 377 loans, secured by properties located throughout Texas, likewise had a face value of approximately $8.5 million and a fair market value of $5.7 million. Centennial and FNMA structured the exchange so that the respective mortgage packages would be deemed "substantially identical" under the FHLBB's Memorandum R-49, a regulatory directive aimed at identifying mortgage exchanges that would not generate accounting losses for FHLBB regulatory purposes but that would generate deductible losses for federal tax purposes. See generally Cottage Savings Assn. v. Commissioner, ante, at 556-557. On its 1981 return, Centennial claimed a deduction for the loss of $2,819,218, the difference between the face value (and cost basis) of the mortgage interests surrendered to FNMA and the market value of the mortgage interests received from FNMA in return. </s> The second set of transactions was Centennial's collection of early withdrawal penalties from customers who prematurely terminated their CD accounts. Each CD agreement established a fixed-term, fixed-interest account. See App. 27-29. Consistent with federal regulations, each agreement also provided that the depositor would be required to pay a penalty to Centennial should the depositor withdraw the principal before maturity. See 12 CFR 526.7(a) (1979); 12 CFR 526.7(a) (1980); 12 CFR 1204.103 (1981). Thus, in the event of premature withdrawal, the depositor was entitled under the CD agreement to the principal and accrued interest, minus the applicable penalty. See App. 27-29. </s> Centennial collected $258,019 in early withdrawal penalties in 1981. In its tax return for that year, Centennial treated the penalties as income from the discharge of indebtedness. Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 108 and 1017 (1982 ed.), Centennial excluded the $258,019 from its income and reduced the basis of its depreciable property by that amount. [499 U.S. 573, 577] </s> On audit, the Internal Revenue Service disallowed the deduction of the losses associated with Centennial's mortgages, and determined that Centennial should have declared as income the early withdrawal penalties collected that year. After paying the resulting deficiencies, Centennial instituted this refund action in the District Court for the Northern District of Texas, which entered judgment for the United States on the mortgage exchange issue, and for Centennial on the early withdrawal penalty issue. 682 F.Supp. 1389 (1988). </s> The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part. 887 F.2d 595 (1989). It reversed the District Court's ruling that Centennial did not realize a deductible loss in the mortgage exchange transaction. Relying on its reasoning in another decision handed down the same day, see San Antonio Savings Assn. v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d 577 (1989), the Court of Appeals concluded that, although the respective mortgage packages exchanged by Centennial and FNMA were "substantially identical" under Memorandum R-49, the two sets of mortgages were nonetheless "materially different" for tax purposes because they were secured by different residential properties. See 887 F.2d, at 600. Consequently, the court held, the exchange of the two sets of mortgages did give rise to a realization event for tax purposes, allowing Centennial immediately to recognize its losses. See ibid. </s> The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's conclusion that Centennial was entitled to treat the early withdrawal penalties as income from the discharge of indebtedness under 108. The court reasoned that "the characterization of income as income from the discharge of indebtedness depends purely on the spread between the amount received by the debtor and the amount paid by him to satisfy his obligation." Id., at 601. Under this test, the early withdrawal penalties constituted income from the discharge of indebtedness, the court concluded, because the penalties reduced the size of Centennial's obligation to its depositors. See id. [499 U.S. 573, 578] at 601-602. The court rejected the United States' characterization of the penalties as merely a "medium of payment" for Centennial's performance of its "separate obligation" to release the deposits prior to maturity. Id., at 604-605. </s> The United States thereafter petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. Because the Court of Appeals' dispositions of both the mortgage exchange issue and the early withdrawal penalty issue are in conflict with decisions in other Circuits, and because of the importance of both issues for the savings and loan industry, we granted the petition. 498 U.S. 808 (1990). 3 </s> II </s> The question whether Centennial realized tax-deductible losses when it exchanged mortgage interests with FNMA is controlled by our decision in Cottage Savings Assn. v. Commissioner. In Cottage Savings, we recognized that a property exchange gives rise to a realization event for purposes of 1001(a) of the Internal Revenue Code 4 so long as the exchanged [499 U.S. 573, 579] properties are "materially different." Ante, at 560-562. We concluded that the properties are "different" in the sense "material" to the Code so long as they embody legally distinct entitlements. Ante, at 564-565. </s> That test is easily satisfied here. As in Cottage Savings, the participation interests exchanged here were in loans made to different obligors and secured by different properties. Thus, the interests embodied distinct entitlements. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Centennial was entitled to a refund of the disallowed losses claimed on its mortgages. </s> III </s> We next consider the question whether the early withdrawal penalties collected by Centennial constituted "income by reason of the discharge . . . of indebtedness" excludable from income under 26 U.S.C. 108(a)(1) (1982 ed.). We conclude that the penalties were not subject to exclusion under 108 because the depositors who paid these penalties did not "discharge" Centennial from any repayment obligation. </s> The version of 108 in effect for the 1981 tax year states: </s> "Gross income does not include any amount which (but for this subsection) would be includible in gross income by reason of the discharge (in whole or in part) of indebtedness of the taxpayer if - </s> . . . . . </s> "(C) the indebtedness discharged is qualified business indebtedness." 26 U.S.C. 108(a)(1) (1982 ed.). </s> "[Q]ualified business indebtedness" includes "indebtedness . . . incurred or assumed . . . by a corporation." 26 U.S.C. 108(d)(4)(A) (1982 ed.). 5 Income from the discharge of [499 U.S. 573, 580] qualified business indebtedness can be excluded from gross income under 108 only if the taxpayer elects to reduce the basis of his depreciable property by an amount equal to the income excluded. 26 U.S.C. 108(c)(1), 108(d)(4)(B), 1017 (1982 ed.). Thus, the effect of 108 is not genuinely to exempt such income from taxation, but rather to defer the payment of the tax by reducing the taxpayer's annual depreciation deductions or by increasing the size of taxable gains upon ultimate disposition of the reduced-basis property. </s> In characterizing early withdrawal penalties as discharge-of-indebtedness income, Centennial, like the Court of Appeals, focuses purely on the "spread" between the debt that Centennial assumed upon the opening of each CD account and the amount that it actually paid each depositor upon the closing of the account. See 887 F.2d, at 601. When a depositor opens a CD account, Centennial notes, the bank becomes indebted to the depositor for the principal of the deposit plus accrued interest. By virtue of its collection of an early withdrawal penalty, however, the bank satisfies the debt for less than that amount should the depositor withdraw the principal before maturity. The end result, in Centennial's view, is no different from what it would have been had the bank and depositor (freed from the restraints of bank regulatory law) formed no agreement on an early withdrawal penalty at the outset, but rather negotiated a forgiveness of that amount at the time of withdrawal. </s> We reject this analysis, because it fails to make sense of 108's use of the term "discharge." As used in 108, the term "discharge of indebtedness" conveys forgiveness of, or release from, an obligation to repay. 6 A depositor who [499 U.S. 573, 581] prematurely closes his account and pays the early withdrawal penalty does not forgive or release any repayment obligation on the part of the financial institution. The CD agreement itself provides that the depositor will be entitled only to the principal and accrued interest, less the applicable penalty, should the the depositor prematurely withdraw the principal. Through this formula, the depositor and the bank have determined in advance precisely how much the depositor will be entitled to receive should the depositor close the account on any day up to the maturity date. Thus, the depositor does not "discharge" the bank from an obligation when it accepts an amount equal to the principal and accrued interest minus the penalty, for this is exactly what the bank is obligated to pay under the terms of the CD agreement. </s> Because 108 presupposes the "discharge" of an obligation to repay, we disagree with Centennial and the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the "spread" between the debt assumed by Centennial and the amount paid by Centennial upon the closing of the account is sufficient to trigger 108. The existence of such a spread is sufficient to demonstrate that Centennial enjoyed an accession to income equal in size to the amount of the penalty. But because this income was not the product of the release of any obligation assumed by Centennial at the outset of the bank-depositor relationship, it does not constitute income "by reason of [a] discharge." In sum, to determine whether the debtor has realized "income by reason of the discharge . . . of indebtedness," it is necessary to look at both the end result of the transaction and the repayment terms agreed to by the parties at the outset of the debtor-creditor relationship. 7 </s> [499 U.S. 573, 582] </s> This common-sense reading of the statutory language best comports with the purpose underlying 108. The tax deferral mechanism in 108 is designed to mitigate the effect of treating the discharge of indebtedness as income. See 26 U.S.C. 61(a)(12) (1982 ed.) ("gross income ... includ[es] ... [i]ncome from discharge of indebtedness"). Borrowed funds are excluded from income in the first instance because the taxpayer's obligation to repay the funds offsets any increase in the taxpayer's assets; if the taxpayer is thereafter released from his obligation to repay, the taxpayer enjoys a net increase in assets equal to the forgiven portion of the debt, and the basis for the original exclusion thus evaporates. See United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931); Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 38 (1949); see also Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 307 , 310-311, n. 11 (1983). But while the cancellation of the obligation to repay increases the taxpayer's assets, it does not necessarily generate cash with which the taxpayer can pay the resulting income tax. Congress established the tax-deferral mechanism [499 U.S. 573, 583] in 108 so that the prospect of immediate tax liability would not discourage businesses from taking advantage of opportunities to repurchase or liquidate their debts at less than face value. See H. R. Rep. No. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1939); S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 77-78 (1942). See generally Wright, Realization of Income Through Cancellations, Modifications, and Bargain Purchases of Indebtedness: I, 49 Mich. L. Rev. 459, 477, 492 (1951). </s> This rationale is squarely implicated only when the debtor is seeking forgiveness or cancellation of a preexisting repayment obligation. A debtor who negotiates in advance the circumstances in which he will liquidate the debt for less than its face value is in a position to anticipate his need for cash with which to pay the resulting income tax and can negotiate the terms of the anticipated liquidation accordingly. Moreover, insofar as the CD agreements at issue in this case committed Centennial to releasing the deposits at the sole election of the depositors, Centennial abandoned any control whatsoever over whether and when these particular debt obligations would be liquidated. Consequently, unlike a debtor considering the negotiation of an adjustment of the terms of his duty to repay, Centennial had no discretion to take the tax effects of the transaction into account before liquidating its debt obligations at less than face value. </s> It is true, as Centennial points out, that construing 108 to apply only to debt reductions stemming from a negotiated forgiveness of a duty to repay withholds a tax incentive to include "anticipatory discharge" terms in the credit agreement at the outset. But we read the statutory language as embodying a legislative choice not to extend the benefits of 108's deferral mechanism that far. For the reasons that we have stated, Congress could easily have concluded that only debtors seeking a release from a preexisting repayment obligation need or deserve the tax break conferred by 108. Consistent with the rule that tax exemption and deferral provisions are to be construed narrowly, Commissioner v. [499 U.S. 573, 584] Jacobson, supra, at 49; Elam v. Commissioner, 477 F.2d 1333, 1335 (CA6 1973), we conclude that Congress did not intend to extend the benefits of 108 beyond the setting in which a creditor agrees to release a debtor from an obligation assumed at the outset of the relationship. </s> IV </s> For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> [Footnote * JUSTICE WHITE joins Parts I and III of this opinion, and JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins Part III. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 While this case was pending on appeal, the FHLBB found Centennial to be insolvent. Centennial is currently under the receivership of the Resolution Trust Corporation. </s> [Footnote 2 By exchanging merely participation interests, each party retained its relationships with the obligors of the exchanged loans. See Cottage Savings Assn. v. Commissioner, ante, at 557-558, n. 3. </s> [Footnote 3 The Fifth Circuit's conclusion that an exchange of mortgages that are "substantially identical" under Memorandum R-49 can give rise to realizable tax losses is in conflict with a decision of the Sixth Circuit. See Cottage Savings Assn. v. Commissioner, 890 F.2d 848 (1989), rev'd and remanded, ante, p. 554. The Fifth Circuit's conclusion that early withdrawal penalties constitute discharge-from-indebtedness income under the pre-1986 version of 108 is in conflict with a decision of the Seventh Circuit. See Colonial Savings Assn. v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d 1001 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1090 (1989). In 1986, Congress amended 108, limiting its application to situations in which the taxpayer is insolvent or in bankruptcy at the time of the discharge of his indebtedness. See Pub.L. 99-514, 822(a), 100 Stat. 2373; see also Pub. L. 100-647, 1004(a)(1), 102 Stat. 3385 (1988) (extending 108 to "qualified farm indebtedness"). We granted certiorari nonetheless in light of the significant number of pending cases concerning the tax status of early withdrawal penalties collected prior to 1986. </s> [Footnote 4 The gain from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the excess of the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis provided in section 1011 for determining gain, and the loss shall be the excess of [499 U.S. 573, 579] the adjusted basis provided in such section for determining loss over the amount realized. 26 U.S.C. 1001(a). </s> [Footnote 5 It also includes "indebtedness . . . incurred or assumed . . . by an individual in connection with property used in his trade or business." 26 U.S.C. 108(d)(4)(A) (1982 ed.). </s> [Footnote 6 "Discharge" can be used to signify various means of extinguishing a legal duty. See generally Black's Law Dictionary 463 (6th ed. 1990). Thus, a debtor might be said to "discharge" his debt by satisfying it. But 108 uses "income by reason of the discharge . . . of indebtedness" to refer to the change in the debtor's financial condition when the debtor is no longer legally required to satisfy his debt either in part or in full. "Discharge" [499 U.S. 573, 581] in this sense can occur only if the creditor cancels or forgives a repayment obligation. </s> [Footnote 7 Renewing the argument that it unsuccessfully advanced in the Court of Appeals, the United States characterizes the penalties not as income by reason of the discharge of indebtedness, but rather as income for Centennial's performance of a "separate obligation." This argument [499 U.S. 573, 582] draws on authorities recognizing that 108 does not apply when a creditor discharges a debtor's obligation in exchange for services or some other form of nonmonetary consideration. See Spartan Petroleum Co. v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 733 (SC 1977) (debt discharged in exchange for cancellation of distributorship agreement); OKC Corp. v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 638, 649-650 (1984) (debt discharged in exchange for settlement of lawsuit). In that situation, the debt is not forgiven, but is in fact satisfied in full through the debtor's performance of a "separate obligation"; discharge of the debt is merely the "medium of payment" for that performance, and must be treated as ordinary income for tax purposes. See S.Rep. No. 96-1035, p. 8, n. 6 (1980), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 1980, pp. 7017, 7023 ("Debt discharge that is only a medium for some other form of payment, such as a gift or salary, is treated as that form of payment, rather than under the debt discharge rules"). See generally 1 B. Bittker & L. Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts § 6.4.7, p. 6-66 (2d ed. 1989). Because we conclude that Centennial's reliance on 108 fails for a more fundamental reason - the absence of a "discharge" for purposes of the statute - we need not consider whether the early withdrawal penalties were actually payments for services unrelated to the debtor-creditor relationship. </s> For opinion of JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in part and dissenting in part, see ante, p. 568. </s> [499 U.S. 573, 585]

United States Supreme Court HUDSON DISTRIBUTORS v. ELI LILLY(1964) No. 490 Argued: April 30, 1964Decided: June 1, 1964 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 489, Hudson Distributors, Inc., v. Upjohn Company, also on appeal from the same court, argued April 29, 1964. </s> Under the McGuire Act a trademark owner may, where sanctioned by a state fair-trade act, enforce a minimum retail price established by written agreements with some retailers in the State against a notified retailer who has not signed such an agreement. Pp. 386-395. </s> 174 Ohio St. 487, 190 N. E. 2d 460, affirmed. </s> Myron N. Krotinger argued the cause for appellant in both cases. With him on the briefs were Leonard Lane and Morton L. Stone. </s> Ralph M. Carson argued the cause for appellee in No. 489. With him on the brief was Henry L. King. </s> Everett I. Willis argued the cause for appellee in No. 490. With him on the brief was Louis S. Peirce. </s> Briefs of amici curiae, urging affirmance, were filed by James A. Gorrell for Corning Glass Works et al., and by R. W. Kilbourne for Ohio Hardware Association et al. </s> MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> These appeals raise the question of whether the McGuire Act, 66 Stat. 631, 15 U.S.C. 45 (a) (1)-(5), permits the application and enforcement of the Ohio Fair Trade Act against appellant in support of appellees' systems of retail price maintenance. For the reasons stated below, we hold that the Ohio Act, as applied to the facts of these cases, comes within the provisions of the McGuire Act exempting certain resale price systems from the [377 U.S. 386, 387] prohibitions of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. 1 et seq. </s> The two appeals, one involving The Upjohn Co. and one involving Eli Lilly & Co., were considered together in the Ohio courts. 1 For simplicity we state only the facts of the Lilly case. Appellant, Hudson Distributors, Inc., owns and operates a retail drug chain in Cleveland, Ohio. Appellee, Eli Lilly & Co., manufactures pharmaceutical products bearing its trademarks and trade names. Lilly sells its products directly to wholesalers and makes no sales to retailers. Hudson purchases Lilly brand products from Regal D. S., Inc., a Michigan wholesaler. </s> In June 1959, the Ohio Legislature enacted a new Fair Trade Act, Ohio Revised Code 1333.27-1333.34. Subsequently Lilly sent letters to all Ohio retailers of Lilly products, including Hudson, to notify them of Lilly's intention to establish minimum retail resale prices for its trademarked products pursuant to the new Ohio Act and to invite the retailers to enter into written fair-trade contracts. More than 1,400 Ohio retailers of Lilly products (about 65% of all the retail pharmacists in Ohio) signed fair-trade contracts with Lilly. Hudson, however, refused to enter into a written contract with Lilly and ignored the specified minimum resale prices. Lilly formally notified Hudson that the Ohio Act required Hudson to observe the minimum retail resale prices for Lilly commodities. Hudson, nevertheless, continued to purchase and then to resell Lilly products at less than the stipulated minimum retail resale prices. </s> Hudson thereupon filed a petition in the Court of Common Pleas for Cuyahoga County, Ohio, for a judgment declaring the Ohio Act invalid under the State Constitution [377 U.S. 386, 388] and federal law. Lilly answered and cross-petitioned for enforcement of the Ohio Act against Hudson. The Court of Common Pleas held the Ohio Act unconstitutional under the State Constitution. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, after discussing the federal and state legislation, 117 Ohio App. 207, 176 N. E. 2d 236, reversed the trial court and entered a judgment declaring that the Ohio Act was not "in violation of the Constitution of the State of Ohio nor of the Constitution of the United States . . . ." The court remanded the case "for further proceedings according to law with respect to the cross-petition . . . ." 2 On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed 3 the [377 U.S. 386, 389] judgment of the Court of Appeals. 4 174 Ohio St. 487, 190 N. E. 2d 460. This Court noted probable jurisdiction. 375 U.S. 938, 939 . </s> Hudson contends that the provisions of the Ohio Act under which Lilly established minimum resale prices are not authorized by the McGuire Act, 66 Stat. 631, 15 U.S.C. 45 (a) (1)-(5). 5 Section 2 of the McGuire Act provides in pertinent part as follows: </s> "Nothing contained in this section or in any of the Antitrust Acts shall render unlawful any contracts or agreements prescribing minimum or stipulated prices, . . . when contracts or agreements of that description are lawful as applied to intrastate transactions under any statute, law, or public policy now or hereafter in effect in any State . . . ." </s> Section 3 of the McGuire Act reads as follows: </s> "Nothing contained in this section or in any of the Antitrust Acts shall render unlawful the exercise or the enforcement of any right or right of action created by any statute, law, or public policy now or hereafter in effect in any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, which in substance provides that willfully and knowingly advertising, offering for [377 U.S. 386, 390] sale, or selling any commodity at less than the price or prices prescribed in such contracts or agreements whether the person so advertising, offering for sale, or selling is or is not a party to such a contract or agreement, is unfair competition and is actionable at the suit of any person damaged thereby." </s> Before the enactment of the McGuire Act, this Court in 1951 in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 , considered whether the Miller-Tydings Act, 50 Stat. 693, 15 U.S.C. 1, removed from the prohibition of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. 1 et seq., a state statute which authorized a trademark owner, by notice, to require a retailer who had not executed a written contract to observe resale price maintenance. Respondents in that case argued that since the Sherman Act outlawed "contracts" in restraint of trade and since the Miller-Tydings amendment to the Sherman act excepted "contracts or agreements prescribing minimum prices for the resale" of a commodity where such contracts or agreements were lawful under state law, the Miller-Tydings Act therefore immunized all arrangements involving resale price maintenance authorized by state law. 341 U.S., at 387 . After examining the history of the Miller-Tydings Act, the Court concluded that Congress had intended the words "contracts or agreements" as contained in that Act to be used "in their normal and customary meaning," id., at 388, and to cover only arrangements whereby the retailer voluntarily agreed to be bound by the resale price restrictions. The Court held therefore that the state resale price maintenance law could not be applied to nonsigners - "recalcitrants . . . dragged in by the heels and compelled to submit to price fixing." Id., at 390. The Court stated that: </s> "It should be remembered that it was the state laws that the federal law was designed to accommodate. Federal regulation was to give way to state [377 U.S. 386, 391] regulation. When state regulation provided for resale price maintenance by both those who contracted and those who did not, and the federal regulation was relaxed only as respects `contracts or agreements,' the inference is strong that Congress left the noncontracting group to be governed by preexisting law." Id., at 395. </s> Shortly after the Schwegmann decision, Congress passed the McGuire Act, 6 66 Stat. 631, 15 U.S.C. 45 (a) (1)-(5). The Report of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, which accompanied the McGuire Act, declared that: </s> "The primary purpose of the [McGuire] bill is to reaffirm the very same proposition which, in the committee's opinion, the Congress intended to enact into law when it passed the Miller-Tydings Act . . ., to the effect that the application and enforcement of State fair-trade laws - including the nonsigner provisions of such laws - with regard to interstate transactions shall not constitute a violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act or the Sherman Antitrust Act. This reaffirmation is made necessary because of the decision of a divided Supreme Court in Schwegmann v. Calvert Distillers Corporation [377 U.S. 386, 392] ( 341 U.S. 384 , May 21, 1951). In that case, six members of the Court held that the Miller-Tydings Act did not exempt from these Federal laws enforcement of State fair trade laws with respect to nonsigners. Three members of the Court held that the Miller-Tydings Act did so apply. </s> "The end result of the Supreme Court decision has been seriously to undermine the effectiveness of the Miller-Tydings Act and, in turn, of the fair-trade laws enacted by 45 States. H. R. 5767, as amended, is designed to restore the effectiveness of these acts by making it abundantly clear that Congress means to let State fair-trade laws apply in their totality; that is, with respect to nonsigners as well as signers." (Emphasis added.) H. R. Rep. No. 1437, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., at 1-2. </s> This authoritative report evinces the clear intention of Congress that, where sanctioned by a state fair-trade act, a trademark owner such as Lilly could be permitted to enforce, even against a nonsigning retailer such as Hudson, the stipulated minimum prices established by written contracts with other retailers. 7 </s> Without disputing this interpretation of the McGuire Act, Hudson argues that the Ohio Act as interpreted by the Ohio courts reaches beyond the exemptive terms of the federal Act by permitting the maintenance of resale prices "by notice alone" where no contract has been entered into between the owner of the trademark and any retailer. Hudson emphasizes that the Ohio courts sustained the Ohio Act under the State Constitution on the theory that Hudson, simply by acquiring Lilly's products [377 U.S. 386, 393] with notice of the stipulated prices, impliedly contracted to observe the minimum prices. This implied contract theory was deemed necessary by the Ohio Legislature and by the Ohio courts to satisfy the State Constitution which had recently been held to invalidate the enforcement of resale prices against nonsigners. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc., 167 Ohio St. 182, 147 N. E. 2d 481 (1958). Whatever merit there may be in the argument that the logic of the Ohio implied contract theory would apply to prices set by notice alone and without any conventional or express contracts, on the facts of the present case we need not and do not consider whether a state statute so applied would involve "contracts or agreements" in the sense in which those terms are used in the McGuire Act. 8 The undisputed facts show that Lilly had established a system of resale price maintenance involving written contracts with some 1,400 Ohio retailers. Section 1333.29 (A) of the Ohio Act authorizes the establishment of minimum prices through such contracts. Under these circumstances the fact that the Ohio law, as construed for purposes of assessing its validity under the State Constitution, regards Hudson as a "contractor" (or "implied contractor") rather than as a nonsigner does not control the application and effect of the federal statute - the McGuire Act. Section 3 of the federal Act plainly upholds "any right or right of action created by any statute . . . in effect in any State . . . which in substance" permits enforcement of resale prices prescribed in contracts whether or not the violating seller was a party to those contracts. For the purposes of 3 of the McGuire Act, therefore, it is clear that these cases involve the requisite contracts with retailers, 9 that, regardless [377 U.S. 386, 394] of whether Hudson itself entered into "contracts" within the meaning of the McGuire Act, Hudson was at least a nonsigner, and that under such circumstances Congress plainly intended "to let State fair-trade laws apply . . . with respect to nonsigners as well as signers." H. R. Rep. No. 1437, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., at 2. Accordingly we hold that the Ohio Act, as applied to the facts of these cases, comes within the terms of the McGuire Act. </s> Hudson also argues that the Ohio statute can be read to authorize fair-trade prices to be established by persons other than the owner of the trademark or trade name. This contention raises a hypothetical issue: Lilly is the owner of all trademarks affixed to its goods and the Ohio Supreme Court has not interpreted the statute as applying to persons other than owners. Hudson further argues that 1333.29 (A) of the Ohio Act authorizes a proprietor to establish minimum resale prices for wholesale distributors with whom it competes and therefore conflicts with the McGuire Act under this Court's decision in United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 . This argument also raises a hypothetical question for, as noted, Lilly sells only to wholesalers and does not sell to retailers. 10 </s> The questions raised by Hudson in its second amended answer to the cross-petition, 11 including the contention [377 U.S. 386, 395] that Paragraph 6 of the Lilly fair-trade contracts compels retailers to enter into allegedly unlawful horizontal price-fixing agreements in violation of 1 of the Sherman Act, are not properly before us. They are pending and unresolved in the Ohio Court of Common Pleas, Cuyahoga County. Hudson's remaining questions are not properly presented for resolution on this appeal; they concern issues involving alleged interpretations of the Ohio Act not made or considered by the Ohio courts or not raised by the facts of the case. Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207, 213 -214; Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 470 -471. </s> The price fixing authorized by the Ohio Fair Trade Act and involving goods moving in interstate commerce would be, absent approval by Congress, clearly illegal under the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. 1 et seq. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 . "Fixing minimum prices, like other types of price fixing, is illegal per se." Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., supra, at 386. Congress, however, in the McGuire Act has approved state statutes sanctioning resale price maintenance schemes such as those involved here. Whether it is good policy to permit such laws is a matter for Congress to decide. Where the statutory language and the legislative history clearly indicate the purpose of Congress that purpose must be upheld. We therefore affirm the judgments of the Supreme Court of Ohio. </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The Supreme Court of Ohio stated: "The facts in both cases are similar and the law applicable is the same. The appeals will be treated together, since the assignments of errors in both cases are exactly the same." 174 Ohio St. 487, 190 N. E. 2d 460. </s> [Footnote 2 Hudson, in its second amended answer to the cross-petition, allegedly raised the following defenses: </s> "(1) Hudson did not willfully resell at less than Lilly's fair trade prices; </s> "(2) Lilly, a foreign corporation, was not properly licensed to transact business in the State of Ohio; </s> "(3) paragraph 6 of Lilly's fair trade contract [which provides that: "Retailer agrees not to knowingly sell any of Manufacturer's `Identified Commodities' to any dealer who fails to observe the minimum retail resale prices established under Paragraph 3 hereof"] compelled retailers to enter into unlawful horizontal price fixing agreements in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act . . .; </s> "(4) Lilly was not uniformly enforcing its fair trade program on trade-marked commodities in Ohio; and </s> "(5) Lilly modified its fair trade program by abandoning enforcement on its prescription products in Ohio." </s> The issues on the cross-petition are pending in the Court of Common Pleas, Cuyahoga County; further proceedings have been stayed by that court pending the outcome of this appeal. </s> [Footnote 3 The decision was affirmed by a 3-to-4 vote. The Ohio Constitution, Art. IV, 2, provides: "No law shall be held unconstitutional and void by the supreme court without the concurrence of at least all but one of the judges, except in the affirmance of a judgment of the court of appeals declaring a law unconstitutional and void." </s> [Footnote 4 The fact that separate and unresolved issues are pending in the Ohio courts and subject to "further proceedings" therein on the cross-petition does not render the judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court on the issue here considered and decided nonfinal or unappealable within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1257. Cf. Local No. 438 Construction & General Laborers' Union, AFL-CIO, v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542, 548 -552; Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 557 -558. </s> [Footnote 5 The McGuire Act amended 5 (a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended. Section 5 (a) (2) of the latter statute as thus amended, 15 U.S.C. 45 (a) (2), is referred to herein simply as Section 2 of the McGuire Act, and 5 (a) (3), 15 U.S.C. 45 (a) (3), is referred to as Section 3 of the McGuire Act. </s> [Footnote 6 The purpose of the McGuire Act is stated in its preamble: "Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That it is the purpose of this Act to protect the rights of States under the United States Constitution to regulate their internal affairs and more particularly to enact statutes and laws, and to adopt policies, which authorize contracts and agreements prescribing minimum or stipulated prices for the resale of commodities and to extend the minimum or stipulated prices prescribed by such contracts and agreements to persons who are not parties thereto. It is the further purpose of this Act to permit such statutes, laws, and public policies to apply to commodities, contracts, agreements, and activities in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce." 66 Stat. 631-632. </s> [Footnote 7 See United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 311 , n. 14: "The McGuire Act . . . specifically exempts from the antitrust laws price fixing under `fair trade' agreements which bind not only retailers who are parties to the agreement but also retailers who refuse to sign the agreement." </s> [Footnote 8 See Note, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 763, 766-767 (1964). </s> [Footnote 9 The Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County expressly noted that: "These [manufacturers] have entered into many written contracts with retail pharmaceutical establishments in Ohio, determining the [377 U.S. 386, 394] retail resale price for their trademarked or branded commodities and have caused notice of these contracts and the prices therein established to be served on [Hudson]." 117 Ohio App. 207, 208; 176 N. E. 2d 236, 237. </s> [Footnote 10 Hudson contends that the Upjohn case is distinguishable in this regard for Upjohn allegedly does not sell only to retailers. It is clear, however, that this contention was reserved for future determination by the Ohio courts pursuant to a stipulation of the parties and was not in any event passed upon in the decision from which the present appeal is taken. </s> [Footnote 11 See note 2, supra. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting. </s> I would dismiss these appeals for lack of jurisdiction. Under well-established principles, the judgments on review here are not "final," as required by 28 U.S.C. 1257, 1 </s> [377 U.S. 386, 396] even assuming that the federal question which the Court decides can be deemed to have been passed on by the Supreme Court of Ohio. 2 </s> The appellant, Hudson, filed its petitions for a declaratory judgment that the Ohio Fair Trade Act 3 was invalid as soon as the Act went into effect. 4 The appellees, Upjohn and Lilly, filed answers and cross-petitions alleging Hudson's refusal to comply with the Act and seeking injunctive relief and damages. Pursuant to a stipulation of the parties and as permitted by Ohio procedure, the issue raised by the petition for a declaratory judgment - the "general" validity of the Ohio Act - was tried separately and in advance of the trial of all other factual and legal issues raised by the answers and cross-petitions and the responses thereto. In this posture, the cases, decided together at every level, proceeded through the Ohio courts. The Court of Common Pleas for Cuyahoga County decided that the Ohio Fair Trade Act was invalid under the Ohio Constitution, because it involved an unlawful delegation of legislative power. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County reversed, 117 Ohio App. 207, 176 N. E. 2d 236, and remanded the case [377 U.S. 386, 397] to the Court of Common Pleas "for further proceedings according to law with respect to the cross-petition filed in this cause . . . ." The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed. 174 Ohio St. 487, 190 N. E. 2d 460. </s> Although the distinction between final and nonfinal judgments, for purposes of this Court's jurisdiction, has been "faint and faltering at times," Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 69 , it has not disappeared altogether. The nature of the distinction and the reasons for maintaining it have repeatedly been stated. To be reviewed in this Court, a state court judgment must be "final as an effective determination of the litigation and not of merely interlocutory or intermediate steps therein. It must be the final word of a final court." Market Street R. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 324 U.S. 548, 551 . It "must end the litigation by fully determining the rights of the parties . . . ." Gospel Army v. Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 543, 546 . See also, e. g., Mower v. Fletcher, 114 U.S. 127, 128 ; Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324 -325; Department of Banking v. Pink, 317 U.S. 264, 267 -268; Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 345 U.S. 379, 381 -382. </s> "Since its establishment, it has been marked characteristic of the federal judicial system not to permit an appeal until a litigation has been concluded in the court of first instance . . . . This requirement has the support of considerations generally applicable to good judicial administration. It avoids the mischief of economic waste and of delayed justice. Only in very few situations, where intermediate rulings may carry serious public consequences, has there been a departure from this requirement of finality for federal appellate jurisdiction. This prerequisite to review derives added force when the jurisdiction of this Court is invoked to upset the decision of a State court. Here we are in the realm of potential conflict [377 U.S. 386, 398] between the courts of two different governments. . . . This requirement is not one of those technicalities to be easily scorned. It is an important factor in the smooth working of our federal system." Radio Station WOW, Inc., v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 123 -124. </s> One would have thought that the judgments reviewed here were paradigms of the nonfinal judgment. Assuming that the federal question which the Court decides was really passed on by the Ohio Supreme Court, 5 it is [377 U.S. 386, 399] clear nonetheless that this litigation is still in its early stages. No rights have yet been established; no liabilities have been incurred. The Court acknowledges that federal questions, involving unresolved issues of fact and interpretations of the Ohio Act, must still be decided by the Ohio courts. In Upjohn, No. 489, a federal question concerning the possible application of our decision in United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 , "was reserved for future determination by the Ohio courts pursuant to a stipulation of the parties . . . ." Ante, p. 394, note 10. And in Lilly, No. 490, other questions, including at least one federal question, "are pending and unresolved in the Ohio Court of Common Pleas . . . ." Ante, p. 395. The Court can only hope that it will not prove to have wasted its time altogether in these "piecemeal proceedings," Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., supra, at 381, because a subsequent decision of the Ohio courts renders the decision here "unnecessary and irrelevant to a complete disposition of the litigation." Id., at 382 (footnote omitted). If that does not happen, there is every likelihood that the cases will be brought back to this Court for a second time, for consideration of the questions now unresolved. In Radio Station WOW, supra, at 127, this Court stated: "Of course, where the remaining litigation may raise other federal questions [377 U.S. 386, 400] that may later come here, . . . to allow review of an intermediate adjudication would offend the decisive objection to fragmentary reviews." The Court ignores that "decisive objection." </s> In addition to making an uneconomic use of its own time, the Court's entertainment of these appeals has interfered with the orderly procedures of the Ohio courts. In its brief to this Court, Lilly states that proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas have been stayed "pending the outcome of this appeal." Brief, p. 11. Upjohn states in its brief that it has not yet taken action to bring to trial the issues reserved in its case, Brief, p. 13, presumably because of the pendency of the present proceedings. So far as the litigants are concerned, this march to the well for an eye-dropper of water does them no good either, except insofar as delay may be temporarily useful to one party or the other. Now that this Court's decision is rendered, the action will presumably go forward in the state courts; the litigants are no better informed of their ultimate rights than they were before the case came here, and the case is not a jot closer to its conclusion. </s> The Court gives no explanation at all for its departure from established principles. There is not the faintest suggestion of compelling public considerations requiring a determination of whatever issue it is that the Court does actually decide. 6 Nor are there any private interests at [377 U.S. 386, 401] stake which will be irremediably lost unless the Court acts, since no rights or liabilities were determined below or have been determined here. The fact that under Ohio procedure Hudson's petition for a declaratory judgment was separable from the cross-petition and could be determined independently of its has no bearing on whether that determination was final for purposes of this Court's jurisdiction. 7 E. g., Department of Banking v. Pink, supra, at 268; Market Street R. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, supra, at 551. </s> Ninety percent of this case remains submerged. I suspect that the explanation for the Court's snipping off and deciding the 10% that has reached the surface lies in the fact that the Court failed to dismiss the appeal when it was first presented, 375 U.S. 938, 939 , because the jurisdictional objections to review were not then so apparent. 8 I am at a loss to understand why the Court chooses to compound the original error, rather than to correct it. </s> I would dismiss both appeals. </s> [Footnote 1 "Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows: </s> . . . . . </s> "(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity." </s> [Footnote 2 See note 5, infra, p. 398. </s> [Footnote 3 Ohio Rev. Code 1333.27-1333.34. </s> [Footnote 4 The Act became effective on October 22, 1959. In the Upjohn case, No. 489, Hudson filed its original petition in August 1959, after the Act had been passed by the Ohio Legislature, and filed several amended petitions after the Act became effective. The original petition in Lilly, No. 490, was filed on October 22, 1959; it also was later amended. </s> [Footnote 5 The Court of Common Pleas did not reach any federal question, since it found the Ohio Act invalid under the State Constitution. On appeal, the Court of Appeals described the cases as follows: </s> "The actions seek a declaratory judgment declaring the Ohio Fair Trade Act invalid and unconstitutional. Both cases involve similar facts and, with the questions to be determined by this court the same in each case, the appeals will be considered together. The assignment of error is identical in both cases. </s> "`For its assignment of error, the defendant-appellant asserts that the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County erred in declaring Sections 1333.27 through 1333.34 of the Ohio Revised Code to be in violation of the Constitution of the state of Ohio, and therefore void and not binding upon the plaintiff-appellee, and in granting judgment for the plaintiff-appellee on its petition and dismissing the cross-petition of the defendant-appellant.'" 117 Ohio App. 207-208, 176 N. E. 2d, 237. </s> There followed a long discussion of the "historical background," id., at 208, 176 N. E. 2d, 238, of the Ohio Act, which included consideration of major federal legislation and cases. It is entirely clear from the opinion that federal law was considered only as part of the demonstration "that not only the great majority of state legislatures but also the Congress of the United States have determined that there is need to provide reasonable controls in this field [of fair trade], under the police powers of the sovereign power." Id., at 224, 176 N. E. 2d, 247. There is nothing to indicate that the court considered anything beyond the single contention that the Court of Common Pleas had erred in holding the Act invalid under the State Constitution. A dissenting opinion states: "On this appeal, the single question presented is whether the 1959 Fair Trade Act . . . has the effect of nullifying the decision of the Supreme Court [of Ohio] [377 U.S. 386, 399] in Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc., 167 Ohio St., 182." Id., at 230, 176 N. E. 2d, 251. The Union Carbide case was concerned solely with the validity of a prior Fair Trade Act under the Ohio Constitution. In a petition for rehearing (which was denied) the appellant itself urged that the court appeared to have ignored the question whether the Ohio Act was consistent with federal law, in particular the McGuire Act. Only the formal judgment, from which the Court quotes, ante, p. 388, contain any intimation that the Court of Appeals considered any federal question. </s> On review in the Supreme Court of Ohio, neither the majority opinion nor the dissenting opinion even once mentions the McGuire Act or this Court's cases construing it. 174 Ohio St. 487, 497, 190 N. E. 2d 460, 466. </s> [Footnote 6 Indeed, so far as I can tell, the Court decides nothing at all which is not already established law. In United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 311 , note 14, this Court stated: </s> ". . . [The McGuire Act] specifically exempts from the antitrust laws price fixing under `fair trade' agreements which bind not only retailers who are parties to the agreement but also retailers who refuse to sign the agreement." </s> As I read the Court's opinion in this case, its sole holding is that "where sanctioned by a state fair-trade act, a trademark owner such as Lilly could be permitted to enforce, even against a nonsigning retailer such as Hudson, the stipulated minimum prices established by [377 U.S. 386, 401] written contracts with other retailers." Ante, p. 392. This is nothing more than a restatement of the passage quoted from McKesson & Robbins, with the names of the parties in this case filled in. No special questions which might be raised by the facts of this case or by particular features of the Ohio Act are decided here, since the Court properly leaves all such questions for the initial decision of the Ohio courts. </s> The triviality, given the established law, of the question which the Court decides makes its determination to reach the question the more puzzling. </s> [Footnote 7 The fact that Hudson's original petition was for a declaratory judgment has no bearing on the jurisdictional question present here. Such fact does not defeat this Court's jurisdiction, Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 ; but it surely does not create jurisdiction which would otherwise be lacking. </s> [Footnote 8 The jurisdictional question was not called to the attention of the Court by either of the appellees at the time probable jurisdiction was noted. Upjohn filed no response to the jurisdictional statement; Lilly, then represented by other counsel, filed a motion to dismiss, but did not mention the jurisdictional question. </s> [377 U.S. 386, 402]

United States Supreme Court TWA, INC. v. FLIGHT ATTENDANTS(1989) No. 87-548 Argued: November 7, 1988Decided: February 28, 1989 </s> Although petitioner airline (TWA) and respondent flight attendants' union (IFFA) pursued all the required dispute resolution mechanisms of the Railway Labor Act (RLA), their negotiations over a new collective bargaining agreement were unsuccessful. The parties bargained over wages and working conditions but not over the existing agreement's seniority system, which ensured that the most senior qualified attendant who bid on a vacant job assignment, flight schedule, or base of operation (domicile) would obtain it, and would be least affected by periodic furloughs. During the IFFA's subsequent strike, TWA continued operations by hiring permanent replacements for strikers, by continuing to employ attendants who chose not to strike, and by rehiring strikers who abandoned the strike, and filled strike-created vacancies by application of the existing seniority bidding system to all working attendants. After the strike ended, and pursuant to its preannounced policy, TWA refused to displace permanent replacements or junior nonstriking attendants ("crossover" employees) with senior full-term strikers, many of whom were therefore left without an opportunity to return to work. Although a poststrike arbitral agreement guaranteed that all reinstated full-term strikers would be returned to work as vacancies arose and with precisely the seniority they would have had if no strike had occurred, the IFFA filed the instant action contending that, even assuming the strike was economic, the full-term strikers were entitled to displace the newly hired replacements and the less senior crossover attendants either under the terms of the prestrike collective bargaining agreement or under the RLA itself. The District Court denied relief for the most part, but the Court of Appeals, relying on its reading of the prestrike agreement and on judicial interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), reversed the lower court's ruling that the more senior full-term strikers could not displace junior crossovers. </s> Held: </s> An employer is not required by the RLA to lay off junior crossover employees in order to reinstate more senior full-term strikers at the conclusion of a strike. Pp. 432-443. </s> (a) Nothing in the federal common labor law developed under the NLRA, which may provide guiding precedent in RLA cases, indicates that TWA's crossover policy is unlawful. In fact, under NLRB v. [489 U.S. 426, 427] Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 , and its progeny, it is not an unfair labor practice under the NLRA for an employer to refuse to discharge replacement employees in order to make room for strikers at the end of an economic strike. The IFFA's argument that the Mackay Radio rule is inapplicable to junior crossovers because those workers must be treated differently than newly hired permanent replacements (who, the union concedes, need not be displaced) is rejected, since full-term strikers at TWA, once reinstated, have lost no seniority either in absolute or relative terms, and will be able to displace junior flight attendants - whether new hires, crossovers, or full-term strikers - with regard to future reductions in force, vacancies in desirable assignments or domiciles, or periodic bids on job scheduling, and since any "cleavage" between junior crossovers and reinstated full-term strikers is merely the inevitable effect of TWA's lawful use of the economic weapons available to it during a period of self-help. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 , distinguished. To differentiate between crossovers and new hires in the manner the IFFA proposes would have the effect of penalizing those who exercised their right not to strike, which is protected both by the RLA and the NLRA, in order to benefit those who did strike, a result that is not required by the NLRA. Pp. 432-439. </s> (b) TWA's crossover policy is not forbidden by the RLA itself, which, in fact, provides greater avenues of self-help to parties that have exhausted the statute's extensive dispute resolution mechanisms than would be available under the NLRA. Section 2 Fourth of the RLA - which prohibits carriers from "influenc[ing] or coerc[ing] employees . . . not to join . . . any labor organization" - does not prohibit the policy, since that section is addressed primarily to the precertification rights of unorganized employees to organize and choose their representatives, with the intent of protecting the dispute resolution procedures' effectiveness by assuring that the employees' putative representative is not subject to employer control and that neither party will be able to enlist the courts to further its own partisan ends. Where, as here, the parties have exhausted those procedures and have reached an impasse, they are free, without threat of judicial involvement, to turn to any peaceful, self-help measures that do not strike a fundamental blow to union or employer activity and the collective bargaining process itself. Moreover, as the IFFA concedes, nothing in the collective bargaining agreement or any poststrike agreement prohibits TWA's crossover policy. Pp. 439-442. </s> (c) TWA's decision to guarantee to crossovers the same protections lawfully applied to new hires was a decision to apply the pre-existing seniority terms of the collective bargaining agreement uniformly to all employees. That this decision had the effect of encouraging prestrike [489 U.S. 426, 428] workers to remain on the job during the strike or to abandon the strike before all vacancies were filled was simply an effect of TWA's lawful exercise of its peaceful economic power. P. 443. </s> 819 F.2d 839, reversed. </s> O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE, STEVENS, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 443. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in Parts I and II of which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 452. </s> Murray Gartner argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Paul E. Donnelly, Mark A. Buckstein, Michael A. Katz, Carole O'Blenes, Toby R. Hyman, Andrew P. Marks, and Richard M. Klein. </s> Lawrence S. Robbins argued the cause for the National Labor Relations Board as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Deputy Solicitor General Cohen, Glen D. Nager, Rosemary M. Collyer, Robert E. Allen, Norton J. Come, and Linda Sher. </s> John P. Hurley argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were William A. Jolley, Marsha S. Berzon, and Laurence Gold. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Airline Industrial Relations Conference by Harry A. Rissetto and Thomas E. Reinert, Jr.; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States by Stephen A. Bokat; and for Crossover Flight Attendants by Mark P. Johnson. </s> JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> We decide today whether, at the end of a strike, an employer is required by the Railway Labor Act (RLA or Act), 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U.S.C. 151 et seq., to displace employees who worked during the strike in order to reinstate striking employees with greater seniority. </s> I </s> In March 1984, Trans World Airlines, Inc. (TWA), and the Independent Federation of Flight Attendants (IFFA or [489 U.S. 426, 429] Union) began negotiations pursuant to 6 of the RLA, 45 U.S.C. 156, on a new collective bargaining agreement to replace their prior agreement due to expire on July 31, 1984. The existing collective bargaining agreement created a complex system of bidding the general effect of which was to insure that those flight attendants with the greatest seniority would have the best opportunity to obtain their preferred job assignments, flight schedules, and bases of operation as vacancies appeared, and to insure that senior flight attendants would be least affected by the periodic furloughs endemic to the airline industry. Thus, for example, should a job vacancy appear at the highly desirable Los Angeles or San Francisco bases of operation or "domiciles," the most senior qualified flight attendant who bid on such a vacancy would be entitled to it. Conversely, should a reduction in force eliminate a position in the Los Angeles domicile, the furloughed flight attendant could opt to displace the most junior attendant of equal rank in the entire system or the most junior attendant of lower rank either at the same domicile or in the entire system. 1981-1984 TWA/IFFA Collective Bargaining Agreement, Arts. 12-13, 18-A, 18-B, reprinted in App. 31-62. </s> For two years TWA and the Union unsuccessfully bargained over wages and working conditions not including the seniority bidding system. They pursued all the required dispute resolution mechanisms of the RLA, including direct negotiation, 45 U.S.C. 152 Second, mediation, 45 U.S.C. 155 First, and the final 30-day "cooling off" period. Ibid. By early 1986 a strike seemed imminent, and on March 7, 1986, the Union went out on strike. </s> TWA informed its flight attendants before and during the strike that it would continue operations by hiring permanent replacements for striking flight attendants, by continuing to employ any flight attendant who chose not to strike, and by rehiring any striker who abandoned the strike and made an unconditional offer to return to any available vacancies. [489 U.S. 426, 430] TWA also informed its flight attendants that any vacancies created as a result of the strike would be filled by application of the seniority bidding system to all working flight attendants and that such job and domicile assignments would remain effective after the strike ended. App. 120-122, 132-134, 137-139. Thus, at the conclusion of the strike, senior full-term strikers would not be permitted to displace permanent replacements or junior nonstriking flight attendants and could be left without an opportunity to return to work. TWA's promise not to displace working flight attendants after the strike created two incentives specifically linked to the seniority bidding system: it gave senior flight attendants an incentive to remain at, or return to, work in order to retain their prior jobs and domicile assignments; it gave junior flight attendants an incentive to remain at, or return to, work in order to obtain job and domicile assignments that were previously occupied by more senior, striking flight attendants. </s> As promised, TWA continued its operations during the 72-day strike by utilizing approximately 1,280 flight attendants who either did not strike or returned to work before the end of the strike and by hiring and fully training approximately 2,350 new flight attendants, some 1,220 of whom were hired during the first few days of the strike. On May 17, 1986, the Union made an unconditional offer to TWA on behalf of the approximately 5,000 flight attendants who had remained on strike to return to work. TWA accepted the offer but refused the Union's May 27th demand that TWA displace those prestrike employees who were working as of May 17th ("crossover" employees). Accordingly, TWA initially recalled only the 197 most senior full-term strikers to fill available job and domicile vacancies. By the terms of a poststrike arbitral agreement, these strikers and all subsequently reinstated full-term strikers returned to work as vacancies arose and with precisely the seniority they would have had if no strike [489 U.S. 426, 431] had occurred. In May 1988, more than 1,100 full-term strikers had been reinstated with full seniority. </s> In an effort to reinstate all the full-term strikers by displacing the newly hired flight attendants and less senior crossover employees, the Union proceeded on two fronts. First, it brought an injunction action alleging that the full-term strikers were not "economic strikers" but "unfair labor practice strikers" entitled to reinstatement by application of principles this Court has developed in interpreting the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956). The District Court ultimately ruled against the Union on this claim. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 1003 (WD Mo. 1988), appeal pending, No. 88-1984M (CA8). At the same time, the Union filed the instant action contending that, even assuming the strike was economic, the full-term strikers were entitled to reinstatement either under the terms of the prestrike collective bargaining agreement or under the RLA itself. On cross motions for partial summary judgment, the District Court held that the full-term strikers were not entitled to displace either the junior crossovers or the 1,220 new hires employed by TWA immediately after the strike commenced. (The motions did not require the District Court to rule on the status of the remaining new hires.) The District Court also held that 463 new hires not fully trained by the end of the strike could be displaced by full-term strikers. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 470 (WD Mo. 1986). </s> Meanwhile, TWA sought a declaratory judgment that the union security clause of the prestrike collective bargaining agreement containing provisions for the checkoff of union dues and a requirement that new hires join the Union did not survive the self-help period after the parties had bargained to impasse. On cross motions for summary judgment, the same District Court ruled that, because the union security clause [489 U.S. 426, 432] was not part of the prestrike negotiations, it had survived the strike. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants, 640 F. Supp. 1108 (WD Mo. 1986). </s> Appeals were taken from both judgments. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's ruling that the union security clause had survived the period of self-help. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants, 809 F.2d 483 (CA8 1987). In a separate opinion, the same panel also affirmed the District Court's ruling that full-term strikers could not displace the 1,220 fully trained new hires but could displace the 463 untrained new hires. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 819 F.2d 839 (CA8 1987). The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the District Court's ruling that more senior full-term strikers could not displace junior crossovers. In so holding, the court relied primarily on its reading of the union security clause of the prestrike collective bargaining agreement and, secondarily, on judicial interpretations of the NLRA. Id., at 843-845. </s> We granted petitions for writs of certiorari in both cases. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Flight Attendants, 482 U.S. 913 (1987) (TWA I); Flight Attendants v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 485 U.S. 958 (1988) (TWA II) (certiorari granted only to consider displacement of crossovers). Last Term, we affirmed by an equally divided Court the judgment of the Court of Appeals in TWA I that the union security clause survived the strike. 485 U.S. 175 (1988). Today, we reverse the Court of Appeals in TWA II and hold that an employer is not required by the RLA to lay off junior crossovers in order to reinstate more senior full-term strikers at the conclusion of a strike. </s> II </s> We have observed in the past that carefully drawn analogies from the federal common labor law developed under the NLRA may be helpful in deciding cases under the RLA. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 377 </s> [489 U.S. 426, 433] (1969). Thus, as in this case, those lower courts that have examined the reinstatement rights of strikers under the RLA have turned to NLRA precedents for guidance. E. g., Air Line Pilots Assn. International v. United Air Lines, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 1020, 1041, 1045-1046 (ND Ill. 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 802 F.2d 886 (CA7 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946 (1987); National Airlines, Inc. v. International Assn. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 416 F.2d 998, 1004-1006 (CA5 1969). </s> We first considered the reinstatement rights of strikers under the NLRA in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). In Mackay Radio, radio and telegraph operators working in the San Francisco offices of a national telecommunications firm went on strike. In order to continue operations, the employer brought employees from its other offices to fill the strikers' places. At the conclusion of the strike, the striking operators sought to displace their replacements in order to return to work. We held that it was not an unfair labor practice under 8 of the NLRA for the employer to have replaced the striking employees with others "in an effort to carry on the business," or to have refused to discharge the replacements in order to make room for the strikers at the conclusion of the strike. Id., at 345-346. As we there observed, "[t]he assurance by [the employer] to those who accepted employment during the strike that if they so desired their places might be permanent was not an unfair labor practice nor was it such to reinstate only so many of the strikers as there were vacant places to be filled." Id., at 346. On various occasions we have reaffirmed the holding of Mackay Radio. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 232 (1963) ("We have no intention of questioning the continuing vitality of the Mackay rule . . ."); NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 379 (1967) (Employers have "`legitimate and substantial business justifications' for refusing to reinstate employees who engaged in an economic strike . . . when the jobs claimed by the [489 U.S. 426, 434] strikers are occupied by workers hired as permanent replacements during the strike in order to continue operations"); Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 504 , n. 8 (1983) ("The refusal to fire permanent replacements because of commitments made to them in the course of an economic strike satisfies the requirement . . . that the employer have a `legitimate and substantial justification' for its refusal to reinstate strikers"). </s> TWA asks us to apply this line of cases decided under the NLRA to determine the status under the RLA of those prestrike flight attendants who were working at the conclusion of the strike. TWA argues that it would be completely anomalous to hold that full-term strikers may displace junior crossovers when, as the Union has conceded, they may not displace newly hired permanent replacements under either statute. The Union, by contrast, argues that the rule of Mackay Radio is inapplicable to junior crossovers because of differences between the RLA and the NLRA and because, even under the NLRA, junior crossovers would be treated differently from newly hired permanent replacements. 1 </s> The Union relies on Erie Resistor, supra, to distinguish junior crossovers from new hires under the NLRA. In Erie Resistor we struck down an employer's award of 20 years' superseniority to new hires and crossovers as an unfair labor practice within the meaning of 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), 158(a)(3). We observed: </s> ". . . Super-seniority affects the tenure of all strikers whereas permanent replacement, proper under Mackay, affects only those who are, in actuality, replaced. It is [489 U.S. 426, 435] one thing to say that a striker is subject to loss of his job at the strike's end but quite another to hold that in addition to the threat of replacement, all strikers will at best return to their jobs with seniority inferior to that of the replacements and of those who left the strike. </s> . . . . . </s> ". . . Unlike the replacement granted in Mackay which ceases to be an issue once the strike is over, the [superseniority] plan here creates a cleavage in the plant continuing long after the strike is ended. Employees are henceforth divided into two camps: those who stayed with the union and those who returned before the end of the strike and thereby gained extra seniority. This breach is reemphasized with each subsequent layoff and stands as an ever-present reminder of the dangers connected with striking and with union activities in general." 373 U.S., at 230 -231. </s> The Union does not and cannot contend that reinstated full-term strikers have less seniority relative to new hires and junior crossovers than they would have had if they had not remained on strike. It is clear that reinstated full-term strikers lost no seniority either in absolute or relative terms. Thus, unlike the situation in Erie Resistor, any future reductions in force at TWA will permit reinstated full-term strikers to displace junior flight attendants exactly as would have been the case in the absence of any strike. Similarly, should any vacancies develop in desirable job assignments or domiciles, reinstated full-term strikers who have bid on those vacancies will maintain their priority over junior flight attendants, whether they are new hires, crossovers, or full-term strikers. In the same vein, periodic bids on job scheduling will find senior reinstated full-term strikers maintaining their priority over all their junior colleagues. In short, once reinstated, the seniority of full-term strikers is in no way affected by their decision to strike. [489 U.S. 426, 436] </s> Nevertheless, IFFA argues that TWA's refusal to displace junior crossovers will create a "cleavage" between junior crossovers and reinstated full-term strikers at TWA "long after the strike is ended." Id., at 231. This is the case because desirable job assignments and domiciles that would have been occupied by the most senior flight attendants had there been no strike will continue to be held by those who did not see the strike through to its conclusion. For example, the senior full-term striker who worked in the Los Angeles domicile before the strike may have been replaced by a junior crossover. As poststrike vacancies develop in TWA's work force, permitting reinstatement of full-term strikers, they are not likely to occur in the most desirable domiciles. Thus, it is unlikely that the senior full-term striker would be reinstated back to her preferred domicile. Resentful rifts among employees will also persist after the strike, the Union argues, because TWA's prestrike assurance of nondisplacement to junior crossovers, unlike the same assurance to new hires, "set up a competition among those individuals who participated in the original decision to strike, and thereby undermined the group's ability to take the collective action that it is the very purpose of the [RLA] to protect." Brief for Respondent 36-37. </s> We reject this effort to expand Erie Resistor. Both the RLA and the NLRA protect an employee's right to choose not to strike. 45 U.S.C. 152 Fourth; 29 U.S.C. 157, and, thereby, protect employees' rights to "the benefit of their individual decisions not to strike . . . ." Post, at 448, n. 4 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). 2 Accordingly, in virtually [489 U.S. 426, 437] every strike situation there will be some employees who disagree with their union's decision to strike and who cannot be required to abide by that decision. It is the inevitable effect of an employer's use of the economic weapons available during a period of self-help that these differences will be exacerbated and that poststrike resentments may be created. Thus, for example, the employer's right to hire permanent replacements in order to continue operations will inevitably also have the effect of dividing striking employees between those who, fearful of permanently losing their jobs, return to work and those who remain stalwart in the strike. In such a situation, apart from the "pressure on the strikers as a group to abandon the strike," to which the dissent refers, post, at 449 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), a "competition" may arise among the striking employees to return to work in order to avoid being displaced by a permanent replacement. Similarly, employee awareness that an employer may decide to transfer working employees to necessary positions previously occupied by more senior striking employees will isolate employees fearful of losing those positions and employees coveting those positions from employees more committed to the strike. Conversely, a policy such as TWA employed here, in creating the incentive for individual strikers to return to work, also "puts pressure on the strikers as a group to abandon the strike," ibid., in the same manner that the hiring of permanent replacements does. </s> None of these scenarios, however, present the prospect of a continuing diminution of seniority upon reinstatement at the end of the strike that was central to our decision in Erie Resistor. All that has occurred is that the employer has filled vacancies created by striking employees. Some of these vacancies will be filled by newly hired employees, others by doubtless more experienced and therefore more needed employees who either refused to strike or abandoned the strike. The dissent's observation that, "at the conclusion of the strike," discrimination in the filling of "available [489 U.S. 426, 438] positions" based on union activity is impermissible is beside the point. See post, at 450 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). The positions occupied by newly hired replacements, employees who refused to strike, and employees who abandoned the strike are simply not "available positions" to be filled. As noted above, those positions that were available at the conclusion of the strike were filled "according to some principle, such as seniority, that is neutral . . . ." Ibid. (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). That the prospect of a reduction in available positions may divide employees and create incentives among them to remain at work or abandon a strike before its conclusion is a secondary effect fairly within the arsenal of economic weapons available to employers during a period of self-help. </s> To distinguish crossovers from new hires in the manner IFFA proposes would have the effect of penalizing those who decided not to strike in order to benefit those who did. Because permanent replacements need not be discharged at the conclusion of a strike in which the union has been unsuccessful, a certain number of prestrike employees will find themselves without work. We see no reason why those employees who chose not to gamble on the success of the strike should suffer the consequences when the gamble proves unsuccessful. Requiring junior crossovers, who cannot themselves displace the newly hired permanent replacements, and "who rank lowest in seniority," post, at 447 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), to be displaced by more senior full-term strikers is precisely to visit the consequences of the lost gamble on those who refused to take the risk. While the employer and union in many circumstances may reach a back-to-work agreement that would displace crossovers and new hires or an employer may unilaterally decide to permit such displacement, nothing in the NLRA or the federal common law we have developed under that statute requires such a result. That such agreements are typically one mark of a successful strike is yet another indication that crossovers opted not to [489 U.S. 426, 439] gamble; if the strike was successful the advantage gained by declining to strike disappears. </s> III </s> The Union argues, however, that whether or not the NLRA prohibits a crossover policy such as TWA's, the statutory framework of the RLA forbids such a policy. </s> Although we have observed that the NLRA may provide useful analogies for interpreting the RLA, we have also emphasized that the NLRA "cannot be imported wholesale into the railway labor arena. Even rough analogies must be drawn circumspectly with due regard for the many differences between the statutory schemes." Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal, 394 U.S., at 383 . Thus, in Trainmen itself we declined to examine the "panoply of detailed law developed" under the NLRA to determine what kind of secondary picketing in a railway dispute may be enjoined by state courts. Rather, we held that Congress had entirely withdrawn such injunctive power from the States: "[P]arties who have unsuccessfully exhausted the Railway Labor Act's procedures for resolution of a major dispute . . . [may] employ the full range of whatever peaceful economic power they can muster, so long as its use conflicts with no other obligation imposed by federal law." Id., at 391-392. Similarly, two Terms ago in Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Maintenance of Way Employes, 481 U.S. 429 (1987), we declined to find in the RLA an implied limit on a union's resort to secondary activity by analogy to the NLRA. These cases have read the RLA to provide greater avenues of self-help to parties that have exhausted the statute's "virtually endless," id., at 444, dispute resolution mechanisms than would be available under the NLRA. Nevertheless, they provide the backdrop for the Union's contention that, in this case, we should understand provisions of the RLA to limit "the full range of whatever peaceful economic power [the parties] can [489 U.S. 426, 440] muster," Trainmen, supra, at 392, beyond the limitations even imposed by the NLRA. This we decline to do. </s> The Union points to 2 Fourth of the RLA as the source of this limitation on the use of the employer's economic power. The section provides, in pertinent part: </s> "No carrier, its officers or agents shall deny or in any way question the right of its employees to join, organize, or assist in organizing the labor organization of their choice, and it shall be unlawful for any carrier to interfere in any way with the organization of its employees, . . . or to influence or coerce employees in an effort to induce them to join or remain or not to join or remain members of any labor organization . . . ." 45 U.S.C. 152 Fourth. </s> The Union argues that TWA's crossover policy, which created an incentive for flight attendants either not to join or to abandon the strike, constituted influence or coercion in an effort to induce the flight attendants not to remain members of IFFA and was, therefore, impermissible under 2 Fourth. </s> Section 2 Fourth was enacted as part of the 1934 amendments to the RLA. 48 Stat. 1185. From the time of our very first opportunity to interpret the 1934 amendments, we have viewed them as addressing primarily the precertification rights and freedoms of unorganized employees. In Virginian R. Co. v. Railway Employees, 300 U.S. 515 (1937), we observed that the employees' freedom "to organize and to make choice of their representatives without the `coercive interference' and `pressure' of a company union . . . was continued and made more explicit by the amendment of 1934." Id., at 543, citing 2 Third, 2 Fourth, and Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Railway Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930). In Switchmen v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943), the Court divided over whether the federal courts have jurisdiction under 2 Fourth to review a certification of union representatives for collective bargaining by the National Mediation Board acting under 2 Ninth of the RLA as amended in 1934. Both the majority and the dissent agreed, however, that [489 U.S. 426, 441] "[t]he 1934 Act was directed particularly at control over the initial step in collective bargaining - the determination of the employees' representatives." Id., at 317 (Reed, J., dissenting); see also id., at 302 (opinion of the Court); Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 759 (1961). </s> The explanation for the precertification focus of the 1934 amendments is clear. The RLA provides an exhaustively detailed procedural framework "to facilitate the voluntary settlement of major disputes." Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal, supra, at 378. The effectiveness of these private dispute resolution procedures depends on the initial assurance that the employees' putative representative is not subject to control by the employer and on the subsequent assurance that neither party will be able to enlist the courts to further its own partisan ends. See Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Transportation Union, 402 U.S. 570, 596 -597 (1971) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting) (the duty to exhaust the dispute resolution procedures "does not contemplate that governmental power should, after failure of the parties to reach accord, be added to the scales in favor of either party and thus compel the other to agree upon the aided party's terms. Rather, at that point, impasse was to free both parties to resort to self-help"); Burlington Northern, supra, at 451-452 (the availability of self-help measures rather than judicial remedies "may increase the effectiveness of the RLA in settling major disputes by creating an incentive for the parties to settle prior to exhaustion of the statutory procedures"). Thus, we have understood judicial intervention in RLA procedures to be limited to those cases where "but for the general jurisdiction of the federal courts there would be no remedy to enforce the statutory commands which Congress had written into the Railway Labor Act." Switchmen, supra, at 300; Chicago & N. W. R. Co., supra, at 595 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting) ("The underlying cohesiveness of the decisions [permitting judicial interference] lies in the fact that in each instance the scheme of the Railway Labor Act could not begin to work without judicial involvement"). [489 U.S. 426, 442] </s> Here, TWA and the Union followed without interference the scheme of the RLA to an unsuccessful conclusion and then turned to self-help. We have more than once observed that, at this final stage of a labor dispute regulated by the RLA, "the Act is wholly inexplicit as to the scope of allowable self-help." Trainmen, 394 U.S., at 391 ; Burlington Northern, 481 U.S., at 447 -448. Such silence does not amount to a congressional imprimatur on all forms of postnegotiation self-help. It does, however, indicate that we should hesitate to imply limitations on all but those forms of self-help that strike a fundamental blow to union or employer activity and the collective bargaining process itself. Accordingly, just as we saw no statutory basis for limiting the secondary activities of unions during a period of self-help in Trainmen and Burlington Northern, we see no basis in 2 Fourth for prohibiting the crossover policy employed by TWA once bargaining had reached an impasse. Both self-help measures fall squarely within the "full range of whatever peaceful economic power [the parties] can muster" once they have "unsuccessfully exhausted the Railway Labor Act's procedures for resolution of a major dispute . . . ." Trainmen, supra, at 392. Neither measure prevented the scheme of the RLA from working; neither measure was inherently destructive of union or employer activity. Similarly, we see nothing in Railway Clerks v. Florida East Coast R. Co., 384 U.S. 238 (1966), so heavily relied upon by the Union, that is to the contrary. In Florida East Coast we recognized a carrier's ability to depart from the terms of an existing collective bargaining agreement when reasonably necessary to operate during a strike. As the Union itself concedes, see n. 1, supra, nothing in the collective bargaining agreement or any poststrike agreement between TWA and IFFA prohibits the crossover policy adopted by TWA. Thus, there was no departure from the collective bargaining agreement that would require an examination of reasonable necessity. [489 U.S. 426, 443] </s> IV </s> Neither the RLA itself nor any analogies to the NLRA indicate that the crossover policy adopted by TWA during the period of self-help was unlawful. Rather, the decision to guarantee to crossovers the same protections lawfully applied to new hires was a simple decision to apply the pre-existing seniority terms of the collective bargaining agreement uniformly to all working employees. That this decision had the effect of encouraging prestrike workers to remain on the job during the strike or to abandon the strike and return to work before all vacancies were filled was an effect of the exercise of TWA's peaceful economic power, a power that the company was legally free to deploy once the parties had exhausted the private dispute resolution mechanisms of the RLA. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is </s> Reversed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The Union has abandoned as irrelevant arguments that persuaded the Court of Appeals below, based on its holding in TWA I, that the union security clause of the prestrike collective bargaining agreement had survived the strike. Brief for Respondent 4, n. 6. We agree that this concession by the Union is proper. Nothing in the prestrike collective bargaining agreement guaranteed reinstatement of striking flight attendants to positions occupied by junior crossovers. </s> [Footnote 2 Our affirmance in TWA I of the judgment that the union security clause sanctioned by 45 U.S.C. 152 Eleventh survived the strike means that crossover and new hires continue to bear the burden of paying union dues. Free riding on the benefits that may come to these employees as a result of IFFA's status as the flight attendants' exclusive bargaining representative is thereby foreclosed. See Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 760 -762 (1961). </s> JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, dissenting. </s> The issue in this case is whether under the Railway Labor Act (RLA) an employer, in allocating available jobs among members of a bargaining unit at the conclusion of a strike, may discriminate against full-term strikers by giving preference to employees who crossed the picket line to return to work before the strike was over. Because I conclude that such discrimination on the basis of union activity is "inherently destructive" of the right to strike, as guaranteed by both the RLA and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), I dissent. </s> I </s> Notwithstanding the Court's suggestion that the portion of the RLA at issue here addresses "primarily" the precertification context, ante, at 440, it should be clear that under the RLA an employee's right to strike is protected against coercion by her employer. The Court relies in part on Trainmen [489 U.S. 426, 444] v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969), but it overlooks the clear teaching of that case: </s> "[E]mployees subject to the Railway Labor Act enjoy the right to engage in primary strikes over major disputes. . . . Whether the source of this right be found in a particular provision of the Railway Labor Act or in the scheme as a whole, it is integral to the Act." Id., at 384-385 (footnote omitted). </s> The "particular provision," we made clear, was 2 Fourth. Id., at 385, n. 20. While the issue in Jacksonville Terminal was the extent of a state court's power to issue an antistrike injunction, we emphasized that the RLA's guarantee of the right to strike was not limited to the context of interference by the State: "However, 2 Fourth of the RLA, added in 1934, was designed primarily, if not exclusively to prohibit coercive employer practices." Ibid. (emphasis added). Whatever may have been the "primary" purpose of 2 Fourth, it is too late in the day to suggest that this provision, at least when read in the context of the entire RLA, does not prohibit employer coercion of the right to strike. </s> The Court compounds its error in regard to the reach of 2 Fourth with a more fundamental mistake when it appears to assume that the employer's action in this case is sanctioned by the mere fact that it occurred during the "self-help" stage of the dispute. Ante, at 440-442. Clearly this cannot be the case. I am confident that the Court would agree, for example, that an employer could not legally discharge striking employees under the RLA. But if this is so, it must be because the RLA contains some injunction against employer interference with the right to strike, even when that interference consists of actions taken during the period of permissible self-help. Thus, the question is not whether the RLA protects the right to strike against employer coercion - for it surely does - but whether that protection goes so far as to prohibit the specific employer practice at issue here. [489 U.S. 426, 445] </s> The key to this case is a fundamental command of the RLA and the NLRA alike, which in the case of the RLA is textually anchored in 2 Fourth: the employer may not engage in discrimination among its employees - whether at the precertification stage, the bargaining stage, or during or after a strike - on the basis of their degree of involvement in protected union activity such as a strike. 1 This case thus falls within the class of cases in which judicial intervention to enforce the right at issue is justified because "the scheme of the Railway Labor Act could not begin to work without judicial involvement." Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Transportation Union, 402 U.S. 570, 595 (1971) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). The "central theme" of the RLA is, of course, "to bring about voluntary settlement." Ibid. But "unless the unions fairly represented all of their employees; unless the employer bargained with the certified representative of the employees; unless the status quo was maintained during the entire range of bargaining, the statutory mechanism could not hope to induce a negotiated settlement." Ibid. The same is true here: the statutory scheme would be just as incapable of bringing about a negotiated settlement if the employer, in the name of "self-help," impermissibly retaliated against employees because of their exercise of their right under the RLA to engage in protected union activity such as a strike. 2 </s> II </s> A </s> That the RLA broadly enjoins discrimination against strikers does not necessarily settle the issue, of course. In the context of the NLRA we have on occasion found reason to [489 U.S. 426, 446] make an exception to that statute's nondiscrimination provision in the name of the employer's "necessity." See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). The RLA itself provides little guidance as to whether the employer is in any way privileged, in allocating jobs at the end of a strike, to give preference to bargaining unit members who crossed the picket line to return to work. As we have previously noted, "the Act is wholly inexplicit as to the scope of allowable self-help." Jacksonville Terminal, 394 U.S., at 391 . </s> While of course "the National Labor Relations Act cannot be imported wholesale into the railway labor arena," id., at 383, we have frequently "referred to the NLRA for assistance in construing the Railway Labor Act." Ibid. Given the paucity of RLA precedent on the specific issue before us, the Court quite properly looks to the NLRA for guidance. Ante, at 432-439. It arrives at an incorrect conclusion, however, because it mischaracterizes the employer's action and because it appears unwilling to take seriously the protection Congress has seen fit to afford to the right to strike. </s> The Court's conception of this case is most clearly expressed in a key paragraph that summarizes its discussion of the NLRA case law: </s> "To distinguish crossovers from new hires in the manner IFFA proposes would have the effect of penalizing those who decided not to strike in order to benefit those who did. . . . We see no reason why those employees who chose not to gamble on the success of the strike should suffer the consequences when the gamble proves unsuccessful. Requiring junior crossovers . . . to be displaced by more senior full-term strikers is precisely to visit the consequences of the lost gamble on those who refused to take the risk." Ante, at 438. </s> This understanding of the Union's position contains a factual and a legal error, both of which infect the Court's analysis of the case. [489 U.S. 426, 447] </s> In the first place, refusing to discriminate in favor of crossovers is not to visit the consequences of the lost strike on "those who refused to take the risk," but rather on those who rank lowest in seniority. Whether a given flight attendant chose to take the risk of the strike or not is wholly immaterial. Rather - as is virtually universally the case when work-force reductions are necessary for whatever reason in a unionized enterprise - it is the most junior employees, whether strikers or crossovers, who are most vulnerable. This is precisely the point of seniority. </s> More fundamental, I fear, is the legal mistake inherent in the Court's objection to "penalizing those who decided not to strike in order to benefit those who did." The Court, of course, does precisely the opposite: it allows TWA to single out for penalty precisely those employees who were faithful to the strike until the end, in order to benefit those who abandoned it. What is unarticulated is the Court's basis for choosing one position over the other. If indeed one group or the other is to be "penalized," 3 what basis does the Court have for determining that it should be those who remained on strike rather than those who returned to work? I see none, unless it is perhaps an unarticulated hostility toward strikes. In any case the NLRA does provide a basis for resolving this question. It requires simply that in making poststrike reinstatements an employer may not discriminate among its employees on account of their union activity. That, in fact, is the holding of NLRB v. Mackay Radio, supra, at 346 - the more familiar teaching as to the employer's right to hire permanent replacements having been dictum. If an employer may not discriminate - in either direction - on the basis of the employee's strike activity, then it follows that the employer must make decisions about which employees to reinstate on [489 U.S. 426, 448] the basis of some neutral criterion, such as seniority. That is precisely what the Union asks. 4 </s> B </s> We have recognized only a narrow exception to the general principle prohibiting discrimination against employees for exercising their right to strike. Since Mackay Radio it has been accepted that an employer may hire "permanent replacements" in order to maintain operations during a strike, and that these replacements need not be displaced to make room for returning strikers. The question here is whether the Mackay exception should be expanded to cover the present case, involving as it does members of the striking bargaining unit who have crossed the picket lines, rather than new hires from outside the bargaining unit. Despite the superficial similarity between the two situations, strong reasons counsel against applying the Mackay rule to crossover employees. </s> The employer's promise to members of the bargaining unit that they will not be displaced at the end of a strike if they [489 U.S. 426, 449] cross the picket lines addresses a far different incentive to the bargaining-unit members than does the employer's promise of permanence to new hires. The employer's threat to hire permanent replacements from outside the existing work force puts pressure on the strikers as a group to abandon the strike before their positions are filled by others. But the employer's promise to members of the striking bargaining unit that if they abandon the strike (or refuse to join it at the outset) they will retain their jobs at strike's end in preference to more senior workers who remain on strike produces an additional dynamic: now there is also an incentive for individual workers to seek to save (or improve) their own positions at the expense of other members of the striking bargaining unit. We have previously observed that offers of "individual benefits to the strikers to induce them to abandon the strike . . . could be expected to undermine the strikers' mutual interest and place the entire strike effort in jeopardy." NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 230 -231 (1963). Such a "divide and conquer" tactic thus "strike[s] a fundamental blow to union . . . activity and the collective bargaining process itself." Ante, at 442. </s> In Erie Resistor we found the employer's offer of superseniority to new hires and crossovers to be "inherently destructive" of the right to strike and therefore in contravention of 8(a)(1) and (a)(3) of the NLRA. 373 U.S., at 231 -232. In my view the same conclusion should apply here. Beyond its specific holding outlawing superseniority, I read Erie Resistor to stand for the principle that there are certain tools an employer may not use, even in the interest of continued operations during a strike, and that the permissibility of discriminatory measures taken for that purpose must be evaluated by weighing the "necessity" of the employer's action (i. e., its interest in maintaining operations during the strike) against its prejudice to the employees' right to strike. 5 It [489 U.S. 426, 450] seems clear to me that in this case the result of such an analysis should be to forbid the employer to give preferential treatment to crossovers, because of the destructive impact of such an action on the strikers' mutual interest. Thus, when an employer recalls workers to fill the available positions at the conclusion of a strike, it may not discriminate against either the strikers or the crossovers. Rather it must proceed according to some principle, such as seniority, that is neutral as between them. 6 That TWA failed to do. 7 </s> [489 U.S. 426, 451] </s> III </s> Precedent under the NLRA clearly forbids an employer to burden the right to strike in the manner TWA has done in this case, and I see no reason why that conclusion should not apply equally under the RLA. </s> In a case like this it is not difficult to conjure up a parade of horribles to support either position. Forbidding an employer to discriminate in favor of crossovers, as I would do, makes it impossible for a junior employee who does not want to strike, and who is unable to persuade a majority of her colleagues to adopt that stance, to be sure that she can save her job. But that employee is in the same position she would be in if a layoff were necessary for other reasons beyond her control, such as an economic downturn. The principle of seniority is based on the notion that it is those employees who have worked longest in an enterprise and therefore have most at stake whose jobs should be most protected. Permitting the employer to give preference to crossovers, as the Court today does, will mean that an employee of only six months' experience, who abandoned the strike one day before it ended, could displace a 20-year veteran who chose to remain faithful to the decision made collectively with her fellow workers until the group as a whole decided to end the strike. Unfortunately there will be individual injustices whichever [489 U.S. 426, 452] rule we adopt. I would favor - and I believe Congress has provided for - the rule that errs on the side of preferring solidarity and seniority, rather than a rule that would permit the employer to discriminate on the basis of protected union activity. </s> [Footnote 1 We have noted that 2 Fourth is "comparable" to 7 of the NLRA, which protects the right to engage in concerted activities. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 385 , n. 20 (1969). </s> [Footnote 2 It is particularly difficult to discern any reason why judicial intervention should be necessary to enforce a union's duty of fair representation under the RLA, see Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), but not an employer's duty to refrain from discrimination based on union activity. </s> [Footnote 3 Of course, as explained in the preceding paragraph, the position the Union advocates does not "penalize" any employee on the basis of her decision to strike or not to strike. </s> [Footnote 4 That some crossovers, like some strikers - in both cases the most junior members of the work force - may lose their jobs because of the collective decision to strike is simply a reflection of the employer's right to hire "permanent replacements," or perhaps of a downturn in business due to the strike or other factors. The Court's argument that the crossovers should not be "penalized" rests on its apparent belief that they should not be denied the benefit of their individual decisions not to strike (although it should be noted that the Court apparently objects to "penalizing" even those crossovers who voted for the strike, as long as they repented of that decision before the strike ended). But "[u]nion activity, by its very nature, is group activity," NLRB v. Textile Workers, 409 U.S. 213, 221 (1972) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting), and inherent in the system of exclusive bargaining representatives, which is a fundament of our labor law, is the principle of majority decision - even where such decisions may impose costs on the dissenting minority. The contrary rule, moreover, would allow the employee who abandons the collectively taken decision to strike to become a free rider, enjoying the benefit of any gains won by the strike, but without sharing in its risk. See Pattern Makers v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 129 (1985) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). </s> [Footnote 5 Unlike JUSTICE BLACKMUN, post, at 464-466, I would weigh necessity and prejudice in categories of situations rather than on a case-by-case [489 U.S. 426, 449] basis. Thus, just as in Erie Resistor where we held grants of superseniority to be per se illegal, regardless of the business necessity that might be found in the particular case, I have no difficulty in determining that discrimination in favor of crossovers in poststrike callbacks - even if perhaps less egregious than grants of superseniority - is inherently destructive of the right to strike, notwithstanding whatever business purpose the employer might be able to assert in an individual case. I agree, in any event, with JUSTICE BLACKMUN's conclusion, post, at 466, that such employer conduct could rarely be shown to be "necessary" under the standard of Railway Clerks v. Florida East Coast R. Co., 384 U.S. 238 (1966). </s> [Footnote 6 While there might be circumstances in which some neutral principle other than seniority might be acceptable as a basis for recalls (e. g., the employer's need for particular skills), seniority is so well established in labor relations as the basis for such decisions that exceptions should be rare. Indeed we have described seniority as of "overriding importance" in "determin[ing] who gets or who keeps an available job." Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 346 -347 (1964). In any case, TWA has made no pretense that its discriminatory recalls are justified by some other neutral principle. </s> [Footnote 7 The NLRB, in an amicus brief, argues that the employer not only may, but must, accord preferential treatment to crossovers, on the ground that once the crossovers have resumed work - which they have a right to do if jobs are available - the positions they occupy are not "vacant" at the end of the strike. Brief for NLRB as Amicus Curiae 13-15; see also ante, at 438. This argument simply begs the question. If the employer is prohibited from discriminating among members of the bargaining unit on the basis of strike activity in allocating poststrike jobs, then the employer may not promise certain bargaining-unit members that the jobs will be theirs permanently, merely because those members returned to work during the strike. Whether or not the employer may do this is precisely the question this case presents, and the answer to that question cannot be assumed by [489 U.S. 426, 451] stating it as a premise. Neither NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967), nor Laidlaw Corp., 171 N. L. R. B. 1366 (1968), dealt with the conflicting rights of crossovers and full-term strikers. </s> Similarly, the Court's concluding statement that "the decision to guarantee to crossovers the same protections lawfully applied to new hires was a simple decision to apply the pre-existing seniority terms of the collective bargaining agreement uniformly to all working employees," ante, at 443 (emphasis added), again assumes what must be proved. If "working" refers to the poststrike period, which employees are working and which are not is a function of the employer's decision to give preference to the crossovers; if instead it refers to the period prior to the strike's end, the question remains whether the employer may make poststrike employment decisions on the basis of which employees were "working" during the strike. </s> JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins as to Parts I and II, dissenting. </s> The central question in this Railway Labor Act (RLA) case is whether it is unlawful for a carrier to refuse to reinstate employees who supported a strike until its end ("full-term strikers") solely because the carrier chooses to retain in its active work force employees who returned to work before the strike's conclusion ("crossovers"). 1 </s> The Court today answers that question in the negative, concluding that such conduct never violates the RLA, regardless of whether business necessity dictated the carrier's course of action. In dissent, JUSTICE BRENNAN takes the diametrically opposite view, in agreement with the Court of Appeals. JUSTICE BRENNAN finds such conduct "inherently destructive," ante, at 443, of the right to strike and violative of the RLA regardless of any proffered business justification. In my view, neither of these positions accurately captures the delicate balance our RLA precedents have attempted to achieve between the public's dual interests in the maintenance of transportation service during labor disputes and in the long-term stability of labor relations in the rail and airline industries. [489 U.S. 426, 453] </s> My differences with JUSTICE BRENNAN are limited in scope. Concisely stated, I give greater weight than he does to the RLA's policy in favor of continued operations, and accordingly conclude that this case should be remanded to permit TWA to make a factual showing that its crossover policy truly was necessary for that purpose. The Court's opinion presents far greater concerns, as much because of the false assumptions that underlie the Court's analysis as because of its erroneous result. </s> I </s> The threshold question is whether the provisions and policies of the RLA place any limit on a carrier's exercise of self-help during a strike. The Court acknowledges that the RLA does contemplate such a limit. Indeed, there would be little need to distinguish, see ante, at 436, TWA's crossover policy from the superseniority policy in NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963), if the RLA had no relevance to the legality of grants of superseniority, or to other, even more egregious, discriminatory, and coercive employer practices. But the Court adopts a stingy interpretation of the RLA, reserving the RLA's protective force for only the most extraordinary circumstances. In so doing, the Court uses language which suggests that any limit on employer self-help must be "impl[ied]," ante, at 442, which in turn suggests that the Court finds no express limit in the text of the RLA. I find no basis for that view, a view which does not sit comfortably with the Court's opinion read as a whole and which results in a far too restrictive reading of the RLA. </s> When the Court addressed the permissible scope of employer self-help under the RLA in Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969), it held that the RLA permits "parties who have unsuccessfully exhausted the Railway Labor Act's procedures for resolution of a major dispute to employ the full range of whatever peaceful economic power they can muster, so long as its use conflicts with no other obligation imposed by federal law." Id., at 392 (emphasis [489 U.S. 426, 454] added). In applying that holding to the facts of this case, the Court rejects the proposition that 2 Fourth of the RLA, 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U.S.C. 152 Fourth, creates a relevant conflicting federal obligation. </s> The Court's stated reason for rejecting the applicability of 2 Fourth sweeps too broadly. The Court places great emphasis on the fact that the 1934 amendments which introduced 2 Fourth had a "precertification focus." Ante, at 441. It should be clear, however, that a precertification focus is not the same as a postcertification blindspot. In 1934, Congress was faced with evidence that railroad employees' efforts at self-organization had been thwarted by coercive employer tactics, including the support of employer-dominated company unions. See Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 759 (1961). Certainly, Congress had cause for concern: unless each side is free to choose its own bargaining representative, there can be no legitimate bargaining relationship. There is no indication, however, that Congress' concern in enacting 2 Fourth is satisfied at the moment of a union's certification. Congress aimed to protect the employee's right to organize and join unions "with a view to asserting himself as to hours, conditions, and wages," 78 Cong. Rec. 11720 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Monaghan) - not as an end in itself. This Court long has recognized that a "primary purpose of the major revisions made in 1934 was to strengthen the position of the labor organizations vis-a-vis the carriers, to the end of furthering the success of the basic congressional policy of self-adjustment of the industry's labor problems." Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S., at 759 . </s> Indeed, the Court today acknowledges that, precertification focus notwithstanding, 2 Fourth has relevance to the right of employees to decide whether to assist in postcertification union activities, free from employer coercion. The Court places substantial reliance on 2 Fourth as the source of "an employee's right to choose not to strike," ante, at 436, [489 U.S. 426, 455] a right relevant to this case only if it applies to post certification strike activity. </s> Finding 2 Fourth to be a source of the right not to strike is entirely proper. In Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954), the Court held that the protection 8(a)(3) of the NLRA affords against employer discrimination "to . . . discourage membership in any labor organization," 29 U.S.C. 158(a) (3), extends to "discrimination to discourage participation in union activities as well as to discourage adhesion to union membership." 347 U.S., at 40 . I see no reason why similar language in 2 Fourth, i. e., its protection of employees' right to "join or remain or not to join or remain members of any labor organization," should not be read in a similar fashion. Cf. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S., at 385 , n. 20. Neither, apparently, does the Court. And if 2 Fourth bars discrimination or retaliation against employees who choose not to strike, the same must be true of discrimination or retaliation against employees who choose to strike. See Railway Labor Executives' Assn. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 808 F.2d 150, 158 (CA1 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830 (1987); Air Line Pilots Assn. v. United Air Lines, Inc., 802 F.2d 886, 897 (CA7 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946 (1987). </s> In contrast, the Court's suggestion that the RLA provides employees no express protection against discrimination on the basis of levels of support for union activities leads the Court to limit the RLA's force to whatever protections this Court is willing to "imply" from the RLA's general policies. This uncertainty carries with it the danger of undermining the stability of labor relations under the RLA. Under this Court's longstanding RLA jurisprudence, a strike that takes place after the RLA's dispute resolution mechanisms have failed "represents only an interruption in the continuity of the relation" between employer and union, not an invitation for "labor-management relations [to] revert to the jungle." Railway Clerks v. Florida East Coast R. Co., 384 U.S. 238 , [489 U.S. 426, 456] 246-247 (1966). Stated otherwise, a strike under the RLA is a "bounded conflict." Cf. Estreicher, Strikers and Replacements, 38 Lab. L. J. 287, 288 (1987). Contract negotiations are limited in scope to the matters raised by the parties' bargaining notices, see 45 U.S.C. 156; both during and after strikes that occur following unsuccessful mediation, the union often will maintain its status as exclusive bargaining representative. See, e. g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants, 809 F.2d 483, 492 (CA8 1987), aff'd by equally divided Court, 485 U.S. 175 (1988). The long-term stability of labor relations thus will depend upon the maintenance of the working relationship between the union and the employer. This Court has been aware in the past that one party's power of self-help cannot be permitted effectively to negate the other's, lest "the right of self-help . . . become unilateral," Railway Clerks v. Florida East Coast R. Co., 384 U.S. at 246, and that a carrier cannot be permitted to reap rewards from a strike so much in excess of the rewards of negotiation that it will "have a strong reason to prolong the strike and even break the union." Id., at 247. The central emphasis of the RLA on continuity of labor relations requires courts to take the long view. See, e. g., Empresa Ecuatoriana de Aviacion v. District Lodge No. 100, 690 F.2d 838, 845 (CA11 1982), cert. dism'd, 463 U.S. 1250 (1983); National Airlines, Inc. v. International Assn. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 416 F.2d 998, 1006 (CA5 1969). </s> The Court's position leaves far too little room for these concerns. By interpreting the RLA as affording protection to striking employees only in the most unusual circumstances, the Court encourages employers to test the limits, knowing that the burden will fall on the employees to demonstrate that the employer's conduct has crossed an artificially high barrier of "implied" tolerance for employer coercion. The Court thus needlessly creates incentives to undermine long-term [489 U.S. 426, 457] labor stability and to expand labor conflicts beyond their natural bounds. </s> In sum, this Court consistently has recognized that there is a difference between traditional self-help economic pressure and coercion or discrimination in derogation of federal law. The Court today continues to recognize this principle, and is willing to "imply" protection in extraordinary circumstances. But Congress did not leave the protection of employee rights to this Court's selective "implication." I reject this Court's failure to give full force to 2 Fourth, the RLA's express statutory prohibition of coercive and discriminatory employer conduct. </s> II </s> Even under the standards the Court articulates today, the result it reaches in this case cannot stand. The Court's conclusion that TWA's conduct cannot be said to violate the statutory rights (implied or otherwise) of full-term strikers fails to take seriously the significant discriminatory impact of TWA's refusal to reinstate full-term strikers. That failure rests on two assumptions that are patently inconsistent with central tenets of federal labor law. </s> First, the Court appears to suggest that because there were no "vacancies" for the full-term strikers to fill, employer "discrimination" cannot have been a factor in the final allocation of poststrike positions in the active work force. Contrary to this view, this Court long has held that the mere fact that a particular employee occupies a job at the conclusion of a strike does not entitle the employee to retain that job. This is illustrated by our NLRA precedents. Under NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 347 (1938), an employer subject to the NLRA is "not bound to displace men hired to take the strikers' places in order to provide positions for them" if the employer has found it necessary to promise the replacements permanent employment in [489 U.S. 426, 458] order to operate during the strike. 2 In contrast, positions occupied by new hires to whom no promise of "permanent replacement" status is made are as good as "vacancies" from the full-term strikers' point of view. The employer's legal right to resist a union demand for reinstatement flows from the necessity of the offer of permanence; absent such necessity, the employer may be required to furlough (or discharge) the replacements to make room for the strikers' return. See NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378 -379 (1967); Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 514 , 517 (1983) (opinion concurring in judgment). The poststrike situation is not, in short, a game of musical chairs: it is governed not by the rule of capture, but by conflicting claims of legal entitlement. </s> Second, and in tacit recognition that the poststrike situation is governed by law rather than by force or happenstance, the Court elevates the rights of crossovers to the preeminent position, a position which in the Court's view flows naturally from the RLA's and NLRA's protection of "an employee's right to choose not to strike." Ante, at 436. From the fact that some employees will disagree with the union's decision to strike, the Court deduces the proposition that "employees who chose not to gamble on the success of the strike" should not "suffer the consequences when the gamble proves unsuccessful." Ante, at 438. </s> The Court's analysis entirely ignores, and threatens to vitiate, the "`majority-rule concept [that] is today unquestionably at the center of our federal labor policy.'" NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967), quoting Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 Yale L. J. 1327, 1333 (1958). "Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining representative with powers comparable to those possessed [489 U.S. 426, 459] by a legislative body both to create and restrict the rights of those whom it represents." Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944) (discussing the duty of fair representation). What the Court characterizes as "their union's decision to strike," ante, at 437 (emphasis added), is the decision reached by the majority of the members of the bargaining unit through democratic processes. The right to remain a member of the collectivity but to opt out of the consequences of particular collective decisions when the going gets rough is not a normal incident of participation in the democratic process. </s> The Court also overlooks the long-recognized fact that the benefits of successful union activity flow to all members of the bargaining unit regardless of their personal support for the union. See Railway Employees v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956); Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S., at 762 . By elevating the right of crossovers to be "free rider[s]," id., at 762-763, nn. 13 and 14, to the status of a first principle of labor law, the Court forgets that, by definition, the benefits and burdens of collective action are borne collectively. </s> This newly asserted statutory right of dissidents to be free from the consequences of collective action buckles under the heavy load the Court asks it to bear. As TWA concedes and the Court recognizes, employers and unions often lawfully agree to displace crossovers through poststrike back-to-work agreements, and employers may unilaterally decide to permit such displacement. See Brief for Petitioner 29; see also Copaz Packing Corp., 115 LRRM 1008, 1008 (1983) (NLRB General Counsel Advice Memorandum) (employers are "privileged to enter into a strike settlement which provide[s] that . . . crossovers and strikers who remained on strike until the settlement would be treated equally for recall purposes"); Florida East Coast R. Co., 41 Lab. Arb. 1001, 1006-1007 (1963) (recommendation of Presidential Emergency Board that the carrier replace crossovers and new-hire replacements, who were the poststrike "occupants of the jobs covered [489 U.S. 426, 460] by agreements between the Carrier and the organizations with striking employees to the extent necessary to permit these jobs to be filled on the basis of seniority"). If the right of dissidents to be free of the economic consequences of strikes is so central, it is difficult to see why the union has the power to bargain it away or why the employer has the power to ignore it. </s> In sum, the Court concludes that TWA's conduct was lawful on the basis of two assumptions: that the resulting job distribution is justified by the absence of "vacancies" for the returning strikers, and that TWA's acts were a necessary consequence of its duty to respect the crossovers' statutory right not to strike. The Court allows these assumptions to stand in the way of considering the adverse impact of TWA's actions on the full-term strikers' statutory rights. But I find these assumptions to be without foundation, and thus turn to the question the Court fails to reach. </s> III </s> A </s> At the conclusion of the strike, TWA refused to reinstate full-term strikers to positions then occupied by crossovers. In analyzing the lawfulness of TWA's conduct, certain NLRA principles provide a useful starting point. This Court has recognized under the NLRA that an employer's refusal to reinstate striking employees discourages employees from exercising their right to organize and to strike, NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S., at 378 , and violates the statutory prohibition against discrimination "unless the employer . . . can show that his action was due to `legitimate and substantial business justifications.'" Ibid., quoting NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967). If the employer fails to meet this burden, the inquiry is at an end. Furthermore, in certain circumstances, "the Board can find an unfair labor practice even if the employer introduces evidence that the conduct was motivated by business considerations," [489 U.S. 426, 461] id., at 34, by striking "`the proper balance between the asserted business justifications and the invasion of employee rights.'" Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 703 (1983), quoting Great Dane, 388 U.S., at 33 -34. 3 </s> These basic principles are consistent with our RLA precedents. In Railway Clerks v. Florida East Coast R. Co., 384 U.S. 238 (1966), the carrier, during a strike, resorted to self-help in facial violation of 2 Seventh of the RLA, which prohibits unilateral changes in terms and conditions of employment embodied in collective agreements. The Court held that the carrier could not fulfill its duty to the public to make reasonable efforts to maintain service during the strike if 2 Seventh were applied with full force during strikes. To accommodate the public interest in continued service, it interpreted [489 U.S. 426, 462] the RLA as granting the carrier a "closely confined and supervised" power to alter the terms of the agreement during a strike in order to continue service under the particular strike conditions presented by that case. 384 U.S., at 246 . The appropriate standard for reviewing a carrier's alteration of an agreement, the Court concluded, was adequately captured by the words "reasonably necessary," "provided that `reasonably necessary' is construed strictly" to mean "only such changes as are truly necessary . . . for the continued operation" of the carrier. Id., at 248. </s> In this case, we address conduct that facially violates a different provision of the RLA: 2 Fourth's bar against conduct by a carrier which, by its natural tendency, induces or influences employees in their decisions to support or refrain from supporting union activities. The logic of Florida East Coast R. Co., however, is equally applicable here and suggests that a carrier's refusal to reinstate strikers - conduct which, on its face, violates 2 Fourth because of its tendency to influence adversely employees' willingness to support strikes - is unlawful if the refusal was not truly necessary for the continued operation of the carrier during the strike. </s> In my view, there is no basis under the RLA for a presumption that offers of permanence are necessary in order to induce crossovers and outside replacements to work during a strike. Cf. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 146 N. L. R. B. 802, 805 (1964); Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S., at 504 , n. 8 (discussing presumptive necessity of offers of permanence to outside replacements under the NLRA). The Court recognized in Florida East Coast R. Co., 384 U.S., at 246 , that a carrier may have need to "improvis[e] and emplo[y] an emergency labor force" in order to continue operations. Under the RLA, as under the NLRA, in short, the Court has recognized that the employer has "the right to protect and continue his business by supplying places left vacant by strikers." NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S., at 345 . The Union does not here dispute that proposition, [489 U.S. 426, 463] nor does it question that RLA employers may offer new hires "permanent" status. Cf. id., at 346. But this Court has also recognized that the public has an interest in the long-term stability of labor relations in industries governed by the RLA. See Virginian R. Co. v. Railway Employees, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937). A rule that presumes that replacements and crossovers must be offered permanence would needlessly infringe on that interest in stability. </s> "There may be some who will . . . argu[e] that employees must take their chances on being permanently replaced when they elect to go on strike. There is little doubt that striking employees have lost their jobs in many firms through the application of this principle. On the other hand, we are concerned in this case not with an ordinary private business but with a common carrier in an industry vital to the public. . . . Experience suggests that the prospects for achieving a `peaceable settlement' of this dispute will remain in jeopardy so long as the striking employees are prevented from working by the presence of the newly-hired replacements. While this situation persists, the organizations can be expected to employ every legitimate means to put pressure on the company to reinstate the strikers. Controversy of this kind may interfere with the legitimate needs of passengers and shippers . . . . Moreover, other railroads may be tempted to follow the example of this carrier, thus provoking bitter and disruptive disputes in other sections of the country." Florida East Coast R. Co., 41 Lab. Arb., at 1006-1007. </s> This risk should be taken only if absolutely necessary to the carrier's continued operations. Presuming the need does gratuitous damage to significant statutory interests. 4 </s> [489 U.S. 426, 464] </s> B </s> In his dissent, JUSTICE BRENNAN does not reach the question whether a carrier who offers permanence to replacements and crossovers is entitled to a presumption of business necessity. Indeed, he would not even permit TWA to make a case-specific showing that its crossover policy was necessary for its continued operation during the strike. Here, our positions differ: I would require the carrier to prove the business necessity of offering permanence to replacements and crossovers on the facts of each case. 5 </s> [489 U.S. 426, 465] </s> JUSTICE BRENNAN rests his contrary position on NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963). In that case, an employer granted 20 years' superseniority to employees (new hires and crossovers) who had worked during a strike, which later placed reinstated full-term strikers at a substantial and long-term risk of layoff. There, the NLRB found, and this Court agreed, that "the employer's insistence that its overriding purpose in granting super-seniority was to keep its plant open and that business necessity justified its conduct was unacceptable since `to excuse such conduct would greatly diminish, if not destroy, the right to strike guaranteed by the Act.'" Id., at 225-226 (quoting Erie Resistor Corp., 132 N. L. R. B. 621, 630 (1961)). Because the Court concluded that the stated business justification would not outweigh the asserted interest in continued operation, no factual inquiry into whether the employer's claim that he could not otherwise have operated during the strike was held to be necessary. </s> Two considerations cause me to part ways with JUSTICE BRENNAN'S conclusion. First, it is not so clear to me as it is to JUSTICE BRENNAN, ante at 449, that TWA's conduct in this case is sufficiently egregious for its destructive impact to outweigh the interest in maintaining operations during the strike. In Erie Resistor, this Court identified a number of factors that made grants of superseniority particularly harmful to employee rights. Several, but not all, of those factors are present in this case. TWA's conduct, like the conduct at issue in Erie Resistor, induces employees to abandon the strike and particularly harms full-term strikers. See 373 U.S., at 230 -231. But in Erie Resistor the Court stressed the fact that, for years after the strike, reinstated strikers would face a greater risk of layoff because of the additional seniority given to those who worked during the strike. Although Erie Resistor does not suggest an overarching principle identifying which factors are dispositive, the absence of a [489 U.S. 426, 466] similar continued threat of loss of employment suggests to me that the crossover policy at issue here is not so destructive of employee rights as was the superseniority policy at issue in Erie Resistor. The fact that the Court struck the balance against the employer in Erie Resistor is thus not dispositive of this case. </s> Second, and more generally, I am concerned that a standard that permits courts to balance employer and employee interests in the abstract, without a concrete evidentiary record, will lead to erroneous results that endanger the unique statutory interests embodied in the RLA. In the past we have recognized that the public has a significant interest in the continuity of transportation services during labor disputes, and that the RLA protects that interest. Railroad and airline industry employers, we have held, must make "reasonable efforts to maintain the public service at all times, even when beset by labor-management controversies." Florida East Coast R. Co., 384 U.S., at 245 . I recognize that we have stopped short of holding that federal law imposes an absolute duty to operate during strikes, see id., at 250 (WHITE, J., dissenting), and thus have never held that the interest in continued operation cannot be outweighed by other concerns. In my view, however, the balance should be struck on a case-by-case basis and upon a factual record. I expect that it will be a rare case in which gravely destructive carrier conduct will be proved necessary to continued operation under the strict standard of necessity established by Florida East Coast. The ultimate question as to which interest should prevail in such a case is one we can afford to leave unanswered until it is presented on proper facts. </s> IV </s> Because the Court of Appeals found TWA's conduct unlawful without considering whether TWA's crossover policy was "truly necessary" for continued operations during the strike, I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and direct [489 U.S. 426, 467] that court to remand the case for consideration of that issue. 6 Inasmuch as this Court is now reversing outright, I dissent. </s> [Footnote 1 The question has been presented by the parties, and is stated by the Court, in terms of reinstatement of full-term strikers with greater seniority. For reasons explained in n. 6, infra, however, the question whether the final allocation of positions must be made on the basis of seniority is essentially remedial in nature. Cf. Lone Star Industries, Inc., 279 N. L. R. B. 550 (1986) (employer is free to choose any nondiscriminatory means of making its poststrike reinstatement decisions). The question upon which liability turns is whether the basis of the allocation made (i. e., the duration of the employee's support for the strike) was discriminatory. </s> [Footnote 2 The employer, of course, may agree to discharge permanent replacements, subject to any claims the replacements may have under state law. See Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 496 -497, 500 (1983). </s> [Footnote 3 Under 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(3), the employer's motive is relevant to the analysis. See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 700 (1983); see generally Christensen & Svanoe, Motive and Intent in the Commission of Unfair Labor Practices: The Supreme Court and the Fictive Formality, 77 Yale L. J. 1269 (1968). The motive inquiry does not arise, however, unless the employer is able to demonstrate business justification for his actions. At that point, the course of the inquiry varies depending upon the severity of the adverse impact of the employer's conduct on employee rights. Where the impact is relatively slight, the employer's conduct will be deemed lawful unless the union proves that the employer's conduct was motivated by antiunion animus. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S., at 34 . Where, in contrast, the impact is sufficiently severe to render the employer's conduct "`inherently destructive' of important employee rights," ibid., antiunion motive may be inferred from the conduct itself. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228 , 231 (1963). </s> To decide this case, it is not necessary to resolve the question whether antiunion motive is a necessary element of a 2 Fourth violation. I think it clear that the crossover policy at issue here is "inherently destructive" of employee rights: it is sufficiently destructive not to require an express showing of antiunion motive even under the motive-based standards of 8(a)(3). For this same reason, I note, TWA's conduct falls afoul of the RLA under the "inherently destructive" standard set forth by the Court in this case. See ante, at 442. </s> [Footnote 4 Count 2 of the union's complaint seeks "to establish that it was not necessary for TWA to offer permanent jobs to the replacements hired from outside the pre-strike workforce and that TWA therefore violated the RLA by doing so." Brief for Respondent 3, n. 5; see App. to Pet. for [489 U.S. 426, 464] Cert. 55a-56a. That claim has not yet been tried and remains pending. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 42. The union has explained that Count 2 of the complaint, as drafted, proceeds on the theory that the employer is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that an offer of permanence is necessary for continued operation. Brief for Respondent 39. The union takes the position that although "there may well be a basis for erecting a presumption that offers of permanence to outside replacements are `truly necessary' in order to operate during a strike and placing the burden to prove otherwise on the injured full-term strikers or their union, there is no basis for any such presumption with regard to crossovers." Ibid. (footnote omitted). I agree with the union that there is less basis for presuming the necessity of an offer of permanence in the case of crossovers than in the case of outside replacements. But, as indicated in the text, I would go further: I see no need to afford the carrier the benefit of a rebuttable presumption of business necessity even in the case of outside replacements. </s> [Footnote 5 Adopting a uniform standard applicable to both outside replacements and crossovers disposes of the argument that to permit full-term strikers to displace crossovers would have the anomalous result of treating crossovers more harshly than permanent replacements. Ante, at 434, 436; see Tr. of Oral Arg. 43. In a particular case, members of the prestrike work force may well return to work solely because they can no longer endure the present economic costs of the strike, and will do so without further inducement. If the carrier also needs to hire outside replacements, and legitimately finds that it can do so only by promising them that they will not be laid off to make room for returning strikers, the result in that case will be that the crossovers will have less protection from layoff than will the new hires. This result is not anomalous, however; it is merely the result of applying a uniform standard to disparate facts. </s> [Footnote 6 If it proved to be the case on remand that TWA's crossover policy was indeed unlawful, the question (noted at n. 1, supra) would arise whether the union is entitled to the specific relief it seeks: the allocation of positions in the active work force on the basis of seniority. This Court suggested in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 347 (1938), and the NLRB held in Lone Star Industries, 279 N. L. R. B. 550 (1986), that an employer may make its poststrike reinstatement decisions on the basis of any nondiscriminatory criterion. Because "[i]t is universally recognized, as a matter of sound labor relations, that seniority provides the employee with an equitable interest in continued employment," Florida East Coast R. Co. 41 Lab. Arb. 1001, 1006 (1963), seniority is likely to be the neutral criterion of choice. Indeed, TWA unilaterally implemented a settlement proposal calling for reinstatement of full-term strikers to "vacancies" in seniority order. See App. 90-91; App. to Pet. for Cert. 52a-53a (Complaint § 28). </s> Although this unilateral undertaking may well bind TWA at the remedial stage of this litigation, I note that the union has not based its entitlement to seniority-based relief on that ground. Nor has the union argued (at least explicitly) that specific provisions of its collective-bargaining agreement require that result. Cf. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 48 Lab. Arb. 1005 (1967) (interpreting general seniority provisions of collective-bargaining agreement as applicable to poststrike reinstatement). Rather, the union's argument for a seniority-based remedy appears to be purely statutory in nature. There is some merit to the view that the bounded nature of strikes under the RLA requires that seniority be used as the mechanism for poststrike reinstatement because it will achieve the closest possible approximation of the prestrike work force. But there is some danger that imposing seniority-based reinstatement as a statutory matter would place courts in the position of expanding contractual seniority provisions beyond their contemplated scope. In light of the likelihood that TWA would voluntarily employ seniority as a basis for its reinstatement decisions on remand, this question need not be reached. </s> [489 U.S. 426, 468]

United States Supreme Court JENKINS v. UNITED STATES(1965) No. 761 Argued: April 1, 1965Decided: April 5, 1965 </s> After some deliberation on a two-count indictment, the jury sent a note to the trial judge advising that it was unable to arrive at a verdict "on both counts because of insufficient evidence." In his response the judge stated that the jury had to reach a decision. Thereafter the petitioner was found guilty on one count. Held: In its context and under all the circumstances of this case, the judge's statement had a coercive effect on the jury and therefore the conviction must be reversed. </s> 117 U.S. App. D.C. 346, 330 F.2d 220, reversed and remanded. </s> H. Thomas Sisk argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were M. Michael Cramer and David B. Isbell. </s> Philip B. Heymann argued the cause for the United States. On the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Miller and Philip R. Monahan. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> Petitioner was charged in a two-count indictment in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia with robbing a High's Dairy Products store on December 27, 1962 (count 1), and with assault with intent to rob upon the proprietress of a grocery store on January 24, 1963 (count 2), in violation of 22-2901 and 22-501, respectively, of the District of Columbia Code. Following a trial by jury, he was found guilty on count 1 and not guilty on count 2. He was sentenced to imprisonment for from 3 to 10 years. A divided Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, 117 U.S. App. D.C. 346, 330 F.2d 220. A petition for rehearing en banc was denied, four judges dissenting. [380 U.S. 445, 446] </s> Slightly more than two hours after the jury retired to deliberate, the jury sent a note to the trial judge advising that it had been unable to agree upon a verdict "on both counts because of insufficient evidence." The judge thereupon recalled the jury to the courtroom and in the course of his response stated that "You have got to reach a decision in this case." We granted certiorari, 379 U.S. 944 , to consider whether in its context and under all the circumstances of this case the statement was coercive. The Solicitor General in his brief in this Court stated: </s> "Of course, if this Court should conclude that the judge's statement had the coercive effect attributed to it, the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial; the principle that jurors may not be coerced into surrendering views conscientiously held is so clear as to require no elaboration." </s> Upon review of the record, we conclude that in its context and under all the circumstances the judge's statement had the coercive effect attributed to it. Accordingly the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. Cf. Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 450 ; Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 307 -308; United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433, 435 (C. A. 4th Cir.) </s> It is so ordered. </s> MR. JUSTICE CLARK and MR. JUSTICE HARLAN dissent. </s> [380 U.S. 445, 447]

United States Supreme Court CHANDLER v. ROUDEBUSH(1976) No. 74-1599 Argued: March 2, 1976Decided: June 1, 1976 </s> Section 717 (c) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as added by 11 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, provides that within a specified period after notice of final administrative action on a federal employee's discrimination complaint by the employing agency, or by the Civil Service Commission (CSC), upon an appeal from the agency's order, or after a specified period of delay by the agency or the CSC, the employee "may file a civil action" as provided in the statute, against the agency head. Petitioner, a Negro, claiming that her failure to receive a promotion by the Veterans' Administration was sexually and racially discriminatory, after exhausting her administrative remedies brought suit under 717 (c). She was not allowed to proceed with discovery, the District Court having determined that "the absence of discrimination is firmly established by the clear weight of the administrative record." The court thereupon granted summary judgment in favor of respondents. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: The plain meaning of the statute, reinforced by the legislative history of the 1972 amendments, compels the conclusion that federal employees have the same right to a trial de novo as is enjoyed by private-sector or state-government employees under the amended Civil Rights Act of 1964. Pp. 843-864. </s> 515 F.2d 251, reversed and remanded. </s> STEWART, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. </s> Joel L. Selig argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Paul R. Dimond, J. Harold Flannery, and Stuart P. Herman. </s> Assistant Attorney General Lee argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General [425 U.S. 840, 841] Bork, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Kenneth S. Geller, and Robert E. Kopp. * </s> [Footnote * Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Charles Stephen Ralston, Melvyn Leventhal, and Eric Schnapper filed a brief for the N. A. A. C. P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as amicus curiae urging reversal. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> In 1972 Congress extended the protection of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. IV), to employees of the Federal Government. A principal goal of the amending legislation, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, was to eradicate "`entrenched discrimination in the Federal service,'" Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 547 , by strengthening internal safeguards and by according "[a]ggrieved [federal] employees or applicants . . . the full rights available in the courts as are granted to individuals in the private sector under title VII." 1 The issue presented by this case is whether the 1972 Act gives federal employees the same right to a trial de novo of employment discrimination claims as "private sector" employees enjoy under Title VII. </s> I </s> The petitioner, Mrs. Jewell Chandler, is a Negro. In 1972 she was employed as a claims examiner by the Veterans' Administration. In August of that year she applied for a promotion to the position of supervisory claims examiner. Following a selection procedure she was designated as one of three finalists for the position. [425 U.S. 840, 842] The promotion was awarded to a Filipino-American male. The petitioner subsequently filed a complaint with the Veterans' Administration alleging that she had been denied the promotion because of unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex and race. After an administrative hearing on the claim, the presiding complaints examiner submitted proposed findings to the effect that the petitioner had been discriminated against on the basis of sex but not race and recommended that she be given a retroactive promotion to the position for which she had applied. The agency rejected the proposed finding of sex discrimination as not "substantiated by the evidence," and accordingly granted no relief. 2 The petitioner filed a timely appeal to the Civil Service Commission Board of Appeals and Review, which affirmed the agency's decision. </s> Within 30 days after receiving notice of the Commission's decision, the petitioner brought the present suit in a Federal District Court under 717 (c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as added by 11 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 111, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16 (c) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). After moving unsuccessfully for summary judgment, she initiated discovery proceedings by filing notice of two depositions and a request for the production of documents. The respondents moved for an order prohibiting discovery on the ground that the judicial action authorized by 717 (c) is limited to a review of the administrative record. The petitioner opposed the motion, asserting that she had a right under 717 (c) to a plenary judicial trial de novo. The District Court adopted the holding of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in Hackley v. Johnson, 360 F. Supp. 1247, rev'd [425 U.S. 840, 843] sub nom. Hackley v. Roudebush, 171 U.S. App. D.C. 376, 520 F.2d 108, that a "trial de novo is not required [under 717 (c)] in all cases" and that review of the administrative record is sufficient if "an absence of discrimination is affirmatively established by the clear weight of the evidence in the record . . . ." 360 F. Supp., at 1252. 3 Applying this standard of review, the District Court determined that "the absence of discrimination is firmly established by the clear weight of the administrative record" and granted summary judgment in favor of the respondents. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, agreeing with the District Court's ruling that 717 (c) contemplates not a trial de novo but the "intermediate scope of inquiry expounded in Hackley v. Johnson . . . ." Chandler v. Johnson, 515 F.2d 251, 255 (CA9). We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Circuits concerning the nature of the judicial proceeding provided by 717 (c). 4 </s> 423 U.S. 821 . </s> II </s> We begin with the language of the statute. Section 717 (c), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16 (c) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), [425 U.S. 840, 844] states that within 30 days after notice of final adverse administrative action on a federal employee's discrimination complaint by either the employing agency or the Civil Service Commission (in the event a permissive appeal is taken), or after 180 days of delay by the agency or the Commission, the employee "may file a civil action as provided in section 706, in which civil action the head of the department agency, or unit, as appropriate, shall be the defendant." Section 717 (d), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16 (d) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), goes on to specify that "[t]he provisions of section 706 (f) through (k), as applicable, shall govern civil actions brought hereunder." </s> Section 706 (f) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 (f) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), authorizes the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to bring "civil actions" on behalf of private sector employees in federal district court. 5 Alternatively, 706 (f) (1) authorizes an individual employee to sue on his own behalf if a specified period of delay has elapsed or if the EEOC has declined to represent him on the basis of its initial determination that "there is not reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true . . . ." 706 (b), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 (b) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Sections 706 (f) through (k), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 (f) through (k) (1970 ed. and Supp. IV), provide specific rules and guidelines for private-sector "civil actions." </s> It is well established that 706 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 accords private-sector employees the right to de novo consideration of their Title VII claims. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 ; McDonnell [425 U.S. 840, 845] Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 -799; Norman v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 414 F.2d 73, 75 n. 2 (CA8). The "employee's statutory right to a trial de novo under Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] . . .," Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., supra, at 38, embodies a congressional decision to "vest federal courts with plenary powers to enforce the [substantive] requirements [of Title VII] . . . ." Id., at 47. </s> The 1972 amendments to the 1964 Act added language to 706 which reflects the de novo character of the private sector "civil action" even more clearly than did the 1964 version. 6 Section 706 (f) (4), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 (f) (4) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), for instance, requires the chief judge of the district in which a "civil action" is pending to "immediately . . . designate a judge in such district to hear and determine the case." The judge so designated must "assign the case for hearing at the earliest practicable date . . . ." 706 (f) (5). If the case has not been "scheduled . . . for trial within one hundred and twenty days after issue has been joined," then the designated judge may appoint a special master to hear it. Ibid. And, as under the 1964 version, if the district court "finds" that the respondent has intentionally committed an unlawful employment practice, then the court may order appropriate relief. 706 (g), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 (g) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). The terminology employed by Congress - "assign the case for hearing," "scheduled . . . for trial," "finds" - indicates clearly that the "civil action" to which private-sector employees are entitled under the amended version of Title VII is to be a trial de novo. </s> Since federal-sector employees are entitled by 717 (c) to "file a civil action as provided in section 706 [42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 (1970 ed., Supp. IV)]" and since [425 U.S. 840, 846] the civil action provided in 706 is a trial de novo, it would seem to follow syllogistically that federal employees are entitled to a trial de novo of their employment discrimination claims. The Court of Appeals, however, held that a contrary result was indicated by the words "as applicable" in 717 (d) and by the legislative history of 717, and in support of that position the respondents further argue that routine de novo trials of federal employees' claims would clash with the 1972 Act's delegation of enforcement responsibilities to the Civil Service Commission and would contravene this Court's view that "de novo review is generally not to be presumed." Consolo v. FMC, 383 U.S. 607, 619 n. 17. </s> A. The Meaning of the Phrase "As Applicable" </s> The opinion of the District Court for the District of Columbia in Hackley v. Johnson, relied on by the Court of Appeals here, expressed the view that the phrase "as applicable" in 717 (d) evidences a congressional intent to restrict or qualify the right to a de novo proceeding granted by 717 (c). 360 F. Supp., at 1252 n. 9. A careful reading of 717 (d) and the provisions to which it refers indicates, however, that the phrase was intended merely to reflect the fact that certain provisions in 706 (f) through (k) pertain to aspects of the Title VII enforcement scheme that have no possible relevance to judicial proceedings involving federal employees. </s> Section 717 (d) states that "[t]he provisions of section 706 (f) through (k), as applicable, shall govern civil actions brought hereunder." Sections 706 (f) through (k) set forth specific procedures and guidelines to be followed in private-sector "civil actions." Several of these procedures could not possibly apply to civil actions involving federal employees. Section 706 (f) (1), for instance, provides that in the private sector the EEOC "may bring a civil action against any respondent [425 U.S. 840, 847] not a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision" and that the Attorney General of the United States may bring a civil action for employment discrimination against a state government, agency, or political subdivision. The individual complainant retains the right to intervene in suits brought by the EEOC or the Attorney General. In the case of a "civil action" maintained by an individual complainant against a private or state governmental employer, the EEOC or the Attorney General, respectively, may be permitted to intervene "upon certification that the case is of general public importance." These provisions, allowing suits and permissive intervention by the EEOC or the Attorney General, could have no possible application to "civil actions" under 717 (c), because the individual federal employee or job applicant is the only party who can institute and maintain a "civil action" under that subsection. </s> Similarly, the provision in 706 (f) (2) permitting the EEOC or the Attorney General to "bring an action for appropriate temporary or preliminary relief pending final disposition" of a charge where the EEOC has "conclude[d] on the basis of a preliminary investigation that prompt judicial action is necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act" could not possibly apply without modification to "civil actions" involving federal employees, because the EEOC is given no general responsibility for investigating or prosecuting the complaints of federal employees. </s> The most natural reading of the phrase "as applicable" in 717 (d) is that it merely reflects the inapplicability of provisions in 706 (f) through (k) detailing the enforcement responsibilities of the EEOC and the Attorney General. 7 We cannot, therefore, agree with the view [425 U.S. 840, 848] expressed by the District Court in Hackley v. Johnson, supra, and relied on by the Court of Appeals here, that Congress used the words "as applicable" to voice its intent to disallow trials de novo by aggrieved federal employees who have received prior administrative hearings. As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held in reversing Hackley v. Johnson, supra, such an interpretation of the phrase "as applicable" would require a strained and unnatural reading of 706 (f) through (k). Hackley v. Roudebush, 171 U.S. App. D.C., at 389, 520 F.2d, at 121. This Court pointed out in Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U.S. 364, 370 , that "`the plain, obvious and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, hidden sense that nothing but the exigency of a hard case and the ingenuity and study of an acute and powerful intellect would discover.'" To read the phrase "as applicable" in 717 (d) as obliquely qualifying the federal employee's right to a trial de novo under 717 (c) rather than as merely reflecting the inapplicability to 717 (c) actions of provisions relating to the enforcement responsibilities of the EEOC or the Attorney General would violate this elementary canon of construction. </s> B. Legislative History </s> The legislative history of the 1972 amendments reinforces the plain meaning of the statute and confirms that Congress intended to accord federal employees the same right to a trial de novo as is enjoyed by private-sector employees and employees of state governments and political subdivisions under the amended Civil Rights Act of 1964. </s> Two themes dominated the debates, proposals, and committee reports which preceded the enactment of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. The first was the inadequacy of the individually instituted and [425 U.S. 840, 849] maintained trial de novo as an enforcement technique in the private sector under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 8 The second was federal employees' lack of adequate internal safeguards against employment discrimination and Congress' perception of their lack of access to the courts to raise claims of job discrimination. 9 </s> [425 U.S. 840, 850] </s> In 1971, the House Committee on Education and Labor and the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare reported out bills designed to remedy these deficiencies. The proposed bills, H. R. 1746 and S. 2515, gave the EEOC cease-and-desist powers in the private sector while retaining the private-sector complainant's pre-existing right to a trial de novo in certain instances. 10 The grant of cease-and-desist power to the EEOC provoked strong dissenting statements in both committee reports. While nearly all members of both committees agreed that the EEOC should be given enforcement powers in the private sector, 11 there was sharp disagreement over whether the EEOC should be given the power merely to institute de novo suits in federal trial courts on behalf of employees or the power actually to adjudicate discrimination controversies subject only to review on a substantial-evidence basis in the federal courts of appeals. </s> The dissenting members of the two committees favored the trial de novo approach. As Senator Dominick put it in a minority statement in the Senate Report: </s> "The issue is no longer whether we need enforcement powers for Title VII, but rather what form [425 U.S. 840, 851] and scope of enforcement is needed to best protect the rights of all parties involved. To accomplish this end the Senate is given two types of enforcement machinery to choose from - vesting EEOC with cease and desist powers or giving EEOC the authority to sue directly in Federal Courts. </s> ". . . Determination of employment civil rights deserves and requires non-partisan judgment. This judgment is best afforded by Federal court judges who, shielded from political influence by life tenure, are more likely to withstand political pressures and render their decisions in a climate tempered by judicial reflection and supported by historical judicial independence." 12 </s> In response to these criticisms and in justification of their contrary position, the majority members of the two committees set forth in considerable detail their reasons for choosing the approach of agency adjudication with appellate court review. The House committee majority thought that the EEOC was "better equipped to handle the complicated issues involved in employment discrimination cases" and "better suited to rapid resolution of such complex issues than are Courts." In addition, the majority thought that an administrative tribunal would offer procedural advantages in that it would be "less subject to technical rules governing such matters as pleadings and motion practice . . . and . . . less constrained by formal rules of evidence . . . ." 13 The Senate Report spelled out in even greater detail the perceived differences between "enforcement by district court trials rather than through agency hearings followed by appellate [425 U.S. 840, 852] late court review," 14 stressing the delays that would be occasioned by court trials and the need for administrative expertise in recognizing and remedying complex forms of employment discrimination. 15 The Report stated that the committee had given "full and careful consideration" to an "alternative measure providing for court enforcement for title VII" but that that proposal had been rejected in favor of the administrative agency approach. 16 </s> It was against this backdrop of focused debate on the issue of administrative agency versus wholly judicial enforcement machinery in the area of discrimination in private employment that the two committees proposed extending to a federal employee the right to file a "civil action" if "aggrieved" by his employing agency's action in dealing with his complaint of discrimination. The fact that the federal employee, prior to filing such a "civil action," would have enjoyed the benefit of improved internal safeguards, including "appropriate procedures for an impartial [agency] adjudication of the complain[t]," 17 might well have provided a rationale for reposing primary adjudicative authority in the appropriate federal agency rather than in the district courts. But the two committees clearly chose to permit de novo judicial trial of such complaints rather than mere judicial review of employing agency determinations: In both the House and Senate Committee Bills, the sections which accorded an aggrieved federal employee the right to file a "civil action" following adverse agency action referred not to the substantial-evidence review provisions applicable to EEOC cease-and-desist orders but rather to [425 U.S. 840, 853] other provisions which retained the private-sector employees right to a trial de novo in specified circumstances. 18 It is inconceivable that the two congressional committees, which were keenly aware of the consequences of vesting in an administrative agency rather than in the federal courts the primary adjudicative responsibility, did not act in a knowing and deliberate manner in thus equating a federal employee's "civil action" with private-sector plenary trials and in eschewing any reference to the private-sector provisions of the proposed legislation which provided for agency adjudication subject only to review on a substantial-evidence basis in the federal courts of appeals. 19 </s> In short, the bills reported out of the Senate and House committees and the accompanying Reports reveal a thorough and meticulous consideration of the question whether an administrative agency or a court should be given primary adjudicative responsibility for particular [425 U.S. 840, 854] categories of Title VII complaints and an unambiguous choice to grant federal employees the right to plenary trials in the federal district courts. 20 </s> The House Committee Bill was opposed on the floor of the House on the ground that it placed primary adjudicative responsibility over private-sector Title VII complaints in an agency which was also responsible for prosecuting such complaints. Opponents contended that such a commingling of functions would bias the agency's adjudications. 21 This argument prevailed, and H. R. 1746 was amended on the floor by H. R. 9247, 22 which granted the EEOC the right to file private-sector "civil actions" in district court but not the power to issue cease-and desist orders. 23 The amendment changed H. R. 1746 in one other important respect: It deleted the provisions [425 U.S. 840, 855] extending Title VII to federal employees. 24 As amended, H. R. 1746 passed the House. 25 </s> The Senate Committee Bill, like its House counterpart, was strongly opposed on the floor. As in the House, controversy centered on whether agency adjudication with limited appellate judicial review in the federal appellate courts should be the technique by which the EEOC would enforce Title VII in the private sector. 26 Early in the four-week Senate floor debate which preceded passage of S. 2515, Senator Dominick introduced an amendment which would replace the EEOC's cease-and desist authority with a right to institute de novo proceedings in the federal district courts on behalf of private-sector employees. 27 This amendment conformed to the dissenting views he had expressed in the Senate Report. 28 The principal aim of the amendment was to separate prosecutorial from adjudicative functions in private-sector Title VII proceedings. 29 </s> A central theme of Senator Dominick's argument, stressed repeatedly in the floor debate, was that the Committee Bill already contemplated the resolution of federal employees' claims through district court and not agency [425 U.S. 840, 856] adjudication. Speaking of the Senate committee's deliberations, Senator Dominick stated that when the committee had "examined the Federal employee situation" he had </s> "pointed out again that we were creating an agency czar in the EEOC which could determine personnel policies in all the other Federal agencies of the Government. I doubted the wisdom of creating such an omnipotent agency. After some discussion on this . . . we were able to work out an agreement whereby a Federal employee who feels he is discriminated against can go through his agency, and if he is still dissatisfied, he is empowered to bring suit in Federal court or through the existing Civil Service Board of Appeals and Reviews to Federal court. So on two of the major groups of employees covered by this legislation; namely, State and local employees on the one hand, and Federal employees on the other, the committee itself agreed to grievance remedy procedures through the Federal district courts; yet with the private employee they say, `No, you cannot have that. We will have an agency that can do it all by itself.' That is discrimination in and of itself, right within the bill; and it strikes me that one of the first things we have to do is at least to put employees holding their jobs, be they government or private employees, on the same plane so that they have the same rights, so that they have the same opportunities, and so that they have the same equality within their jobs, to make sure that they are not being discriminated against and have the enforcement, investigatory procedure carried out the same way. </s> . . . . . </s> "As I said earlier, it seems wrong to me to say to an aggrieved employee, `Certainly we will hear your [425 U.S. 840, 857] case. We will do the investigating. We will bring the charges. We will do everything else, but you will not get a decision for over 2 years.' That is not justice. This is not equal employment opportunity. But if we have the investigator saying that this is a legitimate complaint, and that it will be brought to the district court and will get priority treatment there, we can get the matter decided in half the time it would take in any other way. </s> "It strikes me that this is right on principle. It is right in terms of administrative procedures. It conforms to what we did with State and local employees and with Federal employees." 30 </s> Senator Dominick reiterated the theme of remedial disparity throughout the floor debates, arguing for equal treatment of private-sector and federal-sector complainants: Since the latter were entitled to plenary adjudication of their claims by a federal district court, rather than mere appellate review on a substantial-evidence basis following agency adjudication, he contended, the former should be treated similarly. 31 </s> Senator Dominick's amendment was eventually adopted 32 and S. 2515, as amended, passed the Senate. 33 The House had already passed the amended version of H. R. 1746, which differed from the amended Senate Committee Bill in that it did not apply to federal employees. The bills accordingly went to a conference committee, which adopted the Senate Committee Bill's provision extending Title VII to federal employees. 34 The conference bill was enacted by the Senate and the House. </s> Since the federal employee provisions of the Senate [425 U.S. 840, 858] bill were eventually adopted by the conference committee and passed by Congress, the legislative history of that bill is the most helpful on the issue presented here. 35 The sequence of debate, amendment, and Senate passage of S. 2515 shows unmistakably that the Senate decided to provide both private-and federal-sector employees the adjudicative mechanism which the Senate committee had advocated for federal-, but not private-sector, employees. No changes were made or even proposed with respect to the committee's choice to allow federal employees judicial trials rather than "substantial evidence" review of administrative dispositions of their discrimination claims. On the contrary, it was the federal-sector de novo procedure which served as the model for Senator Dominick's proposed alteration of private-sector enforcement provisions. The passage of the Dominick amendment and the subsequent approval of S. 2515 by the Senate achieved the parity which Senator Dominick had advocated - judicial trial de novo for private as well as federal employees. 36 </s> [425 U.S. 840, 859] </s> The Court of Appeals held that "the district judge faced with a demand for a trial de novo is entitled to determine, at a pretrial conference or otherwise, why the plaintiff believes that a trial de novo is necessary," 515 F.2d, at 255, and concluded that the petitioner had presented "nothing before the district court to indicate that [425 U.S. 840, 860] a useful purpose would be served by having a trial de novo." Ibid. This approach substantially parallels the holding in Hackley v. Johnson: </s> "The trial de novo is not required in all cases. The District Court is required by the Act to examine the administrative record with utmost care. If it [425 U.S. 840, 861] determines that an absence of discrimination is affirmatively established by the clear weight of the evidence in the record, no new trial is required. If this exacting standard is not met, the Court shall, in its discretion, as appropriate, remand, take testimony to supplement the administrative record, or grant the plaintiff relief on the administrative record." 360 F. Supp., at 1252. </s> Nothing in the legislative history indicates that the federal-sector "civil action" was to have this chameleon-like character, providing fragmentary de novo consideration of discrimination claims where "appropriate," ibid., and otherwise providing record review. On the contrary, the options which Congress considered were entirely straightforward. It faced a choice between record review of agency action based on traditional appellate standards and trial de novo of Title VII claims. The Senate committee selected trial de novo as the proper means for resolving the claims of federal employees. The Senate broadened the category of claims entitled to trial de novo to include those of private-sector employees, and the Senate's decision to treat private-and federal-sector employees alike in this respect was ratified by the Congress as a whole. </s> C. Presumption Against De Novo Review </s> Given the clear expression of congressional intent, as revealed in both the plain language of 717 and the legislative history of the 1972 amendments, we find unpersuasive the respondents' reliance on decisions by this Court indicating that "de novo review is generally not to be presumed." Consolo v. FMC, 383 U.S., at 619 n. 17; United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709, 715 . </s> Consolo involved review of agency action under provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act giving "a reviewing court authority to `set aside agency action, [425 U.S. 840, 862] findings, and conclusions found to be (1) arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion . . . [or] (5) unsupported by substantial evidence . . . .'" 383 U.S., at 619 . In this context, the Court observed: "We do not read the opinion below as asserting that the Court of Appeals, in a direct review proceeding, may conduct a de novo review of the equities of a reparation award. We find nothing in the Shipping Act, the Hobbs Act, or the Administrative Procedure Act that would authorize a de novo review in these circumstances, and in the absence of specific statutory authorization, a de novo review is generally not to be presumed." Id., at 619 n. 17. Here, by contrast, there is a "specific statutory authorization" of a district court "civil action," which both the plain language of the statute and the legislative history reveal to be a trial de novo. 37 </s> [425 U.S. 840, 863] </s> The respondents' contention that administrative dispositions of federal employee discrimination complaints would, unlike arbitral decisions under collective-bargaining agreements or preliminary EEOC findings of "no reasonable cause," typically furnish an adequate basis for "substantial evidence" review cannot overcome the clear import of the statutory language and the legislative history. The Congress was aware of the fact that federal employees would have the benefit of "appropriate procedures for an impartial [agency] adjudication of the complain[t]," 38 and yet chose to give employees who had been through those procedures the right to file a de novo "civil action" equivalent to that enjoyed by private-sector employees. 39 It may well be, as the respondents have argued, that routine trials de novo in the federal courts will tend ultimately to defeat, rather than to [425 U.S. 840, 864] advance, the basic purposes of the statutory scheme. But Congress has made the choice, and it is not for us to disturb it. </s> Since the Court of Appeals in this case erroneously concluded that 717 (c) does not accord a federal employee the same right to a trial de novo as private-sector employees enjoy under Title VII, its judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 S. Rep. No. 92-415, p. 16 (1971) (hereinafter cited as Senate Report). </s> [Footnote 2 The Veterans' Administration accepted the examiner's proposed finding of no race discrimination. </s> [Footnote 3 The District Court in Hackley had held that even if that "exacting standard" were not met, a full trial de novo would not necessarily be required. Rather a district court could, "in its discretion, as appropriate, remand, take testimony to supplement the administrative record, or grant the plaintiff relief on the administrative record." 360 F. Supp., at 1252. </s> [Footnote 4 Four Courts of Appeals have held that 717 (c) gives federal employees the right to a trial de novo in the district court. Abrams v. Johnson, 534 F.2d 1226 (CA6); Caro v. Schultz, 521 F.2d 1084 (CA7); Hackley v. Roudebush, 171 U.S. App. D.C. 376, 520 F.2d 108; Sperling v. United States, 515 F.2d 465 (CA3). Three other Courts of Appeals have held that federal employees are not generally entitled to trials de novo. Haire v. Calloway, 526 F.2d 246 (CA8); Chandler v. Johnson, 515 F.2d 251 (CA9) (opinion below); Salone v. United States, 511 F.2d 902 (CA10). </s> [Footnote 5 The Attorney General of the United States is given responsibility for instituting Title VII civil actions on behalf of employees of state governments, governmental agencies, or political subdivisions. 706 (f) (1), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 (f) (1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). </s> [Footnote 6 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 706, 78 Stat. 259. </s> [Footnote 7 See Hackley v. Roudebush, 171 U.S. App. D.C., at 387-388, 520 F.2d, at 119-120. </s> [Footnote 8 As stated in the Senate Report: </s> "The most striking deficiency of the 1964 Act is that the EEOC does not have the authority to issue judicially enforceable order to back up its findings of discrimination. In prohibiting discrimination in employment based on race, religion, color, sex or national origin, the 1964 Act limited the Commission's enforcement authority to `informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion.' </s> "As a consequence, unless the Department of Justice concludes that a pattern or practice of resistance to Title VII is involved, the burden of obtaining enforceable relief rests upon each individual victim of discrimination, who must go into court as a private party, with the delay and expense that entails, in order to secure the rights promised him under the law. Thus, those persons whose economic disadvantage was a prime reason for enactment of equal employment opportunity provisions find that their only recourse in the face of unyielding discrimination is one that is time consuming, burdensome, and all too often, financially prohibitive." Senate Report 4. </s> [Footnote 9 The Senate Report stated: </s> "The testimony before the Labor Subcommittee reflected a general lack of confidence in the effectiveness of the complaint procedure on the part of Federal employees. Complaints have indicated skepticism regarding the commission's record in obtaining just resolutions of complaints and adequate remedies. This has, in turn, discouraged persons from filing complaints with the Commission for fear that doing so will only result in antagonizing their supervisors and impairing any future hope of advancement." Id., at 14. </s> "The testimony of the Civil Service Commission notwithstanding, the committee found that an aggrieved Federal employee does not have access to the courts. In many cases, the employee must overcome a U.S. Government defense of sovereign immunity or failure to exhaust administrative remedies with no certainty as to the steps required to exhaust such remedies. Moreover, the remedial authority of the Commission and the courts has also been in doubt." Id., at 16. </s> [Footnote 10 Under both committee bills, the private-sector employee could bring a civil action within 60 days after the EEOC gave notice that it had dismissed the charge of employment discrimination or that 180 days had elapsed from the filing of the charge without the EEOC having issued a complaint or having entered into an acceptable conciliation agreement. H. R. 1746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (j) (1971) (hereinafter cited as H. R. 1746 or House Committee Bill); S. 2515, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (a) (1971) (hereinafter cited as S. 2515 or Senate Committee Bill). </s> [Footnote 11 Representatives Ashbrook and Landgrebe did not favor granting the EEOC any enforcement authority. H. R. Rep. No. 92-238, p. 70 (1971) (hereinafter cited as House Report). </s> [Footnote 12 Senate Report 85. Similar minority views were expressed in the Report of the House committee. House Report 58-63. </s> [Footnote 13 Id., at 10-11. </s> [Footnote 14 Senate Report 18. </s> [Footnote 15 Id., at 17-19. </s> [Footnote 16 Id., at 17. </s> [Footnote 17 House Report 26. </s> [Footnote 18 The House committee Bill, supra, n. 10, provided in relevant part that a federal employee, if aggrieved by final administrative disposition of his complaint, "may file a civil action as provided in section 715 . . . ." 11. Section 715 of the proposed bill preserved the private-sector employee's right to institute a trial de novo in certain limited circumstances. 8 (j). See n. 10, supra. </s> The Senate Committee Bill, supra, n. 10, provided in relevant part that a federal employee, if aggrieved by final administrative disposition of his complaint or by failure to take action on his complaint, "may file a civil action as provided in section 706 (q) . . . ." 11. Section 706 (q) of the proposed bill preserved the private-sector employee's right to a trial de novo in specified instances. 4 (a). See n. 10, supra. </s> [Footnote 19 The House and Senate Reports as well as the Committee Bills themselves evince a detailed awareness of the interaction in the private sector of the new cease-and-desist remedy and the pre-existing right to a trial de novo. See House Committee Bill 8 (j); House Report 12; Senate Committee Bill 4 (a); Senate Report 24. </s> [Footnote 20 The respondents argued that because private-sector employees enjoyed only a conditional right to plenary trials under the Senate Committee Bill and because the committee intended to give aggrieved federal employees the same "rights . . . in the courts as are granted to individuals in the private sector under title VII," Senate Report 16, it follows that the Senate committee intended federal employees to have trials de novo only in circumstances analogous to those where private-sector employees would enjoy the same right - i. e., where the responsible agency had dismissed the charge without a hearing or where a sufficient period of delay had elapsed from the filing of the charge. This argument overlooks the fact that the provision in the Senate Committee Bill creating a federal employee's right to bring a "civil action" contained no reference to the substantial-evidence review provisions in the draft legislation but referred only to the provisions which pertained to private-sector trials de novo. </s> [Footnote 21 E. g., 117 Cong. Rec. 31958-31959 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Martin); id., at 31969-31970 (remarks of Rep. Railsback); id., at 31972-31973 (remarks of Rep. Erlenborn); id., at 32091-32092 (remarks of Rep. Ford); id., at 32106 (remarks of Rep. Broomfield); id., at 32107-32108 (remarks of Rep. Shoup); id., at 32109-32110 (remarks of Rep. Fisher). </s> [Footnote 22 Id., at 32111-32112. </s> [Footnote 23 H. R. 9247, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (c) (1971). </s> [Footnote 24 See id.; S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-681, pp. 20-21 (1972) (hereinafter referred to as Conference Report). </s> [Footnote 25 117 Cong. Rec. 32113 (1971). </s> [Footnote 26 E. g., 118 Cong. Rec. 311-312 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Ervin); id., at 595 (remarks of Sen. Tower); id., at 731-732 (remarks of Sen. Saxbe); id., at 732 (remarks of Sen. Brock); id., at 735 (remarks of Sen. Williams); id., at 928-929 (remarks of Sen. Mondale); id., at 930 (remarks of Sen. Javits); id., at 931-932 (remarks of Sen. Allen); id., at 933 (remarks of Sen. Thurmond); id., at 943-944 (remarks of Sen. Talmadge); id., at 944 (remarks of Sen. Chiles); id., at 1384 (remarks of Sen. Weicker). </s> [Footnote 27 Id., at 591-592. </s> [Footnote 28 See Senate Report 86-87. </s> [Footnote 29 118 Cong. Rec. 592-593 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Dominick). </s> [Footnote 30 Id., at 594. </s> [Footnote 31 Id., at 595, 942, 943, 3389, 3809, 3967. </s> [Footnote 32 Id., at 3979-3980. </s> [Footnote 33 Id., at 4944. </s> [Footnote 34 Conference Report 1, 10-11, 20-21. </s> [Footnote 35 See Hackley v. Roudebush, 171 U.S. App. D.C., at 413, 520 F.2d, at 145; Sperling v. United States, 515 F.2d, at 473. </s> [Footnote 36 The respondents argue that a statement in the floor debate by Senator Williams and a statement purportedly made in that debate by Senator Cranston indicate that Congress did not intend to give federal employees the right to plenary judicial trials but only the right to record review of agency proceedings. Near the close of the debate on S. 2515 Senator Williams spoke as follows: </s> "Finally, written expressly into the law is a provision enabling an aggrieved Federal employee to file an action in U.S. District Court for a review of the administrative proceeding record after a final order by his agency or by the Civil Service Commission, if he is dissatisfied with that decision. Previously, there have been unrealistically high barriers which prevented or discouraged a Federal employee from taking a case to court. This will no longer be the case. There is no reason why a Federal employee should not have the same private right of action enjoyed by individuals in the [425 U.S. 840, 859] private sector, and I believe that the committee has acted wisely in this regard." 118 Cong. Rec. 4922 (1972) (emphasis added). </s> Senator Williams had an expanded version of this statement printed in the Congressional Record. Id., at 4923. </s> Despite the fact that Senator Williams was one of the original sponsors of S. 2515 and its floor manager, we decline to give controlling weight to the quoted statement for three reasons. First, it is self-contradictory: While characterizing the federal-sector "civil action" as a "review of the administrative proceeding record," Senator Williams stated in the same breath that "[t]here is no reason why a Federal employee should not have the same private right of action enjoyed by individuals in the private sector . . . ." Yet the private right of action enjoyed by individuals in the private sector was to be a trial de novo under the pending bill. Second, the federal-sector provision before the Senate was precisely that which the Senate committee had proposed. Indeed, Senator Williams specifically applauded the committee for having "acted wisely in this regard." Yet the committee clearly chose to grant federal-sector employees the right to a trial de novo and omitted any reference to the record review provisions it advocated for private-sector cease-and-desist orders. The committee's unambiguous and unaltered treatment of federal-sector "civil actions" is more probative of congressional intent than the casual remark of a single Senator in the floor debate. Cf. United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 585 ; Sperling v. United States, supra, at 480. Finally, as Senator Williams himself acknowledged earlier in the debate, Senator Dominick rather than he was "[t]he principal architect of . . . changes dealing with the civil service area . . . ." 118 Cong. Rec. 595 (1972). That statement was made immediately after Senator Dominick's discussion of the Senate committee's decision to grant federal employees the right to bring "civil actions" in district court rather than the right to have administrative adjudication of their claims with substantial-evidence review in the courts. Id., at 594. </s> The other statement relied on by the respondents was purportedly [425 U.S. 840, 860] made by Senator Cranston during the final portion of the floor debate. The daily edition of the Congressional Record shows Senator Cranston as having made the following statement: </s> "For the first time, [my Federal EEO amendment would] permit Federal employees to sue the Federal Government in discrimination cases - under the theory of Federal sovereign immunity, courts have not generally allowed such suits - and to bring suit either prior to or after CSC review of the agency EEO decision in the case. As with other cases brought under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Federal district court review would be based on the agency and/or CSC record and would not be a trial de novo." 118 Cong. Rec. S 2287 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1972) (emphasis added). </s> Approximately a year after the debate and 10 months after the enactment of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Senator Cranston informed the Senate that "the word `not' was misplaced" in the daily edition and that when "set forth . . . in the correct manner" the italicized portion of the statement would read "review would not be based on the agency and/or CSC record and would be a trial de novo." 119 Cong. Rec. S 1219 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1973). The language was so corrected, see 118 Cong. Rec. 4929. We agree with the respondents that this belated correction is not probative. But we cannot agree with their further argument and the view of the Eighth Circuit, Haire v. Calloway, 526 F.2d, at 248 n. 4, that the uncorrected version, as originally printed in the daily edition of the Congressional Record, is probative. As with Senator Williams' remark, the uncorrected statement is self-contradictory: Senator Cranston first equated federal- and private-sector "civil actions" and then went on to characterize a federal-sector suit as "not . . . a trial de novo." Yet the private-sector suit was to be a trial de novo. And, as with Senator Williams' remark, the Senate committee's decision to equate federal-sector "civil actions" with private-sector trials de novo is more probative of congressional intent than a fleeting remark in the floor debate. </s> [Footnote 37 United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709 , involved review of agency action under the Wunderlich Act, which provided that a governmental decision on a question of fact arising under a "disputes" clause of a Government contract should be final and conclusive "`unless the same is fraudulent or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evidence.'" Id., at 714. The Court held that this language indicated that Congress intended to limit review to the administrative record and observed that even "in cases where Congress has simply provided for review, without setting forth the standards to be used or the procedures to be followed, this Court has held that consideration is to be confined to the administrative record and that no de novo proceeding may be held." Id., at 715. Here Congress has not "simply provided for review" but has affirmatively chosen to grant federal employees the right to maintain a trial de novo. </s> In most instances, of course, where Congress intends review to be confined to the administrative record, it so indicates, either expressly or by use of a term like "substantial evidence," which has "become a term of art to describe the basis on which an administrative record is to be judged by a reviewing court." Ibid. E. g., 5 U.S.C. 706 (scope-of-review provision of Administrative Procedure Act); 12 U.S.C. 1848 (scope-of-review [425 U.S. 840, 863] provision applicable to certain orders of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System); 15 U.S.C. 21 (c) (scope-of-review provision applicable to certain orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Federal Trade Commission); 21 U.S.C. 371 (f) (3) (scope-of-review provision applicable to certain orders of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare). </s> [Footnote 38 House Report 26. </s> [Footnote 39 The goal may have been to compensate for the perceived fact that "[t]he Civil Service Commission's primary responsibility over all personnel matters in the Government . . . create[s] a built-in conflict of interest for examining the Government's equal employment opportunity program for structural defects which may result in a lack of true equal employment opportunity." Senate Report 15. </s> Prior administrative findings made with respect to an employment discrimination claim may, of course, be admitted as evidence at a federal-sector trial de novo. See Fed. Rule Evid. 803 (8) (C). Cf. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 n. 21. Moreover, it can be expected that, in the light of the prior administrative proceedings, many potential issues can be eliminated by stipulation or in the course of pre trial proceedings in the District Court. </s> [425 U.S. 840, 1]

United States Supreme Court HERBERT v. LANDO(1979) No. 77-1105 Argued: October 31, 1978Decided: April 18, 1979 </s> Petitioner instituted a diversity action in Federal District Court against the respondents, a television network and two of its employees, and a magazine, alleging that a program aired by the network and an article published by the magazine defamed him. Petitioner conceded that because he was a "public figure" the First and Fourteenth Amendments precluded recovery absent proof that respondents had published damaging falsehoods with "actual malice" - that is, with knowledge that the statements were false or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 , and subsequent decisions of this Court. Preparing to prove his case in light of these requirements, petitioner deposed one of the network employees at length and sought an order to compel answers to a variety of questions to which response was refused on the ground that the First Amendment protected against inquiry into the state of mind of those who edit, produce, or publish, and into the editorial process. The District Court ruled that the questions were relevant and rejected the claim of constitutional privilege. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed, two judges concluding that the First Amendment lent sufficient protection to the editorial processes to protect the network employee from inquiry about his thoughts, opinions, and conclusions with respect to the material gathered by him and about his conversations with his editorial colleagues. </s> Held: </s> When a member of the press is alleged to have circulated damaging falsehoods and is sued for injury to the plaintiff's reputation, there is no privilege under the First Amendment's guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press barring the plaintiff from inquiring into the editorial processes of those responsible for the publication where the inquiry will produce evidence material to the proof of a critical element of the plaintiff's cause of action. Pp. 158-177. </s> (a) Contrary to the views of the Court of Appeals, according an absolute privilege to the editorial process of a media defendant in a libel case is not required, authorized, or presaged by this Court's prior cases, and would substantially enhance the burden of proving actual malice, contrary to the expectations of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, [441 U.S. 153, 154] supra; Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 , and similar cases. New York Times and its progeny do not suggest any First Amendment restriction on the sources from which the plaintiff can obtain the necessary evidence to prove the critical elements of his cause of action, but, on the contrary, make it essential to proving liability that the plaintiff focus on the defendant's conduct and state of mind. It is also untenable to conclude from the prior cases that although proof of the necessary state of mind can be in the form of objective circumstances from which the ultimate fact can be inferred, plaintiffs may not inquire directly from the defendants whether they knew or suspected that their damaging publication was in error. Pp. 158-169. </s> (b) The case for modifying firmly established constitutional doctrine by placing beyond the plaintiff's reach a range of direct evidence relevant to proving knowing or reckless falsehood by the publisher of an alleged libel, elements that are critical to a plaintiff such as petitioner, is by no means clear and convincing. The suggested privilege for the editorial process would constitute a substantial interference with the ability of a defamation plaintiff to establish the ingredients of malice as required by New York Times, and furthermore the outer boundaries of the suggested editorial privilege are difficult to perceive. The important interests of petitioner and other defamation plaintiffs at stake in opposing the creation of the asserted privilege cannot be overridden on the ground that requiring disclosure of editorial conversations and of a reporter's conclusions about veracity of the material he has gathered will have an intolerable chilling effect on the editorial process and editorial decisionmaking. If the claimed inhibition flows from the fear of damages liability for publishing knowing or reckless falsehoods, those effects are precisely those that have been held to be consistent with the First Amendment. Pp. 169-175. </s> (c) Creating a constitutional privilege foreclosing direct inquiry into the editorial process would not cure the press' problem as to escalating costs and other burdens incident to defamation litigation. Only complete immunity from liability for defamation would effect this result, and this Court has regularly found this to be an untenable construction of the First Amendment. Furthermore, mushrooming litigation costs, much of it due to pretrial discovery, are not peculiar to the libel and slander area. Until and unless there are major changes in the present Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, reliance must be had on what in fact and in law are ample powers of the district judge to prevent abuse. Pp. 175-177. </s> 568 F.2d 974, reversed. [441 U.S. 153, 155] </s> WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 177. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, post, p. 180. STEWART, J., post, p. 199, and MARSHALL, J., post, p. 202, filed dissenting opinions. </s> Jonathan W. Lubell argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Mary K. O'Melveny. </s> Floyd Abrams argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Dean Ringel, Kenneth M. Vittor, Carleton G. Eldridge, Jr., and Richard G. Green. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Arthur B. Hanson and Frank M. Northam for the American Newspaper Publishers Assn.; and by Dan Paul, Parker D. Thomson, Susan B. Werth, Alan R. Finberg, Corydon B. Dunham, Edgar A. Zingman, Richard M. Schmidt, Jr., Samuel E. Klein, J. Laurent Scharff, Robert C. Lobdell, Erwin G. Krasnow, Robert D. Sack, Gary G. Gerlach, Paul E. Kritzer, James A. Strain, and Robert Haydock for New York Times Co. et al. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> By virtue of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, neither the Federal nor a State Government may make any law "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . ." The question here is whether those Amendments should be construed to provide further protection for the press when sued for defamation than has hitherto been recognized. More specifically, we are urged to hold for the first time that when a member of the press is alleged to have circulated damaging falsehoods and is sued for injury to the plaintiff's reputation, the plaintiff is barred from inquiring into the editorial processes of those responsible for the publication, even though the inquiry would produce evidence material to the proof of a critical element of his cause of action. </s> I </s> Petitioner, Anthony Herbert, is a retired Army officer who had extended wartime service in Vietnam and who received [441 U.S. 153, 156] widespread media attention in 1969-1970 when he accused his superior officers of covering up reports of atrocities and other war crimes. Three years later, on February 4, 1973, respondent Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS), broadcast a report on petitioner and his accusations. The program was produced and edited by respondent Barry Lando and was narrated by respondent Mike Wallace. Lando later published a related article in Atlantic Monthly magazine. Herbert then sued Lando, Wallace, CBS, and Atlantic Monthly for defamation in Federal District Court, basing jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship. In his complaint, Herbert alleged that the program and article falsely and maliciously portrayed him as a liar and a person who had made war-crimes charges to explain his relief from command, and he requested substantial damages for injury to his reputation and to the literary value of a book he had just published recounting his experiences. </s> Although his cause of action arose under New York State defamation law, Herbert conceded that because he was a "public figure" the First and Fourteenth Amendments precluded recovery absent proof that respondents had published a damaging falsehood "with `actual malice' - that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." This was the holding of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964), with respect to alleged libels of public officials, and extended to "public figures" by Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 1 Under this rule, absent knowing falsehood, liability requires proof of reckless disregard for truth, that is, that the defendant "in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication." St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). Such "subjective awareness of probable falsity," Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 335 n. 6 (1974), may be found if "there are obvious reasons to doubt [441 U.S. 153, 157] the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports." St. Amant v. Thompson, supra, at 732. </s> In preparing to prove his case in light of these requirements, Herbert deposed Lando at length and sought an order to compel answers to a variety of questions to which response was refused on the ground that the First Amendment protected against inquiry into the state of mind of those who edit, produce, or publish, and into the editorial process. 2 Applying the standard of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26 (b), which permits discovery of any matter "relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action" if it would either be admissible in evidence or "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence," the District Court ruled that because the defendant's state of mind was of "central importance" to the issue of malice in the case, it was obvious that the questions were relevant and "entirely appropriate to Herbert's efforts to discover whether Lando had any reason to doubt the veracity of certain of his sources, or, equally significant, to prefer the veracity of one source over another." 73 F. R. D. 387, 395, 396 (SDNY 1977). The District Court rejected the claim of constitutional privilege because it found nothing in the First Amendment or the relevant cases to permit or require it to increase the weight of the injured plaintiff's [441 U.S. 153, 158] already heavy burden of proof by in effect creating barriers "behind which malicious publication may go undetected and unpunished." Id., at 394. The case was then certified for an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1292 (b), and the Court of Appeals agreed to hear the case. 3 </s> A divided panel reversed the District Court. 568 F.2d 974 (CA2 1977). Two judges, writing separate but overlapping opinions, concluded that the First Amendment lent sufficient protection to the editorial processes to protect Lando from inquiry about his thoughts, opinions, and conclusions with respect to the material gathered by him and about his conversations with his editorial colleagues. The privilege not to answer was held to be absolute. We granted certiorari because of the importance of the issue involved. 435 U.S. 922 (1978). We have concluded that the Court of Appeals misconstrued the First and Fourteenth Amendments and accordingly reverse its judgment. </s> II </s> Civil and criminal liability for defamation was well established in the common law when the First Amendment was adopted, and there is no indication that the Framers intended to abolish such liability. Until New York Times, the prevailing jurisprudence was that "[l]ibelous utterances [are not] within the area of constitutionally protected speech . . . ." Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952); see also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482 -483 (1957); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 -572 (1942); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 707 -708 (1931). The accepted view was that neither civil nor criminal [441 U.S. 153, 159] liability for defamatory publications abridges freedom of speech or freedom of the press, and a majority of jurisdictions made publishers liable civilly for their defamatory publications regardless of their intent. 4 New York Times and Butts effected major changes in the standards applicable to civil libel actions. Under these cases public officials and public figures who sue for defamation must prove knowing or reckless falsehood in order to establish liability. Later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Court held that nonpublic figures must demonstrate some fault on the defendant's part and, at least where knowing or reckless untruth is not shown, some proof of actual injury to the plaintiff before liability may be imposed and damages awarded. </s> These cases rested primarily on the conviction that the common law of libel gave insufficient protection to the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of press and that to avoid self-censorship it was essential that liability for damages be conditioned on the specified showing of culpable conduct by those who publish damaging falsehood. [441 U.S. 153, 160] Given the required proof, however, damages liability for defamation abridges neither freedom of speech nor freedom of the press. </s> Nor did these cases suggest any First Amendment restriction on the sources from which the plaintiff could obtain the necessary evidence to prove the critical elements of his cause of action. On the contrary, New York Times and its progeny made it essential to proving liability that the plaintiff focus on the conduct and state of mind of the defendant. To be liable, the alleged defamer of public officials or of public figures must know or have reason to suspect that his publication is false. In other cases proof of some kind of fault, negligence perhaps, 5 is essential to recovery. Inevitably, unless liability is to be completely foreclosed, the thoughts and editorial processes of the alleged defamer would be open to examination. </s> It is also untenable to conclude from our cases that, although proof of the necessary state of mind could be in the form of objective circumstances from which the ultimate fact could be inferred, plaintiffs may not inquire directly from the defendants whether they knew or had reason to suspect that their damaging publication was in error. In Butts, for example, it is evident from the record that the editorial process had been subjected to close examination and that direct as well as indirect evidence was relied on to prove that the defendant magazine had acted with actual malice. The damages verdict was sustained without any suggestion that plaintiff's proof had trenched upon forbidden areas. 6 </s> [441 U.S. 153, 161] </s> Reliance upon such state-of-mind evidence is by no means a recent development arising from New York Times and similar cases. Rather, it is deeply rooted in the common-law rule, predating the First Amendment, that a showing of malice on the part of the defendant permitted plaintiffs to [441 U.S. 153, 162] recover punitive or enhanced damages. 7 In Butts, the Court affirmed the substantial award of punitive damages which in Georgia were conditioned upon a showing of "wanton or reckless indifference or culpable negligence" or "`ill will, spite, hatred and an intent to injure . . . .'" 388 U.S., at 165 -166. Neither Mr. Justice Harlan, id., at 156-162, 8 nor Mr. Chief Justice Warren, concurring, id., at 165-168, raised any question as to the propriety of having the award turn on such a showing or as to the propriety of the underlying evidence, [441 U.S. 153, 163] which plainly included direct evidence going to the state of mind of the publisher and its responsible agents. 9 </s> Furthermore, long before New York Times was decided, certain qualified privileges had developed to protect a publisher from liability for libel unless the publication was made with malice. 10 Malice was defined in numerous ways, but in general [441 U.S. 153, 164] depended upon a showing that the defendant acted with improper motive. 11 This showing in turn hinged upon the intent or purpose with which the publication was made, the belief of the defendant in the truth of his statement, or upon the ill will which the defendant might have borne toward the plaintiff. 12 </s> [441 U.S. 153, 165] </s> Courts have traditionally admitted any direct or indirect evidence relevant to the state of mind of the defendant and necessary to defeat a conditional privilege or enhance damages. 13 The rules are applicable to the press and to other defendants alike, 14 and it is evident that the courts across the country have long been accepting evidence going to the editorial processes of the media without encountering constitutional objections. 15 </s> [441 U.S. 153, 166] </s> In the face of this history, old and new, the Court of Appeals nevertheless declared that two of this Court's cases had announced unequivocal protection for the editorial process. [441 U.S. 153, 167] In each of these cases, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), and Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973), we invalidated governmental efforts to pre-empt editorial decision by requiring the publication of specified material. In Columbia Broadcasting System, it was the requirement that a television network air paid political advertisements and in Tornillo, a newspaper's obligation to print a political candidate's reply to press criticism. Insofar as the laws at issue in Tornillo and Columbia Broadcasting System sought to control in advance the content of the publication, they were deemed as invalid as were prior efforts to enjoin [441 U.S. 153, 168] publication of specified materials. 16 But holdings that neither a State nor the Federal Government may dictate what must or must not be printed neither expressly nor impliedly suggest that the editorial process is immune from any inquiry whatsoever. </s> It is incredible to believe that the Court in Columbia Broadcasting System or in Tornillo silently effected a substantial contraction of the rights preserved to defamation plaintiffs in Sullivan, Butts, and like cases. Tornillo and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., were announced on the same day; and although the Court's opinion in Gertz contained an overview of recent developments in the relationship between the First Amendment and the law of libel, there was no hint that a companion case had narrowed the evidence available to a defamation plaintiff. Quite the opposite inference is to be drawn from the Gertz opinion, since it, like prior First Amendment libel cases, recited without criticism the facts of record indicating that the state of mind of the editor had been placed at issue. Nor did the Gertz opinion, in requiring proof of some degree of fault on the part of the defendant editor and in forbidding punitive damages absent at least reckless disregard of truth or falsity, suggest that the First Amendment also foreclosed direct inquiry into these critical elements. 17 </s> [441 U.S. 153, 169] </s> In sum, contrary to the views of the Court of Appeals, according an absolute privilege to the editorial process of a media defendant in a libel case is not required, authorized, or presaged by our prior cases, and would substantially enhance the burden of proving actual malice, contrary to the expectations of New York Times, Butts, and similar cases. </s> III </s> It is nevertheless urged by respondents that the balance struck in New York Times should now be modified to provide further protections for the press when sued for circulating erroneous information damaging to individual reputation. It is not uncommon or improper, of course, to suggest the abandonment, modification, or refinement of existing constitutional interpretation, and notable developments in First Amendment jurisprudence have evolved from just such submissions. But in the 15 years since New York Times, the doctrine announced by that case, which represented a major development and which was widely perceived as essentially protective of press freedoms, has been repeatedly affirmed as the appropriate First Amendment standard applicable in libel actions brought by public officials and public figures. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976). At the same time, however, the Court has reiterated its conviction - reflected in the laws of defamation of all of the States - that the individual's interest in his reputation is also a basic concern. Id., at 455-457; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra, at 348-349. </s> We are thus being asked to modify firmly established constitutional doctrine by placing beyond the plaintiff's reach a range of direct evidence relevant to proving knowing or reckless falsehood by the publisher of an alleged libel, elements that are critical to plaintiffs such as Herbert. The case for [441 U.S. 153, 170] making this modification is by no means clear and convincing, and we decline to accept it. </s> In the first place, it is plain enough that the suggested privilege for the editorial process would constitute a substantial interference with the ability of a defamation plaintiff to establish the ingredients of malice as required by New York Times. As respondents would have it, the defendant's reckless disregard of the truth, a critical element, could not be shown by direct evidence through inquiry into the thoughts, opinions, and conclusions of the publisher, but could be proved only by objective evidence from which the ultimate fact could be inferred. It may be that plaintiffs will rarely be successful in proving awareness of falsehood from the mouth of the defendant himself, but the relevance of answers to such inquiries, which the District Court recognized and the Court of Appeals did not deny, can hardly be doubted. To erect an impenetrable barrier to the plaintiff's use of such evidence on his side of the case is a matter of some substance, particularly when defendants themselves are prone to assert their good-faith belief in the truth of their publications, 18 and libel plaintiffs are required to prove knowing or reckless falsehood with "convincing clarity." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S., at 285 -286. </s> Furthermore, the outer boundaries of the editorial privilege now urged are difficult to perceive. The opinions below did not state, and respondents do not explain, precisely when the editorial process begins and when it ends. Moreover, although we are told that respondent Lando was willing to testify as to what he "knew" and what he had "learned" from his interviews, as opposed to what he "believed," it is not at all clear why the suggested editorial privilege would not cover knowledge as well as belief about the veracity of published [441 U.S. 153, 171] reports. 19 It is worth noting here that the privilege as asserted by respondents would also immunize from inquiry the internal communications occurring during the editorial process and thus place beyond reach what the defendant participants learned or knew as the result of such collegiate conversations or exchanges. If damaging admissions to colleagues are to be barred from evidence, would a reporter's admissions made to third parties not participating in the editorial process also be immune from inquiry? We thus have little doubt that Herbert and other defamation plaintiffs have important interests at stake in opposing the creation of the asserted privilege. </s> Nevertheless, we are urged by respondents to override these important interests because requiring disclosure of editorial conversations and of a reporter's conclusions about the veracity of the material he has gathered will have an intolerable chilling effect on the editorial process and editorial decisionmaking. But if the claimed inhibition flows from the fear of damages liability for publishing knowing or reckless falsehoods, those effects are precisely what New York Times and other cases have held to be consistent with the First Amendment. Spreading false information in and of itself carries no First Amendment credentials. "[T]here is no constitutional value in false statements of fact." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra, at 340. </s> Realistically, however, some error is inevitable; and the difficulties of separating fact from fiction convinced the Court in New York Times, Butts, Gertz, and similar cases to limit [441 U.S. 153, 172] liability to instances where some degree of culpability is present in order to eliminate the risk of undue self-censorship and the suppression of truthful material. Those who publish defamatory falsehoods with the requisite culpability, however, are subject to liability, the aim being not only to compensate for injury but also to deter publication of unprotected material threatening injury to individual reputation. Permitting plaintiffs such as Herbert to prove their cases by direct as well as indirect evidence is consistent with the balance struck by our prior decisions. If such proof results in liability for damages which in turn discourages the publication of erroneous information known to be false or probably false, this is no more than what our cases contemplate and does not abridge either freedom of speech or of the press. </s> Of course, if inquiry into editorial conclusions threatens the suppression not only of information known or strongly suspected to be unreliable but also of truthful information, the issue would be quite different. But as we have said, our cases necessarily contemplate examination of the editorial process to prove the necessary awareness of probable falsehood, and if indirect proof of this element does not stifle truthful publication and is consistent with the First Amendment, as respondents seem to concede, we do not understand how direct inquiry with respect to the ultimate issue would be substantially more suspect. 20 Perhaps such examination will lead to liability that would not have been found without it, but this does not suggest that the determinations in these instances will be inaccurate and will lead to the suppression of protected information. On the contrary, direct inquiry from the actors, which affords the opportunity to refute inferences that might otherwise be drawn from circumstantial evidence, suggests [441 U.S. 153, 173] that more accurate results will be obtained by placing all, rather than part, of the evidence before the decisionmaker. Suppose, for example, that a reporter has two contradictory reports about the plaintiff, one of which is false and damaging, and only the false one is published. In resolving the issue whether the publication was known or suspected to be false, it is only common sense to believe that inquiry from the author, with an opportunity to explain, will contribute to accuracy. If the publication is false but there is an exonerating explanation, the defendant will surely testify to this effect. 21 Why should not the plaintiff be permitted to inquire before trial? On the other hand, if the publisher in fact had serious doubts about accuracy, but published nevertheless, no undue self-censorship will result from permitting the relevant inquiry. Only knowing or reckless error will be discouraged; and unless there is to be an absolute First Amendment privilege to inflict injury by knowing or reckless conduct, which respondents do not suggest, constitutional values will not be threatened. </s> It is also urged that frank discussion among reporters and editors will be dampened and sound editorial judgment endangered if such exchanges, oral or written, are subject to inquiry by defamation plaintiffs. 22 We do not doubt the direct relationship between consultation and discussion on the one hand and sound decisions on the other; but whether or not there is liability for the injury, the press has an obvious interest in avoiding the infliction of harm by the publication [441 U.S. 153, 174] of false information, and it is not unreasonable to expect the media to invoke whatever procedures may be practicable and useful to that end. Moreover, given exposure to liability when there is knowing or reckless error, there is even more reason to resort to prepublication precautions, such as a frank interchange of fact and opinion. Accordingly, we find it difficult to believe that error-avoiding procedures will be terminated or stifled simply because there is liability for culpable error and because the editorial process will itself be examined in the tiny percentage of instances in which error is claimed and litigation ensues. Nor is there sound reason to believe that editorial exchanges and the editorial process are so subject to distortion and to such recurring misunderstanding that they should be immune from examination in order to avoid erroneous judgments in defamation suits. The evidentiary burden Herbert must carry to prove at least reckless disregard for the truth is substantial indeed, and we are unconvinced that his chances of winning an undeserved verdict are such that an inquiry into what Lando learned or said during the editorial process must be foreclosed. </s> This is not to say that the editorial discussions or exchanges have no constitutional protection from casual inquiry. There is no law that subjects the editorial process to private or official examination merely to satisfy curiosity or to serve some general end such as the public interest; and if there were, it would not survive constitutional scrutiny as the First Amendment is presently construed. No such problem exists here, however, where there is a specific claim of injury arising from a publication that is alleged to have been knowingly or recklessly false. 23 </s> [441 U.S. 153, 175] </s> Evidentiary privileges in litigation are not favored, 24 and even those rooted in the Constitution must give way in proper circumstances. The President, for example, does not have an absolute privilege against disclosure of materials subpoenaed for a judicial proceeding. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). In so holding, we found that although the President has a powerful interest in confidentiality of communications between himself and his advisers, that interest must yield to a demonstrated specific need for evidence. As we stated, in referring to existing limited privileges against disclosure, "[w]hatever their origins, these exceptions to the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth." Id., at 710. </s> With these considerations in mind, we conclude that the present construction of the First Amendment should not be modified by creating the evidentiary privilege which the respondents now urge. </s> IV </s> Although defamation litigation, including suits against the press, is an ancient phenomenon, it is true that our cases from New York Times to Gertz have considerably changed the profile of such cases. In years gone by, plaintiffs made out a prima facie case by proving the damaging publication. Truth [441 U.S. 153, 176] and privilege were defenses. Intent, motive, and malice were not necessarily involved except to counter qualified privilege or to prove exemplary damages. The plaintiff's burden is now considerably expanded. In every or almost every case, the plaintiff must focus on the editorial process and prove a false publication attended by some degree of culpability on the part of the publisher. If plaintiffs in consequence now resort to more discovery, it would not be surprising; and it would follow that the costs and other burdens of this kind of litigation would escalate and become much more troublesome for both plaintiffs and defendants. It is suggested that the press needs constitutional protection from these burdens if it is to perform its task, 25 which is indispensable in a system such as ours. </s> Creating a constitutional privilege foreclosing direct inquiry into the editorial process, however, would not cure this problem for the press. Only complete immunity from liability for defamation would effect this result, and the Court has regularly found this to be an untenable construction of the First Amendment. Furthermore, mushrooming litigation costs, much of it due to pretrial discovery, are not peculiar to the libel and slander area. There have been repeated expressions of concern about undue and uncontrolled discovery, and voices from this Court have joined the chorus. 26 But [441 U.S. 153, 177] until and unless there are major changes in the present Rules of Civil Procedure, reliance must be had on what in fact and in law are ample powers of the district judge to prevent abuse. </s> The Court has more than once declared that the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment to effect their purpose of adequately informing the litigants in civil trials. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 114 -115 (1964); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 , 507 (1947). But the discovery provisions, like all of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, are subject to the injunction of Rule 1 that they "be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." (Emphasis added.) To this end, the requirement of Rule 26 (b) (1) that the material sought in discovery be "relevant" should be firmly applied, and the district courts should not neglect their power to restrict discovery where "justice requires [protection for] a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. . . ." Rule 26 (c). With this authority at hand, judges should not hesitate to exercise appropriate control over the discovery process. </s> Whether, as a nonconstitutional matter, however, the trial judge properly applied the rules of discovery was not within the boundaries of the question certified under 28 U.S.C. 1292 (b) and accordingly is not before us. 27 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. </s> So ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Criminal libel prosecutions are subject to the same constitutional limitations. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964). </s> [Footnote 2 The Court of Appeals summarized the inquiries to which Lando objected as follows: </s> "1. Lando's conclusions during his research and investigations regarding people or leads to be pursued, or not to be pursued, in connection with the `60 Minutes' segment and the Atlantic Monthly article; </s> "2. Lando's conclusions about facts imparted by interviewees and his state of mind with respect to the veracity of persons interviewed; </s> "3. The basis for conclusions where Lando testified that he did reach a conclusion concerning the veracity of persons, information or events; </s> "4. Conversations between Lando and Wallace about matter to be included or excluded from the broadcast publication; and </s> "5. Lando's intentions as manifested by his decision to include or exclude certain material." 568 F.2d 974, 983 (CA2 1977). </s> [Footnote 3 Respondents' petition for leave to appeal from an interlocutory order, which was granted, stated the issue on appeal as follows: </s> "What effect should be given to the First Amendment protection of the press with respect to its exercise of editorial judgment in pre-trial discovery in a libel case governed by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)?" </s> [Footnote 4 See, e. g., Restatement of Torts 580 (1938); Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: The Modern Revised Translation, 49 Corn. L. Q. 581, 583-584 (1964); Developments in the Law - Defamation, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 875, 902-910 (1956). In Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 189 (1909), Mr. Justice Holmes summarized the prevailing view of strict liability in the course of reviewing a libel judgment rendered in a federal diversity of citizenship action: </s> "There was some suggestion that the defendant published the portrait by mistake, and without knowledge that it was the plaintiff's portrait or was not what it purported to be. But the fact, if it was one, was no excuse. If the publication was libellous the defendant took the risk. As was said of such matters by Lord Mansfield, `Whatever a man publishes he publishes at his peril.' The King v. Woodfall, Lofft 776, 781. . . . The reason is plain. A libel is harmful on its face. If a man sees fit to publish manifestly hurtful statements concerning an individual, without other justification than exists for an advertisement or a piece of news, the usual principles of tort will make him liable, if the statements are false or are true only of some one else." </s> [Footnote 5 The definition of fault was to be the responsibility of state laws. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). </s> [Footnote 6 See 388 U.S., at 156 -159, where Mr. Justice Harlan, writing for a plurality of the Court, reviewed the record under the standard he preferred to apply to public figures, and upheld the verdict for the plaintiff. Mr. Chief Justice Warren independently reviewed the record under the "actual malice" standard of New York Times and also concluded in his concurring [441 U.S. 153, 161] opinion that the verdict should be upheld. Id., at 168-170. The evidence relied on and summarized in both opinions included substantial amounts of testimony that would fall within the editorial-process privilege as defined by respondents. The record before the Court included depositions by the author of the defamatory article, an individual paid to assist the author in preparation, the sports editor of the Saturday Evening Post, and both its managing editor and editor in chief. These depositions revealed the Saturday Evening Post's motives in publishing the story (Record, O. T. 1966, No. 37, pp. 706-717), sources (id., at 364, 662-664, 719-720, 729), conversations among the editors and author concerning the research and development of the article (id., at 363-367, 721-737), decisions and reasons relating to who should be interviewed and what should be investigated (id., at 666-667, 699-700, 734-736, 772-774), conclusions as to the importance and veracity of sources and information presented in the article (id., at 720, 732-735, 737, 771-772, 776), and conclusions about the impact that publishing the article would have on the subject (id., at 714-716, 770). MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, writing for himself and MR. JUSTICE WHITE, also thought the evidence of record sufficient to satisfy the New York Times malice standard. It is quite unlikely that the Court would have arrived at the result it did had it believed that inquiry into the editorial processes was constitutionally forbidden. </s> The Court engaged in similar analysis of the record in reversing the judgments entered in a companion case to Butts, Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S., at 158 -159; id., at 165 (Warren, C. J., concurring); and in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 391 -394 (1967). In Hill, the record included the edited drafts of the allegedly libelous article and an examination and cross-examination of the author. During that examination, the writer explained in detail the preparation of the article, his thoughts, conclusions, and beliefs regarding the material, and a line-by-line analysis of the article with explanations of how and why additions and deletions were made to the various drafts. As in Butts, the editorial process was the focus of much of the evidence, and direct inquiry was made into the state of mind of the media defendants. Yet the Court raised no question as to the propriety of the proof. </s> [Footnote 7 A. Hanson, Libel and Related Torts § 163 (1969); Developments in the Law - Defamation, supra n. 4, at 938; 50 Am. Jur. 2d, Libel and Slander 352 (1970); 53 C. J. S., Libel and Slander 260 (1955). </s> The Restatement originally provided in a separate section for the award of punitive damages for malicious defamations. Restatement of Torts 1068 (Tent. Draft 13, 1936): </s> "One who is liable for harm to another's reputation caused by the publication of a libel or slander is also liable for punitive damages if the defamatory matter was published with knowledge of its falsity or if it was published in reckless indifference to its truth or falsity or solely for the purpose of causing harm to the plaintiff's reputation or other legally protected interest." </s> The provision was later omitted with the explanation that recovery of punitive damages would be determined by the rules in the Restatement with respect to damages in general. Restatement of Torts 1068 (Proposed Final Draft 3, 1937). </s> Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra, at 350, limited the entitlement to punitive damages, but such damages are still awardable upon a showing of knowing or reckless falsehood. </s> [Footnote 8 As Mr. Justice Harlan noted, the jury had been instructed in considering punitive damages to assess "`the reliability, the nature of the sources of the defendant's information, its acceptance or rejection of the sources, and its care in checking upon assertions.'" 388 U.S., at 156 (emphasis added). The Justice found nothing amiss either with the instruction or the result the jury reached under it. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting in the Butts case, id., at 172-174, analyzed the instructions differently but raised no question as to the constitutionality of turning the award of either compensatory or punitive damages upon direct as well as circumstantial evidence going to the mental state of the defendant. </s> [Footnote 9 See n. 6, supra. </s> [Footnote 10 See Nalle v. Oyster, 230 U.S. 165, 179 -180 (1913); White v. Nicholls, 3 How. 266, 286-292 (1845); T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 502 (5th ed. 1956); Hallen, Character of Belief Necessary for the Conditional Privilege in Defamation, 25 Ill. L. Rev. 865 (1931). In White v. Nicholls, supra, at 290-291, the Court surveyed the common law and summarized the privilege as follows: </s> "We have thus taken a view of the authorities which treat of the doctrines of slander and libel, and have considered those authorities particularly with reference to the distinction they establish between ordinary instances of slander, written and unwritten, and those which have been styled privileged communications; the peculiar character of which is said to exempt them from inferences which the law has created with respect to those cases that do not partake of that character. Our examination, extended as it may seem to have been, has been called for by the importance of a subject most intimately connected with the rights and happiness of individuals, as it is with the quiet and good order of society. The investigation has conducted us to the following conclusions, which we propound as the law applicable thereto. 1. That every publication, either by writing, printing, or pictures, which charges upon or imputes to any person that which renders him liable to punishment, or which is calculated to make him infamous, or odious, or ridiculous, is prima facie a libel, and implies malice in the author and publisher towards the person concerning whom such publication is made. Proof of malice, therefore, in the cases just described, can never be required of the party complaining beyond the proof of the publication itself: justification, excuse, or extenuation, if either can be shown, must proceed from the defendant. 2. That the description of cases recognised as privileged communications, must be understood as exceptions to this rule, and as being founded upon some apparently recognised obligation or motive, legal, moral, or social, which may fairly be presumed to have led to the publication, and therefore prima facie relieves it from that just implication from which the general rule of the law is deduced. The rule of evidence, as to such cases, is accordingly [441 U.S. 153, 164] so far changed as to impose it on the plaintiff to remove those presumptions flowing from the seeming obligations and situations of the parties, and to require of him to bring home to the defendant the existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct. Beyond this extent no presumption can be permitted to operate, much less be made to sanctify the indulgence of malice, however wicked, however express, under the protection of legal forms. We conclude then that malice may be proved, though alleged to have existed in the proceedings before a court, or legislative body, or any other tribunal or authority, although such court, or legislative body, or other tribunal, may have been the appropriate authority for redressing the grievance represented to it; and that proof of express malice in any written publication, petition, or proceeding, addressed to such tribunal, will render that publication, petition, or proceeding, libellous in its character, and actionable, and will subject the author and publisher thereof to all the consequences of libel." </s> [Footnote 11 Hallen, supra, at 866-867. In some jurisdictions a defendant forfeited his privilege if he published negligently or without probable cause to believe the statement was true. Id., at 867; see White v. Nicholls, supra, at 291. </s> [Footnote 12 See, e. g., 50 Am. Jur. 2d, supra n. 7, 455: </s> "The existence of actual malice may be shown in many ways. As a general rule, any competent evidence, either direct or circumstantial, can be resorted to, and all the relevant circumstances surrounding the transaction may be shown, provided they are not too remote, including threats, prior or subsequent defamations, subsequent statements of the defendant, circumstances indicating the existence of rivalry, ill will, or hostility between the parties, facts tending to show a reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights, and, in an action against a newspaper, custom and usage with respect to the treatment of news items of the nature of the one under consideration. The plaintiff may show that the defendant had drawn a pistol at the time he uttered the words complained of; that defendant had tried to kiss and embrace plaintiff just prior to the defamatory publication; or that defendant had failed to make a proper investigation before publication of the statement in question. On cross-examination the [441 U.S. 153, 165] defendant may be questioned as to his intent in making the publication." (Footnotes and citations omitted.) </s> [Footnote 13 E. g., W. Odgers, A Digest of the Law of Libel and Slander *271-*288 (1st Am. ed. Bigelow 1881); 50 Am. Jur. 2d, supra n. 7, 455; 53 C. J. S., supra n. 7, 213. </s> [Footnote 14 Cf. Odgers, supra, at *271; F. Holt, The Law of Libel 57 (1st Am. ed. 1818); Billet v. Times-Democrat Publishing Co., 107 La. 751, 32 So. 17 (1902). </s> [Footnote 15 In scores of libel cases, courts have addressed the general issue of the admissibility of evidence that would be excluded under the editorial-process privilege asserted here and have affirmed the relevance and admissibility of the evidence on behalf of libel plaintiffs. See, e. g., Johnson Publishing Co. v. Davis, 271 Ala. 474, 124 So.2d 441 (1960) (editor may be cross-examined on meaning intended to be conveyed by passages in magazine article); Freeman v. Mills, 97 Cal. App. 2d 161, 217 P.2d 687 (1950) (malice may be established by direct proof of the state of mind of a person, or by evidence from which its existence may be inferred); Scott v. Times-Mirror Co., 181 Cal. 345, 184 P. 672 (1919) (all relevant circumstances concerning publication admissible); Sandora v. Times Co., 113 Conn. 574, 155 A. 819 (1931) (all relevant evidence including direct evidence on state of mind or surrounding circumstances - city editor and reporter called to stand and questioned extensively as to motives, circumstances of publication, and general practices); Rice v. Simmons, 2 Del. 309, 31 Am. Dec. 766 (1838) (where question of malice in issue, declarations of publisher at the time of publication admissible as part of the res gestae); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Vickers, 71 Ga. App. 204, 30 S. E. 2d 440 (1944) (all relevant evidence admissible, including direct evidence of state of mind and surrounding circumstances); Cook v. East Shore Newspapers, 327 Ill. App. 559, 64 N. E. 2d 751 (1945) (all relevant evidence concerning circumstances of publications admissible, including testimony by reporters and employees of defendant); Berger v. Freeman Tribune Publishing Co., 132 Iowa 290, 109 N. W. 784 [441 U.S. 153, 166] (1906) (all relevant evidence); Thompson v. Globe Newspaper Co., 279 Mass. 176, 181 N. E. 249 (1932) (only evidence on state of mind of those agents of defendant entrusted with determining what shall be published is admissible and material); Conroy v. Fall River Herald News Co., 306 Mass. 488, 28 N. E. 2d 729 (1940) (any relevant evidence on defendant's malice); Cyrowski v. Polish-American Pub. Co., 196 Mich. 648, 163 N. W. 58 (1917) (testimony of individuals who advised reporter to question plaintiff before publishing defamatory article was admissible on the issue of malice); Friedell v. Blakely Printing Co., 163 Minn. 226, 203 N. W. 974 (1925) (any relevant evidence admissible); Cook v. Globe Printing Co., 227 Mo. 471, 127 S. W. 332 (1910) (evidence showing that defendant's editorial manager knew an important fact to be false admissible on question of malice); Butler v. Gazette Co., 119 App. Div. 767, 104 N. Y. S. 637 (1907) (any evidence admissible to prove actual malice of defendant); Briggs v. Byrd, 34 N.C. 377 (1851) (express malice may be proved either by direct evidence or surrounding circumstances); McBurney v. Times Publishing Co., 93 R. I. 331, 175 A. 2d 170 (1961) (relevant evidence admissible to rebut testimony by reporters and editors that they published without malice); Lancour v. Herald & Globe Assn., 112 Vt. 471, 28 A. 2d 396 (1942) (any relevant evidence on malice); Farrar v. Tribune Publishing Co., 57 Wash. 2d 549, 358 P.2d 792 (1961) (all circumstances surrounding publication relevant and admissible). </s> Similarly, the courts have uniformly admitted such evidence on behalf of the defendant. See, e. g., Bohan v. Record Pub. Co., 1 Cal. App. 429, 82 P. 634 (1905) (testimony on good faith); Hearne v. De Young, 119 Cal. 670, 52 P. 150 (1898) (testimony on sources, precautions taken, and good faith); Ballinger v. Democrat Co., 203 Iowa 1095, 212 N. W. 557 (1927) (testimony of reporter and editor on good faith admissible); Snyder v. Tribune Co., 161 Iowa 671, 143 N. W. 519 (1913) (testimony as to source of information and good faith of reporter admissible); Courier-Journal Co. v. Phillips, 142 Ky. 372, 134 S. W. 446 (1911) (testimony of reporter on good faith); Conner v. Standard Pub. Co., 183 Mass. 474, 67 N. E. 596 (1903) (testimony as to source of information); Davis v. Marxhausen, 103 Mich. 315, 61 N. W. 504 (1894) (testimony on good faith and proper precautions taken before publishing); Julian v. Kansas City Star Co., 209 Mo. 35, 107 S. W. 496 (1908) (testimony on thoughts and intentions at the time of publication admissible); Paxton v. Woodward, 31 Mont. 195, 78 P. [441 U.S. 153, 167] 215 (1904) (testimony as to motive, good faith, and sources); Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v. Franklin, 74 Nev. 282, 329 P.2d 867 (1958) (testimony of publisher on good faith); Lindsey v. Evening Journal Assn., 10 N. J. Misc. 1275, 163 A. 245 (1932) (testimony on good faith); Kohn v. P&D Publishing Co., 169 App. Div. 580, 155 N. Y. S. 455 (1915) (source); Hains v. New York Evening Journal, 240 N. Y. S. 734 (Sup. Ct. 1930) (source); Goodrow v. Malone Telegram, Inc., 235 App. Div. 3, 255 N. Y. S. 812 (1932) (reporter's testimony as to source); Goodrow v. Press Co., 233 App. Div. 41, 251 N. Y. S. 364 (1931) (defendant can testify and introduce evidence on his good faith at time of publication); Kehoe v. New York Tribune, 229 App. Div. 220, 241 N. Y. S. 676 (1930) (testimony on good faith admissible to prevent imposition of punitive damages); Varvaro v. American Agriculturist, Inc., 222 App. Div. 213, 225 N. Y. S. 564 (1927) (defendant may testify and introduce evidence on lack of malice); Van Arsdale v. Time, Inc., 35 N. Y. S. 2d 951 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 265 App. Div. 919, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 413 (1942); Weichbrodt v. New York Evening Journal, 11 N. Y. S. 2d 112 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (defendant may testify as to good faith and probable cause); Cleveland Leader Printing Co. v. Nethersole, 84 Ohio St. 118, 95 N. E. 735 (1911) (testimony on good faith); Cobb v. Oklahoma Pub. Co., 42 Okla. 314, 140 P. 1079 (1914) (defendant's testimony as to lack of malice and source of information); Times Pub. Co. v. Ray, 1 S. W. 2d 471 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927), aff'd, 12 S. W. 2d 165 (1929) (testimony as to lack of malice); Pfister v. Milwaukee Free Press Co., 139 Wis. 627, 121 N. W. 938 (1909) (testimony as to absence of malice). </s> None of these cases as much as suggested that there were special limits applicable to the press on the discoverability of such evidence, either before or during trial. </s> [Footnote 16 As we stated in Tornillo, "no `government agency - local, state, or federal - can tell a newspaper in advance what it can print and what it cannot.'" 418 U.S., at 255 -256, quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 400 (1973) (STEWART, J., dissenting). </s> [Footnote 17 Two years later, in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), there was likewise no indication that the plaintiff is subject to substantial evidentiary restrictions in proving the defendant's fault. As MR. JUSTICE POWELL and MR. JUSTICE STEWART stated in concurrence, the answer to this question of culpability "depends upon a careful consideration of all the relevant evidence concerning Time's actions prior to the publication of the `Milestones' article." Id., at 465-466. They suggested that on remand all the evidence of record should be considered, which included evidence going to the beliefs of Time's editorial staff. See id., at 467-470, and n. 5. </s> [Footnote 18 See, e. g., the cases collected in n. 15, supra, in which media defendants asserted, and courts upheld, the right to present this type of evidence at trial in order to establish good faith and lack of malice. </s> [Footnote 19 It was also suggested at oral argument that the privilege would cover questions in the "why" form, but not of the "who," "what," "when," and "where" type. Tr. of Oral Arg. 32-34. But it is evident from Lando's deposition that questions soliciting "why" answers relating to the editorial process were answered, e. g., Tr. of Deposition 21, L. 7; 1892, L. 18, and that he refused to answer others that did not fall into this category, e. g., id., at 666, L. 20; 774, L. 5; 877, L. 12; 880, L. 5; 1488, L. 3; 1893, L. 11; see Tr. of Oral Arg. 46. </s> [Footnote 20 The kind of question respondents seek to avoid answering is, by their own admission, the easiest to answer. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 31: </s> "[T]hey are set-up questions for our side. . . . [T]hese are not difficult questions to answer." </s> [Footnote 21 Often it is the libel defendant who first presents at trial direct evidence about the editorial process in order to establish good faith and lack of malice. That was true in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, see, e. g., Record, O. T. 1963, No. 39, p. 762, and in many of the cases cited in n. 15, supra. </s> [Footnote 22 They invoke our observation in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974): "[T]hose who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking process." </s> [Footnote 23 MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN would extend more constitutional protection to editorial discussion by excusing answers to relevant questions about in-house conversations until the plaintiff has made a prima facie case of falsity. If this suggestion contemplates a bifurcated trial, first on falsity and then on culpability and injury, we decline to subject libel trials to such burdensome complications and intolerable delay. On the other [441 U.S. 153, 175] hand, if, as seems more likely, the prima facie showing does not contemplate a minitrial on falsity, no resolution of conflicting evidence on this issue, but only a credible assertion by the plaintiff, it smacks of a requirement that could be satisfied by an affidavit or a simple verification of the pleadings. We are reluctant to imbed this formalism in the Constitution. </s> [Footnote 24 See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting): "Limitations are properly placed upon the operation of this general principle [of no testimonial privilege] only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth." See also 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence 2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961); 4 The Works of Jeremy Bentham 321 (J. Bowring ed. 1843). </s> [Footnote 25 It is urged that the large costs of defending lawsuits will intimidate the press and lead to self-censorship, particularly where smaller newspapers and broadcasters are involved. It is noted that Lando's deposition alone continued intermittently for over a year and filled 26 volumes containing nearly 3,000 pages and 240 exhibits. As well as out-of-pocket expenses of the deposition, there were substantial legal fees, and Lando and his associates were diverted from news gathering and reporting for a significant amount of time. </s> [Footnote 26 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740 -741 (1975); ACF Industries, Inc. v. EEOC, 439 U.S. 1081 (1979) (POWELL, J., joined by STEWART and REHNQUIST, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Burger: Agenda for 2000 A. D.: A Need for Systematic Anticipation, Address at the Pound Conference, 70 F. R. D. 83, 95-96 [441 U.S. 153, 177] (1976). The Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States has proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure designed to ameliorate this problem. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1978). </s> [Footnote 27 MR. JUSTICE STEWART would remand to have the trial court rule once again on the relevance of the disputed questions. But the opinion of the [441 U.S. 153, 178] trial judge reveals that he correctly understood that New York Times and Gertz required Herbert to prove either knowing falsehood or reckless disregard for truth. With the proper constitutional elements in mind, the judge went on to rule that the questions at issue were clearly relevant and that no constitutional privilege excused Lando from answering them. We hold that the judge committed no constitutional error but, contrary to MR. JUSTICE STEWART, find it inappropriate to review his rulings on relevancy. </s> MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. </s> I join the opinion of the Court, and write separately to elaborate on what is said in Part IV. I do not see my observations [441 U.S. 153, 178] as being inconsistent with the Court's opinion; rather, I write to emphasize the additional point that, in supervising discovery in a libel suit by a public figure, a district court has a duty to consider First Amendment interests as well as the private interests of the plaintiff. </s> I agree with the Court that the explicit constitutional protection of First Amendment rights in a case of this kind, as articulated by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), should not be expanded to create an evidentiary privilege. With respect to pretrial discovery in a civil proceeding, whatever protection the "exercise of editorial judgment" enjoys depends entirely on the protection the First Amendment accords the product of this judgment, namely, published speech. 1 As the Court makes clear, the privilege respondents claim is unnecessary to safeguard published speech. This holding requires a reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Court notes, however, that whether "the trial judge properly applied the rules of discovery," as a nonconstitutional matter, is not before us under the question certified pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1292 (b), ante, at 177. I assume, therefore, that the litigation will continue and the District Court will review the interrogatories and questions which respondents declined to answer. [441 U.S. 153, 179] </s> Earlier this Term, in dissenting from the denial of certiorari in ACF Industries, Inc. v. EEOC, 439 U.S. 1081 (1979), I had occasion to comment upon the widespread abuse of discovery that has become a prime cause of delay and expense in civil litigation. Id., at 1086-1088. At the 1946 Term, just a few years after adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court stated "that the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). The bar and trial courts understandably responded affirmatively. As the years have passed, discovery techniques and tactics have become a highly developed litigation art - one not infrequently exploited to the disadvantage of justice. As the Court now recognizes, the situation has reached the point where there is serious "concern about undue and uncontrolled discovery." Ante, at 176. 2 In view of the evident attention given discovery by the District Judge in this case, it cannot be said that the process here was "uncontrolled." But it certainly was protracted and undoubtedly was expensive for all concerned. 3 </s> Under present Rules the initial inquiry in enforcement of any discovery request is one of relevance. Whatever standard may be appropriate in other types of cases, when a discovery demand arguably impinges on First Amendment rights a district court should measure the degree of relevance required in light of both the private needs of the parties and the public concerns implicated. On the one hand, as this Court has repeatedly recognized, the solicitude for First Amendment rights evidenced in our opinions reflects concern for the [441 U.S. 153, 180] important public interest in a free flow of news and commentary. See First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 781 -783 (1978); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862 -863 (1974) (POWELL, J., dissenting). On the other hand, there also is a significant public interest in according to civil litigants discovery of such matters as may be genuinely relevant to their lawsuit. Although the process of weighing these interests is hardly an exact science, it is a function customarily carried out by judges in this and other areas of the law. In performing this task, trial judges - despite the heavy burdens most of them carry - are now increasingly recognizing the "pressing need for judicial supervision." AFC Industries, Inc. v. EEOC, supra, at 1087. 4 </s> The Court today emphasizes that the focus must be on relevance, that the injunction of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 1 must be heeded, and that "district courts should not neglect their power to restrict discovery" in the interest of justice or to protect the parties from undue burden or expense. Ante, at 177; see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26 (c). I join the Court's opinion on my understanding that in heeding these admonitions, the district court must ensure that the values protected by the First Amendment, though entitled to no constitutional privilege in a case of this kind, are weighed carefully in striking a proper balance. </s> [Footnote 1 Our decisions in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), and Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973), provide no support for the theory that the prepublication editorial process enjoys a special status under the First Amendment. Rather, those decisions rest on the fundamental principle that the coerced publication of particular views, as much as their suppression, violates the freedom of speech. </s> [Footnote 2 See ABA, Report of Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force, 74 F. R. D. 159, 191-192 (1976); Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint for the Justice System in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F. R. D. 277, 288-290 (1978); Bell, The Pound Conference Follow-Up: A Response from the United States Department of Justice, 76 F. R. D. 320, 328 (1978); Powell, Reforms - Long Overdue, 33 Record of N. Y. C. B. A. 458, 461-463 (1978). </s> [Footnote 3 See ante, at 176 n. 25. </s> [Footnote 4 In some instances, it might be appropriate for the district court to delay enforcing a discovery demand, in the hope that the resolution of issues through summary judgment or other developments in discovery might reduce the need for the material demanded. It is pertinent to note that respondents here had not sought summary judgment on any issue at the time discovery was opposed, and have not argued that discovery should be postponed until other issues on which liability depends are resolved. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting in part. </s> Respondents are representatives of the news media. They are defendants in a libel action brought by petitioner, Lieutenant [441 U.S. 153, 181] Colonel Anthony Herbert (U.S. Army, Ret.), who is concededly a public figure. The Court today rejects respondents' claim that an "editorial privilege" shields from discovery information that would reveal respondents' editorial processes. I agree with the Court that no such privilege insulates factual matters that may be sought during discovery, and that such a privilege should not shield respondents' "mental processes." 568 F.2d 974, 995 (CA2 1977) (Oakes, J.). I would hold, however, that the First Amendment requires predecisional communication among editors to be protected by an editorial privilege, but that this privilege must yield if a public-figure plaintiff is able to demonstrate to the prima facie satisfaction of a trial judge that the publication in question constitutes defamatory falsehood. </s> I </s> The Court of Appeals below stated that "the issue presented by this case is whether, and to what extent, inquiry into the editorial process, conducted during discovery in a New York Times v. Sullivan type libel action, impermissibly burdens the work of reporters and broadcasters." Id., at 979 (Kaufman, C. J.). The court grouped the discovery inquiries objected to by respondents into five categories: </s> "1. Lando's conclusions during his research and investigations regarding people or leads to be pursued, or not to be pursued, in connection with the `60 Minutes' segment and the Atlantic Monthly article; </s> "2. Lando's conclusions about facts imparted by interviewees and his state of mind with respect to the veracity of persons interviewed; </s> "3. The basis for conclusions where Lando testified that he did reach a conclusion concerning the veracity of persons, information or events; </s> "4. Conversations between Lando and Wallace about matter to be included or excluded from the broadcast publication; and [441 U.S. 153, 182] </s> "5. Lando's intentions as manifested by his decision to include or exclude certain material." Id., at 983. </s> The Court of Appeals concluded: </s> "If we were to allow selective disclosure of how a journalist formulated his judgments on what to print or not to print, we would be condoning judicial review of the editor's thought processes. Such an inquiry, which on its face would be virtually boundless, endangers a constitutionally protected realm, and unquestionably puts a freeze on the free interchange of ideas within the newsroom." Id., at 980. </s> The Court of Appeals held that all five categories of information sought by petitioner were shielded by an editorial privilege. </s> The holding of the Court of Appeals presents a novel and difficult question of law. Federal Rule Civ. Proc. 26 (b) (1) provides: "Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) The instant case is brought under diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. 1332 (a), and Fed. Rule Evid. 501 states that "in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness [or] person . . . shall be determined in accordance with State law." Although New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), placed constitutional limits on state libel claims, it did not itself create a federal cause of action for libel. The "rule of decision" in this case, therefore, is defined by state law. There is no contention, however, that applicable state law encompasses an editorial privilege. Thus if we were to create and apply such a privilege, it would have to be constitutionally grounded, as, for example, is executive privilege, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), or the privilege against self-incrimination. See McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924). The existence [441 U.S. 153, 183] of such a privilege has never before been urged before this Court. </s> This case must be approached from the premise that pretrial discovery is normally to be "accorded a broad and liberal treatment," Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947), and that judicial creation of evidentiary privileges is generally to be discouraged. We have in the past, however, recognized evidentiary privileges in order to protect "interests and relationships which . . . are regarded as of sufficient social importance to justify some incidental sacrifice of sources of facts needed in the administration of justice." E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence 152 (2d ed. 1972). For example, Hickman v. Taylor, supra, created a qualified privilege for attorneys' work products in part because, without such a privilege, "[t]he effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing." 329 U.S., at 511 . Similarly, Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957), recognized a qualified "informer's privilege" for "the furtherance and protection of the public interest in effective law enforcement." Id., at 59. </s> The inquiry to be pursued, therefore, is whether the creation of an editorial privilege would so further the purposes and goals of the constitutional scheme as embodied in the First Amendment, as to justify "some incidental sacrifice" of evidentiary material. This inquiry need not reach an inflexible result: The justifications for an editorial privilege may well support only a qualified privilege which, in appropriate instances, must yield to the requirements of "the administration of justice." </s> II </s> Mr. Justice Brandeis reminded us over a half century ago that "[t]hose who won our independence . . . valued liberty both as an end and as a means." 1 Whitney v. California, [441 U.S. 153, 184] 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (concurring opinion). In its instrumental aspect, the First Amendment serves to foster the values of democratic self-government. This is true in several senses. The First Amendment bars the state from imposing upon its citizens an authoritative vision of truth. 2 It prohibits the state from interfering with the communicative processes [441 U.S. 153, 185] through which its citizens exercise and prepare to exercise their rights of self-government. 3 And the Amendment shields those who would censure the state or expose its abuses. 4 </s> [441 U.S. 153, 186] These various senses can sometimes weave together, as can be seen in the letter of 1774 addressed by the First Continental Congress to the inhabitants of Quebec, listing the rights "a profligate [English] Ministry are now striving, by force of arms, to ravish from us": </s> "The last right we shall mention, regards the freedom of the press. The importance of this consists, besides the advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government, its ready communication of thoughts between subjects, and its consequential promotion of union among them, whereby oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated, into more honourable and just modes of conducting affairs." 5 </s> [441 U.S. 153, 187] </s> Although the various senses in which the First Amendment serves democratic values will in different contexts demand distinct emphasis and development, they share the common characteristic of being instrumental to the attainment of social ends. It is a great mistake to understand this aspect of the First Amendment solely through the filter of individual rights. 6 This is the meaning of our cases permitting a litigant to challenge the constitutionality of a statute as overbroad under the First Amendment if the statute "prohibits privileged exercises of First Amendment rights whether or not the record discloses that the petitioner has engaged in privileged conduct." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963). Our reasoning is that First Amendment freedoms "are delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society," id., at 433, and that a litigant should therefore be given standing to assert this more general social interest in the "vindication of freedom of expression." Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965). See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 -98 (1940). It is also the meaning of the "actual malice" standard set forth in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S., at 279 -280. Even though false information may have no intrinsic First Amendment worth, St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968), and even though a particular defendant may have published false information, his freedom of expression is nevertheless protected in the absence of actual malice because, "to insure the ascertainment and publication [441 U.S. 153, 188] of the truth about public affairs, it is essential that the First Amendment protect some erroneous publications as well as true ones." Ibid. 7 </s> In recognition of the social values served by the First Amendment, our decisions have referred to "the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences," Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (emphasis supplied), and to "the circulation of information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional guaranties." Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (emphasis supplied). In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), we stated that the guarantees of the First Amendment "are not for the benefit of the press so much as for the benefit of all of us. A broadly defined freedom of the press assures the maintenance of our political system and an open society." Id., at 389. </s> The editorial privilege claimed by respondents must be carefully analyzed to determine whether its creation would significantly further these social values recognized by our prior decisions. In this analysis it is relevant to note that respondents are representatives of the communications media, and that the "press and broadcast media," Gertz v. Robert [441 U.S. 153, 189] Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974), 8 have played a dominant and essential role in serving the "informative function," Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 705 (1972), protected by the First Amendment. "The press cases emphasize the special and constitutionally recognized role of that institution in informing and educating the public, offering criticism, and providing a forum for discussion and debate." First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 781 (1978). 9 "The newspapers, magazines and other journals of the country, it is safe to say, have shed and continue to shed, more light on the public and business affairs of the nation than any other instrumentality of publicity; and since informed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression or abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free press cannot be regarded otherwise than with grave concern." Grosjean v. American Press Co., supra, at 250. An editorial privilege would thus not be merely personal to respondents, but would shield the press in its function "as an agent of the public at large. . . . The press is the necessary representative of the public's interest in this context and the instrumentality which effects the public's right." Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 -864 (1974) (POWELL, J., dissenting). [441 U.S. 153, 190] </s> III </s> Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), struck down as undue interference with the editorial process a Florida statute granting a political candidate a right to equal space to reply to criticisms of his record by a newspaper. </s> "Even if a newspaper would face no additional costs to comply with a compulsory access law and would not be forced to forgo publication of news or opinion by the inclusion of a reply, the Florida statute fails to clear the barriers of the First Amendment because of its intrusion into the function of editors. A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and advertising. The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials - whether fair or unfair - constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time." Id., at 258. </s> See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 391 (1973); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 120 , 124-125 (1973). Through the editorial process expression is composed; to regulate the process is therefore to regulate the expression. The autonomy of the speaker is thereby compromised, whether that speaker is a large urban newspaper or an individual pamphleteer. The print and broadcast media, however, because of their large organizational structure, cannot exist without some form of editorial process. The protection [441 U.S. 153, 191] of the editorial process of these institutions thus becomes a matter of particular First Amendment concern. 10 </s> There is in this case, however, no direct government regulation of respondents' editorial process. But it is clear that disclosure of the editorial process of the press will increase the likelihood of large damages judgments in libel actions, and will thereby discourage participants in that editorial process. 11 And, as New York Times stated: "What a State may not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel. The fear of damage awards under a rule such as that invoked by the Alabama courts here may be markedly more inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under a criminal statute." 376 U.S., at 277 . Of course New York Times set forth a substantive standard defining that speech unprotected by the First Amendment, and respondents' editorial process cannot be shielded merely so as to block judicial determination of whether respondents have in fact engaged in such speech. As the Court states: "[I]f the claimed inhibition flows from the fear of damages liability for publishing knowing or reckless falsehoods, those effects are precisely what New York Times and [441 U.S. 153, 192] other cases have held to be consistent with the First Amendment." Ante, at 171. Our inquiry, therefore, becomes the independent First Amendment values served by the editorial process and the extent to which exposure of that process would impair these First Amendment values. </s> In Tornillo we defined the editorial process in a functional manner, as that process whereby the content and format of published material is selected. The Court of Appeals below identified two aspects of this process. The first concerns "the mental processes of the press regarding `choice of material' . . . ." 568 F.2d, at 995 (Oakes, J.). This aspect encompasses an editor's subjective "thought processes," his "thoughts, opinions and conclusions." Id., at 980, 984 (Kaufman, C. J.). The Court of Appeals concluded that if discovery were permitted concerning this aspect of the editorial process, journalists "would be chilled in the very process of thought." Id., at 984. </s> I find this conclusion implausible. Since a journalist cannot work without such internal thought processes, the only way this aspect of the editorial process can be chilled is by a journalist ceasing to work altogether. Given the exceedingly generous standards of New York Times, this seems unlikely. Moreover, New York Times removed First Amendment protection from defamatory falsehood published with actual malice - in knowing or reckless disregard of the truth. 12 Subsequent decisions have made clear that actual malice turns on a journalist's "subjective awareness of probable falsity." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S., at 335 n. 6. It would be anomalous to turn substantive liability on a journalist's subjective attitude and at the same time to shield from disclosure the most direct evidence of that attitude. There will be, of [441 U.S. 153, 193] course, journalists at the margin - those who have some awareness of the probable falsity of their work but not enough to constitute actual malice - who might be discouraged from publication. But this chill emanates chiefly from the substantive standard of New York Times, not from the absence of an editorial privilege. </s> The second aspect of the editorial privilege identified by the Court of Appeals involves "the free interchange of ideas within the newsroom," 568 F.2d, at 980 (Kaufman, C. J.), "the relationship among editors." Id., at 993 (Oakes, J.). Judge Oakes concluded that "[i]deas expressed in conversations, memoranda, handwritten notes and the like, if discoverable, would in the future `likely' lead to a more muted, less vigorous and creative give-and-take in the editorial room." Id., at 993-994. Chief Judge Kaufman stated that "[a] reporter or editor, aware that his thoughts might have to be justified in a court of law, would often be discouraged and dissuaded from the creative verbal testing, probing, and discussion of hypotheses and alternatives which are the sine qua non of responsible journalism." Id., at 980. </s> An editorial privilege protecting this aspect of the editorial process would essentially be analogous to the executive privilege which shields the "advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations. . . by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated." Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V. E. B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F. R. D. 318, 324 (DC 1966). As our cases interpreting Exemption 5 of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552 (b) (5), make clear, this privilege would not protect merely "factual" material, but only "deliberative or policymaking processes." EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 89 (1973). The rationale for this privilege was succinctly stated in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S., at 705 : "Human experience teaches that those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking process." [441 U.S. 153, 194] </s> The same rationale applies to respondents' proposed editorial privilege. Just as the possible political consequences of disclosure might undermine predecisional communication within the Executive Branch, see NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 151 (1975), so the possibility of future libel judgments might well dampen full and candid discussion among editors of proposed publications. Just as impaired communication "clearly" affects "the quality" of executive decisionmaking, ibid., so too muted discussion during the editorial process will affect the quality of resulting publications. Those editors who have doubts might remain silent; those who would prefer to follow other investigative leads might be restrained; those who would otherwise counsel caution might hold their tongues. In short, in the absence of such an editorial privilege the accuracy, thoroughness, and profundity of consequent publications might well be diminished. </s> Such a diminution would affect First Amendment values. The Amendment embraces the public's interest in "accurate and effective reporting by the news media." Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S., at 863 (POWELL, J., dissenting). "Those who won our independence had confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning and communication of ideas to discover and spread political and economic truth. . . . Abridgment of freedom of speech and of the press . . . impairs those opportunities for public education that are essential to effective exercise of the power of correcting error through the processes of popular government." 13 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940). Petitioner is concededly a public figure; "[o]ur citizenry has a legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of such persons, and freedom of the press to engage in uninhibited debate about their involvement in public issues and events is as crucial as it is in the case of [441 U.S. 153, 195] `public officials.'" Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C. J., concurring in result). To the extent coverage of such figures becomes fearful and inhibited, to the extent the accuracy, effectiveness, and thoroughness of such coverage is undermined, the social values protected by the First Amendment suffer abridgment. </s> I find compelling these justifications for the existence of an editorial privilege. The values at issue are sufficiently important to justify some incidental sacrifice of evidentiary material. 14 The Court today concedes the accuracy of the underlying rationale for such a privilege, stating that "[w]e do not doubt the direct relationship between consultation and discussion on the one hand and sound decisions on the other . . . ." Ante, at 173. The Court, however, contents itself with the curious observation that "given exposure to liability when there is knowing or reckless error, there is even more reason to resort to prepublication precautions, such as a frank interchange of fact and opinion." Ante, at 174. Because [441 U.S. 153, 196] such "prepublication precautions" will often prove to be extraordinarily damaging evidence in libel actions, I cannot so blithely assume such "precautions" will be instituted, or that such "frank interchange" as now exists is not impaired by its potential exposure in such actions. </s> I fully concede that my reasoning is essentially paradoxical. For the sake of more accurate information, an editorial privilege would shield from disclosure the possible inaccuracies of the press; in the name of a more responsible press, the privilege would make more difficult of application the legal restraints by which the press is bound. The same paradox, however, inheres in the concept of an executive privilege: so as to enable the government more effectively to implement the will of the people, the people are kept in ignorance of the workings of their government. The paradox is unfortunately intrinsic to our social condition. Judgment is required to evaluate and balance these competing perspectives. </s> Judgment is also required to accommodate the tension between society's "pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation," Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966), and the First Amendment values that would be served by an editorial privilege. In my view this tension is too fine to be resolved in the abstract. As is the case with executive privilege, there must be a more specific balancing of the particular interests asserted in a given lawsuit. A general claim of executive privilege, for example, will not stand against a "demonstrated, specific need for evidence . . . ." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S., at 713 . Conversely, a general statement of need will not prevail over a concrete demonstration of the necessity for executive secrecy. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953). Other evidentiary privileges are similarly dependent upon the particular exigencies demonstrated in a specific lawsuit. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957), for example, held that the existence of an informer's privilege depends [441 U.S. 153, 197] "on the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer's testimony, and other relevant factors." Id., at 62. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), similarly required ad hoc balancing to determine the existence of an attorneys' work-product privilege. The procedures whereby this balancing is achieved, so far from constituting mere "formalism," ante, at 175 n. 23, are in fact the means through which courts have traditionally resolved conflicts between competing social and individual interests. </s> In my judgment, the existence of a privilege protecting the editorial process must, in an analogous manner, be determined with reference to the circumstances of a particular case. In the area of libel, the balance struck by New York Times between the values of the First Amendment and society's interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation must be preserved. This can best be accomplished if the privilege functions to shield the editorial process from general claims of damaged reputation. If, however, a public-figure plaintiff is able to establish, to the prima facie satisfaction of a trial judge, that the publication at issue constitutes defamatory falsehood, 15 the claim of damaged reputation becomes specific and demonstrable, and the editorial privilege must yield. 16 Contrary to the suggestion of the Court, an editorial privilege so understood would not create "a substantial interference with the ability of a defamation plaintiff to establish the ingredients of malice as required by New York Times." Ante, at 170. Requiring a public-figure plaintiff to make a [441 U.S. 153, 198] prima facie showing of defamatory falsehood will not constitute an undue burden, since he must eventually demonstrate these elements as part of his case in chief. 17 And since editorial privilege protects only deliberative and policymaking processes and not factual material, discovery should be adequate to acquire the relevant evidence of falsehood. A public-figure plaintiff will thus be able to redress attacks on his reputation, and at the same time the editorial process will be protected in all but the most necessary cases. </s> IV </s> Applying these principles to the instant case is most difficult, since the five categories of objectionable discovery inquiries formulated by the Court of Appeals are general, and it is impossible to determine what specific questions are encompassed within each category. It would nevertheless appear that four of the five categories concern respondents' mental processes, and thus would not be covered by an editorial privilege. Only the fourth category - "Conversations between Lando and Wallace about matter to be included or excluded from the broadcast publication" - would seem to be protected by a proper editorial privilege. The Court of Appeals noted, however, that respondents had already made available to petitioner in discovery "the contents of pretelecast conversations between Lando and Wallace . . . ." 568 F.2d, at 982 (Kaufman, C. J.). Whether this constitutes waiver of the editorial privilege should be determined in the first instance by the District Court. I would therefore, like the Court of Appeals, remand this case to the District Court, but would require the District Court to determine (a) whether respondents have waived their editorial privilege; (b) if not, whether petitioner Herbert can overcome the privilege through [441 U.S. 153, 199] a prima facie showing of defamatory falsehood; and (c) if not, the proper scope and application of the privilege. </s> [Footnote 1 Freedom of speech is itself an end because the human community is in large measure defined through speech; freedom of speech is therefore intrinsic to individual dignity. This is particularly so in a democracy [441 U.S. 153, 184] like our own, in which the autonomy of each individual is accorded equal and incommensurate respect. As the Court stated in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971): </s> "The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests." </s> Respondents properly do not rest their arguments for an editorial privilege on the value of individual self-expression. So grounded, an editorial privilege might not stop short of shielding all speech. </s> [Footnote 2 As Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr., stated in 1946: </s> "The First Amendment protects . . . a social interest in the attainment of truth, so that the country may not only adopt the wisest course of action but carry it out in the wisest way. . . . Truth can be sifted out from falsehood only if the government is vigorously and constantly cross-examined . . . ." Free Speech in the United States 33. </s> Mr. Justice Holmes gave this social value a broader and more theoretical formulation: </s> "Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. . . . But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. . . . While that experiment is part of our system I think that we should be [441 U.S. 153, 185] eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country." Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (dissenting opinion). </s> See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). </s> [Footnote 3 "Just so far as, at any point, the citizens who are to decide an issue are denied acquaintance with information or opinion or doubt or disbelief or criticism which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result must be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the general good. It is that mutilation of the thinking process of the community against which the First Amendment to the Constitution is directed. The principle of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the program of self-government. It is not a Law of Nature or of Reason in the abstract. It is a deduction from the basic American agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal suffrage." A. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People 27 (1965). </s> See Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976); Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1965). </s> [Footnote 4 See Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 Am. Bar Found. Research J. 521. Lord Erskine, while defending Thomas Paine in his trial for seditious libel, offered a compact and eloquent statement of this position: </s> "Gentlemen, I have insisted, at great length, upon the origin of governments, and detailed the authorities which you have heard upon the subject, because I consider it to be not only an essential support, but the very foundation of the liberty of the press. If Mr. Burke be right in his principles of government, I admit that the press, in my sense of its freedom, ought not to be free, nor free in any sense at all; and that all addresses to the people upon the subjects of government, and all speculations of amendment, of what kind or nature soever, are illegal and criminal; since if the people have, with out possible re-call, delegated all their authorities, they have no jurisdiction to act, and therefore none to think or write upon such subjects; and it would be a libel to arraign [441 U.S. 153, 186] government or any of its acts, before those who have no jurisdiction to correct them. But on the other hand . . . no legal argument can shake the freedom of the press in my sense of it, if I am supported in my doctrines concerning the great unalienable right of the people, to reform or to change their governments. It is because the liberty of the press resolves itself into this great issue, that it has been in every country the last liberty which subjects have been able to wrest from power. Other liberties are held under governments, but the liberty of opinion keeps governments themselves in due subjection to their duties." 1 Speeches of Lord Erskine 524-525 (J. High ed. 1876). </s> This position is often predicated upon a natural adversity between the government and the press. See A. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 80-88 (1975). In Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966), for example, we stated: </s> "[T]he press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping officials elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve. Suppression of the right of the press to praise or criticize governmental agents and to clamor and contend for or against change . . . muzzles one of the very agencies the Framers of our Constitution thoughtfully and deliberately selected to improve our society and keep it free." </s> [Footnote 5 1 Journals of the Continental Congress 108 (1774) (W. Ford ed. 1904). </s> [Footnote 6 "[I]t is useless to define free speech by talk about rights. The agitator asserts his constitutional right to speak, the government asserts its constitutional right to wage war. The result is a deadlock. </s> . . . . . </s> "The true boundary line of the First Amendment can be fixed only when Congress and the courts realize that the principle on which speech is classified as lawful or unlawful involves the balancing against each other of two very important social interests, in public safety and in the search for truth." Chafee, supra n. 2, at 31, 35. </s> [Footnote 7 In an analogous manner the Court has, over my strong protest, analyzed the exclusionary rule as permitting a defendant to assert social interests that do not reduce to his personal rights: </s> "The primary justification for the exclusionary rule then is the deterrence of police conduct that violates Fourth Amendment rights. Post-Mapp decisions have established that the rule is not a personal constitutional right. It is not calculated to redress the injury to the privacy of the victim of the search or seizure, for any `[r]eparation comes too late.' Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965). Instead, "`the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect . . . .' United States v. Calandra, [414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)]." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976). </s> [Footnote 8 Compare New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282 (1964): </s> "In Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 , this Court held the utterance of a federal official to be absolutely privileged if made `within the outer perimeter' of his duties. . . . Analogous considerations support the privilege for the citizen-critic of government. It is as much his duty to criticize as it is the official's duty to administer." (Emphasis supplied.) </s> [Footnote 9 Of course, "the press does not have a monopoly on either the First Amendment or the ability to enlighten." First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S., at 782 . "The informative function asserted by representatives of the organized press . . . is also performed by lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists. Almost any author may quite accurately assert that he is contributing to the flow of information to the public . . . ." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S., at 705 . </s> [Footnote 10 This is not, of course, to imply that the editorial process of persons or institutions other than the communications media does not merit First Amendment protection. </s> [Footnote 11 The editorial process could be inhibited in other ways as well. For example, public figures might bring harassment suits against the media in order to use discovery to uncover aspects of the editorial process which, if publicly revealed, would prove embarrassing to the press. In different contexts other First Amendment values might be affected. If sued by a powerful political figure, for example, journalists might fear reprisals for information disclosed during discovery. Cf. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 192 U.S. App. D.C. 376, 593 F.2d 1030 (1978). Such a chilling effect might particularly impact on the press' ability to perform its "checking" function. See n. 4, supra. In the instant case, however, petitioner is not such a public official, nor are respondents claiming to be suffering the effects of such a chill. </s> [Footnote 12 Elements of petitioner's complaint appear to set forth a claim for invasion of privacy. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). The case has come to this Court framed as a libel action, however, and I shall so consider it. </s> [Footnote 13 Were the plaintiff in this case a public official intent upon using discovery to intimidate the press, other First Amendment values might well be implicated. See n. 11, supra. </s> [Footnote 14 My Brother POWELL writes separately to emphasize that district courts must carefully weigh "the values protected by the First Amendment" in determining the relevance of discovery requests. Ante, at 180. At the same time, however, he concludes that there should not be an evidentiary privilege which protects the editorial process because "whatever protection the `exercise of editorial judgment' enjoys depends entirely on the protection the First Amendment accords the product of this judgment, namely, published speech," ante, at 178, and because an editorial privilege "is unnecessary to safeguard published speech." Ibid. I assume my Brother POWELL means by this that the exposure of predecisional editorial discussions will not meaningfully affect the nature of subsequent publications. But if this is true, I have difficulty understanding exactly what First Amendment values my Brother POWELL expects district courts to place in the balance. He may be suggesting that First Amendment values are impaired merely by requiring media defendants to respond to discovery requests like any other litigant. But even if district courts were to apply stricter standards of relevance in cases involving media defendants, the burden of pretrial discovery would be only marginally decreased, and it does not seem justified to assume that this result would meaningfully affect the nature of subsequent publications. </s> [Footnote 15 See Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970). </s> [Footnote 16 I do not reach the case in which a media defendant has more specific and concrete interests at stake. See nn. 11 and 13, supra. Nor do I reach the case in which a litigant with more weighty interests than a civil plaintiff attempts to overcome a claim of editorial privilege. See, e. g., Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). </s> [Footnote 17 A plaintiff can make his prima facie showing as part of his motion for an order compelling discovery under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 37, or at any other appropriate time. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART, dissenting. </s> It seems to me that both the Court of Appeals and this Court have addressed a question that is not presented by the case before us. As I understand the constitutional rule of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 , inquiry into the broad "editorial process" is simply not relevant in a libel suit brought by a public figure against a publisher. And if such an inquiry is not relevant, it is not permissible. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26 (b). </s> Although I joined the Court's opinion in New York Times, I have come greatly to regret the use in that opinion of the phrase "actual malice." For the fact of the matter is that "malice" as used in the New York Times opinion simply does not mean malice as that word is commonly understood. In common understanding, malice means ill will or hostility, 1 and the most relevant question in determining whether a person's action was motivated by actual malice is to ask "why." As part of the constitutional standard enunciated in the New York Times case, however, "actual malice" has nothing to do with hostility or ill will, and the question "why" is totally irrelevant. </s> Under the constitutional restrictions imposed by New York Times and its progeny, a plaintiff who is a public official or public figure can recover from a publisher for a defamatory statement upon convincingly clear proof of the following elements: </s> (1) the statement was published by the defendant, </s> (2) the statement defamed the plaintiff, </s> (3) the defamation was untrue, and </s> (4) the defendant knew the defamatory statement was untrue, or published it in reckless disregard of its truth or [441 U.S. 153, 200] falsity. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (plurality opinion); Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 ; Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 ; Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 ; Greenbelt Coop. Pub. Assn. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 ; St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 ; Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 ; Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 ; Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 ; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra. Cf. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 ; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 ; Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 ; Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 ; Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 . </s> The gravamen of such a lawsuit thus concerns that which was in fact published. What was not published has nothing to do with the case. And liability ultimately depends upon the publisher's state of knowledge of the falsity of what he published, not at all upon his motivation in publishing it - not at all, in other words, upon actual malice as those words are ordinarily understood. </s> This is not the first time that judges and lawyers have been led astray by the phrase "actual malice" in the New York Times opinion. In Greenbelt Coop. Pub. Assn. v. Bresler, supra, another defamation suit brought by a public figure against a publisher, the trial judge instructed the jury that the plaintiff could recover if the defendant's publication had been made with malice, and that malice means "spite, hostility, or deliberate intention to harm." In reversing the judgment for the plaintiff, we said that this jury instruction constituted "error of constitutional magnitude." 398 U.S., at 10 . Cf. Letter Carriers v. Austin, supra, at 281; Rosenblatt v. Baer, supra, at 83-84. </s> In the present case, of course, neither the Court of Appeals nor this Court has overtly committed the egregious error manifested in Bresler. Both courts have carefully enunciated the correct New York Times test. See 568 F.2d 974, 985 [441 U.S. 153, 201] (opinion of Oakes, J.), and ante, at 156-157. But each has then followed a false trail, explainable only by an unstated misapprehension of the meaning of New York Times "actual malice," to arrive at the issue of "editorial process" privilege. This misapprehension is reflected by numerous phrases in the prevailing Court of Appeals opinions: "a journalist's exercise of editorial control and judgment," "how a journalist formulated his judgments," "the editorial selection process of the press," "the heart of the editorial process," "reasons for the inclusion or exclusion of certain material." See 568 F.2d 974, passim. Similar misapprehension is reflected in this Court's opinion by such phrases as "improper motive," "intent or purpose with which the publication was made," "ill will," and by lengthy footnote discussion about the spite or hostility required to constitute malice at common law. See ante, at 162 and 164. </s> Once our correct bearings are taken, however, and it is firmly recognized that a publisher's motivation in a case such as this is irrelevant, there is clearly no occasion for inquiry into the editorial process as conceptualized in this case. I shall not burden this opinion with a list of the 84 discovery questions at issue. 2 Suffice it to say that few if any of them [441 U.S. 153, 202] seem to me to come within even the most liberal construction of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26 (b). 3 </s> By the time this case went to the Court of Appeals, the deposition of the respondent Lando alone had lasted intermittently for over a year and had filled 2,903 pages of transcript, with an additional 240 exhibits. The plaintiff had, in Chief Judge Kaufman's words, "already discovered what Lando knew, saw, said and wrote during his investigation." 568 F.2d, at 984. That, it seems to me, was already more than sufficient. </s> In a system of federal procedure whose prime goal is "the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action," 4 time-consuming and expensive pretrial discovery is burdensome enough, even when within the arguable bounds of Rule 26 (b). But totally irrelevant pretrial discovery is intolerable. </s> Like the Court of Appeals, I would remand this case to the District Court, but with directions to measure each of the proposed questions strictly against the constitutional criteria of New York Times and its progeny. Only then can it be determined whether invasion of the editorial process is truly threatened. </s> [Footnote 1 See Webster's New International Dictionary 1367 (2d ed. 1961). </s> [Footnote 2 The following are some random samples: </s> "Did you ever come to a conclusion that it was unnecessary to talk to Capt. Laurence Potter prior to the presentation of the program on February 4th?" </s> "Did you come to the conclusion that you did not want to have a filmed interview with Sgt. Carmon for the program?" </s> "When you prepared the final draft of the program to be aired, did you form any conclusion as to whether one of the matters presented by that program was Col. Herbert's view of the treatment of the Vietnamese?" </s> "Do you have any recollection of discussing with anybody at CBS whether that sequence should be excluded from the program as broadcast?" </s> "Prior to the publication of the Atlantic Monthly article, Mr. Lando, did you discuss that article or the preparation of that article with any representative of CBS?" </s> [Footnote 3 Rule 26 (b) (1) provides in relevant part: </s> "Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . . It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." </s> [Footnote 4 Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 1. </s> MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting. </s> Although professing to maintain the accommodation of interests struck in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Court today is unresponsive to the constitutional considerations underlying that opinion. Because I believe that some constraints on pretrial discovery are essential to ensure the "uninhibited [and] robust" debate on public [441 U.S. 153, 203] issues which Sullivan contemplated, id., at 270, I respectfully dissent. </s> I </s> At issue in this case are competing interests of familiar dimension. States undeniably have an interest in affording individuals some measure of protection from unwarranted defamatory attacks. Libel actions serve that end, not only by assuring a forum in which reputations can be publicly vindicated and dignitary injuries compensated, but also by creating incentives for the press to exercise considered judgment before publishing material that compromises personal integrity. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 -342 (1974); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966). </s> Against these objectives must be balanced society's interest in promoting unfettered debate on matters of public importance. As this Court recognized in Sullivan, error is inevitable in such debate, and, if forced to guarantee the truth of all assertions, potential critics might suppress statements believed to be accurate "because of doubt whether [truthfulness] can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so." 376 U.S., at 279 . Such self-censorship would be incompatible with the tenets on which the First Amendment and our democratic institutions are founded. Under a representative system of government, and informed electorate is a precondition of responsive decisionmaking. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936); A. Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government 88-89 (1948). To secure public exposure to the widest possible range of information and insights, some margin of error must be tolerated. Thus, absent knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, the press is shielded from liability for defamatory statements regarding public figures. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra. [441 U.S. 153, 204] </s> Yet this standard of liability cannot of itself accomplish the ends for which it was conceived. Insulating the press from ultimate liability is unlikely to avert self-censorship so long as any plaintiff with a deep pocket and a facially sufficient complaint is afforded unconstrained discovery of the editorial process. If the substantive balance of interests struck in Sullivan is to remain viable, it must be reassessed in light of the procedural realities under which libel actions are conducted. </s> II </s> The potential for abuse of liberal discovery procedures is of particular concern in the defamation context. As members of the bench and bar have increasingly noted, rules designed to facilitate expeditious resolution of civil disputes have too often proved tools for harassment and delay. 1 Capitalizing on this Court's broad mandate in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947), reaffirmed in Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 114 -115 (1964), that discovery rules be accorded a "broad and liberal" scope, litigants have on occasion transformed Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26 devices into tactics of attrition. The possibility of such abuse is enhanced in libel litigation, for many self-perceived victims of defamation are animated by something more than a rational calculus of their chances of recovery. 2 Given the circumstances under which [441 U.S. 153, 205] libel actions arise, plaintiffs' pretrial maneuvers may be fashioned more with an eye to deterrence or retaliation than to unearthing germane material. </s> Not only is the risk of in terrorem discovery particularly pronounced in the defamation context, but the societal consequences attending such abuse are of special magnitude. Rather than submit to the intrusiveness and expense of protracted discovery, even editors confident of their ability to prevail at trial or on a motion for summary judgment may find it prudent to "`steer far wid[e] of the unlawful zone' thereby keeping protected discussion from public cognizance." Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 53 (1971) (plurality opinion; citation omitted). Faced with the prospect of escalating attorney's fees, diversion of time from journalistic endeavors, and exposure of potentially sensitive information, editors may well make publication judgments that reflect less the risk of liability than the expense of vindication. 3 </s> Although acknowledging a problem of discovery abuse, the Court suggests that the remedy lies elsewhere, in "major changes in the present Rules of Civil Procedure." Ante, at 177. And somewhat inconsistently, the Court asserts further that district judges already have "in fact and in law . . . ample powers . . . to prevent abuse." Ibid. I cannot agree. Where First Amendment rights are critically implicated, it is incumbent on this Court to safeguard their effective exercise. By leaving the directives of Hickman and Schlagenhauf unqualified with respect to libel litigation, the Court has abdicated that responsibility. 4 </s> [441 U.S. 153, 206] </s> In my judgment, the same constitutional concerns that impelled us in Sullivan to confine the circumstances under which defamation liability could attach also mandate some constraints on roving discovery. I would hold that the broad discovery principles enunciated in Hickman and Schlagenhauf are inapposite in defamation cases. More specifically, I would require that district courts superintend pretrial disclosure in such litigation so as to protect the press from unnecessarily protracted or tangential inquiry. To that end, discovery requests should be measured against a strict standard of relevance. Further, because the threat of disclosure may intrude with special force on certain aspects of the editorial process, I believe some additional protection in the form of an evidentiary privilege is warranted. </s> III </s> The Court of Appeals extended a privilege subsuming essentially two kinds of discovery requests. The first included questions concerning the state of mind of an individual journalist, principally his conclusions and bases for conclusions as to the accuracy of information compiled during investigation. The second encompassed communications between journalists about matter to be included in the broadcast. 568 F.2d 974, 978 (CA2 1977). Reasoning that discovery of both forms of material would be intrusive, that the intrusion would be inhibiting, and that such inhibition would be inconsistent with [441 U.S. 153, 207] the editorial autonomy recognized in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), and Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973), the Court of Appeals concluded that a privilege from disclosure was essential. 568 F.2d, at 975. </s> With respect to state-of-mind inquiry, that syllogism cannot withstand analysis. For although discovery may well be intrusive, it is unclear how journalists faced with the possibility of such questions can be "chilled in the very process of thought." Id., at 984. Regardless of whether strictures are placed on discovery, reporters and editors must continue to think, and to form opinions and conclusions about the veracity of their sources and the accuracy of their information. At best, it can be argued only that failure to insulate the press from this form of disclosure will inhibit not the editing process but the final product - that the specter of questions concerning opinion and belief will induce journalists to refrain from publishing material thought to be accurate. But as my Brother BRENNAN notes, ante, at 192-193, this inhibition would emanate principally from Sullivan's substantive standard, not from the incremental effect of such discovery. So long as Sullivan makes state of mind dispositive, some inquiry as to the manner in which editorial decisions are made is inevitable. And it is simply implausible to suppose that asking a reporter why certain material was or was not included in a given publication will be more likely to stifle incisive journalism than compelling disclosure of other objective evidence regarding that decision. 5 </s> [441 U.S. 153, 208] </s> I do not mean to suggest, as did the District Court here, that Tornillo and Columbia Broadcasting have "nothing to do" with this case. 73 F. R. D. 387, 396 (SDNY 1977). To the contrary, the values of editorial autonomy given recognition in those decisions should inform district courts as they monitor the discovery phase of defamation cases. But assuming that a trial judge has discharged his obligation to prevent unduly protracted or inessential disclosure, see supra, at 206, I am unpersuaded that the impact of state-of-mind inquiry will of itself threaten journalistic endeavor beyond the threshold contemplated by Sullivan. </s> External evidence of editorial decisionmaking, however, stands on a different footing. For here the concern is not simply that the ultimate product may be inhibited, but that the process itself will be chilled. Journalists cannot stop forming tentative hypotheses, but they can cease articulating them openly. If prepublication dialogue is freely discoverable, editors and reporters may well prove reluctant to air their [441 U.S. 153, 209] reservations or to explore other means of presenting information and comment. The threat of unchecked discovery may well stifle the collegial discussion essential to sound editorial dynamics. As we recognized in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974): "[T]hose who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances . . . to the detriment of the decisionmaking process." (Footnote omitted.) Cf. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 151 (1975). Society's interest in enhancing the accuracy of coverage of public events is ill-served by procedures tending to muffle expression of uncertainty. To preserve a climate of free interchange among journalists, the confidentiality of their conversation must be guaranteed. </s> It is not enough, I believe, to accord a discovery privilege that would yield before any plaintiff who can make a prima facie showing of falsity. See ante, at 197-198 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). Unless a journalist knows with some certitude that his misgivings will enjoy protection, they may remain unexpressed. See 568 F.2d, at 994 (Oakes, J., concurring). If full disclosure is available whenever a plaintiff can establish that the press erred in some particular, editorial communication would not be demonstrably less inhibited than under the Court's approach. And by hypothesis, it is precisely those instances in which the risk of error is significant that frank discussion is most valuable. </s> Accordingly, I would foreclose discovery in defamation cases as to the substance of editorial conversation. 6 Shielding [441 U.S. 153, 210] this limited category of evidence from disclosure would be unlikely to preclude recovery by plaintiffs with valid defamation claims. For there are a variety of other means to establish deliberate or reckless disregard for the truth, such as absence of verification, inherent implausibility, obvious reasons to doubt the veracity or accuracy of information, and concessions or inconsistent statements by the defendant. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968). To the extent that such a limited privilege might deny recovery in some marginal cases, it is, in my view, an acceptable price to pay for preserving a climate conducive to considered editorial judgment. </s> I would therefore direct the Court of Appeals to remand this case to the District Court for determination first, whether the questions concerning Lando's state of mind satisfy the criteria set forth in Part II of this opinion, and second, whether respondents waived the privilege defined in Part III for prepublication discussions. </s> [Footnote 1 See Bell, The Pound Conference Follow-up: A Response from the United States Department of Justice, 76 F. R. D. 320, 328-329 (1978); Erikson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint for the Justice System in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F. R. D. 277, 288-290 (1978); Lasker, The Court Crunch: A View from the Bench, 76 F. R. D. 245, 252 (1978); A. B. A. Litigation Section, Report of the Special Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse (Oct. 1977); Stanley, President's Page, 62 A. B. A. J. 1375 (1976); Burger, Agenda for 2000 A. D. - A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 70 F. R. D. 83, 95-96 (1976); 4 J. Moore, Federal Practice § 26.02 3. (2d ed. 1976). </s> [Footnote 2 See Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 Texas L. Rev. 422, 435 (1975). </s> [Footnote 3 As the facts of the instant case illustrate, that expense can be considerable. The deposition of Lando alone consumed 26 days and close to 3,000 pages of transcript. See 568 F.2d 974, 982 (CA2 1977). </s> [Footnote 4 Although the separate opinions of my Brothers POWELL and STEWART display greater solicitude for First Amendment values than does the opinion for the Court, I believe that they too elide the critical issue presented by this case. Under the "broad and liberal" standard of Hickman, surely [441 U.S. 153, 206] disclosure of what was known to a journalist but "was not published," ante, at 200 (opinion of STEWART, J.), will often be germane to whether that individual proceeded with deliberate or reckless disregard for the truth. And admonishing district courts to monitor discovery in the "interest of justice," ante, at 180 (opinion of POWELL, J.) or to prevent "undue burden or expense," ibid., adds little to the guidance already afforded by Rule 26 and cannot adequately mitigate the burdens on the press so long as Hickman's directive remains in force. Moreover, neither opinion is directly responsive to the effect of discovery on editorial discussion. See infra, at 208-209. </s> [Footnote 5 Respondents in this case produced a considerable amount of evidence regarding preparation of the broadcast: </s> "Lando answered innumerable questions about what he knew, or had seen; whom he interviewed; intimate details of his discussions with interviewees; and the form and frequency of his communications with sources. The exhibits produced included transcripts of his interviews; volumes of reporters notes; videotapes of interviews; and a series of drafts of the `60 [441 U.S. 153, 208] Minutes' telecast. Herbert also discovered the contents of pre-telecast conversations between Lando and Wallace as well as reactions to documents considered by both." 568 F.2d, at 982 (footnote omitted). </s> As an abstract proposition, it is not self-evident why disclosure of this material, for which no privilege was sought, would be less likely to inhibit the final publication than state-of-mind inquiries, which in most cases would presumably elicit self-serving responses. Indeed, as the Court acknowledges, plaintiffs may "rarely be successful in proving awareness of falsehood from the mouth of the defendant himself." Ante, at 170. </s> Thus, I seriously doubt that state-of-mind questions will substantially "increase the likelihood of large damages judgments in libel actions." Ante, at 191 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). But neither can it be disputed that such questions might on occasion generate answers useful to plaintiffs in defamation suits. See, e. g., Davis v. Schuchat, 166 U.S. App. D.C. 351, 355-356, 510 F.2d 731, 735-736 (1975); Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 334-335 (CA2 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970); Varnish v. Best Medium Publishing Co., 405 F.2d 608, 612 (CA2 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987 (1969). </s> [Footnote 6 Contrary to the Court's intimation, ante, at 165, 169-170, this would not be the first instance in which protection apart from the Sullivan malice standard has been extended to safeguard the constitutional interests implicated in libel suits. For example, lower courts have displayed sensitivity to First Amendment values in assessing motions to compel disclosure of confidential sources, see Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 992-994 (CA8 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973), and motions by defendants for summary judgment. See Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 125 U.S. [441 U.S. 153, 210] App. D.C. 32, 34-35, 365 F.2d 965, 967-968 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967). </s> Different considerations would, of course, obtain if a privilege for editorial communications were sought in conjunction with criminal proceedings. Cf. New York Times Co. v. Jascalevich, 439 U.S. 1331 (1978) (MARSHALL, J., in chambers); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 712 -713 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); id., at 741-743 (STEWART, J., dissenting). </s> [441 U.S. 153, 211]

United States Supreme Court OHIO CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N v. DAYTON SCHOOLS(1986) No. 85-488 Argued: March 26, 1986Decided: June 27, 1986 </s> Appellee Dayton Christian Schools, Inc. (Dayton), a private nonprofit corporation that provides elementary and secondary education, requires that its teachers subscribe to a particular set of religious beliefs, including belief in the internal resolution of disputes through the "Biblical chain of command." As a contractual condition of employment, teachers must agree to present any grievance to their immediate supervisor and to acquiesce in the final authority of Dayton's board of directors, rather than to pursue a remedy in civil court. After a pregnant teacher was told that her employment contract would not be renewed because of Dayton's religious doctrine that mothers should stay home with their preschool age children, she contacted an attorney, who threatened Dayton with litigation under state and federal sex discrimination laws if it did not agree to rehire the teacher for the coming school year. Dayton then rescinded its nonrenewal decision, but terminated the teacher because of her violation of the internal dispute resolution doctrine. The teacher then filed a charge with appellant Ohio Civil Rights Commission, alleging that under Ohio statutes Dayton's original nonrenewal decision constituted unlawful sex discrimination and its termination decision unlawfully penalized her for asserting her rights. Ultimately, the Commission initiated administrative proceedings against Dayton, which answered the complaint by asserting that the First Amendment prevented the Commission from exercising jurisdiction over it since its actions had been taken pursuant to sincerely held religious beliefs. While the administrative proceedings were pending, Dayton and others (also appellees here) filed this action in Federal District Court, seeking an injunction against the state administrative proceedings on the ground that any investigation of Dayton's hiring process or any imposition of sanctions for its nonrenewal or termination decisions would violate the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. Without addressing the Commission's argument that the court should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction, the District Court refused to issue an injunction, holding, inter alia, that the Commission's proposed action would not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Commission's exercise of jurisdiction would violate both [477 U.S. 619, 620] the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. </s> Held: </s> 1. This Court has appellate jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. 1254(2), which authorizes review of a court of appeals' decision holding a state statute unconstitutional as applied to the facts of the case. Here, the Court of Appeals expressly held that the Ohio statutory provisions relied on by the teacher, as applied to authorize the administrative proceedings, were repugnant to the Religion Clauses. P. 625. </s> 2. The District Court should have abstained from adjudicating this case under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 , and its progeny. Younger, which held that a federal court should not enjoin a pending state criminal proceeding except when necessary to prevent great and immediate irreparable injury, was based on concerns for comity and federalism. Such concerns are equally applicable to other types of state proceedings, including state administrative proceedings, judicial in nature, in which important state interests are vindicated, so long as in the course of those proceedings the federal plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to litigate his constitutional claim. The elimination of prohibited sex discrimination is a sufficiently important state interest to bring the present case within the ambit of the Younger doctrine, and there is no reason to doubt that Dayton will receive an adequate opportunity to raise its constitutional claims. Even assuming that Ohio law is such that the Commission may not consider the constitutionality of the statute under which it operates, it is sufficient that under Ohio law constitutional claims may be raised in state-court judicial review of the administrative proceedings. Pp. 625-629. </s> 766 F.2d 932, reversed and remanded. </s> REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and WHITE, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 629. </s> Kathleen McManus argued the cause for appellants. With her on the briefs were Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Attorney General of Ohio, and Helen M. Ninos, Assistant Attorney General. [477 U.S. 619, 621] </s> William Bentley Ball argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Philip J. Murren, Sandra E. Wise, and Bruce E. Pence. * </s> [Footnote * Joan E. Bertin, George Kannar, Charles S. Sims, Isabelle Katz Pinzler, and Burt Neuborne filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Jewish Committee et al. by Kimberlee Wood Colby, Samuel E. Ericsson, Michael J. Woodruff, Samuel Rabinove, and Richard T. Foltin; for Americans United for Separation of Church and State by Lee Boothby and Robert A. Yingst; for the Associated Christian Conciliation Services by John D. Robb; for the Catholic Conference of Ohio by David J. Young; for Concerned Women of America by Diane E. White, Joy R. Powell, and Jordan W. Lorence; for the Council on Religious Freedom by Lee Boothby and Rolland Truman; for the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists by Walter E. Carson and Warren L. Johns; for the Gulf & Great Plains Legal Foundation by Jerald L. Hill and Mark J. Bredemeier; for the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs ("COLPA") by Daniel D. Chazin, Nathan Lewin, and Dennis Rapps; for the Rutherford Institute et al. by W. Charles Bundren, Guy O. Farley, Jr., John W. Whitehead, D. Kevin Ikenberry, Thomas O. Kotouc, Alfred Lindh, William B. Hollberg, and Wendell R. Bird; and for the United States Catholic Conference by Wilfred R. Caron and Mark E. Chopko. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American Jewish Congress by Marc D. Stern and Ronald A. Krauss; and for the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights et al. by Steven Frederick McDowell. </s> JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Appellee Dayton Christian Schools, Inc. (Dayton), and various individuals brought an action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking to enjoin a pending state administrative proceeding brought against Dayton by appellant Ohio Civil Rights Commission (Commission). Dayton asserted that the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment prohibited the Commission from exercising jurisdiction over it or from punishing it for engaging in employment discrimination. The District Court refused to [477 U.S. 619, 622] issue the injunction on grounds that any conflict between the First Amendment and the administrative proceedings was not yet ripe, and that in any case the proposed action of the Commission violated neither the Free Exercise Clause nor the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the exercise of jurisdiction and the enforcement of the statute would impermissibly burden appellees' rights under the Free Exercise Clause and would result in excessive entanglement under the Establishment Clause. We postponed the question of jurisdiction pending consideration of the merits. 474 U.S. 978 (1985). We now conclude that we have jurisdiction, and we reverse, holding that the District Court should have abstained under our cases beginning with Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). </s> Dayton is a private nonprofit corporation that provides education at both the elementary and secondary school levels. It was formed by two local churches, the Patterson Park Brethren Church and the Christian Tabernacle, and it is regarded as a "nondenominational" extension of the Christian education ministries of these two churches. Dayton's corporate charter establishes a board of directors (board) to lead the corporation in both spiritual and temporal matters. App. 11. The charter also includes a section entitled "Statement of Faith," which serves to restrict membership on the board and the educational staff to persons who subscribe to a particular set of religious beliefs. The Statement of Faith requires each board or staff member to be a born-again Christian and to reaffirm his or her belief annually in the Bible, the Trinity, the nature and mission of Jesus Christ, the doctrine of original sin, the role of the Holy Ghost, the resurrection and judgment of the dead, the need for Christian unity, and the divine creation of human beings. Id., at 5-6. </s> The board has elaborated these requirements to include a belief in the internal resolution of disputes through the "Biblical [477 U.S. 619, 623] chain of command." The core of this doctrine, rooted in passages from the New Testament, is that one Christian should not take another Christian into courts of the State. Teachers are expected to present any grievance they may have to their immediate supervisor, and to acquiesce in the final authority of the board, rather than to pursue a remedy in civil court. The board has sought to ensure compliance with this internal dispute resolution doctrine by making it a contractual condition of employment. </s> Linda Hoskinson was employed as a teacher at Dayton during the 1978-1979 school year. She subscribed to the Statement of Faith and expressly agreed to resolve disputes internally through the Biblical chain of command. In January 1979, she informed her principal, James Rakestraw, that she was pregnant. After consulting with his superiors, Rakestraw informed Hoskinson that her employment contract would not be renewed at the end of the school year because of Dayton's religious doctrine that mothers should stay home with their preschool age children. Instead of appealing this decision internally, Hoskinson contacted an attorney who sent a letter to Dayton's superintendent, Claude Schindler, threatening litigation based on state and federal sex discrimination laws if Dayton did not agree to rehire Hoskinson for the coming school year. </s> Upon receipt of this letter, Schindler informed Hoskinson that she was suspended immediately for challenging the nonrenewal decision in a manner inconsistent with the internal dispute resolution doctrine. The board reviewed this decision and decided to terminate Hoskinson. It stated that the sole reason for her termination was her violation of the internal dispute resolution doctrine, and it rescinded the earlier nonrenewal decision because it said that she had not received adequate prior notice of the doctrine concerning a mother's duty to stay home with her young children. </s> Hoskinson filed a complaint with appellant Ohio Civil Rights Commission (Commission), alleging that Dayton's [477 U.S. 619, 624] nonrenewal decision constituted sex discrimination, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 4112.02(A) (Supp. 1985), and that its termination decision penalized her for asserting her rights, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 4112.02(I) (Supp. 1985). The Commission notified Dayton that it was conducting a preliminary investigation into the matter, and repeatedly urged Dayton to consider private settlement, warning that failure to do so could result in a formal adjudication of the matter. </s> The Commission eventually determined that there was probable cause to believe that Dayton had discriminated against Hoskinson based on her sex and had retaliated against her for attempting to assert her rights in violation of 4112(A) and (I). Pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 4112.05(B) (Supp. 1985), it sent Dayton a proposed Conciliation Agreement and Consent Order that would have required Dayton to reinstate Hoskinson with backpay, and would have prohibited Dayton from taking retaliatory action against any employee for participating in the preliminary investigation. The Commission warned Dayton that failure to accede to this proposal or an acceptable counteroffer would result in formal administrative proceedings being initiated against it. When Dayton failed to respond, the Commission initiated administrative proceedings against it by filing a complaint. Dayton answered the complaint by asserting that the First Amendment prevented the Commission from exercising jurisdiction over it since its actions had been taken pursuant to sincerely held religious beliefs. App. 103. </s> While these administrative proceedings were pending, Dayton filed this action against the Commission in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking a permanent injunction against the state proceedings on the ground that any investigation of Dayton's hiring process or any imposition of sanctions for Dayton's nonrenewal or termination decisions would violate [477 U.S. 619, 625] the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. App. 118-120. The Commission filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that the District Court should refrain from enjoining the administrative proceedings based on federal abstention doctrines. Record, Doc. No. 9, pp. 7-8. It also filed various documents defending its action on the merits. </s> Without addressing the abstention argument, the District Court refused to issue the injunction. 578 F. Supp. 1004 (1984). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, as previously noted, holding that the exercise of such jurisdiction would violate both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 766 F.2d 932 (1985). </s> We hold that we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1254(2) to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. That statute authorizes an appeal to this Court "by a party relying on a State statute held by a court of appeals to be invalid as repugnant to the Constitution." This authority embraces cases holding a state statute unconstitutional as applied to the facts of the case. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 76 , n. 6 (1970). Here there is no doubt that the decision by the Court of Appeals satisfies this test. The court expressly held that Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 4112.02 et seq. (Supp. 1985) is repugnant to the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses as applied to authorize the administrative body to investigate the charges against Dayton and to decide whether to impose sanctions. See 766 F.2d, at 935, n. 5, 944, 955, 961. </s> Having taken jurisdiction over the decision below, we now turn to whether the District Court should have exercised jurisdiction over the case itself. We conclude that the District Court should have abstained from adjudicating this case under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and later cases. 1 The Commission urged such abstention in the District [477 U.S. 619, 626] Court, and on oral argument here. Tr. of Oral Arg. 7-8. Dayton has filed a postargument brief urging that the Commission has waived any claim to abstention because it had stipulated in the District Court that that court had jurisdiction of the action. We think, however, that this argument misconceives the nature of Younger abstention. It does not arise from lack of jurisdiction in the District Court, but from strong policies counseling against the exercise of such jurisdiction where particular kinds of state proceedings have already been commenced. A State may of course voluntarily submit to federal jurisdiction even though it might have had a tenable claim for abstention. See Brown v. Hotel Employees, 468 U.S. 491, 500 , n. 9 (1984); Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 479 -480 (1977); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 396 -397, n. 3 (1975). But in each of these cases the State expressly urged this Court or the District Court to proceed to an adjudication of the constitutional merits. We think there was no similar consent or waiver here, and we therefore address the issue of whether the District Court should have abstained from deciding the case. </s> In Younger v. Harris, supra, we held that a federal court should not enjoin a pending state criminal proceeding except in the very unusual situation that an injunction is necessary to prevent great and immediate irreparable injury. We justified our decision both on equitable principles, id., at 43, and on the "more vital consideration" of the proper respect for the fundamental role of States in our federal system. Id., at [477 U.S. 619, 627] 44. Because of our concerns for comity and federalism, we thought that it was </s> "perfectly natural for our cases to repeat time and time again that the normal thing to do when federal courts are asked to enjoin pending proceedings in state courts is not to issue such injunctions." Id., at 45 (emphasis added). </s> We have since recognized that our concern for comity and federalism is equally applicable to certain other pending state proceedings. We have applied the Younger principle to civil proceedings in which important state interests are involved. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979). We have also applied it to state administrative proceedings in which important state interests are vindicated, so long as in the course of those proceedings the federal plaintiff would have a full and fair opportunity to litigate his constitutional claim. We stated in Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 576 -577 (1973), that "administrative proceedings looking toward the revocation of a license to practice medicine may in proper circumstances command the respect due court proceedings." Similarly, we have held that federal courts should refrain from enjoining lawyer disciplinary proceedings initiated by state ethics committees if the proceedings are within the appellate jurisdiction of the appropriate State Supreme Court. Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Assn., 457 U.S. 423 (1982). Because we found that the administrative proceedings in Middlesex were "judicial in nature" from the outset, id., at 432-434, it was not essential to the decision that they had progressed to state-court review by the time we heard the federal injunction case. 2 </s> [477 U.S. 619, 628] </s> We think the principles enunciated in these cases govern the present one. We have no doubt that the elimination of prohibited sex discrimination is a sufficiently important state interest to bring the present case within the ambit of the cited authorities. We also have no reason to doubt that Dayton will receive an adequate opportunity to raise its constitutional claims. Dayton contends that the mere exercise of jurisdiction over it by the state administrative body violates its First Amendment rights. But we have repeatedly rejected the argument that a constitutional attack on state procedures themselves "automatically vitiates the adequacy of those procedures for purposes of the Younger-Huffman line of cases." Moore, supra, at 427, n. 10. Even religious schools cannot claim to be wholly free from some state regulation. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972). We therefore think that however Dayton's constitutional claim should be decided on the merits, the Commission violates no constitutional rights by merely investigating the circumstances of Hoskinson's discharge in this case, if only to ascertain whether the ascribed religious-based reason was in fact the reason for the discharge. [477 U.S. 619, 629] </s> Dayton also contends that the administrative proceedings do not afford the opportunity to level constitutional challenges against the potential sanctions for the alleged sex discrimination. In its reply brief in this Court, the Commission cites several rulings to demonstrate that religious justifications for otherwise illegal conduct are considered by it. See, e. g., In re St. Mary of the Falls, No. 948 (1975). Dayton in turn relies on a decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rocky River, 38 Ohio St. 2d 23, 26, 309 N. E. 2d 900, 902 (1974), in which that court held that a local zoning commission could not consider constitutional claims. But even if Ohio law is such that the Commission may not consider the constitutionality of the statute under which it operates, it would seem an unusual doctrine, and one not supported by the cited case, to say that the Commission could not construe its own statutory mandate in the light of federal constitutional principles. Cf. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). In any event, it is sufficient under Middlesex, supra, at 436, that constitutional claims may be raised in state-court judicial review of the administrative proceeding. Section 4112.06 of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (1980) provides that any "respondent claiming to be aggrieved by a final order of the commission . . . may obtain judicial review thereof." Dayton cites us to no Ohio authority indicating that this provision does not authorize judicial review of claims that agency action violates the United States Constitution. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 We think that any ripeness challenge to appellees' complaint is foreclosed by Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), and Doran v. Salem [477 U.S. 619, 626] Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975). Steffel held that a reasonable threat of prosecution for conduct allegedly protected by the Constitution gives rise to a sufficiently ripe controversy. 415 U.S., at 458 -460. If a reasonable threat of prosecution creates a ripe controversy, we fail to see how the actual filing of the administrative action threatening sanctions in this case does not. It is true that the administrative body may rule completely or partially in appellees' favor; but it was equally true that the plaintiffs in Steffel and Doran may have prevailed had they in fact been prosecuted. </s> [Footnote 2 The lower courts have been virtually uniform in holding that the Younger principle applies to pending state administrative proceedings in which an important state interest in involved. See, e. g., Williams v. Red [477 U.S. 619, 628] Bank Board of Education, 662 F.2d 1008 (CA3 1981); Grandco Corp. v. Rochford, 536 F.2d 197, 206 (CA7 1976); McCune v. Frank, 521 F.2d 1152, 1158 (CA2 1975); McDonald v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Division of Metropolitan Transit Authority, 565 F. Supp. 37 (SDNY 1983) (Weinfeld, J.). Only the recent case of Martori Bros. Distributors v. James-Massengale, 781 F.2d 1349, 1354 (CA9 1986), departs from this position, and it does so without analysis. Of course, if state law expressly indicates that the administrative proceedings are not even "judicial in nature," abstention may not be appropriate. See Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 237 -239 (1984). The application of the Younger principle to pending state administrative proceedings is fully consistent with Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982), which holds that litigants need not exhaust their administrative remedies prior to bringing a 1983 suit in federal court. Cf. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607 -611 (1975). Unlike Patsy, the administrative proceedings here are coercive rather than remedial, began before any substantial advancement in the federal action took place, and involve an important state interest. </s> JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE MARSHALL, and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, concurring in the judgment. </s> Appellee Dayton Christian Schools, Inc. (School), employed Mrs. Linda Hoskinson as a teacher. Shortly after [477 U.S. 619, 630] learning that she was pregnant, the School refused to renew Mrs. Hoskinson's teaching contract for the next academic year. The two reasons for this decision, according to the School, were (1) the School's belief that Mrs. Hoskinson should remain at home to supervise and care for her forthcoming child; and (2) the School's belief that Mrs. Hoskinson had violated the "Biblical chain of command" by consulting an attorney regarding her disagreement with the School's conviction that she remain at home. App. 115 (complaint of Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., et al.). </s> After her termination, Mrs. Hoskinson filed a sex discrimination charge against the School with appellant Ohio Civil Rights Commission. The Commission investigated her charge and, upon finding probable cause to believe that the School had violated 4112.02 of the Ohio Revised Code, 1 scheduled a hearing. The School thereupon filed this action in Federal District Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. </s> In the District Court, the School argued that the Ohio antidiscrimination statute violates the First Amendment Religion Clauses as applied to sectarian schools. 2 The District Court determined that "[t]he only conduct on the part of the Commission that is presently being threatened with sufficient [477 U.S. 619, 631] immediacy and reality to present a justiciable controversy is the investigation, which has already taken place, and the pending hearing on the complaint filed by the [Commission] concerning the discharge of Mrs. Hoskinson." 578 F. Supp. 1004, 1029 (SD Ohio 1984). Accord, id., at 1039. On the merits, the District Court concluded that the Commission's investigation and adjudication of sex discrimination charges was constitutional. The court recognized that "the statute could be applied in any number of ways that could impermissibly interfere with" appellees' religious freedom, but it concluded that these concerns - which relate to the possible remedies that might or might not be ordered if a violation is found - were "hypothetical or speculative" and therefore not ripe on the current state of the record. Id., at 1028. 3 </s> The Court of Appeals reversed. 766 F.2d 932 (CA6 1985). It recognized that the School "challenge[d] only the [Commission's] exercise of jurisdiction and its issuance of the complaint in this case." Id., at 950, n. 31. It further acknowledged that "an order of reinstatement or backpay is not at issue in this case." Ibid. It nevertheless determined that the "chilling knowledge" that the School's selection criteria for teachers "will be reevaluated, and, perhaps, adjusted by the state applying secular criteria" placed an impermissible burden on appellees' religious freedoms. Ibid. Looking into the future, the Court of Appeals also concluded that the [477 U.S. 619, 632] "highly intrusive nature" of backpay and reinstatement, as well as the "continuing surveillance implicated by the conciliation agreement proposed by the Commission" and rejected by the School, "reveal the `significant risk that the First Amendment will be infringed.'" Id., at 942-943 (quoting NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979)). Accord, 766 F.2d, at 951. </s> Like the majority, I agree with the District Court that neither the investigation of certain charges nor the conduct of a hearing on those charges is prohibited by the First Amendment: "the Commission violates no constitutional rights by merely investigating the circumstances of Hoskinson's discharge in this case, if only to ascertain whether the ascribed religious-based reason was in fact the reason for the discharge." Ante, at 628. </s> I further agree with the District Court that any challenge to a possibly intrusive remedy is premature at this juncture. As the majority points out, ante, at 629, the Commission recognizes religious justifications for conduct that might otherwise be illegal. Thus, although 4112.02 forbids discrimination on the basis of religion, the Commission has dismissed complaints alleging religious discrimination by religious educational institutions, see Menz v. St. Pius School, No. 3823 (1983), and in particular has dismissed complaints by teachers against sectarian schools for limiting employment to instructors who subscribe to the appropriate faith, see In re St. Michael's School, No. 2726 (1976); In re St. Mary of the Falls, No. 948 (1975). It bears emphasis that the Commission dismissed these complaints only after investigating charges of discrimination, finding probable cause that the statute had been violated, and holding a hearing on the complaint. It therefore follows that the Commission's finding of probable cause and decision to schedule a hearing in this case does not also mean that the Commission intends to impose any sanction, let alone a sanction in derogation of the First Amendment's Religion Clauses. In view of this fact, the District [477 U.S. 619, 633] Court was entirely correct in concluding that appellees' constitutional challenge to the remedial provisions of the Ohio statute is not ripe for review. 4 Accordingly, I concur in the judgment. 5 </s> [477 U.S. 619, 634] </s> [Footnote 1 That section provides, in part: " 4112.02 Unlawful discriminatory practices. "It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice: "(A) For any employer, because of the race, color, religion, sex, national origin, handicap, age, or ancestry of any person, to discharge without just cause, to refuse to hire, or otherwise to discriminate against that person with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to employment." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 4112.02 (Supp. 1985). </s> [Footnote 2 The School also argued that 4112.02 of the Ohio Revised Code is unconstitutional on its face. The District Court held the section to be neither overbroad nor void for vagueness. Because the Court of Appeals invalidated the section as applied to the School, it did not address appellees' facial attack. The School no longer presses the argument that the statute is unconstitutional on its face. </s> [Footnote 3 "In permitting the [Commission] to exercise jurisdiction over the instant controversy, the Court has in no way determined either that the full force of [the Commission's] jurisdiction under [Ohio Revised Code] Chapter 4112 can be brought to bear on [Dayton Christian Schools] without impermissibly burdening [appellees'] first amendment rights or, even with respect to the present controversy, that any remedy deemed appropriate by the [Commission] should they find [Dayton Christian Schools] liable, would necessarily present no further first amendment problems. However, because many of the concerns voiced by [appellees] about state encroachment on their religious freedoms remain as yet only possibilities, they cannot serve as the basis for the issuing of a permanent injunction against the [Commission]." 578 F. Supp., at 1041. </s> [Footnote 4 I fully agree with the majority's general statement that "a reasonable threat of prosecution for conduct allegedly protected by the Constitution gives rise to a sufficiently ripe controversy." Ante, at 626, n. 1 (citation omitted). Thus, when the constitutional challenge is to the arrest and initiation of criminal proceedings - as was the case with the pamphleteer in Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 458 -460 (1974), and the operators of the bars in Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 930 -931 (1975) - a "reasonable threat" of arrest and prosecution is sufficient to make the controversy ripe for judicial review. For purposes of this case, it follows from Steffel and Doran that appellees' First Amendment challenge to the Commission's decision to investigate and adjudicate a charge of sex discrimination against the School is ripe, because the investigation has been completed and the matter set for hearing. However, it does not follow that a challenge to whatever remedy might ultimately be fashioned (should liability be established and relief ordered) is ripe merely upon a showing of a "reasonable threat" that proceedings will commence. Doran and Steffel do not suggest this result, for they did not address the constitutionality of possible remedies for the conduct prosecuted in those cases. In view of the absence of any finding of liability in this case, and the Commission's demonstrated willingness to tailor remedies to accommodate the exercise of religious freedoms, there is plainly no "reasonable threat" that an overly intrusive remedy will trench on appellees' First Amendment rights. To hold otherwise would require the District Court to detail the constitutionally permissible range of the Commission's sentencing discretion in advance of any facts regarding the School's discriminatory conduct or any explanation by the Commission justifying the relief it might fashion. Either or both of these items of information would inform the First Amendment analysis and might prove decisive in determining the constitutionality of the Commission's hypothesized remedy. </s> [Footnote 5 I do not agree with the majority that the doctrine of abstention associated with Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), required the District Court to dismiss appellees' complaint. That disposition would presumably deny the School a federal forum to adjudicate the constitutionality of a provisional administrative remedy, such as reinstatement pending resolution of the complainant's charges, even though the constitutional issues have become ripe for review by the Commission's entry of a coercive order and [477 U.S. 619, 634] the Commission refuses to address the merits of the constitutional claims. Younger abstention has never been applied to subject a federal-court plaintiff to an allegedly unconstitutional state administrative order when the constitutional challenge to that order can be asserted, if at all, only in state-court judicial review of the administrative proceeding. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S., at 462 (holding that Younger abstention is inappropriate when no state-court proceeding "is pending at the time the federal complaint is filed," because in that circumstance "federal intervention does not result in duplicative legal proceedings or disruption of the state criminal justice system"; it cannot "be interpreted as reflecting negatively upon [a] state court's ability to enforce constitutional principles"; and the absence of a pending state-court proceeding deprives "the federal plaintiff [of] a concrete opportunity to vindicate his constitutional rights"). See also Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Assn., 457 U.S. 423, 437 (1982) (requiring abstention where "an adequate state forum for all relevant issues has clearly been demonstrated to be available prior to any proceedings on the merits in federal court" (citation omitted)). </s> [477 U.S. 619, 635]

United States Supreme Court CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, et al. v. GOLDSMITH(1999) No. 98-347 Argued: March 22, 1999Decided: May 17, 1999 </s> After respondent Goldsmith, an Air Force major, defied an order by a superior officer to inform his sex partners that he was infected with HIV and to take measures to block any transfer of bodily fluids during sexual relations, he was convicted by general court-martial of willful disobedience of an order and other offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and sentenced to six years' confinement and partial forfeiture of salary. The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, and when Goldsmith sought no review of that decision in the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF), his conviction became final. Subsequently, in reliance on a newly enacted statute empowering the President to drop from the rolls of the Armed Forces any officer who had both been sentenced by a court-martial to more than six months' confinement and served at least six months, the Air Force notified Goldsmith that it was taking action to drop him from the rolls. Goldsmith did not immediately contest that proposal, but rather petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals for extraordinary relief to redress the unrelated alleged interruption of his HIV medication during his incarceration. The court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to act, and it was in Goldsmith's appeal from that determination that he first asserted the claim that the Air Force's action to drop him violated the ExPost Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses. The CAAF granted his petition for extraordinary relief and relied on the All Writs Act in enjoining the President and other officials from dropping Goldsmith from the Air Force rolls. </s> Held: Because the CAAF's process was neither "in aid of" its strictly circumscribed jurisdiction to review court-martial findings and sentences nor "necessary" or "appropriate" in light of a servicemember's alternative opportunities to seek relief, that court lacked jurisdiction to issue an injunction against dropping respondent from the Air Force rolls. Pp. 4-11. </s> (a) The All Writs Act authorizes "all courts established by Act of Congress [to] issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions." 28 U.S.C. §1651(a). Although military appellate courts are among those so empowered to issue extraordinary writs, see Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 695 , n. 7, the All Writs Act does not enlarge those courts' power to issue process "in aid of" their existing statutory jurisdiction, see, e.g , Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States Marshals Service, 474 U.S. 34, 41 . The CAAF is accorded jurisdiction by statute to "review the record in [specified] cases reviewed by" the service courts of criminal appeals, 10 U.S.C. §§867(a)(2), (3), which in turn have jurisdiction to "revie[w] court-martial cases," §866(a). Since the Air Force's action to drop respondent from the rolls was an executive action, not a "findin[g]" or "sentence," §867(c), that was (or could have been) imposed in a court-martial proceeding, the elimination of Goldsmith from the rolls appears straightforwardly to have been beyond the CAAF's jurisdiction to review and hence beyond the "aid" of the All Writs Act in reviewing it. Goldsmith's claim that the CAAF has satisfied the "aid" requirement because it protected and effectuated the sentence meted out by the court-martial is beside the point, for two related reasons. First, his court-martial sentence has not been changed; another military agency has simply taken independent action. Second, the CAAF is not given authority, by the All Writs Act or any other source, to oversee all matters arguably related to military justice, or to act as a plenary administrator even of criminal judgments it has affirmed. The CAAF spoke too expansively when it asserted that Congress intended it to have such broad responsibility. Pp. 4-7. </s> (b) Even if the CAAF had some seriously arguable basis for jurisdiction in these circumstances, resort to the All Writs Act would still be out of bounds, being unjustifiable either as "necessary" or as "appropriate" in light of alternative remedies available to a servicemember demanding to be kept on the rolls. The All Writs Act invests a court with a power essentially equitable and, as such, not generally available to provide alternatives to other, adequate remedies at law. See, e.g ., Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 429 . This limitation operates here, since the Air Force Board of Correction for Military Records (BCMR) has authority to provide administrative review of the action challenged by respondent, and a servicemember claiming something other than monetary relief may challenge the BCMR's decision to sustain a decision to drop him from the rolls (or otherwise dismiss him) as final agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act. Moreover, in instances in which a claim for monetary relief may be framed, a servicemember may enter the Court of Federal Claims with a challenge to dropping from the rolls (or other discharge) under the Tucker Act, or he may enter a district court under the "Little Tucker Act." Pp. 7-11. </s> 48 M.J. 84, reversed. </s> Souter, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. </s> WILLIAM J. CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, etal. , PETITIONERS v. </s> JAMES T. GOLDSMITH </s> on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the armed forces </s> [May 17, 1999] </s> Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The challenge here is to the use of the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. §1651(a), by the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, to enjoin the President and various military officials from dropping respondent from the rolls of the Air Force. Because that court's process was neither "in aid of" its strictly circumscribed jurisdiction to review court-martial findings and sentences under 10 U.S.C. §867 nor "necessary or appropriate" in light of a servicemember's alternative opportunities to seek relief, we hold that the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces lacked jurisdiction to issue the injunction. </s> I </s> Respondent James Goldsmith, a major in the United States Air Force, was ordered by a superior officer to inform his sex partners that he was HIV-positive and to take measures to block any transfer of bodily fluids during sexual relations. Contrary to this order, on two occasions Goldsmith had unprotected intercourse, once with a fellow officer and once with a civilian, without informing either that he was carrying HIV. </s> As a consequence of his defiance, Goldsmith was convicted by general court-martial of willful disobedience of an order from a superior commissioned officer, aggravated assault with means likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm, and assault consummated by battery, in violation of Articles 90 and 128 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§890, 928(b)(1), (a). In 1994, he was sentenced to six years' confinement and forfeiture of $2,500 of his salary each month for six years. The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence in 1995, and when he sought no review of that decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF), his conviction became final, see §871(c)(1)(A). </s> In 1996, Congress expanded the President's authority by empowering him to drop from the rolls of the Armed Forces any officer who had both been sentenced by a court-martial to more than six months' confinement and served at least six months. </s> 1 </s> See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, 110 Stat. 325, 10 U.S.C. §§1161(b)(2), 1167 (1994 ed., Supp. III). </s> 2 </s> In reliance on this statutory authorization, the Air Force notified Goldsmith in 1996 that it was taking action to drop him from the rolls. </s> Goldsmith did not immediately contest the proposal to drop him, but rather petitioned the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals for extraordinary relief under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. §1651(a), to redress the unrelated alleged interruption of his HIV medication during his incarceration. The Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to act, and it was in Goldsmith's appeal from that determination that he took the first steps to raise the issue now before us, an entirely new claim that the Air Force's action to drop him from the rolls was unconstitutional. He did not challenge his underlying court-martial conviction (the appeal period for which had expired, see Rule 19(a)(1), CAAF Rules of Practice and Procedure). But he charged that the proposed action violated the ExPost Facto Clause, U.S. Const., Art.I, §9, cl.3 (arguing that the statute authorizing it had been enacted after the date of his conviction) and the Double Jeopardy Clause, U.S. Const., Amdt. 5 (arguing that the action would inflict successive punishment based on the same conduct underlying his first conviction). 48 M.J. 84, 89-90 (CAAF 1998). The CAAF, on a division of 3 to 2, granted the petition for extraordinary relief and relied on the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. §1651(a), in enjoining the President and various other Executive Branch officials from dropping respondent from the rolls of the Air Force. </s> 3 </s> We granted certiorari, 525 U.S. ___ (1998), and now reverse. </s> 4 </s> II </s> When Congress exercised its power to govern and regulate the Armed Forces by establishing the CAAF, see U.S. Const. Art. I, §8, cl. 14; 10 U.S.C. §941; see generally Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 166-169 (1994), it confined the court's jurisdiction to the review of specified sentences imposed by courts-martial: the CAAF has the power to act "only with respect to the findings and sentence as approved by the [court-martial's] convening authority and as affirmed or set aside as incorrect in law by the Court of Criminal Appeals." 10 U.S.C. §867(c). </s> 5 </s> Cf. Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 44 (1972) (Court of Military Appeals lacked express authority over claim for discharge based on conscientious objector status). Despite these limitations, the CAAF asserted jurisdiction and purported to justify reliance on the All Writs Act in this case on the view that "Congress intended [it] to have broad responsibility with respect to administration of military justice," 48 M.J., at 86-87, </s> 6 </s> a position that Goldsmith urges us to adopt. This we cannot do. </s> While the All Writs Act authorizes employment of extraordinary writs, it confines the authority to the issuance of process "in aid of" the issuing court's jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §1651(a) ("[A]ll courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law"). Thus, although military appellate courts are among those empowered to issue extraordinary writs under the Act, see Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 695 , n.7 (1969), the express terms of the Act confine the power of the CAAF to issuing process "in aid of" its existing statutory jurisdiction; the Act does not enlarge that jurisdiction, see, e.g. , Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States Marshals Service, 474 U.S. 34, 41 (1985). See also 16 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §3932, p. 470 (2d ed. 1996) ("The All Writs Act ... is not an independent grant of appellate jurisdiction"); 19 J. Moore & G. Pratt, Moore's Federal Practice §204.02[4] (3d ed. 1998) ("The All Writs Act cannot enlarge a court's jurisdiction"). </s> We have already seen that the CAAF's independent statutory jurisdiction is narrowly circumscribed. To be more specific, the CAAF is accorded jurisdiction by statute (so far as it concerns us here) to "review the record in [specified] cases reviewed by" the service courts of criminal appeals, 10 U.S.C. §§867(a)(2), (3), which in turn have jurisdiction to "revie[w] court-martial cases," §866(a). Since the Air Force's action to drop respondent from the rolls was an executive action, not a "findin[g]" or "sentence," §867(c), that was (or could have been) imposed in a court-martial proceeding, </s> 7 </s> the elimination of Goldsmith from the rolls appears straightforwardly to have been beyond the CAAF's jurisdiction to review and hence beyond the "aid" of the All Writs Act in reviewing it. </s> Goldsmith nonetheless claims that the CAAF has satisfied the "aid" requirement of the Act because it protected and effectuated the sentence meted out by the court-martial. Goldsmith emphasizes that the court-martial could have dismissed him from service, but instead chose to impose only confinement and fines. </s> 8 </s> Hence, he says the CAAF merely preserved that sentence as the court-martial imposed it, by precluding additional punishment, which would incidentally violate the ExPost Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses. But this is beside the point, for two related reasons. First, Goldsmith's court-martial sentence has not been changed; another military agency has simply taken independent action. </s> 9 </s> It would presumably be an entirely different matter if a military authority attempted to alter a judgment by revising a court-martial finding and sentence to increase the punishment, contrary to the specific provisions of the UCMJ, and it certainly would be a different matter when such a judgment had been affirmed by an appellate court. In such a case, as the Government concedes, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 15, 19, 52, the All Writs power would allow the appellate court to compel adherence to its own judgment. See, e.g ., United States v. United States Dist. Court for Southern Dist. of N. Y., 334 U.S. 258, 263-264 (1948). Second, the CAAF is not given authority, by the All Writs Act or otherwise, to oversee all matters arguably related to military justice, or to act as a plenary administrator even of criminal judgments it has affirmed. Simply stated, there is no source of continuing jurisdiction for the CAAF over all actions administering sentences that the CAAF at one time had the power to review. Thus the CAAF spoke too expansively when it held itself to be "empowered by the All Writs Act to grant extraordinary relief in a case in which the court-martial rendered a sentence that constituted an adequate basis for direct review in [the CAAF] after review in the intermediate court," 48 M.J., at 87. </s> 10 </s> III </s> Even if the CAAF had some seriously arguable basis for jurisdiction in these circumstances, resort to the All Writs Act would still be out of bounds, being unjustifiable either as "necessary" or as "appropriate" in light of alternative remedies available to a servicemember demanding to be kept on the rolls. </s> 11 </s> The All Writs Act invests a court with a power essentially equitable and, as such, not generally available to provide alternatives to other, adequate remedies at law. See, e.g ., Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 429 (1996) ("`The All Writs Act is a residual source of authority to issue writs that are not otherwise covered by statute'") (quoting Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction , 474 U.S., at 43 ). See also 19 Moore's Federal Practice §201.40 ("[A] writ may not be used . . . when another method of review will suffice"). This limitation operates here, since other administrative bodies in the military, and the federal courts, have authority to provide administrative or judicial review of the action challenged by respondent. </s> In response to the notice Goldsmith received that action was being considered to drop him from the rolls, he presented his claim to the Secretary of the Air Force. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4-5. If the Secretary takes final action to drop him from the rolls (as he has not yet done), Goldsmith will (as the Government concedes) be entitled to present his claim to the Air Force Board of Correction for Military Records (BCMR). This is a civilian body within the military service, with broad-ranging authority to review a servicemember's "discharge or dismissal (other than a discharge or dismissal by sentence of a general court-martial)," 10 U.S.C. §1553(a), or "to correct an error or remove an injustice" in a military record, §1552(a)(1). </s> 12 </s> Respondent may also have recourse to the federal trial courts. We have previously held, for example, that "[BCMR] decisions are subject to judicial review [by federal courts] and can be set aside if they are arbitrary, capricious, or not based on substantial evidence." Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 303 (1983). A servicemember claiming something other than monetary relief may challenge a BCMR's decision to sustain a decision to drop him from the rolls (or otherwise dismissing him) as final agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §551 et seq.; see §§704, 706. For examples of such challenges entertained in the district courts or courts of appeals, see Roelofs v. Secretary of Air Force , 628 F.2d 594, 599-601 (CADC 1980) (proceeding in District Court under APA raising due process challenge to administrative discharge based on conviction of civilian offense); Walker v. Shannon , 848 F.Supp. 250, 251, 254-255 (DC 1994) (suit under APA for review of Army BCMR decision upholding involuntary separation). In the instances in which a claim for monetary relief may be framed, a servicemember may enter the Court of Federal Claims with a challenge to dropping from the rolls (or other discharge) under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §1491. </s> 13 </s> See, e.g ., Doe v. United States , 132 F.3d 1430, 1433-1434 (CA Fed. 1997) (suit for backpay and correction of military records following administrative discharge); Mitchell v. United States , 930 F.2d 893, 896-897 (CA Fed. 1991) (suit for backpay, reinstatement, and correction of records). Or he may enter a district court under the "Little Tucker Act," 28 U.S.C. §1346(a)(2). </s> 14 </s> See, e.g ., Thomas v. Cheney , 925 F.2d 1407, 1411, 1416 (CA Fed. 1991) (reviewing challenge to action to drop plaintiff from the rolls); Sibley v. Ball , 924 F.2d 25, 29 (CA1 1991) (transferring to Federal Circuit case for backpay because within purview of "Little Tucker Act"). </s> In sum, executive action to drop respondent from the rolls falls outside of the CAAF's express statutory jurisdiction, and alternative statutory avenues of relief are available. The CAAF's injunction against dropping respondent from the rolls of the Air Force was neither "in aid of [its] jurisdictio[n]" nor "necessary or appropriate." Accordingly, we reverse the court's judgment. </s> It is so ordered. </s> FOOTNOTES </s> Footnote 1 </s> When a servicemember is dropped from the rolls, he forfeits his military pay. See 37 U.S.C. §803. The drop-from-the-rolls remedy targets a narrow category of servicemembers who are absent without leave (AWOL) or else have been convicted of serious crimes. Since 1870, the President has had authority to drop from the rolls of the Army any officer who has been AWOL for at least three months. See Act of July 15, 1870, §17, 16 Stat. 319. The power was subsequently extended to officers confined in prison after final conviction by a civil court, see Act of Jan. 19, 1911, ch. 22, 36 Stat. 894, and then to "any armed force" officer AWOL for at least three months or else finally sentenced to confinement in a federal or state penitentiary or correctional institution, see Act of May 5, 1950, §10, 64 Stat. 146. </s> Footnote 2 </s> Section 1161(b)(2) authorizes the President to "drop from the rolls of any armed force any commissioned officer . . . who may be separated under Section 1167 of this title by reason of a sentence to confinement adjudged by a court-martial." Section 1167 provides that "a member sentenced by a court-martial to a period of confinement for more than six months may be separated from the member's armed force at any time after the sentence to confinement has become final . . . and the member has served in confinement for a period of six months." </s> Footnote 3 </s> Because respondent had been released from confinement, the CAAF denied respondent's writ-appeal petition concerning his medical treatment claim as moot. See 48 M.J. 84, 87-88 (1998). </s> As a result of the CAAF's order, respondent has not been dropped from the rolls, and has returned to active duty status. The Air Force initiated an administrative separation proceeding against respondent, see 10 U.S.C. §1181, which has been deferred pending resolution of this case. See Brief for Petitioners 8, n.2. </s> Footnote 4 </s> In light of our holding that the CAAF lacked jurisdiction in this case, we do not reach the merits of respondent's double jeopardy and expost facto claims. </s> Footnote 5 </s> When Congress established the Court of Military Appeals (the CAAF's predecessor), it similarly confined its jurisdiction to the review of specified sentences imposed by courts-martial. See Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, Art. 67(d), 64 Stat. 130. See also H.R. Rep. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 32 (1949); S.Rep. No. 486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 3, 28-29 (1949). </s> Footnote 6 </s> One judge was even more emphatic: "We should use our broad jurisdiction under the [UCMJ] to correct injustices like this and we need not wait for another court to perhaps act. . . . Our Court has the responsibility of protecting the rights of all servicemembers in court-martial matters." 48 M.J., at 91 (Sullivan, J., concurring). </s> Footnote 7 </s> A court-martial is specifically barred from dismissing or discharging an officer except as in accordance with the UCMJ, which gives it no authority to drop a servicemember from the rolls. See Rules for Courts-Martial 1003(b)(9)(A)-(C); Rule 1003(b)(9) ("A court-martial may not adjudge an administrative separation from the service"). Moreover, respondent brought the petition against the President, the Secretary of Defense, and military officials who were not even parties to the court-martial. </s> Footnote 8 </s> At the court-martial, respondent faced a maximum punishment of dismissal, confinement for 10 years, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and a fine. </s> Footnote 9 </s> Indeed, the approved findings and sentence in Goldsmith's case had become final over one year before the Air Force initiated its action to drop him from the rolls. </s> Footnote 10 </s> The court, moreover, was simply wrong when it treated itself as a court of original jurisdiction, see supra, at5. </s> Footnote 11 </s> These remedies are in addition to the review as of right by the military department's Court of Criminal Appeals of any court-martial sentence that includes punitive dismissal or discharge. See 10 U.S.C. §866(b)(1); §867(a) (decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals subject to discretionary review by the CAAF). And of course, once a criminal conviction has been finally reviewed within the military system, and a servicemember in custody has exhausted other avenues provided under the UCMJ to seek relief from his conviction, see Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 693-699 (1969), he is entitled to bring a habeas corpus petition, see 28 U.S.C. §2241(c), claiming that his conviction is affected by a fundamental defect that requires that it be set aside. See, e.g ., Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142 (1953) (opinion of Vinson, C.J). See also Calley v. Callaway , 519 F.2d 184, 199 (CA5 1975); Gorko v. Commanding Officer, Second Air Force , 314 F.2d 858, 859 (CA10 1963). In this case, however, respondent chose not to challenge his underlying conviction. See supra, at 3. </s> Footnote 12 </s> Respondent argues nonetheless that seeking BCMR review in his case would have been futile (especially in light of his life-threatening illness) since BCMR's lack authority to declare statutes unconstitutional, cannot consider records of courts-martial and related administrative records (with two inapplicable exceptions), and are generally "`unresponsive, bureaucratic extensions of the uniformed services,'" Brief for Respondent 16 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-450, p. 798 (1996)). </s> In light of the fact that respondent chose to circumvent BCMR review, we need not address whether the Air Force BCMR has the power to correct a record that is erroneous as a result of a constitutional violation. Cf. Guerra v. Scruggs , 942 F.2d 270, 273 (CA4 1991) ("The [Army BCMR] has authority to consider claims of constitutional, statutory and regulatory violations"); Bois v. Marsh , 801 F.2d 462, 467 (CADC 1986) ("[Appellant's] claims based on [the] Constitution, executive orders and Army regulations `could readily have been made within the framework of this intramilitary procedure'" (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 303 (1983))). And while it is true that unless specifically authorized a BCMR may not correct a court-martial record, see 10 U.S.C. §1552(f), it may still consider the record, especially where, as here, the court-martial record is relevant in determining the validity of the subsequent dropping from the rolls. Finally, the alleged unresponsive nature of the BCMR's, if true, would in no way alter the fact that BCMR's are legislatively authorized to provide the relief sought by respondent. </s> In any event, it is clear as noted in the text that follows that respondent's constitutional objections could have been addressed by the federal courts. </s> Footnote 13 </s> Under the Tucker Act, the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over nontort claims against the Government for greater than $10,000. See 28 U.S.C. §1491. Determinations of the Court of Federal Claims may be appealed to the Federal Circuit. </s> Footnote 14 </s> The "Little Tucker Act," 28 U.S.C. §1346(a)(2), confers jurisdiction on district courts for claims of $10,000 or less. Appeals are taken to the Federal Circuit.

United States Supreme Court ACKERMANN v. UNITED STATES(1950) No. 35 Argued: October 19, 1950Decided: December 11, 1950 </s> In proceedings against petitioner, his wife and a relative, the District Court in 1943 entered judgments canceling their certificates of naturalization on grounds of fraud. Petitioner and his wife did not appeal; but the relative appealed and the judgment against him was reversed. More than four years after rendition of the judgment against petitioner, he filed in the District Court a motion to set aside the denaturalization judgment under amended Rule 60 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. He alleged that the denaturalization judgment was erroneous; that he did not appeal because his attorney advised him that he would have to sell his home to pay costs; and that a federal officer, in whose custody he and his wife then were and in whom he had confidence, had told him "to hang on to their home" and he would be released at the end of the war. Held: The District Court properly denied the motion. Pp. 194-202. </s> 1. Relief on the ground of "excusable neglect" was not available to petitioner under Rule 60 (b) (1), since by the Rule's terms a motion for relief on this ground must be made not more than one year after the judgment is entered, whereas in this case the judgment was entered more than four years previously. P. 197. </s> 2. The allegations of the motion did not bring petitioner within Rule 60 (b) (6), which applies if "any other reason justifying relief" exists. Pp. 197-199. </s> 3. Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 , distinguished. Pp. 199-202. </s> 178 F.2d 983, 179 F.2d 236, affirmed. </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 36, Ackermann v. United States, also on certiorari to the same Court. </s> The District Court denied petitioners' motions to set aside judgments canceling their certificates of naturalization. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 178 F.2d 983, 179 F.2d 236. This Court granted certiorari. 339 U.S. 962 . Affirmed, p. 202. [340 U.S. 193, 194] </s> E. M. Grimes argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners. </s> James L. Morrisson argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General McInerney and Israel Convisser. </s> MR. JUSTICE MINTON delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Petitioner Hans Ackermann filed a motion in the District Court for the Western District of Texas to set aside a judgment entered December 7, 1943, in that court cancelling his certificate of naturalization. The motion was filed March 25, 1948, pursuant to amended Rule 60 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which became effective March 19, 1948. * The United States filed a [340 U.S. 193, 195] motion to dismiss petitioner's motion. The District Court denied petitioner's motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 178 F.2d 983. We granted certiorari. 339 U.S. 962 . </s> The question is whether the District Court erred in denying the motion for relief under Rule 60 (b). </s> Petitioner and his wife Frieda were natives of Germany. They were naturalized in 1938. They resided, as now, at Taylor, Texas, where petitioner and Max Keilbar owned and operated a German language newspaper. Frieda Ackermann wrote for the paper. She was a sister of Keilbar, who was also a native of Germany and who had been naturalized in 1933. </s> In 1942 complaints were filed against all three to cancel their naturalization on grounds of fraud. Petitioner and Keilbar were represented by counsel and answered the complaints. After an order of consolidation, trial of the three cases began November 1, 1943, and separate judgments were entered December 7, 1943, cancelling and setting aside the orders admitting them to citizenship. Keilbar appealed to the Court of Appeals, and by stipulation with the United States Attorney his case in that court was reversed, and the complaint against him was ordered dismissed. The Ackermanns did not appeal. </s> Petitioner in his motion here under consideration alleges that his "failure to appeal from said judgment is excusable" for the reason that he had no money or property other than his home in Taylor, Texas, owned by him and his wife and worth $2,500, "and the costs of transcribing [340 U.S. 193, 196] the evidence and printing the record and brief on appeal were estimated at not less than $5,000.00." On December 11, 1943, petitioner was detained in an Alien Detention Station at Seagoville, Texas. Before time for appeal had expired, petitioner was advised by his attorney that he and his wife could not appeal on affidavits of inability to pay costs until they had "appropriated said home to the payment of such costs to the full extent of the proceeds of a sale thereof"; that this information distressed them, and they sought advice from W. F. Kelley, "Assistant Commissioner for Alien Control, Immigration and Naturalization Department," in whose custody petitioner and his wife were being held, "and he being a person in whom they had great confidence"; that Kelley on being informed of their financial condition and the advice of their attorney that it would be necessary for them to dispose of their home in order to appeal, advised them in substance to "hang on to their home," and told them further that they had lost their American citizenship and were stateless, and that they would be released at the end of the war; that relying upon Kelley's advice, they refrained from appealing from said judgments; that on April 29, 1944, after time for appeal had expired, they were interned, and on January 25, 1946, the Attorney General ordered them to depart within thirty days or be deported. They did not depart, and they have not been deported, although the orders of deportation are still outstanding. Petitioner further alleged that he would show that the judgment of December 7, 1943, was unlawful and erroneous by producing the record in the Keilbar case. </s> The District Court on September 28, 1948, denied petitioner's motion to vacate the judgment of denaturalization, the court stating in the order that "there is no merit to said motion." [340 U.S. 193, 197] </s> It will be noted that petitioner alleged in his motion that his failure to appeal was excusable. A motion for relief because of excusable neglect as provided in Rule 60 (b) (1) must, by the rule's terms, be made not more than one year after the judgment was entered. The judgment here sought to be relieved from was more than four years old. It is immediately apparent that no relief on account of "excusable neglect" was available to this petitioner on the motion under consideration. </s> But petitioner seeks to bring himself within Rule 60 (b) (6), which applies if "any other reason justifying relief" is present, as construed and applied in Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 . The circumstances alleged in the motion which petitioner asserts bring him within Rule 60 (b) (6) are that the denaturalization judgment was erroneous; that he did not appeal and raise that question because his attorney advised him he would have to sell his home to pay costs, while Kelley, the Alien Control officer, in whom he alleges he had confidence and upon whose advice he relied, told him "to hang on to their home" and that he would be released at the end of the war; and that these circumstances justify failure to appeal the denaturalization judgment. </s> We cannot agree that petitioner has alleged circumstances showing that his failure to appeal was justifiable. It is not enough for petitioner to allege that he had confidence in Kelley. On the allegations of the motion before us, Kelley was a stranger to petitioner. In that state of the pleadings there are two reasons why petitioner cannot be heard to say his neglect to appeal brings him within the rule. First, anything said by Kelley could not be used to relieve petitioner of his duty to take legal steps to protect his interest in litigation in which the United States was a party adverse to him. Munro v. United States, 303 U.S. 36 ; Burnham Chemical Co. v. Krug, 81 F. Supp. 911, 913, aff'd per curiam sub nom. [340 U.S. 193, 198] Burnham Chemical Co. v. Chapman, 86 U.S. App. D.C. 412, 181 F.2d 288. Secondly petitioner had no right to repose confidence in Kelley, a stranger. There is no allegation of any fact or circumstance which shows that Kelley had any undue influence over petitioner or practiced any fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or duress upon him. There are no allegations of privity or any fiduciary relations existing between them. Indeed, the allegations of the motion all show the contrary. However, petitioner had a confidential adviser in his own counsel. Instead of relying upon that confidential adviser, he freely accepted the advice of a stranger, a source upon which he had no right to rely. Petitioner made a considered choice not to appeal, apparently because he did not feel that an appeal would prove to be worth what he thought was a required sacrifice of his home. His choice was a risk, but calculated and deliberate and such as follows a free choice. Petitioner cannot be relieved of such a choice because hindsight seems to indicate to him that his decision not to appeal was probably wrong, considering the outcome of the Keilbar case. There must be an end to litigation someday, and free, calculated, deliberate choices are not to be relieved from. </s> As further evidence of the inadequacy of petitioner's motion to bring himself within any division of Rule 60 (b) which would excuse him from not having taken an appeal, we call attention to the fact that Keilbar got the record before the Court of Appeals, and it contained all the evidence that was introduced as to petitioner and his wife, who were tried together with Keilbar. The Ackermanns and Keilbar were related, yet no effort was made to get into the Court of Appeals and use the same record as to the evidence that Keilbar used. It certainly would not have taken five thousand dollars or one-tenth thereof for petitioner and his wife to have supplemented the Keilbar record with that pertaining to themselves and [340 U.S. 193, 199] to prepare a brief, even if all of it were printed. We are further aware of the practice of the Courts of Appeals permitting litigants who are poor but not paupers to file typewritten records and briefs at a very small cost to them. With the same counsel representing petitioner as represented his kinsman Keilbar, and with Frieda Ackermann having funds sufficient to employ separate counsel, failure to appeal because of the fear of losing his home in defraying the expenses of the brief and record, makes it further evident that Rule 60 (b) has no application to petitioner in this setting. </s> The Klapprott case was a case of extraordinary circumstances. MR. JUSTICE BLACK stated in the following words why the allegations in the Klapprott case, there taken as true, brought it within Rule 60 (b) (6): </s> "But petitioner's allegations set up an extraordinary situation which cannot fairly or logically be classified as mere `neglect' on his part. The undenied facts set out in the petition reveal far more than a failure to defend the denaturalization charges due to inadvertence, indifference, or careless disregard of consequences. For before, at the time, and after the default judgment was entered, petitioner was held in jail in New York, Michigan, and the District of Columbia by the United States, his adversary in the denaturalization proceedings. Without funds to hire a lawyer, petitioner was defended by appointed counsel in the criminal cases. Thus petitioner's prayer to set aside the default judgment did not rest on mere allegations of `excusable neglect.' The foregoing allegations and others in the petition tend to support petitioner's argument that he was deprived of any reasonable opportunity to make a defense to the criminal charges instigated by officers of the very United States agency which supplied the secondhand information upon which his citizenship was taken [340 U.S. 193, 200] away from him in his absence. The basis of his petition was not that he had neglected to act in his own defense, but that in jail as he was, weakened from illness, without a lawyer in the denaturalization proceedings or funds to hire one, disturbed and fully occupied in efforts to protect himself against the gravest criminal charges, he was no more able to defend himself in the New Jersey court than he would have been had he never received notice of the charges." Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 613 -614. </s> By no stretch of imagination can the voluntary, deliberate, free, untrammeled choice of petitioner not to appeal compare with the Klapprott situation. MR. JUSTICE BLACK set forth in order the extraordinary circumstances alleged by Klapprott. We paraphrase them and give the comparable situation of Ackermann. </s> In the spring of 1942 Klapprott was ill, and the illness left him financially poor and unable to work. On May 12, 1942, proceedings were commenced in a New Jersey District Court to cancel his citizenship. As for Ackermann, when he was sued he was well, and had a home worth $2,500, one-half interest in a newspaper, and the means to employ counsel. </s> When complaint was served upon Klapprott, he had no money to hire a lawyer, and he wrote an answer to the complaint filed against him and a letter to the American Civil Liberties Union asking it to represent him without fee. Ackermann had the means to hire and did hire able counsel of his own choice who prepared and filed an answer for him. </s> In less than two months after the complaint was served on the penniless, ill Klapprott, he was arrested for conspiracy to violate the Selective Service Act and taken to New York and jailed in default of bond. His letter to the American Civil Liberties Union was taken by the [340 U.S. 193, 201] Federal Bureau of Investigation before time for him to answer had expired, and was not mailed by that Bureau. Ackermann was never indicted or in jail from the time complaint was filed against him until after judgment, during all of which time he had the benefit of counsel and freedom of movement and action. </s> Within ten days after his arrest, Klapprott was defaulted in the citizenship proceedings in New Jersey. He was still in jail in New York. No evidence was offered to prove the complaint in the denaturalization proceedings, which complaint was verified on information and belief only. In Ackermann's case, no default was entered. He appeared in person and by counsel and had a trial in open court with able counsel to defend him. Much evidence was introduced and a record was made of it. </s> Klapprott was convicted in New York and sent to a penitentiary in Michigan. He was later transferred to the District of Columbia, where he was lodged in jail and tried on another charge, later dismissed. The New York conviction was reversed, but he had been in jail for about two years. He was then lodged at Ellis Island for deportation because his citizenship had been cancelled in the New Jersey proceedings where he had been defaulted. While at Ellis Island, the motion to relieve from the default judgment cancelling his citizenship was prepared and filed, denied by the District Court and the Court of Appeals and finally sustained by this Court. Ackermann was never under criminal charges or detained while the suit for cancellation of his citizenship was pending. During all of that time he was free, well, and able to defend himself, and in that regard had able counsel representing him in a trial in open court. Even after the judgment cancelling his citizenship, he had counsel and free access to him, although detained by the United States Government. [340 U.S. 193, 202] </s> From a comparison of the situations shown by the allegations of Klapprott and Ackermann, it is readily apparent that the situations of the parties bore only the slightest resemblance to each other. The comparison strikingly points up the difference between no choice and choice; imprisonment and freedom of action; no trial and trial; no counsel and counsel; no chance for negligence and inexcusable negligence. Subsection 6 of Rule 60 (b) has no application to the situation of petitioner. Neither the circumstances of petitioner nor his excuse for not appealing is so extraordinary as to bring him within Klapprott or Rule 60 (b) (6). </s> The motion for relief was properly denied, and the judgment is </s> Affirmed. </s> No. 36, Frieda Ackermann v. United States, is a companion case to No. 35, and it was stipulated that the decision in No. 36 should be the same as in No. 35. The judgment in No. 36 therefore is also </s> Affirmed. </s> MR. JUSTICE CLARK took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> [Footnote * "RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER. </s> . . . . . </s> "(b) MISTAKES; INADVERTENCE; EXCUSABLE NEGLECT; NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE; FRAUD, ETC. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59 (b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant [340 U.S. 193, 195] not actually personally notified as provided in Section 57 of the Judicial Code, U.S.C., Title 28, 118, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. Writs of coram nobis, Coram voids, audita querela, and bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of review, are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action." Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 60 (b). </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS concur, dissenting. </s> The Court's interpretation of amended Rule 60 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure neutralizes the humane spirit of the Rule and thereby frustrates its purpose. The Rule empowers courts to set aside judgments under five traditional, specified types of circumstances in which it would be inequitable to permit a judgment to stand. But the draftsmen of the Rule did not intend that these specified grounds should prevent the granting of similar relief in other situations where fairness might require [340 U.S. 193, 203] it. Accordingly, there was added a broad sixth ground: "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." The Court nevertheless holds that the allegations of the present motions were not sufficient to justify the District Court in hearing evidence to determine whether justice would best be served by granting relief from the judgments against petitioners. * Because I disagree with this interpretation of Rule 60 (b), it becomes necessary to summarize the allegations of the motions. </s> Petitioners, a husband and wife whose native country was Germany, became naturalized citizens of the United States in 1938. After the declaration of war against Germany, the Government commenced proceedings which resulted in the denaturalization of petitioners and also of their relative, Keilbar. United States v. Ackermann, 53 F. Supp. 611. Petitioners did not appeal from these judgments but on March 25, 1948, filed duly verified motions for relief from the judgments. The uncontradicted allegations of the motions show: When the judgments were entered, neither of the petitioners had any money or property except a home at Taylor, Texas, worth not in excess of $2,500. They were told by their counsel that the cost of an appeal would be $5,000; that to prosecute an appeal [340 U.S. 193, 204] they would have to sell their home, contribute that $2,500 and then hope to have the appeal tried out on an affidavit of insolvency. Being distressed by reason of having to choose between selling their home or foregoing an appeal, the petitioners sought advice from the United States official who then held them in custody, one W. F. Kelley, assistant commissioner for alien control, Immigration and Naturalization Service of the United States. Petitioners had great confidence in this officer. Kelley advised them to "hang on to their home" and also that they "would be released at the end of the war." Because of their reliance on this advice, petitioners "refrained from appealing . . . said judgments." Thereafter their relative Keilbar did appeal and the judgment of denaturalization against him was reversed on the Government's admission that the evidence was insufficient to support it. Keilbar v. United States, 144 F.2d 866. Petitioners insisted both in their motions to set the judgments aside and in argument that the evidence against them and Keilbar was substantially the same. </s> In holding that the allegations of these motions are not even sufficient to justify the District Court in hearing evidence, the Court relies heavily on its assertion that petitioners "had no right to repose confidence in Kelley" because Kelley was a "stranger" to them. In the first place, Rule 60 (b)'s broad grant of power to the District Court should not be constricted by the importation of the concept of legal "rights." Moreover, far from being a stranger, Kelley was the United States official who held petitioners in custody. Any person held by the United States should be able to repose confidence in the Government official entrusted with his custody. There are obvious reasons why this should be true in the case of the foreign born, less familiar with our customs than are our native citizens. [340 U.S. 193, 205] </s> The Court also relies on the fact that the motions to set aside the judgments contain "no allegations of privity or any fiduciary relations existing" between petitioners and Kelley. Surely the liberalizing provisions of 60 (b) should not be emasculated by common-law ideas of "privity" or "fiduciary relations." If relevant, however, I should think that the phrase "fiduciary relations" given its best meaning encompasses the relationship between petitioners and the official who held them in custody. </s> Finally, since the Court holds that the allegations of petitioners' motions were insufficient to justify the hearing of evidence by the District Court, I think it inappropriate for the Court to consider what purports to be its judicial knowledge of the cost of transcripts and the ability of litigants to file typewritten records and briefs. The motions refute any such knowledge on the part of these petitioners and I am satisfied that no such knowledge would be established if the District Court were permitted to try these cases. </s> The result of the Court's illiberal construction of 60 (b) is that these foreign-born people, dependent on our laws for their safety and protection, are denied the right to appeal to the very court that held (on the Government's admission) that the judgment against their co-defendant was unsupported by adequate evidence. It does no good to have liberalizing rules like 60 (b) if, after they are written, their arteries are hardened by this Court's resort to ancient common-law concepts. I would reverse. </s> [Footnote * Petitioners' motions to be relieved from the judgments of denaturalization invoked the jurisdiction of the District Court under Rule 60 (b). Contending that these motions did "not state grounds sufficient to invoke the authority of the Court . . .," the Government moved to dismiss them. These pleadings therefore posed only the question of the trial court's jurisdiction. Without further pleadings or the taking of evidence, the court entered an order which stated that "there is no merit to said [petitioners'] motion[s] and . . . the same should be denied." But since we cannot assume that an issue not framed by the pleadings was decided, it necessarily follows that the District Court held it was without jurisdiction to grant relief under Rule 60 (b). But cf. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 -683; Brown v. Western R. Co., 338 U.S. 294 . </s> [340 U.S. 193, 206]

United States Supreme Court FOUNTAIN V. FILSON(1949) No. 542 Argued: Decided: April 18, 1949 </s> Rehearing Denied May 31, 1949. See 337 U.S. 921 . Mr. Charles A. Horsky, of Washington, D.C., for petitioner. Mr. Camden R. McAtee, of Washington, D.C., for respondents. </s> PER CURIAM. Mr. and Mrs. Filson brought this suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia, claiming a $6,000 interest in certain New Jersey realty. The complaint alleged that Mr. and Mrs. Fountain, the defendants, acquired title to this realty subject to a resulting trust [ Fountain v. Filson 336 U.S. 681 (1949) ] </s> [336 U.S. 681 , 682] </s> in favor of the Filsons in that amount. The Fountains answered. They denied the existence of a resulting trust and also denied the existence of any obligation to the Filsons. The documents covering the transfer of the realty and certain depositions of the parties were filed. Mrs. Fountain, her husband having died, them moved for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. The sole basis of the motion was the claim that New Jersey law would not permit the imposition of a resulting trust under the circumstances disclosed in the complaint and the accompanying documents. The motion was granted and judgment for Mrs. Fountain was entered. On appeal the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia came to three conclusions. First, it agreed that under New Jersey law no resulting trust could arise. Second, it concluded that the summary judgment in Mrs. Fountain's favor was nevertheless erroneous, because the complaint contained a general prayer for 'other relief' and alleged facts on the basis of which a personal judgment for $6,000 could have been recovered even in the absence of a resulting trust in the realty. Finally, the Court of Appeals proceeded to examine the depositions which had been taken in advance of trial. The court concluded that they showed the existence of a personal obligation and the case was, therefore, remanded to the District Court with instructions to enter a personal judgment in favor of the Filsons for $6,000. Mrs. Fountain's timely motion for a modification of this order in order to permit a trial as to the existence of the personal obligation was denied. Mrs. Fountain's petition for certiorari, which attacks only the third portion of the Court of Appeals' ruling above stated, is granted and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 171 F.2d 999. We need not pass on the propriety of an order for summary judgment by a district </s> [336 U.S. 681 , 683] </s> court in favor of one party after the opposite party has moved for summary judgment in its favor, where it appears that there is no dispute as to any fact material to the issue being litigated. For here the order was made on appeal on a new issue as to which the opposite party had no opportunity to present a defense before the trial court. In Globe Liquor Co. v. San Roman, 1948, 332 U.S 571, and Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co ., 1947, 330 U.S. 212 , we held that judgment notwithstanding the verdict could not be given in the Court of Appeals in favor of a party who had lost in the trial court and who had not there moved for such relief. One of the reasons for so holding was that otherwise the party who had won in the trial court would be deprived of any opportunity to remedy the defect which the appellate court discovered in his case. He would have had such an opportunity if a proper motion had been made by his opponent in the trial court. The same principle interdicts, a fortiori, the appellate court order or summary judgment here. Summary judgment may be given, under Rule 56, only if there is no dispute as to any material fact. There was no occasion in the trial court for Mrs. Fountain to dispute the facts material to a claim that a personal obligation existed, since the only claim considered by that court on her motion for summary judgment was the claim that there was a resulting trust. When the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court should have considered a claim for personal judgment it was error for it to deprive Mrs. Fountain of an opportunity to dispute the facts material to that claim by ordering summary judgment against her. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, therefore, reversed and the cause remanded to the District Court for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion of the Court of Appeals as here modified. Reversed.

United States Supreme Court CASCADE NAT. GAS v. EL PASO NAT. GAS(1967) No. 24 Argued: January 12, 1967Decided: February 27, 1967 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 5, California v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. et al., and No. 24, Southern California Edison Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. et al., also on appeal from the same court. </s> Almost three years ago this Court directed the District Court to order " without delay" that appellee El Paso Natural Gas Co. divest itself of the Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp., whose acquisition by El Paso was found to have violated 7 of the Clayton Act. United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 662 . Following remand, leave was unsuccessfully sought under Rule 24 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to intervene in the divestiture proceedings by various parties, including appellants, the State of California, where El Paso sells most of its gas; Southern California Edison, a large industrial natural gas user in California; and Cascade Natural Gas, a distributor in Oregon and Washington, whose sole supplier of natural gas was Pacific Northwest. Rule 24 (a) (3) then provided for intervention of right when the applicant is " so situated" as to be " adversely affected by . . . disposition of property" under court control. Amended Rule 24 (a) (2), which became effective after the intervention motions were denied, provides for intervention of right " when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property . . . and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest" unless it is adequately represented by existing parties. The District Court thereafter approved a divestiture plan whereby a New Company would be formed by El Paso to receive the properties and assets which El Paso received from Pacific Northwest. Appellants, claiming that the conditions under which the New Company would be established would fail to create a competitive pipeline in keeping with this Court's mandate, appealed from the District Court's denial of their motions to intervene. Held: </s> 1. The District Court erred in denying appellants the right to intervene in the divestiture proceedings. Pp. 133-136. [386 U.S. 129, 130] </s> (a) The category under old Rule 24 (a) (3) of " so situated" as to be " adversely affected" by disposition of property was not limited exclusively to those with an interest in property. Pp. 133-135. </s> (b) Protection of California interests in a competitive system was " at the heart of our mandate" directing divestiture (cf. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 312 U.S. 502, 506 ). Both the State of California and Southern California Edison qualified as intervenors of right under old Rule 24 (a) (3). P. 135. </s> (c) Since the entire merits of the case must be reopened to give those parties an opportunity to be heard as of right as intervenors, the new Rule 24 (a) (2), which is applicable to " further proceedings" in pending actions, is broad enough to include Cascade as an intervenor as of right since it has " an interest," not otherwise adequately represented, in the " transaction which is the subject of this action." Pp. 135-136. </s> 2. Though the Attorney General has the right to settle litigation, such " settlement" cannot circumscribe the execution of this Court's mandate. P. 136. </s> 3. The following guidelines are suggested for the new decree: </s> (a) The New Company's gas reserves must not be proportionately less to the existing reserves than those which Pacific Northwest had when it was independent; and reserves developed after the merger must, after thorough hearings, be equitably divided between El Paso and the New Company. Pp. 136-137. </s> (b) The terms of gas-acquisition contracts should be negotiated by the New Company, after full opportunity to evaluate their advisability, under such restrictions as the Natural Gas Act may impose. Pp. 137-138. </s> (c) The competitive position of the New Company and its financial viability must be comparable to that which Pacific Northwest enjoyed before the illegal merger obliterated it. P. 138. </s> (d) The severance of the illegal combination, whether by sale to outside interests or otherwise, must be swiftly made and effected in such a manner as to ensure that the New Company's stock does not end up under control of El Paso interests. Pp. 138-142. </s> 4. A District Judge different from the one who heard the case before shall be assigned to hear the case on remand. Pp. 142-143. </s> Reversed and remanded. [386 U.S. 129, 131] Richard B. Hooper argued the cause for appellant in No. 4. With him on the brief were H. B. Jones, Jr., and Wilbert Carl Anderson. William M. Bennett argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant in No. 5. Rollin E. Woodbury argued the cause for appellant in No. 24. With him on the brief were Harry W. Sturges, Jr., and William E. Marx. </s> Gregory A. Harrison argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee El Paso Natural Gas Co. in all cases. Daniel M. Friedman argued the cause for the United States in all cases. On the brief were Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Turner, Richard A. Posner and Milton J. Grossman. </s> Richard W. Sabin, Assistant Attorney General of Oregon, by special leave of Court, argued the cause for the State of Oregon, as amicus curiae. With him on the brief was Robert Y. Thornton, Attorney General. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> When this case was here the last time, 1 we held that the acquisition of Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corporation by El Paso Natural Gas Company violated 7 of the Clayton Act; and we directed the District Court " to order divestiture without delay." United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 662 . That was on April 6, 1964. It is now nearly three years later and, as we shall see, no divestiture in any meaningful sense has been directed. The United States, now an appellee, maintains that the issues respecting divestiture are not [386 U.S. 129, 132] before us. The threshold question does indeed involve another matter. Appellants were denied intervention by the District Court and came here by way of appeal, 32 Stat. 823, 15 U.S.C. 29. We noted probable jurisdiction. 382 U.S. 970 . </s> I. </s> The initial question concerning intervention turns on a construction of Rule 24 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure entitled " Intervention of Right." At the time the District Court ruled on the motions that Rule provided in relevant part, " Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action . . . (3) when the applicant is so situated as to be adversely affected by . . . disposition of property which is in the custody or subject to the control or disposition of the court or an officer thereof." As amended effective July 1, 1966, subsequent to the time these motions to intervene were denied, Rule 24 (a) (2) provides that there may be intervention of right, " when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties." </s> California, one of the appellants, is a State where El Paso sells most of its gas and its purpose in intervening was to assure that Pacific Northwest, illegally merged with El Paso, or its successor, would be restored as an effective competitor in California. As we noted in the prior opinion, Pacific Northwest had been " a substantial factor in the California market at the time it was acquired by El Paso." 376 U.S., at 658 . It was to restore that " competitive factor" that divestiture was ordered. Id., at 658-662. Southern California Edison, another [386 U.S. 129, 133] appellant, is a large industrial user of natural gas purchasing from El Paso sources and desirous of retaining competition in California. Cascade Natural Gas is a distributor in Oregon and Washington, and its sole supplier of natural gas was Pacific Northwest and will be the New Company created under the divestiture plan. Cascade maintains that there has been a grossly unfair division of gas reserves between El Paso and the New Company, particularly in the southwest field known as the San Juan Basin. Moreover, the District Court approved contracts between El Paso and the New Company for delivery of gas both from Canada and from the San Juan Basin, and allowed El Paso unilaterally and without application to the Federal Power Commission, to saddle new and allegedly onerous prices and other conditions on the New Company. Moreover, the stock of West Coast Transmission Co., Ltd., was ordered sold for the benefit of El Paso. Pacific Northwest had owned about a fourth of West Coast Transmission's stock and that ownership gave Pacific Northwest, it is said, special insight into and access to the Canadian gas supply. These factors, implicating the ability of Pacific Northwest to perform in the future, give Cascade, it is argued, standing to intervene. </s> Under old Rule 24 (a) (3) those " adversely affected" by a disposition of property would usually be those who have an interest in the property. 2 But we cannot read it to mean exclusively that group. </s> Rule 24 (a) (3) was not merely a restatement of existing federal practice at law and in equity. If it had been, there would be force in the argument that the rigidity of the older cases remains unaltered, restricting intervention as of right very narrowly, as for example where there is a fund in court to which a third party asserts [386 U.S. 129, 134] a right that would be lost absent intervention. Credits Commutation Co. v. United States, 177 U.S. 311, 316 ; Central Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 218 F. 336, 339. But the Advisory Committee stated that Rule 24 " amplifies and restates the present federal practice at law and in equity." We therefore know that some elasticity was injected; 3 and the question is, how much. As stated by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the Central Trust Co. case, " It is not always easy to draw the line." Ibid. </s> In Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 312 U.S. 502 , a consent decree was entered in an antitrust suit, designed to protect Panhandle from Columbia which had acquired domination of the former to stifle [386 U.S. 129, 135] its competition. The decree sought to assure opportunities for competition by Panhandle. A security holder of Panhandle sought to intervene on Panhandle's behalf when the consent decree was reopened and was denied that right. We reversed, noting at the outset that " the circumstances under which interested outsiders should be allowed to become participants in a litigation is, barring very special circumstances, a matter for the nisi prius court. But where the enforcement of a public law also demands distinct safeguarding of private interests by giving them a formal status in the decree, the power to enforce rights thus sanctioned is not left to the public authorities nor put in the keeping of the district court's discretion." Id., at 506. </s> We noted that Panhandle's economic independence was " at the heart of the controversy." Ibid. In the present case protection of California interests in a competitive system was at the heart of our mandate directing divestiture. For it was the absorption of Pacific North-west by El Paso that stifled that competition and disadvantaged the California interests. It was indeed their interests, as part of the public interest in a competitive system, that our mandate was designed to protect. In that sense the present case is very close to Pipe Line Co. Apart from that but in the spirit of Pipe Line Co. we think that California and Southern California Edison qualify as intervenors under Rule 24 (a) (3). Certainly these two appellants are " so situated" geographically as to be " adversely affected" within the meaning of Rule 24 (a) (3) by a merger that reduces the competitive factor in natural gas available to Californians. We conclude that it was error to deny them intervention. We need not decide whether Cascade could have intervened as of right under that Rule. For there is now in effect a new version of Rule 24 (a) which in subsection (2) recognizes as a proper element in intervention " an interest" in the " transaction which is the subject of the action." This Rule applies to [386 U.S. 129, 136] " further proceedings" in pending actions. 383 U.S. 1031 . Since the entire merits of the case must be reopened to give California and Southern California Edison an opportunity to be heard as of right as intervenors, we conclude that the new Rule 24 (a) (2) is broad enough to include Cascade also; and as we shall see the " existing parties" have fallen far short of representing its interests. We therefore reverse the District Court in each of these appeals and remand with directions to allow each appellant to intervene as of right, to vacate the order of divestiture and to have de novo hearings on the type of divestiture we envisioned and made plain in our opinion in 376 U.S. 651 . </s> II. </s> The necessity for new hearings needs a word of explanation. </s> The United States on oral argument stated that the decree to which it agreed and which it urges us to approve was made in " settlement" of the litigation. We do not question the authority of the Attorney General to settle suits after, as well as before, they reach here. The Department of Justice, however, by stipulation or otherwise has no authority to circumscribe the power of the courts to see that our mandate is carried out. No one, except this Court, has authority to alter or modify our mandate. United States v. du Pont & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 325 . Our direction was that the District Court provide for " divestiture without delay." That mandate in the context of the opinion plainly meant that Pacific Northwest or a new company be at once restored to a position where it could compete with El Paso in the California market. </s> We do not undertake to write the decree. But we do suggest guidelines that should be followed: </s> (1) Gas Reserves. The gas reserves granted the New Company must be no less in relation to present existing [386 U.S. 129, 137] reserves than Pacific Northwest had when it was independent; and the new gas reserves developed since the merger must be equitably divided between El Paso and the New Company. We are told by the intervenors that El Paso gets the new reserves in the San Juan Basin - which due to their geographical propinquity to California are critical to competition in that market. But the merged company, which discovered them, represented the interests both of El Paso and of Pacific Northwest. We do not know what an equitable division would require. Hearings are necessary, followed by meticulous findings made in light of the competitive requirements to which we have adverted. </s> As already indicated, the proposed decree provides the terms of contracts 4 imposed on the New Company respecting the purchase and gathering of gas from various sources. It is urged that these contracts are onerous, detrimental to the New Company, and partial to El Paso interests. We do not pass upon the wisdom or desirability of the proposed contracts. It is enough to note that they were proposed by El Paso, that the changes, reluctantly acceded to by the Government, will redound to the substantial benefit of El Paso, and that the New Company has had no opportunity to evaluate the advisability of the terms or to negotiate for better terms. Nor has the Federal Power Commission had the opportunity to pass [386 U.S. 129, 138] upon the contracts. The terms of these contracts should be negotiated by the New Company under such restrictions as the Natural Gas Act may impose. </s> (2) Financial Aspects. As noted, El Paso is allowed to sell the stock of West Coast Transmission Co., Ltd., brought into the merger by Pacific Northwest, and keep the proceeds, which if stock prices at the time of the proposed divestiture are considered might result, it is alleged, in a profit of $10,000,000 or more, while the New Company gets the stock of Northwest Production Co. which from 1960-1963 showed heavy losses. It is charged that by the proposed decree El Paso is saving the cream for itself and foisting the " cats and dogs" on the New Company. It is also earnestly argued that the New Company will sorely need the valuable and fairly liquid stock of West Coast Transmission if it is to have the working capital necessary to restore the competitive balance that the merger destroyed. These are highly relevant arguments. Certainly a plan of divestiture of the kind we envisaged must establish a New Company in the same or comparable competitive position that Pacific Northwest was in when the illegal merger obliterated it. </s> It is also pointed out that some $53,000,000 of taxable losses which Pacific Northwest had were utilized by El Paso during the years following the ill-starred merger. It is argued that since these tax loss carry-overs were in a real sense an asset of Pacific Northwest utilized by El Paso, the New Company should receive other assets or a reduction in debt of equivalent value. These allegations, if proven, require remuneration of some kind to the New Company. For it must be a viable, healthy unit, as able to compete as Pacific Northwest was when it was acquired by El Paso. </s> (3) Control of El Paso. The divestiture decree provides that El Paso is to cause the formation of the New Company, whose chief executive shall be approved by [386 U.S. 129, 139] El Paso, the Government, and the court. The new company is to file an application with the Federal Power Commission " at the earliest practicable date" requesting the issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing it to acquire, own, and operate the properties to be received from El Paso. 5 When the necessary certificates, authorizations, and orders are obtained from the FPC, El Paso is to transfer to the New Company the properties and assets set forth in the plan of divestiture, generally those which El Paso received from Pacific Northwest. In return, the New Company is to assume certain of El Paso's indebtedness and issue to El Paso all its common stock. El Paso is to transfer the New Company stock to the New Company's chief executive, as voting trustee. The New Company's chief executive shall release the stock only in accordance with the plan for divestment of El Paso's interest in the stock. Under the plan, El Paso is ordered completely to divest itself of all interest in the New Company stock within three years after the transfer of the assets to the New Company. Alternate methods of divestment are provided. (1) El Paso may, within 18 months of the transfer, distribute at least 80% of the shares to holders of El Paso common stock who are willing to exchange their El Paso shares for New Company shares, and who shall own no other El Paso shares immediately after the exchange. The remainder of New Company stock would be disposed of by a public offering. (2) If El Paso does not dispose of the New Company stock under the first alternative, it is to dispose of the New Company stock " by one or more sales to the public." At such public offering no El Paso officer or director and no owner of El Paso's capital stock, [386 U.S. 129, 140] in excess of one-half of one percent of the total shares outstanding, shall be permitted to purchase New Company stock. 6 </s> Thus the El Paso-Pacific Northwest combination will not begin to be severed until the regulatory approvals have been obtained. Complete divestiture is not required until three years after the transfer of assets. An earlier divestiture is permissible, but divestiture is mandatory only after three years. During the interregnum between the entry of the decree and the regulatory approvals, and between the transfer of assets and El Paso's eventual disposition of the New Company stock, El Paso will continue to reap the benefits of the illegal combination. Moreover, prior to the eventual disposition of the New Company stock, all the stock is to be voted by the New Company's chief executive. The chief executive is to be approved by El Paso, and El Paso is the beneficial owner of the stock to be voted by him. Even though the chief executive is subject to the ultimate control and supervision of the District Court, there is danger that he may vote the New Company stock in a manner calculated to perpetuate the very conditions which led us to order severance of the illegal combination. </s> Even after the mandatory disposition of the new company stock there is considerable danger that El Paso interests may end up controlling the New Company. The decree, to be sure, provides that neither El Paso officers and directors nor owners of more than one-half of one percent of El Paso stock shall purchase New Company stock at a public offering. But the decree does not prohibit [386 U.S. 129, 141] members of the families of such prohibited purchasers from obtaining New Company stock. Further, under the terms of the decree, it would be possible for a group of El Paso stockholders, each with less than one-half of one percent of El Paso stock, to acquire at the initial public offering enough New Company stock substantially to influence or even to dominate the New Company. Or, such a group could combine with the families of prohibited purchasers in order to control the New Company. After the exchange or public offering, there is no restriction on the number of New Company shares El Paso shareholders may acquire. Thus, there is a danger that major El Paso stockholders may, subsequent to the exchange or public offering, purchase large blocks of New Company stock and obtain effective control. Thus, there has been no studied attempt to ensure the swift severance of the illegal combination or to make sure that the New Company's stock does not end up controlled by El Paso interests. Disposition of all of the stock with all convenient speed is necessary and conditions must be imposed to make sure that El Paso interests do not acquire a controlling interest. For if they do, the New Company might well be only El Paso under the masquerade of a beard. </s> The proposed decree bypasses completely the prospect of an outright purchase of the assets of the New Company or its stock by outside interests. Two purchasers apparently are anxious and eager; and before the United States knuckled under to El Paso and " settled" this litigation, it represented to the District Court that a " sale to a third party is both a desirable and possible alternative to the El Paso plan." No alternative of that kind was chosen. El Paso carried the day, obtained a decree that promises to perpetuate rather than terminate this unlawful merger, and that threatens to turn loose on the [386 U.S. 129, 142] public a New Company unable to maintain the competitive role that Pacific Northwest filled before this illegal transaction took place. </s> The convenience of El Paso would be the easier choice. The enforcement of our mandate and 7 of the Clayton Act is the harder one; but that is the criterion we follow. </s> The evil with which the proposed decree is permeated reflects the attitude or philosophy of the District Court which was frankly stated after our remand as follows: </s> " The Court: You see, what this plan proposes is a division of the country, a division of the market, a division of the reserves, one area to New Company and another area to El Paso. That's what the root of this plan is. </s> " Now, if you're going to get New Company down here in competition in Southern California from the San Juan Basin, you'd upset the whole scheme. To even that situation up, you're going to have to put El Paso up in the Northwest in competition there; and that's a kind of ridiculous thing - long pipelines from these various sources. </s> " It seems to me to make a lot of sense that New Company operating in the Northwest from very much closer Canadian reserves, and Northwest reserves, and El Paso down in the Southwest, with reserves in the San Juan Basin, serving the Southern California area, among some other areas. That seems to me to make a lot of sense." </s> The proposed decree in its various ramifications does precisely that. It therefore does the opposite of what our prior opinion and mandate commanded. Once more, and nearly three years after we first spoke, we reverse and remand, with directions that there be divestiture without delay and that the Chief Judge of the Circuit or the Judicial Council of the Circuit (28 U.S.C. 332) [386 U.S. 129, 143] assign a different District Judge to hear the case. Cf. United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920, 926, and its sequel, United States v. Ritter, 273 F.2d 30, 32; Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Chandler, 303 F.2d 55, 57; Texaco, Inc. v. Chandler, 354 F.2d 655, 657. </s> Reversed. </s> [Footnote 1 California v. Federal Power Commission, 369 U.S. 482 , involved another aspect of the same merger; and we held that the Commission should not have approved it until the District Court decided whether it violated 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C. 18. </s> [Footnote 2 See Board of Comm'rs v. Bernardin, 74 F.2d 809, 816; Dowdy v. Hawfield, 88 U.S. App. D.C. 241, 242, 189 F.2d 637, 638. </s> [Footnote 3 In 1966 the Advisory Committee when making a revision of Rule 24 (a) said: " Rule 24 (a) (3) as amended in 1948 provided for intervention of right where the applicant established that he would be adversely affected by the distribution or disposition of property involved in an action to which he had not been made a party. Significantly, some decided cases virtually disregarded the language of this provision. Thus Professor Moore states: `The concept of a fund has been applied so loosely that it is possible for a court to find a fund in almost any in personam action.' 4 Moore's Federal Practice § 24.093., at 55 (2d ed. 1962), and see, e. g., Formulabs, Inc. v. Hartley Pen Co., 275 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1960). This development was quite natural, for Rule 24 (a) (3) was unduly restricted. If an absentee would be substantially affected in a practical sense by the determination made in an action, he should, as a general rule, be entitled to intervene, and his right to do so should not depend on whether there is a fund to be distributed or otherwise disposed of. Intervention of right is here seen to be a kind of counterpart to Rule 19 (a) (2) (i) on joinder of persons needed for a just adjudication: where, upon motion of a party in an action, an absentee should be joined so that he may protect his interest which as a practical matter may be substantially impaired by the disposition of the action, he ought to have a right to intervene in the action on his own motion. See Louisell & Hazard, Pleading and Procedure: State and Federal 749-50 (1962)." 4 Moore, Federal Practice (1966 Spec. Supp.), c. 24, pp. 1-2. (Emphasis supplied.) </s> [Footnote 4 For example, one contract relates to reciprocal gas gathering between the New Company and El Paso in the San Juan Basin. Prior to the merger El Paso and Pacific Northwest entered into a contract providing that they would develop gathering lines in the basin cooperatively, and that whichever company made greater use of the other's gathering lines would pay a gathering charge of 1.375 per Mcf. of extra gas. El Paso did much more gathering for Pacific Northwest than Pacific Northwest did for El Paso. The proposed agreement increases the gathering charge to 4.5. The intervenors claim that the increased rate will substantially increase the New Company's costs and impair its ability to compete. </s> [Footnote 5 We are informed that the New Company's chief executive has been approved and that the New Company has applied to the Federal Power Commission for certification. The FPC proceedings have been continued until this Court has decided this appeal. </s> [Footnote 6 El Paso is also enjoined from having as an officer or director any person who is also an officer, director, or employee of the New Company or who owns any capital stock of the New Company or whose immediate family owns more than one-tenth of one percent of the stock of the New Company. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITE and MR. JUSTICE FORTAS took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART, whom MR. JUSTICE HARLAN joins, dissenting. </s> The question presented by these appeals, and the only question, is whether the District Court erred in denying the appellants' motions to intervene as parties. Because I think the Court's answer to that question is wrong, and because I think the Court has gone further astray in undertaking to address itself to issues which are not here for adjudication, I respectfully dissent. </s> Intervention of right is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 (a). At the time the District Court passed on appellants' motions to intervene, 1 that Rule provided as follows: </s> " Rule 24. Intervention </s> " (a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the representation of the applicant's interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the action; or (3) when the applicant is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property which is in the custody or [386 U.S. 129, 144] subject to the control or disposition of the court or an officer thereof." </s> I gather it is common ground that neither 24 (a) (1) nor 24 (a) (2) applies to these cases. No appellant claims any statutory right to intervene under 24 (a) (1). And it is clear that no appellant has any right to intervene under 24 (a) (2), for in order to intervene under that provision, the applicant for intervention must show that he " may be bound" by the judgment in the Government's action in a res judicata sense. Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683 ; Sutphen Estates, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 19 . See Credits Commutation Co. v. United States, 177 U.S. 311 . And it is settled that the judgment in a government suit has no res judicata effect on private antitrust claims. Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, supra. </s> The Court, however, finds that the State of California and Southern California Edison Co. have an absolute right to intervene under 24 (a) (3). I disagree for several reasons. </s> Analysis of the Rule's proper scope must begin with an historical examination of intervention practice, for, as the Court has stated, the Rule constitutes a " codification of general doctrines of intervention." Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 312 U.S. 502, 508 . 2 Intervention to assert an interest in property within the court's control or custody derives from the English doctrine of appearance pro interesse suo. When a court acquired in rem jurisdiction over property, by admiralty libel, sequestration, receivership, or other process, a person claiming title or some other legal or equitable interest [386 U.S. 129, 145] was allowed to come in to assert his claim to the property. Otherwise, he would have been subjected to the obvious injustice of having his claim erased or impaired by the court's adjudication without ever being heard. Elements of this procedure were gradually assimilated in this country, e. g., Pennock v. Coe, 23 How. 117, and provided the foundation for intervention doctrine in the federal courts. 3 </s> Various generalizations about the nature of the property interest that will support intervention of right under this doctrine have been attempted. This Court has stated that the requisite interest must be " of such a direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment." Smith v. Gale, 144 U.S. 509, 518 . 4 Other courts have spoken of " a legal interest as distinguished from interests of a general and indefinite character," Radford Iron Co. v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 62 F.2d 940, 942 (C. A. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 748 , or " one that is known and protected by the law, sufficient and of the type to be denominated a lien, legal or equitable," Gross v. Missouri & A. Ry. Co., 74 F. Supp. 242, 249 (D.C. W. D. Ark.). These formulations are of limited use in deciding particular cases. More illuminating are examples of particular interests which have been held to support intervention of right under the established practice. These have included the [386 U.S. 129, 146] claim of ownership in attached property, 5 the claim of a part owner to personal property being foreclosed under a mortgage, 6 a mortgage lien on a leasehold interest subjected to forfeiture, 7 and the claim of the purchaser of land involved in foreclosure proceedings against the seller. 8 Interests like these have continued to provide a familiar basis for intervention of right since the promulgation of Rule 24 (a) (3). 9 </s> The other traditional basis for intervention under 24 (a) (3) derives from interpleader practice; when a number of persons possess claims to a fund which are or may be mutually exclusive, intervention is allowed a claimant. Thus, in Oliver v. United States, 156 F.2d 281 (C. A. 8th Cir.), the United States had acquired certain land and deposited the purchase price in court to be divided among the various owners. A title insurance company which asserted a claim to the proceeds, based on services rendered to the sellers, was allowed to intervene. 10 </s> Under Rule 24 (a) (3) the federal courts have sometimes allowed intervention even though the interest likely to be " adversely affected" was not one that would be recognized under traditional interpretations of the pro interesse suo or interpleader types of intervention. A representative case is Formulabs, Inc. v. Hartley Pen Co., 275 F.2d 52 (C. A. 9th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 830 . [386 U.S. 129, 147] The applicant for intervention had licensed a secret manufacturing process to one of the parties, and the other party was seeking to apply discovery to the process. Finding that the trade secret was " property" subject to the court's control and that the secrecy which was the heart of the applicant's interest in that property might be totally destroyed, the court allowed intervention under 24 (a) (3). </s> But the claims of California and the Southern California Edison Co. in these cases lie far beyond the reach of even the most imaginable construction of 24 (a) (3). To be sure, the assets of El Paso are " property which is in the custody or subject to the control or disposition of the court" for purposes of the Rule. Sutphen Estates, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 19 . But the " interest" in these assets relied upon by the appellants to justify intervention is merely their preference that certain of the assets, particularly the San Juan Basin reserves, end up in the hands of New Company rather than El Paso, on the theory that such an allocation may be conducive to greater gas competition in California. These general and indefinite interests do not even remotely resemble the direct and concrete stake in litigation required for intervention of right. The Court's decision not only overturns established general principles of intervention, but, as will be shown below in detail, also repudiates a large and long-established body of decisions specifically, and correctly, denying intervention in government antitrust litigation. </s> This Court is all too familiar with the fact that antitrust litigation is inherently protracted. Indeed, it is just such delay which seems to so concern the Court in this case. But nothing could be better calculated to confuse and prolong antitrust litigation than the rule which the Court today announces. The entrance of additional parties into antitrust suits can only serve [386 U.S. 129, 148] to multiply trial exhibits and testimony, and further confound the attempt to bring order out of complicated economic issues. For these reasons, federal courts have been most reluctant to grant intervention under 24 (a) (3) even in private antitrust litigation. For example, in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d 564 (C. A. 7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 834 , the State of Illinois, representing consumers' interests in a possible rate rebate, was denied intervention in a suit brought by a utility charging equipment manufacturers with price fixing. 11 </s> The reasons for denying intervention are even stronger when intervention is sought in an antitrust suit brought by the Government. To the extent that the would-be intervenor seeks to press his own private antitrust claims against the defendant, intervention must be denied because Congress has carefully provided separate statutory procedures for private and public antitrust litigation. 12 As the Court observed in United States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 518 -519, the thrust of the Clayton Act " is sharply to distinguish between Government suits, either criminal or civil, and private suits for injunctive relief or for treble damages. Different policy considerations govern each of these. They may proceed simultaneously or in disregard of each other." 13 The Court has accordingly approved the " unquestionably sound policy of not [386 U.S. 129, 149] permitting private antitrust plaintiffs to press their claims against alleged violators in the same suit as the Government." Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683 , at 693. A fortiori, intervention is improper when a private party appears in order to vindicate his theory of the public interest in an action brought by the Government. For as the Court has consistently recognized, it is the " United States, which must alone speak for the public interest" in antitrust litigation. Buckeye Coal & Ry. Co. v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co., 269 U.S. 42, 49 . 14 The appellants here seek intervention to press their own version of what the public interest in gas competition in California requires. But the determination of what the public interest requires is the statutory duty and responsibility of the Government. The law explicitly requires that suits brought by the Government for injunctive relief shall be " under the direction of the Attorney General." 15 U.S.C. 4 and 25. That statutory command is violated when private parties are allowed to intervene and control public suits. The Government's discharge of its duties would be completely undermined if its antitrust litigation were cluttered with a myriad of private volunteers, all pressing their own particular interpretations of the " public interest" against the defendant, the Government, and each other. </s> It has been the consistent policy of this Court to deny intervention to a person seeking to assert some general [386 U.S. 129, 150] public interest in a suit in which a public authority charged with the vindication of that interest is already a party. Thus, in In re Engelhard & Sons Co., 231 U.S. 646 , intervention was denied to a subscriber seeking to enter a suit between a municipality and a telephone utility involving the validity of the city's rate ordinance and the disposition of rate overcharges. Similarly, in City of New York v. Consolidated Gas Co. of New York, 253 U.S. 219 , and City of New York v. New York Telephone Co., 261 U.S. 312 , the City of New York was not allowed to intervene on behalf of consumer residents of the city in litigation between state authorities and public utilities over the validity of state rate regulation. The wise principle of those decisions is reflected in many other federal cases decided both before and after the adoption of Rule 24 (a) (3). 15 </s> The applicability of this principle to intervention in antitrust suits brought by the Government was early [386 U.S. 129, 151] recognized by this Court. Ex parte Leaf Tobacco Board, 222 U.S. 578 , denied intervention to enterprises that sold tobacco to defendants in an antitrust suit brought by the Government. From that time since, we have consistently refused to recognize the right to intervene in government antitrust suits. 16 Allen Calculators, Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 322 U.S. 137 ; Partmar Corp. v. United States, 338 U.S. 804 ; Wometco Television & Theatre Co. v. United States, 355 U.S. 40 ; Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 364 U.S. 518 , dismissing appeal from 186 F. Supp. 776; Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, supra; Bardy v. United States, 371 U.S. 576 . 17 And we have upheld [386 U.S. 129, 152] denial of intervention to a private party who claimed that a decree negotiated between the Government and an antitrust defendant failed to carry out the mandate of this Court. Ball v. United States, 338 U.S. 802 . </s> The results which follow from the Court's rejection of the practical wisdom embodied in these decisions are apparent. There were over 20 applications to intervene in the decree proceedings below. The Court's construction of 24 (a) (3) would require the District Court to grant most if not all of them. El Paso gas goes to millions of consumers, and under the Court's decision any or all of them are entitled to intervene as of right. And there is nothing in the Court's opinion which suggests that this right to intervene is limited to litigation over remedy. If consumers and others have an interest in making sure that a government antitrust decree meets their standards of effectiveness, they have an even greater interest in insuring that a violation is found. Thus the Court's reasoning gives any consumer a right to intervene in government antitrust litigation at the very outset. The Court invites a scope of intervention that will make the delays in this case seem mercifully short. </s> The Court's decision would not be of such concern, nor merit so much discussion, if it were simply limited to 24 (a) (3), a provision which has been superseded. But the same approach which creates a right to intervene for California and the Southern California Edison Co. under the old Rule 24 (a) (3) appears in the Court's construction of the new Rule 24, under which it says Cascade has a right to intervene. The new Rule 24 (a) (2) [386 U.S. 129, 153] replaces the previous Rule 24 (a) (2) and (3), and provides for intervention of right: </s> " [W]hen the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties." </s> This and other amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated by this Court to " take effect on July 1, 1966, and . . . govern all proceedings in actions brought thereafter and also in all further proceedings in actions then pending . . . ." 383 U.S. 1031 . Since the District Court denied Cascade's motion to intervene in 1965, before the effective date of the amended Rule, the new Rule was inapplicable to Cascade's motion. 18 But even if the new Rule were applicable, neither Cascade nor the other appellants could claim intervention of right under it. </s> The purpose of the revision was to remedy certain logical shortcomings in the construction of the former 24 (a) (2), see Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, supra, and to give recognition to decisions such as [386 U.S. 129, 154] Formulabs, Inc. v. Hartley Pen Co., supra, which had expanded intervention under the former 24 (a) (3) beyond the strict pro interesse suo model it embodied. 19 But an applicant is still required to have an " interest" in the litigation sufficiently direct and immediate to justify his entry as a matter of right. The remote and general concerns that appellants State of California and Southern California Edison Co. have with this government suit have already been discussed. And Cascade's interest is even more insubstantial. While it purchases gas from El Paso in Oregon, it seeks intervention to vindicate gas competition in California. 20 Even if it should be thought that the amended Rule might encompass such remote interests in some conceivable circumstances, it is clear that such interests may never justify intervention of right in public antitrust litigation, where Congress has carefully entrusted the conduct of government suits to the " direction of the Attorney General." But even if Cascade should pass this hurdle, it would also have to show that there was a failure of " adequate representation" by the Justice Department in this case. </s> The Court states that the Government " knuckled under to El Paso" and has " fallen far short of representing" Cascade's interest. Since the interest that Cascade claims to be representing is that of the public, the Court is charging the Justice Department with dereliction of duty or serious incompetence. I regard this charge as wholly unjustified. The Government did settle for less than all the relief that it sought at the outset. But this is a wholly familiar phenomenon of negotiation. Bargaining [386 U.S. 129, 155] for consent decrees and stipulated remedies is a normal and necessary element in the Government's enforcement of the antitrust laws. Moreover, it is perfectly conceivable that in the course of negotiations the Government may become aware of errors in its opening position. If, as the Court's opinion seems to suggest, the Government is required to press its original negotiating position unceasingly and to the bitter end, the number of cases which the Government can afford to undertake will be sharply reduced, and the enforcement of the antitrust laws will ultimately become less effective. And of course the delay in antitrust litigation, which so concerns the Court, will markedly increase. </s> The Court's standard of " adequate representation" comes down to this: If, after the existing parties have settled a case or pursued litigation to the end, some volunteer comes along who disagrees with the parties' assessment of the issues or the way they have pursued their respective interests, intervention must be granted to that volunteer as of right. This strange standard is not only unprecedented and unwise, it is also unworkable. </s> The requirement of inadequate representation by existing parties as a precondition of the right to intervene under the new Rule 24 is obviously an adaptation of the similar standard contained in the former 24 (a) (2). Decisions under that standard allowed intervention of right when the intervenor could show a conflict of interest between himself and the party supposed to represent his interest, 21 a complete failure of representation by existing parties, 22 or collusion or the likelihood of collusion between [386 U.S. 129, 156] them. 23 Mere tactical disagreement over how litigation should be conducted is obviously insufficient to support intervention of right. 24 In ignoring these precedents, the Court also overlooks the sound policies which underlie them. The Court's approach draws judges into the adversary arena and forces them into the impossible position of trying to second-guess the parties in the pursuit of their own interests. It is also wasteful and productive of delay, because under this strange standard a person's right to intervene in litigation cannot be ascertained until that litigation is concluded and the existing parties' conduct evaluated. </s> Wrong as the Court's approach is with respect to litigation generally, it is even more wrong when a would-be intervenor seeks to challenge the adequacy of the Government's representation of the public interest. The separation of powers in our federal system generates principles that make it peculiarly inappropriate for courts to assume the role of supervision over policy decisions of the Executive. Yet the Court presumes to tell the Justice Department that it made tactical errors in conducting litigation, failed in its assessment of the public interest, and cannot settle a lawsuit which it has brought. This Court does not have the constitutional power to second-guess [386 U.S. 129, 157] decisions of the Attorney General made within the bounds of his official discretion. That is the responsibility of the President and, ultimately, the electorate. In words appropriate here, we long ago stated in the context of an attack on the Government's settlement of an antitrust case: " . . . we do not find in the statutes defining the powers and duties of the Attorney General any such limitation on the exercise of his discretion as this contention involves. His authority to make determinations includes the power to make erroneous decisions as well as correct ones." Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 331 -332. The Court today gives only lip service to these principles. It states that " We do not question the authority of the Attorney General to settle suits after, as well as before, they reach here." Ante, at 136. But it then proceeds to take the direction of a government lawsuit out of the hands of the Attorney General and into its own. </s> The Court relies on the fact that we have previously rendered a judgment in this case and cites dictum from the opinion in United States v. E. I. du Pont & Co., 366 U.S. 316 , to justify the extraordinary course it takes. But in the absence of outright fraud, it has never been thought that the fact that parties have initially resorted to the courts gives judges power to set aside later settlement agreements and impose others on the parties. And certainly when it is the Executive Branch of the Government that has made the settlement as representative of the public interest, only the grossest bad faith or malfeasance on its part could possibly support such a step. Either the Court is saying the Government was guilty of such misconduct - a charge totally without support in the record - or the Court has grossly overreached the permissible limit of judicial power. </s> Not only concern for the constitutional position of this Court, but more directly pragmatic considerations [386 U.S. 129, 158] underlie my disagreement with today's decision. To permit volunteers to intervene and second-guess the Justice Department is especially inappropriate when the issues involved, like those in the antitrust field, require technical experience and an assessment and balancing of interests essentially administrative and political. Formulation of effective and consistent government antitrust policy is unlikely to result from " piecemeal intervention of a multitude of individual complainants" 25 in litigation brought by the Government. Less than six years ago we fully recognized this principle: </s> " . . . sound policy would strongly lead us to decline [the] invitation to assess the wisdom of the Government's judgment in negotiating and accepting the . . . consent decree, at least in the absence of any claim of bad faith or malfeasance on the part of the Government in so acting." Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, supra, at 689. 26 </s> Today the Court ignores all this and grants intervention of right to any volunteer claiming to speak for the public interest whenever he can convince a court that the Government might have used bad judgment in conducting or settling a lawsuit. I think this decision, which undermines the Justice Department in the discharge of its responsibilities, and invites obstruction and [386 U.S. 129, 159] delay in the course of public litigation, is unsupported by the provision of old Rule 24, new Rule 24, or any other conceivably tolerable standard governing intervention as of right. The District Court did not err in denying intervention to the appellants, 27 and these appeals should therefore be dismissed. 28 </s> But even if I am completely wrong, and the Court is right in concluding that the District Court erred in denying appellants the right to intervene, the proper course would be simply to remand the case to the District Court so that the appellants' contentions may be met by the Government or El Paso and passed on by a trial court that is intimately familiar with the massive record in this case. Instead, the Court brushes aside the " threshold" question of appellants' right to intervene in a few pages and devotes most of its opinion to pronouncements on gas reserves, delivery contracts, and other intricacies of gas competition in the western United States. These issues were never the subject of adversary proceedings in the District Court. They were never resolved through findings by the District Court. Appellees did not directly brief or argue them before this Court. On the basis of what are in effect ex parte criticisms of the decree entered below, the Court lays down " guidelines" with respect to complex issues which will shape the future of an important segment of this Nation's [386 U.S. 129, 160] commerce. In so doing the Court roams at large, unconfined by anything so mundane as a factual record developed in adversary proceedings. </s> " The obvious must be restated. We do not sit to draft antitrust decrees de novo. This is a court of appeal, not a trial court. We do not see the witnesses, sift the evidence in detail, or appraise the course of extended argument . . . . In short, this Court does not partake of the procedure and is not charged with the responsibility demanded of the court entrusted with the task of devising the details of a decree appropriate for the governance of a vastly complicated situation arising out of unique circumstances." United States v. E. I. du Pont & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 371 (dissenting opinion). </s> The Court has decided this case on little more than repugnance for " the attitude or philosophy of the District Court" and the unjustified and extraordinarily opprobrious conclusion that the Government " knuckled under." This is not a happy foundation for radical extensions of intervention doctrine. And it is not a proper basis for deciding how stock in the New Company should be marketed, or how gas reserves in New Mexico should be divided. In its zeal to censure the District Judge and reprimand the Justice Department, the Court has rushed headlong into a jurisprudential quagmire far more dangerous than the " evil" it purports to discern in the decree entered by the trial court. </s> Finally, I must note my emphatic disagreement with the Court's extraordinary action in directing that further proceedings in this case must be conducted by a different district judge. Federal reviewing courts have taken this serious step only in the rarest circumstances, when the trial judge's personal or emotional involvement in a case has been demonstrated. See Offutt v. United States, [386 U.S. 129, 161] 348 U.S. 11 ; Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 ; Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Chandler, 303 F.2d 55 (C. A. 10th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 915 . No such involvement by the District Judge in this case is remotely suggested by the record. Nobody has requested his replacement at any stage of the proceedings. For this Court, on its own motion, to disqualify a trial judge in the middle of a case because it disagrees with his " philosophy" is not only unprecedented, but incredible. </s> [Footnote 1 The Rule has since been amended. See p. 153, infra. </s> [Footnote 2 This statement is confirmed by the Rules Advisory Committee, which observed that the Rule " amplifies and restates the present federal practice at law and in equity." Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, Notes, 25 (March 1938). </s> [Footnote 3 For a discussion of the English and early American practice, see 4 Moore, Federal Practice § 24.03; 2 Street, Federal Equity Practice 1364-1370 (1909). </s> [Footnote 4 Quoting with approval Horn v. Volcano Water Co., 13 Cal. 62, 69. Subsequent federal decisions following this formulation include Pure Oil Co. v. Ross, 170 F.2d 651, 653 (C. A. 7th Cir.); Dowdy v. Hawfield, 88 U.S. App. D.C. 241, 242, 189 F.2d 637, 638, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 830 . </s> [Footnote 5 Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U.S. 276 . </s> [Footnote 6 Osborne & Co. v. Barge, 30 F. 805 (C. C. N. D. Iowa). </s> [Footnote 7 See United States v. Radice, 40 F.2d 445 (C. A. 2d Cir.). </s> [Footnote 8 Gaines v. Clark, 51 App. D.C. 71, 275 F. 1017. </s> [Footnote 9 E. g., Plitt v. Stonebraker, 90 U.S. App. D.C. 256, 195 F.2d 39 (intervention granted to creditor asserting security interest in goods seized by marshal). </s> [Footnote 10 For expansive interpretations of interpleader-type intervention, see Barnes v. Alexander, 232 U.S. 117 ; Peckham v. Family Loan Co., 212 F.2d 100 (C. A. 5th Cir.). But see Vaughan v. Dickinson, 19 F. R. D. 323 (D.C. W. D. Mich.), aff'd, 237 F.2d 168 (C. A. 6th Cir.). </s> [Footnote 11 Cf. American Louisiana Pipe Line Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 158 F. Supp. 13 (D.C. E. D. Mich.) (county not allowed to intervene on behalf of consumers in private gas contract dispute). See also Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 308 F.2d 856 (C. A. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 936 . </s> [Footnote 12 See 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 4; 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. 15; 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. 15a; 38 Stat. 736, as amended, 737, 15 U.S.C. 25, 26; 32 Stat. 823 (1903), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 28, 29. </s> [Footnote 13 Quoting with approval United States v. Bendix Home Appliances, 10 F. R. D. 73, 77 (D.C. S. D. N. Y.). </s> [Footnote 14 In United States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 518 , the Court stated: " The private-injunction action, like the treble-damage action under 4 of the Act, supplements government enforcement of the antitrust laws; but it is the Attorney General and the United States district attorneys who are primarily charged by Congress with the duty of protecting the public interest under these laws. The Government seeks its injunctive remedies on behalf of the general public; the private plaintiff, though his remedy is made available pursuant to public policy as determined by Congress, may be expected to exercise it only when his personal interest will be served." </s> [Footnote 15 O'Connell v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 19 F.2d 460 (C. A. 9th Cir.) (intervention denied to ratepayer protesting proposed settlement of litigation between utility and municipality); Radford Iron Co. v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 62 F.2d 940 (C. A. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 748 (business injured by utility's proposed dam denied intervention in suit between utility and FPC); MacDonald v. United States, 119 F.2d 821 (C. A. 9th Cir.), aff'd as modified, 315 U.S. 262 (intervention under Rule 24 denied in suit over mineral rights between United States and railroad to one claiming such rights under patent from United States); Reich v. Webb, 336 F.2d 153 (C. A. 9th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 915 (depositors denied 24 (a) (3) intervention in proceeding by Federal Home Loan Bank Board against savings and loan association officers); Gross v. Missouri & A. Ry. Co., 74 F. Supp. 242 (D.C. W. D. Ark.) (24 (a) (3) intervention denied municipalities served by railroad involved in reorganization proceedings to which State was a party); Butterworth v. Dempsey, 229 F. Supp. 754, 798-799 (D.C. Conn.), aff'd, 378 U.S. 562 (intervention under 24 (a) (3) denied overrepresented towns in reapportionment suit brought against state authorities). </s> [Footnote 16 Intervention in this Court was allowed in United States v. St. Louis Terminal, 236 U.S. 194 , but there the " intervenors" were in the practical status of defendants. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 312 U.S. 502 , relied upon by the Court, is completely inapposite. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. was a competitor of defendants charged by the Government with improperly exercising control over Panhandle to weaken its threat as a competitor. A consent decree was negotiated to protect Panhandle's independence. The decree provided for retention of jurisdiction by the court to enter such " further orders and decrees" as were necessary to carry out its purpose, and stated that " Panhandle Eastern, upon proper application, may become a party hereto" to protect its rights under the decree. When the Government later sought modifications of the decree, we held that the decree gave Panhandle the right to intervene. The Court carefully noted that this right to intervene was bottomed solely on the specific provisions of the decree and not general principles of intervention: " Its foundation is the consent decree. We are not here dealing with a conventional form of intervention . . . ." 312 U.S., at 506 . The Court concluded, " Therefore, the codification of general doctrines of intervention contained in Rule 24 (a) does not touch our problem." 312 U.S., at 508 . </s> [Footnote 17 The policy behind these decisions was stated in United States v. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 341 F.2d 1003 (C. A. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 877 , in which ASCAP licensees were denied intervention to assert that ASCAP had violated [386 U.S. 129, 152] a decree in an antitrust suit brought by the Government: " The United States in instituting antitrust litigation seeks to vindicate the public interest and, in so doing, requires continuing control over the suit . . . ." 341 F.2d, at 1008. </s> [Footnote 18 In Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 , the petitioner sought to reopen a default judgment denaturalizing him, relying on amendments to Rule 60 (b). Several Justices thought that the petitioner should be able to obtain relief under the amended Rule even though the District Court had denied the petitioner's application before the effective date of the amendments. Cascade's interest here bears no resemblance to the extraordinary hardship and injustice claimed by the petitioner in Klapprott, where it could be persuasively argued that it was " more consonant with equitable considerations to judge the case on the basis of the Rule now in force, even though the lower court did not have the opportunity to apply it." 335 U.S., at 629 (dissenting opinion). </s> [Footnote 19 See Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24, 28 U.S.C. App. Rule 24 (1964 ed., Supp. II). </s> [Footnote 20 The FPC will protect Cascade's existing supply of gas when New Company applies for certification. See, e. g., Michigan Consolidated Gas Co. v. FPC, 108 U.S. App. D.C. 409, 283 F.2d 204, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 913 . </s> [Footnote 21 Pyle-National Co. v. Amos, 172 F.2d 425 (C. A. 7th Cir.); Mack v. Passaic Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 150 F.2d 474, 154 F.2d 907 (C. A. 3d Cir.); In re Standard Power & Light Corp. 48 F. Supp. 716 (D.C. Del.). </s> [Footnote 22 Pellegrino v. Nesbit, 203 F.2d 463 (C. A. 9th Cir.). </s> [Footnote 23 Cuthill v. Ortman-Miller Machine Co., 216 F.2d 336 (C. A. 7th Cir.); Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (C. A. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 ; Klein v. Nu-Way Shoe Co., 136 F.2d 986 (C. A. 2d Cir.); Molybdenum Corp. of America v. International Mining Corp., 32 F. R. D. 415 (D.C. S. D. N. Y.); Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Jenkins, 7 F. R. D. 197 (D.C. S. D. N. Y.). </s> [Footnote 24 Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 344 F.2d 571 (C. A. 2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 384 U.S. 28 ; Stadin v. Union Electric Co., 309 F.2d 912 (C. A. 8th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 915 ; United States v. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 202 F. Supp. 340 (D.C. S. D. N. Y.). But cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Bisanz Bros., 249 F.2d 22 (C. A. 8th Cir.). </s> [Footnote 25 United States v. General Electric Co., 95 F. Supp. 165, 169 (D.C. N. J.). </s> [Footnote 26 This policy has been given continuing recognition by the lower federal courts. Reich v. Webb, 336 F.2d 153 (C. A. 9th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 915 ; MacDonald v. United States, 119 F.2d 821 (C. A. 9th Cir.), aff'd as modified, 315 U.S. 262 ; United States v. General Electric Co., 95 F. Supp. 165 (D.C. N. J.). See Wometco Television & Theatre Co. v. United States, 355 U.S. 40 . But cf. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 113 U.S. App. D.C. 20, 304 F.2d 387. </s> [Footnote 27 The appellants also seek to challenge the District Court's denial of their motions for permissive intervention under Rule 24 (b). We have no jurisdiction to consider this challenge. Allen Calculators, Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 322 U.S. 137 . See Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683 , at 688 and n. 3. And in any event the District Court did not, in the circumstances of this protracted and complex litigation, abuse its discretion in choosing to allow appellants to present their views by amicus briefs rather than affording them permissive intervention as full parties. </s> [Footnote 28 See Sutphen Estates, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 19 . </s> [386 U.S. 129, 162]

Table of Contents: </s> Case Summary Read the Full Opinion </s> Caselaw Summary: In 1985, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a state law violated the Constitution's guarantee of freedom of religion in Wallace v. Jaffree. An Alabama law allowed teachers in public schools to conduct regular 1-minute periods of silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer." In a 6-3 decision, the Court found that this practice was a positive endorsement of religion in violation of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. Background: The freedom of religion protected by the Constitution also includes freedom from religion. Everyone is allowed to practice the religion of their choosing, or none at all. The Establishment Clause prohibits Congress or any other government entity from creating laws that establish an official religion - or favor one religion over another. The Supreme Court uses a standard called the "Lemon Test" to determine whether a law violates the Establishment Clause. Created by the Court in 1971 in Lemon v. Kurtzman, this test requires legislation concerning religion to: </s> Have a secular purpose Neither advance nor prohibit religion Not result in "excessive government entanglement" with religion </s> Under the Establishment Clause and the related case law, the government must strive for "complete neutrality toward religion." Moreover, the states have no more right to restrain the individual freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution than the federal government does. The Court's Analysis: In writing the majority opinion of the Court, Justice John Paul Stevens pointed out that the First Amendment's protection of religious freedom is twofold. A person has the right to choose their own religion, and therefore also has the right to refrain from accepting someone else's. However, the majority of the justices found that Alabama's law on prayer in schools did not follow this logic. The bill's prime sponsor, State Senator Donald G. Holmes, even testified that the law was an "effort to return voluntary prayer to our public schools." And as Justice Stevens explains: "The legislative intent to return prayer to the public schools is, of course, different from merely protecting every student's right to engage in voluntary prayer." Defenders of the statute didn't identify a secular purpose the law might serve. Therefore, the Court concluded that either the law's goal was to promote prayer as a favored practice, or there was no purpose at all. Holding: Because Alabama's law on prayer in schools endorsed religion and was not motivated by any clearly secular purpose, it violated the Establishment Clause. </s> United States Supreme Court WALLACE v. JAFFREE(1985) No. 83-812 Argued: December 4, 1984Decided: June 4, 1985 </s> In proceedings instituted in Federal District Court, appellees challenged the constitutionality of, inter alia, a 1981 Alabama Statute ( 16-1-20.1) authorizing a 1-minute period of silence in all public schools "for meditation or voluntary prayer." Although finding that 16-1-20.1 was an effort to encourage a religious activity, the District Court ultimately held that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment does not prohibit a State from establishing a religion. The Court of Appeals reversed. </s> Held: </s> Section 16-1-20.1 is a law respecting the establishment of religion and thus violates the First Amendment. Pp. 48-61. </s> (a) The proposition that the several States have no greater power to restrain the individual freedoms protected by the First Amendment than does Congress is firmly embedded in constitutional jurisprudence. The First Amendment was adopted to curtail Congress' power to interfere with the individual's freedom to believe, to worship, and to express himself in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience, and the Fourteenth Amendment imposed the same substantive limitations on the States' power to legislate. The individual's freedom to choose his own creed is the counterpart of his right to refrain from accepting the creed established by the majority. Moreover, the individual freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the right to select any religious faith or none at all. Pp. 48-55. </s> (b) One of the well-established criteria for determining the constitutionality of a statute under the Establishment Clause is that the statute must have a secular legislative purpose. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 -613. The First Amendment requires that a statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion. Pp. 55-56. </s> (c) The record here not only establishes that 16-1-20.1's purpose was to endorse religion, it also reveals that the enactment of the statute was not motivated by any clearly secular purpose. In particular, the statements of 16-1-20.1's sponsor in the legislative record and in his [472 U.S. 38, 39] testimony before the District Court indicate that the legislation was solely an "effort to return voluntary prayer" to the public schools. Moreover, such unrebutted evidence of legislative intent is confirmed by a consideration of the relationship between 16-1-20.1 and two other Alabama statutes - one of which, enacted in 1982 as a sequel to 16-1-20.1, authorized teachers to lead "willing students" in a prescribed prayer, and the other of which, enacted in 1978 as 16-1-20.1's predecessor, authorized a period of silence "for meditation" only. The State's endorsement, by enactment of 16-1-20.1, of prayer activities at the beginning of each schoolday is not consistent with the established principle that the government must pursue a course of complete neutrality toward religion. Pp. 56-61. </s> 705 F.2d 1526 and 713 F.2d 614, affirmed. </s> STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 62. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 67. BURGER, C. J., post, p. 84, WHITE, J., post, p. 90, and REHNQUIST, J., post, p. 91, filed dissenting opinions. </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 83-929, Smith et al. v. Jaffree et al., also on appeal from the same court. </s> John S. Baker, Jr., argued the cause for appellants in both cases and filed briefs for appellant Wallace in No. 83-812. Thomas O. Kotouc and Thomas F. Parker IV filed briefs for appellants in No. 83-929. </s> Deputy Solicitor General Bator argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, Michael W. McConnell, and Brian K. Landsburg. </s> Ronnie L. Williams argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees.Fn </s> Fn [472 U.S. 38, 39] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Delaware et al. by Charles M. Oberly III, Attorney General of Delaware, Fred S. Silverman, State Solicitor, and Susan H. Kirk-Ryan and Barbara MacDonald, Deputy Attorneys General, Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona, Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General of Indiana, William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General of Louisiana, Michael C. Turpen, Attorney General of Oklahoma, and Gerald L. Baliles, Attorney General of Virginia; for the State of Connecticut by Joseph I. Lieberman, Attorney General, Henry S. Cohn, Assistant Attorney General, and Clarine Nardi Riddle; [472 U.S. 38, 40] for the Center for Judicial Studies by Charles E. Rice; for the Christian Legal Society et al. by Forest D. Montgomery and Samuel E. Ericsson; for the Freedom Council by James J. Knicely and John W. Whitehead; for the Legal Foundation of America by David Crump; for the Moral Majority, Inc., by William Bentley Ball and Philip J. Murren; and for Winston C. Anderson et al. by Alfred J. Mainini. </s> Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Jack D. Novik, Burt Neuborne, John Sexton, and Nathan Z. Dershowitz; for the American Jewish Congress et al. by Marc D. Stern, Justin J. Finger, and Jeffrey P. Sinensky; and for Lowell P. Weicker, Jr., by Stanley A. Twardy, Jr. [472 U.S. 38, 40] </s> JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> At an early stage of this litigation, the constitutionality of three Alabama statutes was questioned: (1) 16-1-20, enacted in 1978, which authorized a 1-minute period of silence in all public schools "for meditation"; 1 (2) 16-1-20.1, enacted in 1981, which authorized a period of silence "for meditation or voluntary prayer"; 2 and (3) 16-1-20.2, enacted in 1982, which authorized teachers to lead "willing students" in a prescribed prayer to "Almighty God . . . the Creator and Supreme Judge of the world." 3 </s> [472 U.S. 38, 41] </s> At the preliminary-injunction stage of this case, the District Court distinguished 16-1-20 from the other two statutes. It then held that there was "nothing wrong" with 16-1-20, 4 but that 16-1-20.1 and 16-1-20.2 were both invalid because the sole purpose of both was "an effort on the part of the State of Alabama to encourage a religious activity." 5 After the trial on the merits, the District Court did not change its interpretation of these two statutes, but held that they were constitutional because, in its opinion, Alabama has the power to establish a state religion if it chooses to do so. 6 </s> The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court's initial interpretation of the purpose of both 16-1-20.1 and 16-1-20.2, and held them both unconstitutional. 7 We have already affirmed the Court of Appeals' holding with respect to 16-1-20.2. 8 Moreover, appellees have not questioned the holding that 16-1-20 is valid. 9 Thus, the narrow question for decision is whether 16-1-20.1, which authorizes a period of silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer," is a [472 U.S. 38, 42] law respecting the establishment of religion within the meaning of the First Amendment. 10 </s> I </s> Appellee Ishmael Jaffree is a resident of Mobile County, Alabama. On May 28, 1982, he filed a complaint on behalf of three of his minor children; two of them were second-grade students and the third was then in kindergarten. The complaint named members of the Mobile County School Board, various school officials, and the minor plaintiffs' three teachers as defendants. 11 The complaint alleged that the appellees brought the action "seeking principally a declaratory judgment and an injunction restraining the Defendants and each of them from maintaining or allowing the maintenance of regular religious prayer services or other forms of religious observances in the Mobile County Public Schools in violation of the First Amendment as made applicable to states by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." 12 The complaint further alleged that two of the children had been subjected to various acts of religious indoctrination "from the beginning of the school year in September, 1981"; 13 that the defendant teachers had "on a daily basis" led their classes in saying certain prayers in unison; 14 that the minor children were exposed to ostracism from their peer group class members if they did not participate; 15 and that Ishmael Jaffree had repeatedly but unsuccessfully requested that the devotional services be stopped. The original complaint made no reference to any Alabama statute. [472 U.S. 38, 43] </s> On June 4, 1982, appellees filed an amended complaint seeking class certification, 16 and on June 30, 1982, they filed a second amended complaint naming the Governor of Alabama and various state officials as additional defendants. In that amendment the appellees challenged the constitutionality of three Alabama statutes: 16-1-20, 16-1-20.1, and 16-1-20.2. 17 </s> On August 2, 1982, the District Court held an evidentiary hearing on appellees' motion for a preliminary injunction. At that hearing, State Senator Donald G. Holmes testified that he was the "prime sponsor" of the bill that was enacted in 1981 as 16-1-20.1. 18 He explained that the bill was an "effort to return voluntary prayer to our public schools . . . it is a beginning and a step in the right direction." 19 Apart from the purpose to return voluntary prayer to public school, Senator Holmes unequivocally testified that he had "no other purpose in mind." 20 A week after the hearing, the District Court entered a preliminary injunction. 21 The court held that appellees were likely to prevail on the merits because the enactment of 16-1-20.1 and 16-1-20.2 did not reflect a clearly secular purpose. 22 </s> [472 U.S. 38, 44] </s> In November 1982, the District Court held a 4-day trial on the merits. The evidence related primarily to the 1981-1982 academic year - the year after the enactment of 16-1-20.1 and prior to the enactment of 16-1-20.2. The District Court found that during that academic year each of the minor plaintiffs' teachers had led classes in prayer activities, even after being informed of appellees' objections to these activities. 23 </s> In its lengthy conclusions of law, the District Court reviewed a number of opinions of this Court interpreting the [472 U.S. 38, 45] Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, and then embarked on a fresh examination of the question whether the First Amendment imposes any barrier to the establishment of an official religion by the State of Alabama. After reviewing at length what it perceived to be newly discovered historical evidence, the District Court concluded that "the establishment clause of the first amendment to the United States Constitution does not prohibit the state from establishing a religion." 24 In a separate opinion, the District Court dismissed appellees' challenge to the three Alabama statutes because of a failure to state any claim for which relief could be granted. The court's dismissal of this challenge was also based on its conclusion that the Establishment Clause did not bar the States from establishing a religion. 25 </s> [472 U.S. 38, 46] </s> The Court of Appeals consolidated the two cases; not surprisingly, it reversed. The Court of Appeals noted that this Court had considered and had rejected the historical arguments [472 U.S. 38, 47] that the District Court found persuasive, and that the District Court had misapplied the doctrine of stare decisis. 26 The Court of Appeals then held that the teachers' religious activities violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 27 With respect to 16-1-20.1 and 16-1-20.2, the Court of Appeals stated that "both statutes advance and encourage religious activities." 28 The Court of Appeals then quoted with approval the District Court's finding that 16-1-20.1, and 16-1-20.2, were efforts "`to encourage a religious activity. Even though these statutes are permissive in form, it is nevertheless state involvement respecting an establishment of religion.'" 29 Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that both statutes were "specifically the type which the Supreme Court addressed in Engel [v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)]." 30 </s> [472 U.S. 38, 48] </s> A suggestion for rehearing en banc was denied over the dissent of four judges who expressed the opinion that the full court should reconsider the panel decision insofar as it held 16-1-20.1 unconstitutional. 31 When this Court noted probable jurisdiction, it limited argument to the question that those four judges thought worthy of reconsideration. The judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to the other issues presented by the appeals was affirmed. Wallace v. Jaffree, 466 U.S. 924 (1984). </s> II </s> Our unanimous affirmance of the Court of Appeals' judgment concerning 16-1-20.2 makes it unnecessary to comment at length on the District Court's remarkable conclusion that the Federal Constitution imposes no obstacle to Alabama's establishment of a state religion. Before analyzing the precise issue that is presented to us, it is nevertheless appropriate to recall how firmly embedded in our constitutional jurisprudence is the proposition that the several States have no greater power to restrain the individual freedoms [472 U.S. 38, 49] protected by the First Amendment than does the Congress of the United States. </s> As is plain from its text, the First Amendment was adopted to curtail the power of Congress to interfere with the individual's freedom to believe, to worship, and to express himself in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience. 32 Until the Fourteenth Amendment was added to the Constitution, the First Amendment's restraints on the exercise of federal power simply did not apply to the States. 33 But when the Constitution was amended to prohibit any State from depriving any person of liberty without due process of law, that Amendment imposed the same substantive limitations on the States' power to legislate that the First Amendment had always imposed on the Congress' power. This Court has confirmed and endorsed this elementary proposition of law time and time again. 34 </s> [472 U.S. 38, 50] </s> Writing for a unanimous Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940), Justice Roberts explained: </s> ". . . We hold that the statute, as construed and applied to the appellants, deprives them of their liberty without due process of law in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment. The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment. The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws. The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion." </s> Cantwell, of course, is but one case in which the Court has identified the individual's freedom of conscience as the central liberty that unifies the various Clauses in the First Amendment. 35 Enlarging on this theme, THE CHIEF JUSTICE recently wrote: [472 U.S. 38, 51] </s> "We begin with the proposition that the right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all. See Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 -634 (1943); id., at 645 (Murphy, J., concurring). A system which secures the right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts. The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of `individual freedom of mind.' Id., at 637. </s> . . . . . </s> "The Court in Barnette, supra, was faced with a state statute which required public school students to participate in daily public ceremonies by honoring the flag both with words and traditional salute gestures. In overruling its prior decision in Minersville District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), the Court held that `a ceremony so touching matters of opinion and political attitude may [not] be imposed upon the individual by official authority under powers committed to any political organization under our Constitution.' 319 U.S., at 636 . Compelling the affirmative act of a flag salute involved a more serious infringement upon personal liberties than the passive act of carrying the state motto on a license plate, but the difference is essentially one of degree. Here, as in Barnette, we are faced with a state measure which forces an individual, as part of his daily life - indeed constantly while his automobile is in public view - to be an [472 U.S. 38, 52] instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable. In doing so, the State `invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.' Id., at 642." Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 -715 (1977). </s> Just as the right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of a broader concept of individual freedom of mind, so also the individual's freedom to choose his own creed is the counterpart of his right to refrain from accepting the creed established by the majority. At one time it was thought that this right merely proscribed the preference of one Christian sect over another, but would not require equal respect for the conscience of the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith such as Islam or Judaism. 36 But when the underlying principle has been examined in the crucible of litigation, the [472 U.S. 38, 53] Court has unambiguously concluded that the individual freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the right to select any religious faith or none at all. 37 This conclusion derives support not only from the interest in respecting the individual's freedom of conscience, but also from the conviction that religious beliefs worthy of respect are the product of free and voluntary choice by the faithful, 38 </s> [472 U.S. 38, 54] and from recognition of the fact that the political interest in forestalling intolerance extends beyond intolerance among Christian sects - or even intolerance among "religions" - to encompass intolerance of the disbeliever and the uncertain. 39 </s> [472 U.S. 38, 55] </s> As Justice Jackson eloquently stated in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943): </s> "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." </s> The State of Alabama, no less than the Congress of the United States, must respect that basic truth. </s> III </s> When the Court has been called upon to construe the breadth of the Establishment Clause, it has examined the criteria developed over a period of many years. Thus, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 -613 (1971), we wrote: </s> "Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968); finally, the statute must not foster `an excessive [472 U.S. 38, 56] government entanglement with religion.' Walz [v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)]." </s> It is the first of these three criteria that is most plainly implicated by this case. As the District Court correctly recognized, no consideration of the second or third criteria is necessary if a statute does not have a clearly secular purpose. 40 For even though a statute that is motivated in part by a religious purpose may satisfy the first criterion, see, e. g., Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 296 -303 (1963) (BRENNAN, J., concurring), the First Amendment requires that a statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion. 41 </s> In applying the purpose test, it is appropriate to ask "whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion." 42 In this case, the answer to that question is dispositive. For the record not only provides us with an unambiguous affirmative answer, but it also reveals that the enactment of 16-1-20.1 was not motivated by any clearly secular purpose - indeed, the statute had no secular purpose. </s> IV </s> The sponsor of the bill that became 16-1-20.1, Senator Donald Holmes, inserted into the legislative record - apparently [472 U.S. 38, 57] without dissent - a statement indicating that the legislation was an "effort to return voluntary prayer" to the public schools. 43 Later Senator Holmes confirmed this purpose before the District Court. In response to the question whether he had any purpose for the legislation other than returning voluntary prayer to public schools, he stated: "No, I did not have no other purpose in mind." 44 The State did not present evidence of any secular purpose. 45 </s> [472 U.S. 38, 58] </s> The unrebutted evidence of legislative intent contained in the legislative record and in the testimony of the sponsor of 16-1-20.1 is confirmed by a consideration of the relationship between this statute and the two other measures that were considered in this case. The District Court found that the 1981 statute and its 1982 sequel had a common, nonsecular purpose. The wholly religious character of the later enactment is plainly evident from its text. When the differences between 16-1-20.1 and its 1978 predecessor, 16-1-20, are examined, it is equally clear that the 1981 statute has the same wholly religious character. </s> There are only three textual differences between 16-1-20.1 and 16-1-20: (1) the earlier statute applies only to grades one through six, whereas 16-1-20.1 applies to all grades; (2) the earlier statute uses the word "shall" whereas 16-1-20.1 uses the word "may"; (3) the earlier statute refers [472 U.S. 38, 59] only to "meditation" whereas 16-1-20.1 refers to "meditation or voluntary prayer." The first difference is of no relevance in this litigation because the minor appellees were in kindergarten or second grade during the 1981-1982 academic year. The second difference would also have no impact on this litigation because the mandatory language of 16-1-20 continued to apply to grades one through six. 46 Thus, the only significant textual difference is the addition of the words "or voluntary prayer." </s> The legislative intent to return prayer to the public schools is, of course, quite different from merely protecting every student's right to engage in voluntary prayer during an appropriate moment of silence during the schoolday. The 1978 statute already protected that right, containing nothing that prevented any student from engaging in voluntary prayer during a silent minute of meditation. 47 Appellants have not identified any secular purpose that was not fully served by 16-1-20 before the enactment of 16-1-20.1. Thus, only two conclusions are consistent with the text of 16-1-20.1: (1) the statute was enacted to convey a message of state endorsement and promotion of prayer; or (2) the statute was enacted for no purpose. No one suggests that the statute was nothing but a meaningless or irrational act. 48 </s> We must, therefore, conclude that the Alabama Legislature intended to change existing law 49 and that it was motivated [472 U.S. 38, 60] by the same purpose that the Governor's answer to the second amended complaint expressly admitted; that the statement inserted in the legislative history revealed; and that Senator Holmes' testimony frankly described. The legislature enacted 16-1-20.1, despite the existence of 16-1-20 for the sole purpose of expressing the State's endorsement of prayer activities for one minute at the beginning of each schoolday. The addition of "or voluntary prayer" indicates that the State intended to characterize prayer as a favored practice. Such an endorsement is not consistent with the established principle that the government must pursue a course of complete neutrality toward religion. 50 </s> The importance of that principle does not permit us to treat this as an inconsequential case involving nothing more than a few words of symbolic speech on behalf of the political majority. 51 For whenever the State itself speaks on a religious [472 U.S. 38, 61] subject, one of the questions that we must ask is "whether the government intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion." 52 The well-supported concurrent findings of the District Court and the Court of Appeals - that 16-1-20.1 was intended to convey a message of state approval of prayer activities in the public schools - make it unnecessary, and indeed inappropriate, to evaluate the practical significance of the addition of the words "or voluntary prayer" to the statute. Keeping in mind, as we must, "both the fundamental place held by the Establishment Clause in our constitutional scheme and the myriad, subtle ways in which Establishment Clause values can be eroded," 53 we conclude that 16-1-20.1 violates the First Amendment. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Alabama Code 16-1-20 (Supp. 1984) reads as follows: </s> "At the commencement of the first class each day in the first through the sixth grades in all public schools, the teacher in charge of the room in which each such class is held shall announce that a period of silence, not to exceed one minute in duration, shall be observed for meditation, and during any such period silence shall be maintained and no activities engaged in." </s> Appellees have abandoned any claim that 16-1-20 is unconstitutional. See Brief for Appellees 2. </s> [Footnote 2 Alabama Code 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984) provides: </s> "At the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades in all public schools the teacher in charge of the room in which each class is held may announce that a period of silence not to exceed one minute in duration shall be observed for meditation or voluntary prayer, and during any such period no other activities shall be engaged in." </s> [Footnote 3 Alabama Code 16-1-20.2 (Supp. 1984) provides: </s> "From henceforth, any teacher or professor in any public educational institution within the state of Alabama, recognizing that the Lord God is one, at the beginning of any homeroom or any class, may pray, may lead [472 U.S. 38, 41] willing students in prayer, or may lead the willing students in the following prayer to God: </s> "Almighty God, You alone are our God. We acknowledge You as the Creator and Supreme Judge of the world. May Your justice, Your truth, and Your peace abound this day in the hearts of our countrymen, in the counsels of our government, in the sanctity of our homes and in the classrooms of our schools in the name of our Lord. Amen." </s> [Footnote 4 The court stated that it did not find any potential infirmity in 16-1-20 because "it is a statute which prescribes nothing more than a child in school shall have the right to meditate in silence and there is nothing wrong with a little meditation and quietness." Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732 (SD Ala. 1982). </s> [Footnote 5 Ibid. </s> [Footnote 6 Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1128 (SD Ala. 1983). </s> [Footnote 7 705 F.2d 1526, 1535-1536 (CA11 1983). </s> [Footnote 8 Wallace v. Jaffree, 466 U.S. 924 (1984). </s> [Footnote 9 See n. 1, supra. </s> [Footnote 10 The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, of course, has long been held applicable to the States. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 -16 (1947). </s> [Footnote 11 App. 4-7. </s> [Footnote 12 Id., at 4. </s> [Footnote 13 Id., at 7. </s> [Footnote 14 Ibid. </s> [Footnote 15 Id., at 8-9. </s> [Footnote 16 Id., at 17. </s> [Footnote 17 Id., at 21. See nn. 1, 2, and 3, supra. </s> [Footnote 18 App. 47-49. </s> [Footnote 19 Id., at 50. </s> [Footnote 20 Id., at 52. </s> [Footnote 21 Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727 (SD Ala. 1982). </s> [Footnote 22 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 -613 (1971). Insofar as relevant to the issue now before us, the District Court explained: </s> "The injury to plaintiffs from the possible establishment of a religion by the State of Alabama contrary to the proscription of the establishment clause outweighs any indirect harm which may occur to defendants as a result of an injunction. Granting an injunction will merely maintain the status quo existing prior to the enactment of the statutes. </s> . . . . . </s> "The purpose of Senate Bill 8 [ 16-1-20.2] as evidenced by its preamble is to provide for a prayer that may be given in public schools. Senator [472 U.S. 38, 44] Holmes testified that his purpose in sponsoring 16-1-20.1 was to return voluntary prayer to the public schools. He intended to provide children the opportunity of sharing in their spiritual heritage of Alabama and of this country. See Alabama Senate Journal 921 (1981). The Fifth Circuit has explained that `prayer is a primary religious activity in itself. . . .' Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897, 901 (5th Cir. 1981). The state may not employ a religious means in its public schools. Abington School District v. Schempp, [374 U.S. 203, 224 (1963). Since these statutes do not reflect a clearly secular purpose, no consideration of the remaining two-parts of the Lemon test is necessary. </s> "The enactment of Senate Bill 8 [ 16-1-20.2] and 16-1-20.1 is an effort on the part of the State of Alabama to encourage a religious activity. Even though these statutes are permissive in form, it is nevertheless state involvement respecting an establishment of religion. Engel v. Vitale, [370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962). Thus, binding precedent which this Court is under a duty to follow indicates the substantial likelihood plaintiffs will prevail on the merits." 544 F. Supp., at 730-732. </s> [Footnote 23 The District Court wrote: </s> "Defendant Boyd, as early as September 16, 1981, led her class at E. R. Dickson in singing the following phrase: </s> "`God is great, God is good, </s> "`Let us thank him for our food, </s> "`bow our heads we all are fed, </s> "`Give us Lord our daily bread. </s> "`Amen!' </s> "The recitation of this phrase continued on a daily basis throughout the 1981-82 school year. </s> . . . . . </s> "Defendant Pixie Alexander has led her class at Craighead in reciting the following phrase: [472 U.S. 38, 45] </s> "`God is great, God is good, </s> "`Let us thank him for our food.' </s> "Further, defendant Pixie Alexander had her class recite the following, which is known as the Lord's Prayer: </s> "`Our Father, which are in heaven, hallowed be Thy name. Thy kingdom come. Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven. Give us this day our daily bread and forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtors. And lead us not into temptation but deliver us from evil for thine is the kingdom and the power and the glory forever. Amen.' </s> "The recitation of these phrases continued on a daily basis throughout the 1981-82 school year. </s> . . . . . </s> "Ms. Green admitted that she frequently leads her class in singing the following song: </s> "`For health and strength and daily food, we praise Thy name, Oh Lord.' </s> "This activity continued throughout the school year, despite the fact that Ms. Green had knowledge that plaintiff did not want his child exposed to the above-mentioned song." Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 554 F. Supp., at 1107-1108. </s> [Footnote 24 Id., at 1128. </s> [Footnote 25 Jaffree v. James, 554 F. Supp. 1130, 1132 (SD Ala. 1983). The District Court's opinion was announced on January 14, 1983. On February 11, 1983, JUSTICE POWELL, in his capacity as Circuit Justice for the Eleventh Circuit, entered a stay which in effect prevented the District Court [472 U.S. 38, 46] from dissolving the preliminary injunction that had been entered in August 1982. JUSTICE POWELL accurately summarized the prior proceedings: </s> "The situation, quite briefly, is as follows: Beginning in the fall of 1981, teachers in the minor applicants' schools conducted prayers in their regular classes, including group recitations of the Lord's Prayer. At the time, an Alabama statute provided for a one-minute period of silence `for meditation or voluntary prayer' at the commencement of each day's classes in the public elementary schools. Ala. Code 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1982). In 1982, Alabama enacted a statute permitting public school teachers to lead their classes in prayer. 1982 Ala. Acts 735. </s> "Applicants, objecting to prayer in the public schools, filed suit to enjoin the activities. They later amended their complaint to challenge the applicable state statutes. After a hearing, the District Court granted a preliminary injunction. Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727 (1982). It recognized that it was bound by the decisions of this Court, id., at 731, and that under those decisions it was `obligated to enjoin the enforcement' of the statutes, id., at 733. </s> "In its subsequent decision on the merits, however, the District Court reached a different conclusion. Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 554 F. Supp. 1104 (1983). It again recognized that the prayers at issue, given in public school classes and led by teachers, were violative of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as that Clause had been construed by this Court. The District Court nevertheless ruled `that the United States Supreme Court has erred.' Id., at 1128. It therefore dismissed the complaint and dissolved the injunction. </s> "There can be little doubt that the District Court was correct in finding that conducting prayers as part of a school program is unconstitutional under this Court's decisions. In Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), the Court held that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits a State from authorizing prayer in the public schools. The following Term, in Murray v. Curlett, decided with Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), the Court explicitly invalidated a school district's rule providing for the reading of the Lord's Prayer as part of a school's opening exercises, despite the fact that participation in those exercises was voluntary. </s> "Unless and until this Court reconsiders the foregoing decisions, they appear to control this case. In my view, the District Court was obligated [472 U.S. 38, 47] to follow them." Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 459 U.S. 1314, 1315 -1316 (1983). </s> [Footnote 26 The Court of Appeals wrote: </s> "The stare decisis doctrine and its exceptions do not apply where a lower court is compelled to apply the precedent of a higher court. See 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts 183 (1965). </s> "Federal district courts and circuit courts are bound to adhere to the controlling decisions of the Supreme Court. Hutto v. Davis, [454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) . . . . Justice Rehnquist emphasized the importance of precedent when he observed that `unless we wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be.' Davis, [454 U.S. at 375]. See Also, Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., [460 U.S. 533, 535 (1983) (the Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision, recently stated: `Needless to say, only this Court may overrule one of its precedents')." 705 F.2d, at 1532. </s> [Footnote 27 Id., at 1533-1534. This Court has denied a petition for a writ of certiorari that presented the question whether the Establishment Clause prohibited the teachers' religious prayer activities. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile County v. Jaffree, 466 U.S. 926 (1984). </s> [Footnote 28 705 F.2d, at 1535. </s> [Footnote 29 Ibid. </s> [Footnote 30 Ibid. After noting that the invalidity of 16-1-20.2 was aggravated by "the existence of a government composed prayer," and that the proponents [472 U.S. 38, 48] of the legislation admitted that that section "amounts to the establishment of a state religion," the court added this comment on 16-1-20.1: </s> "The objective of the meditation or prayer statute (Ala. Code 16-1-20.1) was also the advancement of religion. This fact was recognized by the district court at the hearing for preliminary relief where it was established that the intent of the statute was to return prayer to the public schools. James, 544 F. Supp. at 731. The existence of this fact and the inclusion of prayer obviously involves the state in religious activities. Beck v. McElrath, 548 F. Supp. 1161 (MD Tenn. 1982). This demonstrates a lack of secular legislative purpose on the part of the Alabama Legislature. Additionally, the statute has the primary effect of advancing religion. We do not imply that simple meditation or silence is barred from the public schools; we hold that the state cannot participate in the advancement of religious activities through any guise, including teacher-led meditation. It is not the activity itself that concerns us; it is the purpose of the activity that we shall scrutinize. Thus, the existence of these elements require that we also hold section 16-1-20.1 in violation of the establishment clause." Id., at 1535-1536. </s> [Footnote 31 713 F.2d 614 (CA11 1983) (per curiam). </s> [Footnote 32 The First Amendment provides: </s> "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." </s> [Footnote 33 See Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of the City of New Orleans, 3 How. 589, 609 (1845). </s> [Footnote 34 See, e. g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (right to refuse endorsement of an offensive state motto); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (right to free speech); West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 -638 (1943) (right to refuse to participate in a ceremony that offends one's conscience); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (right to proselytize one's religious faith); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 519 (1939) (opinion of Stone, J.) (right to assemble peaceably); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931) (right to publish an unpopular newspaper); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (right to advocate the cause of Communism); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (right to express an unpopular opinion); cf. Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 , n. 7 (1963), where the Court approvingly quoted Board of Education v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211, 253 (1872), which stated: </s> "The great bulk of human affairs and human interests is left by any free government to individual enterprise and individual action. Religion is [472 U.S. 38, 50] eminently one of these interests, lying outside the true and legitimate province of government." </s> [Footnote 35 For example, in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944), the Court wrote: </s> "If by this position appellant seeks for freedom of conscience a broader protection than for freedom of the mind, it may be doubted that any of the great liberties insured by the First Article can be given higher place than the others. All have preferred position in our basic scheme. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 . All are interwoven there together. Differences there are, in them and in the modes [472 U.S. 38, 51] appropriate for their exercise. But they have unity in the charter's prime place because they have unity in their human sources and functioning." See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981) (stating that religious worship and discussion "are forms of speech and association protected by the First Amendment"). </s> [Footnote 36 Thus Joseph Story wrote: </s> "Probably at the time of the adoption of the constitution, and of the amendment to it, now under consideration [First Amendment], the general, if not the universal sentiment in America was, that Christianity ought to receive encouragement from the state, so far as was not incompatible with the private rights of conscience, and the freedom of religious worship. An attempt to level all religions, and to make it a matter of state policy to hold all in utter indifference, would have created universal disapprobation, if not universal indignation." 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 1874, p. 593 (1851) (footnote omitted). </s> In the same volume, Story continued: </s> "The real object of the amendment was, not to countenance, much less to advance, Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating Christianity; but to exclude all rivalry among christian sects, and to prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment, which should give to a hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national government. It thus cut off the means of religious persecution, (the vice and pest of former ages,) and of the subversion of the rights of conscience in matters of religion, which had been trampled upon almost from the days of the Apostles to the present age. . . ." Id., 1877, at 594 (emphasis supplied). </s> [Footnote 37 Thus, in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S., at 15 , the Court stated: </s> "The `establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another." </s> Id., at 18 (the First Amendment "requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers"); Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S., at 216 ("this Court has rejected unequivocally the contention that the Establishment Clause forbids only governmental preference of one religion over another"); id., at 226 ("The place of religion in our society is an exalted one, achieved through a long tradition of reliance on the home, the church and the inviolable citadel of the individual heart and mind. We have come to recognize through bitter experience that it is not within the power of the government to invade that citadel, whether its purpose or effect be to aid or oppose, to advance or retard. In the relationship between man and religion, the State is firmly committed to a position of neutrality"); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) ("We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person `to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.' Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs"). </s> [Footnote 38 In his "Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, 1785," James Madison wrote, in part: </s> "1. Because we hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth, `that Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the [Manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and] conviction, not by force or violence.' The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate. This right is in its nature an unalienable right. It is [472 U.S. 38, 54] unalienable; because the opinions of men, depending only on the evidence contemplated by their own minds, cannot follow the dictates of other men: It is unalienable also; because what is here a right towards men, is a duty towards the Creator. It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage, and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him. . . . We maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no man's right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society, and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance. </s> . . . . . </s> "3. Because, it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties. We hold this prudent jealousy to be the first duty of citizens, and one of [the] noblest characteristics of the late Revolution. The freemen of America did not wait till usurped power had strengthened itself by exercise, and entangled the question in precedents. They saw all the consequences in the principle, and they avoided the consequences by denying the principle. We revere this lesson too much, soon to forget it. Who does not see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects?" The Complete Madison 299-301 (S. Padover ed. 1953). </s> See also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 (1962) ("It is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each separate government in this country should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave that purely religious function to the people themselves and to those the people choose to look for religious guidance"). </s> [Footnote 39 As the Barnette opinion explained, it is the teaching of history, rather than any appraisal of the quality of a State's motive, that supports this duty to respect basic freedoms: </s> "Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment in support of some end thought essential to their time and country have been waged by many good as well as by evil men. Nationalism is a relatively recent phenomenon but at other times and places the ends have been racial or territorial security, support of a dynasty or regime, and particular plans for saving souls. As first and moderate methods to attain unity have failed, those bent on its accomplishment must resort to an ever-increasing severity. As governmental pressure toward unity becomes greater, so strife becomes more bitter as to whose unity it shall be. Probably no deeper division of our people could proceed from any provocation than from finding it necessary [472 U.S. 38, 55] to choose what doctrine and whose program public educational officials shall compel youth to unite in embracing. Ultimate futility of such attempts to compel coherence is the lesson of every such effort from the Roman drive to stamp out Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity, the Inquisition, as a means to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as a means to Russian unity, down to the fast failing efforts of our present totalitarian enemies. Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard." 319 U.S., at 640 -641. </s> See also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S., at 431 ("a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion"). </s> [Footnote 40 See n. 22, supra. </s> [Footnote 41 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984); id., at 690 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring); id., at 697 (BRENNAN, J., joined by MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., dissenting); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S., at 271 ; Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40 -41 (1980) (per curiam); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977). </s> [Footnote 42 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S., at 690 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring) ("The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion. The effect prong asks whether, irrespective of government's actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval. An affirmative answer to either question should render the challenged practice invalid"). </s> [Footnote 43 The statement indicated, in pertinent part: </s> "Gentlemen, by passage of this bill by the Alabama Legislature our children in this state will have the opportunity of sharing in the spiritual heritage of this state and this country. The United States as well as the State of Alabama was founded by people who believe in God. I believe this effort to return voluntary prayer to our public schools for its return to us to the original position of the writers of the Constitution, this local philosophies and beliefs hundreds of Alabamans have urged my continuous support for permitting school prayer. Since coming to the Alabama Senate I have worked hard on this legislation to accomplish the return of voluntary prayer in our public schools and return to the basic moral fiber." App. 50 (emphasis added). </s> [Footnote 44 Id., at 52. The District Court and the Court of Appeals agreed that the purpose of 16-1-20.1 was "an effort on the part of the State of Alabama to encourage a religious activity." Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp., at 732; 705 F.2d, at 1535. The evidence presented to the District Court elaborated on the express admission of the Governor of Alabama (then Fob James) that the enactment of 16-1-20.1 was intended to "clarify [the State's] intent to have prayer as part of the daily classroom activity," compare Second Amended Complaint § 32(d) (App. 24-25) with Governor's Answer to 32(d) (App. 40); and that the "expressed legislative purpose in enacting Section 16-1-20.1 (1981) was to `return voluntary prayer to public schools,'" compare Second Amended Complaint §§ 32(b) and (c) (App. 24) with Governor's Answer to §§ 32(b) and (c) (App. 40). </s> [Footnote 45 Appellant Governor George C. Wallace now argues that 16-1-20.1 "is best understood as a permissible accommodation of religion" and that viewed even in terms of the Lemon test, the "statute conforms to acceptable constitutional criteria." Brief for Appellant Wallace 5; see also Brief for Appellants Smith et al. 39 ( 16-1-20.1 "accommodates the free exercise of the religious beliefs and free exercise of speech and belief of those affected"); id., at 47. These arguments seem to be based on the theory that the free exercise of religion of some of the State's citizens was burdened [472 U.S. 38, 58] before the statute was enacted. The United States, appearing as amicus curiae in support of the appellants, candidly acknowledges that "it is unlikely that in most contexts a strong Free Exercise claim could be made that time for personal prayer must be set aside during the school day." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 10. There is no basis for the suggestion that 16-1-20.1 "is a means for accommodating the religious and meditative needs of students without in any way diminishing the school's own neutrality or secular atmosphere." Id., at 11. In this case, it is undisputed that at the time of the enactment of 16-1-20.1 there was no governmental practice impeding students from silently praying for one minute at the beginning of each schoolday; thus, there was no need to "accommodate" or to exempt individuals from any general governmental requirement because of the dictates of our cases interpreting the Free Exercise Clause. See, e. g., Thomas v. Review Board, Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see also Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S., at 226 ("While the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the use of state action to deny the rights of free exercise to anyone, it has never meant that a majority could use the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs"). What was missing in the appellants' eyes at the time of the enactment of 16-1-20.1 - and therefore what is precisely the aspect that makes the statute unconstitutional - was the State's endorsement and promotion of religion and a particular religious practice. </s> [Footnote 46 See n. 1, supra. </s> [Footnote 47 Indeed, for some persons meditation itself may be a form of prayer. B. Larson, Larson's Book of Cults 62-65 (1982); C. Whittier, Silent Prayer and Meditation in World Religions 1-7 (Congressional Research Service 1982). </s> [Footnote 48 If the conclusion that the statute had no purpose were tenable, it would remain true that no purpose is not a secular purpose. But such a conclusion is inconsistent with the common-sense presumption that statutes are usually enacted to change existing law. Appellants do not even suggest that the State had no purpose in enacting 16-1-20.1. </s> [Footnote 49 United States v. Champlin Refining Co., 341 U.S. 290, 297 (1951) (a "statute cannot be divorced from the circumstances existing at the time it [472 U.S. 38, 60] was passed"); id., at 298 (refusing to attribute pointless purpose to Congress in the absence of facts to the contrary); United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 337 U.S. 78, 80 -81 (1949) (rejecting Government's argument that Congress had no desire to change law when enacting legislation). </s> [Footnote 50 See, e. g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S., at 42 (per curiam); Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792 -793 (1973) ("A proper respect for both the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses compels the State to pursue a course of `neutrality' toward religion"); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968); Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S., at 215 -222; Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S., at 430 ("Neither the fact that the prayer may be denominationally neutral nor the fact that its observance on the part of the students is voluntary can serve to free it from the limitations of the Establishment Clause"); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 211 -212 (1948); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S., at 18 . </s> [Footnote 51 As this Court stated in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S., at 430 : </s> "The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not." </s> Moreover, this Court has noted that "[w]hen the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing [472 U.S. 38, 61] officially approved religion is plain." Id., at 431. This comment has special force in the public-school context where attendance is mandatory. Justice Frankfurter acknowledged this reality in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S., at 227 (concurring opinion): </s> "That a child is offered an alternative may reduce the constraint; it does not eliminate the operation of influence by the school in matters sacred to conscience and outside the school's domain. The law of imitation operates, and non-conformity is not an outstanding characteristic of children." </s> See also Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S., at 290 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); cf. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (distinguishing between adults not susceptible to "religious indoctrination" and children subject to "peer pressure"). Further, this Court has observed: </s> "That [Boards of Education] are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes." West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S., at 637 . </s> [Footnote 52 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S., at 690 -691 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring) ("The purpose prong of the Lemon test requires that a government activity have a secular purpose. . . . The proper inquiry under the purpose prong of Lemon . . . is whether the government intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion"). </s> [Footnote 53 Id., at 694. [472 U.S. 38, 62] </s> JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. </s> I concur in the Court's opinion and judgment that Ala. Code 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984) violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. My concurrence is prompted by Alabama's persistence in attempting to institute state-sponsored prayer in the public schools by enacting three successive statutes. 1 I agree fully with JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S assertion that some moment-of-silence statutes may be constitutional, 2 a suggestion set forth in the Court's opinion as well. Ante, at 59. [472 U.S. 38, 63] </s> I write separately to express additional views and to respond to criticism of the three-pronged Lemon test. 3 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), identifies standards that have proved useful in analyzing case after case both in our decisions and in those of other courts. It is the only coherent test a majority of the Court has ever adopted. Only once since our decision in Lemon, supra, have we addressed an Establishment Clause issue without resort to its three-pronged test. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 4 Lemon, supra, has not been overruled or its test modified. Yet, continued criticism of it could encourage other courts to feel free to decide Establishment Clause cases on an ad hoc basis. 5 </s> [472 U.S. 38, 64] </s> The first inquiry under Lemon is whether the challenged statute has a "secular legislative purpose." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR recognizes, this secular purpose must be "sincere"; a law will not pass constitutional muster if the secular purpose articulated by the legislature is merely a "sham." Post, at 75 (concurring in judgment). In Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam), for example, we held that a statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in public schools violated the Establishment Clause, even though the Kentucky Legislature asserted that its goal was educational. We have not interpreted the first prong of Lemon, supra, however, as requiring that a statute have "exclusively secular" objectives. 6 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 , n. 6 (1984). If such a requirement existed, much conduct and legislation approved by this Court in the past would have been invalidated. See, e. g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (New York's property tax exemption for religious organizations upheld); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (holding that a township may reimburse parents for the cost of transporting their children to parochial schools). [472 U.S. 38, 65] </s> The record before us, however, makes clear that Alabama's purpose was solely religious in character. Senator Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the bill that became Alabama Code 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984), freely acknowledged that the purpose of this statute was "to return voluntary prayer" to the public schools. See ante, at 57, n. 43. I agree with JUSTICE O'CONNOR that a single legislator's statement, particularly if made following enactment, is not necessarily sufficient to establish purpose. See post, at 77 (concurring in judgment). But, as noted in the Court's opinion, the religious purpose of 16-1-20.1 is manifested in other evidence, including the sequence and history of the three Alabama statutes. See ante, at 58-60. </s> I also consider it of critical importance that neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found a secular purpose, while both agreed that the purpose was to advance religion. In its first opinion (enjoining the enforcement of 16-1-20.1 pending a hearing on the merits), the District Court said that the statute did "not reflect a clearly secular purpose." Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732 (SD Ala. 1982). Instead, the District Court found that the enactment of the statute was an "effort on the part of the State of Alabama to encourage a religious activity." 7 Ibid. The Court of Appeals likewise applied the Lemon test and found "a lack of secular purpose on the part of the Alabama Legislature." [472 U.S. 38, 66] 705 F.2d 1526, 1535 (CA11 1983). It held that the objective of 16-1-20.1 was the "advancement of religion." Ibid. When both courts below are unable to discern an arguably valid secular purpose, this Court normally should hesitate to find one. </s> I would vote to uphold the Alabama statute if it also had a clear secular purpose. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 -395 (1983) (the Court is "reluctan[t] to attribute unconstitutional motives to the States, particularly when a plausible secular purpose for the State's program may be discerned from the face of the statute"). Nothing in the record before us, however, identifies a clear secular purpose, and the State also has failed to identify any nonreligious reason for the statute's enactment. 8 Under these circumstances, the Court is required by our precedents to hold that the statute fails the first prong of the Lemon test and therefore violates the Establishment Clause. </s> Although we do not reach the other two prongs of the Lemon test, I note that the "effect" of a straightforward moment-of-silence statute is unlikely to "advanc[e] or inhibi[t] religion." 9 See Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968). Nor would such a statute "foster `an excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Lemon [472 U.S. 38, 67] v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S., at 612 -613, quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S., at 674 . </s> I join the opinion and judgment of the Court. </s> [Footnote 1 The three statutes are Ala. Code 16-1-20 (Supp. 1984) (moment of silent meditation); Ala. Code 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984) (moment of silence for meditation or prayer); and Ala. Code 16-1-20.2 (Supp. 1984) (teachers authorized to lead students in vocal prayer). These statutes were enacted over a span of four years. There is some question whether 16-1-20 was repealed by implication. The Court already has summarily affirmed the Court of Appeals' holding that 16-1-20.2 is invalid. Wallace v. Jaffree, 466 U.S. 924 (1984). Thus, our opinions today address only the validity of 16-1-20.1. See ante, at 41-42. </s> [Footnote 2 JUSTICE O'CONNOR is correct in stating that moment-of-silence statutes cannot be treated in the same manner as those providing for vocal prayer: </s> "A state-sponsored moment of silence in the public schools is different from state-sponsored vocal prayer or Bible reading. First, a moment of silence is not inherently religious. Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading, need not be associated with a religious exercise. Second, a pupil who participates in a moment of silence need not compromise his or her beliefs. During a moment of silence, a student who objects to prayer is left to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts of others. For these simple reasons, a moment of silence statute does not stand or fall under the Establishment Clause according to how the Court regards vocal prayer or Bible reading. Scholars and at least one Member of this Court have recognized the distinction and suggested that a moment of silence in public schools would be constitutional. See Abington, [374 U.S.,] at 281 (BRENNAN, J., concurring) (`[T]he observance of a moment of reverent silence at the opening of class' may serve `the solely secular purposes of the devotional activities without jeopardizing either the religious liberties of any members of the community or the proper degree of separation between the spheres of religion and government'); L. Tribe, [472 U.S. 38, 63] American Constitutional Law 14-6, p. 829 (1978); P. Freund, The Legal Issue, in Religion and the Public Schools 23 (1965); Choper, 47 Minn. L. Rev., at 371; Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme Court, 61 Mich L. Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As a general matter, I agree. It is difficult to discern a serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent, thoughtful schoolchildren." Post, at 72-73 (concurring in judgment). </s> [Footnote 3 JUSTICE O'CONNOR asserts that the "standards announced in Lemon should be reexamined and refined in order to make them more useful in achieving the underlying purpose of the First Amendment." Post, at 68 (concurring in judgment). JUSTICE REHNQUIST would discard the Lemon test entirely. Post, at 112 (dissenting). </s> As I state in the text, the Lemon test has been applied consistently in Establishment Clause cases since it was adopted in 1971. In a word, it has been the law. Respect for stare decisis should require us to follow Lemon. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 559 (1985) (POWELL, J., dissenting) ("The stability of judicial decision, and with it respect for the authority of this Court, are not served by the precipitous overruling of multiple precedents . . ."). </s> [Footnote 4 In Marsh v. Chambers, we held that the Nebraska Legislature's practice of opening each day's session with a prayer by a chaplain paid by the State did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Our holding was based upon the historical acceptance of the practice that had become "part of the fabric of our society." 463 U.S., at 792 . </s> [Footnote 5 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), was a carefully considered opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE, in which he was joined by six other Justices. [472 U.S. 38, 64] Lemon's three-pronged test has been repeatedly followed. In Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), for example, the Court applied the "now well-defined three-part test" of Lemon. 413 U.S., at 772 . </s> In Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), we said that the Court is not "confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area." Id., at 679. The decision in Lynch, like that in Marsh v. Chambers, was based primarily on the long historical practice of including religious symbols in the celebration of Christmas. Nevertheless, the Court, without any criticism of Lemon, applied its three-pronged test to the facts of that case. It focused on the "question . . . whether there is a secular purpose for [the] display of the creche." 465 U.S., at 681 . </s> [Footnote 6 The Court's opinion recognizes that "a statute that is motivated in part by a religious purpose may satisfy the first criterion." Ante, at 56. The Court simply holds that "a statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion." Ibid. (emphasis added). </s> [Footnote 7 In its subsequent decision on the merits, the District Court held that prayer in the public schools - even if led by the teacher - did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court recognized that its decision was inconsistent with Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), and other decisions of this Court. The District Court nevertheless ruled that its decision was justified because "the United States Supreme Court has erred . . . ." Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1128 (SD Ala. 1983). </s> In my capacity as Circuit Justice, I stayed the judgment of the District Court pending appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 459 U.S. 1314 (1983) (in chambers). </s> [Footnote 8 Instead, the State criticizes the Lemon test and asserts that "the principal problems [with the test] stem from the purpose prong." See Brief for Appellant Wallace 9 et seq. </s> [Footnote 9 If it were necessary to reach the "effects" prong of Lemon, we would be concerned primarily with the effect on the minds and feelings of immature pupils. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR notes, during "a moment of silence, a student who objects to prayer [even where prayer may be the purpose] is left to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts of others." Post, at 72 (concurring in judgment). Given the types of subjects youthful minds are primarily concerned with, it is unlikely that many children would use a simple "moment of silence" as a time for religious prayer. There are too many other subjects on the mind of the typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that some children, raised in strongly religious families, properly would use the moment to reflect on the religion of his or her choice. </s> JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in the judgment. </s> Nothing in the United States Constitution as interpreted by this Court or in the laws of the State of Alabama prohibits public school students from voluntarily praying at any time before, during, or after the schoolday. Alabama has facilitated voluntary silent prayers of students who are so inclined by enacting Ala. Code 16-1-20 (Supp. 1984), which provides a moment of silence in appellees' schools each day. The parties to these proceedings concede the validity of this enactment. At issue in these appeals in the constitutional validity of an additional and subsequent Alabama statute, Ala. Code 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984), which both the District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded was enacted solely to officially encourage prayer during the moment of silence. I agree with the judgment of the Court that, in light of the findings of the courts below and the history of its enactment, 16-1-20.1 of the Alabama Code violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. In my view, there can be little doubt that the purpose and likely effect of this subsequent enactment is to endorse and sponsor voluntary prayer in the public schools. I write separately to identify the peculiar features of the Alabama law that render it invalid, and to explain why moment of silence laws in other States do not necessarily manifest the same infirmity. I also write to explain why neither history nor the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment validates the Alabama law struck down by the Court today. </s> I </s> The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, coupled with the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of ordered liberty, preclude both the Nation and the States from making any law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting [472 U.S. 38, 68] the free exercise thereof. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). Although a distinct jurisprudence has enveloped each of these Clauses, their common purpose is to secure religious liberty. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962). On these principles the Court has been and remains unanimous. </s> As these cases once again demonstrate, however, "it is far easier to agree on the purpose that underlies the First Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses than to obtain agreement on the standards that should govern their application." Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (opinion of Harlan, J.). It once appeared that the Court had developed a workable standard by which to identify impermissible government establishments of religion. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Under the now familiar Lemon test, statutes must have both a secular legislative purpose and a principal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and in addition they must not foster excessive government entanglement with religion. Id., at 612-613. Despite its initial promise, the Lemon test has proved problematic. The required inquiry into "entanglement" has been modified and questioned, see Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403 , n. 11 (1983), and in one case we have upheld state action against an Establishment Clause challenge without applying the Lemon test at all. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). The author of Lemon himself apparently questions the test's general applicability. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984). JUSTICE REHNQUIST today suggests that we abandon Lemon entirely, and in the process limit the reach of the Establishment Clause to state discrimination between sects and government designation of a particular church as a "state" or "national" one. Post, at 108-113. </s> Perhaps because I am new to the struggle, I am not ready to abandon all aspects of the Lemon test. I do believe, however, that the standards announced in Lemon should be [472 U.S. 38, 69] reexamined and refined in order to make them more useful in achieving the underlying purpose of the First Amendment. We must strive to do more than erect a constitutional "signpost," Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973), to be followed or ignored in a particular case as our predilections may dictate. Instead, our goal should be "to frame a principle for constitutional adjudication that is not only grounded in the history and language of the first amendment, but one that is also capable of consistent application to the relevant problems." Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitutional Standard, 47 Minn. L. Rev. 329, 332-333 (1963) (footnotes omitted). Last Term, I proposed a refinement of the Lemon test with this goal in mind. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S., at 687 -689 (concurring opinion). </s> The Lynch concurrence suggested that the religious liberty protected by the Establishment Clause is infringed when the government makes adherence to religion relevant to a person's standing in the political community. Direct government action endorsing religion or a particular religious practice is invalid under this approach because it "sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community." Id., at 688. Under this view, Lemon's inquiry as to the purpose and effect of a statute requires courts to examine whether government's purpose is to endorse religion and whether the statute actually conveys a message of endorsement. </s> The endorsement test is useful because of the analytic content it gives to the Lemon-mandated inquiry into legislative purpose and effect. In this country, church and state must necessarily operate within the same community. Because of this coexistence, it is inevitable that the secular interests of government and the religious interests of various sects and their adherents will frequently intersect, conflict, and combine. A statute that ostensibly promotes a secular interest [472 U.S. 38, 70] often has an incidental or even a primary effect of helping or hindering a sectarian belief. Chaos would ensue if every such statute were invalid under the Establishment Clause. For example, the State could not criminalize murder for fear that it would thereby promote the Biblical command against killing. The task for the Court is to sort out those statutes and government practices whose purpose and effect go against the grain of religious liberty protected by the First Amendment. </s> The endorsement test does not preclude government from acknowledging religion or from taking religion into account in making law and policy. It does preclude government from conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred. Such an endorsement infringes the religious liberty of the nonadherent, for "[w]hen the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion in plain." Engel v. Vitale, supra, at 431. At issue today is whether state moment of silence statutes in general, and Alabama's moment of silence statute in particular, embody an impermissible endorsement of prayer in public schools. </s> A </s> Twenty-five states permit or require public school teachers to have students observe a moment of silence in their classrooms. 1 A few statutes provide that the moment of silence [472 U.S. 38, 71] is for the purpose of meditation alone. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 15-522 (1984); Conn. Gen. Stat. 10-16a (1983); R. I. Gen. Laws 16-12-3.1 (1981). The typical statute, however, calls for a moment of silence at the beginning of the schoolday during which students may meditate, pray, or reflect on the activities of the day. See, e. g., Ark. Stat. Ann. 80-1607.1 (1980); Ga. Code Ann. 20-2-1050 (1982); Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 122, § 771 (1983); Ind. Code 20-10.1-7-11 (1982); Kan. Stat. Ann. 72-5308a (1980); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 24, 15-1516.1 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985). Federal trial courts have divided on the constitutionality of these moment of silence laws. Compare Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F. Supp. 337 (Mass. 1976) (upholding statute), with May v. Cooperman, 572 F. Supp. 1561 (NJ 1983) (striking down statute); Duffy v. Las Cruces Public Schools, 557 F. Supp. 1013 (NM 1983) (same); and Beck v. McElrath, 548 F. Supp. 1161 (MD Tenn. 1982) (same). See also Walter v. West Virginia Board of Education, Civ. Action No. 84-5366 (SD W. Va., Mar. 14, 1985) (striking down state constitutional amendment). Relying on this Court's decisions disapproving vocal prayer and Bible reading in the public schools, see Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), the courts that have struck down the moment of silence statutes generally conclude that their purpose and effect are to encourage prayer in public schools. </s> The Engel and Abington decisions are not dispositive on the constitutionality of moment of silence laws. In those [472 U.S. 38, 72] cases, public school teachers and students led their classes in devotional exercises. In Engel, a New York statute required teachers to lead their classes in a vocal prayer. The Court concluded that "it is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as part of a religious program carried on by the government." 370 U.S., at 425 . In Abington, the Court addressed Pennsylvania and Maryland statutes that authorized morning Bible readings in public schools. The Court reviewed the purpose and effect of the statutes, concluded that they required religious exercises, and therefore found them to violate the Establishment Clause. 374 U.S., at 223 -224. Under all of these statutes, a student who did not share the religious beliefs expressed in the course of the exercise was left with the choice of participating, thereby compromising the nonadherent's beliefs, or withdrawing, thereby calling attention to his or her nonconformity. The decisions acknowledge the coercion implicit under the statutory schemes, see Engel, supra, at 431, but they expressly turned only on the fact that the government was sponsoring a manifestly religious exercise. </s> A state-sponsored moment of silence in the public schools is different from state-sponsored vocal prayer or Bible reading. First, a moment of silence is not inherently religious. Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading, need not be associated with a religious exercise. Second, a pupil who participates in a moment of silence need not compromise his or her beliefs. During a moment of silence, a student who objects to prayer is left to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts of others. For these simple reasons, a moment of silence statute does not stand or fall under the Establishment Clause according to how the Court regards vocal prayer or Bible reading. Scholars and at least one Member of this Court have recognized the distinction and suggested that a moment of silence in public schools would be constitutional. See Abington, supra, at 281 (BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("[T]he observance of a moment [472 U.S. 38, 73] of reverent silence at the opening of class" may serve "the solely secular purposes of the devotional activities without jeopardizing either the religious liberties of any members of the community or the proper degree of separation between the spheres of religion and government"); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 14-6, p. 829 (1978); P. Freund, The Legal Issue, in Religion and the Public Schools 23 (1965); Choper, 47 Minn. L. Rev., at 371; Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme Court, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As a general matter, I agree. It is difficult to discern a serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent, thoughtful schoolchildren. </s> By mandating a moment of silence, a State does not necessarily endorse any activity that might occur during the period. Cf. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 272 , n. 11 (1981) ("[B]y creating a forum the [State] does not thereby endorse or promote any of the particular ideas aired there"). Even if a statute specifies that a student may choose to pray silently during a quiet moment, the State has not thereby encouraged prayer over other specified alternatives. Nonetheless, it is also possible that a moment of silence statute, either as drafted or as actually implemented, could effectively favor the child who prays over the child who does not. For example, the message of endorsement would seem inescapable if the teacher exhorts children to use the designated time to pray. Similarly, the face of the statute or its legislative history may clearly establish that it seeks to encourage or promote voluntary prayer over other alternatives, rather than merely provide a quiet moment that may be dedicated to prayer by those so inclined. The crucial question is whether the State has conveyed or attempted to convey the message that children should use the moment of silence for prayer. 2 </s> [472 U.S. 38, 74] This question cannot be answered in the abstract, but instead requires courts to examine the history, language, and administration of a particular statute to determine whether it operates as an endorsement of religion. Lynch, 465 U.S., at 694 (concurring opinion) ("Every government practice must be judged in its unique circumstances to determine whether it constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of religion"). </s> Before reviewing Alabama's moment of silence law to determine whether it endorses prayer, some general observations on the proper scope of the inquiry are in order. First, the inquiry into the purpose of the legislature in enacting a moment of silence law should be deferential and limited. See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 6 (1947) (courts must exercise "the most extreme caution" in assessing whether a state statute has a proper public purpose). In determining whether the government intends a moment of silence statute to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion, a court has no license to psychoanalyze the legislators. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 466 (1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). If a legislature expresses a plausible secular purpose for a moment of silence statute in either the text or the legislative history, 3 or if the statute disclaims an intent to encourage prayer over alternatives during a moment of silence, 4 then courts should generally [472 U.S. 38, 75] defer to that stated intent. See Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 -679 (1971). It is particularly troublesome to denigrate an expressed secular purpose due to postenactment testimony by particular legislators or by interested persons who witnessed the drafting of the statute. Even if the text and official history of a statute express no secular purpose, the statute should be held to have an improper purpose only if it is beyond purview that endorsement of religion or a religious belief "was and is the law's reason for existence." Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 108 (1968). Since there is arguably a secular pedagogical value to a moment of silence in public schools, courts should find an improper purpose behind such a statute only if the statute on its face, in its official legislative history, or in its interpretation by a responsible administrative agency suggests it has the primary purpose of endorsing prayer. </s> JUSTICE REHNQUIST suggests that this sort of deferential inquiry into legislative purpose "means little," because "it only requires the legislature to express any secular purpose and omit all sectarian references." Post, at 108. It is not a trivial matter, however, to require that the legislature manifest a secular purpose and omit all sectarian endorsements from its laws. That requirement is precisely tailored to the Establishment Clause's purpose of assuring that government not intentionally endorse religion or a religious practice. It is of course possible that a legislature will enunciate a sham secular purpose for a statute. I have little doubt that our courts are capable of distinguishing a sham secular purpose from a sincere one, or that the Lemon inquiry into the effect of an enactment would help decide those close cases where the validity of an expressed secular purpose is in doubt. While the secular purpose requirement alone may rarely be determinative in striking down a statute, it nevertheless serves an important function. It reminds government that [472 U.S. 38, 76] when it acts it should do so without endorsing a particular religious belief or practice that all citizens do not share. In this sense the secular purpose requirement is squarely based in the text of the Establishment Clause it helps to enforce. </s> Second, the Lynch concurrence suggested that the effect of a moment of silence law is not entirely a question of fact: </s> "[W]hether a government activity communicates endorsement of religion is not a question of simple historical fact. Although evidentiary submissions may help answer it, the question is, like the question whether racial or sex-based classifications communicate an invidious message, in large part a legal question to be answered on the basis of judicial interpretation of social facts." 465 U.S., at 693 -694. </s> The relevant issue is whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement of prayer in public schools. Cf. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 517 -518, n. 1 (1984) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) (noting that questions whether fighting words are "likely to provoke the average person to retaliation," Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969), and whether allegedly obscene material appeals to "prurient interests," Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), are mixed questions of law and fact that are properly subject to de novo appellate review). A moment of silence law that is clearly drafted and implemented so as to permit prayer, meditation, and reflection within the prescribed period, without endorsing one alternative over the others, should pass this test. </s> B </s> The analysis above suggests that moment of silence laws in many States should pass Establishment Clause scrutiny because they do not favor the child who chooses to pray during a moment of silence over the child who chooses to meditate [472 U.S. 38, 77] or reflect. Alabama Code 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984) does not stand on the same footing. However deferentially one examines its text and legislative history, however objectively one views the message attempted to be conveyed to the public, the conclusion is unavoidable that the purpose of the statute is to endorse prayer in public schools. I accordingly agree with the Court of Appeals, 705 F.2d 1526, 1535 (1983), that the Alabama statute has a purpose which is in violation of the Establishment Clause, and cannot be upheld. </s> In finding that the purpose of 16-1-20.1 is to endorse voluntary prayer during a moment of silence, the Court relies on testimony elicited from State Senator Donald G. Holmes during a preliminary injunction hearing. Ante, at 56-57. Senator Holmes testified that the sole purpose of the statute was to return voluntary prayer to the public schools. For the reasons expressed above, I would give little, if any, weight to this sort of evidence of legislative intent. Nevertheless, the text of the statute in light of its official legislative history leaves little doubt that the purpose of this statute corresponds to the purpose expressed by Senator Holmes at the preliminary injunction hearing. </s> First, it is notable that Alabama already had a moment of silence statute before it enacted 16-1-20.1. See Ala. Code 16-1-20 (Supp. 1984), quoted ante, at 40, n. 1. Appellees do not challenge this statute - indeed, they concede its validity. See Brief for Appellees 2. The only significant addition made by 16-1-20.1 is to specify expressly that voluntary prayer is one of the authorized activities during a moment of silence. Any doubt as to the legislative purpose of that addition is removed by the official legislative history. The sole purpose reflected in the official history is "to return voluntary prayer to our public schools." App. 50. Nor does anything in the legislative history contradict an intent to encourage children to choose prayer over other alternatives during the moment of silence. Given this legislative history, it is not surprising that the State of Alabama conceded in the [472 U.S. 38, 78] courts below that the purpose of the statute was to make prayer part of daily classroom activity, and that both the District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded that the law's purpose was to encourage religious activity. See ante, at 57, n. 44. In light of the legislative history and the findings of the courts below, I agree with the Court that the State intended 16-1-20.1 to convey a message that prayer was the endorsed activity during the state-prescribed moment of silence. 5 While it is therefore unnecessary also to determine the effect of the statute, Lynch, 465 U.S., at 690 (concurring opinion), it also seems likely that the message actually conveyed to objective observers by 16-1-20.1 is approval of the child who selects prayer over other alternatives during a moment of silence. </s> Given this evidence in the record, candor requires us to admit that this Alabama statute was intended to convey a message of state encouragement and endorsement of religion. In Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S., at 669 , the Court stated that the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment are flexible enough to "permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference." Alabama Code 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984) does more than permit prayer to occur during a moment of silence "without interference." It [472 U.S. 38, 79] endorses the decision to pray during a moment of silence, and accordingly sponsors a religious exercise. For that reason, I concur in the judgment of the Court. </s> II </s> In his dissenting opinion, post, at 91-106, JUSTICE REHNQUIST reviews the text and history of the First Amendment Religion Clauses. His opinion suggests that a long line of this Court's decisions are inconsistent with the intent of the drafters of the Bill of Rights. He urges the Court to correct the historical inaccuracies in its past decisions by embracing a far more restricted interpretation of the Establishment Clause, an interpretation that presumably would permit vocal group prayer in public schools. See generally R. Cord, Separation of Church and State (1982). </s> The United States, in an amicus brief, suggests a less sweeping modification of Establishment Clause principles. In the Federal Government's view, a state-sponsored moment of silence is merely an "accommodation" of the desire of some public school children to practice their religion by praying silently. Such an accommodation is contemplated by the First Amendment's guarantee that the Government will not prohibit the free exercise of religion. Because the moment of silence implicates free exercise values, the United States suggests that the Lemon-mandated inquiry into purpose and effect should be modified. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22. </s> There is an element of truth and much helpful analysis in each of these suggestions. Particularly when we are interpreting the Constitution, "a page of history is worth a volume of logic." New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). Whatever the provision of the Constitution that is at issue, I continue to believe that "fidelity to the notion of constitutional - as opposed to purely judicial - limits on governmental action requires us to impose a heavy burden on those who claim that practices accepted when [the provision] was [472 U.S. 38, 80] adopted are now constitutionally impermissible." Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 26 (1985) (dissenting opinion). The Court properly looked to history in upholding legislative prayer, Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), property tax exemptions for houses of worship, Walz v. Tax Comm'n, supra, and Sunday closing laws, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). As Justice Holmes once observed, "[i]f a thing has been practised for two hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it." Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922). </s> JUSTICE REHNQUIST does not assert, however, that the drafters of the First Amendment expressed a preference for prayer in public schools, or that the practice of prayer in public schools enjoyed uninterrupted government endorsement from the time of enactment of the Bill of Rights to the present era. The simple truth is that free public education was virtually nonexistent in the late 18th century. See Abington, 374 U.S., at 238 , and n. 7 (BRENNAN, J., concurring). Since there then existed few government-run schools, it is unlikely that the persons who drafted the First Amendment, or the state legislators who ratified it, anticipated the problems of interaction of church and state in the public schools. Sky, The Establishment Clause, the Congress, and the Schools: An Historical Perspective, 52 Va. L. Rev. 1395, 1403-1404 (1966). Even at the time of adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, education in Southern States was still primarily in private hands, and the movement toward free public schools supported by general taxation had not taken hold. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 489 -490 (1954). </s> This uncertainty as to the intent of the Framers of the Bill of Rights does not mean we should ignore history for guidance on the role of religion in public education. The Court has not done so. See, e. g., Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) (Frankfurter, [472 U.S. 38, 81] J., concurring). When the intent of the Framers is unclear, I believe we must employ both history and reason in our analysis. The primary issue raised by JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S dissent is whether the historical fact that our Presidents have long called for public prayers of Thanks should be dispositive on the constitutionality of prayer in public schools. 6 I think not. At the very least, Presidential Proclamations are distinguishable from school prayer in that they are received in a noncoercive setting and are primarily directed at adults, who presumably are not readily susceptible to unwilling religious indoctrination. This Court's decisions have recognized a distinction when government-sponsored religious exercises are directed at impressionable children who are required to attend school, for then government endorsement is much more likely to result in coerced religious beliefs. See, e. g., Marsh v. Chambers, supra, at 792; Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S., at 686 . Although history provides a touchstone for constitutional problems, the Establishment Clause concern for religious liberty is dispositive here. </s> The element of truth in the United States' arguments, I believe, lies in the suggestion that Establishment Clause analysis must comport with the mandate of the Free Exercise Clause that government make no law prohibiting the free exercise of religion. Our cases have interpreted the Free Exercise Clause to compel the government to exempt persons from some generally applicable government requirements so as to permit those persons to freely exercise their religion. See, e. g., Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, [472 U.S. 38, 82] 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Even where the Free Exercise Clause does not compel the government to grant an exemption, the Court has suggested that the government in some circumstances may voluntarily choose to exempt religious observers without violating the Establishment Clause. See, e. g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 453 (1971); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). The challenge posed by the United States' argument is how to define the proper Establishment Clause limits on voluntary government efforts to facilitate the free exercise of religion. On the one hand, a rigid application of the Lemon test would invalidate legislation exempting religious observers from generally applicable government obligations. By definition, such legislation has a religious purpose and effect in promoting the free exercise of religion. On the other hand, judicial deference to all legislation that purports to facilitate the free exercise of religion would completely vitiate the Establishment Clause. Any statute pertaining to religion can be viewed as an "accommodation" of free exercise rights. Indeed, the statute at issue in Lemon, which provided salary supplements, textbooks, and instructional materials to Pennsylvania parochial schools, can be viewed as an accommodation of the religious beliefs of parents who choose to send their children to religious schools. </s> It is obvious that either of the two Religion Clauses, "if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other." Walz, 397 U.S., at 668 -669. The Court has long exacerbated the conflict by calling for government "neutrality" toward religion. See, e. g., Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). It is difficult to square any notion of "complete neutrality," ante, at 60, with the mandate of the Free Exercise Clause that government must sometimes exempt a religious observer from an otherwise generally applicable obligation. A government that confers a benefit on an explicitly religious basis is not [472 U.S. 38, 83] neutral toward religion. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 372 (1970) (WHITE, J., dissenting). </s> The solution to the conflict between the Religion Clauses lies not in "neutrality," but rather in identifying workable limits to the government's license to promote the free exercise of religion. The text of the Free Exercise Clause speaks of laws that prohibit the free exercise of religion. On its face, the Clause is directed at government interference with free exercise. Given that concern, one can plausibly assert that government-imposed burden on the free exercise of religion. If a statute falls within this category, then the standard Establishment Clause test should be modified accordingly. It is disingenuous to look for a purely secular purpose when the manifest objective of a statute is to facilitate the free exercise of religion by lifting a government-imposed burden. Instead, the Court should simply acknowledge that the religious purpose of such a statute is legitimate by the Free Exercise Clause. I would also go further. In assessing the effect of such a statute - that is, in determining whether the statute conveys the message of endorsement of religion or a particular religious belief - courts should assume that the "objective observer," supra, at 76, is acquainted with the Free Exercise Clause and the values it promotes. Thus individual perceptions, or resentment that a religious observer is exempted from a particular government requirement, would be entitled to little weight if the Free Exercise Clause strongly supported the exemption. </s> While this "accommodation" analysis would help reconcile our Free Exercise and Establishment Clause standards, it would not save Alabama's moment of silence law. If we assume that the religious activity that Alabama seeks to protect is silent prayer, then it is difficult to discern any state-imposed burden on that activity that is lifted by Alabama Code 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984). No law prevents a student who is so inclined from praying silently in public schools. [472 U.S. 38, 84] Moreover, state law already provided a moment of silence to these appellees irrespective of 16-1-20.1. See Ala. Code 16-1-20 (Supp. 1984). Of course, the State might argue that 16-1-20.1 protects not silent prayer, but rather group silent prayer under state sponsorship. Phrased in these terms, the burden lifted by the statute is not one imposed by the State of Alabama, but by the Establishment Clause as interpreted in Engel and Abington. In my view, it is beyond the authority of the State of Alabama to remove burdens imposed by the Constitution itself. I conclude that the Alabama statute at issue today lifts no state-imposed burden on the free exercise of religion, and accordingly cannot properly be viewed as an accommodation statute. </s> III </s> The Court does not hold that the Establishment Clause is so hostile to religion that it precludes the States from affording schoolchildren an opportunity for voluntary silent prayer. To the contrary, the moment of silence statutes of many States should satisfy the Establishment Clause standard we have here applied. The Court holds only that Alabama has intentionally crossed the line between creating a quiet moment during which those so inclined may pray, and affirmatively endorsing the particular religious practice of prayer. This line may be a fine one, but our precedents and the principles of religious liberty require that we draw it. In my view, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be affirmed. </s> [Footnote 1 See Ala. Code 16-1-20, 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984): Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 15-522 (1984); Ark. Stat. Ann. 80-1607.1 (1980); Conn. Gen. Stat. 10-16a (1983); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 14, 4101 (1981) (as interpreted in Del. Op. Atty. Gen. 79-I011 (1979)); Fla. Stat. 233.062 (1983); Ga. Code Ann. 20-2-1050 (1982); Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 122, § 771 (1983); Ind. Code 20-10.1-7-11 (1982); Kan. Stat. Ann. 72.5308a (1980); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 17:2115(A) (West 1982); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 20-A, 4805 (1983); Md. Educ. Code Ann. 7-104 (1985); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 71, 1A (West 1982); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 380.1565 (Supp. 1984-1985); [472 U.S. 38, 71] N. J. Stat. Ann. 18A:36-4 (West Supp. 1984-1985); N. M. Stat. Ann. 22-5-4.1 (1981); N. Y. Educ. Law 3029-a (McKinney 1981); N. D. Cent. Code 15-47-30.1 (1981); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 3313.60.1 (1980); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 24, 15.1516.1 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985); R. I. Gen. Laws 16-12-3.1 (1981); Tenn. Code Ann. 49-6-1004 (1983); Va. Code 22.1-203 (1980); W. Va. Const., Art. III, 15-a. For a useful comparison of the provisions of many of these statutes, see Note, Daily Moments of Silence in Public Schools: A Constitutional Analysis, 58 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 364, 407-408 (1983). </s> [Footnote 2 Appellants argue that Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 -314 (1952), suggests there is no constitutional infirmity in a State's encouraging a child to pray during a moment of silence. The cited dicta from Zorach, however, is inapposite. There the Court stated that "[w]hen the state [472 U.S. 38, 74] encourages religious instruction . . . by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions." Ibid. (emphasis added). When the State provides a moment of silence during which prayer may occur at the election of the student, it can be said to be adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs. But when the State also encourages the student to pray during a moment of silence, it converts an otherwise inoffensive moment of silence into an effort by the majority to use the machinery of the State to encourage the minority to participate in a religious exercise. See Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963). </s> [Footnote 3 See, e. g., Tenn. Code Ann. 49-6-1004 (1983). </s> [Footnote 4 See, e. g., W. Va. Const., Art. III, 15-a. </s> [Footnote 5 THE CHIEF JUSTICE suggests that one consequence of the Court's emphasis on the difference between 16-1-20.1 and its predecessor statute might be to render the Pledge of Allegiance unconstitutional because Congress amended it in 1954 to add the words "under God." Post, at 88. I disagree. In my view, the words "under God" in the Pledge, as codified at 36 U.S.C. 172, serve as an acknowledgment of religion with "the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions, [and] expressing confidence in the future." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (concurring opinion). </s> I also disagree with THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S suggestion that the Court's opinion invalidates any moment of silence statute that includes the word "prayer." Post, at 85. As noted supra, at 73, "[e]ven if a statute specifies that a student may choose to pray silently during a quiet moment, the State has not thereby encouraged prayer over other specified alternatives." </s> [Footnote 6 Even assuming a taxpayer could establish standing to challenge such a practice, see Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982), these Presidential Proclamations would probably withstand Establishment Clause scrutiny given their long history. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). </s> CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting. </s> Some who trouble to read the opinions in these cases will find it ironic - perhaps even bizarre - that on the very day we heard arguments in the cases, the Court's session opened with an invocation for Divine protection. Across the park a few hundred yards away, the House of Representatives and [472 U.S. 38, 85] the Senate regularly open each session with a prayer. These legislative prayers are not just one minute in duration, but are extended, thoughtful invocations and prayers for Divine guidance. They are given, as they have been since 1789, by clergy appointed as official chaplains and paid from the Treasury of the United States. Congress has also provided chapels in the Capitol, at public expense, where Members and others may pause for prayer, meditation - or a moment of silence. </s> Inevitably some wag is bound to say that the Court's holding today reflects a belief that the historic practice of the Congress and this Court is justified because members of the Judiciary and Congress are more in need of Divine guidance than are schoolchildren. Still others will say that all this controversy is "much ado about nothing," since no power on earth - including this Court and Congress - can stop any teacher from opening the schoolday with a moment of silence for pupils to meditate, to plan their day - or to pray if they voluntarily elect to do so. </s> I make several points about today's curious holding. </s> (a) It makes no sense to say that Alabama has "endorsed prayer" by merely enacting a new statute "to specify expressly that voluntary prayer is one of the authorized activities during a moment of silence," ante, at 77 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis added). To suggest that a moment-of-silence statute that includes the word "prayer" unconstitutionally endorses religion, while one that simply provides for a moment of silence does not, manifests not neutrality but hostility toward religion. For decades our opinions have stated that hostility toward any religion or toward all religions is as much forbidden by the Constitution as is an official establishment of religion. The Alabama Legislature has no more "endorsed" religion than a state or the Congress does when it provides for legislative chaplains, or than this Court does when it opens each session with an invocation to [472 U.S. 38, 86] God. Today's decision recalls the observations of Justice Goldberg: </s> "[U]ntutored devotion to the concept of neutrality can lead to invocation or approval of results which partake not simply of that noninterference and noninvolvement with the religious which the Constitution commands, but of a brooding and pervasive dedication to the secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the religious. Such results are not only not compelled by the Constitution, but, it seems to me, are prohibited by it." Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (concurring opinion). </s> (b) The inexplicable aspect of the foregoing opinions, however, is what they advance as support for the holding concerning the purpose of the Alabama Legislature. Rather than determining legislative purpose from the face of the statute as a whole, 1 the opinions rely on three factors in concluding that the Alabama Legislature had a "wholly religious" purpose for enacting the statute under review, Ala. Code 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984): (i) statements of the statute's sponsor, (ii) admissions in Governor James' answer to the second amended complaint, and (iii) the difference between 16-1-20.1 and its predecessor statute. </s> Curiously, the opinions do not mention that all of the sponsor's statements relied upon - including the statement "inserted" into the Senate Journal - were made after the legislature had passed the statute; indeed, the testimony that the Court finds critical was given well over a year after the statute was enacted. As even the appellees concede, see Brief for Appellees 18, there is not a shred of evidence that [472 U.S. 38, 87] the legislature as a whole shared the sponsor's motive or that a majority in either house was even aware of the sponsor's view of the bill when it was passed. The sole relevance of the sponsor's statements, therefore, is that they reflect the personal, subjective motives of a single legislator. No case in the 195-year history of this Court supports the disconcerting idea that postenactment statements by individual legislators are relevant in determining the constitutionality of legislation. </s> Even if an individual legislator's after-the-fact statements could rationally be considered relevant, all of the opinions fail to mention that the sponsor also testified that one of his purposes in drafting and sponsoring the moment-of-silence bill was to clear up a widespread misunderstanding that a schoolchild is legally prohibited from engaging in silent, individual prayer once he steps inside a public school building. See App. 53-54. That testimony is at least as important as the statements the Court relies upon, and surely that testimony manifests a permissible purpose. </s> The Court also relies on the admissions of Governor James' answer to the second amended complaint. Strangely, however, the Court neglects to mention that there was no trial bearing on the constitutionality of the Alabama statutes; trial became unnecessary when the District Court held that the Establishment Clause does not apply to the states. 2 The absence of a trial on the issue of the constitutionality of 16-1-20.1 is significant because the answer filed by the State Board and Superintendent of Education did not make the same admissions that the Governor's answer made. See 1 Record 187. The Court cannot know whether, if these cases had been tried, those state officials would have offered evidence to contravene appellees' allegations concerning legislative purpose. Thus, it is completely inappropriate to accord any relevance to the admissions in the Governor's answer. [472 U.S. 38, 88] </s> The several preceding opinions conclude that the principal difference between 16-1-20.1 and its predecessor statute proves that the sole purpose behind the inclusion of the phrase "or voluntary prayer" in 16-1-20.1 was to endorse and promote prayer. This reasoning is simply a subtle way of focusing exclusively on the religious component of the statute rather than examining the statute as a whole. Such logic - if it can be called that - would lead the Court to hold, for example, that a state may enact a statute that provides reimbursement for bus transportation to the parents of all schoolchildren, but may not add parents of parochial school students to an existing program providing reimbursement for parents of public school students. Congress amended the statutory Pledge of Allegiance 31 years ago to add the words "under God." Act of June 14, 1954, Pub. L. 396, 68 Stat. 249. Do the several opinions in support of the judgment today render the Pledge unconstitutional? That would be the consequence of their method of focusing on the difference between 16-1-20.1 and its predecessor statute rather than examining 16-1-20.1 as a whole. 3 Any such holding would of course make a mockery of our decisionmaking in Establishment Clause cases. And even were the Court's method correct, the inclusion of the words "or voluntary prayer" in 16-1-20.1 is wholly consistent with the clearly permissible purpose of clarifying that silent, voluntary prayer is not forbidden in the public school building. 4 </s> [472 U.S. 38, 89] </s> (c) The Court's extended treatment of the "test" of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), suggests a naive preoccupation with an easy, bright-line approach for addressing constitutional issues. We have repeatedly cautioned that Lemon did not establish a rigid caliper capable of resolving every Establishment Clause issue, but that it sought only to provide "signposts." "In each [Establishment Clause] case, the inquiry calls for line-drawing; no fixed, per se rule can be framed." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984). In any event, our responsibility is not to apply tidy formulas by rote; our duty is to determine whether the statute or practice at issue is a step toward establishing a state religion. Given today's decision, however, perhaps it is understandable that the opinions in support of the judgment all but ignore the Establishment Clause itself and the concerns that underlie it. </s> (d) The notion that the Alabama statute is a step toward creating an established church borders on, if it does not trespass into, the ridiculous. The statute does not remotely threaten religious liberty; it affirmatively furthers the values of religious freedom and tolerance that the Establishment Clause was designed to protect. Without pressuring those who do not wish to pray, the statute simply creates an opportunity to think, to plan, or to pray if one wishes - as Congress does by providing chaplains and chapels. It accommodates the purely private, voluntary religious choices of the individual pupils who wish to pray while at the same time creating a time for nonreligious reflection for those who do not choose to pray. The statute also provides a meaningful opportunity for schoolchildren to appreciate the absolute constitutional right of each individual to worship and believe as the individual wishes. The statute "endorses" only the view that the religious observances of other should be tolerated and, [472 U.S. 38, 90] where possible, accommodated. If the government may not accommodate religious needs when it does so in a wholly neutral and noncoercive manner, the "benevolent neutrality" that we have long considered the correct constitutional standard will quickly translate into the "callous indifference" that the Court has consistently held the Establishment Clause does not require. </s> The Court today has ignored the wise admonition of Justice Goldberg that "the measure of constitutional adjudication is the ability and willingness to distinguish between real threat and mere shadow." Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S., at 308 (concurring opinion). The innocuous statute that the Court strikes down does not even rise to the level of "mere shadow." JUSTICE O'CONNOR paradoxically acknowledges: "It is difficult to discern a serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent, thoughtful schoolchildren." Ante, at 73. 5 I would add to that, "even if they choose to pray." </s> The mountains have labored and brought forth a mouse. 6 </s> [Footnote 1 The foregoing opinions likewise completely ignore the statement of purpose that accompanied the moment-of-silence bill throughout the legislative process: "To permit a period of silence to be observed for the purpose of meditation or voluntary prayer at the commencement of the first class of each day in all public schools." 1981 Ala. Senate J. 14 (emphasis added). See also id., at 150, 307, 410, 535, 938, 967. </s> [Footnote 2 The four days of trial to which the Court refers concerned only the alleged practices of vocal, group prayer in the classroom. </s> [Footnote 3 The House Report on the legislation amending the Pledge states that the purpose of the amendment was to affirm the principle that "our people and our Government [are dependent] upon the moral directions of the Creator." H. R. Rep. No. 1693, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1954). If this is simply "acknowledgment," not "endorsement," of religion, see ante, at 78, n. 5 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment), the distinction is far too infinitesimal for me to grasp. </s> [Footnote 4 The several opinions suggest that other similar statutes may survive today's decision. See ante, at 59; ante, at 62 (POWELL, J., concurring); ante, at 78, n. 5 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment). If this is true, these opinions become even less comprehensible, given that the Court [472 U.S. 38, 89] holds this statute invalid when there is no legitimate evidence of "impermissible" purpose; there could hardly be less evidence of "impermissible" purpose than was shown in these cases. </s> [Footnote 5 The principal plaintiff in this action has stated: "`I probably wouldn't have brought the suit just on the silent meditation or prayer statute . . . . If that's all that existed, that wouldn't have caused me much concern, unless it was implemented in a way that suggested prayer was the preferred activity.'" Malone, Prayers for Relief, 71 A. B. A. J. 61, 62, col. 1 (Apr. 1985) (quoting Ishmael Jaffree). </s> [Footnote 6 Horace, Epistles, bk. III (Ars Poetica), line 139. </s> JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting. </s> For the most part agreeing with the opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE, I dissent from the Court's judgment invalidating Ala. Code 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984). Because I do, it is apparent that in my view the First Amendment does not proscribe either (1) statutes authorizing or requiring in so many words a moment of silence before classes begin or (2) a statute that provides, when it is initially passed, for a moment of silence for meditation or prayer. As I read the filed opinions, [472 U.S. 38, 91] a majority of the Court would approve statutes that provided for a moment of silence but did not mention prayer. But if a student asked whether he could pray during that moment, it is difficult to believe that the teacher could not answer in the affirmative. If that is the case, I would not invalidate a statute that at the outset provided the legislative answer to the question "May I pray?" This is so even if the Alabama statute is infirm, which I do not believe it is, because of its peculiar legislative history. </s> I appreciate JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S explication of the history of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. Against that history, it would be quite understandable if we undertook to reassess our cases dealing with these Clauses, particularly those dealing with the Establishment Clause. Of course, I have been out of step with many of the Court's decisions dealing with this subject matter, and it is thus not surprising that I would support a basic reconsideration of our precedents. </s> JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting. </s> Thirty-eight years ago this Court, in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947), summarized its exegesis of Establishment Clause doctrine thus: </s> "In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect `a wall of separation between church and State.' Reynolds v. United States, [98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879)]." </s> This language from Reynolds, a case involving the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment rather than the Establishment Clause, quoted from Thomas Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptist Association the phrase "I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should `make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation [472 U.S. 38, 92] between church and State." 8 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 113 (H. Washington ed. 1861). 1 </s> It is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of constitutional history, but unfortunately the Establishment Clause has been expressly freighted with Jefferson's misleading metaphor for nearly 40 years. Thomas Jefferson was of course in France at the time the constitutional Amendments known as the Bill of Rights were passed by Congress and ratified by the States. His letter to the Danbury Baptist Association was a short note of courtesy, written 14 years after the Amendments were passed by Congress. He would seem to any detached observer as a less than ideal source of contemporary history as to the meaning of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. </s> Jefferson's fellow Virginian, James Madison, with whom he was joined in the battle for the enactment of the Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty of 1786, did play as large a part as anyone in the drafting of the Bill of Rights. He had two advantages over Jefferson in this regard: he was present in the United States, and he was a leading Member of the First Congress. But when we turn to the record of the proceedings in the First Congress leading up to the adoption of the Establishment Clause of the Constitution, including Madison's significant contributions thereto, we see a far different picture of its purpose than the highly simplified "wall of separation between church and State." </s> During the debates in the Thirteen Colonies over ratification of the Constitution, one of the arguments frequently used by opponents of ratification was that without a Bill of Rights guaranteeing individual liberty the new general Government [472 U.S. 38, 93] carried with it a potential for tyranny. The typical response to this argument on the part of those who favored ratification was that the general Government established by the Constitution had only delegated powers, and that these delegated powers were so limited that the Government would have no occasion to violate individual liberties. This response satisfied some, but not others, and of the 11 Colonies which ratified the Constitution by early 1789, 5 proposed one or another amendments guaranteeing individual liberty. Three - New Hampshire, New York, and Virginia - included in one form or another a declaration of religious freedom. See 3 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 659 (1891); 1 id., at 328. Rhode Island and North Carolina flatly refused to ratify the Constitution in the absence of amendments in the nature of a Bill of Rights. 1 id., at 334; 4 id., at 244. Virginia and North Carolina proposed identical guarantees of religious freedom: </s> "[A]ll men have an equal, natural and unalienable right to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience, and . . . no particular religious sect or society ought to be favored or established, by law, in preference to others." 3 id., at 659; 4 id., at 244. 2 </s> On June 8, 1789, James Madison rose in the House of Representatives and "reminded the House that this was the day that he had heretofore named for bringing forward amendments to the Constitution." 1 Annals of Cong. 424. Madison's subsequent remarks in urging the House to adopt his drafts of the proposed amendments were less those of a dedicated advocate of the wisdom of such measures than those of a prudent statesman seeking the enactment of measures [472 U.S. 38, 94] sought by a number of his fellow citizens which could surely do no harm and might do a great deal of good. He said, inter alia: </s> "It appears to me that this House is bound by every motive of prudence, not to let the first session pass over without proposing to the State Legislatures, some things to be incorporated into the Constitution, that will render it as acceptable to the whole people of the United States, as it has been found acceptable to a majority of them. I wish, among other reasons why something should be done, that those who had been friendly to the adoption of this Constitution may have the opportunity of proving to those who were opposed to it that they were as sincerely devoted to liberty and a Republican Government, as those who charged them with wishing the adoption of this Constitution in order to lay the foundation of an aristocracy or despotism. It will be a desirable thing to extinguish from the bosom of every member of the community, any apprehensions that there are those among his countrymen who wish to deprive them of the liberty for which they valiantly fought and honorably bled. And if there are amendments desired of such a nature as will not injure the Constitution, and they can be ingrafted so as to give satisfaction to the doubting part of our fellow-citizens, the friends of the Federal Government will evince that spirit of deference and concession for which they have hitherto been distinguished." Id., at 431-432. </s> The language Madison proposed for what ultimately became the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment was this: </s> "The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed." Id., at 434. [472 U.S. 38, 95] </s> On the same day that Madison proposed them, the amendments which formed the basis for the Bill of Rights were referred by the House to a Committee of the Whole, and after several weeks' delay were then referred to a Select Committee consisting of Madison and 10 others. The Committee revised Madison's proposal regarding the establishment of religion to read: </s> "[N]o religion shall be established by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be infringed." Id., at 729. </s> The Committee's proposed revisions were debated in the House on August 15, 1789. The entire debate on the Religion Clauses is contained in two full columns of the "Annals," and does not seem particularly illuminating. See id., at 729-731. Representative Peter Sylvester of New York expressed his dislike for the revised version, because it might have a tendency "to abolish religion altogether." Representative John Vining suggested that the two parts of the sentence be transposed; Representative Elbridge Gerry thought the language should be changed to read "that no religious doctrine shall be established by law." Id., at 729. Roger Sherman of Connecticut had the traditional reason for opposing provisions of a Bill of Rights - that Congress had no delegated authority to "make religious establishments" - and therefore he opposed the adoption of the amendment. Representative Daniel Carroll of Maryland thought it desirable to adopt the words proposed, saying "[h]e would not contend with gentlemen about the phraseology, his object was to secure the substance in such a manner as to satisfy the wishes of the honest part of the community." </s> Madison then spoke, and said that "he apprehended the meaning of the words to be, that Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience." Id., at 730. He said that some of the state conventions had thought that Congress might rely on [472 U.S. 38, 96] the Necessary and Proper Clause to infringe the rights of conscience or to establish a national religion, and "to prevent these effects he presumed the amendment was intended, and he thought it as well expressed as the nature of the language would admit." Ibid. </s> Representative Benjamin Huntington then expressed the view that the Committee's language might "be taken in such latitude as to be extremely hurtful to the cause of religion. He understood the amendment to mean what had been expressed by the gentleman from Virginia; but others might find it convenient to put another construction upon it." Huntington, from Connecticut, was concerned that in the New England States, where state-established religions were the rule rather than the exception, the federal courts might not be able to entertain claims based upon an obligation under the bylaws of a religious organization to contribute to the support of a minister or the building of a place of worship. He hoped that "the amendment would be made in such a way as to secure the rights of conscience, and a free exercise of the rights of religion, but not to patronise those who professed no religion at all." Id., at 730-731. </s> Madison responded that the insertion of the word "national" before the word "religion" in the Committee version should satisfy the minds of those who had criticized the language. "He believed that the people feared one sect might obtain a pre-eminence, or two combine together, and establish a religion to which they would compel others to conform. He thought that if the word `national' was introduced, it would point the amendment directly to the object it was intended to prevent." Id., at 731. Representative Samuel Livermore expressed himself as dissatisfied with Madison's proposed amendment, and thought it would be better if the Committee language were altered to read that "Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or infringing the rights of conscience." Ibid. </s> Representative Gerry spoke in opposition to the use of the word "national" because of strong feelings expressed during [472 U.S. 38, 97] the ratification debates that a federal government, not a national government, was created by the Constitution. Madison thereby withdrew his proposal but insisted that his reference to a "national religion" only referred to a national establishment and did not mean that the Government was a national one. The question was taken on Representative Livermore's motion, which passed by a vote of 31 for and 20 against. Ibid. </s> The following week, without any apparent debate, the House voted to alter the language of the Religion Clauses to read "Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights of conscience." Id., at 766. The floor debates in the Senate were secret, and therefore not reported in the Annals. The Senate on September 3, 1789, considered several different forms of the Religion Amendment, and reported this language back to the House: </s> "Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a mode of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion." C. Antieau, A. Downey, & E. Roberts, Freedom From Federal Establishment 130 (1964). </s> The House refused to accept the Senate's changes in the Bill of Rights and asked for a conference; the version which emerged from the conference was that which ultimately found its way into the Constitution as a part of the First Amendment. </s> "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." </s> The House and the Senate both accepted this language on successive days, and the Amendment was proposed in this form. </s> On the basis of the record of these proceedings in the House of Representatives, James Madison was undoubtedly the most important architect among the Members of the [472 U.S. 38, 98] House of the Amendments which became the Bill of Rights, but it was James Madison speaking as an advocate of sensible legislative compromise, not as an advocate of incorporating the Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty into the United States Constitution. During the ratification debate in the Virginia Convention, Madison had actually opposed the idea of any Bill of Rights. His sponsorship of the Amendments in the House was obviously not that of a zealous believer in the necessity of the Religion Clauses, but of one who felt it might do some good, could do no harm, and would satisfy those who had ratified the Constitution on the condition that Congress propose a Bill of Rights. 3 His original language "nor shall any national religion be established" obviously does not conform to the "wall of separation" between church and State idea which latter-day commentators have ascribed to him. His explanation on the floor of the meaning of his language - "that Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law" is of the same ilk. When he replied to Huntington in the debate over the proposal which came from the Select Committee of the House, he urged that the language "no religion shall be established by law" should be amended by inserting the word "national" in front of the word "religion." </s> It seems indisputable from these glimpses of Madison's thinking, as reflected by actions on the floor of the House in 1789, that he saw the Amendment as designed to prohibit the establishment of a national religion, and perhaps to prevent discrimination among sects. He did not see it as requiring neutrality on the part of government between religion and irreligion. Thus the Court's opinion in Everson - while correct in bracketing Madison and Jefferson together in their exertions in their home State leading to the enactment of the [472 U.S. 38, 99] Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty - is totally incorrect in suggesting that Madison carried these views onto the floor of the United States House of Representatives when he proposed the language which would ultimately become the Bill of Rights. </s> The repetition of this error in the Court's opinion in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948), and, inter alia, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), does not make it any sounder historically. Finally, in Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214 (1963), the Court made the truly remarkable statement that "the views of Madison and Jefferson, preceded by Roger Williams, came to be incorporated not only in the Federal Constitution but likewise in those of most of our States" (footnote omitted). On the basis of what evidence we have, this statement is demonstrably incorrect as a matter of history. 4 And its repetition in varying forms in succeeding opinions of the Court can give it no more authority than it possesses as a matter of fact; stare decisis may bind courts as to matters of law, but it cannot bind them as to matters of history. </s> None of the other Members of Congress who spoke during the August 15th debate expressed the slightest indication that they thought the language before them from the Select Committee, or the evil to be aimed at, would require that the Government be absolutely neutral as between religion and irreligion. The evil to be aimed at, so far as those who spoke were concerned, appears to have been the establishment of a national church, and perhaps the preference of one religious sect over another; but it was definitely not concerned about whether the Government might aid all religions evenhandedly. If one were to follow the advice of JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in Abington School District v. Schempp, supra, at 236, and construe the Amendment in the light of what particular [472 U.S. 38, 100] "practices . . . challenged threaten those consequences which the Framers deeply feared; whether, in short, they tend to promote that type of interdependence between religion and state which the First Amendment was designed to prevent," one would have to say that the First Amendment Establishment Clause should be read no more broadly than to prevent the establishment of a national religion or the governmental preference of one religious sect over another. </s> The actions of the First Congress, which reenacted the Northwest Ordinance for the governance of the Northwest Territory in 1789, confirm the view that Congress did not mean that the Government should be neutral between religion and irreligion. The House of Representatives took up the Northwest Ordinance on the same day as Madison introduced his proposed amendments which became the Bill of Rights; while at that time the Federal Government was of course not bound by draft amendments to the Constitution which had not yet been proposed by Congress, say nothing of ratified by the States, it seems highly unlikely that the House of Representatives would simultaneously consider proposed amendments to the Constitution and enact an important piece of territorial legislation which conflicted with the intent of those proposals. The Northwest Ordinance, 1 Stat. 50, reenacted the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and provided that "[r]eligion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged." Id., at 52, n. (a). Land grants for schools in the Northwest Territory were not limited to public schools. It was not until 1845 that Congress limited land grants in the new States and Territories to nonsectarian schools. 5 Stat. 788; C. Antieau, A. Downey, & E. Roberts, Freedom From Federal Establishment 163 (1964). </s> On the day after the House of Representatives voted to adopt the form of the First Amendment Religion Clauses which was ultimately proposed and ratified, Representative [472 U.S. 38, 101] Elias Boudinot proposed a resolution asking President George Washington to issue a Thanksgiving Day Proclamation. Boudinot said he "could not think of letting the session pass over without offering an opportunity to all the citizens of the United States of joining with one voice, in returning to Almighty God their sincere thanks for the many blessings he had poured down upon them." 1 Annals of Cong. 914 (1789). Representative Aedanas Burke objected to the resolution because he did not like "this mimicking of European customs"; Representative Thomas Tucker objected that whether or not the people had reason to be satisfied with the Constitution was something that the States knew better than the Congress, and in any event "it is a religious matter, and, as such, is proscribed to us." Id., at 915. Representative Sherman supported the resolution "not only as a laudable one in itself, but as warranted by a number of precedents in Holy Writ: for instance, the solemn thanksgivings and rejoicings which took place in the time of Solomon, after the building of the temple, was a case in point. This example, he thought, worthy of Christian imitation on the present occasion . . . ." Ibid. </s> Boudinot's resolution was carried in the affirmative on September 25, 1789. Boudinot and Sherman, who favored the Thanksgiving Proclamation, voted in favor of the adoption of the proposed amendments to the Constitution, including the Religion Clauses; Tucker, who opposed the Thanksgiving Proclamation, voted against the adoption of the amendments which became the Bill of Rights. </s> Within two weeks of this action by the House, George Washington responded to the Joint Resolution which by now had been changed to include the language that the President "recommend to the people of the United States a day of public thanksgiving and prayer, to be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts the many and signal favors of Almighty God, especially by affording them an opportunity peaceably to establish a form of government for their safety and happiness." 1 J. Richardson, Messages and Papers of [472 U.S. 38, 102] the Presidents, 1789-1897, p. 64 (1897). The Presidential Proclamation was couched in these words: </s> "Now, therefore, I do recommend and assign Thursday, the 26th day of November next, to be devoted by the people of these States to the service of that great and glorious Being who is the beneficent author of all the good that was, that is, or that will be; that we may then all unite in rendering unto Him our sincere and humble thanks for His kind care and protection of the people of this country previous to their becoming a nation; for the signal and manifold mercies and the favorable interpositions of His providence in the course and conclusion of the late war; for the great degree of tranquillity, union, and plenty which we have since enjoyed; for the peaceable and rational manner in which we have been enabled to establish constitutions of government for our safety and happiness, and particularly the national one now lately instituted; for the civil and religious liberty with which we are blessed, and the means we have of acquiring and diffusing useful knowledge; and, in general, for all the great and various favors which He has been pleased to confer upon us. </s> "And also that we may then unite in most humbly offering our prayers and supplications to the great Lord and Ruler of Nations, and beseech Him to pardon our national and other transgressions; to enable us all, whether in public or private stations, to perform our several and relative duties properly and punctually; to render our National Government a blessing to all the people by constantly being a Government of wise, just, and constitutional laws, discreetly and faithfully executed and obeyed; to protect and guide all sovereigns and nations (especially such as have shown kindness to us), and to bless them with good governments, peace, and concord; to promote the knowledge and practice of true religion and virtue, and the increase of science among them and [472 U.S. 38, 103] us; and, generally, to grant unto all mankind such a degree of temporal prosperity as He alone knows to be best." Ibid. </s> George Washington, John Adams, and James Madison all issued Thanksgiving Proclamations; Thomas Jefferson did not, saying: </s> "Fasting and prayer are religious exercises; the enjoining them an act of discipline. Every religious society has a right to determine for itself the times for these exercises, and the objects proper for them, according to their own particular tenets; and this right can never be safer than in their own hands, where the Constitution has deposited it." 11 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 429 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904). </s> As the United States moved from the 18th into the 19th century, Congress appropriated time and again public moneys in support of sectarian Indian education carried on by religious organizations. Typical of these was Jefferson's treaty with the Kaskaskia Indians, which provided annual cash support for the Tribe's Roman Catholic priest and church. 5 It was not until 1897, when aid to sectarian education [472 U.S. 38, 104] for Indians had reached $500,000 annually, that Congress decided thereafter to cease appropriating money for education in sectarian schools. See Act of June 7, 1897, 30 Stat. 62, 79; cf. Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 77 -79 (1908); J. O'Neill, Religion and Education Under the Constitution 118-119 (1949). See generally R. Cord, Separation of Church and State 61-82 (1982). This history shows the fallacy of the notion found in Everson that "no tax in any amount" may be levied for religious activities in any form. 330 U.S., at 15 -16. </s> Joseph Story, a Member of this Court from 1811 to 1845, and during much of that time a professor at the Harvard Law School, published by far the most comprehensive treatise on the United States Constitution that had then appeared. Volume 2 of Story's Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 630-632 (5th ed. 1891) discussed the meaning of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment this way: </s> "Probably at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and of the amendment to it now under consideration [First Amendment], the general if not the universal sentiment in America was, that Christianity ought to receive encouragement from the State so far as was not incompatible with the private rights of conscience and the freedom of religious worship. An attempt to level all religions, and to make it a matter of state policy to hold all in utter indifference, would have created universal disapprobation, if not universal indignation. </s> . . . . . </s> "The real object of the [First] [A]mendment was not to countenance, much less to advance, Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating Christianity; but to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects, and to prevent [472 U.S. 38, 105] any national ecclesiastical establishment which should give to a hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national government. It thus cut off the means of religious persecution (the vice and pest of former ages), and of the subversion of the rights of conscience in matters of religion, which had been trampled upon almost from the days of the Apostles to the present age. . . ." (Footnotes omitted.) </s> Thomas Cooley's eminence as a legal authority rivaled that of Story. Cooley stated in his treatise entitled Constitutional Limitations that aid to a particular religious sect was prohibited by the United States Constitution, but he went on to say: </s> "But while thus careful to establish, protect, and defend religious freedom and equality, the American constitutions contain no provisions which prohibit the authorities from such solemn recognition of a superintending Providence in public transactions and exercises as the general religious sentiment of mankind inspires, and as seems meet and proper in finite and dependent beings. Whatever may be the shades of religious belief, all must acknowledge the fitness of recognizing in important human affairs the superintending care and control of the Great Governor of the Universe, and of acknowledging with thanksgiving his boundless favors, or bowing in contrition when visited with the penalties of his broken laws. No principle of constitutional law is violated when thanksgiving or fast days are appointed; when chaplains are designated for the army and navy; when legislative sessions are opened with prayer or the reading of the Scriptures, or when religious teaching is encouraged by a general exemption of the houses of religious worship from taxation for the support of State government. Undoubtedly the spirit of the Constitution will require, in all these cases, that care be taken to avoid discrimination [472 U.S. 38, 106] in favor of or against any one religious denomination or sect; but the power to do any of these things does not become unconstitutional simply because of its susceptibility to abuse. . . ." Id., at *470-*471. </s> Cooley added that </s> "[t]his public recognition of religious worship, however, is not based entirely, perhaps not even mainly, upon a sense of what is due to the Supreme Being himself as the author of all good and of all law; but the same reasons of state policy which induce the government to aid institutions of charity and seminaries of instruction will incline it also to foster religious worship and religious institutions, as conservators of the public morals and valuable, if not indispensable, assistants to the preservation of the public order." Id., at *470. </s> It would seem from this evidence that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment had acquired a well-accepted meaning: it forbade establishment of a national religion, and forbade preference among religious sects or denominations. Indeed, the first American dictionary defined the word "establishment" as "the act of establishing, founding, ratifying or ordaining," such as in "[t]he episcopal form of religion, so called, in England." 1 N. Webster, American Dictionary of the English Language (1st ed. 1828). The Establishment Clause did not require government neutrality between religion and irreligion nor did it prohibit the Federal Government from providing nondiscriminatory aid to religion. There is simply no historical foundation for the proposition that the Framers intended to build the "wall of separation" that was constitutionalized in Everson. </s> Notwithstanding the absence of a historical basis for this theory of rigid separation, the wall idea might well have served as a useful albeit misguided analytical concept, had it led this Court to unified and principled results in Establishment Clause cases. The opposite, unfortunately, has been [472 U.S. 38, 107] true; in the 38 years since Everson our Establishment Clause cases have been neither principled nor unified. Our recent opinions, many of them hopelessly divided pluralities, 6 have with embarrassing candor conceded that the "wall of separation" is merely a "blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier," which "is not wholly accurate" and can only be "dimly perceived." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 -678, (1971); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984). </s> Whether due to its lack of historical support or its practical unworkability, the Everson "wall" has proved all but useless as a guide to sound constitutional adjudication. It illustrates only too well the wisdom of Benjamin Cardozo's observation that "[m]etaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it." Berkey v. Third Avenue R. Co., 244 N. Y. 84, 94, 155 N. E. 58, 61 (1926). </s> But the greatest injury of the "wall" notion is its mischievous diversion of judges from the actual intentions of the drafters of the Bill of Rights. The "crucible of litigation," ante, at 52, is well adapted to adjudicating factual disputes on the basis of testimony presented in court, but no amount of repetition of historical errors in judicial opinions can make the errors true. The "wall of separation between church and State" is a metaphor based on bad history, a metaphor which has proved useless as a guide to judging. It should be frankly and explicitly abandoned. [472 U.S. 38, 108] </s> The Court has more recently attempted to add some mortar to Everson's wall through the three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 614-615, which served at first to offer a more useful test for purposes of the Establishment Clause than did the "wall" metaphor. Generally stated, the Lemon test proscribes state action that has a sectarian purpose or effect, or causes an impermissible governmental entanglement with religion. </s> Lemon cited Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968), as the source of the "purpose" and "effect" prongs of the three-part test. The Allen opinion explains, however, how it inherited the purpose and effect elements from Schempp and Everson, both of which contain the historical errors described above. See Allen, supra, at 243. Thus the purpose and effect prongs have the same historical deficiencies as the wall concept itself: they are in no way based on either the language or intent of the drafters. </s> The secular purpose prong has proved mercurial in application because it has never been fully defined, and we have never fully stated how the test is to operate. If the purpose prong is intended to void those aids to sectarian institutions accompanied by a stated legislative purpose to aid religion, the prong will condemn nothing so long as the legislature utters a secular purpose and says nothing about aiding religion. Thus the constitutionality of a statute may depend upon what the legislators put into the legislative history and, more importantly, what they leave out. The purpose prong means little if it only requires the legislature to express any secular purpose and omit all sectarian references, because legislators might do just that. Faced with a valid legislative secular purpose, we could not properly ignore that purpose without a factual basis for doing so. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 262 -263 (1982) (WHITE, J., dissenting). </s> However, if the purpose prong is aimed to void all statutes enacted with the intent to aid sectarian institutions, whether stated or not, then most statutes providing any aid, such as [472 U.S. 38, 109] textbooks or bus rides for sectarian school children, will fail because one of the purposes behind every statute, whether stated or not, is to aid the target of its largesse. In other words, if the purpose prong requires an absence of any intent to aid sectarian institutions, whether or not expressed, few state laws in this area could pass the test, and we would be required to void some state aids to religion which we have already upheld. E. g., Allen, supra. </s> The entanglement prong of the Lemon test came from Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970). Walz involved a constitutional challenge to New York's time-honored practice of providing state property tax exemptions to church property used in worship. The Walz opinion refused to "undermine the ultimate constitutional objective [of the Establishment Clause] as illuminated by history," id., at 671, and upheld the tax exemption. The Court examined the historical relationship between the State and church when church property was in issue, and determined that the challenged tax exemption did not so entangle New York with the church as to cause an intrusion or interference with religion. Interferences with religion should arguably be dealt with under the Free Exercise Clause, but the entanglement inquiry in Walz was consistent with that case's broad survey of the relationship between state taxation and religious property. </s> We have not always followed Walz' reflective inquiry into entanglement, however. E. g., Wolman, supra, at 254. One of the difficulties with the entanglement prong is that, when divorced from the logic of Walz, it creates an "insoluable paradox" in school aid cases: we have required aid to parochial schools to be closely watched lest it be put to sectarian use, yet this close supervision itself will create an entanglement. Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768 -769 (1976) (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment). For example, in Wolman, supra, the Court in part struck the State's nondiscriminatory provision of buses for parochial school filed trips, because the state supervision [472 U.S. 38, 110] of sectarian officials in charge of field trips would be too onerous. This type of self-defeating result is certainly not required to ensure that States do not establish religions. </s> The entanglement test as applied in cases like Wolman also ignores the myriad state administrative regulations properly placed upon sectarian institutions such as curriculum, attendance, and certification requirements for sectarian schools, or fire and safety regulations for churches. Avoiding entanglement between church and State may be an important consideration in a case like Walz, but if the entanglement prong were applied to all state and church relations in the automatic manner in which it has been applied to school aid cases, the State could hardly require anything of church-related institutions as a condition for receipt of financial assistance. </s> These difficulties arise because the Lemon test has no more grounding in the history of the First Amendment than does the wall theory upon which it rests. The three-part test represents a determined effort to craft a workable rule from a historically faulty doctrine; but the rule can only be as sound as the doctrine it attempts to service. The three-part test has simply not provided adequate standards for deciding Establishment Clause cases, as this Court has slowly come to realize. Even worse, the Lemon test has caused this Court to fracture into unworkable plurality opinions, see n. 6, supra, depending upon how each of the three factors applies to a certain state action. The results from our school services cases show the difficulty we have encountered in making the Lemon test yield principled results. </s> For example, a State may lend to parochial school children geography textbooks 7 that contain maps of the United States, but the State may not lend maps of the United States for use in geography class. 8 A State may lend textbooks on American colonial history, but it may not lend a film on [472 U.S. 38, 111] George Washington, or a film projector to show it in history class. A State may lend classroom workbooks, but may not lend workbooks in which the parochial school children write, thus rendering them nonreusable. 9 A State may pay for bus transportation to religious schools 10 but may not pay for bus transportation from the parochial school to the public zoo or natural history museum for a field trip. 11 A State may pay for diagnostic services conducted in the parochial school but therapeutic services must be given in a different building; speech and hearing "services" conducted by the State inside the sectarian school are forbidden, Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 367 , 371 (1975), but the State may conduct speech and hearing diagnostic testing inside the sectarian school. Wolman, 433 U.S., at 241 . Exceptional parochial school students may receive counseling, but it must take place outside of the parochial school, 12 such as in a trailer parked down the street. Id., at 245. A State may give cash to a parochial school to pay for the administration of state-written tests and state-ordered reporting services, 13 but it may not provide funds for teacher-prepared tests on secular subjects. 14 Religious instruction may not be given in public school, 15 but the public school may release students during the day for religion classes elsewhere, and may enforce attendance at those classes with its truancy laws. 16 </s> These results violate the historically sound principle "that the Establishment Clause does not forbid governments . . . to [provide] general welfare under which benefits are distributed to private individuals, even though many of those individuals [472 U.S. 38, 112] may elect to use those benefits in ways that `aid' religious instruction or worship." Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 799 (1973) (BURGER, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). It is not surprising in the light of this record that our most recent opinions have expressed doubt on the usefulness of the Lemon test. </s> Although the test initially provided helpful assistance, e. g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), we soon began describing the test as only a "guideline," Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, supra, and lately we have described it as "no more than [a] useful signpos[t]." Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983), citing Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982). We have noted that the Lemon test is "not easily applied," Meek, supra, at 358, and as JUSTICE WHITE noted in Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980), under the Lemon test we have "sacrifice[d] clarity and predictability for flexibility." 444 U.S. at 662. In Lynch we reiterated that the Lemon test has never been binding on the Court, and we cited two cases where we had declined to apply it. 465 U.S., at 679 , citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). </s> If a constitutional theory has no basis in the history of the amendment it seeks to interpret, is difficult to apply and yields unprincipled results, I see little use in it. The "crucible of litigation," ante, at 52, has produced only consistent unpredictability, and today's effort is just a continuation of "the sisyphean task of trying to patch together the `blurred, indistinct and variable barrier' described in Lemon v. Kurtzman." Regan, supra, at 671 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). We have done much straining since 1947, but still we admit that we can only "dimly perceive" the Everson wall. Tilton, supra. Our perception has been clouded not by the Constitution but by the mists of an unnecessary metaphor. [472 U.S. 38, 113] </s> The true meaning of the Establishment Clause can only be seen in its history. See Walz, 397 U.S., at 671 -673; see also Lynch, supra, at 673-678. As drafters of our Bill of Rights, the Framers inscribed the principles that control today. Any deviation from their intentions frustrates the permanence of that Charter and will only lead to the type of unprincipled decisionmaking that has plagued our Establishment Clause cases since Everson. </s> The Framers intended the Establishment Clause to prohibit the designation of any church as a "national" one. The Clause was also designed to stop the Federal Government from asserting a preference for one religious denomination or sect over others. Given the "incorporation" of the Establishment Clause as against the States via the Fourteenth Amendment in Everson, States are prohibited as well from establishing a religion or discriminating between sects. As its history abundantly shows, however, nothing in the Establishment Clause requires government to be strictly neutral between religion and irreligion, nor does that Clause prohibit Congress or the States from pursuing legitimate secular ends through nondiscriminatory sectarian means. </s> The Court strikes down the Alabama statute because the State wished to "characterize prayer as a favored practice." Ante, at 60. It would come as much of a shock to those who drafted the Bill of Rights as it will to a large number of thoughtful Americans today to learn that the Constitution, as construed by the majority, prohibits the Alabama Legislature from "endorsing" prayer. George Washington himself, at the request of the very Congress which passed the Bill of Rights, proclaimed a day of "public thanksgiving and prayer, to be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts the many and signal favors of Almighty God." History must judge whether it was the Father of his Country in 1789, or a majority of the Court today, which has strayed from the meaning of the Establishment Clause. </s> The State surely has a secular interest in regulating the manner in which public schools are conducted. Nothing in [472 U.S. 38, 114] the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, properly understood, prohibits any such generalized "endorsement" of prayer. I would therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. </s> [Footnote 1 Reynolds is the only authority cited as direct precedent for the "wall of separation theory." 330 U.S., at 16 . Reynolds is truly inapt; it dealt with a Mormon's Free Exercise Clause challenge to a federal polygamy law. </s> [Footnote 2 The New York and Rhode Island proposals were quite similar. They stated that no particular "religious sect or society ought to be favored or established by law in preference to others." 1 Elliot's Debates, at 328; id., at 334. </s> [Footnote 3 In a letter he sent to Jefferson in France, Madison stated that he did not see much importance in a Bill of Rights but he planned to support it because it was "anxiously desired by others . . . [and] it might be of use, and if properly executed could not be of disservice." 5 Writings of James Madison 271 (G. Hunt ed. 1904). </s> [Footnote 4 State establishments were prevalent throughout the late 18th and early 19th centuries. See Mass. Const. of 1780, Part 1, Art. III; N. H. Const. of 1784, Art. VI; Md. Declaration of Rights of 1776, Art. XXXIII; R. I. Charter of 1633 (superseded 1842). </s> [Footnote 5 The treaty stated in part: </s> "And whereas, the greater part of said Tribe have been baptized and received into the Catholic church, to which they are much attached, the United States will give annually for seven years one hundred dollars towards the support of a priest of that religion . . . [a]nd . . . three hundred dollars, to assist the said Tribe in the erection of a church." 7 Stat. 79. </s> From 1789 to 1823 the United States Congress had provided a trust endowment of up to 12,000 acres of land "for the Society of the United Brethren, for propagating the Gospel among the Heathen." See, e. g., ch. 46, 1 Stat. 490. The Act creating this endowment was renewed periodically and the renewals were signed into law by Washington, Adams, and Jefferson. </s> Congressional grants for the aid of religion were not limited to Indians. In 1787 Congress provided land to the Ohio Company, including acreage for the support of religion. This grant was reauthorized in 1792. See 1 Stat. 257. In 1833 Congress authorized the State of Ohio to sell the land [472 U.S. 38, 104] set aside for religion and use the proceeds "for the support of religion . . . and for no other use or purpose whatsoever. . . ." 4 Stat. 618-619. </s> [Footnote 6 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (partial); Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). </s> Many of our other Establishment Clause cases have been decided by bare 5-4 majorities. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); cf. Levitt v. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973). </s> [Footnote 7 Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). </s> [Footnote 8 Meek, 421 U.S., at 362 -366. A science book is permissible, a science kit is not. See Wolman, 433 U.S., at 249 . </s> [Footnote 9 See Meek, supra, at 354-355, nn. 3, 4, 362-366. </s> [Footnote 10 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). </s> [Footnote 11 Wolman, supra, at 252-255. </s> [Footnote 12 Wolman, supra, at 241-248; Meek, supra, at 352, n. 2, 367-373. </s> [Footnote 13 Regan, 444 U.S., at 648 , 657-659. </s> [Footnote 14 Levitt, 413 U.S., at 479 -482. </s> [Footnote 15 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948). </s> [Footnote 16 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). </s> [472 U.S. 38, 115]

United States Supreme Court GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES v. WINDSOR(1957) No. 423 Argued: Decided: May 13, 1957 </s> In an action brought to restrain the enforcement of a state statute on federal constitutional grounds, the federal court should retain jurisdiction until a definitive determination of local law question is obtained from the local courts; and the judgment of the District Court in this case is vacated and the cause is remanded to it with directions to retain jurisdiction until efforts to obtain an appropriate adjudication in the state courts have been exhausted. Pp. 364-367. </s> 146 F. Supp. 214, judgment vacated and cause remanded with directions. </s> Milton I. Shadur argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief were Arthur J. Goldberg, David E. Feller and Herbert S. Thatcher. </s> Gordon Madison, Assistant Attorney General of Alabama, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was John Patterson, Attorney General. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> In 1953, the Alabama Legislature enacted a statute (Ala. Laws 1953, No. 720) which provides that any public employee who joins or participates in a "labor union or labor organization" forfeits the "rights, benefits, or privileges which he enjoys as a result of his public employment." Section 1 defines a "labor union or labor organization" to include an organization of employees whose purpose is to deal with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, or conditions of employment. Teachers, [353 U.S. 364, 365] certain employees of the State Docks Board and city and county employees, however, are exempted from the provisions of the Act. </s> Appellants are an organization composed of employees of governmental and civic agencies, and a member of the organization who is employed by a retail liquor store operated by the Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Board. They commenced this action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama to enjoin the enforcement of the state statute on the grounds that it abridged the freedoms of expression and association of public employees, and that the statute violated the Due Process, Privileges and Immunities, and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. </s> The three-judge District Court, convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2281, 2284, withheld the exercise of its jurisdiction, retaining the cause "for a reasonable time to permit the exhaustion of such State administrative and judicial remedies as may be available." 116 F. Supp. 354, 359. We affirmed that judgment of the District Court. 347 U.S. 901 . </s> Appellant union commenced an action in the Alabama courts to obtain an "authoritative construction" of the state statute. A bill in equity was filed in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama, praying that the enforcement of the statute against the union or its members be enjoined, and for a declaratory judgment that the union was not a "labor union or labor organization" within the meaning of the statute. In its complaint, the union denied that the statute applied to it or its members. None of the constitutional contentions presented in the action pending in the United States District Court were advanced in the state court action. After hearing testimony, the Circuit Court of Montgomery County denied the union's prayer for relief, holding that the statute applied to the [353 U.S. 364, 366] union, its members and its activities. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. 262 Ala. 285, 78 So.2d 646. It held that a local union operating under the appellant's rules and constitution would be subject to the provisions of the Act. </s> The case was resubmitted to the three-judge District Court for final decree. The District Court dismissed the action with prejudice, saying that the Alabama courts have not construed the Act "in such a manner as to render it unconstitutional, and, of course, we cannot assume that the State courts will ever so construe said statute." 146 F. Supp. 214, 216. We noted probable jurisdiction. 352 U.S. 905 . </s> We do not reach the constitutional issues. In an action brought to restrain the enforcement of a state statute on constitutional grounds, the federal court should retain jurisdiction until a definitive determination of local law questions is obtained from the local courts. One policy served by that practice is that of not passing on constitutional questions in situations where an authoritative interpretation of state law may avoid the constitutional issues. Spector Motor Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 . Another policy served by that practice is the avoidance of the adjudication of abstract, hypothetical issues. Federal courts will not pass upon constitutional contentions presented in an abstract rather than in a concrete form. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 575 , 584. The bare adjudication by the Alabama Supreme Court that the union is subject to this Act does not suffice, since that court was not asked to interpret the statute in light of the constitutional objections presented to the District Court. If appellants' freedom-of-expression and equal-protection arguments had been presented to the state court, it might have construed the statute in a different manner. Accordingly, the judgment of the District [353 U.S. 364, 367] Court is vacated, and this cause is remanded to it with directions to retain jurisdiction until efforts to obtain an appropriate adjudication in the state courts have been exhausted. </s> It is so ordered. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> [353 U.S. 364, 368]

United States Supreme Court WESTERN PAC. R. CO. v. UNITED STATES(1965) No. 12 Argued: October 19, 1965Decided: December 7, 1965 </s> Section 3 (4) of the Interstate Commerce Act prohibits carriers from discriminating in their rates between "connecting lines." Appellant Western Pacific Railroad filed a complaint with the Interstate Commerce Commission alleging that certain carriers discriminated against it by refusing to enter into joint through rates via Portland, Oregon, with a multi-railroad route of which Western Pacific is the central portion, although they maintain such joint through rates with a competitor. Division 2 of the Commission refused to accord Western Pacific "connecting line" status on the ground that it did not connect physically with the allegedly discriminating carriers and did not participate in existing through routes with them through the point of discrimination. The Commission denied further hearing and a three-judge federal court dismissed the complaint on the basis that Western Pacific was not a "connecting line." Held: </s> 1. The term "connecting lines" does not require a direct physical connection, but refers to all lines making up a through route. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 288 , followed. Pp. 242-243. </s> 2. To qualify as a "connecting line" in the absence of physical connection, a carrier need only show that it participates in an established through route, making connection at the point of common interchange, all of whose participants stand ready to cooperate in the arrangements needed to remove the alleged discrimination. P. 245. </s> 230 F. Supp. 852, vacated and remanded. </s> Paul Bender, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court, and Walter G. Treanor argued the cause for appellants. With Mr. Bender on the brief for the United States were Acting Solicitor General Spritzer, Assistant Attorney General Turner, Loinel Kestenbaum, Jerry Z. Pruzansky [382 U.S. 237, 238] and John H. Dougherty. With Mr. Treanor on the briefs for Western Pacific Railroad Co. et al. were E. L. Van Dellen and E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr. </s> Robert W. Ginnane argued the cause for appellee Interstate Commerce Commission. With him on the brief was Robert S. Burk. Frank S. Farrell argued the cause for appellees Northern Pacific Railway Co. et al. With him on the brief were William P. Higgins, Charles W. Burkett and Earl F. Requa. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Section 3 (4) of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, 54 Stat. 902, 49 U.S.C. 3 (4) (1964 ed.), commands that "All carriers subject to the provisions of this chapter . . . shall not discriminate in their rates, fares, and charges between connecting lines . . . ." 1 The meaning of the term "connecting lines" is the crucial question in this controversy between the Western Pacific Railroad Company, on the one hand, and the Union Pacific Railroad Company and the Northern Pacific Railway Company, on the other. Western Pacific contends that it is a "connecting line" in relation to these carriers and that, therefore, it is entitled to invoke against them the provisions of 3 (4) prohibiting discriminatory [382 U.S. 237, 239] rates. The Interstate Commerce Commission and the District Court held otherwise. </s> Western Pacific filed a complaint with the Commission, alleging, in part, that Union Pacific and Northern Pacific practice rate discrimination against it. 2 The alleged discrimination consists in the refusal of these carriers, except with respect to a few commodities, to enter into joint through rates via Portland, Oregon, with the route of which Western Pacific is part, although they maintain a full line of such rates with a competitor, the Southern Pacific Company. The hearing examiner found in favor of Western Pacific, but Division 2 of the Commission reversed. The Division found both that Western Pacific could not invoke the provisions of 3 (4) because it was not a "connecting line," and that, even if it were, the evidence did not establish the "similarity of circumstances and conditions" that would compel rate treatment equal to that accorded to Southern Pacific. [382 U.S. 237, 240] The Division refused to accord Western Pacific "connecting line" status on the ground that it neither physically connects with the allegedly discriminating carriers at the point of discrimination, nor participates in existing through routes with them through that point. Western Pacific R. Co. v. Camas Prairie R. Co., 316 I. C. C. 795. When the full Commission denied further hearing, Western Pacific brought this action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California to set aside the Commission's order. The three-judge court dismissed the complaint solely on the ground that Western Pacific was not a "connecting line." Western Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 852. It agreed with the Commission's limited definition of the term and said, "Any further liberalization of the present definition will have to come from the Supreme Court." Id., at 855. We noted probable jurisdiction. 379 U.S. 956 . </s> Analysis of "connecting line" status in this case is closely tied to the geographical, structural, and economic relationships among the railroads involved. Union Pacific, Northern Pacific and their short-line connections provide exclusive rail service between many points in the Pacific Northwest and Portland, Oregon. From Portland, the two competitive routes in question descend, at times parallel, at times intertwined, to Southern California. The route closest to the seacoast consists largely of Southern Pacific. To the east of this route lies the so-called Bieber route whose completion in 1931 was authorized by the Commission to provide competition with Southern Pacific. 3 The Bieber route is composed of the end-to-end connections of three different companies: the Great Northern Railway from Portland to [382 U.S. 237, 241] Bieber, California; the Western Pacific from Bieber to Stockton; and the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe from Stockton to Southern California. Thus the Bieber route and Southern Pacific both connect with the allegedly discriminating carriers at Portland where facilities for the interchange of traffic exist. </s> The Bieber route carriers presently enjoy joint through rates among themselves. Moreover, the other two participants in that route have expressed willingness to join with Western Pacific in the joint rates it seeks with Union Pacific and Northern Pacific. Union Pacific and Northern Pacific, for over 50 years, have maintained through routes and a full line of joint rates with Southern Pacific via Portland. They have refused, however, except for a few commodities, to offer through routes and joint rates on traffic moving on the Bieber route through Portland. The joint rates established with Southern Pacific are lower than the combination of local rates that would otherwise apply. Since the Bieber route carriers can offer joint rates only with respect to a few commodities, they cannot match the lower rates offered by Southern Pacific to shippers of most commodities between points in California and points in the Pacific Northwest exclusively served by Union Pacific and Northern Pacific via Portland. </s> The Commission and the District Court held, however, that even under these circumstances, Western Pacific is not a "connecting line" eligible to complain of the alleged discrimination. In argument here the Commission and the appellee railroads contend that to qualify for that status Western Pacific must show more than that it participates in an established through route that connects with Union Pacific and Northern Pacific, and that all the participants in the route stand willing to cooperate with these carriers in establishing joint through [382 U.S. 237, 242] rates. 4 We are urged to hold that to qualify under 3 (4) as a complainant "connecting line" a railroad must either itself make a direct connection with the discriminating carrier, or be part of a through route that already includes the carrier. We cannot accept such a construction of the statute. </s> The literal meaning of the statute does not require that construction. To be sure, the term, "connecting lines" suggests the requirement of an actual physical connection between the complainant and the discriminating carrier. The term "line," however, admits of more than a single meaning limited to the track owned exclusively by one railroad company. It may also be interpreted reasonably to include a functional railroad unit such as the Bieber through route involved here. Moreover, all parties in this litigation recognize that in Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 288 , this Court rejected the contention that "connecting line" is a term limited to the meaning that the statutory language might initially suggest. Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for a unanimous Court, wrote, "There is no warrant for limiting the meaning of `connecting lines' to those having a direct physical connection . . . . The term is commonly used as referring to all the lines making up a through route." Id., at 293. </s> There also is no warrant for limiting the meaning of "connecting lines" to the lines making up a through route that already includes the discriminating carrier. We have been referred to no previous judicial or administrative decisions compelling that conclusion. The Atlantic Coast Line case, supra, imposes no such limitation. It established that the term "connecting lines" [382 U.S. 237, 243] extends beyond physical connection to encompass lines participating in a through route, but it does not even hint of any limitation on the nature of the through route, much less hold that the through route must already include the discriminating carrier. 5 Our subsequent definition of "through route" in Thompson v. United States, 343 U.S. 549 , adds no more to an analysis of "connecting line" under 3 (4). In that case, which arose under 15 (3) and 15 (4) of the Act, we held that the Commission had improperly applied the test of the existence of a through route: ". . . whether the participating carriers hold themselves out as offering through transportation service." 343 U.S., at 557 . Section 3 (4) does not use the term "through route." But even if, after Atlantic Coast Line, a carrier may qualify as a "connecting line" if it is one of the "lines making up a through route," [382 U.S. 237, 244] 284 U.S., at 293 , the Thompson test offers no solution to the problem presented here. It simply does not speak to the question whether the discriminating carrier must be one of the participating carriers offering through service in conjunction with the carrier seeking "connecting line" status. </s> The reason the issue presented in this case has not been decided before now 6 may be that discrimination of the sort complained of here is uncommon. In most instances it is to the advantage of railroads such as Union Pacific and Northern Pacific to encourage the movement of traffic over their lines from as many sources as possible. 7 Moreover, when such discrimination does occur the railroad connecting directly with the discriminating carrier is likely to take the lead as complainant. </s> In the absence of any settled construction of 3 (4), then, its manifest purpose to deprive railroads of discretion to apportion economic advantage among competitors at a common interchange must be the basic guide to decision. Just such discretion would be conferred upon railroads in a position to discriminate if we were to hold that their decisions not to enter through route relationships with connecting through routes could bar nonadjacent participants in such through routes from eligibility to complain. Indeed such a holding would result in an anomalous set of circumstances clearly illustrated in the present context. No one doubts that Southern Pacific, by virtue of its direct physical connection, [382 U.S. 237, 245] would be eligible to complain of rate discrimination if it were practiced in favor of the Bieber route. It is also undisputed that Great Northern would be eligible to complain of the present discrimination, not merely as it affects its segment of the Bieber route, but on behalf of the route as a whole. Moreover, it is clear that if Union Pacific and Northern Pacific had entered a through route relationship with the Bieber route and then had decided to abandon it, or to set rates somewhat higher than those set for Southern Pacific, any participant in the Bieber route could complain of that discrimination. We cannot therefore construe 3 (4) to bar these participants from eligibility to complain solely because they have been put to an even greater competitive disadvantage by the refusal of the allegedly discriminating carriers to enter a through route relationship with them comparable to the one established with Southern Pacific. Hence, we hold that to qualify as a "connecting line," in the absence of physical connection, a carrier need only show that it participates in an established through route, making connection at the point of common interchange, all of whose participants stand willing to cooperate in the arrangements necessary to eliminate the alleged discrimination. </s> Such a construction of "connecting line" does not interfere with the function of the Commission under 15 (3) of the Act, 54 Stat. 911, 49 U.S.C. 15 (3) (1964 ed.), to require the establishment of through routes and joint rates "in the public interest." 8 Section [382 U.S. 237, 246] 3 (4) is applicable only to a narrower range of situations involving discrimination at a common interchange. Moreover, the remedy in 3 (4) situations need not entail the establishment of through routes, joint rates, or indeed any particular form of relief. All that is required is the elimination of discriminatory treatment. See Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville R. Co. v. United States, 270 U.S. 287, 292 -293; United States v. Illinois Central R. Co., 263 U.S. 515, 520 -521. Finally, our holding does no more than to define the characteristics of a carrier eligible to complain. Relief is warranted only if it also appears that differential treatment is not justified by differences in operating conditions that substantially affect the allegedly discriminating carrier. See United States v. Illinois Central R. Co., supra, at p. 521; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co. v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 359, 369. </s> In the present case, having found that Western Pacific was not eligible to complain, the District Court did not reach the question whether it was entitled to relief. We therefore vacate the judgment and remand this case to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Section 3 (4) provides in full: </s> "All carriers subject to the provisions of this chapter shall, according to their respective powers, afford all reasonable, proper, and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic between their respective lines and connecting lines, and for the receiving, forwarding, and delivering of passengers or property to and from connecting lines; and shall not discriminate in their rates, fares, and charges between connecting lines, or unduly prejudice any connecting line in the distribution of traffic that is not specifically routed by the shipper. As used in this paragraph the term `connecting line' means the connecting line of any carrier subject to the provisions of this chapter or any common carrier by water subject to chapter 12 of this title." </s> [Footnote 2 Western Pacific and its subsidiaries named as defendants: The Northern Pacific Railway Company, The Union Pacific Railroad Company, and certain of their short-line connections. These railroads denied the allegations of the complaint. The Southern Pacific Company intervened in opposition to the complaint. The complaint also named as defendants: The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company, The Great Northern Railway Company, and certain short-line connections. These railroads answered expressing willingness to join in the relief sought by Western Pacific. </s> The complaint also alleged violation of 1 (4) of the Act which requires, in part, that railroads establish "reasonable through routes" with other carriers and "just and reasonable rates, fares, charges, and classifications applicable thereto . . . ." When such routes are not established voluntarily, the Commission has authority under 15 (3), to prescribe them "in the public interest." This authority is subject to the short-haul limitation embodied in 15 (4). Although the complaints indicated a willingness to rely solely on the alleged violation of 3 (4), the Commission found against them on the 1 (4) allegation as well. No question under 1 (4) is presented here. </s> [Footnote 3 Great Northern R. Co. Construction, 166 I. C. C. 3, 39; 170 I. C. C. 399. </s> [Footnote 4 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2322 (1964 ed.), the United States was named as defendant in the District Court. It did not, however, join with the Commission in defense of the Commission's order, and it supports Western Pacific in this Court. </s> [Footnote 5 In the Atlantic Coast Line case, certain railroads leasing the Carolina, Clinchfield & Ohio Railway with the approval of the Commission filed restrictive schedules designed ultimately to exclude an as yet incomplete extension of the Georgia & Florida Railroad from participating, when completed, in joint rates over the Clinchfield. The Commission ordered the schedules canceled on the ground that they violated terms in the lease, accepted by the lessees, on which the Commission had conditioned its approval. One condition required the lessees to permit the Clinchfield to be used as a link for through traffic with "such other carriers, now connecting, or which may hereafter connect, with [it] . . . ." 284 U.S., at 292 , note 3. The extension of the Georgia & Florida made connection with the Clinchfield only via the rails of an intermediate carrier. This Court sustained the Commission's order, however, and held that the Georgia & Florida was a carrier connecting with the Clinchfield because it was one of the "lines making up a through route." 284 U.S., at 293 . Even assuming that the through route referred to was not one limited to the complaining carrier and the intermediate carrier, it is clear that this Court was not faced with the question whether the complaining railroad would be regarded as a "connecting line" if the through route establishing the connection did not also encompass the Clinchfield. In short, Atlantic Coast Line did not present the issue squarely before us now. </s> [Footnote 6 Although we do not regard Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville R. Co. v. United States, 270 U.S. 287 , as dispositive of the question presented, that case, on its facts, supports the conclusion we reach. </s> [Footnote 7 In response to an inquiry at oral argument, the parties have submitted memoranda agreeing that through routes and joint rates are ordinarily established by voluntary agreement, and that a railroad usually interchanges traffic on a comparable basis with competing railroads at a common interchange. See also Thompson v. United States, 343 U.S. 549, 554 . </s> [Footnote 8 Section 15 (3) provides in relevant part: </s> "The Commission may, and it shall whenever deemed by it to be necessary or desirable in the public interest, after full hearing upon complaint or upon its own initiative without complaint, establish through routes, joint classifications, and joint rates, fares, or charges, applicable to the transportation of passengers or property by carriers subject to this chapter . . . or the maxima or minima, or maxima and minima, to be charged, and the divisions of such rates, fares, or charges as hereinafter provided, and the terms and conditions under which such through routes shall be operated." </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting. </s> Under the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 1 et seq., as I read it, there are two ways of obtaining "through routes." One is to qualify as a "connecting line" within the meaning of 3 (4) where a similarly situated competing carrier has been given a through route. 1 </s> [382 U.S. 237, 247] The other is to apply for a rate for a "through route" under 1 (4). 2 In the event that a carrier refuses to establish a "through route," the Commission may "upon complaint or upon its own initiative without complaint," establish a "through route" when "deemed by it to be necessary or desirable in the public interest." 15 (3). 3 </s> In this case appellants sought a "through route" with certain appellee railroads on the same basis as the joint rates those railroads had established with the Southern [382 U.S. 237, 248] Pacific. In an adversary proceeding the Commission denied the establishment of a "through route" under 1 (4) saying: </s> ". . . The shippers urge that the rates and routes sought would give them more freedom of choice in the movement of their goods, would improve transportation service, time in transit, and car supply, and make available additional transit privileges. Nothing of record, however, indicates that the existing through routes and joint rates are inadequate to meet the needs of the shipping public. In fact the failure of the shipper witnesses to initiate in the last 31 years a determined campaign to persuade the defendants of the necessity of establishing through routes between points on the complainants' lines in California and points on the defendants' lines in the Northwest, is at least some indication of the adequacy of the existing routes. The expression `in the public interest' means more than a mere desire on the part of shippers for something that would merely be convenient or desirable for them. This desire must be weighed against the effect on other carriers and the general public. On the basis of this record, we cannot find that the public interest would be served by requiring the establishment of joint rates and through routes which are substantially slower and costlier than the present routes." 316 I. C. C. 795, 810-811. </s> What the Court does today is to let 3 (4) swallow 1 (4) by letting any segment of a multi-carrier through route become a "connecting line." 4 For then the ban [382 U.S. 237, 249] in 3 (4) on discriminatory rates in effect forces the establishment of "through routes" with "just and reasonable rates" as required by 1 (4), without satisfying any of the conditions of 1 (4) and of 15 (3). Indeed after today, the whole protective scheme of 15 (3) which makes the Commission the guardian of "through routes" (see St. Louis R. Co. v. United States, 245 U.S. 136, 142 -143) breaks down. </s> In addition to the conditions set forth in 15 (3) the Commission's power to compel the establishment of through routes is limited by 15 (4), which prevents the Commission from establishing any through route requiring a carrier to "short haul" itself except where particular circumstances (enumerated in 15 (4)) are found to exist. See Thompson v. United States, 343 U.S. 549, 552 -556; Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. v. Union P. R. Co., 351 U.S. 321, 325 et seq.; Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 745 . Can a carrier after today's decision be compelled to "short haul" itself where an internal segment of a multi-carrier through route invokes 3 (4) ? 5 </s> Section 3 (4) narrowly construed to include only lines that physically abut, would, of course, lift some cases from 1 (4) and from 15. But those are the exceptions, relatively few in number. The Court multiplies those almost without end when it holds that any interior segment of an established multi-carrier through route is a "connecting line" within the meaning of 3 (4). </s> Today's decision uproots the established concept of "through routes." As we stated in Thompson v. United [382 U.S. 237, 250] States, 343 U.S. 549, 557 (quoting from the Commission's 21st Annual Report to Congress): </s> "A through route is a continuous line of railway formed by an arrangement, express or implied, between connecting carriers. . . . Existence of a through route is to be determined by the incidents and circumstances of the shipment, such as the billing, the transfer from one carrier to another, the collection and division of transportation charges, or the use of a proportional rate to or from junction points or basing points. These incidents named are not to be regarded as exclusive of others which may tend to establish a carrier's course of business with respect to through shipments." </s> Then we added: </s> "In short, the test of the existence of a `through route' is whether the participating carriers hold themselves out as offering through transportation service. Through carriage implies the existence of a through route whatever the form of the rates charged for the through service." Ibid. (Italics added.) </s> And see Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. v. Union P. R. Co., 351 U.S. 321, 327 , 330. </s> Here there has been no "holding out" by the participating carriers (either consensually or as a result of any Commission action) that offers this interior segment of this multi-carrier route to become a part of any "through route." If we are to allow 1 (4) and 3 (4) and 15 (3) to exist in harmony, we must adhere to that requirement, restricting "connecting line" to those lines that have a direct physical connection with the allegedly discriminating carrier. </s> Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 288 , is not opposed. While the line in question was only a segment in a multi-carrier system, it had "through [382 U.S. 237, 251] routes" with the other carriers in controversy. Id., at 292. The words "connecting lines" 6 were therefore used to include "all the lines making up a through route." Id., at 293. But there is no "through route" here, the defendants not having agreed to one and the Commission having expressly disallowed one pursuant to its power under 15 (3). </s> [Footnote 1 Section 3 (4) provides: </s> "All carriers subject to the provisions of this chapter shall, according to their respective powers, afford all reasonable, proper, and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic between their respective lines and connecting lines, and for the receiving, forwarding, and delivering [382 U.S. 237, 247] of passengers or property to and from connecting lines; and shall not discriminate in their rates, fares, and charges between connecting lines, or unduly prejudice any connecting line in the distribution of traffic that is not specifically routed by the shipper. As used in this paragraph the term `connecting line' means the connecting line of any carrier subject to the provisions of this chapter or any common carrier by water subject to chapter 12 of this title." (Italics added.) </s> The discriminatory refusal to enter into through routes has been held to constitute a violation of 3 (4). See Dixie Carriers, Inc. v. United States, 351 U.S. 56 . </s> [Footnote 2 Section 1 (4) provides in part: </s> "It shall be the duty of every common carrier subject to this chapter to provide and furnish transportation upon reasonable request therefor, and to establish reasonable through routes with other such carriers, and just and reasonable rates, fares, charges, and classifications applicable thereto; . . ." </s> [Footnote 3 Section 15 (3) provides in part: </s> "The Commission may, and it shall whenever deemed by it to be necessary or desirable in the public interest, after full hearing upon complaint or upon its own initiative without complaint, establish through routes, joint classifications, and joint rates, fares, or charges, applicable to the transportation of passengers or property by carriers subject to this chapter, or by carriers by railroad subject to this chapter and common carriers by water subject to chapter 12 of this title, or the maxima, or minima, or maxima and minima, to be charged, and the divisions of such rates, fares, or charges as hereinafter provided, and the terms and conditions under which such through routes shall be operated." </s> [Footnote 4 The term "multi-carrier through route" is used here to indicate a route composed of two or more carriers which have established among themselves a through route with joint rates. This, of [382 U.S. 237, 249] course, describes the Bieber route from southern California to Portland. </s> [Footnote 5 Congress has refused, although requested to do so by the Commission, to repeal 15 (4). See Thompson v. United States, supra, at 555. </s> [Footnote 6 Section 3 (4) was not involved. What was in litigation was the construction of one of its earlier orders allowing one carrier to lease another. Commission approval was accompanied by conditions assuring "equal service, routing, and movement of competitive traffic to and from all connecting lines" reached by the lessee. 284 U.S., at 292 . It was in that context that the Court held that carriers were protected even though their rails did not "physically abut" on the rails of the lessee. 284 U.S., at 293 . </s> [382 U.S. 237, 252]

United States Supreme Court BACHELLAR v. MARYLAND(1970) No. 729 Argued: March 2, 1970Decided: April 20, 1970 </s> Anthony G. Amsterdam, Stanford, Cal., for petitioners. H. Edgar Lentz, Baltimore, Md., for respondent. </s> Mr. Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. A jury in Baltimore City Criminal Court convicted petitioners of violating Md.Ann.Code, Art. 27, 123 (1967 Repl. Vol.),1 which prohibits 'acting in a disorderly manner to the disturbance of the public peace, upon any public street ... in any (Maryland) city ....'2 The </s> [397 U.S. 564 , 565] </s> prosecution arose out of a demonstration protesting the Vietnam war which was staged between 3 and shortly after 5 o'clock on the afternoon of March 28, 1966, in front of a United States Army recruiting station located on a downtown Baltimore street. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals rejected petitioners' contention that their conduct was constitutionally protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and affirmed their convictions. 3 Md.App. 626, 240 A.2d 623 (1968). The Court of Appeals of Maryland denied certiorari in an unreported order. We granted certiorari, 396 U.S. 816 (1969). We reverse. The trial judge instructed the jury that there were alternative grounds upon which petitioners might be found guilty of violating 123. The judge charged, first, that a guilty verdict might be returned if the jury found that petitioners had engaged in 'the doing or saving or both of that which offends, disturbs, incites or tends to incite a number of people gathered in the same area.' The judge also told the jury that '(a) refusal to obey a policeman's command to move on when not to do so may endanger the public peace, may amount to disorderly conduct.'3 So instructed, the jury re- </s> [397 U.S. 564 , 566] </s> turned a general verdict of guilty against each of the petitioners. Since petitioners argue that their conduct was constitutionally protected, we have examined the record for ourselves. When 'a claim of constitutionally protected right is involved, it 'remains our duty ... to make an independent examination of the whole record." Cox v. Louisiana ( I), 379 U.S. 536 , 545 n. 8 (1965). We shall discuss first the factual situation that existed until shortly before 5 o'clock on the afternoon of the demonstration, since the pattern of events changed after that time. There is general agreement regarding the nature of the events during the initial period. Baltimore law enforcement authorities had advance notice of the demonstration, and a dozen or more police officers and some United States marshals were on hand when approximately 15 protesters began peacefully to march in a circle on the sidewalk in front of the station. The marchers carried or more signs bearing such legends as: 'Peasant Emancipation, Not Escalation,' 'Make Love not War,' 'Stop in the Name of Love,' and 'Why are We in Viet Nam?' The number of protesters increased to between 30 and 40 before the demonstration ended. A crowd of onlookers gathered nearby and across the street. From time to time some of the petitioners and other marchers left the circle and distributed leaflets </s> [397 U.S. 564 , 567] </s> among and talked to persons in the crowd. The lieutenant in charge of the police detail testified that he 'overheard' some of the marchers debate with members of the crowd about 'the Viet Cong situation,' and that a few in the crowd resented the protest; '(o)ne particular one objected very much to receiving the circular.' However, the lieutenant did not think that the situation constituted a disturbance of the peace. He testified that '(a)s long as the peace was not disturbed I wasn't doing anything about it.' Clearly the wording of the placards was not within that small class of 'fighting words' that, under Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 , 770 (1942), are 'likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace,' nor is there any evidence that the demonstrators' remarks to the crowd constituted 'fighting words.' Any shock effect caused by the placards, remarks and peaceful marching must be attributed to the content of the ideas being expressed, or to the onlookers' dislike of demonstrations as a means of expressing dissent. But '(i)t is firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers,' Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 , 1366 ( 1969); see also Cox v. Louisiana (I), supra; Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), or simply because bystanders object to peaceful and orderly demonstrations. Plainly nothing that occurred during this period could constitutionally be the ground for conviction under 123. Indeed, the State makes no claim that 123 was violated then. We turn now to the events that occurred shortly before and after 5 o'clock. The petitioners had left the marchers after half past 3 to enter the recruiting station. There they had attempted to persuade the sergeant in </s> [397 U.S. 564 , 568] </s> charge to permit them to display their antiwar materials in the station or in its window fronting on the sidewalk. The sergeant had told them that Army regulations forbade him to grant such permission. The six thereupon staged a sit-in on chairs and a couch in the station. 4 A few minutes before 5 o'clock the sergeant asked them to leave, as he wanted to close the station for the day. When petitioners refused, the sergeant called on United States marshals who were present in the station to remove them. After deputizing several police officers to help, the marshals undertook to eject the petitioners. 5 </s> There is irreconcilable conflict in the evidence as to what next occurred. The prosecution's witnesses testified that the marshals and the police officers 'escorted' the petitioners outside, and that the petitioners thereupon sat or lay down, 'blocking free passage of the sidewalk.' The police lieutenant in charge stated that he then took over and three times ordered the petitioners to get up and leave. He testified that when they remained sitting or lying down, he had each of them picked up bodily and removed to a patrol wagon. In sharp contrast, defense witnesses said that each petitioner was thrown bodily out the door of the station and landed on his back, that petitioners were not positioned so as to block the sidewalk completely, and that no police command was given to them to move away; on the contrary, that as some of them struggled to get to their feet, they were held down by the police officers until they were picked up and thrown into the patrol wagon. The evidence is clear, however, that while petitioners were on the sidewalk, they began to sing 'We Shall </s> [397 U.S. 564 , 569] </s> Overcome' and that they were surrounded by other demonstrators carrying antiwar placards. Thus, petitioners remained obvious participants in the demonstration even after their expulsion from the recruiting station. 6 A crowd of 50-150 people, including the demonstrators, was in the area during this period. The reaction of the onlookers to these events was substantially the same as that to the earlier events of the afternoon. The police lieutenant added only that two uniformed marines in the crowd appeared angry and that a few other bystanders 'were debating back and forth about Bomb Hanoi and different things and I had to be out there to protect these people because they wouldn't leave.' Earlier too, however, some of the crowd had taken exception to the petitioners' protest against the Vietnam war. On this evidence, in light of the instructions given by the trial judge, the jury could have rested its verdict on any of a number of grounds. The jurors may have found that petitioners refused 'to obey a policeman's command to move on when not to do so (might have endangered) the public peace.' Or they may have relied on a finding that petitioners deliberately obstructed the sidewalk, thus offending, disturbing, and inciting the bystanders. 7 Or the jurors may have credited petitioners' </s> [397 U.S. 564 , 570] </s> testimony that they were thrown to the sidewalk by the police and held there, and yet still have found them guilty of violating 123 because their anti-Vietnam protest amounted to 'the doing or saying ... of that which offends, disturbs, incites or tends to incite a number of people gathered in the same area.' Thus, on this record, we find that petitioners may have been found guilty of violating 123 simply because they advocated unpopular ideas. Since conviction on this ground would violate the Constitution, it is our duty to set aside petitioners' convictions. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 ( 1931), is the controlling authority. There the jury returned a general verdict of guilty against an appellant charged under a California statute marking it an offense publicly to display a red flag (a) 'as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organized government,' (b) 'as an invitation or stimulus to anarchistic action,' or (c) 'as an aid to propaganda that is and was of a seditious character.' Id., at 361, 51 S.Ct ., at 533. This Court held that clause (a) was unconstitutional as possibly punishing peaceful and orderly opposition to government by legal means and within constitutional limitations. The Court held that, even though the other two statutory grounds were severable and constitutional, the conviction had to be reversed, because the verdict 'did not specify the ground upon which it rested. As there were three purposes set forth in the statute, and the jury was instructed that their verdict might be given with respect to any one of them, independently considered, it is impossible to say under which clause of the statute the conviction was obtained. If any one of these clauses, which the state court has held to be separable, was invalid, it cannot be determined upon this record that the appellant was not convicted under that clause. ... (T)he necessary conclusion from the manner in which the case was sent to the jury is that, if any </s> [397 U.S. 564 , 571] </s> of the clauses in question is invalid under the Federal Constitution, the conviction cannot be upheld.' 283 U.S., at 368 . See also Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942 ); Terminiello v. Chicago, supra; Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Street v. New York, supra. On this record, if the jury believed the State's evidence, petitioners' convictions could constitutionally have rested on a finding that they sat or lay across a public sidewalk with the intent of fully blocking passage along it, or that they refused to obey police commands to stop obstructing the sidewalk in this manner and move on. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana (I), supra, 379 U.S. at 554-555-465; Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 , 90-91, 213-214 (1965). It is impossible to say, however, that either of these grounds was the basis for the verdict. On the contrary, so far as we can tell, it is equally likely that the verdict resulted 'merely because ( petitioners' views about Vietnam were) themselves offensive to some of their hearers.' Street v. New York, supra, 394 U.S., at 592 , 89 S.Ct. at 1366. Thus, since petitioners' convictions may have rested on an unconstitutional ground, they must be set aside. The judgment of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Judgment reversed and case remanded. </s> Footnotes </s> [Footnote 1 The trial in the Criminal Court was de novo upon appeal from a conviction in the Municipal Court of Baltimore. The Criminal Court judge sentenced each petitioner to 60 days in jail and a $50 fine. [Footnote 2 The statute was amended in 1968 but without change in the operative language involved in this case. See Md.Ann. Code, Art. 27, 123( c) (Supp.1969). </s> [Footnote 3 Both elements of the instruction were based on the Maryland Court of Appeals' construction of 123 in Drews v. Maryland, 224 Md. 186, 192, 167 A.2d 341, 343-344 (1961), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 378 U.S. 547 (1964), reaffirmed on remand, 236 Md. 349, 204 A.2d 64 (1964), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 381 U.S. 421 (1965). The instruction was 'that disorderly conduct is the doing or saying or both of that which offends, disturbs, incites or tends to incite a number of people gathered in the same area. It is conduct of such nature as to affect the peace and quiet of persons who may witness it and who may be disturbed or provoked to resentment because of it. A refusal to obey a policeman's command to move on when not to do so may endanger the public peace, may amount to disorderly conduct.' The trial judge refused to grant petitioners' request that the jury be charged to disregard any anger of onlookers that arose from their disagreement with petitioners' expressed views about Vietnam. For example, the judge refused to instruct the jury that 'if the only threat of public disturbance arising from the actions of these defendants was a threat that arose from the anger of others who were made angry by their disagreement with the defendants' expressed views concerning Viet Nam, or American involvement in Viet Nam, you must acquit these defendants. And if you have a reasonable doubt whether the anger of those other persons was occasioned by their disagreement with defendants' views on Viet Nam, rather than by the conduct of the defendants in sitting or staying on the street, you must acquit these defendants.' </s> [Footnote 4 Petitioners' conduct in the station is not at issue in this case, since the State did not prosecute them for their conduct in that place. [Footnote 5 The local police officers were deputized as marshals because their local police powers did not extend to the federally operated recruiting station. </s> [Footnote 6 The defense evidence indicated that petitioners were on the sidewalk after their removal from the recruiting station for only five minutes. A prosecution witness testified that they were there for 15 or 20 minutes. [Footnote 7 Maryland states in its brief, at 41-42, that '(o)bstructing the sidewalk had the legal effect under these circumstances of not only constituting a violation of ... 123 ... but also of Article 27, 121 of the Maryland Code, obstructing free passage.' Had the State wished to ensure a jury finding on the obstruction question, it could have prosecuted petitioners under 121, which specifically punishes '(a)ny person who shall wilfully obstruct or hinder the free passage of persons passing along or by any public street or highway ....'

United States Supreme Court RAY v. BLAIR(1952) No. 649 Argued: March 31, 1952Decided: April 3, 1952 </s> Opinions filed April 15, 1952. </s> Where a state authorizes a political party to choose its nominees for Presidential Electors in a state-controlled party primary election and to fix the qualifications for the candidates, it is not violative of the Federal Constitution for the party to require the candidates for the office of Presidential Elector to take a pledge to support the nominees of the party's National Convention for President and Vice-President or for the party's officers to refuse to certify as a candidate for Presidential Elector a person otherwise qualified who refuses to take such a pledge. Pp. 215-231. </s> 1. Presidential Electors exercise a federal function in balloting for President and Vice-President, but they are not federal officers. They act by authority of the state which in turn receives its authority from the Federal Constitution. Pp. 224-225. </s> 2. Exclusion of a candidate in a party primary by a state or political party because such candidate will not pledge to support the party's nominees is a method of securing party candidates in the general election who are pledged to the philosophy and leadership of that party; and it is an exercise of the state's right under Art. II, 1, to appoint electors in such manner as it may choose. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 , and Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 , distinguished. Pp. 225-227. </s> 3. The Twelfth Amendment does not bar a political party from requiring of a candidate for Presidential Elector in its primary a pledge to support the nominees of its National Convention. Pp. 228-231. </s> 4. The requirement of such a pledge does not deny equal protection or due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 , distinguished. P. 226, n. 14. </s> 257 Ala. ___, 57 So.2d 395, reversed. </s> The Alabama Supreme Court upheld, on federal constitutional grounds, a peremptory writ of mandamus requiring petitioner, the Chairman of the State Executive [343 U.S. 214, 215] Committee of the Democratic Party, to certify respondent as a candidate for Presidential Elector in a Democratic Primary which was to be held on May 6, 1952. 257 Ala. ___, 57 So.2d 395. This Court granted certiorari. 343 U.S. 901 . In a per curiam decision announced on April 3, 1952, in advance of the preparation of this opinion, this Court reversed that judgment. 343 U.S. 154 . This opinion states the reasons for that decision. </s> Marx Leva and Harold M. Cook argued the cause for petitioner. With them on the brief were James J. Mayfield, George A. LeMaistre and Louis F. Oberdorfer. </s> Horace C. Wilkinson argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. </s> MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The Supreme Court of Alabama upheld a peremptory writ of mandamus requiring the petitioner, the chairman of that state's Executive Committee of the Democratic Party, to certify respondent Edmund Blair, a member of that party, to the Secretary of State of Alabama as a candidate for Presidential Elector in the Democratic Primary to be held May 6, 1952. Respondent Blair was admittedly qualified as a candidate except that he refused to include the following quoted words in the pledge required of party candidates - a pledge to aid and support "the nominees of the National Convention of the Democratic Party for President and Vice-President of the United States." The chairman's refusal of certification was based on that omission. </s> The mandamus was approved on the sole ground that the above requirement restricted the freedom of a federal elector to vote in his Electoral College for his choice for President. 257 Ala. ___, 57 So.2d 395. The pledge was held void as unconstitutional under the Twelfth Amendment [343 U.S. 214, 216] of the Constitution of the United States. 1 Because the mandamus was based on this federal right specially claimed by respondent, we granted certiorari. 28 U.S.C. 1257 (3); 343 U.S. 901 . </s> On account of the limited time before the primary election date, this Court ordered prompt argument on March 31, 1952, after granting certiorari and handed down a per curiam decision on April 3, 343 U.S. 154 , stating summarily our conclusion on the federal constitutional issue that determined the Alabama judgment. This opinion is to supplement that statement. Our mandate issued forthwith. </s> The controversy arose under the Alabama laws permitting party primaries. Title 17 of the Code of Alabama, 1940, as amended, provides for regular optional primary elections in that state on the first Tuesday in May of even years by any political party, as defined in the [343 U.S. 214, 217] chapter, at state cost. 336, 337, 340, 343. They are subject to the same penalties and punishment provisions as regular state elections. 339. Parties may select their own committee in such manner as the governing authority of the party may desire. 341. Section 344 provides that the chairman of the state executive committee shall certify the candidates other than those who are candidates for county offices to the Secretary of State of Alabama. That official, within not less than 30 days prior to the time of holding the primary elections, shall certify these names to the probate judge of any county holding an election. </s> Every state executive committee is given the power to fix political or other qualifications of its own members. It may determine who shall be entitled and qualified to vote in the primary election or to be a candidate therein. The qualifications of voters and candidates may vary. 2 </s> Section 348 requires a candidate to file his declaration of candidacy with the executive committee in the form prescribed by the governing body of the party. There is a provision, 350, which reads as follows: "At the bottom of the ballot and after the name of the last candidate shall [343 U.S. 214, 218] be printed the following, viz: `By casting this ballot I do pledge myself to abide by the result of this primary election and to aid and support all the nominees thereof in the ensuing general election.'" </s> On consideration of these sections in other cases the Supreme Court of Alabama has reached conclusions generally conformable to the current of authority. Section 347 has been said by the Supreme Court of Alabama in Ray v. Garner, 257 Ala. ___, 57 So.2d 824, 826, decided March 27, 1952, to give full power to the state executive committee to determine "who shall be entitled and qualified to vote in primary elections or be candidates or otherwise participate therein . . . just so such Committee action does not run afoul of some statutory or constitutional provision." </s> The Garner case involved a pledge adopted by the State Democratic Executive Committee for printing on the primary ballot, reading as follows: </s> "By casting this ballot I do pledge myself to abide by the result of this Primary Election and to aid and support all the nominees thereof in the ensuing General Elections. I do further pledge myself to aid and support the nominees of the National Convention of the Democratic Party for President and Vice-President of the United States." 257 Ala., at ___, 57 So.2d ___, at 825. </s> This is substantially the same pledge that created the controversy in this present case. The court also called attention approvingly to Lett v. Dennis, 221 Ala. 432, 433, 129 So. 33, 34, a case that required a candidate in the primary to follow a party requirement and make a public oath as to his vote in the past general election, where it was declared "a test by a political organization of party affiliation and party fealty is reasonable and proper to be prescribed for those participating in its primary elections [343 U.S. 214, 219] for nomination of candidates for office." 3 As to the power to prescribe tests for participation in primary elections, it was added in the Garner case that "in Alabama this prerogative is vested in the State Party Executive Committee, acting through its duly elected or chosen members. Smith v. McQueen, [232 Ala. 90, 166 So. 788]." 4 257 Ala., at ___, 57 So.2d, at 826. The McQueen case involved the [343 U.S. 214, 220] selection of delegates to a national political convention. It was also said in Ray v. Garner concerning the voter's pledge that: </s> "Primarily, the pledge must be germane to party membership and party elections and, while the last clause of the pledge pertains to the national party, the party in Alabama will be a part of it by sending delegates to participate in the national convention, the Executive Committee having ordered their election and the party thereby having signified its intention to become a member of the national party. Therefore, it was within the competency of the Committee to adopt the resolution so binding the voters in the primary." 5 257 Ala., at ___, 57 So.2d, at 826. </s> As is well known, political parties in the modern sense were not born with the Republic. They were created by necessity, by the need to organize the rapidly increasing [343 U.S. 214, 221] population, scattered over our Land, so as to coordinate efforts to secure needed legislation and oppose that deemed undesirable. Compare Bryce, Modern Democracies, p. 546. The party conventions of locally chosen delegates, from the county to the national level, succeeded the caucuses of self-appointed legislators or other interested individuals. Dissatisfaction with the manipulation of conventions caused that system to be largely superseded by the direct primary. This was particularly true in the South because, with the predominance of the Democratic Party in that section, the nomination was more important than the election. There primaries are generally, as in Alabama, optional. 6 Various tests of party allegiance for candidates in direct primaries are found in a number of states. 7 The requirement of a pledge from the candidate participating in primaries to support the nominee is not unusual. 8 Such a provision protects a party from intrusion [343 U.S. 214, 222] by those with adverse political principles. 9 It was under the authority of 347 of the Alabama Code, note 2, supra, that the State Democratic Executive Committee of Alabama adopted a resolution on January 26, 1952, requiring candidates in its primary to pledge support to the nominees of the National Convention of the Democratic Party for President and Vice-President. It is this provision in the qualifications required by the party under 347 which the Supreme Court of Alabama held unconstitutional in this case. </s> The opinion of the Supreme Court of Alabama concluded that the Executive Committee requirement violated the Twelfth Amendment, note 1, supra. It said: </s> "We appreciate the argument that from time immemorial, the electors selected to vote in the college have voted in accordance with the wishes of the party to which they belong. But in doing so, the effective compulsion has been party loyalty. That theory has [343 U.S. 214, 223] generally been taken for granted, so that the voting for a president and vice-president has been usually formal merely. But the Twelfth Amendment does not make it so. The nominees of the party for president and vice-president may have become disqualified, or peculiarly offensive not only to the electors but their constituents also. They should be free to vote for another, as contemplated by the Twelfth Amendment." 10 257 Ala., at ___, 57 So.2d, at 398. </s> In urging a contrary view the dissenting Alabama justices, in supporting the right of the Committee to require this candidate to pledge support to the party nominees, said: </s> "Any other view, it seems, would destroy effective party government and would privilege any candidate, regardless of his political persuasion, to enter a primary election as a candidate for elector and fix his [343 U.S. 214, 224] own qualifications for such candidacy. This is contrary to the traditional American political system." 257 Ala., at ___, 57 So.2d, at 403. </s> The applicable constitutional provisions on their face furnish no definite answer to the query whether a state may permit a party to require party regularity from its primary candidates for national electors. 11 The presidential electors exercise a federal function in balloting for President and Vice-President but they are not federal officers or agents any more than the state elector who votes for congressmen. They act by authority of the state that [343 U.S. 214, 225] in turn receives its authority from the Federal Constitution. 12 Neither the language of Art. II, 1, nor that of the Twelfth Amendment forbids a party to require from candidates in its primary a pledge of political conformity with the aims of the party. Unless such a requirement is implicit, certainly neither provision of the Constitution requires a state political party, affiliated with a national party through acceptance of the national call to send state delegates to the national convention, to accept persons as candidates who refuse to agree to abide by the party's requirement. 13 </s> The argument against the party's power to exclude as candidates in the primary those unwilling to agree to aid and support the national nominees runs as follows: The constitutional method for the selection of the President and Vice-President is for states to appoint electors who shall in turn vote for our chief executives. The intention of the Founders was that those electors should exercise their judgment in voting for President and Vice-President. Therefore this requirement of a pledge is a restriction in substance, if not in form, that interferes with the performance of this constitutional duty to select the proper persons to head the Nation, according to the best judgment of the elector. This interference with the [343 U.S. 214, 226] elector's freedom of balloting for President relates directly to the general election and is not confined to the primary, it is contended, because under United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 , and Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 , the Alabama primary is an integral part of the general election. See Schnell v. Davis, 336 U.S. 933 . Although Alabama, it is pointed out, requires electors to be chosen at the general election by popular vote, Ala. Code, 1940, Tit. 17, 222, the real election takes place in the primary. Limitation as to entering a primary controls the results of the general election. 14 </s> First we consider the impact of the Classic and Allwright cases on the present issues. In the former case, we dealt with the power of Congress to punish frauds in the primaries "[w]here the state law has made the primary an integral part of the procedure of choice." We held that Congress had such power because the primary was a necessary step in the choice of candidates for election as federal representatives. Therefore the sanctions of 19 and 20 of the old Criminal Code, subsequently revised [343 U.S. 214, 227] as 18 U.S.C. 241 and 242, which forbade injury to constitutionally secured rights, applied to the right to vote in the primary. 313 U.S., at 317 -321. In the latter, the problem was the constitutionality of the exclusion of citizens by a party as electors in a party primary because of race. We held, on consideration of state participation in the regulation of the primary, that the party exclusion was state action and such state action was unconstitutional because the primary and general election were a single instrumentality for choice of officers. The Fifteenth Amendment's prohibition of abridgment by a state of the right to vote on account of race made the exclusion unconstitutional. Consequently, under 8 U.S.C. 31 and 43 an injured party might sue one injuring him. 321 U.S. 649, 660 -664. </s> In Alabama, too, the primary and general elections are a part of the state-controlled elective process. The issue here, however, is quite different from the power of Congress to punish criminal conduct in a primary or to allow damages for wrongs to rights secured by the Constitution. A state's or a political party's exclusion of candidates from a party primary because they will not pledge to support the party's nominees is a method of securing party candidates in the general election, pledged to the philosophy and leadership of that party. It is an exercise of the state's right to appoint electors in such manner, subject to possible constitutional limitations, as it may choose. U.S. Const., Art. II, 1. The fact that the primary is a part of the election machinery is immaterial unless the requirement of pledge violates some constitutional or statutory provision. It was the violation of a secured right that brought about the Classic and Allwright decisions. Here they do not apply unless there was a violation of the Twelfth Amendment by the requirement to support the nominees of the National Convention. [343 U.S. 214, 228] </s> Secondly, we consider the argument that the Twelfth Amendment demands absolute freedom for the elector to vote his own choice, uninhibited by a pledge. It is true that the Amendment says the electors shall vote by ballot. But it is also true that the Amendment does not prohibit an elector's announcing his choice beforehand, pledging himself. The suggestion that in the early elections candidates for electors - contemporaries of the Founders - would have hesitated, because of constitutional limitations, to pledge themselves to support party nominees in the event of their selection as electors is impossible to accept. History teaches that the electors were expected to support the party nominees. 15 Experts in the history of government recognize the long-standing [343 U.S. 214, 229] practice. 16 Indeed, more than twenty states do not print the names of the candidates for electors on the general election ballot. Instead, in one form or another, they allow a vote for the presidential candidate of the national conventions to be counted as a vote for his party's nominees for the electoral college. 17 This long-continued practical interpretation of the constitutional propriety of an implied or oral pledge of his ballot by a candidate [343 U.S. 214, 230] for elector as to his vote in the electoral college weighs heavily in considering the constitutionality of a pledge, such as the one here required, in the primary. </s> However, even if such promises of candidates for the electoral college are legally unenforceable because violative of an assumed constitutional freedom of the elector under the Constitution, Art. II, 1, to vote as he may choose in the electoral college, it would not follow that the requirement of a pledge in the primary is unconstitutional. A candidacy in the primary is a voluntary act of the applicant. He is not barred, discriminatorily, from participating but must comply with the rules of the party. Surely one may voluntarily assume obligations to vote for a certain candidate. The state offers him opportunity to become a candidate for elector on his own terms, although he must file his declaration before the primary. Ala. Code, Tit. 17, 145. Even though the victory of an independent candidate for elector in Alabama cannot be anticipated, the state does offer the opportunity for the development of other strong political organizations where the need is felt for them by a sizable block of voters. Such parties may leave their electors to their own choice. [343 U.S. 214, 231] </s> We conclude that the Twelfth Amendment does not bar a political party from requiring the pledge to support the nominees of the National Convention. Where a state authorizes a party to choose its nominees for elector in a party primary and to fix the qualifications for the candidates, we see no federal constitutional objection to the requirement of this pledge. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, not having heard the argument, owing to illness, took no part in the disposition of the case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 U.S. Const., Amend. XII: </s> "The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate; - The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted; - The person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. . . ." </s> [Footnote 2 Ala. Code, 1940, Tit. 17, 347: </s> "All persons who are qualified electors under the general laws of the State of Alabama, and who are also members of a political party entitled to participate in such primary election, shall be entitled to vote therein and shall receive the official primary ballot of that political party, and no other; but every state executive committee of a party shall have the right, power and authority to fix and prescribe the political or other qualifications of its own members, and shall, in its own way, declare and determine who shall be entitled and qualified to vote in such primary election, or to be candidates therein, or to otherwise participate in such political parties and primaries; and the qualifications of electors entitled to vote in such primary election shall not necessarily be the same as the qualifications for electors entitled to become candidates therein; . . . ." </s> [Footnote 3 See Merriam and Overacker, Primary Elections (1928), pp. 69-73, 124, 125. Cf. State ex rel. Curyea v. Wells, 92 Neb. 337, 138 N. W. 165; Francis v. Sturgill, 163 Ky. 650, 174 S. W. 753. </s> [Footnote 4 This was not a unique delegation. In 1928 Merriam and Overacker cited ten other states which delegate to the party authorities the right to prescribe such qualifications, with or without a statutory statement of minimum qualifications; these ten were Delaware, Idaho, and the remainder of the "solid South," except North Carolina. See Merriam and Overacker, supra, note 3, at pp. 72-73. In 1948 Penniman reports the continued existence of these delegations in all these states except Idaho, which now apparently requires only that the candidate "represent the principles" of the party and be duly registered in the appropriate precinct. 6 Idaho Code (Bobbs-Merrill, 1948) 34-605, 34-606, 34-614, See Penniman, Sait's American Parties and Elections (4th ed., 1948), p. 431. However, the situation has changed in several of those states: the South Carolina legislature apparently no longer regulates the conduct of primaries at all, see S. C. Acts 1944, No. 810, p. 2323; and Texas and Florida have repealed their election codes and enacted new ones which appear to lack any comparable provision, see The New Election Code, Vernon's Annotated Texas Statutes Service (1951), effective January 1, 1952; Fla. Laws 1951, c. 26870. In both Texas and Florida, the primary is open to party "members"; the extent to which the party itself may prescribe membership qualifications is not explicitly set forth. But cf. 103.111 (3) and 103.121, Fla. Laws 1951, c. 26870. </s> For provisions in the remaining states bearing on this delegation, see 2 Ark. Stat. Ann. (Bobbs-Merrill, 1948) 3-205; 12 Ga. Code Ann. (Harrison, 1936) 34-3218.2; Va. Code, 1950 (Michie, 1949), 24-367, 24-369; 3 Miss. Code Ann., 1942 (Harrison, 1943), 3129; Del. Laws 1944-1945, c. 150, amending Del. Rev. Code, 1935, c. 58, 1782, 14; La. Rev. Stat., 1950, Tit. 18, 306, 309; La. Const. Ann. (Bobbs-Merrill, 1932), Art. 8, 4. </s> [Footnote 5 Such a holding integrates the state and national party. See Cannon's Democratic Manual (1948): </s> "The Democratic National Committee is the permanent agency authorized to act in behalf of the Party during intervals between Conventions. It is the creature of the National Convention and therefore subordinate to its control and direction. Between Conventions the Committee exercises such powers and authority as have been delegated specifically to it and is subject to the directions and instructions imposed by the Convention which created it." P. 4. </s> "Duties and Powers of the Committee </s> "The duties and powers of the National Committee are derived from the Convention creating it, and while subject to variation as the Convention may provide, ordinarily include: </s> . . . . . </s> "8. Provision for the National Convention, involving: </s> . . . . . </s> "b. Authorization of call and determination within authority granted by last National Convention of representation from States, Territories and Districts; . . . ." Pp. 7-8. </s> [Footnote 6 See Penniman, supra, n. 4, cc. XIII, XVIII, especially at pp. 300, 416; Merriam and Overacker, supra, n. 3, at pp. 92-93. </s> [Footnote 7 Penniman, supra, pp. 425-426; Merriam and Overacker, supra, pp. 129-133. </s> [Footnote 8 E. g., 4, c. 109, N. D. Laws 1907, pp. 151, 153, discussed in State ex rel. McCue v. Blaisdell, 18 N. D. 55, 118 N. W. 141. See 7 Fla. Stat. Ann. (Harrison, 1943) 99.021 (pkt. pt.); Fla. Laws 1951, c. 26870, 99.021, amending 7 Fla. Stat. Ann. (Harrison, 1943) 102.29, discussed in Mairs v. Peters, 52 So.2d 793. Cf. 3 Miss. Code Ann., 1942 (Harrison, 1943), 3129; Ruhr v. Cowan, 146 Miss. 870, 112 So. 386. Cf. Va. Code, 1950 (Michie, 1949), 24-367, 24-369. See Westerman v. Mims, 111 Tex. 29, 227 S. W. 178, discussing Art. 3096 of Tex. Rev. Stat. of 1911; cf. Love v. Wilcox, 119 Tex. 256, 28 S. W. 2d 515. </s> For an example of a pledge specifically directed toward primary candidates for the office of presidential elector, see the resolutions of the State Democratic Committee of Texas discussed in Carter v. Tomlinson, 149 Tex. 7, 227 S. W. 2d 795; see also Love v. Taylor, 8 S. W. 2d 795 (Tex. Civ. App.); McDonald v. Calhoun, 149 Tex. 232, 231 S. W. 2d 656; cf. Seay v. Latham, 143 Tex. 1, 182 S. W. 2d 251. See also the pledge required by the Democratic Party of [343 U.S. 214, 222] Arkansas, discussed in Fisher v. Taylor, 210 Ark. 380, 196 S. W. 2d 217. </s> Similar pledges, of course, are frequently exacted of voters in the primaries. See, e. g., State ex rel. Adair v. Drexel, 74 Neb. 776, 105 N. W. 174; Morrow v. Wipf, 22 S. D. 146, 115 N. W. 1121; Ladd v. Holmes, 40 Ore. 167, 66 P. 714. See Penniman, supra, note 4, at p. 431; Merriam and Overacker, supra, note 4, at pp. 124-129. </s> [Footnote 9 See Seay v. Latham, 143 Tex. 1, 182 S. W. 2d 251. This was a Texas case that allowed the Democratic Party of Texas to withdraw its nomination of presidential electors when they announced their determination to vote against the nominees of the party as made by the National Convention. The names of others were substituted. The court said: </s> "A political party is a voluntary association, instituted for political purposes. It is organized for the purpose of effectuating the will of those who constitute its members, and it has the inherent power of determining its own policies." 143 Tex., at p. 5, 182 S. W. 2d, at 253. See Carter v. Tomlinson, 149 Tex. 7, 13, 227 S. W. 2d 795, 798; 29 Tex. L. Rev. 378. </s> [Footnote 10 The court found support for its conclusion in the reasoning of an Opinion of the Justices in answer to questions propounded by the Governor of Alabama in 1948. 250 Ala. 399, 34 So.2d 598. One question was "Would an elector chosen at the general election in November 1948 have a discretion as to the persons for whom he could cast his ballot for President and Vice President?" Alabama had amended 226 of Title 17 of its Code, relating to the meeting and balloting of its electoral college, by adding "and shall cast their ballots for the nominee of the national convention of the party by which they were elected." That opinion said: </s> "The language of the Federal Constitution clearly shows that it was the intention of the framers of the Federal Constitution that the electors chosen for the several states would exercise their judgment and discretion in the performance of their duty in the election of the president and vice-president and in determining the individuals for whom they would cast the electoral votes of the states. History supports this interpretation without controversy." 250 Ala., at 400, 34 So.2d, at 600. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 36 . See also Willbern, Discretion of Presidential Electors, 1 Ala. L. Rev. 40. </s> On this review the right to a place on the primary ballot only is in contest. </s> [Footnote 11 As both constitutional provisions long antedated the party primary system, it is not to be expected that they or their legislative history would illumine this issue. They do not. Discussion in the Constitutional Convention as to the manner of election of the President resulted in the arrangement by which presidential electors were chosen by the state as its legislature might direct. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 28 . </s> The Twelfth Amendment was brought about as the result of the difficulties caused by the procedure set up under Art. II, 1. Under that procedure, the electors of each state did not vote separately for President and Vice-President; each elector voted for two persons, without designating which office he wanted each person to fill. If all the electors of the predominant party voted for the same two men, the election would result in a tie, and be thrown into the House, which might or might not be sympathetic to that party. During the John Adams administration, we had a President and Vice-President of different parties, a situation which could not commend itself either to the Nation or to most political theorists. </s> The situation was manifestly intolerable. Accordingly the Twelfth Amendment was adopted, permitting the electors to vote separately for presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Under this procedure, the party electors could vote the regular party ticket without throwing the election into the House. Electors could be chosen to vote for the party candidates for both offices, and the electors could carry out the desires of the people, without confronting the obstacles which confounded the elections of 1796 and 1800. See 11 Annals of Congress 1289-1290, 7th Cong., 1st Sess. (1802). </s> [Footnote 12 U.S. Const., Art. II, 1: </s> ". . . Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector. . . ." </s> Twelfth Amendment, note 1, supra; In re Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379 ; Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 . </s> [Footnote 13 The Supreme Court of Alabama has just said that the Democratic Party of that state was thus affiliated with the national organization. See the excerpt from Ray v. Garner, in the text at note 5, supra. </s> [Footnote 14 There is also a suggestion that, since the Alabama primary is an integral part of the general election, the Fourteenth Amendment, which among other prohibitions forbids a state to exclude voters on account of their color, also forbids a state to exclude candidates because they refuse to pledge their votes. The answer to this suggestion is that the requirement of this pledge, unlike the requirement of color, is reasonably related to a legitimate legislative objective - namely, to protect the party system by protecting the party from a fraudulent invasion by candidates who will not support the party. See note 9, supra. In facilitating the effective operation of democratic government, a state might reasonably classify voters or candidates according to party affiliations, but a requirement of color, as we have pointed out before, is not reasonably related to any legitimate legislative objective. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 . This requirement of a pledge does not deny equal protection or due process. </s> Furthermore, the Fifteenth Amendment directly forbids abridgment on account of color of the right to vote. </s> [Footnote 15 11 Annals of Congress 1289-1290, 7th Cong., 1st Sess. (1802): </s> "Under the Constitution electors are to vote for two persons, one of whom does not reside in the State of the electors; but it does not require a designation of the persons voted for. Wise and virtuous as were the members of the Convention, experience has shown that the mode therein adopted cannot be carried into operation; for the people do not elect a person for an elector who, they know, does not intend to vote for a particular person as President. Therefore, practically, the very thing is adopted, intended by this amendment." </s> S. Rep. No. 22, 19th Cong., 1st Sess. (1826), p. 4: </s> "In the first election held under the constitution, the people looked beyond these agents [electors], fixed upon their own candidates for President and Vice President, and took pledges from the electoral candidates to obey their will. In every subsequent election, the same thing has been done. Electors, therefore, have not answered the design of their institution. They are not the independent body and superior characters which they were intended to be. They are not left to the exercise of their own judgment; on the contrary, they give their vote, or bind themselves to give it, according to the will of their constituents. They have degenerated into mere agents, in a case which requires no agency, and where the agent must be useless, if he is faithful, and dangerous, if he is not." See 2 Story on the Constitution (5th ed., 1891) 1463. </s> [Footnote 16 McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 36 : </s> "Doubtless it was supposed that the electors would exercise a reasonable independence and fair judgment in the selection of the Chief Executive, but experience soon demonstrated that, whether chosen by the legislatures or by popular suffrage on general ticket or in districts, they were so chosen simply to register the will of the appointing power in respect of a particular candidate." </s> III Cyclopedia of American Government (Appleton, 1914), Presidential Elections, by Albert Bushnell Hart, p. 8: </s> "In the three elections of 1788-89, 1792 and 1796 there was a liberal scattering of votes, 13 persons receiving votes in 1796; but in 1800 there were only five names voted on. As early as 1792 an understanding was established between the electors in some of the different states that they should combine on the same man; and from 1796 on there were always, with the exception of the two elections of 1820 and 1824, regular party candidates. In practice most of the members of the electoral colleges belonged to a party, and expected to support it; and after 1824 it became a fixed principle that the electors offered themselves for the choice of the voters or legislatures upon a pledge to vote for a predesignated candidate." </s> [Footnote 17 E. g., Massachusetts: </s> Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, c. 54: </s> " 43. Presidential Electors, Arrangement of Names of Candidates, etc. - The names of the candidates for presidential electors shall not be printed on the ballot, but in lieu thereof the surnames of the candidates of each party for president and vice president shall be printed thereon in one line under the designation `Electors of president and vice president' and arranged in the alphabetical order of the surnames of the candidates for president, with the political designation of the party placed at the right of and in the same line with [343 U.S. 214, 230] the surnames. A sufficient square in which each voter may designate by a cross (X) his choice for electors shall be left at the right of each political designation." </s> See S. Doc. No. 243, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944), containing a summary of the state laws relating to nominations and election of presidential electors. </s> See Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service, Proposed Reform of the Electoral College, 1950; Edward Stanwood, A History of the Presidency from 1788 to 1897 (1912), pp. 47, 48, 50, 51. The author shows the practice of an elector's announcing his preference and gives an alleged instance of violation. </s> See the comments on instruction of electors in State Law on the Nomination, Election, and Instruction of Presidential Electors, by Ruth C. Silva, 42 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 523. </s> MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS joins, dissenting. </s> The Constitution and its Twelfth Amendment allow each State, in its own way, to name electors with such personal qualifications, apart from stated disqualifications, as the State prescribes. Their number, the time that they shall be named, the manner in which the State must certify their ascertainment and the determination of any contest are prescribed by federal law. U.S. Const., Art. II, 1, 3 U.S.C. 1-7. When chosen, they perform a federal function of balloting for President and Vice President, federal law prescribing the time of meeting, the manner of certifying "all the votes given by them," and in detail how such certificates shall be transmitted and counted. U.S. Const., Amend. XII, 3 U.S.C. 920. But federal statute undertakes no control of their votes beyond providing "The electors shall vote for President and Vice President, respectively, in the manner directed [343 U.S. 214, 232] by the Constitution," 3 U.S.C. 8, and the Constitution requires only that they "vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves." U.S. Const., Amend. XII. No one faithful to our history can deny that the plan originally contemplated, what is implicit in its text, that electors would be free agents, to exercise an independent and nonpartisan judgment as to the men best qualified for the Nation's highest offices. * Certainly under that plan no state law could control the elector in performance of his federal duty, any more than it could a United States Senator who also is chosen by, and represents, the State. </s> This arrangement miscarried. Electors, although often personally eminent, independent, and respectable, officially became voluntary party lackeys and intellectual nonentities to whose memory we might justly paraphrase a tuneful satire: </s> They always voted at their Party's call And never thought of thinking for themselves at all. </s> As an institution the Electoral College suffered atrophy almost indistinguishable from rigor mortis. [343 U.S. 214, 233] </s> However, in 1948, Alabama's Democratic Party Electors refused to vote for the nominee of the Democratic National Convention. To put an end to such party unreliability the party organization, exercising state-delegated authority, closed the official primary to any candidate for elector unless he would pledge himself, under oath, to support any candidate named by the Democratic National Convention. It is conceded that under long-prevailing conditions this effectively forecloses any chance of the State being represented by an unpledged elector. In effect, before one can become an elector for Alabama, its law requires that he must pawn his ballot to a candidate not yet named, by a convention not yet held, of delegates not yet chosen. Even if the nominee repudiates the platform adopted by the same convention, as Democratic nominees have twice done in my lifetime (1904, 1928), the elector is bound to vote for him. It will be seen that the State has sought to achieve control of the electors' ballots. But the balloting cannot be constitutionally subjected to any such control because it was intended to be free, an act performed after all functions of the electoral process left to the States have been completed. The Alabama Supreme Court held that such a requirement violates the Federal Constitution, and I agree. </s> It may be admitted that this law does no more than to make a legal obligation of what has been a voluntary general practice. If custom were sufficient authority for amendment of the Constitution by Court decree, the decision in this matter would be warranted. Usage may sometimes impart changed content to constitutional generalities, such as "due process of law," "equal protection," or "commerce among the states." But I do not think powers or discretions granted to federal officials by the Federal Constitution can be forfeited by the Court for disuse. A political practice which has its origin in custom must rely upon custom for its sanctions. [343 U.S. 214, 234] </s> The demise of the whole electoral system would not impress me as a disaster. At its best it is a mystifying and distorting factor in presidential elections which may resolve a popular defeat into an electoral victory. At its worst it is open to local corruption and manipulation, once so flagrant as to threaten the stability of the country. To abolish it and substitute direct election of the President, so that every vote wherever cast would have equal weight in calculating the result, would seem to me a gain for simplicity and integrity of our governmental processes. </s> But the Court's decision does not even move in that direction. What it is doing is to entrench the worst features of the system in constitutional law and to elevate the perversion of the forefathers' plan into a constitutional principle. This judicial overturn of the theory that has come down to us cannot plead the excuse that it is a practical remedy for the evils or weaknesses of the system. </s> The Court is sanctioning a new instrument of power in the hands of any faction that can get control of the Democratic National Convention to make it sure of Alabama's electoral vote. When the party is in power this will likely be the administration faction and when not in power no one knows what group it will be. This device of prepledged and oath-bound electors imposes upon the party within the State an oath-bound regularity and loyalty to the controlling element in the national party. It centralizes party control and, instead of securing for the locality a share in the central management, it secures the central management in dominance of the local vote in the Electoral College. If we desire free elections, we should not add to the leverage over local party representatives always possessed by those who enjoy the prestige and dispense the patronage of a national administration. </s> The view of many that it is the progressive or liberal element of the party that will presently advantage from this device does not prove that the device itself has any [343 U.S. 214, 235] proper place in a truly liberal or progressive scheme of government. Who will come to possess this weapon and to whose advantage it will prove in the long run I am not foresighted enough to predict. But party control entrenched by disfranchisement and exclusion of nonconforming party members is a means which to my mind cannot be justified by any end. In the interest of free government, we should foster the power and the will to be independent even on the part of those we may think to be independently wrong. </s> Candidates for elector, like those for Senator, of course, may announce to their constituents their policies and preferences, and assume a moral duty to carry them out if they are chosen. Competition in the primary between those of different views would forward the representative principle. But this plan effects a complete suppression of competition between different views within the party. All who are not ready to follow blindly anyone chosen by the national convention are excluded from the primary, and that, in practice, means also from the election. </s> It is not for me, as a judge, to pass upon the wisdom or righteousness of the political revolt this measure was designed to suppress. For me it is enough that, be it ever so benevolent and virtuous, the end cannot justify these means. </s> I would affirm the decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama. </s> [Footnote * See The Federalist, No. 68 (Earle ed., 1937), pp. 441-442: </s> "It was desirable that the sense of the people should operate in the choice of the person to whom so important a trust was to be confided. This end will be answered by committing the right of making it, not to any preestablished body, but to men chosen by the people for the special purpose, and at the particular conjuncture. </s> "It was equally desirable, that the immediate election should be made by men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station, and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation, and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements which were proper to govern their choice. A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to such complicated investigations." </s> [343 U.S. 214, 236]

United States Supreme Court COPPEDGE v. UNITED STATES(1962) No. 157 Argued: December 12, 1961Decided: April 30, 1962 </s> Tried and convicted in a Federal District Court, petitioner applied to that Court under 28 U.S.C. 1915 for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. The District Court denied the application and certified that the appeal was not in good faith. Petitioner then filed a similar application in the Court of Appeals, which appointed counsel for petitioner. Such counsel filed a memorandum in support of the application, contending, inter alia, that the indictment had been procured by perjured testimony and that petitioner had been unable to prove this charge because of the refusal of the District Court to permit him to examine the transcript of the grand jury proceedings. The Court of Appeals ordered that a transcript of the trial proceedings be furnished to petitioner and that the application to appeal in forma pauperis otherwise be held in abeyance. After the transcript had been prepared, the Government filed a detailed memorandum opposing the application and petitioner filed another memorandum based upon the transcript, urging the same questions and others which he claimed showed that his appeal was not frivolous. After considering the petition and the memoranda in support and in opposition, but without hearing arguments, the Court of Appeals denied the petition without opinion. Held: The summary disposition of petitioner's application was not justified. Pp. 440-454. </s> (a) A person convicted in a Federal District Court of a federal offense is entitled to appeal as a matter of right, and he need not petition the Court of Appeals for the exercise of its discretion to allow him to bring the case before it. Pp. 441-442. </s> (b) If a defendant is unable to pay the fee for docketing his appeal in the Court of Appeals or to pay the cost of preparing a transcript of the record of the proceedings in the trial court, he cannot perfect his appeal except by applying under 28 U.S.C. 1915 for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. Pp. 442-444. </s> (c) The sole statutory language to guide the District Court in passing upon such an application is that, "An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith." P. 444. [369 U.S. 438, 439] </s> (d) The requirement that an appeal in forma pauperis be taken "in good faith" is satisfied when the defendant seeks appellate review of any issue that is not frivolous. Pp. 444-445. </s> (e) When a defendant applies to a Court of Appeals for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the District Court's certification that the application is not "in good faith" is entitled to weight; but it is not conclusive. Pp. 445-446. </s> (f) If it appears from the face of the papers filed in the Court of Appeals that the applicant will present issues for review which are not clearly frivolous, the Court of Appeals should grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, appoint counsel to represent the appellant and proceed to consideration of the appeal on the merits in the same manner that it considers paid appeals. P. 446. </s> (g) If the claims made or the issues sought to be raised by the applicant are such that their substance cannot adequately be ascertained from the face of the application, the Court of Appeals must provide the would-be appellant with the assistance of counsel and with a transcript of the record sufficient to enable him to attempt to make a showing that the District Court's certificate of lack of good faith is erroneous. P. 446. </s> (h) If, with such aid, the applicant then presents any issue for the court's consideration which is not clearly frivolous, leave to proceed in forma pauperis must be granted. P. 446. </s> (i) An indigent defendant is entitled in all respects to the same right of appeal as a defendant who is able to pay the expenses of his appeal. Pp. 446-447. </s> (j) On an application for leave to appeal in forma pauperis, the burden is not on the applicant to show that his appeal has merit in the sense that he is bound, or even likely, to prevail ultimately; the burden is on the Government to show that the appeal is so lacking in merit that the court would dismiss the case as frivolous on the Government's motion had the case been docketed and had a record been filed by an appellant able to pay the expenses of complying with these requirements. Pp. 447-448. </s> (k) If it is the practice of a Court of Appeals to defer rulings on motions to dismiss paid appeals until the court has had the benefit of hearing argument and considering briefs and an adequate record, it must accord the same procedural rights to a person applying for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. P. 448. </s> (l) In passing upon applications for leave to appeal in forma pauperis, the Courts of Appeals should have due regard for the [369 U.S. 438, 440] facts that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 39 (d) requires that, in setting appeals for argument, preference shall be given by the Courts of Appeals to appeals in criminal cases and that the purpose of this requirement is to meet the need for speedy disposition of such cases. Pp. 448-450. </s> (m) Although there have been many proceedings and much delay in disposing of this case, the petitioner has not yet received the plenary review of his conviction to which he is entitled, since he has not yet received the benefits of presenting either oral argument or full briefs on the merits to the Court of Appeals. Pp. 450-453. </s> (n) On the record in this case taken as a whole, it cannot be said that petitioner's claims are so frivolous as to justify the summary disposition of his case which was ordered below. Pp. 450-454. </s> Judgment vacated and case remanded for further proceedings. </s> Bennett Boskey argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. </s> Carl W. Belcher argued the cause for the United States. On the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Miller, Beatrice Rosenberg and Sidney M. Glazer. </s> MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Tried and convicted in a Federal District Court for an offense against the United States, petitioner applied for leave to appeal his conviction to the Court of Appeals in forma pauperis. His application was denied. The case presents this question: What standard is to be applied by the lower federal courts in passing upon such applications? The articulation of a usable standard has been the source of considerable recent litigation. 1 And, while [369 U.S. 438, 441] we recognize that no single word or group of words can provide a precise formula that will dispose of every case, we think it appropriate to indicate in somewhat greater detail than in the past, the approach a Court of Appeals must take toward an indigent's application for leave to take a direct appeal from his criminal conviction in forma pauperis. </s> Statutory provision for litigation in forma pauperis in the federal courts is made by 28 U.S.C. 1915, authorizing "[a]ny court of the United States" to allow indigent persons to prosecute, defend or appeal suits without prepayment of costs. Before discussing our understanding of the proper manner in which a Court of Appeals is to exercise its authority to allow a criminal appeal in forma pauperis, we believe it would be helpful to indicate briefly the law applicable to criminal appeals generally. The provisions of 1915 can be understood and applied in such cases only when read together with the other provisions of the Judicial Code and the Federal Rules governing criminal appeals. </s> Present federal law has made an appeal from a District Court's judgment of conviction in a criminal case what is, in effect, a matter of right. 2 That is, a defendant has a right to have his conviction reviewed by a Court of Appeals, and need not petition that court for an exercise [369 U.S. 438, 442] of its discretion to allow him to bring the case before the court. The only requirements a defendant must meet for perfecting his appeal are those expressed as time limitations within which various procedural steps must be completed. First, a timely notice of appeal must be filed in the District Court to confer jurisdiction upon the Court of Appeals over the case. 3 Subsequently, designations of the transcript, a record on appeal and briefs must be filed in the appropriate forum. 4 </s> The indigent defendant will generally experience no material difficulty in filing a timely notice of appeal. 5 </s> [369 U.S. 438, 443] But thereafter he is immediately faced with court fees for docketing his appeal in the Court of Appeals and with the cost of preparing the record, including a stenographic transcript of at least portions of the trial proceedings. 6 If he is unable to meet either or both of these expenses, he can perfect his appeal only by applying for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. The application, to be made to the District Court in which the defendant was convicted, 7 </s> [369 U.S. 438, 444] must conform to the requirements of 28 U.S.C. 1915 (a) and include, in affidavit form, the defendant's representations of poverty, a statement of the case, and his belief that he is entitled to redress. The sole statutory language by which the District Court is guided in passing upon the application provides "[a]n appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith." 28 U.S.C. 1915 (a). </s> What meaning should be placed on the "good faith" of which the statute speaks? In the context of a criminal appeal, we do not believe it can be read to require a District Court to determine whether the would-be appellant seeks further review of his case in subjective good faith, i. e., good faith from his subjective point of view. 8 Such [369 U.S. 438, 445] a construction would deprive the legislation of sensible meaning, there probably being no convicted defendant who would not sincerely wish a Court of Appeals to review his conviction. Further, a subjective standard might suggest that only persons who, in good conscience, could insist on their innocence, are to be entitled to a review of their convictions without payment of costs. We believe this interpretation of the statute is not required by reason nor is it consistent with the sound administration of criminal justice in the federal courts. We hold, instead, that "good faith" in this context must be judged by an objective standard. We consider a defendant's good faith in this type of case demonstrated when he seeks appellate review of any issue not frivolous. In so doing, we note that if in forma pauperis litigation is attempted for reasons that may genuinely be characterized as the litigant's "bad faith," express authority exists in 28 U.S.C. 1915 (d) for dismissal of the cause as frivolous. 9 </s> If the District Court finds the application is not in good faith, and therefore denies leave to appeal in forma pauperis, the defendant may seek identical relief from the Court of Appeals. 10 In considering such an application [369 U.S. 438, 446] addressed to it, the Court of Appeals will have before it what is usually the pro se pleading of a layman and the certificate of a district judge that the applicant lacks "good faith" in seeking appellate review. The District Court's certificate is not conclusive, although it is, of course, entitled to weight. 11 However, we have recognized that the materials before the Court of Appeals at this stage of the proceedings are generally inadequate for passing upon the defendant's application. Nevertheless, if from the face of the papers he has filed, it is apparent that the applicant will present issues for review not clearly frivolous, the Court of Appeals should then grant leave to appeal in forma pauperis, appoint counsel to represent the appellant and proceed to consideration of the appeal on the merits in the same manner that it considers paid appeals. If, on the other hand, the claims made or the issues sought to be raised by the applicant are such that their substance cannot adequately be ascertained from the face of the defendant's application, the Court of Appeals must provide the would-be appellant with both the assistance of counsel and a record of sufficient completeness to enable him to attempt to make a showing that the District Court's certificate of lack of "good faith" is in error and that leave to proceed with the appeal in forma pauperis should be allowed. 12 If, with such aid, the applicant then presents any issue for the court's consideration not clearly frivolous, leave to proceed in forma pauperis must be allowed. </s> In so holding we have been impelled by considerations beyond the corners of 28 U.S.C. 1915, considerations that it is our duty to assure to the greatest degree possible, [369 U.S. 438, 447] within the statutory framework for appeals created by Congress, equal treatment for every litigant before the bar. 13 We have expressed this view in a case comparable to the one before us here by holding that </s> "[u]nless the issues raised [by the indigent seeking leave to appeal in forma pauperis] are so frivolous that the appeal would be dismissed in the case of a nonindigent litigant, Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 39 (a), the request of an indigent for leave to appeal in forma pauperis must be allowed." Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 675 . </s> The point of equating the test for allowing a pauper's appeal to the test for dismissing paid cases, is to assure equality of consideration for all litigants. The equation is intended to place the burdens of proof and persuasion in all cases on the same party - in these cases, on the Government. Since our statutes and rules make an appeal in a criminal case a matter of right, the burden of showing that that right has been abused through the prosecution [369 U.S. 438, 448] of frivolous litigation should, at all times, be on the party making the suggestion of frivolity. It is not the burden of the petitioner to show that his appeal has merit, in the sense that he is bound, or even likely, to prevail ultimately. He is to be heard, as is any appellant in a criminal case, if he makes a rational argument on the law or facts. It is the burden of the Government, in opposing an attempted criminal appeal in forma pauperis, to show that the appeal is lacking in merit, indeed, that it is so lacking in merit that the court would dismiss the case on motion of the Government, had the case been docketed and a record been filed by an appellant able to afford the expense of complying with those requirements. 14 If it were the practice of a Court of Appeals to screen the paid appeals on its docket for frivolity, without hearing oral argument, reviewing a record of the trial proceedings or considering full briefs, paupers could, of course, be bound by the same rules. But, if the practice of the Court of Appeals is to defer rulings on motions to dismiss paid appeals until the court has had the benefit of hearing argument and considering briefs and an adequate record, we hold it must no less accord the poor person the same procedural rights. </s> Two additional factors have relevance to our view of the proper disposition of motions for leave to perfect criminal appeals in forma pauperis. These factors are the foundation for Rule 39 (d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifying that preference shall be given by the Courts of Appeals to criminal cases. This Rule, first, acknowledges the importance to the sovereign, [369 U.S. 438, 449] to the accused and to society of a criminal prosecution. When society acts to deprive one of its members of his life, liberty or property, it takes its most awesome steps. No general respect for, nor adherence to, the law as a whole can well be expected without judicial recognition of the paramount need for prompt, eminently fair and sober criminal law procedures. The methods we employ in the enforcement of our criminal law have aptly been called the measures by which the quality of our civilization may be judged. 15 Second, the preference to be accorded criminal appeals recognizes the need for speedy disposition of such cases. Delay in the final judgment of conviction, including its appellate review, unquestionably erodes the efficacy of law enforcement. </s> Both of these considerations are particularly pertinent to criminal appeals in forma pauperis. Statistics compiled in the court below illustrate the undeniable fact that as many meritorious criminal cases come before that court through applications for leave to proceed in forma pauperis as on the paid docket, and that no a priori justification can be found for considering them, as a class, to be more frivolous than those in which costs have been paid. 16 Even-handed administration of the criminal law [369 U.S. 438, 450] demands that these cases be given no less consideration than others on the courts' dockets. Particularly since litigants in forma pauperis may, in the trial court, have suffered disadvantages in the defense of their cases inherent in their impecunious condition, is appellate review of their cases any less searching than that accorded paid appeals inappropriate. Indigents' appeals from criminal convictions cannot be used as a convenient valve for reducing the pressures of work on the courts. If there are those who insist on pursuing frivolous litigation, the courts are not powerless to dismiss or otherwise discourage it. But if frivolous litigation exists, we are not persuaded that it is concentrated in this narrow, yet vital, area of judicial duty. </s> Similarly, statistics demonstrate the inevitable delay that surrounds a procedure in which the courts give piecemeal attention to the series of motions that indigents must make before a final adjudication of the merits of their cases is reached. Delays described in years between trial and final decision in criminal cases are the unhappy result of separate considerations of motions for the appointment of counsel, for the preparation of a transcript of the trial proceedings and, ultimately, for the leave to appeal in forma pauperis. The case before us illustrates the point. Petitioner was indicted on June 16, 1958, for offenses alleged to have been committed in early December 1957. He was first tried and convicted in December 1958. Leave to appeal in forma pauperis was [369 U.S. 438, 451] granted by the District Court, and on June 23, 1959, the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. 106 U.S. App. D.C. 275, 272 F.2d 504. In October 1959, new counsel was appointed by the District Court to represent petitioner at his second trial. Pre-trial motions were argued in the District Court in December 1959 and January 1960, and petitioner's trial took place in the first week of March 1960. Petitioner was convicted and then sentenced on March 11, 1960. On March 22, 1960, the District Court denied an application for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. An application for leave to appeal in forma pauperis was then directed to the Court of Appeals, and was filed in that court on April 15, 1960. On April 20, that court appointed counsel to represent petitioner, and on June 15, 1960, counsel filed a 30-page memorandum in support of the petition for leave to appeal. The following day, the Government answered with a memorandum stating that it believed it appropriate for the court to order the preparation of a transcript at government expense before ruling on the petition for leave to appeal. Petitioner objected to this procedure on the grounds that his memorandum sufficiently indicated that non-frivolous issues were present in his case and that further delay in allowing the appeal was, therefore, unwarranted. On July 1, 1960, the Court of Appeals ordered the preparation of a transcript at the expense of the United States. The transcript became available August 15, 1960, and the Government's opposition to petitioner's application for leave to appeal in forma pauperis was filed, pursuant to an extension of time granted by the court, on September 2, 1960. The Government, misconceiving the issue as we understand it, claimed the points sought to be raised were "not sufficiently substantial" to warrant an appeal in forma pauperis; it did not suggest the appeal sought was "frivolous." Petitioner filed a reply memorandum on [369 U.S. 438, 452] September 8. On November 5, 1960, the court, one judge dissenting, denied the petition for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. The petition for certiorari was filed in this Court on November 16, 1960, and was granted on June 19, 1961. 366 U.S. 959 . We heard oral argument in December 1961, and our present disposition of the case, remanding it for reconsideration by the Court of Appeals on an intermediary step, still far from the end of petitioner's course through the courts on his original conviction, is now ordered more than four years after the commission of the offenses for which petitioner was tried and more than two years from the date of the trial and judgment petitioner seeks to have reviewed. 17 </s> In the light of this delay, it is not surprising that petitioner asks us to reach the merits of his case immediately. However, delay alone, unfortunate though it is, is not sufficient cause to bypass the orderly processes of judicial review. Contrary to the Government's assertion here that petitioner has already received what amounts to [369 U.S. 438, 453] plenary review of the conviction following his second trial, we hold petitioner has not yet received the benefits of presenting either oral argument or full briefs on the merits of his claims to the court first charged with the supervision of the trial court. 18 The memoranda prepared by counsel in support of petitioner's application for leave to appeal in forma pauperis were not intended to be, nor are they rightly considered as, full appellate briefs. But they do serve to demonstrate that petitioner sought consideration of issues that it would be difficult for an appellate court to consider so patently frivolous as to require a dismissal of petitioner's case without full briefing or argument. In so saying, we need not, and do not, express any opinion on whether petitioner's conviction should ultimately be affirmed or reversed. We only hold that taken as a whole, petitioner's various claims cannot justify the summary disposition of his case ordered below. </s> The first of numerous claims asserted by the petitioner is that the indictment against him was procured through the use of perjured testimony before the grand jury. This Court has not yet decided whether such a charge, if proven, would require the reversal of a criminal conviction based upon an indictment returned by a grand jury hearing the perjury. But we have granted certiorari and given full consideration to related issues in other cases. See, e. g., Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (hearsay evidence considered by grand jury); Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (illegally seized evidence considered by grand jury); Beck v. Washington, post, p. 541 (alleged inflammatory publicity surrounding state grand jury deliberations). </s> Petitioner also claims that he has been unable to prove his charge that perjured testimony was presented to the [369 U.S. 438, 454] grand jury because of the refusal of the courts below to permit him to examine the transcript of the grand jury's proceedings. Again, although in the particular context of this case access to the normally secret minutes of the grand jury may ultimately be held to have been properly denied, recent volumes of the United States Reports and the Federal Reporter include a number of opinions in which the extent of the secrecy normally attached to grand jury minutes has been explored. 19 </s> A number of other arguable claims were also made by petitioner to support his application for leave to appeal. But we believe those mentioned would alone have warranted the allowance of an appeal in forma pauperis. They meet the test of being sufficiently reasonable to withstand a claim that their frivolity is so manifest that they merit no further argument or consideration, and that dismissal of petitioner's case is, therefore, in order. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER took no part in the decision of this case. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 During the past five Terms of the Court, we have found it necessary to vacate and remand for reconsideration 14 cases in which a Court of Appeals has applied an erroneous standard in passing on an indigent's application for leave to appeal. Johnson v. United States, [369 U.S. 438, 441] 352 U.S. 565 ; Farley v. United States, 354 U.S. 521 ; Delbridge v. United States, 354 U.S. 906 ; Edwards v. United States, 355 U.S. 36 ; Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674 ; Hill v. United States, 356 U.S. 704 ; Cash v. United States, 357 U.S. 219 ; Hansford v. United States, 357 U.S. 578 ; Kitchens v. United States, 358 U.S. 42 ; Smith v. United States, 358 U.S. 281 ; Smith v. United States, 361 U.S. 13 ; Smith v. United States, 361 U.S. 38 ; McAbee v. United States, 361 U.S. 537 ; Lurk v. United States, 366 U.S. 712 . See also Page v. United States, 359 U.S. 116 ; Willis v. United States, 362 U.S. 216 . Cf. Simcox v. Madigan, 366 U.S. 765 ; Ragan v. Cox, 369 U.S. 437 . </s> [Footnote 2 28 U.S.C. 1291, 1294; Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 37 (a). Cf. Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 400 -401. </s> [Footnote 3 Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 37 (a); United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220 . </s> [Footnote 4 Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 39 (c) (record on appeal to be docketed in Court of Appeals within 40 days of filing of notice of appeal); Rules of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 33 (b) (application for copies of stenographic transcript of trial proceedings to be made within 3 days of filing of notice of appeal, or within 10 days if appellant is incarcerated), 33 (c) (appellant's designation of record on appeal to be filed within 20 days of filing notice of appeal), 18 (a) (appellant's briefs due within 20 days of filing record on appeal). </s> [Footnote 5 Although the timely filing of a notice of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite for perfecting an appeal, United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220 , a liberal view of papers filed by indigent and incarcerated defendants, as equivalents of notice of appeal, has been used to preserve the jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeals. See, e. g., Lemke v. United States, 346 U.S. 325 (notice of appeal filed prior to judgment); O'Neal v. United States, 272 F.2d 412 (C. A. 5th Cir.) (appeal bond filed in District Court); Tillman v. United States, 268 F.2d 422 (C. A. 5th Cir.) (application for leave to appeal in forma pauperis filed in District Court); Belton v. United States, 104 U.S. App. D.C. 81, 259 F.2d 811 (letter written to District Court); Williams v. United States, 88 U.S. App. D.C. 212, 188 F.2d 41 (notice of appeal delivered to prison officials for forwarding to District Court). See also Jordan v. United States District Court, 98 U.S. App. D.C. 160, 233 F.2d 362, vacated on other grounds sub nom. Jordan v. United States, 352 U.S. 904 (mandamus petition filed in Court of Appeals held equivalent of notice of appeal from [369 U.S. 438, 443] judgment in proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255); West v. United States, 94 U.S. App. D.C. 46, 222 F.2d 774 (petition for leave to appeal in forma pauperis filed in Court of Appeals held equivalent in 2255 case). </s> Further, Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 37 (a) (2) expressly provides: </s> "When a court after trial imposes sentence upon a defendant not represented by counsel, the defendant shall be advised of his right to appeal and if he so requests, the clerk shall prepare and file forthwith a notice of appeal on behalf of the defendant." </s> The salutary purpose of this provision may, however, not be achieved when the defendant appears at sentencing with counsel. If neither counsel, whether retained or court appointed, nor the district judge imposing sentence, notifies the defendant of the requirement for filing a prompt notice of appeal, the right of appeal may irrevocably be lost. Cf. Hodges v. United States, 108 U.S. App. D.C. 375, 282 F.2d 858, cert. granted, 365 U.S. 810 , cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 368 U.S. 139, 140 -141 (dissent); Lewis and Simms v. United States, 107 U.S. App. D.C. 353, 278 F.2d 33, 111 U.S. App. D.C. 13, 294 F.2d 209. </s> [Footnote 6 The fee for docketing an appeal in the Court of Appeals is $25. Stenographic transcripts in the federal courts cost $0.65 per page for the first copy, and $0.30 per page for additional copies. Transcripts in excess of 100 pages are not uncommon. The cost of printing briefs, records, and appendices, as illustrated by the present charge for printing records in this Court, may be $3.80 per page or more. The printing requirements are generally waived in appeals proceeding in forma pauperis. Cf. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 75 (m). But if, in such cases, printing is required by the Court of Appeals, the expense is borne by the United States. 28 U.S.C. 1915 (b). </s> [Footnote 7 The statute appears to contemplate an initial application to the District Court by providing "An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in writing that it is not taken in [369 U.S. 438, 444] good faith." 28 U.S.C. 1915 (a). And this is the manner in which the statute has been interpreted. See, e. g., West v. United States, 94 U.S. App. D.C. 46, 222 F.2d 774; Waterman v. McMillan, 77 U.S. App. D.C. 310, 135 F.2d 807; Murrey v. United States, 134 F.2d 956 (C. A. 8th Cir.); Bayless v. Johnston, 127 F.2d 531 (C. A. 9th Cir.). And see Rules of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 41 (a). But cf. Jordan v. United States District Court, 98 U.S. App. D.C. 160, 163, 233 F.2d 362, 365 note 3, vacated on other grounds sub nom. Jordan v. United States, 352 U.S. 904 . </s> [Footnote 8 In discussing the "good faith" requirement of what is now 28 U.S.C. 1915 (a), Senator Bacon of the Senate Judiciary Committee said: </s> "When a judge has heard a case and it is about to be carried to an appellate court, he . . . is in a position to judge whether it is a case proceeding captiously, or viciously, or with prejudice, or from any other improper motive, or whether the litigant is proceeding in good faith." 45 Cong. Rec. 1533 (1910). </s> However, he was discussing primarily civil suits. And see Jaffe v. United States, 246 F.2d 760 (C. A. 2d Cir.) (civil case). But in criminal cases cf. Cash v. United States, 104 U.S. App. D.C. 265, 269, 261 F.2d 731, 735, vacated, 357 U.S. 219 ; Parsell v. United States, 218 F.2d 232 (C. A. 5th Cir.). See also United States v. Visconti, 261 F.2d 215 (C. A. 2d Cir.) (proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 2255). </s> [Footnote 9 And see Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 39 (a); Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 12 (f). </s> [Footnote 10 28 U.S.C. 1915 expressly authorizes "[a]ny court of the United States" to permit a litigant to proceed in forma pauperis. Thus it is not necessary to consider the application to the Court of Appeals a separate "appeal" from the order of the District Court denying relief, to which the time requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would be applicable as they are to appeals in other ancillary post-conviction proceedings. Cf. Roberts v. United States District Court, 339 U.S. 844, 845 . The court below has, by its own Rule 41 (b), required all persons seeking leave to appeal a judgment of the District Court in forma pauperis, to apply for such leave from the Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date on which their applications for such relief from the District Court have been denied. The instant petitioner has complied with this Rule. </s> [Footnote 11 Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565, 566 . </s> [Footnote 12 Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565, 566 . See also Farley v. United States, 354 U.S. 521 ; Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674 ; Whitt v. United States, 104 U.S. App. D.C. 1, 259 F.2d 158. </s> [Footnote 13 Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 , in which we were presented with a state law requiring defendants in all criminal cases in that State to furnish a bill of exceptions to the appellate court in which they sought review of their convictions. The bill of exceptions was difficult, if not impossible, to prepare without a stenographic transcript of the trial proceedings. Persons sentenced to death received transcripts at the expense of the State; all others were required to purchase a transcript. We found the failure of the State to provide for appellate review for indigents in non-capital cases, when such review was available for all defendants able to purchase transcripts, an "invidious discrimination" inconsistent with the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws of the Fourteenth Amendment. See also Eskridge v. Washington State Board, 357 U.S. 214 ; Ross v. Schneckloth, 357 U.S. 575 ; Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 ; Douglas v. Green, 363 U.S. 192 ; McCrary v. Indiana, 364 U.S. 277 ; Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 , in which comparable state rules and practices, effectively limiting the poor person's access to courts ostensibly open to all, similarly have been found vulnerable. </s> [Footnote 14 See Brown v. United States, 110 U.S. App. D.C. 310, 293 F.2d 149; United States v. Nudelman, 207 F.2d 109 (C. A. 3d Cir.). Cf. United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106 ; Smith v. United States, 105 U.S. App. D.C. 414, 267 F.2d 691; Young v. United States, 105 U.S. App. D.C. 415, 267 F.2d 692; United States v. Peltz, 246 F.2d 537 (C. A. 2d Cir.). </s> [Footnote 15 Justice Schaefer of the Supreme Court of Illinois, in the 1956 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lecture at the Harvard Law School, reprinted as Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 26 (1956). </s> [Footnote 16 Jones v. United States, 105 U.S. App. D.C. 326, 328, 266 F.2d 924, 926. There, Judge Bazelon pointed out that of 86 criminal appeals considered by the Court of Appeals within a period of approximately 15 months, 18 were prepaid, while 68 were considered after either the District Court or the Court of Appeals had granted leave to appeal in forma pauperis. Of this total, 14 of the prepaid appeals resulted in a judgment affirming the conviction; a similar majority of the paupers' appeals resulted in affirmance. However, during a comparable span between September 1, 1957, and February 28, 1959, 24 criminal appeals were decided by the Court of Appeals in which the [369 U.S. 438, 450] District Court had initially denied leave to appeal in forma pauperis. In 11 of those 24 cases, reversals were ordered, and in 6 more, one of the three judges of the court's panel dissented from the judgment affirming the conviction. During those same 18 months, the court granted 31 of 47 petitions for leave to take a direct appeal in forma pauperis from a conviction, and this Court subsequently reversed the denials of leave to appeal ordered in the cases of 5 of the 16 unsuccessful applicants in the court below. </s> [Footnote 17 The instant case is not unique in this regard. See, e. g., Johnson: Indicted (March 1956), tried (May 1956), appeal in forma pauperis denied, 238 F.2d 565 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1956), vacated, 352 U.S. 565 (1957), conviction affirmed on the merits, 254 F.2d 175, petition for certiorari dismissed per stipulation of parties, 357 U.S. 933 (June 1958); Farley: Indicted (December 1955), tried (May 1956), application for leave to appeal in forma pauperis remanded to District Court, 238 F.2d 575 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1956), appeal in forma pauperis denied, 242 F.2d 338, vacated, 354 U.S. 521 (1957), remanded to District Court for settling transcript (December 1960), appeal in forma pauperis granted by District Court (May 1961), conviction affirmed on the merits, 292 F.2d 789 (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 857 (April 1962); Ellis: Indicted (April 1956), tried (September 1956), appeal in forma pauperis denied, 101 U.S. App. D.C. 386, 249 F.2d 478 (1957), vacated, 356 U.S. 674 (1958), conviction affirmed on the merits, 105 U.S. App. D.C. 86, 264 F.2d 372, cert. denied, 359 U.S. 998 (May 1959), motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied, 361 U.S. 945 (January 1960). </s> [Footnote 18 This argument was also presented by the Government, and then rejected by us, in Lurk v. United States, 366 U.S. 712 . </s> [Footnote 19 See, e. g., Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 399 -400; De Binder v. United States, 110 U.S. App. D.C. 244, 246, 292 F.2d 737, 739; United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-630 (C. A. 3d Cir.); Parr v. United States, 265 F.2d 894, 901-904 (C. A. 5th Cir.), reversed on other grounds, 363 U.S. 370 . Cf. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 -684. See Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent? 49 Calif. L. Rev. 56, 68-71 (1961); Note, Inspection of Grand Jury Minutes by Criminal Defendants, 1961 Wash. U. L. Q. 382. [369 U.S. 438, 455] </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN agrees, concurring. </s> In joining the opinion and judgment of the Court, I think it appropriate to add a few words. The rule of Ellis v. United States is a simple one. An appeal in forma pauperis must be allowed in a criminal case "unless the issues raised are so frivolous that the appeal would be dismissed in the case of a nonindigent litigant." 356 U.S. 674, 675 . The difficulties which the Courts of Appeals have encountered in applying this simple and practical test are largely, I think, of their own making. </s> These difficulties may stem in part from a failure to consider the in forma pauperis statute in the context of the over-all scheme governing criminal appeals. Our statutes and rules make an appeal in a criminal case a matter of right. The provisions governing appeals in forma pauperis are not to be read as diluting that right by imposing a more stringent test of merit. Rather, 28 U.S.C. 1915 provides at most a device for advance screening of appeals which, if paid, would upon motion be dismissed before argument as frivolous. The only justification for such a preliminary screening is the absence of the built-in pecuniary brake upon frivolous appeals which is present in nonindigent cases. There is no other difference between paid and unpaid appeals. In both, the burden of showing that the right to appeal has been abused is on the party making the suggestion. </s> It has been said that a District Court's certification that an appeal is not taken in good faith is entitled to great weight. Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565, 566 . Nevertheless, if a District Court has denied leave to appeal in forma pauperis, the Court of Appeals has the ultimate responsibility of deciding for itself whether the appeal is frivolous. Justice demands an independent and objective assessment of a district judge's appraisal of his [369 U.S. 438, 456] own conduct of a criminal trial. Anything less would impose a disability upon indigent defendants far greater than that contemplated by the preliminary screening provision which 1915 permits. The statutory safeguard against overindulgence in free frivolous appeals cannot be allowed to impinge upon the fundamental right of every litigant, rich or poor, to equal consideration before the courts. </s> When a Court of Appeals chooses to utilize the preliminary screening device permitted by 1915, difficulties of the kind evident in this case frequently arise. The bare application for leave to appeal in forma pauperis seldom furnishes sufficient material for evaluating the weight of the issues involved. For this reason, we have held that in such cases a Court of Appeals must provide the applicant with the assistance of counsel and with a record of sufficient completeness to give him full opportunity to show that the appeal is in "good faith." Johnson v. United States, supra; Farley v. United States, 354 U.S. 521 . In the course of such proceedings, however, experience has shown that there may be a tendency to lose sight of the precise issue before the court at this point - whether the appeal is so frivolous that it would be dismissed even if all the fees had been paid. Obviously arguments concerning the weight of the issues raised by an appeal are difficult to disengage from arguments dealing with the ultimate merits of these same issues. Understandably and commendably, counsel for indigent defendants often exert every effort to prove the substantial nature of their clients' claims - an exertion of energy which draws a similar effort from government counsel. The product of these forces is a procedure which may bear close superficial resemblance to the appeal itself. </s> The result is that a Court of Appeals may come to think of these preliminary proceedings as tantamount to appeals on the merits, and may tend to decide whether or [369 U.S. 438, 457] not to grant leave to appeal by appraising the entire case in terms of whether or not reversible error appears. By the same token, when leave to appeal has been denied, and the case has come here, the Government has argued in the past, as it argues in this case, that the preliminary screening procedure was itself the equivalent of an affirmance on the merits. See Lurk v. United States, 366 U.S. 712 . </s> This attempted conversion of the proceedings to determine good faith into a truncated substitute for appeal distorts the purpose of 1915, and, if accepted, would raise serious questions of due process. The filing of memoranda in support of an application for leave to appeal is not an appeal. The merits of the ultimate issues are not logically involved at this point, but only the weight of those issues. Appellate briefs are not written or submitted. There is no oral argument. The court's mode of considering such memoranda, as a matter of internal machinery, may markedly differ from the process employed in the decision of cases actually on appeal. For all these reasons the interim proceeding permitted by 1915 cannot itself be deemed to constitute the appeal to which a person convicted of crime in the federal courts is entitled. </s> In addition to the danger of equating the "good faith" determination with the appeal itself, there are other disadvantages inherent in compelling the parties to go through the preliminary procedure permitted by 1915. It is a serious imposition upon appointed counsel to require dissipation of energy and time in preliminary skirmishing. Moreover, the delay occasioned by this extended interim proceeding is itself offensive to the ideal of speedy administration of criminal justice. </s> The primary responsibility for containing within limited bounds the separate "good faith" proceeding permitted by 1915 rests upon those Courts of Appeals [369 U.S. 438, 458] which choose to utilize this system of dealing with in forma pauperis appeals. While I would not deny great latitude to the various circuits autonomously to devise their own procedures consistent with their appraisal of local conditions and needs, the courts' duty in this area can be properly achieved only by keeping in mind the very limited test of "good faith" which the Ellis case established. </s> This suggests that each Court of Appeals might well consider whether its task could not be more expeditiously and responsibly performed by simply granting applications to appeal from criminal convictions in forma pauperis as a matter of course, and appointing counsel to brief and argue each case on the merits. The Government would then be free in any case to file before argument a motion to dismiss the appeal as frivolous, as every appellee is always free to do. In the absence of such a motion an appeal which after argument appeared clearly without merit could be expeditiously disposed of by summary affirmance, in the secure knowledge that all the issues had been fully canvassed. This procedure, it seems to me, would not only save the time and energy of court and counsel, but would obviate the many difficulties which, as the present case shows, the complicated two-step system is all too likely to produce. </s> MR. JUSTICE CLARK, with whom MR. JUSTICE HARLAN joins, dissenting. </s> I. </s> Congress has provided that no indigent appeal may be taken "if the trial court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith," i. e., is frivolous. 28 U.S.C. 1915 (a). With the opinion today the Court for all practical purposes repeals this statute by placing the burden on the Government to sustain such a certification [369 U.S. 438, 459] rather than on the indigent to overturn it. This position is a sub silentio reversal of our previous holding in Farley v. United States, 354 U.S. 521, 523 (1957), where we said that "petitioner has not yet been afforded an adequate opportunity to show the Court of Appeals that his claimed errors are not frivolous. . . ." Accord, Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565 (1957). 1 Moreover, the Court goes against a long line of cases holding that the trial judge's certificate of frivolity is entitled to "great weight" - a rule which the opinion here notes but fails to recognize. If the finding is entitled to "great weight," in fact controlling weight in the absence of "some showing that the certificate is made without warrant . . .," Wells v. United States, 318 U.S. 257, 259 (1943), how can it be said the Government has the burden of upholding it? The Court seems to say the burden is upon the Government because when it files a motion to dismiss in a nonindigent case it has the burden of showing frivolity. I submit the two are not at all analogous. In the case of paid appeals Congress has not provided for a determination by the trial court of whether the issues warrant further review, and to treat nonpaid appeals like paid appeals is to ignore such a provision in the statute governing indigent appeals. </s> The Court does not make clear on what grounds it bases its assumption that the Government has the burden of showing frivolity. It professes to act "within the statutory framework for appeals created by Congress"; but it intimates that it is "impelled by considerations beyond the corners of 28 U.S.C. 1915," and the touchstone of its opinion is a principle arising from cases based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [369 U.S. 438, 460] I do not believe, however, that a disparity in the burden of showing frivolity denies equal justice as between paid and nonpaid appeals. They both remain subject to the same peril. Congress has set up a special procedure which subjects every nonpaid appeal to an examination to determine if further briefing and oral argument are necessary. Such an examination in the case of paid appeals is left to the initiative of the court or the Government. This distinction does not give rise to a discrimination of constitutional proportions. As was pointed out in Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943), "[t]he Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause and it restrains only such discriminatory legislation by Congress as amounts to a denial of due process. . . . Congress may hit at a particular danger where it is seen, without providing for others which are not so evident or so urgent." I see no constitutional impediment to asking one who seeks a free ride to show that he is not just a joyrider. Although a government that affords appellate review must pay the cost of meritorious indigent appeals, surely it may protect itself from frivolous ones (which incidentally in numbers over-whelmingly predominate) being "subsidized and public moneys . . . needlessly spent." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 24 (1956) (concurring opinion). </s> II. </s> The Court holds that petitioner is entitled to oral argument in the Court of Appeals on new briefs. An examination of the record shows that the action of the Court of Appeals was on the basis of a complete transcript and extensive briefs filed by counsel. With due deference to the Court's suggestion that these briefs were only preliminary, I find them to be substantially similar in both bulk and substance to the ones filed here on which petitioner asks for a decision on the merits. Upon such [369 U.S. 438, 461] presentation the Court of Appeals found itself satisfied that petitioner's conviction was proper. It is true that no oral argument was permitted. However, having come to the conclusion that the case had no merit, the court had to put a stop to the review proceeding. This is true whether the appeal is paid or nonpaid. See United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106 (1946). We adjudicate most of our appeals in the same manner, i. e., by dismissing or affirming on the briefs without argument. Inasmuch as the case had arisen within the procedural confines of appeals in forma pauperis, the Court of Appeals simply denied leave to appeal. It could have granted leave to proceed and then summarily affirmed or dismissed the appeal under Rule 39 (a), Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. I see no substantial distinction between the two dispositions. </s> The Court, however, is remanding the case for further review proceedings because it has concluded that at least two of petitioner's claims are not frivolous and that the Court of Appeals therefore erred in not allowing the review to run its full length. The Court in reaching this conclusion has, in my view, misplaced the burden on the issue of frivolity, but even assuming arguendo that petitioner's contentions are not frivolous, I cannot agree to the fruitless approach the Court has taken. </s> To be sure, frivolity or some analogous standard delimits those appeals, paid or nonpaid, which can be decided without oral argument. However, it would seem that any error by a Court of Appeals in evaluating frivolity upon such a full presentation as was had below is often not only incorrectable but harmless. Concededly, this Court has of late consistently remanded cases in which a Court of Appeals has mistakenly characterized contentions as frivolous. Experience has shown this tack to be unsatisfactory, and perhaps it is now time to re-evaluate our approach. [369 U.S. 438, 462] </s> This is not to say that we should do a complete turn about and never remand a case for further review. What I am suggesting is that we give substance to the congressional mandate and yet analyze, inter alia, the thoroughness of the review below, the character of the issues raised, the beneficiality of further action by a lower court, and the strength or weakness of the contentions made. Applying such criteria to the present case, I am convinced that to remand this case will only compel the lower court to go through wasteful formalities to the detriment of its consideration of other appeals and put off to another day action by this Court. 2 The Court speaks of long delays, but by remanding it appears to have contributed to the very evil which it seeks to eliminate. I would follow the teaching of Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957), and Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 342 (1941), and decide the merits of petitioner's contentions now. I therefore dissent. </s> [Footnote 1 Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674 (1958), is inapposite. There the Court was concerned with the standard governing the allowance of appeals in forma pauperis, not with where rests the burden of showing frivolity in the face of a certification by the trial court. </s> [Footnote 2 For a case in which a similar warning was sounded, see Lurk v. United States, 366 U.S. 712 (1961) (dissenting opinion). Subsequent events have shown this admonition to be words of wisdom indeed. See 111 U.S. App. D.C. 238, 296 F.2d 360, certiorari granted, 368 U.S. 815 . [For subsequent decision of this Court, see 370 U.S. 530 (1962).] </s> [369 U.S. 438, 463]

United States Supreme Court FISHER V. HURST(1948) No. 325 Argued: Decided: February 16, 1948 </s> Messrs. Thurgood Marshall, of New York City, and Amos T. Hall, of Oklahoma City, Okl., for petitioner. </s> PER CURIAM. Petitioner moves for leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel compliance with our mandate [ Fisher v. Hurst 333 U.S. 147 (1948) ] </s> [333 U.S. 147 , 148] </s> issued in Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 , January 12, 1948. We there said: 'The petitioner is entitled to secure legal education afforded by a state institution. To this time, it has been denied her although during the same period many white applicants have been afforded legal education by the State. The State must provide it for her in conformity with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and provide it as soon as it does for applicants of any other group. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 1938, 305 U.S. 337 .' Petitioner states that on January 17, 1948, 190 P.2d 437, 438, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma rendered an opinion in which it was said: </s> 'Said Board of Regents is hereby directed, under the authority conferred upon it by the provisions of Art. 13-A, Constitution of the State of Oklahoma, and Title 70 O.S.1941 1976, 1979, to afford to plaintiff, and all others similarly situated, an opportunity to commence the study of law at a state institution as soon as citizens of other groups are afforded such opportunity, in conformity with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and with the provisions of the Constitution and statutes of this state requiring segregation of the races in the schools of this state. Art. 13, Sec. 3, Constitution of Oklahoma; 70 O.S.1941 451-457. </s> 'Reversed with directions to the trial court to take such proceedings as may be necessary to fully carry out the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States and this opinion. The mandate is ordered to issue forthwith.' </s> [333 U.S. 147 , 149] </s> It is further stated by petitioner that the District Court of Cleveland County of Oklahoma entered an order on January 22, 1948, as follows: </s> 'It is, therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed by this court that unless and until the separate school of law for negroes, which the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in effect directed the Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education to establish 'with advantages for education substantially equal to the advantages afforded to white students,' is established and ready to function at the designated time applicants of any other group may hereafter apply for admission to the first-year class of the School of Law of the University of Oklahoma, and if the plaintiff herein makes timely and proper application to enroll in said class, the defendants, Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, et al, be, and the same are hereby ordered and directed to either: </s> '(1) enroll plaintiff, if she is otherwise qualified, in the first- year class of the School of Law of the University of Oklahoma, in which school she will be entitled to remain on the same scholastic basis as other students thereof until such a separate law schoolf or negroes is established and ready to function, or </s> '(2) not enroll any applicant of any group in said class until said separate school is established and ready to function. </s> 'It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that if such a separate law school is so established and ready to function, the defendants, Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, et al., be, and the same are hereby ordered and directed to </s> [333 U.S. 147 , 150] </s> not enroll plaintiff in the first-year class of the School of Law of the University of Oklahoma. </s> 'The cost of this case is taxed to defendants. </s> 'This court retains jurisdiction of this cause to hear and determine any question which may arise concerning the application of any performance of the duties prescribed by this order.' </s> The only question before us on this petition for a writ of mandamus is whether or not our mandate has been followed. It is clear that the District Court of Cleveland County did not depart from our mandate. The petition for certiorari in Sipuel v. Board of Regents, did not present the issue whether a state might not satisfy the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by establishing a separate law school for Negroes. On submission, we were clear it was not an issue here. The Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld the refusal to admit petitioner on the ground that she had failed to demand establishment of a separate school and admission to it. On remand, the district court correctly understood our decision to hold that the equal protection clause permits no such defense. Nothing which may have transpired since the orders of the Oklahoma courts were issued is in the record before us, nor could we consider it on this petition for writ of mandsmus if it were. The Oklahoma District Court has retained jurisdiction to hear and determine any question arising under its order. Whether or not the order is followed or disobeyed should be determined by it in the first instance. The manner in which, or the method by which, Oklahoma may have satisfied, or could satisfy the requirements of the mandate of this Court, as applied by the District Court of Cleveland County in its order of January 22, 1948, is not before us. </s> [333 U.S. 147 , 151] </s> Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus is denied. Mr. Justice MURPHY is of the opinion that a hearing should be had in order to determine whether the action of the Oklahoma courts subsequent to the issuance of this Court's mandate constitutes an evasion of that mandate. </s> Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE, dissenting. I am unable to join in the Court's opinion or in its disposition of the petition. In my judgment neither the action taken by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma nor that of the District Court of Cleveland County, following upon the decision and issuance of our mandate in No. 369, Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 , decided January 12, 1948, is consistent with our opinion in that cause or therefore with our mandate which issued forthwith. 1 </s> It is possible under those orders for the state's officials to dispose of petitioner's demand for a legal education equal to that afforded to white students by establishing overnight a separate law school for Negroes or to continue affording the present advantages to white students while denying them to petitioner. The latter could be done either by excluding all applicants for admission to the first-year class of the state university law school after the date of the District Court's order or, depending upon the meaning of that order, by excluding such applicants and asking all first-year students enrolled prior to that order's date to withdraw from school. Neither of those courses, in my opinion, would comply with our mandate. It plainly meant, to me at any </s> [333 U.S. 147 , 152] </s> rate, that Oklahoma should end the discrimination practiced against petitioner ato nce, not at some later time, near or remote. It also meant that this should be done, if not by excluding all students, then by affording petitioner the advantages of a legal education equal to those afforded to white students. And in my comprehension the equality required was equality in fact, not in legal fiction. Obviously no separate law school could be established elsewhere overnight capable of giving petitioner a legal education equal to that afforded by the state's long-established and well-known state university law school. Nor could the necessary time be taken to create such facilities, while continuing to deny them to petitioner, without incurring the delay which would continue the discrimination our mandate required to end at once. Neither would the state comply with it by continuing to deny the required legal education to petitioner while affording it to any other student, as it could do by excluding only students in the first-year class from the state university law school. Since the state courts' orders allow the state authorities at their election to pursue alternative courses, some of which do not comply with our mandate, I think those orders inconsistent with it. Accordingly I dissent from the Court's opinion and decision in this case. Footnotes </s> [Footnote 1 The mandate reversed the Oklahoma Supreme Court's judgment and remand ed the cause to it 'for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.'

United States Supreme Court ZATKO v. CALIFORNIA(1991) No. 91-5052 Argued: Decided: November 4, 1991 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 91-5111, Zatko v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California, No. 91-5166, Zatko v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California, 91-5167, Zatko v. United States, No. 91-5244, Martin v. Mrvos, No. 91-5246, Martin v. Smith, No. 91-5307, Martin v. Delaware Law School of Widener University, Inc., No. 91-5331, Martin v. Walmer, No. 91-5332, Martin v. Townsend, No. 91-5401, Martin v. Supreme Court of New Jersey, No. 91-5416, Zatko v. California, No. 91-5476, Martin v. Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, No. 91-5583, Martin v. Huyett, No. 91-5594, Zatko v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California, No. 91-5692, Zatko v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California, No. 91-5730, Zatko v. California, and No. 91-5732, Zatko v. California, also on motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. </s> Over the past 10 years, petitioner Zatko has filed 73 petitions with this Court, 34 within the last 2 years, and petitioner Martin has filed over 45 petitions, 15 within the last 2 years. </s> Held: </s> Zatko and Martin are denied in forma pauperis status in the instant cases, pursuant to this Court's Rule 39.8. Their patterns of repetitious filings have resulted in an extreme abuse of the system by burdening the office of the Clerk and other members of the Court's staff. </s> Motions denied. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> Last Term, we amended Rule 39 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States to add the following: </s> 39.8 If satisfied that a petition for a writ of certiorari, jurisdictional statement, or petition for an extraordinary writ, as the case may be, is frivolous or malicious, the Court may deny a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. </s> Because in forma pauperis petitioners lack the financial disincentives - filing fees and attorney's fees - that help to [502 U.S. 16, 17] deter other litigants from filing frivolous petitions, we felt such a rule change was necessary to provide us some control over the in forma pauperis docket. In ordering the amendment, we sought to discourage frivolous and malicious in forma pauperis filings, particularly [from] those few persons whose filings are repetitive with the obvious effect of burdening the office of the Clerk and other members of the Court staff. In re Amendment to Rule 39, 500 U.S. 13 (1991). </s> Today, we invoke Rule 39.8 for the first time, and deny in forma pauperis status to petitioners Vladimir Zatko and James L. Martin. We do not do so casually, however. We deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis only with respect to two petitioners who have repeatedly abused the integrity of our process through frequent frivolous filings. Over the last 10 years, Zatko has filed 73 petitions in this Court; 34 of those filings have come within the last 2 years. Martin has been only slightly less prolific over the same 10-year period, and has filed over 45 petitions, 15 of them within the last 2 years. In each of their filings up to this point, we have permitted Zatko and Martin to proceed in forma pauperis, and we have denied their petitions without recorded dissent. However, this Court's goal of fairly dispensing justice is compromised when the Court is forced to devote its limited resources to the processing of repetitious and frivolous requests such as these. In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177 (1991). We conclude that the pattern of repetitious filing on the part of Zatko and Martin has resulted in an extreme abuse of the system. In the hope that our action will deter future similar frivolous practices, we deny Zatko and Martin leave to proceed in forma pauperis in these cases. </s> The dissent complains that, by invoking this rule against Zatko and Martin, we appear to ignore our duty to provide equal access to justice for both the rich and the poor. The message we hope to send is quite the opposite, however. In order to advance the interests of justice, the Court's general [502 U.S. 16, 18] practice is to waive all filing fees and costs for indigent individuals, whether or not the petitions those individuals file are frivolous. As the dissent recognizes, for example, well over half of the numerous in forma pauperis petitions filed since the beginning of this Term are best characterized as frivolous. It is important to observe that we have not applied Rule 39.8 to those frivolous petitions, although the rule might technically apply to them. Instead, we have denied those petitions in the usual manner, underscoring our commitment to hearing the claims, however meritless, of the poor. But "[i]t is vital that the right to file in forma pauperis not be incumbered by those who would abuse the integrity of our process by frivolous filings." In re Amendment to Rule 39, supra, at 13. For that reason we take the limited step of censuring two petitioners who are unique - not merely among those who seek to file in forma paupers, but also among those who have paid the required filing fees - because they have repeatedly made totally frivolous demands on the Court's limited resources. </s> To discourage abusive tactics that actually hinder us from providing equal access to justice for all, we therefore deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis in these cases, pursuant to Rule 39.8. Accordingly, petitioners are allowed until November 25, 1991, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court. Future similar filings from these petitioners will merit additional measures. </s> It is so ordered. </s> JUSTICE THOMAS took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions. </s> JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins, dissenting. </s> Last Term, over the dissent of three Justices, the Court amended its Rule 39 for the "vital" purpose of protecting [502 U.S. 16, 19] "the integrity of our process" from those indigent petitioners who file frivolous petitions for certiorari. 1 Since the amended rule became effective on July 1, 1991, indigent litigants have filed almost 1,000 petitions, which this Court has denied without pausing to determine whether they were frivolous within the meaning of Rule 39. In my judgment, well over half of these petitions could have been characterized as frivolous. Nevertheless, under procedures that have been in place for many years, the petitions were denied in the usual manner. The "integrity of our process" was not compromised in the slightest by the Court's refusal to spend valuable time deciding whether to enforce Rule 39 against so many indigent petitioners. </s> The Court has applied a different procedure to the petitioners in these cases. Their multiple filings have enabled the Court to single them out as candidates for enforcement of the amended rule. As a result, the order in their cases denies leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to Rule 39.8, rather than simply denying certiorari. The practical effect of such an order is the same as a simple denial. 2 However, the symbolic effect of the Court's effort to draw distinctions among the multitude of frivolous petitions - none of which will be granted in any event - is powerful. Although the Court may have intended to send a message about the [502 U.S. 16, 20] need for the orderly administration of justice and respect for the judicial process, the message that it actually conveys is that the Court does not have an overriding concern about equal access to justice for both the rich and the poor.[fn3 ] </s> By its action today, the Court places yet another barrier in the way of indigent petitioners. 4 By branding these petitioners under Rule 39.8, the Court increases the chances that their future petitions, which may very well contain a colorable claim, will not be evaluated with the attention they deserve. </s> Because I believe the Court has little to gain and much to lose by applying Rule 39.8 as it does today, I would deny certiorari in these cases, and will so vote in similar cases in the future. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 In re Amendment to Rule 39, 500 U.S. 13 (1991). The amended rule, Rule 39.8 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, provides as follows: </s> "If satisfied that a petition for a writ of certiorari, jurisdictional statement, or petition for an extraordinary writ, as the case may be, is frivolous or malicious, the Court may deny a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis." </s> [Footnote 2 In the past, I have noted that the work of the Court is "facilitated by the practice of simply denying certiorari once a determination is made that there is no merit to the petitioner's claim," rather than determining whether "the form of the order should be a denial or a dismissal" in cases of questionable jurisdiction. Davis v. Jacobs, 454 U.S. 911, 914 -915 (1981) (STEVENS, J., respecting denial of petitions for writs of certiorari). </s> [Footnote 3 Our longstanding tradition of leaving our door open to all classes of litigants is a proud and decent one worth maintaining. See Talamini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 470 U.S. 1067, 1070 (1985) (STEVENS, J., concurring). In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ.). </s> [Footnote 4 And with each barrier that it places in the way of indigent litigants, . . . the Court can only reinforce in the hearts and minds of our society's less fortunate members the unsettling message that their pleas are not welcome here. In re Demos, 500 U.S. 16, 19 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by BLACKMUN and STEVENS, JJ.). </s> [502 U.S. 16, 21]

United States Supreme Court SECRETARY OF INTERIOR v. CALIFORNIA(1984) No. 82-1326 Argued: November 1, 1983Decided: January 11, 1984 </s> Section 307(c)(1) of the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) provides that "[e]ach Federal agency conducting or supporting activities directly affecting the coastal zone shall conduct or support those activities in a manner which is, to the maximum extent practicable, consistent with approved state management programs." CZMA defines the "coastal zone" to include state but not federal land near the shorelines of the several coastal States, as well as coastal waters extending "seaward to the outer limit of the United States territorial sea." The territorial sea for the States bordering on the Pacific Ocean or Atlantic Ocean extends three geographical miles seaward from the coastline. Submerged lands subject to the jurisdiction of the United States that lie beyond the territorial sea constitute the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). By virtue of the Submerged Lands Act, the coastal zone belongs to the States, while the OCS belongs to the Federal Government. In these cases, the Department of the Interior (Interior), rejecting California's demands that a consistency review was required under 307(c)(1), sold oil and gas leases of certain tracts on the OCS off the coast of California. California and other interested parties then filed suits in Federal District Court to enjoin the sale of some of the tracts, alleging that Interior had violated 307(c)(1) in that leasing sets in motion a chain of events that culminates in oil and gas development and therefore "directly affects" the coastal zone within the meaning of 307(c)(1). The District Court entered a summary judgment for the plaintiffs, holding that a consistency determination was required before the sale. The Court of Appeals affirmed. </s> Held: </s> Interior's sale of OCS oil and gas leases is not an activity "directly affecting" the coastal zone within the meaning of 307(c)(1), and thus a consistency review is not required under that section before such sales are made. Pp. 320-343. [464 U.S. 312, 313] </s> (a) CZMA nowhere defines or explains which federal activity should be viewed as "directly affecting" the coastal zone, but the legislative history of 307(c)(1) discloses that Congress did not intend the section to reach OCS lease sales. The "directly affecting" language was aimed primarily at activities conducted or supported by federal agencies on federal lands physically situated in the coastal zone but excluded from the zone as formally defined by CZMA. This reading of 307(c)(1) finds further support in the history of other sections of CZMA. Pp. 321-330. </s> (b) Nor is a broader reading of 307(c)(1) compelled by the thrust of other CZMA provisions. It is clear that Congress believed that CZMA's purposes could be adequately effectuated without reaching federal activities conducted outside the coastal zone. Moreover, an examination of 307's structure suggests that lease sales are a type of federal agency activity not intended to be covered by 307(c)(1). Section 307(c)(3), which deals with private parties' activities authorized by a federal agency's issuance of licenses and permits, is the provision that is more pertinent to OCS lease sales, and that provision definitely does not require consistency review of such sales. Pp. 331-335. </s> (c) Congress has carefully codified the fine distinction between a sale of a "lease" and the issuance of a permit to "explore for," "produce," or "develop" oil or gas. By the time the leases in question here were sold, it was clear that a lease sale by Interior did not involve the submission or approval of "any plan for the exploration or development of, or production from" the lease tracts. Since 1978, when the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 (OCSLA) was amended, there have been four statutory stages to developing an offshore oil well: (1) preparation of a leasing program, (2) lease sales (the stage in dispute here), (3) exploration by the lessees, and (4) development and production. The purchase of an OCS lease, standing alone, entails no right to explore for, develop, or produce oil or gas resources on the OCS. The first two stages are not subject to consistency review, but the last two stages are. Under OCSLA's plain language, the purchase of a lease entails no right to proceed with full exploration, development, or production that might trigger 307(c)(3)(B)'s consistency review provisions; the lessee acquires only a priority in submitting plans to conduct those activities. Pp. 335-341. </s> (d) Even if OCS lease sales are viewed as involving an activity "conduct[ed]" or "support[ed]" by a federal agency within the meaning of 307(c)(1), lease sales cannot be characterized as "directly affecting" the coastal zone. Since 1978, the sale of a lease grants the lessee the right to conduct only very limited "preliminary activities" on the OCS, and does not authorize full-scale exploration, development, or production [464 U.S. 312, 314] Those activities may not begin until separate federal approval has been obtained. In these circumstances, the possible effects on the coastal zone that may eventually result from the sale of a lease cannot be termed "direct." Pp. 342-343. </s> 683 F.2d 1253, reversed. </s> O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and WHITE, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 344. </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 82-1327, Western Oil & Gas Association et al. v. California et al., and No. 82-1511, California et al. v. Secretary of the Interior et al., also on certiorari to the same court. </s> Solicitor General Lee argued the cause for petitioners in No. 82-1326 and respondents in No. 82-1511. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Dinkins, Deputy Solicitors General Wallace and Claiborne, Acting Assistant Attorney General Habicht, Richard G. Wilkins, Peter R. Steenland, Jr., and Anne S. Almy. E. Edward Bruce argued the cause for Western Oil & Gas Association et al., petitioners in No. 82-1327 and respondents in No. 82-1511. With him on the briefs was Howard J. Privett. </s> Theodora Berger, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for the State of California et al. in all cases. With her on the brief for the State of California et al., respondents in Nos. 82-1326 and 82-1327, were John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General, N. Gregory Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, and John A. Saurenman, Deputy Attorney General. Roger Beers, Kathryn Burkett Dickson, and William M. Boyd filed a brief for the County of Humboldt et al., respondents in Nos. 82-1326 and 82-1327. Mr. Van de Kamp, Mr. Taylor, Ms. Berger, Mr. Saurenman, Trent W. Orr, Mr. Beers, Ms. Dickson, and Mr. Boyd filed briefs for petitioners in No. 82-1511. Mr. Orr filed a brief for the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al., respondents in Nos. 82-1326 and 82-1327.Fn </s> Fn [464 U.S. 312, 314] Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Alaska by Norman C. Gorsuch, Attorney General, and G. Thomas Koester, Assistant Attorney General; for the State of Florida by Jim Smith, Attorney General, and Gerald B. Curington and Bruce Barkett, [464 U.S. 312, 315] Assistant Attorneys General; for the State of New Jersey by Irwin I. Kimmelman, Attorney General, and Deborah T. Poritz and John M. Van Dalen, Deputy Attorneys General; and for the Coastal States Organization et al. by H. Bartow Farr III and the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut, Charles M. Oberly III of Delaware, Tany S. Hong of Hawaii, James E. Tierney of Maine, Stephen H. Sachs of Maryland, Francis X. Bellotti of Massachusetts, Robert Abrams of New York, Rufus L. Edmisten of North Carolina, Dave Frohmayer of Oregon, and Kenneth O. Eikenberry of Washington. [464 U.S. 312, 315] </s> JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> These cases arise out of the Department of the Interior's sale of oil and gas leases on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) off the coast of California. We must determine whether the sale is an activity "directly affecting" the coastal zone under 307(c)(1) of the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA). That section provides in its entirety: </s> "Each Federal agency conducting or supporting activities directly affecting the coastal zone shall conduct or support those activities in a manner which is, to the maximum extent practicable, consistent with approved state management programs." 86 Stat. 1285, 16 U.S.C. 1456(c) (1) (1982 ed.). </s> We conclude that the Secretary of the Interior's sale of Outer Continental Shelf oil and gas leases is not an activity "directly affecting" the coastal zone within the meaning of the statute. </s> I </s> CZMA defines the "coastal zone" to include state but not federal land near the shorelines of the several coastal States, as well as coastal waters extending "seaward to the outer limit of the United States territorial sea." 16 U.S.C. 1453(1) (1982 ed.). The territorial sea for States bordering on the Pacific Ocean or Atlantic Ocean extends three geographical miles seaward from the coastline. See 43 U.S.C. 1301; United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139 (1965). Submerged lands subject to the jurisdiction of the United [464 U.S. 312, 316] States that lie beyond the territorial sea constitute the "outer Continental Shelf." See 43 U.S.C. 1331(a). By virtue of the Submerged Lands Act, passed in 1953, the coastal zone belongs to the States, while the OCS belongs to the Federal Government. 43 U.S.C. 1302, 1311. </s> CZMA was enacted in 1972 to encourage the prudent management and conservation of natural resources in the coastal zone. Congress found that the "increasing and competing demands upon the lands and waters of our coastal zone" had "resulted in the loss of living marine resources, wildlife, nutrient-rich areas, permanent and adverse changes to ecological systems, decreasing open space for public use, and shoreline erosion." 16 U.S.C. 1451(c) (1982 ed.). Accordingly, Congress declared a national policy to protect the coastal zone, to encourage the States to develop coastal zone management programs, to promote cooperation between federal and state agencies engaged in programs affecting the coastal zone, and to encourage broad participation in the development of coastal zone management programs. 16 U.S.C. 1452 (1982 ed.). </s> Through a system of grants and other incentives, CZMA encourages each coastal State to develop a coastal management plan. Further grants and other benefits are made available to a coastal State after its management plan receives federal approval from the Secretary of Commerce. To obtain such approval a state plan must adequately consider the "national interest" and "the views of Federal agencies principally affected by such program." 16 U.S.C. 1455(c)(8), 1456(b) (1982 ed.). </s> Once a state plan has been approved, CZMA 307(c)(1) requires federal agencies "conducting or supporting activities directly affecting the coastal zone" to do so "consistent" with the state plan "to the maximum extent practicable." 16 U.S.C. 1456(c)(1) (1982 ed.). The Commerce Department has promulgated regulations implementing that provision. Those regulations require federal agencies to prepare a "consistency [464 U.S. 312, 317] determination" document in support of any activity that will "directly affect" the coastal zone of a State with an approved management plan. The document must identify the "direct effects" of the activity and inform state agencies how the activity has been tailored to achieve consistency with the state program. 15 CFR 930.34, 930.39 (1983). </s> II </s> OCS lease sales are conducted by the Department of the Interior (Interior). Oil and gas companies submit bids, and the high bidders receive priority in the eventual exploration for and development of oil and gas resources situated in the submerged lands on the OCS. A lessee does not, however, acquire an immediate or absolute right to explore for, develop, or produce oil or gas on the OCS; those activities require separate, subsequent federal authorization. </s> In 1977, the Department of Commerce approved the California Coastal Management Plan. The same year, Interior began preparing Lease Sale No. 53 - a sale of OCS leases off the California coast near Santa Barbara. Interior first asked several state and federal agencies to report on potential oil and gas resources in this area. The agency then requested bidders, federal and state agencies, environmental organizations, and the public to identify which of 2,036 tracts in the area should be offered for lease. In October 1978, Interior announced the tentative selection of 243 tracts, including 115 tracts situated in the Santa Maria Basin located off western Santa Barbara. Various meetings were then held with state agencies. Consultations with other federal agencies were also initiated. Interior issued a Draft Environmental Impact Statement in April 1980. </s> On July 8, 1980, the California Coastal Commission informed Interior that it had determined Lease Sale No. 53 to be an activity "directly affecting" the California coastal zone. The State Commission therefore demanded a consistency determination - a showing by Interior that the lease sale [464 U.S. 312, 318] would be "consistent" to the "maximum extent practicable" with the state coastal zone management program. Interior responded that the lease sale would not "directly affect" the California coastal zone. Nevertheless, Interior decided to remove 128 tracts, located in four northern basins, from the proposed lease sale, leaving only the 115 tracts in the Santa Maria Basin. In September 1980, Interior issued a final Environmental Impact Statement. On October 27, 1980, it published a proposed notice of sale, limiting bidding to the remaining 115 blocks in the Santa Maria Basin. 45 Fed. Reg. 71140 (1980). </s> On December 16, 1980, the State Commission reiterated its view that the sale of the remaining tracts in the Santa Maria Basin "directly affected" the California coastal zone. The Commission expressed its concern that oil spills on the OCS could threaten the southern sea otter, whose range was within 12 miles of the 31 challenged tracts. The Commission explained that it "has been consistent in objecting to proposed offshore oil development within specific buffer zones around special sensitive marine mammal and seabird breeding areas . . . ." App. 77. The Commission concluded that 31 more tracts should be removed from the sale because "leasing within 12 miles of the Sea Otter Range in the Santa Maria Basin would not be consistent" with the California Coastal Management Program. Id., at 79. 1 California Governor Brown later took a similar position, urging that 34 more tracts be removed. Id., at 81. 2 </s> Interior rejected the State's demands. In the Secretary's view, no consistency review was required because the lease sale did not engage CZMA 307(c)(1), and the Governor's request was not binding because it failed to strike a reasonable [464 U.S. 312, 319] balance between the national and local interests. On April 10, 1981, Interior announced that the lease sale of the 115 tracts would go forward, and on April 27 issued a final notice of sale. 46 Fed. Reg. 23674 (1981). </s> California and other interested parties (hereafter respondents) filed two substantially similar suits in Federal District Court to enjoin the sale of 29 tracts situated within 12 miles of the Sea Otter Range. 3 Both complaints alleged, inter alia, Interior's violation of 307(c)(1) of CZMA. 4 They argued that leasing sets in motion a chain of events that culminates in oil and gas development, and that leasing therefore "directly affects" the coastal zone within the meaning of 307(c)(1). </s> The District Court entered a summary judgment for respondents on the CZMA claim. California v. Watt, 520 F. [464 U.S. 312, 320] Supp. 1359 (CD Cal. 1981). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed that portion of the District Court judgment that required a consistency determination before the sale. 5 California v. Watt, 683 F.2d 1253 (1982). We granted certiorari, 461 U.S. 925 (1983), and we now reverse. </s> III </s> Whether the sale of leases on the OCS is an activity "directly affecting" the coastal zone is not self-evident. 6 As [464 U.S. 312, 321] already noted, OCS leases involve submerged lands outside the coastal zone, and as we shall discuss, an OCS lease authorizes the holder to engage only in preliminary exploration; further administrative approval is required before full exploration or development may begin. Both sides concede that the preliminary exploration itself has no significant effect on the coastal zone. Both also agree that a lease sale is one (not the first, see infra, at 337) in a series of decisions that may culminate in activities directly affecting that zone. </s> A </s> We are urged to focus first on the plain language of 307(c)(1). Interior contends that "directly affecting" means "[h]av[ing] a [d]irect, [i]dentifiable [i]mpact on [t]he [c]oastal [z]one." Brief for Federal Petitioners 20. Respondents insist that the phrase means "[i]nitiat[ing] a [s]eries of [e]vents of [c]oastal [m]anagement [c]onsequence." Brief for Respondent State of California et al. 10. 7 But CZMA nowhere defines or explains which federal activities should be viewed as "directly affecting" the coastal zone, and the alternative verbal formulations proposed by the parties, both of which are superficially plausible, find no support in the Act itself. </s> We turn therefore to the legislative history. 8 A fairly detailed review is necessary, but that review persuades us that [464 U.S. 312, 322] Congress did not intend OCS lease sales to fall within the ambit of CZMA 307(c)(1). </s> In the CZMA bills first passed by the House and Senate, 307(c)(1)'s consistency requirements extended only to federal activities "in" the coastal zone. The "directly affecting" standard appeared nowhere in 307(c)(1)'s immediate antecedents. It was the House-Senate Conference Committee that replaced "in the coastal zone" with "directly affecting the coastal zone." Both Chambers then passed the Conference bill without discussing or even mentioning the change. </s> At first sight, the Conference's adoption of "directly affecting" appears to be a surprising, unexplained, and subsequently unnoticed expansion in the scope of 307(c)(1), going beyond what was required by either of the versions of 307(c)(1) sent to the Conference. But a much more plausible explanation for the change is available. </s> The explanation lies in the two different definitions of the "coastal zone." The bill the Senate sent to the Conference defined the coastal zone to exclude "lands the use of which is by law subject solely to the discretion of or which is held in trust by the Federal Government, its officers or agents." 9 </s> [464 U.S. 312, 323] This exclusion would reach federal parks, military installations, Indian reservations, and other federal lands that would lie within the coastal zone but for the fact of federal ownership. Under the Senate bill, activities on these lands would thus have been entirely exempt from compliance with state management plans. By contrast, the House bill's definition of "coastal zone" included lands under federal jurisdiction; thus federal activities on those lands were to be fully subject to 307(c)(1)'s consistency requirement. Under both bills, however, submerged lands on the OCS were entirely excluded from the coastal zone, and federal agency activities in those areas thus were exempt from 307(c)(1)'s consistency requirement. </s> Against this background, the Conference Committee's change in 307(c)(1) has all the markings of a simple compromise. The Conference accepted the Senate's narrower definition of the "coastal zone," but then expanded 307(c)(1) to cover activities on federal lands not "in" but nevertheless "directly affecting" the zone. By all appearances, the intent was to reach at least some activities conducted in those federal enclaves excluded from the Senate's definition of the "coastal zone." </s> Though cryptic, the Conference Report's reference to the change in 307(c)(1) fully supports this explanation. "The Conferees . . . adopted the Senate language . . . which made it clear that Federal lands are not included within a state's coastal zone. As to the use of such lands which would affect a state's coastal zone, the provisions of section 307(c) would apply." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1544, p. 12 (1972) (emphasis added). In the entire Conference Report, this is the only mention of the definition of the coastal zone chosen by the Conference, and the only hint of an explanation for the change in 307(c)(1). The "directly affecting" language was not deemed worthy of note by any Member of Congress in the subsequent floor debates. 10 The implication seems clear: [464 U.S. 312, 324] "directly affecting" was used to strike a balance between two definitions of the "coastal zone." The legislative history thus strongly suggests that OCS leasing, covered by neither the House nor the Senate version of 307(c)(1), was also intended to be outside the coverage of the Conference's compromise. </s> Nonetheless, the literal language of 307(c)(1), read without reference to its history, is sufficiently imprecise to leave open the possibility that some types of federal activities conducted on the OCS could fall within 307(c)(1)'s ambit. We need not, however, decide whether any OCS activities other than oil and gas leasing might be covered by 307(c)(1), because further investigation reveals that in any event Congress expressly intended to remove the control of OCS resources from CZMA's scope. </s> B </s> If 307(c)(1) and its history standing alone are less than crystalline, the history of other sections of the original CZMA bills impels a narrow reading of that clause. Every time it faced the issue in the CZMA debates, Congress deliberately and systematically insisted that no part of CZMA was to reach beyond the 3-mile territorial limit. </s> There are, first, repeated statements in the House and Senate floor debates that CZMA is concerned only with activities on land or in the territorial sea, not on the OCS, and that the allocation of state and federal jurisdiction over the coastal zone and the OCS was not to be changed in any way. 11 But [464 U.S. 312, 325] Congress took more substantial and significant action as well. Congress debated and firmly rejected at least four proposals to extend parts of CZMA to reach OCS activities. </s> Section 313 of the House CZMA bill, as reported by Committee and passed by the House, embodied the most specific of these proposals. That section would have achieved explicitly what respondents now contend 307(c)(1) achieves implicitly. It provided: </s> "(a) The Secretary shall develop . . . a program for the management of the area outside the coastal zone and within twelve miles of the [coast] . . . . </s> "(b) To the extent that any part of the management program . . . shall apply to any high seas area, the subjacent seabed and subsoil of which lies within the seaward boundary of a coastal state, . . . the program shall be coordinated with the coastal state involved. . . . </s> "(c) The Secretary shall, to the maximum extent practicable, apply the program . . . to waters which are adjacent to specific areas in the coastal zone which have been designated by the states for the purpose of preserving or restoring such areas for their conservation, recreational, [464 U.S. 312, 326] ecological, or esthetic values." H. R. 14146, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 313 (1972), reprinted in H. R. Rep. No. 92-1049, p. 7 (1972). </s> Congressman Anderson of California, the drafter of this section and coauthor of the House CZMA bill, explained the section's purpose on the floor of the House. In light of the instant litigation, his comments were remarkably prescient. By 1972, Congressman Anderson pointed out, California had established seven marine sanctuaries, including one located near Santa Barbara, Cal., in the area allegedly threatened by the leases here in dispute. </s> "These State-established sanctuaries, which extend from the coastline seaward to 3 miles, account for nearly a fourth of the entire California coast. </s> "However, the Federal Government has jurisdiction outside the State area, from 3 miles to 12 miles at sea. All too often, the Federal Government has allowed development and drilling to the detriment of the State program. </s> "A case in point is Santa Barbara where California established a marine sanctuary banning the drilling of oil in the area under State authority. </s> "Yet, outside the sanctuary - in the federally controlled area - the Federal Government authorized drilling which resulted in the January 1969 blowout. This dramatically illustrated the point that oil spills do not respect legal jurisdictional lines." 118 Cong. Rec. 26484 (1972). 12 </s> House 313, Congressman Anderson went on to explain, would play the crucial role of encouraging federal OCS oil [464 U.S. 312, 327] and gas leasing to be conducted in a manner consistent with state management programs. Ibid.; see also id., at 26495, 35549-35550. </s> Since House 313 would have provided respondents with precisely the protection they now seek here, it is significant that the Conference Committee, and ultimately the Congress as a whole, flatly rejected the provision. And the reason for the rejection, as explained in the Conference Report, was to forestall conflicts of the type before us now. "The Conferees . . . excluded [House 313] authorizing a Federal management program for the contiguous zone of the United States, because the provisions relating thereto did not prescribe sufficient standards or criteria and would create potential conflicts with legislation already in existence concerning Continental Shelf resources." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1544, p. 15 (1972) (emphasis added). </s> The House bill included another similar provision that would have been almost equally favorable to respondents here - had it not been rejected by the Conference and subsequently by Congress as a whole. Sections 312(b), (c), of the House bill invited the Secretary of Commerce to extend coastal zone marine sanctuaries established by the States into the OCS region. 13 But the Conference Committee rejected House 312 as well. The Conference Report explained: "The Conferees agreed to delete the provisions of the House [464 U.S. 312, 328] version relating to extension of estuarine sanctuaries, in view of the fact that the need for such provisions appears to be rather remote and could cause problems since they would extend beyond the territorial limits of the United States." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1544, pp. 14-15 (1972). </s> When the Conference bill returned to the House, with House 312 and 313 deleted, Congressman Anderson expressed his dismay: </s> "I am deeply disappointed that the Senate conferees would not accept the position of the House of Representatives regarding the extension of State-established marine sanctuaries to areas under Federal jurisdiction. </s> ". . . [W]e were successful, in committee, in adding a provision which I authored designed to protect State-established sanctuaries, such as exis[t] off Santa Barbara, Calif., from federally authorized development. </s> "This provision would have required the Secretary to apply the coastal zone program to waters immediately adjacent to the coastal waters of a State, which that State has designated for specific preservation purposes. </s> "It was accepted overwhelmingly by the House of Representatives despite the efforts of the oil and petroleum industry to defeat it. </s> "But what they failed to accomplish in the House, they accomplished in the conference committee . . . ." 118 Cong. Rec. 35549-35550 (1972). </s> In light of these comments by Congressman Anderson, and the express statement in the Conference Report that House 313 was removed to avoid "conflicts with legislation already in existence concerning Continental Shelf resources," see supra, at 327, it is fanciful to suggest that the Conferees intended the "directly affecting" language of 307(c)(1) to substitute for the House 313's specific and considerably more detailed language. Certainly the author of House 313 recognized that the amended 307(c)(1) could not serve that purpose. [464 U.S. 312, 329] </s> Two similar attempts to extend CZMA's reach beyond the coastal zone were made in the Senate. These, as well, were firmly rejected on the Senate floor or in Conference. 14 </s> [464 U.S. 312, 330] </s> C </s> To recapitulate, the "directly affecting" language in 307(c)(1) was, by all appearances, only a modest compromise, designed to offset in part the narrower definition of the coastal zone favored by the Senate and adopted by the Conference Committee. Section 307(c)(1)'s "directly affecting" language was aimed at activities conducted or supported by federal agencies on federal lands physically situated in the coastal zone but excluded from the zone as formally defined by the Act. Consistent with this view, the same Conference Committee that wrote the "directly affecting" language rejected two provisions in the House bill that would have required precisely what respondents seek here - coordination of federally sponsored OCS activities with state coastal management and conservation programs. In light of the Conference Committee's further, systematic rejection of every other attempt to extend the reach of CZMA to the OCS, we are impelled to conclude that the 1972 Congress did not intend 307(c)(1) to reach OCS lease sales. 15 </s> [464 U.S. 312, 331] </s> IV </s> A </s> A broader reading of 307(c)(1) is not compelled by the thrust of other CZMA provisions. First, it is clear beyond [464 U.S. 312, 332] peradventure that Congress believed that CZMA's purposes could be adequately effectuated without reaching federal activities conducted outside the coastal zone. Both the Senate and House bills were originally drafted, debated, and passed, with 307(c)(1) expressly limited to federal activities in the coastal zone. Broad arguments about CZMA's structure, the Act's incentives for the development of state management programs, and the Act's general aspirations for state-federal cooperation thus cannot support the expansive reading of 307(c)(1) urged by respondents. </s> Moreover, a careful examination of the structure of CZMA 307 suggests that lease sales are a type of federal agency activity not intended to be covered by 307(c)(1) at all. </s> Section 307(c) contains three coordinated parts. Paragraph (1) refers to activities "conduct[ed] or support[ed]" by a federal agency. Paragraph (2) covers "development project[s]" "undertake[n]" by a federal agency. Paragraph (3) deals with activities by private parties authorized by a federal agency's issuance of licenses and permits. The first two paragraphs thus reach activities in which the federal agency is itself the principal actor, the third reaches the federally approved activities of third parties. Plainly, Interior's OCS lease sales fall in the third category. Section 307(c)(1) should therefore be irrelevant to OCS lease sales, if only because drilling for oil or gas on the OCS is neither "conduct[ed]" nor "support[ed]" by a federal agency. Section [464 U.S. 312, 333] 307(c)(3), not 307(c)(1), is the more pertinent provision. Respondents' suggestion that the consistency review requirement of 307(c)(3) is focused only on the private applicants for permits or licenses, not federal agencies, is squarely contradicted by abundant legislative history and the language of 307(c)(3) itself. 16 </s> CZMA 307(c)(3) definitely does not require consistency review of OCS lease sales. As enacted in 1972, that section addressed the requirements to be imposed on federal licensees whose activities might affect the coastal zone. A federal [464 U.S. 312, 334] agency may not issue a "license or permit" for any activity "affecting land or water uses in the coastal zone" without ascertaining that the activity is consistent with the state program or otherwise in the national interest. 17 Each affected State with an approved management program must concur in the issuance of the license or permit; a State's refusal to do so may be overridden only if the Secretary of Commerce finds that the proposed activity is consistent with CZMA's objectives or otherwise in the interest of national security. Significantly, 307(c)(3) contained no mention of consistency requirements in connection with the sale of a lease. </s> In 1976, Congress expressly addressed - and preserved - that omission. Specific House and Senate Committee proposals to add the word "lease" to 307(c)(3) were rejected by the House and ultimately by the Congress as a whole. 18 It is [464 U.S. 312, 335] surely not for us to add to the statute what Congress twice decided to omit. </s> Instead of inserting the word "lease" in 307(c)(3), the House-Senate Conference Committee renumbered the existing 307(c)(3) as 307(c)(3)(A), and added a second subparagraph, 307(c)(3)(B). Respondents apparently concede that of these two subparagraphs, only the latter is now relevant to oil and gas activities on the OCS. Brief for Respondent State of California et al. 44, and n. 76; Brief for Respondent Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al. 7, n. 6. The new subparagraph 307(c)(3)(B), however, provides only that applicants for federal licenses or permits to explore for, produce, or develop oil or gas on the OCS must first certify consistency with affected state plans. 19 Again, there is no suggestion that a lease sale by Interior requires any review of consistency with state management plans. </s> B </s> If the distinction between a sale of a "lease" and the issuance of a permit to "explore for," "produce," or "develop" oil [464 U.S. 312, 336] or gas seems excessively fine, it is a distinction that Congress has codified with great care. CZMA 307(c)(3)(B) expressly refers to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, 67 Stat. 462, as amended, 43 U.S.C. 1331 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. V) (OCSLA), so it is appropriate to turn to that Act for a clarification of the differences between a lease sale and the approval of a plan for "exploration," "development," or "production." </s> OCSLA was enacted in 1953 to authorize federal leasing of the OCS for oil and gas development. The Act was amended in 1978 to provide for the "expeditious and orderly development, subject to environmental safeguards," of resources on the OCS. 43 U.S.C. 1332(3) (1976 ed., Supp. V). As amended, OCSLA confirms that at least since 1978 the sale of a lease has been a distinct stage of the OCS administrative process, carefully separated from the issuance of a federal license or permit to explore for, develop, or produce gas or oil on the OCS. </s> Before 1978, OCSLA did not define the terms "exploration," "development," or "production." But it did define a "mineral lease" to be "any form of authorization for the exploration for, or development or removal of deposits of, oil, gas, or other minerals." 43 U.S.C. 1331(c). The pre-1978 OCSLA did not specify what, if any, rights to explore, develop, or produce were transferred to the purchaser of a lease; the Act simply stated that a lease should "contain such rental provisions and such other terms and provisions as the Secretary may prescribe at the time of offering the area for lease." 43 U.S.C. 1337(b)(4). Thus before 1978 the sale by Interior of an OCS lease might well have engaged CZMA 307(c)(3)(B) by including express or implied federal approval of a "plan for the exploration or development of, or production from" the leased tract. 20 </s> [464 U.S. 312, 337] </s> The leases in dispute here, however, were sold in 1981. By then it was quite clear that a lease sale by Interior did not involve the submission or approval of "any plan for the exploration or development of, or production from" the leased tract. Under the amended OCSLA, the purchase of a lease entitles the purchaser only to priority over other interested parties in submitting for federal approval a plan for exploration, production, or development. Actual submission and approval or disapproval of such plans occur separately and later. </s> Since 1978 there have been four distinct statutory stages to developing an offshore oil well: (1) formulation of a 5-year leasing plan by the Department of the Interior; (2) lease sales; (3) exploration by the lessees; (4) development and production. Each stage involves separate regulatory review that may, but need not, conclude in the transfer to lease purchasers of rights to conduct additional activities on the OCS. And each stage includes specific requirements for consultation with Congress, between federal agencies, or with the States. Formal review of consistency with state coastal management plans is expressly reserved for the last two stages. </s> (1) Preparation of a leasing program. The first stage of OCS planning is the creation of a leasing program. Interior is required to prepare a 5-year schedule of proposed OCS lease sales. 43 U.S.C. 1344 (1976 ed., Supp. V). During the preparation of that program Interior must solicit comments from interested federal agencies and the Governors of affected States, and must respond in writing to all comments [464 U.S. 312, 338] or requests received from the State Governors. 43 U.S.C. 1344(c) (1976 ed., Supp. V). The proposed leasing program is then submitted to the President and Congress, together with comments received by the Secretary from the Governor of the affected State. 43 U.S.C. 1344(d)(2) (1976 ed., Supp. V). </s> Plainly, prospective lease purchasers acquire no rights to explore, produce, or develop at this first stage of OCSLA planning, and consistency review provisions of CZMA 307(c)(3)(B) are therefore not engaged. There is also no suggestion that CZMA 307(c)(1) consistency requirements operate here, though we note that preparation and submission to Congress of the leasing program could readily be characterized as "initiat[ing] a [s]eries of [e]vents of [c]oastal [m]anagement [c]onsequence." Brief for Respondent State of California et al. 10. </s> (2) Lease sales. The second stage of OCS planning - the stage in dispute here - involves the solicitation of bids and the issuance of offshore leases. 43 U.S.C. 1337(a) (1976 ed., Supp. V). Requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act and the Endangered Species Act must be met first. The Governor of any affected State is given a formal opportunity to submit recommendations regarding the "size, timing, or location" of a proposed lease sale. 43 U.S.C. 1345(a) (1976 ed., Supp. V). Interior is required to accept these recommendations if it determines they strike a reasonable balance between the national interest and the well-being of the citizens of the affected State. 43 U.S.C. 1345 (c) (1976 ed., Supp. V). Local governments are also permitted to submit recommendations, and the Secretary "may" accept these. 43 U.S.C. 1345(a), (c) (1976 ed., Supp. V). The Secretary may then proceed with the actual lease sale. Lease purchasers acquire the right to conduct only limited "preliminary" activities on the OCS - geophysical and other surveys that do not involve seabed penetrations [464 U.S. 312, 339] greater than 300 feet and that do not result in any significant environmental impacts. 30 CFR 250.34-1 (1982). </s> Again, there is no suggestion that these activities in themselves "directly affect" the coastal zone. But by purchasing a lease, lessees acquire no right to do anything more. Under the plain language of OCSLA, the purchase of a lease entails no right to proceed with full exploration, development, or production that might trigger CZMA 307(c)(3)(B); the lessee acquires only a priority in submitting plans to conduct those activities. If these plans, when ultimately submitted, are disapproved, no further exploration or development is permitted. </s> (3) Exploration. The third stage of OCS planning involves review of more extensive exploration plans submitted to Interior by lessees. 43 U.S.C. 1340 (1976 ed., Supp. V). Exploration may not proceed until an exploration plan has been approved. A lessee's plan must include a certification that the proposed activities comply with any applicable state management program developed under CZMA. OCSLA expressly provides for federal disapproval of a plan that is not consistent with an applicable state management plan unless the Secretary of Commerce finds that the plan is consistent with CZMA goals or in the interest of national security. 43 U.S.C. 1340(c)(2) (1976 ed., Supp. V). The plan must also be disapproved if it would "probably cause serious harm or damage . . . to the marine, coastal, or human environment . . . ." 43 U.S.C. 1334(a)(2)(A)(i), 1340(c)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. V). If a plan is disapproved for the latter reason, the Secretary may "cancel such lease and the lessee shall be entitled to compensation . . . ." 43 U.S.C. 1340(c)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. V). </s> There is, of course, no question that CZMA consistency review requirements operate here. CZMA 307(c)(3)(B) expressly applies, and as noted, OCSLA itself refers to the applicable CZMA provision. [464 U.S. 312, 340] </s> (4) Development and production. The fourth and final stage is development and production. 43 U.S.C. 1351 (1976 ed., Supp. V). The lessee must submit another plan to Interior. The Secretary must forward the plan to the Governor of any affected State and, on request, to the local governments of affected States, for comment and review. 43 U.S.C. 1345(a), 1351(a)(3) (1976 ed., Supp. V). Again, the Governor's recommendations must be accepted, and the local governments' may be accepted, if they strike a reasonable balance between local and national interests. Reasons for accepting or rejecting a Governor's recommendations must be communicated in writing to the Governor. 43 U.S.C. 1345(c) (1976 ed., Supp. V). In addition, the development and production plan must be consistent with the applicable state coastal management program. The State can veto the plan as "inconsistent," and the veto can be overridden only by the Secretary of Commerce. 43 U.S.C. 1351(d) (1976 ed., Supp. V). A plan may also be disapproved if it would "probably cause serious harm or damage . . . to the marine, coastal or human environments." 43 U.S.C. 1351(h)(1)(D)(i) (1976 ed., Supp. V). If a plan is disapproved for the latter reason, the lease may again be canceled and the lessee is entitled to compensation. 43 U.S.C. 1351(h)(2)(C) (1976 ed., Supp. V). </s> Once again, the applicability of CZMA to this fourth stage of OCS planning is not in doubt. CZMA 307(c)(3)(B) applies by its own terms, and is also expressly invoked by OCSLA. </s> Congress has thus taken pains to separate the various federal decisions involved in formulating a leasing program, conducting lease sales, authorizing exploration, and allowing development and production. Since 1978, the purchase of an OCS lease, standing alone, entails no right to explore for, develop, or produce oil and gas resources on the OCS. The first two stages are not subject to consistency review; instead, [464 U.S. 312, 341] input from State Governors and local governments is solicited by the Secretary of the Interior. The last two stages invite further input for Governors or local governments, but also require formal consistency review. States with approved CZMA plans retain considerable authority to veto inconsistent exploration or development and production plans put forward in those latter stages. 21 The stated reason for this four-part division was to forestall premature litigation regarding adverse environmental effects that all agree will flow, if at all, only from the latter stages of OCS exploration and production. 22 </s> [464 U.S. 312, 342] </s> C </s> Having examined the coordinated provisions of CZMA 307(c)(3) and OCSLA we return to CZMA 307(c)(1). </s> As we have noted, the logical paragraph to examine in connection with a lease sale is not 307(c)(1), but 307(c)(3). Nevertheless, even if OCS lease sales are viewed as involving an OCS activity "conduct[ed]" or "support[ed]" by a federal agency, lease sales can no longer aptly be characterized as "directly affecting" the coastal zone. Since 1978 the sale of a lease grants the lessee the right to conduct only very limited, "preliminary activities" on the OCS. It does not authorize full-scale exploration, development, or production. Those activities may not begin until separate federal approval has been obtained, and approval may be denied on several grounds. If approval is denied, the lease may then be canceled, with or without the payment of compensation to the lessee. In these circumstances, the possible effects on the coastal zone that may eventually result from the sale of a lease cannot be termed "direct." </s> It is argued, nonetheless, that a lease sale is a crucial step. Large sums of money change hands, and the sale may therefore generate momentum that makes eventual exploration, development, and production inevitable. On the other side, it is argued that consistency review at the lease sale stage is at best inefficient, and at worst impossible: Leases are sold before it is certain if, where, or how exploration will actually occur. </s> The choice between these two policy arguments is not ours to make; it has already been made by Congress. In the 1978 OCSLA amendments Congress decided that the better course is to postpone consistency review until the two later [464 U.S. 312, 343] stages of OCS planning, and to rely on less formal input from State Governors and local governments in the two earlier ones. It is not for us to negate the lengthy, detailed, and coordinated provisions of CZMA 307(c)(3)(B), and OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. 1344-1346 and 1351 (1976 ed., Supp. V), by a superficially plausible but ultimately unsupportable construction of two words in CZMA 307(c)(1). </s> V </s> Collaboration among state and federal agencies is certainly preferable to confrontation in or out of the courts. In view of the substantial consistency requirements imposed at the exploration, development, and production stages of OCS planning, Interior, as well as private bidders on OCS leases, might be well advised to ensure in advance that anticipated OCS operations can be conducted harmoniously with state coastal management programs. 23 But our review of the history of CZMA 307(c)(1), and the coordinated structures of the amended CZMA and OCSLA, persuade us that Congress did not intend 307(c)(1) to mandate consistency review at the lease sale stage. </s> Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed insofar as it requires petitioners to conduct consistency review pursuant to CZMA 307(c)(1) before proceeding with Lease Sale No. 53. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Four of the objectionable tracts were combined as two for sale purposes, so the Commission's conclusion was actually directed to 29 sale tracts. California v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359, 1367 (CD Cal. 1981). </s> [Footnote 2 Again, the objection encompassed only 32 sale tracts. Ibid. </s> [Footnote 3 The litigation was instituted through separate but similar complaints filed by the State of California and by the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, Friends of the Sea Otter, and the Environmental Coalition on Lease Sale No. 53. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Interior and two other officials within the Department of the Interior. The Department itself, and the Bureau of Land Management, were also named as defendants. Western Oil and Gas Association, a regional trade association, and 12 of its members, intervened as defendants. Subsequently, various local governmental entities within California intervened as plaintiffs in the case commenced by the State. </s> Petitioner-defendants (hereafter petitioners) state their disagreement with the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's holding that environmental groups and local governments have standing to sue under CZMA 307(c)(1), but do not challenge that standing decision here. Since the State of California clearly does have standing, we need not address the standing of the other respondents, whose position here is identical to the State's. </s> [Footnote 4 Respondents claimed below that petitioners had also violated four other federal statutes. The District Court ruled for the defendants on those four claims, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment on the non-CZMA claims that were appealed. Those claims are not presented here. </s> [Footnote 5 The Court of Appeals went on to rule that the Federal Government, not the State, makes the final determination as to whether a federal activity is consistent "to the maximum extent practicable" with the state management program. In view of our conclusion that a lease sale is not subject to 307(c)(1)'s consistency review requirements, we need not decide who holds final authority to determine when sufficient consistency has been achieved. </s> [Footnote 6 The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in the Department of Commerce is the federal agency charged with administering CZMA. See 16 U.S.C. 1463 (1982 ed). Under normal circumstances NOAA's understanding of the meaning of CZMA 307(c)(1) would be entitled to deference by the courts. But in construing 307(c)(1) the agency has walked a path of such tortured vacillation and indecision that no help is to be gained in that quarter. </s> In 1977, NOAA expressly declined to take a position on the applicability of 307(c)(1) to the leasing process. See 42 Fed. Reg. 43591-43592 (1977). In 1978, NOAA issued regulations purporting to clarify 307(c)(1), but the agency expressly acknowledged that the applicability of the section to lease sales was "still under consideration." 43 Fed. Reg. 10512 (1978). Interior nevertheless objected to the new verbal formulation of "directly affecting" that NOAA had proposed, and the interdepartmental dispute was submitted to the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). OLC rejected crucial portions of NOAA's regulations as inconsistent with the statutory language, and those portions were withdrawn by NOAA. App. 45-46; 44 Fed. Reg. 37142 (1979). In 1980 NOAA noted its view that OCS sales trigger consistency review requirements in a letter from NOAA to State Coastal Management Program Directors (Apr. 9, 1980). NOAA later renewed its attempt to arrive at a general definition of "directly affecting." Two weeks after the instant litigation commenced, NOAA took the position that lease sales do not directly affect the coastal zone. 46 Fed. Reg. 26660 (1981). But shortly after the [464 U.S. 312, 321] regulation was published in final form, id., at 35253, the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries exercised a "legislative veto," see 16 U.S.C. 1463a (1982 ed.), and the agency withdrew its regulation. 47 Fed. Reg. 4231 (1982). </s> [Footnote 7 This formulation finds support in 1980 House and Senate Reports. H. R. Rep. No. 96-1012, p. 34; S. Rep. No. 96-783, p. 11. For reasons explained in n. 15, infra, we do not believe these Committee views, articulated many years after CZMA's passage, are reliable guides to the intent of the full Congress acting in 1972. </s> [Footnote 8 As discussed infra, at 331-341, other sections of CZMA, as well as related provisions in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, have been significantly amended since 1972. But 307(c)(1) has not been changed since its enactment. Our decision must therefore turn principally on the language of 307(c)(1) and the legislative history of the original, 1972 CZMA. </s> [Footnote 9 S. 3507, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 304(a) (1972), reprinted at 118 Cong. Rec. 14188 (1972). The Senate's definition is now codified (with subsequent minor amendments) in 16 U.S.C. 1453(1) (1982 ed.). </s> There was language in an earlier Senate Report (not the final CZMA Senate Report) urging that federal activities determined to have a "functional interrelationship" with the coastal zone "should" be administered consistently with approved state management programs. S. Rep. No. 92-526, pp. 20, 30 (1971). Nine years later a House Report reiterated the "functional interrelationship" standard. H. R. Rep. No. 96-1012, p. 34 (1980). But the Senate Report's language was purely precatory. It used "should," rather than the "shall" that actually appears in 307(c)(1), and more importantly, was written in connection with a Senate bill that would have entirely exempted activities on all federal lands from 307(c)(1)'s mandate. It is fanciful to suggest that an early Senate Report should be read as endorsing an expansive interpretation of 307(c)(1)'s "directly affecting" language when the Senate bill that the Report accompanied did not include the relevant phrase and indisputably did not reach OCS lease sales. </s> [Footnote 10 On the other hand, in comments on the floor made before the House acted on the post-Conference bill, Congressman Mosher stated: "The final [464 U.S. 312, 324] version in no way affects the jurisdictional responsibilities of . . . the Department of the Interior in regard to the administration of Federal lands, since the conferees have specifically eliminated those land areas from the definition of coastal zone." 118 Cong. Rec. 35548 (1972). </s> [Footnote 11 See, e. g., id., at 14180 ("This bill covers the territorial seas; it does not cover the Outer Continental Shelf") (remark of Sen. Stevens); id., at 14184 (facilities in the "contiguous zone" "would be outside the jurisdiction of the neighboring States") (remark of Sen. Boggs); ibid. ("this bill attempts to deal with the Territorial Sea, not the Outer Continental Shelf") (remark of Sen. Moss); id., at 14185 ("we wanted to make certain that Federal jurisdiction was unimpaired beyond the 3-mile limit in the territorial sea") (remark of Sen. Hollings); ibid. ("this bill focuses on the territorial sea or the area that is within State jurisdiction, and preserves the Federal [464 U.S. 312, 325] jurisdiction beyond, which is not to be considered or disturbed by the bill at this time") (remark of Sen. Moss); id., at 26479 ("the measure does not diminish Federal or State jurisdiction, responsibility, or rights under other programs and does not supersede, modify, or repeal existing Federal law") (remark of Cong. Mosher); id., at 26484 ("the Federal Government has jurisdiction outside the State area, from 3 miles to 12 miles at sea") (remark of Cong. Anderson); id., at 35548 ("The final version [of CZMA] in no way affects the jurisdictional responsibilities of . . . the Department of Interior in regard to the administration of Federal lands, since the conferees have specifically eliminated those land areas from the definition of coastal zone") (remark of Cong. Mosher); id., at 35550 ("the Federal Government has jurisdiction outside the State area, from 3 to 12 miles at sea") (remark of Cong. Anderson). </s> [Footnote 12 Congressman Anderson repeated these remarks when he opposed an amendment that would have weakened House 312, id., at 26495, and again when he expressed his concern over the removal of House 312 by the Senate-House Conference, id., at 35550. </s> [Footnote 13 The section provided: </s> "(b) When an estuarine sanctuary is established by a coastal state . . . the Secretary, at the request of the state concerned, . . . may extend the established estuarine sanctuary seaward beyond the coastal zone, to the extent necessary to effectuate the purposes for which the estuarine sanctuary was established. </s> "(c) The Secretary shall . . . assure that the development and operation [of the sanctuary extension] is coordinated with the development and operation of the estuarine sanctuary of which it forms an extension." H. R. 14146, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 312(b), (c) (1972), reprinted in H. R. Rep. No. 92-1049, p. 7 (1972). </s> [Footnote 14 An amendment to CZMA proposed by Senator Boggs on the Senate floor would have given respondents all that they are asking for here. The amendment stated: </s> "Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, no Federal department or agency shall construct, or license, or lease, or approve in any way the construction of any facility of any kind beyond the territorial sea off the coast of the United States until (1) such department or agency has filed with the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, a complete report with respect to the proposed facility; (2) the Administrator has forwarded such report to the Governor of each adjacent coastal State which might be adversely affected by pollution from such facility; and (3) each such Governor has filed an approval of such proposal with the Administrator. . . ." 118 Cong. Rec. 14183 (1972). </s> In proposing the amendment Senator Boggs explained his concern with offshore oil transfer terminals located at sites outside the 3-mile territorial limit. </s> "Such sites, of course, would place these facilities in the contiguous zone, or in international waters on the Continental Shelf. If that were so, of course, the facility would be outside the jurisdiction of the neighboring States. </s> "Yet, the coastal zones of these neighboring States could be severely and adversely affected by pollution that might come from such an offshore facility. </s> ". . . I believe it is important that the affected States play a meaningful role in the plan to construct such a facility." Id., at 14184. </s> But other Senators immediately attacked Senator Boggs' amendment. Senator Hollings stated: </s> "The amendment . . . goes beyond the territorial sea and goes into what we agreed on and compromised on awhile ago. It goes beyond any territorial sea to construction of any facility on the ocean floor, into what we call a contiguous zone from the 3-mile limit to the 12-mile limit. </s> "This amendment provides the Governor would have a veto over such matters. I do not think the Senate wants to go that far." Ibid. </s> Senator Moss agreed: "[T]his bill attempts to deal with the Territorial Sea, not the Outer Continental Shelf." Ibid. In response, Senator Boggs conceded that the problem should be addressed in other legislation, and he withdrew the proposed amendment. Ibid. </s> In addition, 316(c)(1) of the Senate bill as amended on the floor of the Senate called on the National Academy of Sciences "to undertake a full [464 U.S. 312, 330] investigation of the environmental hazards attendant on offshore drilling on the Atlantic Outer Continental Shelf." S. 3507, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 316(c)(1) (1972), reprinted in 118 Cong. Rec. 14191 (1972). In the Senate debate several Senators voiced their opposition even to this modest venture outside the coastal zone. Senator Stevens, for example, argued that the provision was inappropriate because the OCS "is not even covered by this bill. This bill covers the territorial seas; it does not cover the Outer Continental Shelf." Id., at 14180. Senator Moss added: "[S]ince the State coastal zone management programs relate only to the territorial sea, we should, therefore, be very careful of a study which extends beyond the territorial sea to encompass the Continental Shelf." Id., at 14181. Again, the Conference Committee agreed; it deleted Senate 316(c) without comment in the Conference Report. On the floor of the House Congressman Downing explained that the provision had been deleted "as nongermane." Id., at 35547. </s> [Footnote 15 Respondents rely heavily on four statements that appear in Committee Reports issued years after CZMA was enacted. </s> (1) A 1975 Senate Report stated: "The Committee's intent when the 1972 Act was passed was for the consistency clause to apply to Federal [464 U.S. 312, 331] leases for offshore oil and gas development, since such leases were viewed by the Committee to be within the phrase `licenses or permits' [in 307(c)(3)]. [The Report then discusses the proposed amendment that would insert `lease' into 307(c)(3).] In practical terms, this [amendment] means that the Secretary of the Interior would need to seek the certification of consistency from adjacent State governors before entering into a binding lease agreement with private oil companies." S. Rep. No. 94-277, pp. 19-20 (1975). </s> (2) One footnote in a 323-page House Report that accompanied the 1978 amendments to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 stated: </s> "The committee is aware that under the [CZMA] certain OCS activities including lease sales and approval of development and production plans must comply with `consistency' requirements as to coastal zone management plans approved by the Secretary of Commerce. Except for specific changes made by Titles IV and V of the 1977 Amendments, nothing in this Act is intended to amend, modify or repeal any provision of [CZMA]. Specifically, nothing is intended to alter procedures under that Act for consistency once a State has an approved Coastal Zone Management Plan." H. R. Rep. No. 95-590, p. 153, n. 52 (1977). </s> (3) A 1980 House Report stated that the 1976 CZMA 307 amendments "did not alter Federal agency responsibility to provide States with a consistency determination related to OCS decisions which preceded issuance of leases." H. R. Rep. No. 96-1012, p. 28. </s> (4) A 1980 Senate Report stated that under CZMA, "[t]he Department of the Interior's activities which preced[e] lease sales . . . remain subject to the requirements of section 307(c)(1). As a result, intergovernmental coordination for purposes of OCS development commences at the earliest practicable time in the opinion of the Committee, as the Department of the Interior sets in motion a series of events which have consequences in the coastal zone." S. Rep. No. 96-783, p. 11. </s> In our view, these subsequent Committee interpretations of CZMA, written three or more years after CZMA was passed, are of little help in ascertaining the intent of Congress when CZMA 307(c)(1) was passed in 1972. We note that the most relevant and unambiguous statement of the House Committee's views appeared in House 312 and 313 as originally reported out of Committee and passed by the House. But those sections [464 U.S. 312, 332] were emphatically rejected by the full Congress when CZMA was enacted in 1972, see supra, at 324-329, and Committee-proposed amendments that would have had a similar effect were rejected when the Act was amended in 1976, see infra, at 334-335, and n. 18. Likewise, by 1976 the Senate Committee had taken a position favoring the extension of consistency review requirements to lease sales, see ibid., but that position too was subsequently rejected by the full Congress, see n. 18, infra. Legislative Committees' desires to reaffirm positions they have taken that were rejected by the full Congress are understandable enough, but of little help in construing the intent behind the law actually enacted. </s> [Footnote 16 Both the original 307(c)(3) and the amended 307(c)(3)(B), see infra, at 335, and n. 19, expressly address and constrain the actions of federal agencies. "No license or permit shall be granted by the Federal agency until the state . . . has concurred with the applicant's [consistency] certification . . . ." 16 U.S.C. 1456(c)(3) (1982 ed.). "No Federal official or agency shall grant such person any license or permit for any activity . . . until [the affected] state . . . receives a copy of [the applicant's certification of consistency and concurs in the certification or is overridden by the Secretary of Commerce]." 16 U.S.C. 1456(c) (3)(B) (1982 ed.). Moreover, in the 1976 CZMA amendment debates Members of Congress uniformly viewed 307(c)(3) as directly concerned with the consistency obligations of federal agencies. When Congress considered adding the word "lease" to 307(c)(3), the shared assumption was that consistency requirements in 307(c)(3) were functionally identical to those of 307(c)(1). One Senator was of the view that the proposed amendment would "mak[e] it clear that Outer Continental Shelf leasing is a Federal activity subject to the Federal consistency provision . . . ." 121 Cong. Rec. 23075 (1975). Another commented that the addition to 307(c)(3) would establish that "Federal agencies must conduct their activities consistent with" applicable state management programs. Id., at 23084. The Senate Report stated that the proposed 307(c)(3) amendment, "[i]n practical terms, . . . means that the Secretary of the Interior would need to seek the certification of consistency from adjacent State governors before entering into a binding lease agreement with private oil companies." S. Rep. No. 94-277, p. 20 (1975). And the House Report stated that the amendment would establish that "the OCS leasing process is indeed a federal action that undoubtedly has the potential for affecting a state's coastal zone and, hence, must conform with approved state coastal management programs." H. R. Rep. No. 94-878, p. 37 (1976); see also id., at 52-53. </s> [Footnote 17 "[A]ny applicant for a required Federal license or permit to conduct an activity affecting land or water uses in the coastal zone . . . shall provide in the application to the licensing or permitting agency a certification that the proposed activity . . . will be conducted in a manner consistent with [the approved state management] program. . . . At the earliest practicable time, the state . . . shall notify the Federal agency concerned that the state concurs with or objects to the applicant's certification. . . . No license or permit shall be granted by the Federal agency until the state . . . has concurred with the applicant's certification . . . unless the Secretary . . . finds . . . that the activity is consistent with the objectives of [CZMA] or is otherwise necessary in the interest of national security." 16 U.S.C. 1456(c) (3) (1982 ed.). </s> [Footnote 18 The bills reported out of House and Senate Committees would have inserted the word "lease" in 307(c)(3). See H. R. Rep. No. 94-878, pp. 52-53 (1976); S. Rep. No. 94-277, pp. 19-20 (1975). The proposal passed the Senate but was removed on the floor of the House. 122 Cong. Rec. 6128 (1976). </s> The Conference Committee decided not to introduce "lease" into 307(c) (3). Instead, the Committee created the new 307(c)(3)(B). The Conference Report explained: </s> "The conference substitute follows the Senate bill in amending the Federal consistency requirement [of] section 307(c)(3) . . . . The Senate bill required that each Federal lease (for example, offshore oil and gas leases) had to be submitted to each state with an approved coastal zone [464 U.S. 312, 335] management program for a determination by that state as to whether or not the lease was consistent with its program. The conference substitute further elaborates on this provision and specifically applies the consistency requirement to the basic steps in the OCS leasing process - namely, the exploration, development and production plans submitted to the Secretary of the Interior. This provision will satisfy the state needs for complete information, on a timely basis, about the details of the oil industry's offshore plans." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 94-1298, p. 30 (1976). </s> [Footnote 19 "[A]ny person who submits to the Secretary of the Interior any plan for the exploration or development of, or production from, any area which has been leased under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act . . . shall, with respect to any exploration, development, or production described in such plan and affecting any land use or water use in the coastal zone . . . [certify] that each activity . . . complies with [the] state's approved management program . . . . No Federal official or agency shall grant such person any license or permit for any activity . . . until [the state concurs or] . . . the Secretary finds . . . that each activity . . . is consistent with the objectives of [CZMA] or is otherwise necessary in the interest of national security." 16 U.S.C. 1456(c)(3)(B) (1982 ed.). </s> [Footnote 20 As discussed infra, at 339, 11 of the OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. 1340 (1976 ed., Supp. V), as amended in 1978, added a requirement for the submission and separate approval of an exploration plan following the [464 U.S. 312, 337] purchase of a lease. However, that section made the requirements prospective only, to come into force 90 days after September 18, 1978. 43 U.S.C. 1340(b) (1976 ed., Supp. V). Similarly, the 1978 OCSLA amendments required oil or gas leases to provide that development and production be conducted only in accordance with a subsequently submitted and approved plan, but extended this requirement only to leases issued after September 18, 1978. 43 U.S.C. 1351(b) (1976 ed., Supp. V). </s> [Footnote 21 OCSLA contains a saving clause that provides: "Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall be construed to amend, modify, or repeal any provision of [CZMA]." 43 U.S.C. 1866(a) (1976 ed., Supp. V). Our analysis of CZMA 307(c)(1) is entirely consistent with this clause. A narrow construction of "directly affecting" is compelled by CZMA's legislative history, standing alone. It is reinforced by CZMA 307(c)(3), which expressly addresses the consistency review requirements to be imposed on OCS oil and gas programs. Section 307(c)(3) provides for consistency review prior to exploration, development, and production, not prior to lease sales. CZMA itself invokes OCSLA, so it is appropriate to look to that Act for the distinction between lease sales on the one hand, and exploration, development, and production permits on the other. OCSLA confirms that a lease sale is a separate, distinct stage of OCS planning, not to be confused with exploration, development, or production. The 1978 OCSLA amendments are relevant not because they change any part of CZMA, but because they change, or at least substantially clarify, the rights transferred by Interior when a lease is sold. </s> [Footnote 22 The House Report accompanying the 1978 OCSLA amendments explained: </s> "[The consistency review provision imposed at the production stage] is intended to provide the mechanism for review and evaluation of, and decision on, development and production in a leased area, after consultation and coordination with all affected parties. </s> "The committee considers this one of the most important provisions of the 1977 amendments. It provides a means to separate the Federal decision to allow private industry to explore for oil and gas from the Federal decision to allow development and production to proceed if the lessee finds [464 U.S. 312, 342] oil and gas. The failure to have such a mechanism in the past has led to extensive litigation prior to lease sales, when onshore and environmental impacts of production activity are not yet known." H. R. Rep. No. 95-590, p. 164 (1977). </s> [Footnote 23 In his comments regarding the House's 1976 refusal to add the word "lease" to CZMA 307(c)(3), Congressman Murphy noted that "even if an organization had a lease it could not do much with it because the licenses and permits are required to deal with the development of oil on the Continental Shelf." 122 Cong. Rec. 6128 (1976). </s> The California Coastal Commission is also well aware of its power to demand consistency at later stages in OCS planning. In voicing its objections to the sale of the 31 disputed tracts the Commission warned: "Any attempt to explore or develop these tracts will face the strong possibility of an objection to a consistency certification of the Plan of Exploration or Development by the Commission." App. 79. [464 U.S. 312, 344] </s> JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE MARSHALL, and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting. </s> In these cases, the State of California is attempting to enforce a federal statutory right. Its coastal zone management program was approved by the Federal Government pursuant to a statute enacted in 1972. In 307(c)(1) of that statute, the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), the Federal Government made a promise to California: </s> "Each Federal agency conducting or supporting activities directly affecting the coastal zone shall conduct or support those activities in a manner which is, to the maximum extent practicable, consistent with approved state management programs." 86 Stat. 1285, 16 U.S.C. 1456(c) (1) (1982 ed.). </s> The question in these cases is whether the Secretary of the Interior was conducting an activity directly affecting the California Coastal Zone when he sold oil and gas leases in the Pacific Ocean area immediately adjacent to that zone. One would think that this question could be easily answered simply by reference to a question of fact - does this sale of leases directly affect the coastal zone? The District Court made a finding that it did, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, and which is not disturbed by the Court. Based on a straightforward reading of the statute, one would think that that would be the end of the cases. </s> The Court reaches a contrary conclusion, however, based on either or both of these two theories: (1) 307(c)(1) only applies to federal activities that take place within the coastal zone itself or in a federal enclave within the zone - it is wholly inapplicable to federal activities on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) no matter how seriously they may affect the coastal zone; (2) even if the sale of oil leases by the Secretary of the Interior would have been covered by 307(c)(1) when the CZMA was enacted in 1972, amendments to an entirely [464 U.S. 312, 345] different statute adopted in 1978 mean that the leases cannot directly affect the coastal zone notwithstanding the fact that those amendments merely imposed additional obligations on private lessees and did not purport to cut back on any obligation previously imposed on federal agencies. </s> The Court's first theory is refuted by the plain language of the 1972 Act, its legislative history, the basic purpose of the Act, and the findings of the District Court. The Court's second theory, which looks at post-1972 legislative developments, is simply overwhelmed by a series of unambiguous legislative pronouncements that consistently belie the Court's interpretation of the intent of Congress. </s> I </s> Because there is so much material refuting the Court's reading of the 1972 Act, an index of what is to follow may be useful. I shall first note that the plain language of 307(c)(1) draws no distinction between activities that take place outside the coastal zone and those that occur within the zone; it is the effect of the activities rather than their location that is relevant. I shall then review the legislative history which demonstrates that the words "directly affecting" were included in the section to make sure that the statute covered activities occurring outside the coastal zone if they are the functional equivalent of activities occurring within the zone. I shall then identify some of the statutory provisions indicating that Congress intended to require long-range, advance planning. I shall conclude Part I with a description of the findings that bring these cases squarely within the congressional purpose. </s> Plain Language </s> In statutory construction cases, the Court generally begins its analysis by noting that "[t]he starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself." E. g., Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265 (1981). Not much [464 U.S. 312, 346] is said, however, about the plain language of 307(c)(1) in the opinion of the Court, and no wonder. The words "activities directly affecting the coastal zone" make it clear that 307(c)(1) applies to activities that take place outside the zone itself as well as to activities conducted within the zone. There are federal enclaves inside the boundaries of the coastal zone that, as a matter of statutory definition, are excluded from the zone itself. 1 Moreover, the ocean areas on the OCS that are adjacent to, and seaward of, the coastal zone are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Government. 2 Quite plainly, the federal activities that may directly affect the coastal zone can be conducted in the zone itself, in a federal enclave, or in an adjacent federal area. The plain meaning of the words thus indicates that the words "directly affecting" were intended to enlarge the coverage of 307(c)(1) to encompass activities conducted outside as well as inside the zone. In light of this language it is hard to see how the Court can hold, as it does, that federal activities in the OCS can never fall within the statute because they are outside the outer boundaries of the coastal zone. [464 U.S. 312, 347] </s> Legislative History </s> The plain meaning of the Act is confirmed by its legislative history. Both the House and the Senate versions of the CZMA originally applied only to federal agencies conducting "activities in the coastal zone." 3 At the same time, Congress clearly recognized that the most fundamental purpose of the CZMA was "to preserve, protect, develop, and where possible, to restore or enhance, the resources of the Nation's coastal zone for this and succeeding generations." 86 Stat. 1281, 16 U.S.C. 1452(1) (1982 ed.). In writing the versions of the CZMA that went to conference, both Houses stated that their purpose was to prevent adverse effects on the coastal zone. 4 Yet it plainly would have been impossible to achieve this purpose without considering activities outside of the zone which nevertheless could have a devastating impact on it - activities such as those that led to the 1969 Santa [464 U.S. 312, 348] Barbara, Cal., oil spill, which occurred in the OCS but which had a devastating impact on the adjacent California coast. 5 When the Conferees adopted the definition of "coastal zone" that excluded federal enclaves, they recognized the need to expand the description of federal activities that should be conducted in a manner that is consistent with an approved state program. The substitution of the words "directly affecting" for the word "in" accomplished this purpose. Thus, if an activity outside the zone has the same kind of effect on the zone as if it had been conducted in the zone, it is covered by 307(c)(1). 6 </s> The Court's position seems to be that since neither the Senate nor House versions covered federal activities outside of the coastal zone, the bill that emerged from the Conference Committee could not have either. See ante, at 322-324. To construe the Conference substitute otherwise would be to find a "surprising, unexplained, and subsequently unnoticed expansion in the scope of 307(c)(1)," ante, at 322. Not only does that construction ignore the "directly affecting" language used by Congress, but it rests on a demonstrably incorrect assumption as to the scope of the earlier versions of the CZMA. [464 U.S. 312, 349] </s> The House version of the CZMA clearly recognized that activities outside the coastal zone could have a critical impact upon the coastal zone, and therefore had to be covered by management plans. It defined the coastal zone to extend inland to areas which could have an impact on it, see H. R. 14146, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 304(a) (1972), reprinted in 118 Cong. Rec. 26501 (1972), in order to enable the CZMA to achieve "its basic underlying purpose, that is the management and the protection of the coastal waters. It would not be possible to accomplish that purpose without to some degree extending the coverage to the shorelands which have an impact on those waters." H. R. Rep. No. 92-1049, p. 14 (1972). The House bill did not extend the zone seaward because it instead required the Secretary of Commerce to develop a management program for activities on the OCS that was consistent with the management program of the adjacent State. H. R. 14146, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 313 (1972), reprinted in 118 Cong. Rec. 26503 (1972); H. R. Rep. No. 92-1049, p. 23 (1972). 7 Section 313 was thus specifically premised on the recognition that federal activities in the OCS, particularly the sale of oil and gas leases, could have a direct impact on the coastal zone. 8 The House further recognized [464 U.S. 312, 350] the need to regulate federal OCS activities to protect the coastal zone in 312 of its bill, which provided for the expansion of coastal zone marine sanctuaries established by state management plans into the OCS, in order to fully protect the coastal zone. 9 The House showed its concern about the impact of federal activities in the OCS on the coastal zone by rejecting an amendment to 312 which would have made it permissive rather than mandatory for the Federal Government to establish sanctuaries in areas adjacent to state sanctuaries, and another amendment that would have deleted 312 altogether. See 118 Cong. Rec. 26495-26496 (1972). [464 U.S. 312, 351] Thus it is plainly evident that the House did wish to protect the integrity of state coastal zone management with respect to federal activities in the OCS. </s> The Senate shared the House's concern that state management plans must apply to federal activities in areas adjacent to the coastal zone. The Senate Report on its version of the CZMA stated that its version was derived from a bill it had reported favorably during the previous year, S. 582. 10 In particular, the 1971 Senate version of the CZMA used exactly the same language in framing the consistency obligation as did the 1972 version. 11 The Report on the 1971 bill construed [464 U.S. 312, 352] this language to extend the consistency obligation to federal activities in waters outside of the coastal zone which functionally interact with the zone: </s> "[A]ny lands or waters under Federal jurisdiction and control, where the administering Federal agency determines them to have a functional interrelationship from an economic, social, or geographic standpoint with lands and waters within the territorial sea, should be administered consistent with approved State management programs except in cases of overriding national interest as determined by the President." S. Rep. No. 92-526, p. 20 (1971). 12 </s> Since the 1972 Senate CZMA used identical language to describe the consistency requirement, and nothing in the 1972 Senate Report indicates that this language should be construed differently than the 1971 language, it follows that the 1972 Senate version placed a consistency obligation upon federal activities in the OCS which affect the coastal zone. </s> Thus, the Court is simply wrong to say that both versions of the CZMA sent to conference displayed no interest in regulating federal activities occurring outside of the exterior boundaries of the coastal zone. The Conferees' adoption of the "directly affecting" language merely clarified the scope [464 U.S. 312, 353] of the consistency obligation. The House surrendered the requirements that the Federal Government develop its own management plan for OCS activities and that federal lands within the coastal zone be included in the zone, but in return ensured that any federal activities "directly affecting" the coastal zone would be subject to the consistency requirement of 307(c)(1). The only explanations of this compromise to be found in the legislative history can be briefly set out. The Conferees wrote: </s> "[A]s to Federal agencies involved in any activities directly affecting the state coastal zone and any Federal participation in development projects in the coastal zone, the Federal agencies must make certain that their activities are to the maximum extent practicable consistent with approved state management programs. In addition, similar consideration of state management programs must be given in the process of issuing Federal licenses or permits for activities affecting State coastal zones. The Conferees also adopted language which would make certain that there is no intent in this legislation to change Federal or state jurisdiction or rights in specified fields, including submerged lands." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1544, p. 14 (1972) (emphasis supplied). </s> Senator Hollings, the floor manager of the CZMA, said when he presented the Conference Report to the Senate: "The bill provides States with national policy goals to control those land uses which have a direct and significant impact upon coastal waters." 118 Cong. Rec. 35459 (1972). That is the entire history of the Conference compromise. There is not the slightest indication that Congress intended to adopt the strange rule which the Court announces today - that OCS leasing cannot be subject to consistency requirements. To the contrary, these statements indicate that any federal activity [464 U.S. 312, 354] is covered as long as it directly affects the coastal zone. The Conferees' reference to federal rights in "submerged lands" further indicates that it recognized that the statute could be applied to the OCS. The inescapable conclusion is that 312 and 313 were deleted precisely because 307(c)(1) had been strengthened so as to protect the coastal zone from federal OCS activities, which obviated the need for these sections. There is no indication whatsoever that the deletion occurred because Congress rejected any application of state management plans to federal activities in the OCS. 13 </s> [464 U.S. 312, 355] </s> In sum, the substitution of the words "directly affecting the coastal zone" for the words "in the coastal zone" plainly effectuated the congressional intent to cover activities outside the zone that are the functional equivalent of activities within the zone, thereby addressing the concern of both Houses that the consistency requirement extend to federal OCS activities. There is simply no evidence that 307(c)(1) was not intended to reach federal OCS activities which directly affect the coastal zone. </s> Purposes of the CZMA </s> An examination of the underlying purposes of the CZMA confirms that the most obvious reading of 307(c)(1), which [464 U.S. 312, 356] would apply its consistency obligation to federal OCS leasing that directly affects the coastal zone, is fully justified. </s> The congressional findings in 302 of the CZMA first identify the "national interest in the effective management, beneficial use, protection, and development of the coastal zone," 86 Stat. 1280, 16 U.S.C. 1451(a) (1982 ed.), and then recite the various conflicting demands on the valuable resources in such zones, including those occasioned by the "extraction of mineral resources and fossil fuels." Congress found that special natural and scenic characteristics are "being damaged by ill-planned development" and that "present state and local institutional arrangements for planning and regulating land and water uses in such areas are inadequate." 1451(g) and (h). Finally, Congress found that the effective protection of resources in the coastal zone required the development of "land and water use programs for the coastal zone, including unified policies, criteria, standards, methods, and processes for dealing with land and water use decisions of more than local significance." 1451(i). The declaration of national policy in 303 of the 1972 CZMA unambiguously exhorted "all Federal agencies engaged in programs affecting the coastal zone to cooperate and participate with state and local governments and regional agencies in effectuating the purposes of this title." 86 Stat. 1281. The policy declaration concluded: </s> "With respect to implementation of such management programs, it is the national policy to encourage cooperation among the various state and regional agencies including establishment of interstate and regional agreements, cooperative procedures, and joint action particularly regarding environmental problems." Ibid. </s> These provisions surely indicate a congressional preference for long-range planning and for close cooperation between federal and state agencies in conducting or supporting activities [464 U.S. 312, 357] that directly affect the coastal zone. 14 Statutes should be construed in a manner consistent with their underlying policies and purposes. E. g., FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 625 , and n. 7 (1982); Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 18 -19 (1981); Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975). By applying the consistency obligation to the first critical step in OCS development, the decision to lease, the statute is construed in a manner consistent with its underlying purpose. </s> The majority's construction of 307(c)(1) is squarely at odds with this purpose. Orderly, long-range, cooperative planning dictates that the consistency requirement must apply to OCS leasing decisions. The sale of OCS leases involves the expenditure of millions of dollars. 15 If exploration and development of the leased tracts cannot be squared with the requirements of the CZMA, it would be in everyone's interest to determine that as early as possible. On the other [464 U.S. 312, 358] hand, if exploration and development of the tracts would be consistent with the state management plan, a preleasing consistency determination would provide assurances to prospective purchasers and hence enhance the value of the tracts to the Federal Government and, concomitantly, the public. Advance planning can only minimize the risk of either loss or inconsistency that may ultimately confront all interested parties. 16 It is directly contrary to the legislative scheme not to make a consistency determination at the earliest possible point. 17 It is especially incongruous since the Court agrees that all federal activity "in" the coastal zone is subject to consistency review. If activity in the OCS directly affects the [464 U.S. 312, 359] zone - if it is in fact the functional equivalent of activity "in" the zone - it is inconceivable that Congress would have wanted it to be treated any differently. </s> The only federal activity that ever occurs with respect to OCS oil and gas development is the decision to lease; all other activities in the process are conducted by lessees and not the Federal Government. If the leasing decision is not subject to consistency requirements, then the intent of Congress to apply consistency review to federal OCS activities would be defeated and this part of the statute rendered nugatory. Such a construction must be rejected. See American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 513 (1981); Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 560 (1963); United States v. Shirey, 359 U.S. 255, 259 -260 (1959); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 622 -623 (1954); Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 392 (1940). 18 </s> [464 U.S. 312, 360] </s> The Direct Effects </s> The lease sales at issue in these cases are in fact the functional equivalent of an activity conducted in the zone. There is no dispute about the fact that the Secretary's selection of lease tracts and lease terms constituted decisions of major importance to the coastal zone. The District Court described some of the effects of those decisions: </s> "For example, a reading of the notice itself reveals some of the many consequences of leasing upon the coastal zone. The `Notice of Oil and Gas Lease Sale No. 53 (Partial Offering)', as published in the Federal Register, announced ten stipulations to be applied to federal lessees. The activities permitted and/or required by the stipulations result in direct effects upon the coastal zone. Stipulation No. 4 sets forth the conditions for operation of boats and aircraft by lessees. Stipulation No. 6 states the conditions under which pipelines will be required; the Department of Interior, as lessor, specifically reserves the right to regulate the placement of `any pipeline used for transporting production to shore'. Lessees must agree, pursuant to stipulation No. 1, to preserve and protect biological resources discovered during the conduct of operations in the area. </s> "The Secretarial Issue Document (`SID'), prepared in October 1980 by the Department of Interior to aid the Secretary in his decision, contains voluminous information indicative of the direct effects of this project on the coastal zone. For instance, the SID contains a table showing the overall probability of an oilspill impacting a point within the sea otter range during the life of the project in the northern portion of the Santa Maria Basin to be 52%. Both the SID and the EIS [Environmental Impact Statement] contain statistics showing the likelihood of oilspills during the life of the leases; based on the unrevised USGS estimates, 1.65 spills are expected during the project conducted in the Santa Maria subarea. [464 U.S. 312, 361] According to the SID, the probability of an oilspill is even higher when the revised USGS figures are utilized. </s> ". . . Both documents refer to impacts upon air and water quality, marine and coastal ecosystems, commercial fisheries, recreation and sportfishing, navigation, cultural resources, and socio-economic factors. For instance, the EIS states that `[n]ormal offshore operations would have unavoidable effects . . . on the quality of the surrounding water'. Pipelaying, drilling, and construction, chronic spills from platforms, and the discharge of treated sewage contribute to the degradation of water quality in the area. As to commercial fisheries, drilling muds and cuttings `could significantly affect fish and invertebrate populations'; the spot prawn fishery in the Santa Maria Basin is particularly vulnerable to this physical disruption. In reference to recreation and sport-fishing, the EIS indicates the possibility of adverse impacts as a result of the competition for land between recreation and OCS-related onshore facilities as a result of the temporary disruption of recreation areas caused by pipeline burial. There are the additional risks of `the degradation of the aesthetic environment conducive to recreation and the damage to recreational sites as a result of an oil spill'. Another impact on the coastal zone will occur as a result of the migration of labor into the area during the early years of oil and gas operations. Impacts on the level of employment and the size of the population in the coastal region are also predicted. </s> "The SID notes that there are artifacts of historic interest as well as aboriginal archaeological sites reported in the area of the Santa Maria tracts. The FWS and NMFS biological opinions, appended to the SID, indicate the likelihood that development and production activities may jeopardize the existence of the southern sea otter and the gray whale. </s> "These effects constitute only a partial list. Further enumeration is unnecessary. The threshold test under [464 U.S. 312, 362] 307(c)(1) would in fact be satisfied by a finding of a single direct effect upon the coastal zone. Although the evidence of direct effects is substantial, such a showing is not required by the CZMA." 520 F. Supp. 1359, 1380-1382 (CD Cal. 1981) (footnotes and citations omitted). </s> The Court of Appeals predicated its conclusion that the lease sale in these cases directly affects the coastal zone on these findings. It wrote: </s> "We agree that the lease sale in this case directly affects the coastal zone. These direct effects of Lease Sale 53 on California's coastal zone are detailed by the district court. We need not repeat them here. It is enough to point out that decisions made at the lease sale stage in this case establish the basic scope and charter for subsequent development and production. Prior to the sale of leases, critical decisions are made as to the size and location of the tracts, the timing of the sale, and the stipulations to which the leases would be subject. These choices determine, or at least influence, whether oil will be transported by pipeline or ship, which areas of the coastal zone will be exposed to danger, the flow of vessel traffic, and the siting of on-shore construction. </s> "Under these circumstances Lease Sale 53 established the first link in a chain of events which could lead to production and development of oil and gas on the individual tracts leased. This is a particularly significant link because at this stage all the tracts can be considered together, taking into account the cumulative effects of the entire lease sale, whereas at the later stages consistency determinations would be made on a tract-by-tract basis under section 307(c)(3)." 683 F.2d 1253, 1260 (CA9 1982) (citations omitted). </s> Neither petitioners nor the Court challenges these findings, which clearly state that the oil and gas lease sale at issue here [464 U.S. 312, 363] will directly affect the coastal zone. Oil and gas exploration and development are the expected and desired results of the leasing decision which respondents seek to have reviewed under 307(c)(1), and their impact on the coastal zone will be undeniably significant. Moreover, the findings indicate some of those impacts will occur almost immediately, prior to review under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), and can never be reviewed adequately if they are not reviewed now. 19 </s> In my judgment these rather sensible appraisals of the probable consequences of the lease sale are entirely consistent with the congressional intent reflected in 307(c)(1). It cannot be denied that in reality OCS oil and gas leasing "directly" looks toward development of the OCS, and the consequences for the coastal zone that the District Court found development would entail. Development is the expected consequence of leasing; if it were not, purchasers would [464 U.S. 312, 364] never commit millions of dollars to the acquisition of leases. Congress views leasing in exactly this way; it has defined the lease acquired by purchasers as a "form of authorization . . . which authorizes exploration for, and development and production of, minerals . . . ." 92 Stat. 632, 43 U.S.C. 1331(c) (1976 ed., Supp. V). As the Court of Appeals observed, leasing sets into motion a chain of events designed and intended to lead to exploration and development. When the intended and most probable consequence of a federal activity is oil and gas production that will dramatically affect the adjacent coastal zone, that activity is one "directly affecting" the coastal zone within the meaning of 307(c)(1). </s> II </s> The Court's holding rests, in part, on selections from legislative developments subsequent to the enactment of the CZMA in 1972. In my view the 1978 amendment to the OCSLA on which the Court relies lends no support to its reading of 307(c)(1) of the CZMA. On the contrary, a fair review of the post-1972 history reveals such a dramatically different congressional understanding of the meaning of its own work product that it merits a rather detailed treatment. I shall comment on this history in chronological order. </s> The 1976 Amendment to CZMA </s> The CZMA was amended in 1976. One of the primary purposes for this legislation was the recognition that OCS leasing has a dramatic impact on the coastal zone. The 1976 legislation created a program of federal financial aid to coastal areas in order to help them deal with the impact of OCS leasing. The amount of money each State received was keyed to the amount of adjacent OCS acreage that had been leased by the Federal Government. 90 Stat. 1019-1028, 16 U.S.C. 1456a (1982 ed.). This provision was added precisely [464 U.S. 312, 365] because Congress recognized that OCS leasing could dramatically affect the adjacent coastal zone, not only environmentally but socially and economically. See S. Rep. No. 94-277, pp. 10-19 (1975); H. R. Rep. No. 94-878, pp. 13, 15-17 (1976); 20 121 Cong. Rec. 23055-23056 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Stevens); id., at 23060 (remarks of Sen. Jackson); id., at 23065 (remarks of Sen. Magnuson); 122 Cong. Rec. 6111-6112 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Sullivan); id., at 6112 (remarks of Rep. Du Pont); id., at 6113 (remarks of Rep. Mosher); id., at 6114 (remarks of Rep. Murphy); id., at 6117 (remarks of Rep. Young); id., at 6119 (remarks of Rep. Lagomarsino); id., at 6120 (remarks of Rep. Hughes); id., at 6121-6122 (remarks of Rep. Drinan). 21 This congressional recognition completely undermines the Court's position that OCS oil and gas leasing can never directly affect the coastal zone. </s> Both the Senate and House versions of the 1976 amendments reported out of committee explicitly applied the consistency requirement of 307 to OCS oil and gas leasing. See S. 586, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 102(12) (1975), reprinted in S. Rep. No. 94-277, p. 59 (1975); 22 H. R. 3981, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 2(15) (1976), reprinted in H. R. Rep. No. 94-878, p. 4 (1976). The significant point here is that at every opportunity, Congress indicated that all it was doing by these provisions [464 U.S. 312, 366] was restating what had been its original intent in the 1972 CZMA. For example, the Senate Report stated: </s> "Section 307 is the portion of the Act which has come to be known as the `Federal consistency' section. It assures that once State coastal zone management programs are approved and a rational management system for protecting, preserving, and developing the State's coastal zone is in place (approved), the Federal departments, agencies, and instrumentalities will not violate such system but will, instead, conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the States' approved management program. This includes conducting or supporting activities in or out of the coastal zone which affect that area. . . . As energy facilities have been focused upon more closely recently, the provisions of section 307 for the consistency of Federal actions with the State coastal zone management programs has [sic] provided assurance to those concerned with the coastal zone that the law already provides an effective mechanism for guaranteeing that Federal activities, including those supported by, and those carried on pursuant to, Federal authority (license, lease, or permit) will accord with a rational management plan for protection, preservation and development of the coastal zone. One of the specific federally related energy problem areas for the coastal zone is, of course, the potential effects of Federal activities on the Outer Continental Shelf beyond the State's coastal zones, including Federal authorizations for non-Federal activity, but under the act as it presently exists, as well as the S. 586 amendments, if the activity may affect the State coastal zone and it has an approved management program, the consistency requirements do apply." S. Rep. No. 94-277, supra, at 36-37 (emphasis supplied). 23 </s> [464 U.S. 312, 367] </s> Similarly, the House Report states: </s> "Specifically what the section does is add the word `lease' to `licenses and permits' in section 307(c)(3). This clarifies the scope of the coverage of those federal actions which must be certified as complying with a state's approved coastal management program. The Committee felt, because of the intense interest in the matter on the part of a number of states, it would make explicit its view that federal leasing is an activity already covered by section 307 of the Act. </s> "To argue otherwise would be to maintain that a federal permit for a wastewater discharge, for example, must be certified by the applicant to be in compliance with a state program, the state being given an opportunity to approve or disapprove of the proposal, while a federal lease for an Outer Continental Shelf tract does not have to so certify. Given the obvious impacts on coastal lands and waters which will result from the federal action to permit exploration and development of offshore petroleum resources, it is difficult to imagine that the original intent of the Act was not to include such a major federal coastal action within the coverage of `federal consistency.'" H. R. Rep. No. 94-878, supra, at 52 (emphasis supplied). 24 </s> Along the same lines, the Report also stated that "the Committee wants to assure coastal states in frontier areas that the OCS leasing process is indeed a federal action that undoubtedly [464 U.S. 312, 368] has the potential for affecting a state's coastal zone and, hence, must conform with approved state coastal management programs." Id., at 37. Statements to similar effect were made by sponsors of the legislation on the floors of both Houses. 25 </s> Though the explicit reference to OCS leasing was deleted by the Conferees, their Report indicates that the reason for the deletion was not disagreement with the concept of applying 307 to OCS leasing, but rather to supplement that requirement by applying consistency to other stages in the process as well. 26 The subsequent debates on the Conference Report evince no retreat from the position that OCS leasing should be consistent with state management programs. In light of the widespread agreement by Congress in 1976 that OCS leasing was already subject to consistency review under the 1972 CZMA, the logical explanation for the Conferees' action is simply that they saw no need to amend the CZMA since everyone agreed that it already applied to OCS oil and gas leasing. The only need was to further extend [464 U.S. 312, 369] consistency review to subsequent stages in the process. This view is explicitly supported by the House's consideration of the amendments, where it was made clear that Congress believed that OCS leasing was subject to consistency requirements. Representative Hughes said: </s> "I am disappointed, however, that the amendment offered by Mr. DU PONT to delete the provision requiring that Federal offshore leasing be consistent with State coastal zone management plans has been agreed to. I nevertheless rely upon the record established during today's debate to show that it is the intent of this legislation that offshore leasing not be in conflict with State management plans." 122 Cong. Rec. 6120 (1976) (emphasis supplied). 27 </s> The failure of the Conferees to include the proposed language in the CZMA is all the more illuminating in light of the fact that the proposal before the Conferees was to amend 307(c)(3), which details the consistency obligations of private lessees. This proposal was entirely irrelevant to the obligations of the Secretary of the Interior since that subsection does not apply to the Secretary. Thus, the Conferees simply saw no reason to add language covering OCS leasing to subsection (c)(3) when there was agreement that it was already covered by (c)(1). 28 In any event, whatever the explanation [464 U.S. 312, 370] for the Conferees' failure to amend 307(c)(3), the legislative history contains no ambiguities on one point - everyone to address the issue agreed that 307(c)(1) already applied to federal OCS oil and gas leasing decisions. This is not merely "postenactment" legislative history, for this was a central premise on which Congress legislated when it decided that 307 need be extended only to subsequent stages in the process of oil and gas development. </s> The 1978 Amendments to OCSLA </s> In 1978, Congress passed the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments, 92 Stat. 629. The majority relies on these Amendments, concluding that since they require federal approval prior to exploration or development by OCS lessees, they make it clear that mere OCS leasing cannot invoke the consistency requirement of 307(c)(1) of the CZMA. Ante, at 337-340. After all, as the Court recites, these leases are subject to cancellation and most of the specific activities contemplated by the leases must be approved before they take place. At most, however, this simply raises a factual question that the District Court has answered in these cases - does the necessity for approval of exploration and development under OCSLA mean that the leasing decision does not "directly affect" the coastal zone because of the contingent nature of the leasing? Posing that question in no sense obviates the need for the factual analysis demanded by 307(c)(1). The question whether the leasing decision "directly affects" the coastal zone must still be confronted. </s> This is made clear by the text of the OCSLA Amendments, which explicitly preserves the pre-existing provisions of the [464 U.S. 312, 371] CZMA. "Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, nothing in this Act shall be contrued to amend, modify, or repeal any provision of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 . . . ." 92 Stat. 698, 43 U.S.C. 1866(a) (1976 ed., Supp. V). Moreover, the legislative history of this provision indicates that it was intended to require consistency review of federal OCS leasing activity. In the only discussion of this question during the entire consideration of the OCSLA Amendments, the House Report 29 made it clear that the consistency obligation of the CZMA would continue to apply to OCS leasing decisions. </s> "The committee is aware that under the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, as amended in 1976 (16 U.S.C. 1451 et seq.), certain OCS activities including lease sales and approval of development and production plans must comply with `consistency' requirements as to coastal zone management plans approved by the Secretary of Commerce. Except for specific changes made by Titles IV and V of the 1977 Amendments, nothing in this act is intended to amend, modify, or repeal any provision of the Coastal Zone Management Act. Specifically, nothing is intended to alter procedures under that Act for consistency once a State has an approved Coastal Zone Management Plan." H. R. Rep. No. 95-590, p. 153, n. 52 (1977) (emphasis supplied). 30 </s> One could not ask for a more explicit indication of legislative intent. The Court can find no indication of any intent to the [464 U.S. 312, 372] contrary. Thus, the premise of the 1978 legislation, like the 1976 amendment to the CZMA, was that consistency review would be applied to OCS leasing. </s> Even more important is 18 of the OCSLA, 92 Stat. 649, 43 U.S.C. 1344 (1976 ed., Supp. V), which governs the OCS leasing program. Subsection (f) provides, in pertinent part: "The Secretary shall, by regulation, establish procedures for . . . consideration of the coastal zone management program being developed or administered by an affected coastal State pursuant to Section 1454 or 1455 of title 16 [the CZMA]." This provision was added "for coordination of the [leasing] program with management programs and consistency requirements established pursuant to the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972." H. R. Rep. No. 95-590, supra, at 151; S. Rep. No. 95-284, p. 77 (1977). 31 Section 18 of the OCSLA makes it clear, if it were not previously, that state coastal management plans must be considered by the Secretary at the OCS leasing stage. 32 Thus, both the saving clause and 18(f) establish that Congress intended that consistency determination under the CZMA be made for OCS leasing decisions when it enacted the 1978 OCSLA Amendments. </s> In any event, the fact that additional licensing is required under the OCSLA scheme for exploration and development hardly makes those steps "indirect" consequences of leasing in the sense that any effect on the coastal zone is the result of intervening causes, which is the definition of "indirect" urged by petitioners. 33 Approval for exploration and development [464 U.S. 312, 373] by the lessee is obviously the expected and intended result of leasing; if it were not, the Secretary would not bother to lease and the lessees would not bother to bid. Subsequent exploration and development is hardly an intervening cause; it is the natural and expected consequence of the original lease, and hence the "direct" effect of leasing. It would be disapproval of exploration and development that would constitute an intervening cause, not the expected approval. 34 </s> The 1980 Amendment to CZMA </s> In 1980, the CZMA was reauthorized and again amended. 94 Stat. 2060. In the course of considering the statute, Congress once again addressed the precise problem we are faced with today. Once again its answer was the same - OCS oil and gas leasing is subject to the consistency obligation of 307(c)(1) of the CZMA. The House Report, for example, observed that the 1976 amendments had not altered this obligation. "The change did not alter Federal agency responsibility to provide States with a consistency determination related to OCS decisions which preceded issuance of leases." H. R. Rep. No. 96-1012, p. 28 (1980). The Report then went on to consider whether 307 needed to be amended, and declined to do so only after determining that it clearly applied to OCS leasing. </s> "Finally, the committee has not recommended any changes in the Federal consistency provision, section 307 of the existing act. During its oversight phase, the [464 U.S. 312, 374] committee heard much testimony on these provisions. However, the consensus of witnesses advocated no change. . . . </s> ". . . Generally all consistency provisions have been properly construed. The only uncertainty that has arisen concerns the interpretation of section 307(c)(1), the threshold test of `directly affecting' the coastal zone. The committee points out that in the preamble to NOAA's Federal consistency regulations, this threshold test was considered during earlier congressional deliberations and was determined to apply whenever a Federal activity had a functional interrelationship from an economic, geographic or social standpoint with a State coastal program's land or water use policies. Under such circumstances, a State has a legitimate interest in reviewing a proposed Federal activity since the management program's policies are likely to apply to the activity. Thus, when a Federal Agency initiates a series of events of coastal management consequence, the inter-governmental coordination provisions of the Federal consistency requirements should apply." Id., at 34. </s> Similarly, the Senate Report described the 1976 amendments as having maintained the consistency obligation for OCS leasing: </s> "The Department of Interior's activities which preceded OCS lease sales were to remain subject to the requirements of section 307(c)(1) [under the 1976 CZMA]. As a result, intergovernmental coordination for purposes of OCS development commences at the earliest practicable time in the opinion of the Committee, as the Department of the Interior sets in motion a series of events which have consequences in the coastal zone. Coordination must continue during the critical exploration, development, and production stages. </s> "The Committee see[s] no justification to depart from this point of view. The Committee hopes that through [464 U.S. 312, 375] the rulemaking, future areas of disagreement over the application of Federal consistency will be substantially reduced, especially given the excellent record of application shown by the coastal States." S. Rep. No. 96-783, p. 11 (1980). 35 </s> Thus, the 1980 legislative history indicates that when Congress reauthorized the CZMA it intended 307(c)(1) to be applied to OCS leasing decisions. Congress unmistakably rejected the position embraced by the majority today. 36 </s> [464 U.S. 312, 376] </s> Postscript in 1981 </s> After the new administration took office in 1981, the Secretary of Commerce proposed a CZMA regulation which would have removed OCS leasing decisions from the scope of consistency review. 37 The House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries promptly considered whether to exercise a legislative veto over the regulations 38 and overwhelmingly voted to veto the regulations. H. R. Rep. No. 97-269, pp. 7-8 (1981). The regulations were later withdrawn, in an apparent administrative concession of error. 47 Fed. Reg. 4231 (1982). Apparently this is the last of a long series of congressional actions indicating that body's intent that OCS leasing be subject to consistency review under 307(c)(1) of the CZMA. </s> In sum, the intent of Congress expressed in the plain language of the statute and in its long legislative history unambiguously requires consistency review if an OCS lease sale directly affects the coastal zone. The affirmative findings of fact made by the lower courts on that score are amply supported and are not disturbed by the Court today. </s> I therefore respectfully dissent. </s> [Footnote 1 Section 304(a) defines the coastal zone as follows: </s> "(a) The term `coastal zone' means the coastal waters (including the lands therein and thereunder) and the adjacent shorelands (including the waters therein and thereunder), strongly influenced by each other and in proximity to the shorelines of the several coastal states, and includes islands, transitional and intertidal areas, salt marshes, wetlands, and beaches. The zone extends, in Great Lakes waters, to the international boundary between the United States and Canada and, in other areas, seaward to the outer limit of the United States territorial sea. The zone extends inland from the shorelines only to the extent necessary to control shorelands, the uses of which have a direct and significant impact on the coastal waters. Excluded from the coastal zone are lands the use of which is by law subject solely to the discretion of or which is held in trust by the Federal Government, its officers or agents." 86 Stat. 1281, as amended, 16 U.S.C. 1453(1) (1982 ed.). </s> [Footnote 2 See United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975); 43 U.S.C. 1302, 1332(1) (1976 ed. and Supp. V). </s> [Footnote 3 See H. R. 14146, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 307(c)(1) (1972), reprinted in 118 Cong. Rec. 26502 (1972) ("Each Federal agency conducting or supporting activities in the coastal zone shall conduct or support those activities in a manner which is, to the maximum extent practicable, consistent with approved state management programs"); S. 3507, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 314(b)(1) (1972), reprinted in 118 Cong. Rec. 14190 (1972) ("All Federal agencies conducting or supporting activities in the coastal zone shall administer their programs consistent with approved State management programs except in cases of overriding national interest as determined by the President"). </s> [Footnote 4 The Senate's version stated that the purpose of a state coastal zone management plan must be "to minimize direct, significant, and adverse impact on the coastal waters . . . ." S. 3507, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 304(g) (1972), reprinted in 118 Cong. Rec. 14188 (1972). Plans were required to state "what shall constitute permissible land and water uses within the coastal zone so as to prevent such uses which have a direct, significant, and adverse impact on the coastal waters . . . ." 305(b)(2), reprinted in 118 Cong. Rec. 14188 (1972). The House bill contained similar language, see H. R. 14146, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 305(b) (1972), reprinted in 118 Cong. Rec. 26501 (1972). See also S. Rep. No. 92-753, p. 10 (1972). </s> [Footnote 5 The Santa Barbara incident was referred to on several occasions during the consideration of the CZMA. See 118 Cong. Rec. 14180 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Boggs); id., at 26484 (remarks of Rep. Anderson); id., at 26495 (same); ibid. (remarks of Rep. Teague); id., at 35550 (remarks of Rep. Anderson). </s> [Footnote 6 The Court seems to read this history as indicating that only federal activities in the coastal zone or on federal enclaves may directly affect the zone. See ante, at 323-324. If that were a correct reading, 307(c)(1) would have no application at all in the ocean area adjacent to the coastal zone. None of the litigants has advanced such an improbable construction of "directly affecting." It is perfectly obvious that when Congress adopted language that excluded federal enclaves from the zone, it realized that activities which are conducted outside the zone itself can have the same kind of effect within the zone as an activity conducted in the zone. An oil well adjacent to the zone will affect the zone in precisely the same way whether it is in a federal enclave or in federal water just outside the zone. </s> [Footnote 7 The House version provided that the Secretary's management program "shall be coordinated with the [adjacent] coastal state involved." H. R. 14146, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 313(b) (1972), reprinted in 118 Cong. Rec 26503 (1972). It further provided: "The Secretary shall, to the maximum extent practicable, apply the program developed pursuant to this section to waters which are adjacent to specific areas in the coastal zone which have been designated by the states for the purpose of preserving or restoring such areas for their conservation, recreational, ecological, or esthetic values." 313(c), reprinted in 118 Cong. Rec. 26503 (1972). </s> [Footnote 8 "Mr. Chairman, of particular interest to me is a subsection, which I authored, designed to protect State-established coastal sanctuaries, such as exists off California, from federally authorized development. </s> "The State of California in 1955 created five marine sanctuaries to protect the beaches from oil spills. In 1963, two more sanctuaries were created. </s> "These State-established sanctuaries, which extend from the coastline [464 U.S. 312, 350] seaward to 3 miles, account for nearly a fourth of the entire California coast. </s> "However, the Federal Government has jurisdiction outside the State area, from 3 miles to 12 miles at sea. All too often, the Federal Government has allowed development and drilling to the detriment of the State program. </s> "A case in point is Santa Barbara where California established a marine sanctuary banning the drilling of oil in the area under State authority. </s> "Yet outside the sanctuary - in the federally controlled area - the Federal Government authorized drilling which resulted in the January 1969 blowout. This dramatically illustrated the point that oil spills do not respect legal jurisdictional lines. </s> "In order to protect the desires of the citizens of the coastal States who wish to establish marine sanctuaries, I offered a provision which `requires that the Secretary of Commerce shall, to the maximum extent practicable, apply the coastal zone program to waters immediately adjacent to the coastal waters of a State, which the State has designated for specific preservation purposes.' The Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee approved this provision." Id., at 26484 (remarks of Rep. Anderson). </s> [Footnote 9 "When an estuarine sanctuary is established by a coastal state . . . whether or not Federal funds have been made available for a part of the costs of acquisition, development, and operation, the Secretary, at the request of the state concerned, and after consultation with interested Federal departments and agencies and other interested parties, may extend the established estuarine sanctuary seaward beyond the coastal zone, to the extent necessary to effectuate the purposes for which the estuarine sanctuary was established." H. R. 14146, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 312(b) (1972), reprinted in 118 Cong. Rec. 26503 (1972). </s> [Footnote 10 "During the first session of the 92d Congress, the Subcommittee on Oceans and Atmosphere, formerly the Subcommittee on Oceanography, held an additional three days of hearings during May 1971. Fifteen witnesses were heard and 39 new letters, articles and publications were received for the record, which was published by the Committee as Serial No. 92-15. </s> "In the ensuing period, S. 582 was redrafted by the Subcommittee, incorporating additional ideas from S. 638 and S. 992, which the Subcommittee felt strengthened the bill. The Subcommittee also drew substantially upon ideas propounded by the Council on Environmental Quality, whose assistance was invaluable. The Subcommittee reported the bill favorably to the Committee on Commerce on August 4, 1971, and on September 30, 1971 the Committee ordered the bill reported favorably with amendments. </s> "On March 14, 1972, at the request of Senator Hollings, S. 582 was recommitted to the Committee. Changes were made in the bill so as to clear up conflicting matters of jurisdiction, to place limitations on the coastal zone, and to broaden the participation of local governments, interstate agencies and areawide agencies in the preparation and operation of management programs. Additional changes were made to make the bill compatible with proposed land use policy legislation as proposed by the Administration. (See S. 992) Then, on Tuesday, April 11, 1972, the Committee ordered S. 3507 be reported favorably as an original bill." S. Rep. No. 92-753, p. 7 (1972). </s> [Footnote 11 The 1971 bill stated: "All Federal agencies conducting or supporting activities in the coastal and estuarine zone shall administer their programs consistent with approved State management programs except in cases of [464 U.S. 312, 352] overriding national interest as determined by the President." S. 582, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 313(b)(1) (1971), reprinted in S. Rep. No. 92-526, p. 7 (1971). The 1972 version is identical, except that what the 1971 version called the "coastal and estuarine zone" the 1972 version shortened to the "coastal zone." </s> [Footnote 12 The Report repeated itself, apparently for emphasis: "As noted previously, it is intended that any lands or waters under Federal jurisdiction and control, within or adjacent to the coastal and estuarine zone, where the administering Federal agency determines them to have a functional interrelationship from an economic, social, or geographic standpoint with lands and waters within the coastal and estuarine zone, should be administered consistent with approved State management programs." Id., at 30. </s> [Footnote 13 There is not a word in the Conference Report on the CZMA indicating that the Conferees rejected the concept that the coastal zone be protected from federal OCS activities through consistency review. The Court relies on Representative Anderson's statement concerning the Conference Report, ante, at 328, but in fact he spoke only with reference to the "provision [that] would have required the Secretary to apply the coastal zone program to waters immediately adjacent to the coastal waters of a State, which that State has designated for specific preservation purposes." 118 Cong. Rec. 35549-35550 (1972). His remarks did not concern the scope of 307(c)(1). Moreover, with respect to 313 the Conferees indicated that it was deleted only because "the provisions relating thereto did not prescribe sufficient standards or criteria [for coastal management] and would create potential conflicts with legislation already in existence concerning Continental Shelf resources." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1544, p. 15 (1972). As for 312, the objection to it was not that it applied state management plans to the OCS; in fact it did not. The objections were of a much different nature - concern that 312 might automatically foreclose OCS development without judicial or administrative review, see 118 Cong. Rec. 26495 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Clark), and that it duplicated existing programs which already achieved the same purpose. Id., at 26495-26496 (remarks of Rep. Kyl). All the Conferees said about their reasons for rejecting 312 was: "[T]he need for such provisions appears to be rather remote and could cause problems since they would extend beyond the territorial limits of the United States." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1544, pp. 14-15 (1972). </s> The Court also relies on the Senate's rejection of an amendment which would have required the Federal Government to submit leasing proposals to affected States for approval, and the Conferees' rejection of a provision of the Senate version of the CZMA providing for a study of the environmental hazards attendant to drilling in the Atlantic OCS. Ante, at 329-330, [464 U.S. 312, 355] n. 14. As for the Senate amendment, the objection to it had nothing to do with whether consistency obligations applied to federal OCS activity. The objections centered around the veto it gave to the States. Senator Hollings said: "This amendment provides the Governor would have a veto over such matters. I do not think the Senate wants to go that far. The amendment comes without public hearing and full consideration, which we have not had the benefit of." 118 Cong. Rec. 14184 (1972). Then, Senator Moss pointed out that a study of this problem was then underway in the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Ibid. It was for that reason, and that reason alone, that the sponsor of the amendment voluntarily withdrew it: "I am happy that these hearings and studies are continuing. I believe and hope they will shed full light on this important subject so that the Senate can give the fullest consideration in light of these hearings and further studies. Mr. President, with the chairman's permission, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw the amendment." Ibid. (remarks of Sen. Boggs). As for the study in the Senate version, S. 3507, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 316(c)(1) (1972), reprinted in 118 Cong. Rec. 14191 (1972), it was deleted in conference for no other reason than that it was nongermane. Id., at 35547 (remarks of Rep. Downing). Moreover, the Court misstates the objections to this provision. Senators Stevens and Moss objected only because they thought the study should also produce recommendations as to how to eliminate the environmental hazards posed by OCS drilling. See id., at 14180 (remarks of Sen. Stevens). The sponsor, Senator Pell, offered an amendment providing for such recommendations, and then both Senators withdrew their objections to the study. See id., at 14181 (remarks of Sen. Stevens); id., at 14181-14182 (remarks of Sen. Moss). </s> [Footnote 14 Construing the CZMA to begin federal-state cooperation at the OCS leasing stage enhances such long-range planning and maximizes cooperation. Indeed, the 1980 House Report on the CZMA stated that Congress intended consistency review to apply at the OCS leasing stage for precisely this reason: </s> "The benefits of this [construction] are significant. First, it fosters consultation between Federal and State agencies at the earliest practicable time. This, in turn, enhances the ability of the States to plan for and manage the coastal zone effects which are directly linked to Federal commitment of resources for Federal activities likely to lead to results inconsistent with the requirements of approved State programs. </s> "Secondly, broad opportunities for States to influence Federal activities enhances the incentive of the consistency provisions, thereby reinforcing voluntary State participation in the national program. Finally, an expansive interpretation of the threshold test is compatible with the amendment to section 303 calling for Federal agencies and others to participate and cooperate in carrying out the purposes of the act." H. R. Rep. No. 96-1012, pp. 34-35 (1980). </s> [Footnote 15 In the lease sale at issue in this case, $220 million was bid on the disputed tracts. </s> [Footnote 16 Petitioners complain that at the leasing stage there may be inadequate information on which to base a consistency determination. The applicable regulations dispose of this objection. While they require a consistency determination at the earliest possible time, the determination need not be made until sufficient information is developed to make a consistency determination practicable. See 15 CFR 930.34(b) (1983). The regulations also permit consistency determinations to be made in phases as new information develops. See 930.37(c). </s> [Footnote 17 In this connection the arrangement of the four subparagraphs of 307 is instructive. That section obligates four categories of parties to conform their activities, to the maximum extent practicable, with approved state management programs. The four categories are (1) federal agencies conducting or supporting activities directly affecting the coastal zone; (2) federal agencies undertaking development projects in the coastal zone; (3) private parties who apply for a license or permit to conduct activities in the coastal zone; and (4) state and local governments submitting applications for federal assistance under programs affecting the coastal zone. Neither subparagraph (2) nor (4) has any application to the case before us. It is subparagraph (3), that requires private parties to comply with state programs. Unless subparagraph (1) applies to the Secretary of the Interior, Congress simply omitted entirely the federal activity of selecting the tracts that will be leased from the conformity requirement. If lessees must ultimately conform their activities, to the maximum extent practicable, with the approved state programs, it is difficult to understand why Congress would not have wanted the original planning that preceded the lease sales also to be consistent with the approved program. </s> [Footnote 18 My view, unlike the Court's, is consistent with that of the agency charged by Congress with administering the CZMA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). While the majority correctly points out that NOAA has waffled on the specific issue of whether there should be a special rule for OCS oil and gas leasing, ante, at 320-321, n. 6, it has consistently rejected the majority's position that federal activities in the OCS need not be evaluated to see if they directly affect the coastal zone. To the contrary, NOAA has agreed with the position formerly taken by the Department of Justice (which itself later waffled on this issue, see n. 35, infra), that the question whether OCS leasing activity is subject to consistency review is one of fact to be decided on a case-by-case basis. See 44 Fed. Reg. 37142 (1979). The NOAA regulation on this subject (which remains in effect) states: "Federal activities outside of the coastal zone (e. g., on excluded Federal lands, on the Outer Continental Shelf, or landward of the coastal zone) are subject to Federal agency review to determine whether they directly affect the coastal zone." 15 CFR 930.33(c) (1983). NOAA also urged federal agencies "to construe liberally the `directly affecting' test in borderline cases so as to favor inclusion of Federal activities subject to consistency review." 44 Fed. Reg. 37146-37147 (1979). </s> [Footnote 19 The California Coastal Commission, the state agency responsible for the administration of the state management plan, made this same point in objecting to the lease sale at issue here. "The Commission's objections to Lease Sale 53 cannot be resolved later at the plan of exploration stage because they involve such major concerns as the lack of onshore facilities, land, and population that can accommodate oil development." App. 118. The Commission believed that inclusion of four specific areas in the sale is inconsistent with its management plan because (1) it leases tracts that are close to areas considered marine sanctuaries or marine resource areas which must be protected from development under the state plan, (2) it will require transportation of oil through the range of the endangered sea otter, which is an environmentally sensitive area that must be protected from such transportation under the state plan, (3) it would affect the scenic and visual qualities of protected recreational areas, (4) it will require the construction of facilities that are not sufficiently justified in terms of the "public welfare" as defined by the plan, and (5) there was not sufficient planning for future demands on coastal resources as required by the state plan. Id., at 120-132. The area of dispute involves 29 of 111 tracts proposed for leasing containing about 8 percent of the oil reserves projected from the sale area. Id., at 148. Prior to this sale, the Commission had concurred in 26 out of 27 OCS lease sales proposed by the Department of the Interior. Id., at 117-120, 154. </s> [Footnote 20 In fact, the House Report contains an attachment which details at some length the impacts of OCS oil and gas leasing on the coastal zone. See H. R. Rep. No. 94-878, pp. 119-126 (1976). </s> [Footnote 21 For additional statements demonstrating the effects of leasing decisions on the coastal zone, see Congressional Research Service, Effects of Offshore Oil and Natural Gas Development on the Coastal Zone, A Study Prepared for the Ad Hoc Select Committee on Outer Continental Shelf, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 93 (Comm. Print 1976); Office of Technology Assessment, Offshore Oil and Gas Development, A Study for the Ad Hoc Select House Committee on Outer Continental Shelf, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 155-157 (Comm. Print 1977). </s> [Footnote 22 See also S. Rep. No. 94-277, pp. 19-20 (1975). </s> [Footnote 23 See also id., at 52-53. </s> [Footnote 24 The Senate Report also stated: "There is very little coordination or communication between Federal agencies and the affected coastal States prior to major energy resource development decisions, such as the decision to lease large tracts of the OCS for oil and gas . . . . Full implementation of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 and recognition of its capability to solve energy-related conflicts could go far to institute the broad objectives of Federal-State cooperative planning envisioned by the framers of the act." Id., at 3 (emphasis supplied). </s> [Footnote 25 See 121 Cong. Rec. 23075 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Tunney); id., at 23082 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy); id., at 23084 (remarks of Sen. Williams); 122 Cong. Rec. 6117 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Forsythe). Similar statements were made emphasizing the breadth of the consistency requirement. See, e. g., id., at 6112 (remarks of Rep. Du Pont) ("Once a State has an approved coastal zone management plan in place, all subsequent Federal activities which affect the coastal zone must be found to be consistent with adopted State management programs"); id., at 6113 (remarks of Rep. Lent) (The 1972 CZMA "provides for the representation of local, State, and regional interests . . . in the making of decisions affecting the coastal zone areas"). </s> [Footnote 26 "The Senate bill required that each Federal lease (for example, offshore oil and gas leases) had to be submitted to each state with an approved coastal zone management program for a determination by that state as to whether or not the lease was consistent with its program. The conference substitute further elaborates on this provision and specifically applies the consistency requirement to the basic steps in the OCS leasing process - namely, the exploration, development and production plans submitted to the Secretary of the Interior." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 94-1298, p. 30 (1976). </s> [Footnote 27 Representative Du Pont himself stated that he also believed that OCS leasing was subject to consistency requirements. See 122 Cong. Rec. 6128 (1976). </s> [Footnote 28 This observation was later made in a statement signed by one of the principal sponsors of the 1976 legislation, Representative Studds. </s> "Nowhere, in this entire set of deliberations [in 1976], was there any explilct [sic] or implicit reference to consistency decisions by the Department of the Interior in its pre-lease activity pursuant to Section 307(c)(1). The focus was on the proper time for a state to certify a private company's activity - not on the federal agency's obligations under Section 307(c)(1). </s> "The deletion of `lease' from Section 30.7(c)(3) was an agreement by the Congress that a State would have better information on which to base a [464 U.S. 312, 370] 307(c)(3) decision later in the process - i. e., at the exploration and development stage - than when the oil company simply had been awarded a lease. Such deletion, however, had absolutely no reference to the range of pre-leasing decisions made by the Interior Department and no implication is warranted with respect to the Section 307(c)(1) issue here." H. R. Rep. No. 97-269, p. 14 (1981) (additional views of Reps. Studds and D'Amours). </s> [Footnote 29 The Report also incorporates by reference the earlier Congressional Research Service report, cited in n. 21, supra, detailing the impact of OCS leasing decisions on the coastal zone. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-590, p. 55, n. 1 (1977). </s> [Footnote 30 See also 124 Cong. Rec. 2057-2058 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Murphy) ("I want to assure my colleagues that we are simply making sure that the provisions of the 1976 Coastal Zone Management Act consistency amendments will continue to operate in these revised OCS procedures"). </s> [Footnote 31 See also S. Rep. No. 95-284, pp. 43-44 (1977); S. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1091, p. 105 (1978). </s> [Footnote 32 Regulations have been issued governing oil and gas leasing which implement this requirement by requiring consideration of state coastal zone management plans. See 43 CFR 3310.4 (1982). </s> [Footnote 33 The Court does not offer a definition of the term "directly" for purposes of 307(c)(1) since it takes the position that the statute does not extend to OCS activities. Therefore, I address only petitioners' definition. </s> [Footnote 34 Moreover, petitioners argue only that any "physical" impacts on the coastal zone depend on future licensing and hence are indirect. Petitioners cannot address the economic or social impacts of the leasing decision, however, which are not dependent upon subsequent approval, and which may well result in direct effects on the coastal zone, as Congress recognized both in the 1971 Senate Report and the 1976 CZMA amendments. As noted above, the findings of fact made by the lower courts indicate that the proposed lease sale at issue here would have had direct economic and social effects on the coastal zone. </s> [Footnote 35 To make sure of the correct construction of the Act, two sponsors of the 1980 amendments conducted a colloquy on the floor of the House in which they indicated that the intent of Congress was to apply 307(c)(1) to OCS leasing decisions if as a factual matter they affected the coastal zone. </s> "[Mr. MCCLOSKEY.] Do any portions of the Coastal Zone Management Improvement Act or the report language change the provisions of section 307 of the Coastal Zone Management Act on coordination and cooperation, the so-called Federal consistency provision? </s> "Mr. STUDDS. I would like to assure my colleague that nothing in H. R. 6979 nor its accompanying report changes the intent of the Federal consistency provision. In testimony before the Subcommittee on Oceanography, we heard from many witnesses that this section is critical for the effective implementation of State management programs. Since the consistency provisions are important to the act and appear to be working, no changes were made to section 307 of the act. </s> "Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I assume that this means also that there are no changes in the bill or the report language which further modify the term `directly affecting' which occurs in section 307(c)(1) of the original statute. </s> "Mr. STUDDS. The gentleman from Washington is correct. The term `directly affecting is essentially one of fact' as the Department of Justice has previously concluded." 126 Cong. Rec. 28458 (1980). </s> Representative Studds' reference was to the Department of Justice's previously stated position that 307(c)(1) did apply to OCS leasing activity if, in fact, a given leasing decision could be said to directly affect the coastal zone. See App. 35-47. </s> [Footnote 36 Even if the Court were correct to view the 1980 history as not part of the legislative history of the CZMA, despite the fact that Congress in fact reauthorized the CZMA in 1980 and explicitly stated its view as to the correct construction of 307(c)(1), this nevertheless qualifies as the view of a subsequent Congress and is not without persuasive value. See, e. g., Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 784 -785 (1983); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599 -602 (1983); Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 666 , n. 8 (1980). </s> [Footnote 37 See 46 Fed. Reg. 26660 (1981). </s> [Footnote 38 See 16 U.S.C. 1463a (1982 ed.). </s> [464 U.S. 312, 377]

United States Supreme Court BECK v. WASHINGTON(1962) No. 40 Argued: November 14, 1961Decided: May 14, 1962 </s> Petitioner contended that his conviction in a Washington State court of grand larceny from the union of which he was president was invalid under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, primarily because of voluminous and intensive adverse publicity circulated by news media in the vicinity where he was indicted and tried. Specifically he claimed that the grand jury which indicted him was biased, that it was unfairly impaneled and instructed, and that the prosecutor acted improperly before it. Held: On the record in this case, petitioner has failed to sustain the burden of showing that his indictment, trial and conviction violated the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 542-558. </s> 1. Petitioner has failed to show that the grand jury proceedings which resulted in his indictment violated the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 545-555. </s> (a) Petitioner has failed to show that the grand jury which indicted him was unfairly impaneled or instructed or was biased or prejudiced against him. Pp. 545-549. </s> (b) Petitioner has failed to show that he was denied equal protection of the laws on the ground that he is a member of a class (the union of which he was president) that was not accorded equal treatment in the grand jury proceedings. P. 549. </s> (c) Petitioner's contention that he was denied equal protection of the laws by a Washington statute which permits persons in custody or on bail to challenge grand jurors but denies the same right to persons who are not in custody or on bail when investigated by grand juries, is not properly before this Court. Pp. 549-554. </s> (d) On the record in this case, it cannot be said that the State has failed to afford petitioner the procedural safeguards it affords others to insure an unbiased grand jury or that a failure to afford such procedures would deny petitioner equal protection of the laws. Pp. 554-555. </s> (e) It cannot be said that the manner in which a witness before the grand jury was interrogated violated petitioner's constitutional rights. P. 555. [369 U.S. 541, 542] </s> 2. On the record in this case, petitioner has not sustained the burden of showing that the petit jury which convicted him was biased or prejudiced against him. Pp. 555-558. </s> 56 Wash. 2d 474, 349 P.2d 387, 353 P.2d 429, affirmed. </s> Charles S. Burdell argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Donald McL. Davidson entered an appearance for petitioner. </s> James E. Kennedy argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs was William L. Paul, Jr. </s> MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Petitioner David D. Beck contends that his conviction of grand larceny in the Superior Court of the State of Washington for King County is invalid under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. This contention is based primarily on what is characterized as voluminous and continuous adverse publicity circulated by news media in the vicinity of Seattle, Washington, where he was indicted and tried. Specifically he claims, inter alia, that the grand jury was unfairly impaneled and instructed, that the prosecutor acted improperly before the grand jury, and that his motions for a change of venue and for continuances were erroneously denied. The judges of the Supreme Court of Washington divided equally in review, 56 Wash. 2d 474, 349 P.2d 387, 353 P.2d 429, leaving petitioner's conviction undisturbed. We granted certiorari limited to the above contentions, 365 U.S. 866 , and we now affirm the conviction. </s> I. THE PUBLICITY OF WHICH PETITIONER COMPLAINS. </s> In addition to challenges to the grand and petit juries, petitioner prior to the selection of the petit jury made five motions on the ground of bias and prejudice arising [369 U.S. 541, 543] from the publicity, viz., one to quash the indictment, three for continuances ranging from one month to an indefinite period, and one for a change of venue to Snohomish or Whatcom County. Petitioner's counsel supported his factual contentions in regard to these various motions by his personal affidavits as well as by photostats of stories appearing in local newspapers and national magazines. We shall now summarize the highlights of the publicity set forth by the petitioner in his moving papers and exhibits. </s> The Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field of the United States Senate began its investigation on February 26, 1957. In early March the Chairman of the Committee announced that the Committee had "produced `rather conclusive' evidence of a tie-up between West Coast Teamsters and under-world bosses to monopolize vice in Portland, Ore." The announcement also stated that "Teamsters' President Dave Beck and Brewster [also a Teamster leader] will be summoned for questioning on a charge that they schemed to control Oregon's law enforcement machinery from a local level on up to the governor's chair." </s> On March 22 the Committee was quoted in the newspapers as stating "$250,000 had been taken from Teamster funds . . . and used for Beck's personal benefit." Petitioner appeared before the Committee on March 26, and the newspapers reported: "BECK TAKES 5TH AMENDMENT President of Teamsters `Very Definitely' Thinks Records Might Incriminate Him." Television cameras were permitted at the hearings. One Seattle TV station ran an 8 3/4-hour "live" broadcast of the session on March 27, and films of this session were shown by various TV stations in the Seattle-Tacoma area. The April 12 issue of the U.S. News & World Report ran a caption: "Take a look around Seattle these days, and you find what a Senate inquiry can do to a top labor leader [369 U.S. 541, 544] in his own home town." On April 26 the county prosecutor announced that a special grand jury would be impaneled in Seattle "to investigate possible misuse of Teamsters Union funds by international president Dave Beck . . . ." It was later announced that former Mayor Devin of Seattle was to be appointed Chief Special Prosecutor. On May 3 petitioner was indicted by a federal grand jury at Tacoma for income tax evasion. The announcement of this action was of course in front-page headlines. Five days later the petitioner was again called as a witness before the Committee in Washington. News stories on his appearance concentrated on his pleading of the Fifth Amendment 60 times during the hearings. Other stories emanating from the Committee hearings were featured intermittently, and on May 20, the day of the convening of the special grand jury, the Chairman of the Senate Committee announced that "the Committee has not convicted Mr. Beck of any crime, although it is my belief that he has committed many criminal offenses." The publicity continued to some degree after the grand jury had been convened and during the three-week period in which the prosecutors were gathering up documentary evidence through the use of grand jury subpoenas. Among other stories that appeared was one of June 4 stating that at the Committee hearings "Beck, Jr., who even refused to say whether he knew his father, took shelter behind the [fifth] amendment 130 times, following the example of Beck, Sr., who refused to answer 210 times in three appearances before the committee." The indictment in this case was returned by the special grand jury on July 12 and of course received banner headlines. Intermittent publicity continued, some from Washington, D.C., until August 28 when a federal grand jury indicted petitioner and others on additional income tax evasion counts. The co-conspirators named in this latter indictment were then called before the Committee in Washington, [369 U.S. 541, 545] and these hearings, which were held on November 5, brought on additional publicity. On November 12 Dave Beck, Jr., went to trial on other larceny charges and was convicted on November 23, a Saturday. The state papers gave that event considerable coverage. The trial of petitioner in this case began on December 2 and continued until his conviction on December 14. </s> II. THE OBJECTIONS TO THE GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS. </s> Ever since Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), this Court has consistently held that there is no federal constitutional impediment to dispensing entirely with the grand jury in state prosecutions. The State of Washington abandoned its mandatory grand jury practice some 50 years ago. 1 Since that time prosecutions have been instituted on informations filed by the prosecutor, on many occasions without even a prior judicial determination of "probable cause" - a procedure which has likewise had approval here in such cases as Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914), and Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586 (1913). Grand juries in Washington are convened only on special occasions and for specific purposes. The grand jury in this case, the eighth called in King County in 40 years, was summoned primarily to investigate circumstances which had been the subject of the Senate Committee hearings. </s> In his attempts before trial to have the indictment set aside petitioner did not contend that any particular grand juror was prejudiced or biased. Rather, he asserted that the judge impaneling the grand jury had breached his duty to ascertain on voir dire whether any prospective juror had been influenced by the adverse publicity and that this error had been compounded by his failure to adequately [369 U.S. 541, 546] instruct the grand jury concerning bias and prejudice. It may be that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the State, having once resorted to a grand jury procedure, to furnish an unbiased grand jury. Compare Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 349 -350 (1958); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 485 (1951). But we find that it is not necessary for us to determine this question; for even if due process would require a State to furnish an unbiased body once it resorted to grand jury procedure - a question upon which we do not remotely intimate any view - we have concluded that Washington, so far as is shown by the record, did so in this case. </s> Petitioner's appearance before the Senate Committee was current news of high national interest and quite normally was widely publicized throughout the Nation, including his home city of Seattle and the State of Washington. His answers to and conduct before the Committee disclosed the possibility that he had committed local offenses within the jurisdiction of King County, Washington, against the laws of that State. In the light of those disclosures the King County authorities were duty-bound to investigate and, if the State's laws had been violated, to prosecute the offenders. It appears that documentary evidence - in the hands of petitioner's union - was necessary to a complete investigation. The only method available to secure such documents was by grand jury process, and it was decided therefore to impanel a grand jury. This Washington was free to do. </s> Twenty-three prospective grand jurors were called. The trial judge explained, as is customary in such matters, that they had been called primarily to investigate possible crimes committed in King County by officers of the Teamsters Union which had been the subject of the Senate Committee hearings. In impaneling the grand jury the [369 U.S. 541, 547] judge, after determining their statutory qualifications, businesses, union affiliations and the like, asked each of the prospective jurors: "Is there anything about sitting on this grand jury that might embarrass you at all?" In answer to this or the question of whether they were conscious of any prejudice or bias, which was asked whenever previous answers suggested a need for further inquiry, two admitted they were prejudiced by the publicity and were excused. Another stated that whether he was prejudiced was "pretty hard to answer," and he, too, was excused. In addition three persons who were or had been members of unions that were affiliated with petitioner's union were excused. The remaining 17 were accepted and sworn as grand jurors and as a part of the oath swore that they would not "present [any] person through envy, hatred or malice." Among them were a retired city employee who had been a Teamsters, the manager of a real estate office, a bookkeeper, an engineer, an airplane manufacturer's employee, a seamstress whose husband was a union member, a material inspector, a gravel company superintendent who was a former Teamsters Union member, a civil engineer with the State Department of Fisheries, and an engineer for a gyroscope manufacturer. </s> In his charge to the grand jury the trial judge explained that its "function is to inquire into the commission of crime in the county," that ordinarily this was done "by the regularly established law enforcement agencies," but that this was impossible here because further investigation was necessary requiring the attendance of witnesses and the examination of books and records which a prosecutor had no power to compel. As to the purpose for which it was called, he explained that "disclosures" by the Senate Investigating Committee indicated "hundreds of thousands of dollars of the funds" of the Teamsters Union had been "embezzled or stolen" by its officers. He also stated that the president of the Teamsters had "publicly [369 U.S. 541, 548] declared" that the money he had received was a loan. "This presents a question of fact," he added, "the truth of which is for you to ascertain." After mentioning other accusations he concluded, "I urge you to do all that you can within practical limitations to ascertain the truth or falsity of these charges. . . . You have a most serious task to perform . . . . It is a tremendous responsibility, and I wish you well in your work." </s> It is true that the judge did not admonish the grand jurors to disregard or disbelieve news reports and publicity concerning petitioner. Nor did he mention or explain the effect of the invocation of the Fifth Amendment by petitioner before the Committee or inquire as to the politics of any panel member. Discussion along such lines might well have added fuel to the flames which some see here. Apparently sensing this dilemma the judge admonished the grand jury that its function was to inquire into the commission of crime in the county and that it was to conduct an examination of witnesses as well as books and records. Twice in his short statement he said that it was for the grand jury to determine whether the charges were true or false. Taking the instructions as a whole, they made manifest that the jurors were to sift the charges by careful investigation, interrogation of witnesses, and examination of records, not by newspaper stories. </s> In the light of these facts and on the attack made we cannot say that the grand jury was biased. It was chosen from the regular jury list. Some six months thereafter a petit jury to try this case was selected from the same community and, as will hereafter be shown, was not found to be prejudiced. Indeed, every judge who passed on the issue in the State's courts, including its highest court, has so held. A look at the grand jury through the record reveals that it was composed of people from all walks of life, some of whom were former union members. The judge immediately and in the presence of all of the panel [369 U.S. 541, 549] eliminated six prospective grand jurors when indications of prejudice appeared. No grand juror personally knew petitioner or was shown to be adverse to the institutions with which petitioner is generally identified. Every person who was selected on the grand jury took an oath that he would not indict any person through "hatred or malice." Moreover, the grand jury sat for six weeks before any indictment was returned against petitioner. The record also indicates that it heard voluminous testimony on the charges that had been made against petitioner and others and that it gave the matter most meticulous and careful consideration. We therefore conclude that petitioner has failed to show that the body which indicted him was biased or prejudiced against him. </s> In addition to the above due process contention three equal protection arguments are made by petitioner or suggested on his behalf. First, petitioner argues he is a member of a class (Teamsters) that was not accorded equal treatment in grand jury proceedings. The contention is based on references to the Teamsters by the judge impaneling the grand jury as he conducted the voir dire and explained the scope of the investigation. The complete answer to petitioner's argument is that references to the Teamsters were necessary in the voir dire to eliminate persons who might be prejudiced for or against petitioner and in the instructions to explain the purpose and scope of this special body. Petitioner has totally failed to establish that non-Teamsters who are members of groups under investigation are given any different treatment. </s> Secondly, it is said that the Washington statute permitting persons in custody to challenge grand jurors, Revised Code of Washington 10.28.030, denies equal protection to persons not in custody who are investigated by grand juries. This point is not properly before this Court. Although both opinions of the Washington Supreme Court discuss the interpretation of 10.28.030, [369 U.S. 541, 550] neither considered that question in light of the equal protection argument for that argument was never properly presented to the court in relation to this statute. The Washington Supreme Court has unfailingly refused to consider constitutional attacks upon statutes not made in the trial court, even where the constitutional claims arise from the trial court's interpretation of the challenged statute. E. g., Johnson v. Seattle, 50 Wash. 2d 543, 313 P.2d 676 (1957). 2 Petitioner's formal attack at the trial court level did not even mention 10.28.030, much less argue that a restrictive interpretation would be unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. 3 That the [369 U.S. 541, 551] prosecution and the court viewed petitioner as outside the scope of 10.28.030 was brought home to him in the course of the trial court proceedings on his grand jury attack. But even then petitioner did not suggest that constitutional [369 U.S. 541, 552] considerations might compel a different result. The failure to inject the equal protection contention into the case was carried forward to the proceedings before the Washington Supreme Court when petitioner failed to comply with that court's rule prescribing the manner in which contentions are to be brought to its attention. Rule 43 of the Rules on Appeal, Revised Code of Washington, provides that "[n]o alleged error of the superior court will be considered by this court unless the same be definitely pointed out in the `assignments of error' in appellant's brief." Mere generalized attacks upon the validity of the holding below as petitioner made in his "assignments of error" 4 are not considered by reason of [369 U.S. 541, 553] this rule sufficient to invoke review of the underlying contentions. See, e. g., Washington v. Tanzymore, 54 Wash. 2d 290, 292, 340 P.2d 178, 179 (1959); Fowles v. Sweeney, 41 Wash. 2d 182, 188, 248 P.2d 400, 403, (1952). Nor will the Washington Supreme Court search through the brief proper to find specific contentions which should have been listed within the "assignments of error." See Washington ex rel. Linden v. Bunge, 192 Wash. 245, 251, 73 P.2d 516, 518-519 (1937). Moreover, the failure of petitioner to argue the constitutional contention in his brief, as opposed to merely setting it forth as he did in one sentence of his 125-page brief, is considered by the Washington Supreme Court to be an abandonment or waiver of such contention. E. g., Martin v. J. C. Penney Co., 50 Wash. 2d 560, 565, 313 P.2d 689, 693 (1957); Washington v. Williams, 49 Wash. 2d 354, 356-357, 301 P.2d 769, 770 (1956). Nor was the equal protection contention made at all in the petitions for rehearing filed after the Supreme Court had agreed with the lower court's interpretation of the statute to exclude petitioner. Assuming arguendo that for the purposes of our jurisdiction the question would have been timely if raised in a petition for rehearing, not having been raised there or elsewhere or actually decided by the Washington Supreme Court, the argument cannot be entertained here under an unbroken line of precedent. [369 U.S. 541, 554] E. g., Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 572 (1961); Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio, 183 U.S. 238, 248 (1902). Furthermore, it was not within the scope of the questions to which the writ of certiorari in this case was specifically limited, 365 U.S. 866 , and for this additional reason cannot now be presented. </s> The final argument under the Equal Protection Clause is that Washington has singled out petitioner for special treatment by denying him the procedural safeguards the law affords others to insure an unbiased grand jury. But this reasoning proceeds on the wholly unsupported assumption that such procedures have been required in Washington in all other cases. 5 Moreover, it is contrary to the underlying finding of the Superior Court, in denying the motion to dismiss the indictment, that the grand jurors were lawfully selected and instructed. And even if we were to assume that Washington law requires such procedural safeguards, the petitioner's argument here comes down to a contention that Washington law was misapplied. Such misapplication cannot be shown to be an invidious discrimination. We have said time and again that the Fourteenth Amendment does not "assure uniformity of judicial decisions . . . [or] immunity from [369 U.S. 541, 555] judicial error . . . ." Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co. v. Wisconsin ex rel. Milwaukee, 252 U.S. 100, 106 (1920). Were it otherwise, every alleged misapplication of state law would constitute a federal constitutional question. Finally, were we to vacate this conviction because of a failure to follow certain procedures although it has not been shown that their ultimate end - a fair grand jury proceeding - was not obtained, we would be exalting form over substance contrary to our previous application of the Equal Protection Clause, e. g., Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 630 (1912). </s> Petitioner also contends that a witness before the grand jury was improperly interrogated in a manner which prejudiced his case before that body. It appears that an employee of petitioner's union was called before the grand jury to testify in reference to activities within his employment. During his first appearance he made statements which he subsequently changed on a voluntary reappearance before the grand jury some two days before the indictment was returned. On the second appearance the prosecutor attacked the witness' changed story as incredible and warned him that he was under oath, that he might be prosecuted for perjury, and that there was no occasion for him to go to jail for petitioner. The record indicates that the prosecutor became incensed over the witness' new story; and though some of his threats were out of bounds, it appears that they had no effect upon the witness whatsoever for he stuck to his story. We can find no irregularity of constitutional proportions, and we therefore reject this contention. </s> III. THE OBJECTIONS AS TO THE PETIT JURY. </s> As in his grand jury attack, petitioner makes no claim that any particular petit juror was biased. Instead, he states the publicity which prevented the selection of a fair grand jury also precluded a fair petit jury. He argues [369 U.S. 541, 556] that such a strong case of adverse publicity has been proved that any jury selected in Seattle at the time he was tried must be held to be presumptively biased and that the trial court's adverse rulings on his motions for a change of venue and for continuances were therefore in error. Of course there could be no constitutional infirmity in these rulings if petitioner actually received a trial by an impartial jury. Hence, our inquiry is addressed to that subject. </s> Petitioner's trial began early in December. This was nine and one-half months after he was first called before the Senate Committee and almost five months after his indictment. Although there was some adverse publicity during the latter period which stemmed from the second tax indictment and later Senate hearings as well as from the trial of petitioner's son, it was neither intensive nor extensive. The news value of the original "disclosures" was diminished, and the items were often relegated to the inner pages. Even the occasional front-page items were straight news stories rather than invidious articles which would tend to arouse ill will and vindictiveness. If there was a campaign against him as petitioner infers, it was sidetracked by the appearance of other "labor bosses" on the scene who shared the spotlight. </s> The process of selecting a jury began with the exclusion from the panel of all persons summoned as prospective jurors in the November 12 trial of Dave Beck, Jr. In addition, all persons were excused who were in the courtroom at any time during the trial of that case. Next, the members were examined by the court and counsel at length. Of the 52 so examined, only eight admitted bias or a preformed opinion as to petitioner's guilt and six others suggested they might be biased or might have formed an opinion - all of whom were excused. Every juror challenged for cause by petitioner's counsel was [369 U.S. 541, 557] excused; in addition petitioner was given six peremptory challenges, all of which were exercised. Although most of the persons thus selected for the trial jury had been exposed to some of the publicity related above, each indicated that he was not biased, that he had formed no opinion as to petitioner's guilt which would require evidence to remove, and that he would enter the trial with an open mind disregarding anything he had read on the case. </s> A study of the voir dire indicates clearly that each juror's qualifications as to impartiality far exceeded the minimum standards this Court established in its earlier cases as well as in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), on which petitioner depends. There we stated: </s> "To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court." Id., at 723. </s> We cannot say the pretrial publicity was so intensive and extensive or the examination of the entire panel revealed such prejudice that a court could not believe the answers of the jurors and would be compelled to find bias or preformed opinion as a matter of law. Compare Irvin v. Dowd, supra, at 723-728, where sensational publicity adverse to the accused permeated the small town in which he was tried, the voir dire examination indicated that 90% of 370 prospective jurors and two-thirds of those seated on the jury had an opinion as to guilt, and the accused unsuccessfully challenged for cause several persons accepted on the jury. The fact that petitioner did [369 U.S. 541, 558] not challenge for cause any of the jurors so selected is strong evidence that he was convinced the jurors were not biased and had not formed any opinions as to his guilt. In addition, we note that while the Washington Supreme Court was divided on the question of the right of an accused to an impartial grand jury, the denial of the petitioner's motions based on the bias and prejudice of the petit jury did not raise a single dissenting voice. </s> "While this Court stands ready to correct violations of constitutional rights, it also holds that `it is not asking too much that the burden of showing essential unfairness be sustained by him who claims such injustice and seeks to have the result set aside, and that it be sustained not as a matter of speculation but as a demonstrable reality.'" United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 351 U.S. 454, 462 (1956). This burden has not been met. </s> Affirmed. </s> MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER took no part in the decision of this case. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Washington Laws 1909, c. 87. </s> [Footnote 2 Washington v. Griffith, 52 Wash. 2d 721, 328 P.2d 897 (1958), does not detract from this principle. In Griffith the Washington Supreme Court, while recognizing the general rule that constitutional arguments cannot be presented for the first time in the Supreme Court, found an exception to this general rule when the accused in a capital case asserts his court-appointed attorney incompetently conducted his trial. The reasons for such an exception are obvious, and it is just as obvious that such reasons are not applicable to the present case. </s> [Footnote 3 Petitioner made the following attacks upon the grand jury: </s> "MOTION TO SET ASIDE AND DISMISS INDICTMENT - Filed October 18, 1957 </s> "Comes Now David D. Beck, also known as Dave Beck, defendant herein, by and through his attorneys of record herein, and respectfully moves to set aside and dismiss the indictment on the following grounds: </s> "1. That the grand jurors were not selected, drawn, summoned, impaneled or sworn as prescribed by law. </s> "2. That unauthorized persons, not required or permitted by law to attend sessions of the grand jury were present before the grand jury during the investigation of the allegations of the indictment. </s> "3. That persons other than the grand jurors were present before the grand jury during consideration of the matters and things charged in the indictment. </s> "4. That the proceedings of the grand jury which returned the indictment were conducted in an atmosphere of extreme bias, prejudice and hostility toward this defendant, and that said atmosphere [369 U.S. 541, 551] was in part created by the Prosecuting Attorney and by persons acting or claiming to act upon his behalf; all of which was prejudicial to this defendant and which has denied and will continue to deny him rights guaranteed under the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, Amendment 10 of the Constitution of the State of Washington, and Article I, 3 of the Constitution of the State of Washington. </s> "5. That by reason of extreme bias, prejudice and hostility toward the defendant herein, contributed to in part by the conduct of the Prosecuting Attorney and persons acting or claiming to act upon his behalf, it is and will be impossible for the defendant to secure and obtain a fair and impartial trial in the jurisdiction of this Court, all of which is and will be prejudicial to this defendant and which will constitute a denial of his rights guaranteed under the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, Amendment 10 of the Constitution of the State of Washington, and Article I, 3 of the Constitution of the State of Washington. </s> "6. That the Court erred in its instructions and directions to the Grand Jury to the prejudice of the defendant and in denial of rights guaranteed under the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, Amendment 10 of the Constitution of the State of Washington, and Article I, 3 of the Constitution of the State of Washington. </s> "7. That there were excluded from the Grand Jury persons of defendant's financial, social and business class and occupation, contrary to the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and contrary to Article I, 3 of the Constitution of the State of Washington. </s> "8. That the defendant herein was required and compelled to give evidence against himself, contrary to the provisions of Article I, 9 of the Constitution of the State of Washington and the 5th and 14th Amendments of the Constitution of the United States. </s> "9. That the Grand Jury committed misconduct in violation of RCW 10.28.085 and RCW 10.28.100. </s> "This motion is based upon all of the files, records, transcripts, exhibits and affidavits herein." [369 U.S. 541, 552] </s> "CHALLENGE TO GRAND JURY - Filed October 18, 1957 </s> "Comes Now the defendant herein and challenges each and all of the members of the grand jury which returned the indictment herein for the reason and on the grounds that the Court which impaneled said grand jury made no determination as to whether a state of mind existed on the part of any juror such as would render him unable to act impartially and without prejudice." </s> [Footnote 4 Petitioner's 29 "assignments of error" included the following: </s> "6. The lower court erred in denying appellant's motion to set aside and dismiss the indictment. </s> "7. The lower court erred in denying appellant's challenge to grand jury. </s> . . . . . </s> "25. The court denied appellant's rights to a fair and impartial grand jury." </s> However, when petitioner did attempt to conform to the rule of the Washington Supreme Court by pointing out "definitely" the errors committed in denying his attacks upon the grand jury, he limited the review to violations of the Due Process Clause as set out below. </s> "29. The appellant was denied due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America and under the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution of the State of Washington, as follows: </s> "a. by denying appellant his right to challenge the grand jury or to dismiss the indictment for bias and prejudice of the grand jury members. [369 U.S. 541, 553] </s> "b. by denying his motions for continuance and change of venue thereby forcing appellant to go to trial in an atmosphere of extreme hostility and prejudice. </s> "c. by misconduct of the prosecutor </s> "1. during and after the grand jury proceedings, and </s> "2. at the trial. </s> "d. by denying appellant an opportunity to examine or inspect transcripts of proceedings before the grand jury after the State had introduced evidence of particular statements made before the grand jury by cross-examination or secondary evidence. </s> "e. the means used to accuse and convict appellant were not compatible with reasonable standards of fair play." </s> [Footnote 5 There are no reported Washington cases so holding. The two cases on which this claim is predicated, Washington v. Guthrie, 185 Wash. 464, 56 P.2d 160 (1936), and Washington ex rel. Murphy v. Superior Court, 82 Wash. 284, 144 P. 32 (1914), were concerned only with whether the members of the grand jury had been selected by chance as the law requires. Quotations from these cases when read in context clearly have reference only to the desirability of selecting grand jurors by chance. Petitioner in his rehearing petition before the Washington Supreme Court quoted from two unnamed, unreported Washington grand jury proceedings in which some prospective jurors were questioned as to bias. Even if it were clear that all the jurors in those cases were so questioned (which it is not), such isolated, unreviewable instances would not establish that Washington law requires the claimed procedures. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE concurs, dissenting. </s> I dissent from the Court's holding because I think that the failure of the Washington courts to follow their own state law by taking affirmative action to protect the petitioner Beck from being indicted by a biased and prejudiced grand jury was a denial to him of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. [369 U.S. 541, 559] </s> Since 1854, when Washington was a Territory, that State has had a statute comprehensively governing the use of grand juries in criminal trials which provides in part: </s> "Challenges to individual grand jurors may be made by . . . [any person in custody or held to answer for an offense] for reason of want of qualification to sit as such juror; and when, in the opinion of the court, a state of mind exists in the juror, such as would render him unable to act impartially and without prejudice." 1 </s> In State ex rel. Murphy v. Superior Court, 2 the Washington Supreme Court held in construing this statute that in order to preserve the right of defendants to fair and impartial grand jurors, Washington State judges must select grand jurors by chance, explaining: </s> "That it was the policy of the legislature to preserve the right to have an unbiased and unprejudiced jury and grand jury, and that no suspicion should attach to the manner of its selection in all cases, cannot be questioned." </s> Some years later in State v. Guthrie 3 the Washington Supreme Court held that it was not only within the power of Washington State judges but it was also their duty to insure unbiased grand juries, even if so doing meant changing the composition of the grand juries selected by the rules of chance. That court in this latter case reiterated the statute's policy to preserve impartial grand [369 U.S. 541, 560] juries and made it crystal clear that juries biased because of judicial inaction are as offensive to the policy of the Washington statute as juries biased because of deliberate judicial selection: </s> "While this section may be said to relate to challenges made by interested persons, it is not to be construed as denying to the court the right, upon its own motion, to excuse a juror deemed to be disqualified or incompetent. To deny this right would be out of harmony with the policy of the law, which charges the court with the responsibility of insuring that qualified and impartial grand jurors are secured." </s> That this state policy for impartial grand juries has been generally accepted as the settled law of Washington is demonstrated, not only by the statements of the four judges who voted to reverse this conviction, 4 but also by the current practice cited to us of other Washington trial courts. 5 Indeed, the presiding judge who impaneled the [369 U.S. 541, 561] Beck grand jury made sufficient inquiries to insure that grand jurors would not be biased against the State in its investigation of Beck. </s> The Court, however, finds that the Murphy and Guthrie cases have no relation to the guarantee of a fair and impartial grand jury but are "concerned only with whether the members of the grand jury had been selected by chance." But even the State has taken no such position, either before the Washington Supreme Court or here. In its brief before the Washington Supreme Court the State acknowledged that the Washington statute as interpreted by the Murphy and Guthrie cases set out a "well-recognized rule" that state "grand juries should be impartial and unprejudiced." 6 And even in this Court the State [369 U.S. 541, 562] does not repudiate this acknowledgment but says only that because the Washington Supreme Court was equally divided "the meaning of Washington statutes in regard to grand juries cannot be determined at this point." But of course we must decide what the Washington law is in order to pass upon Beck's claim that Washington has denied him the equal protection of the law. </s> The Washington statute as authoritatively interpreted by its Supreme Court in the Murphy and Guthrie cases means not only that defendants are entitled under Washington law to have indictments against them returned by impartial grand jurors but also that Washington State judges are specifically charged with the duty and responsibility of making all inquiries necessary to insure defendants against being tried on indictments returned by prejudiced grand jurors. Neither the legislature nor the State Supreme Court has ever changed that statute or its interpretation. Certainly, the equal division of judges in the Washington Supreme Court which left Beck's conviction standing did not impair the old statute or its previously established interpretation. Even Washington's own counsel tell us that "since the reasons for the Washington court being equally divided are signed by no more than four judges each, those reasons are not a decision of that court," and "are of no significance whatsoever as far as the decisional law of the state of Washington is concerned." Since the legislature has not changed its statute and the Supreme Court of Washington has not changed its interpretation of that statute, the law of Washington remains the same as it was before Beck's [369 U.S. 541, 563] conviction was left standing by the equally divided Washington court. And as it was before, it required Washington judges to protect persons from being indicted by prejudiced and biased grand juries. If Beck has been denied that protection without the law's having been changed, then he has been singled out by the State as the sole person to be so treated. Such a singling out would be a classic invidious discrimination and would amount to a denial of equal protection of the law. We must determine, therefore, whether the grand jury that indicted Beck was impaneled in a way that violated the state law. </s> This question is not that which the Court treats as crucial, whether there is proof in the record that some individual grand juror was actually prejudiced against Beck, but rather the quite different question of whether the judge who impaneled the grand jury took the precautions required by the statute and its controlling judicial interpretation to insure a grand jury that would not be tainted by prejudice against Beck. I think that the record in this case shows beyond doubt that the presiding judge failed to do what the state law required him to do - try to keep prejudiced persons off the grand jury. This failure was particularly serious here because of the extraordinary opportunity for prejudgment and prejudice created by the saturation of the Seattle area with publicity hostile and adverse to Beck in the months preceding and during the grand jury hearing. </s> Petitioner Beck is a long-time resident of Seattle, well known to the community as president of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and as a former president of the Western Conference of Teamsters. Beginning in March 1957, he became the target of a number of extremely serious charges of crime and corruption by the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field and its staff. These charges were [369 U.S. 541, 564] given unprecedented circulation in the Seattle area. 7 On March 22-23, banner headlines proclaimed the Committee's charge that Beck had used $270,000 in Teamsters funds for his own benefit. When Beck appeared before the Committee several days later and refused to answer questions regarding the charges, he again drew headline coverage in the Seattle press: "BECK TAKES 5TH AMENDMENT." One television station went so far as to run a 9 3/4-hour telecast of the proceedings. On May 3, the headlines announced the fact that Beck had been indicted for federal tax evasion and that a former mayor of Seattle had received a special appointment to prosecute further charges before a state grand jury. On May 9, 15 and 16, other front-page, page-wide headlines appeared, the last charging that Beck had misused his position of union trust no less than 52 different times. On May 17, a three-column front-page story recounted the fact that Beck had pleaded the Fifth Amendment 60 times to questions from the Senate Committee. And on May 20, the day the grand jury was impaneled, headlines announced Beck's expulsion from his AFL-CIO post on the ground that "Dave Beck was found `guilty as charged' by the A. F. of L.-C. I. O. executive council," and that same paper also carried a charge by Senator McClellan that Beck "has committed many criminal offenses." All the while radio, television, the national news magazines and the press in lesser front-page and backup stories published charges of a similar nature. This flood of intense public accusation of crime and breach of trust by prominent and highly placed persons, coupled with publicity resulting from Beck's refusal on grounds of possible self-incrimination to answer questions [369 U.S. 541, 565] before the Senate Committee as to the charges made, imposed a very heavy duty on the presiding judge under Washington law to protect Beck from a biased and prejudiced grand jury. </s> Far from discharging that duty, however, the judge actually increased the probability that persons biased against Beck would be left on the grand jury. For while he asked a number of questions directed toward excluding from the jury union members who might be sympathetic to Beck, he made no effective effort at all to protect Beck. Thus, he managed to ask almost every juror whether he had any connection with the Teamsters or any affiliated union, whether he knew any of the Teamsters officers, or whether he had ever been a union officer himself. But, despite his knowledge of the widespread prejudice-breeding publicity against Beck, the judge failed to ask a single juror a single question regarding whether he had read about, heard about or discussed the charges against Beck. Moreover, he failed to ask a single juror who actually sat on the jury whether he was prejudiced against Beck or had already made up his mind about the many public charges. 8 Indeed as to those jurors the most searching question which even the Court has managed to pull from the record was the sterile query: "Is there anything about sitting on this grand jury that might embarrass you at all?" Even the most tenuous logic could not equate that search for embarrassment with a search for bias and prejudice. That a search for bias and prejudice would have shown its existence hardly seems questionable, particularly in view of the fact that six months later when the publicity adverse to Beck was, according to the Court, "neither intensive nor extensive," 15 of 43 prospective petit jurors [369 U.S. 541, 566] subjected to voir dire questioning expressed some degree of bias or prejudice in the case. 9 </s> After such a restrained effort toward affording Beck the protection of the unbiased grand jury assured by Washington law, it would be expected that the presiding judge would have given careful and detailed instructions to the grand jury in order to dispel any possible prejudice in their minds. Not so here, however. In fact the instructions given not only failed to cure, they made the situation worse. For instead of instructing that the testimony and charges before the Senate Committee were not evidence before the grand jury and that it would be highly improper for the grand jury to consider them at all, the presiding judge called the jury's attention to the charges of theft and embezzlement against Beck before the Committee and told the jury that it was under a duty to determine whether these charges were refuted by an explanation attributed by the press to Beck: </s> "It seems unnecessary to review the recent testimony before a Senate Investigating Committee except to say that disclosures have been made indicating that officers of the Teamsters Union have, through trick and device, embezzled or stolen hundreds of thousands of dollars of the funds of that union - money which had come to the union from the dues of its members. . . . </s> "The president of the Teamsters Union has publicly declared that the money he received from the union was a loan which he has repaid. This presents a question of fact, the truth of which is for you to ascertain." [369 U.S. 541, 567] </s> Together with the additional facts set out by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS in his dissent, what I have said above seems clearly to show that the presiding judge took none of the steps, either in interrogation or in instruction, that in the atmosphere of the day would have fulfilled his state statutory duty to insure a grand jury unbiased against Beck. </s> This failure of the judge denies petitioner a protection which Washington has provided to similarly situated defendants over the years and which, so far as now foreseeable, Washington will continue to provide to all Washington defendants in the future. This failure would be cast in a different light if the Washington Legislature had repealed its law or if its Supreme Court had altered its interpretation and set out a general rule abrogating the right to have judges take affirmative action to insure an unbiased grand jury. But without any change in the prior law or any sure indication that Beck's "law" is the law of the future, the State of Washington in convicting Beck applies special and unfair treatment to him. For only Beck, a single individual out of all the people charged with crime by indictment in Washington, is denied his clearly defined right under the law to have the state judicial system insure his indictment by "impartial grand jurors." Through the device of an equally divided vote in the Washington Supreme Court he goes to prison for 15 years. I think that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids such an invidious picking out of one individual to bear legal burdens that are not imposed upon others similarly situated. 10 I cannot agree with the Court that such a gross discrimination against a single individual with such disastrous consequences [369 U.S. 541, 568] can be treated as a mere trial error. For a judicial decision which sends a man to prison by refusing to apply settled law which always has been and so far as appears will continue to be applied to all other defendants similarly situated is far more than a mere misapplication of state law. 11 It is a denial of equal protection of the law and a State should no more be allowed to deny a defendant protection of its laws through its judicial branch than through its legislative or executive branch. </s> I think that petitioner was denied equal protection of the law for still another reason. The four Washington judges who voted to affirm the conviction below, and whose views have therefore determined the outcome of Beck's case, agreed that those "in custody or held [on bail] to answer for an offense," the "[p]ersons for whose benefit that statute was enacted," are entitled to grand jurors without bias or prejudice. 12 This divides all persons suspected of larceny by embezzlement, as petitioner was, into two classes: (1) those persons in custody or on bail, and (2) those persons who are only under investigation by grand jury. The first class is entitled to have an impartial and unbiased grand jury; the second is not. The four judges who wanted to reverse this conviction could see no reason, nor can I, for saying that one charged with crime and in jail or on bail should be entitled to an unprejudiced grand jury but one who happened not to be already held for grand jury action could validly be indicted by a biased and prejudiced grand jury. So far as [369 U.S. 541, 569] the need to be free from prosecution by a prejudiced grand jury is concerned, there can be no rational distinction between the need of the man who is not yet in custody and the need of the man who is in jail or on bail, 13 particularly where as here the grand jury was called for the specific purpose of examining into petitioner's activities and was so instructed. No doubt the clearest evidence of the lack of rationality in such a distinction is the fact that for 108 years the State of Washington has itself made no such distinction. For even though the statute on its face applies only to those in custody or on bail, it has always been interpreted to guarantee an impartial grand jury to all. </s> A fair trial under fair procedure is a basic element in our Government. Zealous partisans filled with bias and [369 U.S. 541, 570] prejudice have no place among those whom government selects to play important parts in trials designed to lead to fair determinations of guilt or innocence. Whether the due process provisions of the Federal Constitution require, however, that every procedural step in a trial, including the impaneling of a grand jury, be absolutely fair and impartial, I need not determine here. But in considering whether people charged with the same crimes under the same circumstances, subject to the same penalties in the same place may be divided up into classes, some of whom are given the benefit of fair grand jurors and some of whom are not, we must keep in mind the high standard of fair and equal treatment imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the important part that grand juries play in trial procedures when they are used. For me the need for fair grand juries as between those who have not yet been formally arrested and those who have is too much the same to be treated as though it were different. I would not permit the State of Washington to lay its hands so unequally upon groups whose interests, whose needs and whose dangers are so similar. 14 </s> Not surprisingly the Court attempts to shrug off both of Beck's equal protection claims without reaching them on the merits. As to his first claim, that he was denied equal protection by the failure of the Washington courts to accord him the benefit of the state law guaranteeing an impartial grand jury, this Court asserts that even if Beck was, unlike everyone else, denied the benefit of a grand jury which had been questioned by the presiding judge to protect against bias, the error was harmless because he presented no proof to show that the grand jury selected in violation of Washington law was actually [369 U.S. 541, 571] biased or prejudiced against him. But the Washington law puts the duty on the judge to insure against bias not on the defendant to show bias. The court cites absolutely no authority and I have been unable to find any that when a Washington State judge neglects his duty to assure an impartial grand jury his error is cured by the failure of the defendant to show actual bias on the part of one or more grand jurors. On the contrary, the Washington Supreme Court said in State ex rel. Murphy v. Superior Court: </s> "Granting, for the sake of argument, that no real injustice has been done in this particular case, and that a fair jury was selected, to approve the method adopted by the court would be to permit a judge, if he so willed, to provide a grand jury of his own choosing in every case under color of law." 15 </s> Moreover, even if it were possible under Washington law so cavalierly to fritter away important rights of criminal procedure designed to achieve fairness, this record should satisfy the most doubting Thomas that the failure to insure a proper grand jury here was in fact not harmless. While the trial court made no determination as to whether the grand jury was prejudiced against Beck, four of the eight Washington Supreme Court judges who ruled on the question felt that a conclusive showing of prejudice had been made. Judge Donworth, speaking for those four judges, after an exhaustive review of the facts concluded: </s> "I think it would be unrealistic to believe that a very substantial number of the citizens of the community had not adopted, consciously or unconsciously, an attitude of bias and prejudice toward appellant at the time the grand jury was convened. If ever there [369 U.S. 541, 572] was a case which required the most stringent observance of every safeguard known to the law to protect a citizen against bias and prejudice, this was it." 16 </s> The other four judges did say: "There is no showing of bias or prejudice," but gave not the slightest evidentiary or even argumentative support to show the correctness of this offhand statement. 17 In these circumstances where there has been no finding by the trial court and where the highest court of the State has divided evenly so that there is no finding there either, our ordinary "solemn duty to make independent inquiry and determination of the disputed facts" 18 upon which the question of denial of equal protection of the law turns becomes particularly pointed. Considering the overwhelming evidence to support the four judges who thought that petitioner had made a showing of prejudice, it seems inconceivable to me that it can fairly be said that no showing of prejudice was made. </s> As to Beck's second claim, that it is a denial of equal protection of the law to afford those in jail or on bail the judicial assurance of an impartial grand jury while denying such protection to those not in jail or on bail like Beck, the Court apparently does not claim that the error was harmless but discovers yet another way to avoid having to pass on the plain merits of his constitutional claim. It concludes on a number of grounds that petitioner's claim was not properly presented to the Washington Supreme Court. I do not think any one of the Court's grounds or all of them together justify its avoidance of determining Beck's constitutional contention on its merits. </s> (a) It is said that this contention was not properly before the State Supreme Court because "Petitioner's [369 U.S. 541, 573] formal attack at the trial court level did not even mention 10.28.030 . . . ." But Beck did claim that that section had not been complied with both in his "Challenge to Grand Jury" and in his separate motion to set aside the indictment, both of which are set out in note 3 of the Court's opinion. In fact his challenge to the grand jury was specifically cast in the terms of 10.28.030. And Beck's reliance on 10.28.030 and related sections of Washington's grand jury statute was emphasized time and time again by his counsel's arguments to the trial court, both oral and written, on the challenge and on his separate motion to dismiss the indictment. For example, trial counsel said: </s> ". . . [T]he decisions which we have been able to find all indicate the same thing. That is, that the Grand Jury just like the trial jury, must be unbiased and unprejudiced, and indeed in a couple of the decisions they referred to this 10.28.030 in the same manner I have done to indicate the intent of the Legislature." 19 </s> (b) The Court says: "That the prosecution and the court viewed petitioner as outside the scope of 10.28.030 was brought home to him in the course of the trial court proceedings on his grand jury attack." I cannot agree that the trial court construed 10.28.030 as denying Beck the right to an impartial and unprejudiced grand jury or informed him to that effect. While it is true that the State's counsel argued and the trial court agreed that petitioner could not question the method of impaneling the grand jury by a "Challenge to Grand Jury," the trial court never even intimated that 10.28.030 limited its assurance of an impartial and unprejudiced grand jury [369 U.S. 541, 574] only to those who were indicted while they were in jail or out on bond. On the contrary, the trial court admitted, even though it ultimately denied petitioner's motion without further comment, that petitioner could attack the grand jury - "incidentally on a motion to set aside the indictment" - precisely the kind of motion the petitioner actually made under 10.40.070, which motion is set out in note 3 of the Court's opinion. </s> (c) The Court says that the State Supreme Court was not required to pass on petitioner's claim of denial of equal protection because it was not "definitely pointed out in the `assignments of error' in appellant's brief," as required by Rule 43 of the State Rules on Appeal. But as just pointed out the trial court had not construed the statute as denying Beck who was not in custody or on bail the benefit of an impartial grand jury while insuring such a grand jury for defendants who were in custody or on bail. Since the trial court had made no such ruling, Beck could not of course assign as error a ruling that had not been made. He did, however, properly assign errors which, as shown in the Court's note 4, were sufficiently broad to challenge the trial court's failure to comply with state law in insuring an impartial grand jury. That was all that he could do at that time. </s> (d) Another ground for this Court's refusal to rule on Beck's claim is that: "The Washington Supreme Court has unfailingly refused to consider constitutional attacks upon statutes not made in the trial court . . . ." But even a casual investigation of the opinions of that court shows that it has not "unfailingly" followed any such practice. 20 Moreover, no Washington case or any other [369 U.S. 541, 575] has been cited to prove that a question of equal protection of the law must be raised in the trial court even though that court does not itself ever make a ruling which denies equal protection of the law. And I would think that this Court would not tolerate use of such a state device to bar correction of constitutional violations. </s> (e) Finally while I disagree that Beck's claim has not been properly presented to the Washington Supreme Court, I find that wholly immaterial here. For as we said in Raley v. Ohio: "There can be no question as to the proper presentation of a federal claim when the highest state court passes on it." 21 And here although undoubtedly familiar with the state rule and the state cases dug up here by this Court for the first time to show that Beck's claim was not properly presented, the fact is that the eight judges of the Washington Supreme Court who sat in this case did actually pass on Beck's claim in his brief before them that to take away his right to an impartial grand jury because he was not in custody or on bail would deny him the equal protection of the laws. That claim in Beck's State Supreme Court brief was: </s> "In fact, to permit one who has already been arrested to challenge the mental qualifications of a grand juror, while denying this right to one who has not been arrested, would amount to a denial of equal protection of the law. This is particularly true . . . in the state of Washington . . . ." 22 </s> [369 U.S. 541, 576] </s> In response to Beck's claim Judge Donworth, speaking for the four judges who voted to reverse the conviction, fully agreed with his contention, saying: </s> "I do not understand how it can be said, under the facts shown in this record, that the reason entitling a person in custody or held to answer for an offense to be investigated by an impartial and unprejudiced grand jury, does not apply equally well to appellant. It is axiomatic that all men are equal before the law and are entitled to the same rights under the same or similar circumstances. </s> . . . . . </s> "Until the legislature amends or repeals the statutory law, . . . it must be applied with equal effect to every person whose conduct is under investigation by a grand jury pursuant to the court's charge to it." 23 </s> [369 U.S. 541, 577] </s> The other four judges, obviously disagreeing with their brethren and rejecting Beck's equal protection claim, held that "There was a reason" for the statutory guarantee of an impartial grand jury for one "in custody or held to answer for an offense," although denying it to one not in custody or on bail. 24 </s> (f) The Court also goes so far as to say that Beck's constitutional question was not included among those questions presented which our writ of certiorari was granted to review. I disagree. In the questions presented in the petition for certiorari and in the brief supporting that petition, counsel for Beck repeatedly asserted that in the manner of selecting this grand jury Beck had been denied the equal protection of the law. The core of all these claims is discrimination growing out of the manner of the selection of the grand jury. The particular classification claim which the Court seeks to avoid passing on is also a claimed discrimination with reference to the manner of selection of the grand jury. Since all these contentions are inextricably intertwined, under our decision of last term in Boynton v. Virginia 25 I see no more reason for refusing to pass on one than another. That case held a statutory claim of discrimination to have been sufficiently raised where discrimination generally was "the core of the . . . broad constitutional questions presented." Moreover, I agree with MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS that under Rule 23 which prohibits "unnecessary detail" and which deems a question presented "to include every subsidiary question fairly comprised therein" even the most general claim of equal protection would have been sufficient to raise petitioner's claim. </s> The petitioner here, however, has no need to rely on either the Boynton case or on the broad mandate of Rule 23, for his claims are clearly encompassed among the [369 U.S. 541, 578] specific questions as to which the writ of certiorari was granted. Two of those questions read in part: </s> ". . . [D]oes a person . . . have a right under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to have the charges and evidence considered by a grand jury which was fair and impartial or, at least, which was instructed and directed to act fairly and impartially?" </s> ". . . [D]id he [petitioner] have a right under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to have the grand jury impaneled in a manner which would prevent or at least tend to prevent the selection of biased and prejudiced grand jurors?" </s> Since petitioner's claim is that he was denied equal protection of the law by the failure of the presiding judge to provide the protection, guaranteed to others, of a grand jury impaneled in a manner that would insure against biased and prejudiced grand jurors, it seems inconceivable that this conviction should be sustained on the basis that the claim was not included in the petition for certiorari. </s> The net result of what has taken place in the Washington Supreme Court and here is to leave Beck in this predicament: the State Supreme Court considered his contention, tried to decide it but could not because it was equally divided; this Court on the contrary refuses to decide it at all on the ground that Beck has never raised such a question anywhere. The practical consequence of this predicament is to accept the argument of the State that if Beck's constitutional rights are to be protected he must depend upon "the Washington legislature and not the United States Supreme Court." 26 For this Court to [369 U.S. 541, 579] accept such a consequence seems to me to be an abandonment of its solemn responsibility to protect the constitutional rights of the people. </s> The rules of practice which Congress and this Court have adopted over the course of years to crystallize and define the issues properly before the Court were designed to assist the Court in the fair and impartial administration of justice. I cannot believe that this end has been achieved here. </s> [Footnote 1 Revised Code of Washington 10.28.030. The bracketed portion is from 10.28.010, a companion section relating to challenges to the entire grand jury panel. These provisions were 45-46 of the original 1854 Act, Washington Territory Acts, p. 110. </s> [Footnote 2 82 Wash. 284, 286, 144 P. 32, 32-33. </s> [Footnote 3 185 Wash. 464, 475, 56 P.2d 160, 164. </s> [Footnote 4 These four judges were of the opinion that the above-cited statute and cases required this case to be decided on the "premise that . . . [Beck], as a matter of law, was entitled to an impartial and unprejudiced grand jury," and that the "failure of the court to interrogate the jurors for the existence of possible bias and prejudice against the officers of the teamsters' union constituted prejudicial error." State v. Beck, 56 Wash. 2d 474, 519, 520, 349 P.2d 387, 412, 413. Judge Hunter in a separate opinion stated that the requirement of impartiality "was announced as essential to a grand jury proceeding by both the legislature and the supreme court of this state, in the statutes and decisions . . . ." 56 Wash. 2d, at 537, 349 P.2d, at 423-424. </s> [Footnote 5 The following were quoted to us as typical voir dire questions asked by presiding judges in the impaneling of two recent grand juries in Washington: </s> "`Q - Would there be anything in your acquaintanceship with Mr. Schuster that would in any way tend to affect your decisions in this Grand Jury investigation? [369 U.S. 541, 561] </s> "`A - I don't think so. </s> "`Q - In other words, you wouldn't have any hatred or malice or fear or favor or anything of that nature so far as your deliberating would be concerned in connection with this investigation? </s> "`A - No.'" </s> "`Q - From what you have heard, and I don't believe you live in a vacuum any more than the rest of us, is there anything you have read or that has been suggested by the court in these proceedings that would suggest to you why you couldn't be fair, impartial and objective in making an examination into law enforcement in this county? </s> "`A - No, sir.'" </s> [Footnote 6 The four judges who voted to reverse this conviction below relied in part upon this acknowledgment, saying: </s> "The state has filed a comprehensive brief consisting of one hundred fifty pages containing the following answer to appellant's argument regarding his right to an impartial and unprejudiced grand jury: </s> "`Appellant asserts that the denial of his motion to set aside the indictment constituted error under our statutes and constitution and the constitution of the United States (App. Br. 35). </s> "`. . . Except for citing the well-recognized rule that grand juries should be impartial and unprejudiced (App. Br. 37), the cases are not otherwise applicable.'" (Emphasis supplied by the Washington [369 U.S. 541, 562] Supreme Court.) Among the cases cited in appellant's state court brief to support his contention that the grand jury was not organized in accordance with state law were Watts v. Washington Territory, 1 Wash. Terr. 409; State ex rel. Murphy v. Superior Court, 82 Wash. 284, 144 P. 32; and State v. Guthrie, 185 Wash. 464, 56 P.2d 160. </s> [Footnote 7 "The amount, intensity, and derogatory nature of the publicity received by appellant during this period is without precedent in the state of Washington." 56 Wash. 2d, at 511, 349 P.2d, at 408 (opinion of Judge Donworth for the four judges who voted to reverse). </s> [Footnote 8 No prospective grand juror was asked if he was prejudiced against Beck, and only three were asked if they were conscious of bias or prejudice of any kind. Two of these were excused. </s> [Footnote 9 Although 52 prospective jurors were admitted to voir dire, nine of these were excused for personal reasons of health or convenience and were not therefore questioned by either counsel. </s> [Footnote 10 See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96, 104 -105. Cf. McFarland v. American Sugar Refining Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86 . </s> [Footnote 11 Unlike this case, which involves the contention that the failure of the Washington courts to apply their prior settled law as to a single statute denies petitioner Beck the equal protection of the law, Milwaukee Elec. R. Co. v. Milwaukee, 252 U.S. 100 , involves the question of whether the Wisconsin Supreme Court was inconsistent in its treatment of two different municipal legislative provisions. </s> [Footnote 12 56 Wash. 2d, at 480, 349 P.2d, at 390. </s> [Footnote 13 Even before the adoption of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, other courts had refused to allow any distinction as to the right to a proper composition of a grand jury under state law between those in jail or on bail and those merely subject to grand jury investigation. Thus in United States v. Blodgett, 30 Fed. Cas. 1157, 1159 (No. 18312), the court said: </s> "True, he was not arrested and imprisoned on any criminal charge, and now brought hither by order of the court, nor is he under bail or recognizance; but because he is not in any of these constrained positions, is he any the less entitled to a grand jury of his country, legally qualified under its laws? Surely not." </s> And in McQuillen v. State, 16 Miss. 587, 597, the Mississippi court said as to a purported distinction between the right of persons in court at the time of indictment to challenge grand jurors for cause and the right of those not in court to challenge such jurors: </s> "[T]he law works unequally by allowing one class of persons to object to the competency of the grand jury, whilst another class has no such privilege. This cannot be. The law furnishes the same security to all, and the same principle which gives to a prisoner in court the right to challenge, gives to one who is not in court the right to accomplish the same end by plea . . . ." See also Hardin v. State, 22 Ind. 347, 351-352; Crowley v. United States, 194 U.S. 461, 469 -470. </s> [Footnote 14 Cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 . </s> [Footnote 15 82 Wash. 284, 287-288, 144 P. 32, 33. </s> [Footnote 16 56 Wash. 2d, at 512, 349 P.2d, at 408. </s> [Footnote 17 56 Wash. 2d, at 480, 349 P.2d, at 390. </s> [Footnote 18 Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 358 . </s> [Footnote 19 The decisions referred to were Watts v. Washington Territory, 1 Wash. Terr. 409; State ex rel. Murphy v. Superior Court, 82 Wash. 284, 144 P. 32; and State v. Guthrie, 185 Wash. 464, 56 P.2d 160. </s> [Footnote 20 See, e. g., Washington v. Griffith, 52 Wash. 2d 721, 328 P.2d 897; Lee v. Seattle-First National Bank, 49 Wash. 2d 254, 299 P.2d 1066. </s> [Footnote 21 360 U.S. 423, 436 . </s> [Footnote 22 I know of no reason why this Court should say that the Washington Supreme Court would not "search through the brief" "to find" this contention, for I am not willing to assume that the members of the highest court of Washington did not read the briefs of the parties in this case. I must also take issue with the Court's view that this particular constitutional contention was stated in only one sentence. As I read the briefs before me petitioner took up almost two whole [369 U.S. 541, 576] pages in presenting this argument and cites eight cases and other authorities. Moreover, the four State Supreme Court judges who voted to affirm and who had petitioner's brief before them referred to that part of the brief devoted to the "Grand Jury Proceedings" as "the longest section of appellant's brief." 56 Wash. 2d, at 475, 349 P.2d, at 387. Since they had to read this section to refer to it in this way and to discuss it, I am at a complete loss to understand the Court's further statement that petitioner's argument on this point was "considered by the Washington Supreme Court to be an abandonment or waiver of such contention." I can only consider the abandonment found by this Court to be an ex post facto abandonment as far as the Washington Supreme Court is concerned because as pointed out above that court actually considered and passed on the point. </s> [Footnote 23 56 Wash. 2d, at 528, 530, 349 P.2d, at 418, 419. (Emphasis supplied by Judge Donworth.) To suggest, as the Court does, that this discussion involves "interpretation" of the statute but does not relate to equal protection of the laws is to draw a distinction that simply does not exist. What the four judges who wanted to reverse this conviction said in the plainest words possible was that the interpretation of the statute adopted by the four who voted to affirm is one that is wrong because, among other reasons, it denies equal protection of the law. </s> [Footnote 24 56 Wash. 2d, at 479, 349 P.2d, at 390. </s> [Footnote 25 364 U.S. 454, 457 . </s> [Footnote 26 That argument was fully set out in the State's Opposition to the Petition for certiorari: "The effect of the Washington court decision in the instant case is that the meaning of Washington statutes in [369 U.S. 541, 579] regard to grand juries cannot be determined at this point. It would follow that this determination also is binding on the United States Supreme Court. </s> "Since there is neither a Federal nor a Washington state Constitutional right to an impartial grand jury, and the Washington Supreme Court cannot determine what the Washington statutes prescribe in that regard, the Washington legislature and not the United States Supreme Court must answer that question." (Emphasis supplied.) </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting. </s> I. </s> Although, according to Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 , Washington need not use the grand jury in order to bring criminal charges against persons, it occasionally does use one; and a grand jury was impaneled in this case. It is well settled that when either the Federal Government or a State uses a grand jury, the accused is entitled to those procedures which will insure, so far as possible, that the grand jury selected is fair and impartial. 1 That [369 U.S. 541, 580] is the reason why the systematic exclusion of Negroes from grand jury service infects the accusatory process. See Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 ; Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 . The same principle was applied in Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 , when Mexicans were systematically excluded from duty as grand and petit jurors. The same principle would also apply "if a law should be passed excluding all naturalized Celtic Irishmen" from grand jury duty. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 . </s> Racial discrimination is only one aspect of the grand jury problem. As stated in Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59 , ". . . the most valuable function of the grand jury was not only to examine into the commission of crimes, but to stand between the prosecutor and the accused, and to determine whether the charge was founded upon credible testimony or was dictated by malice or personal ill will." We emphasized in Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 485 , the importance of "the continuing necessity that prosecutors and courts alike be `alert to repress' any abuses of the investigatory power" of the grand jury. 2 We recently stated in Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 , that: </s> "The grand jury is an English institution, brought to this country by the early colonists and incorporated in the Constitution by the Founders. There is every reason to believe that our constitutional grand jury was intended to operate substantially like its English progenitor. The basic purpose of the English grand jury was to provide a fair method for instituting criminal proceedings against persons believed to have committed crimes." (Italics added.) [369 U.S. 541, 581] </s> The Washington Supreme Court, which affirmed this judgment of conviction, did so by an equally divided vote. The four voting for affirmance stated that absent a statutory requirement, "bias or prejudice" on the part of the grand jury was irrelevant. 56 Wash. 2d 474, 480, 349 P.2d 387, 390. </s> The case of Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 , is offered as justification for the use of an unfair procedure in bringing this charge against petitioner. We there held that forcibly abducting a person and bringing him into the State did not vitiate a state conviction where the trial was fair and pursuant to constitutional procedural requirements. Here, however, a part of the criminal proceeding is itself infected with unfairness. Whether it was necessary to use the grand jury is immaterial. It was used; and the question is whether it was used unfairly. The case is, therefore, like those where procedures, anterior to the trial, are oppressive. A notorious example is an unlawful arrest or the use of detention by the police to obtain a confession. See, e. g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 ; Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 ; Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 ; Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 ; Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 . Another example is denial of the right to counsel. As stated in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 , that right extends to a period anterior to the trial itself "when consultation, thorough-going investigation and preparation" are "vitally important." Cf. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324 (concurring opinion). </s> Could we possibly sustain a conviction obtained in either a state or federal court where the grand jury that brought the charge was composed of the accused's political enemies? If we did, we would sanction prosecution for private, not public, purposes. Whenever unfairness can be shown to infect any part of a criminal proceeding, we should hold that the requirements of due process are lacking. [369 U.S. 541, 582] </s> A dissent in Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 298 , said, "It hardly lies in the mouth of a defendant whom a fairly chosen trial jury has found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, to say that his indictment is attributable to prejudice." Id., at 302. But the Court did not agree. Since a grand jury was used to indict, the Court held the grand jury to constitutional requirements. We should do the same here. As we stated in Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 406 : </s> "It is the State's function, not ours, to assess the evidence against a defendant. But it is our duty as well as the State's to see to it that throughout the procedure for bringing him to justice he shall enjoy the protection which the Constitution guarantees. Where, as in this case, timely objection has laid bare a discrimination in the selection of grand jurors, the conviction cannot stand, because the Constitution prohibits the procedure by which it was obtained." </s> A grand jury serves a high function. As stated in United States v. Wells, 163 F. 313, 324: </s> "It is a familiar historical fact that the system was devised to prevent harassments growing out of malicious, unfounded, or vexatious accusations. That it serves the purpose of allowing prosecutions to be initiated by the people themselves in no way detracts from the fact that it still stands as a safeguard against arbitrary or oppressive action." </s> The same view was stated by Mr. Justice Field, sitting as Circuit Justice: </s> "In this country, from the popular character of our institutions, there has seldom been any contest between the government and the citizen, which required the existence of the grand jury as a protection against oppressive action of the government. [369 U.S. 541, 583] Yet the institution was adopted in this country, and is continued from considerations similar to those which give to it its chief value in England, and is designed as a means, not only of bringing to trial persons accused of public offenses upon just grounds, but also as a means of protecting the citizen against unfounded accusation, whether it come from government or be prompted by partisan passion or private enmity." 30 Fed. Cas. 992, 993, No. 18,255. </s> One who reads this record is left with doubts of the most serious character that the procedure used in the selection of the grand jury was fair in light of the unusual conditions that obtained at the time. </s> II. </s> Petitioner on March 26 and 27, 1957, appeared before a Senate Committee in Washington, D.C., and during his questioning invoked the Fifth Amendment 150 times. </s> On May 2, 1957, petitioner was indicted in Tacoma by a federal grand jury for income tax evasion. </s> On May 8, 1957, petitioner was recalled to testify before the Senate Committee and during another long interrogation invoked the Fifth Amendment about 60 times. </s> During these hearings the Committee members made various comments concerning petitioner. As Judge Donworth, speaking for himself and three other members of the Supreme Court of Washington, said: </s> "These comments, which were extremely derogatory to appellant, were widely circulated by all news media throughout the United States, and particularly in the Seattle area. In these comments, appellant was characterized as a thief, and it was asserted that he was guilty of fraud and other illegal conduct with respect to his management of the affairs of the teamsters' union as its principal officer in the eleven [369 U.S. 541, 584] western states, and later in his position as its international president. </s> "These conclusions and opinions (particularly those expressed by Senator McClellan, the chairman of the committee) were displayed by local newspapers on the front page in prominent headlines. The following are a few of the comments which were referred to in such headlines which appeared in Seattle newspapers: </s> "`TEAMSTERS' CASH KEPT GOING TO BECK AFTER HE BECAME UNION PRESIDENT, SAYS PROBER.' Seattle Times, March 23, 1957. </s> . . . . . </s> "`BECK GIVES "BLACK EYE" TO LABOR, SAYS SEN. McNAMARA.' Seattle Times, March 27, 1957. </s> "`SENATE PROBE LIFTS LID ON BECK BEER BUSINESS - USE OF UNION MONEY RELATED.' Seattle Post-Intelligencer, May 9, 1957. </s> "Substantial portions of the committee proceedings relating to these charges were also reproduced in the course of news broadcasts on local radio and television stations. </s> "The amount, intensity, and derogatory nature of the publicity received by appellant during this period is without precedent in the state of Washington. A Seattle newspaper carried a news item reporting that the switchboard of a local radio station that had broadcast the committee proceedings on the preceding day was jammed with calls, and that the officials of the station characterized the response to the broadcast on the part of the public as `astounding,' and that such response was greater than that resulting from any other broadcast ever aired by them. The serious accusations made by United States senators in the committee hearings are generally regarded by [369 U.S. 541, 585] laymen as being officials charges (which appellant had refused to answer), and thus the impression was created among the general public that appellant had been found guilty of a crime." 56 Wash. 2d 474, 510-512, 349 P.2d 387, 408. </s> The grand jury which returned the indictment was convened on May 20, 1957. </s> The effect of the saturation of Seattle with this adverse publicity was summarized by Judge Donworth: </s> "The natural effect of this publicity was that, in the eyes of the average citizen, the character of appellant had been thoroughly discredited in the Seattle area on or before May 20, 1957." 56 Wash. 2d, at 512, 349 P.2d, at 408. </s> The trial court at the time of the selection of the petit jury referred to the publicity the case had received in the papers and over the radio and TV and sought to determine whether any jurors had become prejudiced or biased against the accused. The judge who impaneled the grand jury took no such precautions. He excused three who might have been prejudiced because they were or had been members of petitioner's union or of affiliated unions. He excused one employer who in reply to the question "Are you conscious of any bias, prejudice or sympathy in this case at all?" said, "That is pretty hard to answer." Of the six he excused, two admitted prejudice. Not once did the judge inquire as to the intensive adverse publicity petitioner had received and its likely effect on each juror. He asked two types of questions. The one already noted, whether the juror was conscious of bias, etc., and the other one, "Is there anything about sitting on this grand jury that might embarrass you at all?" It seems to me that the judge was derelict in failing to ascertain whether the amount of adverse [369 U.S. 541, 586] publicity petitioner had received had prejudiced the jurors toward the case about to be presented. Although he made no such inquiry of any juror, he proceeded upon the assumption that the grand jury had full knowledge of the activities of the Senate Committee: </s> "We come now to the purpose of this grand jury and the reasons which the judges of this court thought sufficient to justify the expense to the county, and the inconvenience to and sacrifice by you, which this grand jury session will require. </s> "It seems unnecessary to review the recent testimony before a Senate Investigating Committee except to say that disclosures have been made indicating that officers of the Teamsters Union have, through trick and device, embezzled or stolen hundreds of thousands of dollars of the funds of that union - money which had come to the union from the dues of its members. It has been alleged that many of these transactions, through which the money was siphoned out of the union treasury, occurred in King County. Such crimes, if committed, cannot be punished under Federal law, or under any law other than that of the State of Washington, and prosecution must take place in King County. The necessary criminal charges can only be brought in this county upon indictment by the grand jury or information filed by the prosecuting attorney. </s> "The president of the Teamsters Union has publicly declared that the money he received from the union was a loan which he has repaid. This presents a question of fact, the truth of which is for you to ascertain. </s> "You may find that many of the transactions happened more than three years ago; this would raise the question of the statute of limitations, which ordinarily [369 U.S. 541, 587] bars a prosecution for larceny after three years. There are some instances, however, where the period is extended. This is a question of law and you should be guided by the advice of the prosecutors on this and similar questions. Your investigation may conceivably result in the adoption of better standards of conduct for union officials." </s> No admonition was given that radio, television, and newspaper reports were not the gospel. No warning was made that one who invokes the Fifth Amendment does not admit guilt. No admonition was given that the deliberations should be free of bias or prejudice. The question is not whether one who receives large-scale adverse publicity can escape grand jury investigation nor whether the hue and cry attendant on adverse publicity must have died down before the grand jury can make its investigation. This case shows the need to make as sure as is humanly possible that one after whom the mob and public passion are in full pursuit is treated fairly, that the grand jury stands between him and an aroused public, that the judge uses the necessary procedures to insure dispassionate consideration of the charge. </s> The State of Washington uses the grand jury only occasionally, the normal method of accusation being by information. Whether grand jurors in other cases are screened for bias or prejudice does not appear. Yet on the assumption that they are not, Beck's objections should not be in vain. Whether the unfair device is used customarily or only once, it does not comport with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. </s> III. </s> I think the Court is correct in rejecting the general equal protection question on the merits. But I do think that a narrow phase of equal protection was raised and [369 U.S. 541, 588] should be decided in petitioner's favor. 3 It is conceded that if Beck had been "in custody or held to answer for an offense" he would have been entitled to challenge the grand jurors for prejudice. 56 Wash. 2d, at 479, 349 P.2d [369 U.S. 541, 589] ___, at 390. To grant that class the right to challenge for prejudice and to deny it to those who are merely under investigation is to draw a line not warranted by the requirements of equal protection. I agree with the views of Judge Donworth, with whom Judges Finley, Hunter, and Rosellini concurred: </s> "I do not understand how it can be said, under the facts shown in this record, that the reason entitling a person in custody or held to answer for an offense to be investigated by an impartial and unprejudiced grand jury, does not apply equally well to appellant. It is axiomatic that all men are equal before the law and are entitled to the same rights under the same or similar circumstances." 56 Wash. 2d, at 528, 349 P.2d, at 418. </s> [Footnote 1 Since petitioner was not represented by counsel at the impaneling of the grand jury, his objection at the return of the indictment was timely. As stated in Crowley v. United States, 194 U.S. 461, 469 -470: </s> "Some of the cases have gone so far as to hold that an objection to the personal qualifications of grand jurors is not available for the accused unless made before the indictment is returned in court. Such a rule would, in many cases, operate to deny altogether the right of an accused to question the qualifications of those who found [369 U.S. 541, 580] the indictment against him; for he may not know, indeed, is not entitled, of right, to know, that his acts are the subject of examination by the grand jury." </s> [Footnote 2 See Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10 Ore. L. Rev. 217. </s> [Footnote 3 This is not a case where decision is asked on a question not "formally presented" by the petition for certiorari, as was true in General Pictures Co. v. Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175, 179 . It appears from the record that the question of equal protection was a "definite issue" decided by the Washington Supreme Court (Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Duvall, 225 U.S. 477, 487 ); and in at least two places in the questions presented by the petition for certiorari that decision was challenged for denial of equal protection. This was clearly sufficient, as Rule 23 (1) (c), in haec verba, discourages detailed amplification of the questions presented: </s> "The questions presented for review, expressed in the terms and circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail. The statement of a question presented will be deemed to include every subsidiary question fairly comprised therein. . . ." </s> The petition states, inter alia: </s> "1. Where accusation is by a grand jury indictment, does a person (in this case a member and officer of a labor union who at the time of the grand jury proceedings was the subject of continuous, extensive and intensely prejudicial publicity) have a right under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to have the charges and evidence considered by a grand jury which was fair and impartial or, at least, which was instructed and directed to act fairly and impartially? </s> "(a) Where petitioner was a member and officer of a labor union, and where prejudicial and inflammatory charges against him were being widely and intensively disseminated by all news media, did he have a right under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to have the grand jury impaneled in a manner which would prevent or at least tend to prevent the selection of biased and prejudiced grand jurors?" </s> This is enough to bring the case within our rule that only the questions "urged in the petition for certiorari and incidental to their determination will be considered on review." Rorick v. Devon Syndicate, 307 U.S. 299, 303 . </s> At least four of the judges below thought that the equal protection point treated in this dissent was an issue. For after referring to the Washington statute which gives those in custody or held to answer [369 U.S. 541, 589] for an offense the right to an impartial and unprejudiced grand jury (56 Wash. 2d, at 527-528, 349 P.2d, at 417) they stated: "Until the legislature amends or repeals the statutory law, quoted and emphasized above, it must be applied with equal effect to every person whose conduct is under investigation by a grand jury pursuant to the court's charge to it." 56 Wash. 2d, at 530, 349 P.2d, at 419. That seems to me sufficient to bring this ruling within the statement in Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 436 , to the effect that "There can be no question as to the proper presentation of a federal claim when the highest state court passes on it." </s> [369 U.S. 541, 590]

United States Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. JACKSON(1968) No. 85 Argued: December 7, 1967Decided: April 8, 1968 </s> The Federal Kidnaping Act provides that interstate kidnapers "shall be punished (1) by death if the kidnaped person has not been liberated unharmed, and if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend, or (2) by imprisonment for any term of years or for life, if the death penalty is not imposed." The District Court dismissed the count of an indictment charging appellees with violating the Act because it makes "the risk of death" the price for asserting the right to trial by jury and thus "impairs . . . free exercise" of that constitutional right. The Government appealed directly to this Court. Held: The death penalty clause imposes an impermissible burden upon the exercise of a constitutional right, but that provision is severable from the remainder of the Act and the unconstitutionality of that clause does not require the defeat of the Act as a whole. Pp. 572-591. </s> 262 F. Supp. 716, reversed and remanded. </s> Ralph S. Spritzer argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Richard A. Posner, Beatrice Rosenberg and Marshall Tamor Golding. </s> Steven B. Duke argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief for appellee Jackson was Stephen I. Traub. Ira B. Grudberg was on the brief for appellee Walsh. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The Federal Kidnaping Act, 18 U.S.C. 1201 (a), provides: </s> "Whoever knowingly transports in interstate . . . commerce, any person who has been unlawfully . . . kidnaped . . . and held for ransom . . . or otherwise [390 U.S. 570, 571] . . . shall be punished (1) by death if the kidnaped person has not been liberated unharmed, and if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend, or (2) by imprisonment for any term of years or for life, if the death penalty is not imposed." </s> This statute thus creates an offense punishable by death "if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend." The statute sets forth no procedure for imposing the death penalty upon a defendant who waives the right to jury trial or upon one who pleads guilty. </s> On October 10, 1966, a federal grand jury in Connecticut returned an indictment charging in count one that three named defendants, the appellees in this case, had transported from Connecticut to New Jersey a person who had been kidnaped and held for ransom, and who had been harmed when liberated. 1 The District Court dismissed this count of the indictment, 2 holding the Federal Kidnaping Act unconstitutional because it makes "the risk of death" the price for asserting the right to jury trial, and thereby "impairs . . . free exercise" of that constitutional right. 3 The Government appealed [390 U.S. 570, 572] directly to this Court, 4 and we noted probable jurisdiction. 5 We reverse. </s> We agree with the District Court that the death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnaping Act imposes an impermissible burden upon the exercise of a constitutional right, but we think that provision is severable from the remainder of the statute. There is no reason to invalidate the law in its entirety simply because its capital punishment clause violates the Constitution. The District Court therefore erred in dismissing the kidnaping count of the indictment. </s> I. </s> One fact at least is obvious from the face of the statute itself: In an interstate kidnaping case where the victim has not been liberated unharmed, the defendant's assertion of the right to jury trial may cost him his life, for the federal statute authorizes the jury - and only the jury - to return a verdict of death. The Government does not dispute this proposition. What it disputes is the conclusion that the statute thereby subjects the defendant who seeks a jury trial to an increased hazard of capital punishment. As the Government construes the statute, a defendant who elects to be tried by a jury cannot be put to death even if the jury so recommends - unless the trial judge agrees that capital punishment should be imposed. Moreover, the argument goes, a defendant cannot avoid the risk of death by attempting to plead guilty or waive jury trial. For even if the trial judge accepts a guilty plea or approves a jury waiver, the judge remains free, in the Government's view of the statute, to convene a special jury for the limited purpose of deciding whether to recommend the death penalty. The Government thus contends that, whether or not the [390 U.S. 570, 573] defendant chooses to submit to a jury the question of his guilt, the death penalty may be imposed if and only if both judge and jury concur in its imposition. On this understanding of the statute, the Government concludes that the death penalty provision of the Kidnaping Act does not operate to penalize the defendant who chooses to contest his guilt before a jury. It is unnecessary to decide here whether this conclusion would follow from the statutory scheme the Government envisions, 6 for it is not in fact the scheme that Congress enacted. </s> At the outset, we reject the Government's argument that the Federal Kidnaping Act gives the trial judge discretion to set aside a jury recommendation of death. So far as we are aware, not once in the entire 34-year history of the Act has a jury's recommendation of death been discarded by a trial judge. 7 The Government would [390 U.S. 570, 574] apparently have us assume either that trial judges have always agreed with jury recommendations of capital punishment under the statute - an unrealistic assumption at best 8 - or that they have abdicated their statutory duty to exercise independent judgment on the issue of penalty. In fact, the explanation is a far simpler one. The statute unequivocally states that, "if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend," the defendant "shall be punished . . . by death . . . ." The word is "shall," not "may." 9 In acceding without exception to jury recommendations [390 U.S. 570, 575] of death, trial judges have simply carried out the mandate of the statute. </s> The Government nonetheless urges that we overlook Congress' choice of the imperative. Whatever might have been assumed in the past, we are now asked to construe the statute so as to eliminate the jury's power to fix the death penalty without the approval of the presiding judge. "[T]his reading," it is said, would conform "to the long tradition that makes the trial judge in the federal courts the arbiter of the sentence." And so it would. The difficulty is that Congress intentionally discarded that tradition when it passed the Federal Kidnaping Act. Over the forcefully articulated objection that jury sentencing would represent an unwarranted departure from settled federal practice, 10 Congress rejected a version of the Kidnaping Act that would have [390 U.S. 570, 576] left punishment to the court's discretion 11 and instead chose an alternative that shifted from a single judge to a jury of 12 the onus of inflicting the penalty of death. 12 To accept the Government's suggestion that the jury's sentencing role be treated as merely advisory would return to the judge the ultimate duty that Congress deliberately placed in other hands. </s> The thrust of the clause in question was clearly expressed by the House Judiciary Committee that drafted it: Its purpose was, quite simply, "to permit the jury to designate a death penalty for the kidnaper." 13 The fact that Congress chose the word "recommend" to describe what the jury would do in designating punishment cannot obscure the basic congressional objective of making the jury rather than the judge the arbiter of the death sentence. The Government's contrary contention cannot stand. </s> Equally untenable is the Government's argument that the Kidnaping Act authorizes a procedure unique in the federal system - that of convening a special jury, without the defendant's consent, for the sole purpose of deciding [390 U.S. 570, 577] whether he should be put to death. We are told initially that the Federal Kidnaping Act authorizes this procedure by implication. The Government's reasoning runs as follows: The Kidnaping Act permits the infliction of capital punishment whenever a jury so recommends. The Act does not state in so many words that the jury recommending capital punishment must be a jury impaneled to determine guilt as well. Therefore the Act authorizes infliction of the death penalty on the recommendation of a jury specially convened to determine punishment. The Government finds support for this analysis in a Seventh Circuit decision construing the Federal Kidnaping Act to mean that the death penalty may be imposed whenever "an affirmative recommendation [is] made by a jury," including a jury convened solely for that purpose after the court has accepted a guilty plea. Seadlund v. United States, 97 F.2d 742, 748. Accord, Robinson v. United States, 264 F. Supp. 146, 153. But the statute does not say "a jury." It says "the jury." At least when the defendant demands trial by jury on the issue of guilt, the Government concedes that "the verdict of the jury" means what those words naturally suggest: the general verdict of conviction or acquittal returned by the jury that passes upon guilt or innocence. Thus, when such a jury has been convened, the statutory reference is to that jury alone, not to a jury impaneled after conviction for the limited purpose of determining punishment. 14 Yet the Government argues that, when the issue of guilt has been tried to a judge or has been eliminated altogether by a plea of guilty, "the verdict of the jury" at once assumes a completely new meaning. In such a case, it is said, "the verdict of the jury" means the recommendation [390 U.S. 570, 578] of a jury convened for the sole purpose of deciding whether the accused should live or die. </s> The Government would have us give the statute this strangely bifurcated meaning without the slightest indication that Congress contemplated any such scheme. Not a word in the legislative history so much as hints that a conviction on a plea of guilty or a conviction by a court sitting without a jury might be followed by a separate sentencing proceeding before a penalty jury. If the power to impanel such a jury had been recognized elsewhere in the federal system when Congress enacted the Federal Kidnaping Act, perhaps Congress' total silence on the subject could be viewed as a tacit incorporation of this sentencing practice into the new law. But the background against which Congress legislated was barren of any precedent for the sort of sentencing procedure we are told Congress impliedly authorized. </s> The Government nonetheless maintains that Congress' failure to provide for the infliction of the death penalty upon those who plead guilty or waive jury trial was no more than an oversight that the courts can and should correct. At least twice, Congress has expressly authorized the infliction of capital punishment upon defendants convicted without a jury, 15 but even on the assumption [390 U.S. 570, 579] that the failure of Congress to do so here was wholly inadvertent, it would hardly be the province of the courts to fashion a remedy. Any attempt to do so would be fraught with the gravest difficulties: If a special jury were convened to recommend a sentence, how would the penalty hearing proceed? What would each side be required to show? What standard of proof would govern? To what extent would conventional rules of evidence be abrogated? What privileges would the accused enjoy? Congress, unlike the state legislatures that have authorized jury proceedings to determine the penalty in capital cases, 16 has addressed itself to none of these questions. 17 </s> [390 U.S. 570, 580] </s> It is one thing to fill a minor gap in a statute - to extrapolate from its general design details that were inadvertently omitted. It is quite another thing to create from whole cloth a complex and completely novel procedure and to thrust it upon unwilling defendants for the sole purpose of rescuing a statute from a charge of unconstitutionality. We recognize that trial judges sitting in federal kidnaping cases have on occasion chosen the latter course, attempting to fashion on an ad hoc basis the ground rules for penalty proceedings before a jury. 18 We do not know what kinds of rules particular federal judges have adopted, how widely such rules have varied, or how fairly they have been applied. But one thing at least is clear: Individuals forced to defend their lives in proceedings tailor-made for the occasion must do so without the guidance that defendants ordinarily find in a body of procedural and evidentiary rules spelled out in advance of trial. 19 The Government notes with approval [390 U.S. 570, 581] "the decisional trend which has sought . . . to place the most humane construction on capital legislation." Yet it asks us to extend the capital punishment provision of the Federal Kidnaping Act in a new and uncharted direction, without the compulsion of a legislative mandate and without the benefit of legislative guidance. That we decline to do. </s> II. </s> Under the Federal Kidnaping Act, therefore, the defendant who abandons the right to contest his guilt before a jury is assured that he cannot be executed; the defendant ingenuous enough to seek a jury acquittal stands forewarned that, if the jury finds him guilty and does not wish to spare his life, he will die. Our problem is to decide whether the Constitution permits the establishment of such a death penalty, applicable only to those defendants who assert the right to contest their guilt before a jury. The inevitable effect of any such provision is, of course, to discourage assertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty 20 and to deter exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury trial. If the provision had no other purpose or effect than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then it would be patently unconstitutional. But, as the Government notes, limiting the death penalty to cases where the jury recommends its imposition does have another objective: It avoids the more drastic alternative of mandatory [390 U.S. 570, 582] capital punishment in every case. In this sense, the selective death penalty procedure established by the Federal Kidnaping Act may be viewed as ameliorating the severity of the more extreme punishment that Congress might have wished to provide. 21 </s> The Government suggests that, because the Act thus operates "to mitigate the severity of punishment," it is irrelevant that it "may have the incidental effect of inducing defendants not to contest in full measure." 22 We cannot agree. Whatever might be said of Congress' objectives, they cannot be pursued by means that needlessly chill the exercise of basic constitutional rights. Cf. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 ; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 -489. The question is not whether the chilling effect is "incidental" rather than intentional; the question is whether that effect is unnecessary and therefore excessive. In this case the answer to that question is clear. The Congress can of course mitigate the severity of capital punishment. The goal of limiting the death penalty to cases in which a jury recommends it is an entirely legitimate one. But that goal can be achieved without penalizing those defendants who plead not guilty and demand jury trial. In some States, for example, the choice between life imprisonment and capital punishment is left to a jury in every case - regardless of how the defendant's guilt has been determined. 23 Given the availability of this and other alternatives, it is clear that the selective death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnaping Act cannot be justified [390 U.S. 570, 583] by its ostensible purpose. Whatever the power of Congress to impose a death penalty for violation of the Federal Kidnaping Act, Congress cannot impose such a penalty in a manner that needlessly penalizes the assertion of a constitutional right. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 . 24 </s> It is no answer to urge, as does the Government, that federal trial judges may be relied upon to reject coerced pleas of guilty and involuntary waivers of jury trial. For the evil in the federal statute is not that it necessarily coerces guilty pleas and jury waivers but simply that it needlessly encourages them. A procedure need not be inherently coercive in order that it be held to impose an impermissible burden upon the assertion of a constitutional right. Thus the fact that the Federal Kidnaping Act tends to discourage defendants from insisting upon their innocence and demanding trial by jury hardly implies that every defendant who enters a guilty plea to a charge under the Act does so involuntarily. 25 The power to reject coerced guilty pleas and involuntary jury waivers might alleviate, but it cannot totally eliminate, the constitutional infirmity in the capital punishment provision of the Federal Kidnaping Act. [390 U.S. 570, 584] </s> The Government alternatively proposes that this Court, in the exercise of its supervisory powers, should simply instruct federal judges sitting in kidnaping cases to reject all attempts to waive jury trial and all efforts to plead guilty, however voluntary and well-informed such attempted waivers and pleas might be. In that way, we could assure that every defendant charged in a federal court with aggravated kidnaping would face a possible death penalty, and that no defendant tried under the federal statute would be induced to forgo a constitutional right. But of course the inevitable consequence of this "solution" would be to force all defendants to submit to trial, however clear their guilt and however strong their desire to acknowledge it in order to spare themselves and their families the spectacle and expense of protracted courtroom proceedings. It is true that a defendant has no constitutional right to insist that he be tried by a judge rather than a jury, Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 , and it is also true "that a criminal defendant has [no] absolute right to have his guilty plea accepted by the court." Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 719 . But the fact that jury waivers and guilty pleas may occasionally be rejected hardly implies that all defendants may be required to submit to a full-dress jury trial as a matter of course. Quite apart from the cruel impact of such a requirement upon those defendants who would greatly prefer not to contest their guilt, it is clear - as even the Government recognizes - that the automatic rejection of all guilty pleas "would rob the criminal process of much of its flexibility." As one federal court has observed: 26 </s> "The power of a court to accept a plea of guilty is traditional and fundamental. Its existence is necessary for the . . . practical . . . administration [390 U.S. 570, 585] of the criminal law. Consequently, it should require an unambiguous expression on the part of the Congress to withhold this authority in specified cases." </s> If any such approach should be inaugurated in the administration of a federal criminal statute, we conclude that the impetus must come from Congress, not from this Court. The capital punishment provision of the Federal Kidnaping Act cannot be saved by judicial reconstruction. </s> III. </s> The remaining question is whether the statute as a whole must fall simply because its death penalty clause is constitutionally deficient. The District Court evidently assumed that it must, for that court dismissed the kidnaping indictment. We disagree. As we said in Champlin Rfg. Co. v. Commission, 286 U.S. 210, 234 : </s> "The unconstitutionality of a part of an Act does not necessarily defeat . . . the validity of its remaining provisions. Unless it is evident that the legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law." 27 </s> [390 U.S. 570, 586] </s> Under this test, it is clear that the clause authorizing capital punishment is severable from the remainder of the kidnaping statute and that the unconstitutionality of that clause does not require the defeat of the law as a whole. See McDowell v. United States, 274 F. Supp. 426, 429. Cf. Spillers v. State, ___ Nev. ___, ___, 436 P.2d 18, 23-24. </s> The clause in question is a functionally independent part of the Federal Kidnaping Act. Its elimination in no way alters the substantive reach of the statute and leaves completely unchanged its basic operation. Under such circumstances, it is quite inconceivable that the Congress which decided to authorize capital punishment in aggravated kidnaping cases would have chosen to discard the entire statute if informed that it could not include the death penalty clause now before us. 28 </s> In this case it happens that history confirms what common sense alone would suggest: The law as originally enacted in 1932 contained no capital punishment provision. 29 A majority of the House had favored the [390 U.S. 570, 587] death penalty but had yielded to opposition in the Senate as a matter of expediency. 30 Only one Congressman had expressed the view that the law would not be worth enacting without capital punishment. 31 The majority obviously felt otherwise. 32 When the death penalty was added in 1934, the statute was left substantially unchanged [390 U.S. 570, 588] in every other respect. 33 The basic problem that had prompted enactment of the law in 1932 - the difficulty of relying upon state and local authorities to [390 U.S. 570, 589] investigate and prosecute interstate kidnaping 34 - had not vanished during the intervening two years. It is therefore clear that Congress would have made interstate kidnaping a federal crime even if the death penalty provision had been ruled out from the beginning. It would be difficult to imagine a more compelling case for severability. </s> In an effort to suggest the contrary, the appellees insist that the 1934 amendment "did not merely increase the penalties for kidnaping; it changed the whole thrust of the Act." They note that Congress deliberately limited [390 U.S. 570, 590] capital punishment to those kidnapers whose victims are not liberated unharmed. Such a differential penalty provision, the appellees argue, is needed to discourage kidnapers from injuring those whom they abduct. 35 The appellees contend that, without its capital punishment clause, the Federal Kidnaping Act would not distinguish "the penalties applicable to those who do and those who do not harm or kill their victims." Stressing the obvious congressional concern for the victim's safety, they conclude that "it is doubtful that Congress would intend for the statute to stand absent such a feature." This argument is wrong as a matter of history, for Congress enacted the statute "absent such a feature." 36 It is [390 U.S. 570, 591] wrong as a matter of fact, for the length of imprisonment imposed under the Act can obviously be made to reflect the kidnaper's treatment of his victim. And it is wrong as a matter of logic, for nothing could more completely obliterate the distinction between "the penalties applicable to those who do and those who do not harm or kill their victims" than the total invalidation of all the penalties provided by the Federal Kidnaping Act - the precise result sought by the appellees. </s> Thus the infirmity of the death penalty clause does not require the total frustration of Congress' basic purpose - that of making interstate kidnaping a federal crime. By holding the death penalty clause of the Federal kidnaping Act unenforceable, we leave the statute an operative whole, free of any constitutional objection. The appellees may be prosecuted for violating the Act, but they cannot be put to death under its authority. </s> The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Count one: "On or about September 2, 1966, CHARLES JACKSON, also known as `Batman,' also known as `Butch'; and GLENN WALTER ALEXANDER DE LA MOTTE; and JOHN ALBERT WALSH, JR., the defendants herein, did knowingly transport in interstate commerce from Milford in the District of Connecticut to Alpine, New Jersey, one John Joseph Grant, III, a person who had theretofore been unlawfully seized, kidnapped, carried away and held by the defendants herein, for ransom and reward and for the purpose of aiding the said defendants to escape arrest, and the said John Joseph Grant, III, was harmed when liberated, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1201 (a)." </s> [Footnote 2 Count two, charging transportation of a stolen motor vehicle from Connecticut to New York in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2312, has not been challenged and is not now before us. </s> [Footnote 3 262 F. Supp. 716, 718. </s> [Footnote 4 18 U.S.C. 3731. </s> [Footnote 5 387 U.S. 929 . </s> [Footnote 6 Even if the Government's interpretation were sound, the validity of its conclusion would still be far from clear. As the District Court observed, "even if the trial court has the power to submit the issue of punishment to a jury, that power is discretionary, its exercise uncertain." 262 F. Supp. 716, 717-718. The Government assumes that a judge who would accept the death penalty recommendation appended to a jury verdict of guilt is a judge who would exercise his discretionary power to convene a penalty jury if the defendant were to plead guilty or submit to a bench trial. But the mere fact that a judge would defer to the jury's recommendation hardly implies that he would take the extraordinary step of convening a penalty jury after accepting a plea of guilty or approving a waiver of jury trial. Even if the Government's statutory position were correct, the fact would remain that the defendant convicted on a guilty plea or by a judge completely escapes the threat of capital punishment unless the trial judge makes an affirmative decision to commence a penalty hearing and to impanel a special jury for that purpose, whereas the defendant convicted by a jury automatically incurs a risk that the same jury will recommend the death penalty and that the judge will accept its recommendation. </s> [Footnote 7 One district judge has indicated that he would not feel bound by a jury recommendation of death in a kidnaping case, see Robinson v. United States, 264 F. Supp. 146, 151-153, but the question [390 U.S. 570, 574] was not directly before him since the case involved a petition for post-conviction relief. Although federal juries have recommended capital punishment in a number of kidnaping cases, counsel for the Government stated at oral argument in this Court that he was aware of no case in which such a recommendation had been set aside. </s> [Footnote 8 See H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, The American Jury 436-444 (1966). </s> [Footnote 9 The Government notes that the word "shall" precedes both alternative punishments: The offender "shall be punished (1) by death if the kidnaped person has not been liberated unharmed, and if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend, or (2) by imprisonment . . . ." But the notion that judicial discretion is thereby authorized is dispelled by the qualification attached to the second alternative: "by imprisonment . . . if the death penalty is not imposed." Although it is true that the judge rather than the jury is formally responsible for imposing sentence in a federal criminal case, those qualifying words would state a pointless truism unless they were meant to refer to the jury's recommendation: The offender "shall be punished (1) by death . . . if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend, or (2) by imprisonment" if the jury's verdict does not so recommend. To accept the Government's reading of the statute would make its final phrase a complete redundancy, anomalous indeed in a statute that Congress has twice pruned of excess verbiage. See Reviser's Note following 18 U.S.C. 1201. Nothing in the language or history of the Federal Kidnaping Act points to any such result. On the contrary, an examination of the death penalty provision in its original form demonstrates that [390 U.S. 570, 575] Congress could not have intended the meaning the Government now seeks to attribute to it. For the statute as it stood in 1934 provided that the offender "shall, upon conviction, be punished (1) by death if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend, provided that the sentence of death shall not be imposed by the court if, prior to its imposition, the kidnaped person has been liberated unharmed, or (2) if the death penalty shall not apply nor be imposed the convicted person shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for such term of years as the court in its discretion shall determine . . . ." 48 Stat. 781. In this form, the statutory language simply will not support the interpretation that the offender "shall be punished by death or by imprisonment" if the jury recommends the death penalty. For the statute in this form makes unmistakably clear that, if the death penalty applies - i. e., if the jury has recommended death - then the punishment shall be death unless, before the judge has imposed sentence, the victim has been liberated unharmed. There is absolutely no reason to think that the purely formal transformations through which the statute has passed since 1934 were intended to alter this basic penalty structure. </s> [Footnote 10 See 75 Cong. Rec. 13288, 13295-13297 (1932). </s> [Footnote 11 As originally drafted, the Kidnaping Act had provided for punishment "by death or imprisonment . . . for such term of years as the court in its discretion shall determine. . . ." 75 Cong. Rec. 13288 (1932). </s> [Footnote 12 A number of Congressmen feared that empowering judges to impose capital punishment might make some jurors unduly reluctant to convict. See 75 Cong. Rec. 13289, 13294 (1932). To the extent that this concern was responsible for the decision to require a jury recommendation of death as a prerequisite to the imposition of capital punishment, it is of course immaterial whether or not the jury's recommendation is binding on the trial judge. But, as the Government concedes, many of the Congressmen who favored jury determination of the death penalty did so largely because such a scheme would take from the judge the onus of inflicting capital punishment. See, e. g., 75 Cong. Rec. 13297. </s> [Footnote 13 H. R. Rep. No. 1457, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1934) (emphasis added). </s> [Footnote 14 If the jury's verdict of guilt includes no death penalty recommendation, the judge can impose no penalty beyond imprisonment. He cannot convene another jury to recommend capital punishment. See United States v. Dressler, 112 F.2d 972, 980. </s> [Footnote 15 In a statute forbidding the wrecking of trains, Congress provided that "[w]hoever is convicted of any such crime, which has resulted in the death of any person, shall be subject . . . to the death penalty . . . if the jury shall in its discretion so direct, or, in the case of a plea of guilty, if the court in its discretion shall so order." 62 Stat. 794 (1948), 18 U.S.C. 1992 (emphasis added). And in a statute prohibiting the destruction of aircraft, Congress provided that violators whose conduct causes death "shall be subject . . . to the death penalty . . . if the jury shall in its discretion so direct, or, in the case of a plea of guilty, or a plea of not guilty where the defendant has waived a trial by jury, if the court in its discretion shall so order." 70 Stat. 540 (1956), 18 U.S.C. 34 (emphasis added). The language of the aircraft-wrecking statute, 18 U.S.C. 34, is of particular interest here because it reflects a congressional [390 U.S. 570, 579] awareness of the precise problem the Government suggests Congress overlooked in the kidnaping area: In a letter addressed to the Chairman of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, William P. Rogers, then Deputy Attorney General, suggested on behalf of the Justice Department that the bill then under consideration should be amended by the addition of the phrase "or in the case of a plea of not guilty where the defendant has waived trial by jury." The letter stated: "Under the present phraseology it is doubtful whether the court could invoke the death penalty in a situation where the defendant has entered a plea of not guilty, waived his right to a trial by jury, and asked to be tried by the court." 2 U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 3149-3150 (1956). Congress inserted the suggested language in the aircraft statute as enacted on July 14, 1956. Less than a month later, Congress reconsidered the Kidnaping Act and added a technical amendment, 70 Stat. 1043 (1956), but included no provision to authorize the imposition of the death penalty upon defendants who plead guilty or waive the right to jury trial. </s> [Footnote 16 See Cal. Penal Code 190.1 (Supp. 1966); Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. 53-10 (Supp. 1965); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 18, 4701 (1963); N. Y. Penal Law 125.30, 125.35 (1967). </s> [Footnote 17 The complex problems presented by separate penalty proceedings have frequently been noted. See, e. g., Frady v. United States, 121 U.S. App. D.C. 78, 109-110, 348 F.2d 84, 115-116 (Burger, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Note, The California Penalty Trial, 52 Calif. L. Rev. 386 (1964); Note, The Two-Trial [390 U.S. 570, 580] System in Capital Cases, 39 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 50 (1964). See also Kuh, A Prosecutor Considers the Model Penal Code, 63 Col. L. Rev. 608, 615 (1963). It is not surprising that courts confronted with such problems have concluded that their solution requires "comprehensive legislative and not piecemeal judicial action." State v. Mount, 30 N. J. 195, 224, 152 A. 2d 343, 358 (concurring opinion). See also People v. Friend, 47 Cal. 2d 749, 763, 306 P.2d 463, 471, n. 7. But see United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904, 914-915. </s> [Footnote 18 The Government informs us that at least three of the defendants who pleaded guilty in cases arising under the Federal Kidnaping Act have been sentenced to death on the recommendation of special penalty juries convened to determine punishment. </s> [Footnote 19 Even in States with legislatively established jury proceedings on the penalty issue, defense attorneys have not always been prepared to take advantage of those features of the penalty trial designed to benefit their clients. See Note, Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 136, 167 (1964). If the relative novelty of penalty proceedings has thus impaired effective representation in jurisdictions where the contours of such proceedings have been fixed by statute, it seems clear that the difficulties for the defense would be even more formidable under the amorphous [390 U.S. 570, 581] case-by-case system that the Government asks us to legitimize today. It is no wonder that the Second Circuit, while not foreclosing two-stage trials altogether, was "loath to compel unwilling defendants to submit" to them. United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904, 914. </s> [Footnote 20 It is established that due process forbids convicting a defendant on the basis of a coerced guilty plea. See, e. g., Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 . </s> [Footnote 21 See United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904, 913-914 and n. 8. See also Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 753 -754 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). </s> [Footnote 22 See McDowell v. United States, 274 F. Supp. 426, 431. See also Laboy v. New Jersey, 266 F. Supp. 581, 585. </s> [Footnote 23 See, e. g., Wash. Rev. Code 9.48.030, 10.01.060, 10.49.010 (1956). Cf. Cal. Penal Code 190.1 (Supp. 1966). </s> [Footnote 24 In an opinion by Justice Zenoff, Spillers v. State, ___ Nev. ___, ___, 436 P.2d 18, 22-23, the Supreme Court of Nevada has recently held unconstitutional a state penalty scheme imposing capital punishment for forcible rape resulting in great bodily injury "if the jury by their verdict affix the death penalty." Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.360 (1) (1963). </s> [Footnote 25 See Laboy v. New Jersey, 266 F. Supp. 581, 584. So, too, in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 , the Court held that comment on a defendant's failure to testify imposes an impermissible penalty on the exercise of the right to remain silent at trial. Yet it obviously does not follow that every defendant who ever testified at a pre-Griffin trial in a State where the prosecution could have commented upon his failure to do so is entitled to automatic release upon the theory that his testimony must be regarded as compelled. </s> [Footnote 26 United States v. Willis, 75 F. Supp. 628, 630. </s> [Footnote 27 The appellees correctly note that Champlin was a case where Congress had included a clause expressly authorizing the severance of any invalid provision, a fact upon which this Court relied in recognizing "a presumption that, eliminating invalid parts, the legislature would have been satisfied with what remained . . . ." 286 U.S. 210, 235 . But whatever relevance such an explicit clause might have in creating a presumption of severability, see Electric Bond Co. v. Comm'n, 303 U.S. 419, 434 , the ultimate determination of severability will rarely turn on the presence or absence of such a clause. Thus, for example, the Court in Champlin, after stating the basic test quoted above, cited cases in which invalid statutory provisions had been severed despite the absence of any provision for severability. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 635 ; Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 , [390 U.S. 570, 586] 395-396; Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 695 -696. </s> [Footnote 28 As this Court observed in Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 396 , "it is not to be presumed that the legislature was legislating for the mere sake of imposing penalties, but the penalties . . . were simply in aid of the main purpose of the statute. They may fail, and still the great body of the statute have operative force, and the force contemplated by the legislature in its enactment." </s> [Footnote 29 The original Federal Kidnaping Act, 47 Stat. 326, provided: "That whoever shall knowingly transport or cause to be transported, or aid or abet in transporting, in interstate or foreign commerce, any person who shall have been unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnaped, abducted, or carried away by any means whatsoever and held for ransom or reward shall, upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for such term of years as the court, in its discretion, shall determine . . . ." </s> [Footnote 30 The Senate Judiciary Committee had opposed capital punishment and had reported the kidnaping law in a version that authorized no penalty beyond "imprisonment . . . for such term of years as the court, in its discretion, shall determine." S. Rep. No. 765, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1932); 75 Cong. Rec. 11878 (1932). In the ensuing debates, some members of the House opposed the death penalty on principle. 75 Cong. Rec. 13285, 13289-13290, 13294 (1932). Others argued that the threat of capital punishment would encourage kidnapers to kill their victims lest their testimony lead to conviction and execution. Id., at 13285, 13304. Most favored the death penalty in some form, see id., at 13283-13284, 13286-13287, 13295, but feared that efforts to persuade the Senate to accept a capital punishment provision would occasion further delay and might cause ultimate defeat. Id., at 13288, 13299, 13303. The majority therefore compromised their views and accepted the Senate version of the bill. Id., at 13304. See Bomar, The Lindbergh Law, 1 Law & Contemp. Prob. 435, 440 (1934). </s> [Footnote 31 Congressman Dyer of Missouri had stated that without the death penalty "the legislation would not be worth anything, because every State now has a kidnaping law and few of them provide the death penalty." 75 Cong. Rec. 13287 (1932). </s> [Footnote 32 Congressman Cochran of Missouri, who had introduced the original bill (H. R. 5657) with a death penalty clause, stressed that his objective was the prompt enactment of a federal kidnaping law; to that end, he was "willing to go along and strike out the death penalty." 75 Cong. Rec. 13296 (1932); see also id., at 13284, 13299, 13304. Congressman LaGuardia of New York put the matter succinctly: "[I]f what Congress is looking for is a headline, leave the death penalty in; but if we are looking for a real bill that will be a deterrent to kidnaping, take the Senate bill. [Applause.]" Id., at 13299. Shortly thereafter, the House passed the Senate version of the Act. Id., at 13304. </s> [Footnote 33 By 1934, the Senate's attitude toward capital punishment had changed markedly. In that year the Senate passed a bill (S. 2841) authorizing punishment "by imprisonment for not less than 10 years, or by death" for killing or kidnaping in connection with a bank robbery. 78 Cong. Rec. 5738 (1934). The House Judiciary Committee amended the Senate provision to its present form, see 18 U.S.C. 2113 (e), limiting the death penalty to those cases where "the verdict of the jury shall so direct." H. R. Rep. No. 1461, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1934). The House Judiciary Committee had not forgotten that its attempt to include similar language in the Kidnaping Act of 1932, see H. R. Rep. No. 1493, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1932), had been defeated "in the rush to draft and enact a [kidnaping] bill suitable to both houses before adjournment." Finely, The Lindbergh Law, 28 Geo. L. J. 908, 914, n. 24 (1940). Taking its cue from the bank robbery legislation, the House Committee found an ideal opportunity to reassert its 1932 position in a Senate bill (S. 2252) that had begun as a technical amendment to the 1932 Kidnaping Act. See 78 Cong. Rec. 5737 (1934). In S. 2252, the Senate retained the basic punishment of "imprisonment in the penitentiary for such term of years as the court, in its discretion, shall determine," see n. 29, supra, but the House Judiciary Committee added the alternative penalty of "death if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend, provided that the sentence of death shall not be imposed by the court if, prior to its imposition, the kidnaped person has been liberated unharmed . . . ." H. R. Rep. No. 1457, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1934); 78 Cong. Rec. 8127-8128 (1934). After initial disagreement in the Senate, id., at 8263-8264, and a conference, id., at 8322; H. R. Rep. No. 1595, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), the Senate accepted the House addition to S. 2252 without debate, 78 Cong. Rec. 8767, 8775, 8778, 8855-8857 (1934), and the resulting statute, 48 Stat. 781 (1934), employed substantially the same language as that now appearing in 18 U.S.C. 1201 (a). As amended in 1934, the Federal Kidnaping Act, 48 Stat. 781, thus provided: "Whoever shall knowingly transport or cause to be transported, or aid or abet in transporting, in interstate or foreign commerce, any person who shall have been unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, [390 U.S. 570, 589] decoyed, kidnaped, abducted, or carried away by any means whatsoever and held for ransom or reward or otherwise, except, in the case of a minor, by a parent thereof, shall, upon conviction, be punished (1) by death if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend, provided that the sentence of death shall not be imposed by the court if, prior to its imposition, the kidnaped person has been liberated unharmed, or (2) if the death penalty shall not apply nor be imposed the convicted person shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for such term of years as the court in its discretion shall determine . . . ." </s> [Footnote 34 In late 1931 the American public became seriously concerned about the mounting incidence of professional kidnaping and the apparent inability of state and local authorities to cope with the interstate aspects of the problem. See Fisher & McGuire, Kidnapping and the So-Called Lindbergh Law, 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 646, 652-653 (1935). Because of its geographical position, the city of St. Louis "had experienced numerous kidnapings in which the handicap of state lines had hindered or defeated her police officers." Bomar, The Lindbergh Law, 1 Law & Contempt. Prob. 435 (1934). Largely in response to this experience, Senator Patterson and Congressman Cochran, both of Missouri, introduced identical bills (S. 1525, H. R. 5657) in the House and Senate, 75 Cong. Rec. 275, 491 (1931), forbidding the transportation in interstate or foreign commerce of any person "kidnaped . . . and held for ransom or reward, or . . . for any other unlawful purpose." Several months after the kidnaping of the Lindbergh baby in March 1932, Congress enacted the first Federal Kidnaping Act, see n. 29, supra, a slightly modified version of the bills introduced by Patterson and Cochran. </s> [Footnote 35 See Bomar, The Lindbergh Law, 1 Law & Contemp. Prob. 435, 440 and n. 36. One might legitimately doubt the ability of the death penalty clause to achieve this supposed objective. In that regard, it has been observed that "[t]he advantage to the kidnapper in killing his victim is obvious and immediate, for the [Government's] best witness, perhaps its whole case, will be put our of the way. Thus a sentence of life imprisonment instead of death may not suffice to induce a kidnapper to refrain from killing his victim, even if the kidnapper is aware of the mitigation provision - itself a supposition not always true." Note, A Rationale of the Law of Kidnapping, 53 Col. L. Rev. 540, 550 (1953). Moreover, as this Court has interpreted the statute, the death penalty may be imposed so long as "the kidnapped person . . . was still suffering from . . . injuries when liberated." Robinson v. United States, 324 U.S. 282, 285 . As a result, "[o]nce [an] injury has taken place, the inducement held out by the statute necessarily is either to hold the victim until cure is effected or to do away with him so that evidence, both of the injury and of the kidnapping, is destroyed." Id., at 289 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). </s> [Footnote 36 Congress was certainly aware when it passed the original Kidnaping Act of 1932 that "[t]he victim may be murdered or slain" if the kidnaper "has nothing to gain by [keeping] the victim . . . alive." 75 Cong. Rec. 13285 (1932). Such considerations might have been influential in the omission of any death penalty provision in 1932, see Robinson v. United States, 324 U.S. 282, 289 , n. 4 (Rutledge, J., dissenting), but not a single member of Congress [390 U.S. 570, 591] even hinted that the anti-kidnaping law should be defeated altogether in the interest of the victim's safety. Given the law's fundamental objective of preventing interstate kidnaping in the first instance, any such suggestion would have been unthinkable. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK joins, dissenting. </s> The Court strikes down a provision of the Federal Kidnaping Act which authorizes only the jury to impose the death penalty. No question is raised about the death penalty itself or about the propriety of jury participation in its imposition, but confining the power to impose the death penalty to the jury alone is held to [390 U.S. 570, 592] burden impermissibly the right to a jury trial because it may either coerce or encourage persons to plead guilty or to waive a jury and be tried by the judge. In my view, however, if the vice of the provision is that it may interfere with the free choice of the defendant to have his guilt or innocence determined by a jury, the Court needlessly invalidates a major portion of an Act of Congress. The Court itself says that not every plea of guilty or waiver of jury trial would be influenced by the power of the jury to impose the death penalty. If this is so, I would not hold the provision unconstitutional but would reverse the judgment, making it clear that pleas of guilty and waivers of jury trial should be carefully examined before they are accepted, in order to make sure that they have been neither coerced nor encouraged by the death penalty power in the jury. </s> Because this statute may be properly interpreted so as to avoid constitutional questions, I would not take the first step toward invalidation of statutes on their face because they arguably burden the right to jury trial. </s> [390 U.S. 570, 593]

United States Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. GRAINGER(1953) No. 634 Argued: Decided: June 15, 1953 </s> 1. The running of the general three-year statute of limitations on federal prosecutions for crimes, now 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 3282, was suspended by the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act, 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 3287, as to violations, in 1945 and 1946, of the false claims clause of the False Claims Act, now 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 287. Pp. 240-244. </s> (a) The offenses charged here of attempting to obtain payments from the Commodity Credit Corporation in amounts based upon knowingly false certifications to that corporation by the accused that certain purchases of wool had been made by him when he knew that no such purchases had been made by him or, at least, that no such purchases had been made by him at prices as high as those he certified that he paid, are offenses of a pecuniary nature. Pp. 240-241. </s> (b) Offenses which occurred in 1945 or 1946, preceding the President's proclamation of December 31, 1946, declaring that the hostilities of World War II terminated on that day, come within the period to which the Suspension Act applies. P. 241. </s> (c) Fraud upon the United States is an essential ingredient of violations of the false claims clause of the False Claims Act, 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 287. Pp. 241-243. </s> (d) In the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act, the phrase "involving fraud . . . in any manner" makes the Act applicable to offenses which are fairly identifiable as those in which fraud is an essential ingredient, by whatever words they be defined; it does not limit the application of the Act to such offenses as Congress has denominated as "frauds" by using that very word or one of its derivatives. The same reasoning applies to conspiracies to commit such offenses. Pp. 243-244. [346 U.S. 235, 236] </s> 2. The Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act had the effect of extending through 1952 the time for the prosecution of the offenses to which it applied. Pp. 244-246. </s> 3. In relation to those offenses here involved which were committed in 1945 and 1946, during the period of suspension, the general three-year limitation prescribed by 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 3282 began to run for the first time on January 1, 1950, and expired December 31, 1952. Pp. 246-247. </s> 4. The codification of the Criminal Code, June 25, 1948, effective September 1, 1948, did not change the situation respecting the extension through 1952 of the time for prosecuting the offenses to which the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act applied. Pp. 247-248. </s> 5. The Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act is applicable to the indictments here involved for offenses committed in 1945 and 1946 and the United States could thus prosecute them in 1952, except that (1) this conclusion does not apply to any overt act alleged in No. 636 to have been committed in 1947, and (2) this conclusion does not apply to overt acts set forth in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4, under Count Two of the Indictment in No. 636, which are not explicit enough to show that the issuance or endorsement of certain checks there described constituted an attempt to defraud the United States. Pp. 236-248; p. 237, n. 1. </s> Reversed and remanded. </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 635, United States v. Clavere et al., and No. 636, United States v. Clavere et al., both also on appeal from the same Court. </s> John F. Davis argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Robert L. Stern, then Acting Solicitor General, Beatrice Rosenberg and John R. Wilkins. Walter J. Cummings, Jr., then Solicitor General, was on the Statement as to Jurisdiction. </s> Jack J. Miller argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee in No. 634. </s> John V. Lewis argued the cause for appellees in Nos. 635 and 636. With him on the brief was Clyde C. Sherwood. </s> MR. JUSTICE BURTON delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> These cases were argued immediately following No. 548, Bridges v. United States, ante, p. 209. They concern the [346 U.S. 235, 237] Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act which we found inapplicable to the offenses stated in the Bridges indictment. These cases, however, involve different offenses and we hold the Suspension Act applicable to the instant indictments for offenses committed in 1945 and 1946 and we hold that the United States may thus prosecute them in 1952. 1 </s> The principal questions here are: (1) whether the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act 2 suspended the running of the general three-year statute of limitations 3 as to violations of the false claims clause of the False Claims Act, 4 and (2) if so, whether the indictments for such offenses, found in 1952, were timely. For the reasons hereafter stated, our answer to each question is in the affirmative. </s> These indictments were filed in 1952 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The indictment in No. 634 charges appellee Grainger, in 16 counts, with having "unlawfully, knowingly, [346 U.S. 235, 238] wilfully and fraudulently" presented for payment to the Commodity Credit Corporation, at various times in 1945, claims upon that corporation certifying that appellee had made certain purchases of wool at certain prices, knowing such claims "to be false, fictitious and fraudulent . . . ." It charges, further, that appellee knowingly and falsely certified to the Commodity Credit Corporation that he had paid higher prices for the wool than he actually did. 5 </s> The indictment in No. 635 charges appellees Clavere and Kennedy, in 15 counts, with like offenses committed in 1946, including several claims based upon their false certifications of purchases of wool when they knew that they had made no such purchases. </s> The indictment in No. 636 charges appellees Clavere and Kennedy, in one count, with conspiring to make false, fictitious and fraudulent claims upon the Commodity Credit Corporation 6 by making somewhat comparable claims in 1946 and 1947. A second count charges appellees Clavere, Kennedy and Shapiro with engaging in a like conspiracy, with overt acts committed in 1946. 7 </s> Appellees moved to dismiss the indictments on the ground, among others, that each was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The District Court granted the motions and dismissed the indictments. That [346 U.S. 235, 239] court's unreported opinion concludes with the following statement: </s> "Accordingly, the Court holds that, as to all three indictments, the three-year statute of limitations fixed by 18 USC section 582 and its successor, 18 USC [Supp. V] section 3282., applies. Because the statute that the various defendants are charged with having violated or with having conspired to violate does not `denominate' the acts proscribed therein as `frauds,' or does not, in so many words, have as an `ingredient' a `defrauding or an attempt to defraud the United States,' neither the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act of 1942 nor its successor of 1948 can apply." </s> The United States appealed directly to this Court, under 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 3731. 8 </s> [346 U.S. 235, 240] </s> 1. The running of the general three-year statute of limitations 9 was suspended by the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act 10 as to violations, in 1945 and 1946, of the false claims clause of the False Claims Act. 11 </s> A. While the offenses charged here are not spelled out in detail, they are sufficiently clear at least to show [346 U.S. 235, 241] attempts to obtain payments from the Commodity Credit Corporation in amounts based upon knowingly false certifications to that corporation by the accused that certain purchases of wool had been made by him when he knew that no such purchases had been made by him or, at least, that no such purchases had been made by him at prices as high as those he certified that he paid. The offenses charged are, therefore, of a pecuniary nature and we are not required in these cases to pass upon the contention, discussed in the Bridges case, that, in order for the Suspension Act to apply to them, the offenses not only must involve defrauding the United States or an agency thereof, but they also must be of a pecuniary nature or of a nature concerning property. </s> B. The offenses with which we concern ourselves here are alleged to have occurred in 1945 or 1946. They, therefore, precede the President's proclamation of December 31, 1946, which declared that the hostilities of World War II terminated on that day. 12 The offenses thus come within the period to which the Suspension Act applies. United States v. Smith, 342 U.S. 225 . </s> C. Fraud upon the United States is an essential ingredient of the offenses charged. The offenses charged in Cases No. 634 and No. 635 are violations of the false claims clause, as distinguished from the false statement clause, of the False Claims Act. Such false claims clause provides that - </s> "Whoever shall . . . present . . . for payment or approval, to . . . any corporation in which the United States of America is a stockholder, any claim upon or against the Government of the United States . . . or any corporation in which the United States of America is a stockholder, knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent . . . shall [346 U.S. 235, 242] be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both." 52 Stat. 197, 18 U.S.C. 80, now 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 287. </s> The indictments show that it is the false claims clause that is involved. And, what is more important to the issue here, the offense defined by that clause is the kind of offense at which the Suspension Act is directed. </s> The Suspension Act provides that - </s> "When the United States is at war the running of any statute of limitations applicable to any offense (1) involving fraud or attempted fraud against the United States or any agency thereof in any manner, whether by conspiracy or not . . . shall be suspended until three years after the termination of hostilities as proclaimed by the President or by a concurrent resolution of Congress." 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 3287. </s> In determining the kind of offenses to which that section applies, we have the benefit of the conclusion heretofore reached by this Court that such offenses are limited to those which include fraud as an essential ingredient. 13 The next question is what constitutes the required fraud. Our problem is simpler than in the Bridges case and in those cases which involve violations of the false statement clause of the False Claims Act. In those cases there is a question whether the mere making of a false statement in the connection specified necessarily includes the ingredient of fraud required by the Suspension Act. In the instant cases that question is not involved because the offenses include more than that. The substantive offenses here charged include the making of claims upon the Government for payments induced by knowingly false representations [346 U.S. 235, 243] - constituting violations of the false claims clause of the False Claims Act. The statement of the offenses here carries with it the charge of inducing or attempting to induce the payment of a claim for money or property involving the element of deceit that is the earmark of fraud. 14 The false statement clause contains no such ingredient. The difference between the clauses is emphasized in the 1948 codification which has placed the former in 287 and the latter in 1001 of 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V). </s> We conclude that the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act has added time within which to prosecute the wartime frauds involved in violations of the false claims clause of the False Claims Act. </s> Appellees have placed emphasis also upon the following statement by Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking for the Court, in United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S. 518, 521 -522: </s> "Moreover, the concluding clause of the section, though denominated a proviso, is an excepting clause and therefore to be narrowly construed. United States v. McElvain, 272 U.S. 633, 639 . And as the section has to do with statutory crimes it is to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose, and ought not [346 U.S. 235, 244] to be extended by construction to embrace so-called frauds not so denominated by the statutes creating offenses." </s> Appellees argue that this language limits the Suspension Act not merely to those offenses in which fraud upon the United States is an essential ingredient, but to such of those offenses as Congress has "denominated" as "frauds" by using that very word or, at least, one of its derivatives. </s> We believe that Congress sought by its phrase "involving fraud . . . in any manner" 15 to make the Suspension Act applicable to offenses which are fairly identifiable as those in which fraud is an essential ingredient, by whatever words they be defined, and that Congress did not seek to limit its applicability to such of those identifiable offenses as also are labeled with a particular symbol. In the false claims clause of the False Claims Act, Congress met the requirement by identifying the offense as that of making "any claim upon . . . the United States . . . knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent . . . ." 16 The combination of either falsity, fiction or fraud with the claim is enough. The same reasoning applies to a conspiracy to make false claims, as alleged in No. 636. </s> 2. The Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act extended the time for finding the indictments through 1952. </s> A. The Suspension Act had the effect of extending through 1952 the time for the prosecution of the offenses to which it applied. </s> When enacted August 24, 1942, during the first year of World War II, it provided for the inception and expiration [346 U.S. 235, 245] of its effect on existing statutes of limitations as follows: </s> ". . . the running of any existing statute of limitations applicable to offenses involving the defrauding or attempts to defraud the United States or any agency thereof, whether by conspiracy or not, and in any manner, and now indictable under any existing statutes, shall be suspended until June 30, 1945, or until such earlier time as the Congress by concurrent resolution, or the President, may designate. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) 56 Stat. 747-748. </s> There is no doubt as to the meaning of the word "running" in that enactment. The running of any existing statute of limitations simply was to be suspended until June 30, 1945 - that is, for about three years - unless such suspension was cut short by Congress or the President. The obvious purpose was to add about three years (or a shorter wartime period) to the time otherwise available for the prosecution of certain wartime frauds. </s> The present difficulty was introduced by the amendment of July 1, 1944. It added not only specific language as to war contracts but it changed the expiration clause to read - </s> "The running of any existing statute of limitations applicable to any offense . . . (1) involving defrauding . . . the United States . . . or (2) committed in connection with the . . . performance . . . of any contract . . . related to the prosecution of the present war . . . shall be suspended until three years after the termination of hostilities in the present war as proclaimed by the President or by a concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) 58 Stat. 667. [346 U.S. 235, 246] </s> The effect of this language, when read with the Act of 1942, is inescapable. The phrase as to "running of any existing statute of limitations" remains precisely as it was in 1942, but the expiration date of the suspension is changed from June 30, 1945 (or an earlier date to be designated by Congress or the President), to a new date. The new date is not fixed as one to come three years later. It is made a movable date which can occur only three years after the date of the termination of hostilities as proclaimed by the President or Congress. Under the 1942 Act, the running of the general three-year statute was suspended for three years or less. Under the 1944 amendment, the running is just as clearly suspended until three years has expired after the termination of hostilities. </s> The precise language of the July 1, 1944, amendment was reenacted October 3, 1944, when a clause was added dealing with offenses connected with the handling of property under the Surplus Property Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 781. The language was then carried into 18 U.S.C. 590a. </s> When the President, December 31, 1946, proclaimed the termination of hostilities of World War II, 3 CFR, 1946 Supp., 77-78, this automatically caused the resumption of the running of statutes of limitations on December 31, 1949. Accordingly, in relation to the instant offenses committed in 1945 and 1946, during the period of suspension, the general three-year limitation prescribed by 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 3282 began to run for the first time on January 1, 1950, and expired December 31, 1952. </s> United States v. Smith, 342 U.S. 225 , held that the offenses to which the Suspension Act applied were only those actually committed before the termination of hostilities December 31, 1946. The length of the period for their prosecution was not there in controversy because the offenses occurred in 1947. That period, however, was [346 U.S. 235, 247] mentioned either directly or by implication in the concurring and dissenting opinions published on behalf of a majority of the members of the Court. The following statement was made in the concurring opinion: </s> "These cases clearly illustrate that the suspension statute was not intended to and should not embrace offenses committed subsequent to December 31, 1946. It applies only to offenses committed between August 25, 1939, and December 31, 1946. For those offenses which occurred between the date of the 1942 Act and the cessation of hostilities, Congress' intention was to give the Department of Justice six years from the latter date to investigate and prosecute. For those offenses which occurred before the date of the 1942 Act, Congress' intention was to give the Department three years after the cessation of hostilities plus whatever portion of the regular three-year limitations' period had not yet run when the 1942 Act was passed." P. 231. </s> This issue was before the Court in No. 527, United States v. Klinger, which this day is affirmed by an evenly divided Court, 345 U.S. 979 . In that case, however, there was presented not only this issue but also an issue as to whether the offense charged was one involving fraud of a pecuniary nature upon the United States. </s> B. The codification of the Criminal Code, June 25, 1948, effective September 1, 1948, did not change the situation. It repealed the Suspension Act, as amended October 3, 1944, by reference to it as 28 of Chapter 479, 58 Stat. 781, and as 18 U.S.C. 590a. 62 Stat. 862, 868. At the same time, Congress substantially reenacted the Suspension Act as 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 3287. 62 Stat. 828. The appellees point out that the saving clause in 21 of the Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 862, saves only substantive rights and liabilities then existing under the [346 U.S. 235, 248] repealed sections. They suggest also that any extended periods of limitation resulting from the Suspension Act were thus repealed as of September 1, 1948, leaving applicable the general three-year statute of limitations which would terminate the period for prosecution September 1, 1951. We do not agree with that suggestion. The reenactment of the Suspension Act as 3287, June 25, 1948, effective September 1, 1948, like the reenactment of the general three-year statute of limitations as 3282, carried with it the purpose of the codification. That purpose makes 3287 and 3282 applicable not merely prospectively to subsequent offenses, but forthwith to existing offenses in the same manner and with the same effect as if the reenacted provisions had remained continuously in effect in their substantially identical precodification form. Codification contemplates, implies and produces continuity of existing law in clarified form rather than its interruption. </s> The motions to dismiss the indictments should have been denied. The judgment of the District Court therefore is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> Reversed and remanded. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, adopting the reasoning in the opinion of Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Klinger, 199 F.2d 645, would affirm the District Court in dismissing these indictments. </s> MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 This conclusion does not apply to any overt act alleged in No. 636 to have been committed in 1947. Any such act was committed after the President's proclamation of the termination of hostilities December 31, 1946, 3 CFR, 1946 Supp., 77-78, and, therefore, after the period to which the Suspension Act applied. United States v. Smith, 342 U.S. 225 . </s> The indictment in No. 636 is not explicit enough as to the overt acts set forth in paragraphs numbered 2, 3 and 4, under Count Two, to show that the issuance or endorsement of certain checks there described constituted an attempt to defraud the United States. The Suspension Act, accordingly, does not appear to be applicable to them. These items have not been separately discussed by the parties, and are mentioned here to avoid the application of our general conclusions to them in the absence of further consideration. </s> [Footnote 2 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 3287. </s> [Footnote 3 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 3282. </s> [Footnote 4 35 (A) of the Criminal Code, 52 Stat. 197, 18 U.S.C. 80, now 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 287. </s> [Footnote 5 Commodity Credit Corporation was a Delaware corporation in which the United States was a stockholder. In 1945 and 1946 it served as an agency of the United States in making loans or purchases in connection with the expansion of the production of many commodities. 15 U.S.C. 713-713a-9; 1 CFR, 1938, 659-678. See also, Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act of June 29, 1948, 62 Stat. 1070, as amended, 15 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 714-714o. </s> [Footnote 6 37 of the Criminal Code, 35 Stat. 1096, 18 U.S.C. 88, now 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 371. See also, 52 Stat. 197, 18 U.S.C. 83, now 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 286. </s> [Footnote 7 See note 1, supra. </s> [Footnote 8 "An appeal may be taken by and on behalf of the United States from the district courts direct to the Supreme Court of the United States in all criminal cases in the following instances: </s> "From a decision or judgment setting aside, or dismissing any indictment or information, or any count thereof, where such decision or judgment is based upon the invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the indictment or information is founded. </s> . . . . . </s> "From the decision or judgment sustaining a motion in bar, when the defendant has not been put in jeopardy. . . ." 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 3731. </s> In its notices of appeal, the United States said merely that it appealed from the several orders dismissing the respective indictments. In its combined statement of jurisdiction it relied upon its right to appeal from a judgment sustaining a motion in bar where the defendant has not been put in jeopardy. The Government, however, now suggests that its appeals are based upon the District Court's construction of the statutes upon which the indictments are founded and it seeks to restrict us to the consideration of the District Court's view of the relation between those statutes and the Suspension Act, without reference to the claim of appellees that the extension of time provided by the Suspension Act expired before the indictments were [346 U.S. 235, 240] found. We treat the appeals as presenting both issues. See United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 ; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 . See also, United States v. Hark, 320 U.S. 531, 536 ; United States v. Goldman, 277 U.S. 229, 236 -237; United States v. Barber, 219 U.S. 72, 78 ; and United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 606 . </s> [Footnote 9 "Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted within three years next after such offense shall have been committed." 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 3282. </s> [Footnote 10 "When the United States is at war the running of any statute of limitations applicable to any offense (1) involving fraud or attempted fraud against the United States or any agency thereof in any manner, whether by conspiracy or not, or (2) committed in connection with the acquisition, care, handling, custody, control or disposition of any real or personal property of the United States, or (3) committed in connection with the negotiation, procurement, award, performance, payment for, interim financing, cancelation, or other termination or settlement, of any contract, subcontract, or purchase order which is connected with or related to the prosecution of the war, or with any disposition of termination inventory by any war contractor or Government agency, shall be suspended until three years after the termination of hostilities as proclaimed by the President or by a concurrent resolution of Congress." 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 3287. </s> The above Act originated in 1942 and was amplified in 1944. In 1945 and 1946, it contained substantially the terms shown above which went into effect September 1, 1948. 56 Stat. 747-748, 58 Stat. 667, 781, 18 U.S.C. 590a. </s> [Footnote 11 52 Stat. 197, 18 U.S.C. 80, 83, 84, 85. In the codification of 1948, 80 was subdivided by placing its false claims clause in 287, and its false statement clause in 1001, of 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V). The special conspiracy clause, found in 83, became 286 in Supp. V. </s> [Footnote 12 3 CFR, 1946 Supp., 77-78. </s> [Footnote 13 United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S. 518 ; United States v. McElvain, 272 U.S. 633 ; United States v. Noveck, 271 U.S. 201 . </s> [Footnote 14 The false statement clause of the False Claims Act, which was involved in Marzani v. United States, 83 U.S. App. D.C. 78, 168 F.2d 133, affirmed by an equally divided Court, 335 U.S. 895, 336 U.S. 922, provides merely that "whoever shall . . . make . . . any false or fraudulent statements or representations . . . in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or of any corporation in which the United States of America is a stockholder . . . shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both." 52 Stat. 197, 18 U.S.C. 80, now 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1001. Cases arising under that clause need not be discussed here and the references made in them to offenses arising generally under the False Claims Act should be read as referring to its false statement clause rather than to its false claims clause or to the Act as a whole. </s> [Footnote 15 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 3287. </s> [Footnote 16 52 Stat. 197. </s> [346 U.S. 235, 249]

United States Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. TESTAN(1976) No. 74-753 Argued: November 12, 1975Decided: March 2, 1976 </s> Respondent Government trial attorneys with civil service grade GS-13 classifications requested their employing agency to reclassify their positions to grade GS-14, contending that their duties and responsibilities met the requirements for the higher grade and were identical to those of other trial attorneys classified as GS-14 in another agency, and that under the principle of "equal pay for substantially equal work" prescribed in the Classification Act, they were entitled to the higher classification. But their agency, and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on appeal, denied reclassification. Respondents then sued the Government in the Court of Claims, seeking reclassification as of the date of the first administrative denial of their request, and each seeking backpay, computed at the difference between his GS-13 salary and his claimed GS-14 salary, from that date. The trial judge denied backpay but held that the CSC's refusal to reclassify respondents to GS-14 was arbitrary and that respondents were entitled to an order remanding the case to the CSC with directions so to reclassify respondents. The court en bane, while disapproving the trial judge's recommendation that the court was empowered to direct reclassification, held that if the CSC were to determine that it had made an erroneous classification the court was authorized to award money damages for backpay lost, that the CSC's refusal to compare respondents' positions with those of the other trial attorneys was arbitrary and capricious, and that the court had power to order the CSC to reconsider its classification decision. Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the CSC to make the comparison and to report the result to the court. Held: </s> 1. The Tucker Act, which merely confers jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims whenever a substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages exists, does not in itself support the action taken by the Court of Claims in this case. Pp. 397-398. </s> 2. Neither the Classification Act nor the Back Pay Act creates a substantive right in respondents to backpay for the period of the claimed wrongful classification. Pp. 398-407. </s> 205 Ct. Cl. 330, 499 F.2d 690, reversed and remanded. [424 U.S. 392, 393] </s> BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all Members joined except STEVENS, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. </s> John P. Rupp argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney General Jaffe, and Ronald R. Glancz. </s> Edwin J. McDermott argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. * </s> [Footnote * Robert N. Sayler, filed a brief for Melvin Allison et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This is a suit for reclassification of federal civil service positions and for backpay. It presents a substantial issue concerning the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims and the relief available in that tribunal. </s> I </s> The plaintiff-respondents, Herman R. Testan and Francis L. Zarrilli, are trial attorneys employed in the Office of Counsel, Defense Personnel Support Center, Defense Supply Agency, in Philadelphia. They represent the Government in certain matters that come before the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals of the Department of Defense. Their positions are subject to the Classification Act, 5 U.S.C. 5101 et seq., and they are presently classified at civil service grade GS-13. </s> In December 1969 respondents, through their Chief Attorney, requested their employing agency to reclassify their positions to grade GS-14. The asserted ground was that their duties and responsibilities met the requirements for the higher grade under standards promulgated [424 U.S. 392, 394] by the Civil Service Commission in General Attorney Series GS-905-0. In addition, they contended that their duties were identical to those of other trial attorneys in positions classified as GS-14 in the Contract Appeals Division, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Headquarters, Air Force Logistics Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, and that under the principle of "equal pay for substantially equal work," prescribed in 5101 (1) (A), 1 they were entitled to the higher classification. </s> The agency, after an audit by a position classification specialist, concluded that the respondents' assigned duties were properly classified at the GS-13 level under the Commission's classification standards. On appeal, the Commission reached the same conclusion and denied reclassification. The Commission also ruled that comparison of the positions held by the respondents with those of attorneys employed by the referenced Logistics Command was not a proper method of classification. </s> The two respondents then instituted this suit in the Court of Claims. 2 Each sought an order directing reclassification of his position as of the date (May 8, 1970) of the first administrative denial of his request, and backpay, computed at the difference between his salary and grade GS-14 (and the claimed appropriate within-grade step), from that date. The trial judge, in a long opinion, App. 43-117, concluded that the respondents were not [424 U.S. 392, 395] entitled to backpay due to their allegedly wrongful classification. Id., at 57. But he also concluded that the Commission's refusal to reclassify respondents to GS-14 was arbitrary, discriminatory, and not supported by substantial evidence, ibid., and that as a matter of law the respondents were entitled to an order remanding the case to the Commission with directions so to reclassify the respondents. Id., at 58, 117. </s> The Court of Claims considered the case en banc and divided 4-3. The majority disapproved the trial judge's recommendation that the court was empowered to direct the reclassification of respondents to GS-14, for the Court of Claims is not authorized to create an entitlement to a governmental position. "If entitlement depends on the exercise of discretion by someone else we cannot substitute our own discretion." 205 Ct. Cl. 330, 332, 499 F.2d 690, 691 (1974). The majority felt, however, that if the Commission were to determine that it had made an erroneous classification, that determination "could create a legal right which we could then enforce by a money judgment." Id., at 333, 499 F.2d, at 691. </s> The majority agreed with the trial judge that the Commission's failure to compare respondents' positions with those of the Logistics Command attorneys was arbitrary and capricious. Id., at 331, 499 F.2d, at 691. The court observed: "Ordinarily . . . it is not arbitrary and capricious to refuse to consider the grade of employees other than the ones complaining." But it went on to say: "This case is peculiar in its facts," for the employees "all belong to a small readily manageable cadre, their jobs have a large nexus of duties shared in common, and the other employees are specifically pointed out by the complaining employees." Id., at 332, 499 F.2d, at 691. The court ruled that it had the power under the remand statute, 86 Stat. 652, now codified as part of 28 U.S.C. 1491 [424 U.S. 392, 396] (1970 ed., Supp. IV), to order the Commission to reconsider its classification decision "under proper directions." Accordingly, and pursuant to its Rule 149 (b), the court remanded the case to the Commission to make the comparison and to report the result to the court. 3 </s> The dissent argued that the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is limited to money judgments and, since none had been or could be ordered in this case, the court was without jurisdiction even to remand the case to the Civil Service Commission. In addition, the respondents had not stated a claim upon which relief could be granted, for they were asking for positions, and pay, to which they had never been appointed. The dissent further argued that there is no constitutional right to a governmental position to which one has not been appointed; that the salary of a Government job is payable only to the person appointed to that position; and that the court has no authority to take over the appointing power that the Constitution, Art. II, 2, has placed in the Executive Department. It asserted that the decision of the majority was but a declaratory judgment, a legal function not within the court's jurisdiction. Finally, the dissent argued that the classification decision of the Commission was neither arbitrary nor capricious and was supported by substantial evidence. 205 Ct. Cl., at 334-338, 499 F.2d, at 692-694. [424 U.S. 392, 397] </s> We granted certiorari because of the importance of the issue in the measure of the Court of Claims' statutory jurisdiction, and because of the significance of the court's decision upon the Commission's administration of the civil service classification system. 420 U.S. 923 (1975). </s> II </s> We turn to the respective statutes that are advanced as support for the action taken by the Court of Claims. </s> A. The Tucker Act. The central provision establishing the jurisdiction of the court is that part of the Tucker Act now codified as 28 U.S.C. 1491: </s> "The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 4 </s> This Court recently had occasion to examine the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims under this statutory formulation. In United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1 (1969), the Court reviewed a decision (182 Ct. Cl. 631, 390 F.2d 894) in which the Court of Claims had concluded that it was empowered to exercise jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201. This Court observed that the Court of Claims was established by Congress in 1855; that "[t]throughout its entire history," until the King case was filed, "its jurisdiction has been limited to money claims against the [424 U.S. 392, 398] United States Government"; that decided cases in this Court had "reaffirmed this view of the limited jurisdiction of the Court of Claims," and "the passage of the Tucker Act in 1887 had not expanded that jurisdiction to equitable matters"; that "neither the Act creating the Court of Claims nor any amendment to it" granted that court jurisdiction of the case before it because King's claim was "not limited to actual, presently due money damages from the United States"; and that what King was requesting was "essentially equitable relief of a kind that the Court of Claims has held throughout its history . . . it does not have the power to grant." 395 U.S., at 2 -3. The Court then went on to hold that the Declaratory Judgment Act did not grant the Court of Claims authority to issue declaratory judgments. Cited in support of all this were Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 557 (1962) (Harlan, J.) (plurality opinion); United States v. Jones, 131 U.S. 1 (1889); and United States v. Alire, 6 Wall. 573, 575 (1868). See Lee v. Thornton, 420 U.S. 139 (1975); Richardson v. Morris, 409 U.S. 464 (1973); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 589 -591 (1941). </s> The Tucker Act, of course, is itself only a jurisdictional statute; it does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages. The Court of Claims has recognized that the Act merely confers jurisdiction upon it whenever the substantive right exists. Eastport S. S. Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 599, 605-607, 372 F.2d 1002, 1007-1009 (1967). We therefore must determine whether the two other federal statutes that are invoked by the respondents confer a substantive right to recover money damages from the United States for the period of their allegedly wrongful civil service classifications. </s> B. The Classification Act. Inasmuch as the trial judge [424 U.S. 392, 399] proposed, App. 57, that the respondents were not entitled to backpay under the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. 5596, and the Court of Claims held that there was no need for it to reach and construe that Act, 205 Ct. Cl., at 333, 499 F.2d, at 691, it is implicit in the court's decision in favor of respondents that a violation of the Classification Act gives rise to a claim for money damages for pay lost by reason of the allegedly wrongful classifications. </s> It long has been established, of course, that the United States, as sovereign, "is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued . . . and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit." United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S., at 586 . And it has been said, in a Court of Claims context, that a waiver of the traditional sovereign immunity "cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed." United States v. King, 395 U.S., at 4 ; Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957). Thus, except as Congress has consented to a cause of action against the United States, "there is no jurisdiction in the Court of Claims more than in any other court to entertain suits against the United States." United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S., at 587 -588. </s> We find no provision in the Classification Act that expressly makes the United States liable for pay lost through allegedly improper classifications. To be sure, in the "purpose" section of the Act, 5 U.S.C. 5101 (1) (A), Congress stated that it was "to provide a plan for classification of positions whereby . . . the principle of equal pay for substantially equal work will be followed." And in subsequent sections, there are set forth substantive standards for grading particular positions, and provisions for procedures to ensure that those standards are met. But none of these several sections contains an express [424 U.S. 392, 400] provision for an award of backpay to a person who has been erroneously classified. </s> In answer to this fact, the respondents and the amici make two observations. They first argue that the Tucker Act fundamentally waives sovereign immunity with respect to any claim invoking a constitutional provision or a federal statute or regulation, and makes available any and all generally accepted and important forms of redress, including money damages. It is said that the Government has confused two very different issues, namely, whether there has been a waiver of sovereignty, and whether a substantive right has been created, and it is claimed that where there has been a violation of a substantive right, the Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity as to all measures necessary to redress that violation. </s> The argument does not persuade us. As stated above, the Tucker Act is merely jurisdictional, and grant of a right of action must be made with specificity. The respondents do not rest their claims upon a contract; neither do they seek the return of money paid by them to the Government. It follows that the asserted entitlement to money damages depends upon whether any federal statute "can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained." Eastport S. S. Corp. v. United States, 178, Ct. Cl., at 607, 372 F.2d, at 1009; Mosca v. United States, 189 Ct. Cl. 283, 290, 417 F.2d 1382, 1386 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 911 (1970). We are not ready to tamper with these established principles because it might be thought that they should be responsive to a particular conception of enlightened governmental policy. See Brief for Amici Curiae 9-11. In a suit against the United States, there cannot be a right to money damages without a waiver of sovereign immunity, and [424 U.S. 392, 401] we regard as unsound the argument of amici that all substantive rights of necessity create a waiver of sovereign immunity such that money damages are available to redress their violation. </s> We perceive nothing in the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974), cited by the amici with other cases centering in the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation"), that lends support to the respondents. These Fifth Amendment cases are tied to the language, purpose, and self-executing aspects of that constitutional provision, Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933), and are not authority to the effect that the Tucker Act eliminates from consideration the sovereign immunity of the United States. </s> The respondents and the amici next argue that the violation of any statute or regulation relating to federal employment automatically creates a cause of action against the United States for money damages because, if this were not so, the employee would then have a right without a remedy, inasmuch as he is denied access to the one forum where he may seek redress. 5 </s> Here again we are not persuaded. Where the United States is the defendant and the plaintiff is not suing for money improperly exacted or retained, the basis of the federal claim - whether it be the Constitution, a statute, [424 U.S. 392, 402] or a regulation - does not create a cause of action for money damages unless, as the Court of Claims has stated, that basis "in itself . . . can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained." Eastport S. S. Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl., at 607, 372 F.2d, at 1008, 1009. We see nothing akin to this in the Classification Act or in the context of a suit seeking reclassification. </s> The present action, of course, is not one concerning a wrongful discharge or a wrongful suspension. In that situation, at least since the Civil Service Act of 1883, the employee is entitled to the emoluments of his position until he has been legally disqualified. United States v. Wickersham, 201 U.S. 390 (1906). There is no claim here that either respondent has been denied the benefit of the position to which he was appointed. The claim, instead, is that each has been denied the benefit of a position to which he should have been, but was not, appointed. The established rule is that one is not entitled to the benefit of a position until he has been duly appointed to it. United States v. McLean, 95 U.S. 750 (1878); Ganse v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 183, 186, 376 F.2d 900, 902 (1967). The Classification Act does not purport by its terms to change that rule, and we see no suggestion in it or in its legislative history that Congress intended to alter it. </s> The case of Selman v. United States, 204 Ct. Cl. 675, 498 F.2d 1354 (1974), pressed upon us by the respondents, 6 if correct, if correct, is clearly distinguishable. The pay claims there rested flatly upon the mandatory provision contained in 37 U.S.C. 202 (l) to the effect that an officer "serving as Assistant Judge Advocate General of the Navy is entitled to the basic pay of a rear admiral (lower half) or brigadier general, as appropriate." [424 U.S. 392, 403] Neither the Classification Act nor the Back Pay Act contains any mandatory provision of this kind. </s> The situation, as we see it, is not that Congress has left the respondents remediless, as they assert, for their allegedly wrongful civil service classification, but that Congress has not made available to a party wrongfully classified the remedy of money damages through retroactive classification. There is a difference between prospective reclassification, on the one hand, and retroactive reclassification resulting in money damages, on the other. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). Respondents, of course, have an administrative avenue of prospective relief available to them under the elaborate and structured provisions of the Classification Act, 5 U.S.C. 5101-5115. The amici so recognize. Brief for Amici Curiae 13-15. Among the Act's provisions along this line are those requiring the Civil Service Commission to engage in supervisory review of an agency's classifications, and, where necessary, to review and reclassify individual positions, 5 U.S.C. 5110; allowing the Commission to reclassify, 5112; and allowing the Commission even to revoke or suspend the agency's authority to classify its own positions, 5111. Indeed, as the amici describe it: "[T]he Act is not merely a hortatory catalogue of high principles." Brief for Amici Curiae 15. The built-in avenue of administrative relief is one response to these statutory requirements. Review and reclassification may be brought into play at the request of an employee. 5 U.S.C. 5112 (b). And respondents, as has been noted, did just that. A second possible avenue of relief - and it, too, seemingly, is only prospective - is by way of mandamus, under 28 U.S.C. 1361, in a proper federal district court. In this way, also, the respondents have asserted their claims. See n. 5, supra. </s> The respondents, thus, are not entirely without remedy. They are without the remedies in the Court of Claims [424 U.S. 392, 404] of retroactive classification and money damages to which they assert they are entitled. Additional remedies of this kind are for the Congress to provide and not for the courts to construct. </s> Finally, we note that if the respondents were correct in their claims to retroactive classification and money damages, many of the federal statutes - such as the Back Pay Act - that expressly provide money damages as a remedy against the United States in carefully limited circumstances would be rendered superfluous. </s> The Court of Claims, in the present case, sought to avoid all this by its remand to the Civil Service Commission for further proceedings. If, then, the Commission were to find that the respondents were entitled to a higher grade, the Court of Claims announced that it would be prepared on appropriate motion to enter an award of money damages for the respondents for whatever backpay they lost during the period of their wrongful classifications. See Chambers v. United States, 196 Ct. Cl. 186, 451 F.2d 1045 (1971). The remand statute, Pub. L. 92-415, 86 Stat. 652, now codified as part of 28 U.S.C. 1491 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), authorizes the Court of Claims to "issue orders directing restoration to . . . position, placement in appropriate duty . . . status, and correction of applicable records" in order to complement the relief afforded by a money judgment, and also to "remand appropriate matters to any administrative . . . body" in a case "within its jurisdiction." The remand statute, thus, applies only to cases already within the court's jurisdiction. The present litigation is not such a case. 7 </s> [424 U.S. 392, 405] </s> Respondents cite Allison v. United States, 196 Ct. Cl. 263, 451 F.2d 1035 (1971), and Pettit v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 207, 488 F.2d 1026 (1973), as precedent for the remand order in this case. Those cases found the employees' "entitlement" to money damages in an Executive Order, and to that extent might be distinguishable from the instant case. But cf. Ogletree v. McNamara, 449 F.2d 93 (CA6 1971); Gnotta v. United States, 415 F.2d 1271 (CA8 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 934 (1970); Manhattan-Bronx Postal Union v. Gronouski, 121 U.S. App. D.C. 321, 350 F.2d 451 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966). To the extent, however, that Allison and Pettit rely on the concept that an admission of misclassification by an agency automatically gives rise to a cause of action for money damages against the United States, their reasoning is identical to the Court of Claims' reasoning in the instant case; and to the extent that analysis is now rejected, the analysis of Allison and Pettit is necessarily rejected. See also Chambers v. United States, supra. </s> C. The Back Pay Act. This statute, which the Court of Claims found unnecessary to evaluate in arriving at its decision, does not apply, in our view, to wrongful-classification claims. The Act does authorize retroactive recovery of wages whenever a federal employee has "undergone an unjustified or unwarranted personnel action that has resulted in the withdrawal or reduction of all or a part of" the compensation to which the employee is otherwise entitled. 5 U.S.C. 5596 (b). The statute's language was intended to provide a monetary remedy for wrongful reductions in grade, removals, suspensions, and "other unwarranted or unjustified actions affecting pay or allowances [that] could occur in the course of reassignments and change from full-time to part-time work." S. Rep. No. 1062, 89th Cong., 2d [424 U.S. 392, 406] Sess., 3 (1966). The Commission consistently has so construed the Back Pay Act. See 5 CFR 550.803 (e) (1975). So has the Court of Claims. See Desmond v. United States, 201 Ct. Cl. 507, 527 (1973). </s> For many years federal personnel actions were viewed as entirely discretionary and therefore not subject to any judicial review, and in the absence of a statute eliminating that discretion, courts refused to intervene where an employee claimed that he had been wrongfully discharged. Compare Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290, 293 -296 (1900), with United States v. Wickersham, 201 U.S. 390 (1906). See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 69 -70 (1974). Relief was invariably denied where the claim was that the employee had been denied a promotion on improper grounds. See Keim v. United States, 177 U.S., at 296 ; United States v. McLean, 95 U.S., at 753 . </s> Congress, of course, now has provided specifically in the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, 5 U.S.C. 7501, for administrative review of a claim of wrongful adverse action, and in the Back Pay Act for the award of money damages for a wrongful deprivation of pay. But federal agencies continue to have discretion in determining most matters relating to the terms and conditions of federal employment. One continuing aspect of this is the rule, mentioned above, that the federal employee is entitled to receive only the salary of the position to which he was appointed, even though he may have performed the duties of another position or claims that he should have been placed in a higher grade. Congress did not override this rule, or depart from it, with its enactment of the Back Pay Act. It could easily have so provided had that been its intention. 8 </s> [424 U.S. 392, 407] </s> In support of their contention that the Back Pay Act authorizes a claim in the situation here presented, respondents and amici cite only two cases other than the Court of Claims cases whose reasoning is directly in question here. Neither case supports the proposition. Walker v. Kleindienst, 357 F. Supp. 749 (DC 1973). (cited by respondents), addressed the issue of the retroactivity of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. Ainsworth v. United States, 185 Ct. Cl. 110, 399 F.2d 176 (1968) (cited by amici), involved the rights of an employee who had been discharged and subsequently reinstated. </s> Neither of these cases provides a reason for doubting that the Back Pay Act, as its words so clearly indicate, was intended to grant a monetary cause of action only to those who were subjected to a reduction in their duly appointed emoluments or position. </s> III </s> We therefore conclude that neither the Classification Act nor the Back Pay Act creates a substantive right in the respondents to backpay for the period of their claimed wrongful classifications. This makes it unnecessary for us to consider the additional argument advanced by the United States that the Classification Act does not require that positions held by employees of one agency be compared with those of employees in another agency. </s> The Court of Claims was in error when it remanded the case to the Civil Service Commission for further proceedings. That court's judgment is therefore reversed, [424 U.S. 392, 408] and the case is remanded with directions to dismiss the respondents' suit. </s> It is so ordered. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Title 5, 5101. "Purpose. </s> "It is the purpose of this chapter to provide a plan for classification of positions whereby - </s> "(1) in determining the rate of basic pay which an employee will receive - </s> "(A) the principle of equal pay for substantially equal work will be followed . . . ." </s> [Footnote 2 There is no suggestion that the plaintiff-respondents have not properly pursued and exhausted their administrative remedies. </s> [Footnote 3 The decision of the Court of Claims in this case is not inconsistent, as to these issues, with other recent cases resolved by divided votes in that court. See Chambers v. United States, 196 Ct. Cl. 186, 451 F.2d 1045 (1971); Allison v. United States, 196 Ct. Cl. 263, 451 F.2d 1035 (1971); Small v. United States, 200 Ct. Cl. 11, 470 F.2d 1020 (1972); Pettit v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 207, 488 F.2d 1026 (1973). But see Applegate v. United States, 207 Ct. Cl. 999, 521 F.2d 1406 (1975); Roseman v. United States, 207 Ct. Cl. 998, 521 F.2d 1406 (1975); Kaeserman v. United States, 207 Ct. Cl. 983 (1975); Barnum v. United States, 207 Ct. Cl. 1024, 529 F.2d 531 (1975). </s> [Footnote 4 Title 28 U.S.C. 1494 also grants the Court of Claims jurisdiction to determine the amount due from the United States "by reason of any unsettled account of any officer . . . of . . . the United States." </s> [Footnote 5 The amici acknowledge that it is conceivable that the respondents will be able to obtain reclassification for the future through the mandamus action they instituted in 1971. See Testan v. Hampton, Civ. No. 71-2250 (ED Pa.). That suit apparently lies dormant subject to reactivation. The Government states that if respondents proceed with the action, the United States "will not contest the district court's jurisdiction to entertain respondents' claim for prospective equitable relief." Reply Brief for United States 17 n. 7. </s> [Footnote 6 Brief for Respondents 12; Tr. of Oral Arg. 25-28. </s> [Footnote 7 The committee reports relating to Pub. L. 92-415 expressly confirm the understanding that the remand statute "does not extend the class of cases over which the Court of Claims has jurisdiction." S. Rep. No. 92-1066, p. 1 (1972); H. R. Rep. No. 92-1023, p. 3 (1972). </s> [Footnote 8 In 1972, Congress made Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applicable to federal employees. 86 Stat. 103, 42 U.S.C. 2000e (a) [424 U.S. 392, 407] (1970 ed., Supp. IV). The nature of that explicit waiver of sovereign immunity is presently before the Court. See Brown v. General Services Administration, 507 F.2d 1300 (CA2 1974), cert. granted, 421 U.S. 987 (1975). </s> [424 U.S. 392, 409]

United States Supreme Court ZANT v. STEPHENS(1983) No. 81-89 Argued: February 24, 1982Decided: June 22, 1983 </s> In a bifurcated trial in a Georgia state court, a jury found respondent guilty of murder and imposed the death penalty. At the sentencing phase of the trial, the judge instructed the jury that it was authorized to consider all of the evidence received during the guilt phase of the trial as well as all facts and circumstances presented in mitigation or aggravation during the sentencing proceeding, and that it must find and designate in writing the existence of one or more specified statutory aggravating circumstances in order to impose the death penalty. The jury stated in writing that it found the statutory aggravating circumstances that respondent had a prior conviction of a capital felony, that he had "a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions," and that the murder was committed by an escapee. While respondent's appeal was pending, the Georgia Supreme Court held in another case that one of the aggravating circumstances - "substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions" - was unconstitutionally vague. In respondent's case, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the two other aggravating circumstances adequately supported the sentence. After the Federal District Court denied respondent's petition for habeas corpus, the Court of Appeals held that respondent's death penalty was invalid. In response to this Court's certified question, Zant v. Stephens, 456 U.S. 410 , the Georgia Supreme Court explained the state-law premises for its view that the failure of one aggravating circumstance does not invalidate a death sentence that is otherwise adequately supported by other aggravating circumstances. Under Georgia law the finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance serves a limited purpose - it identifies those members of the class of persons convicted of murder who are eligible for the death penalty, without furnishing any further guidance to the jury in the exercise of its discretion in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed. </s> Held: </s> 1. The limited function served by the jury's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance does not render Georgia's statutory scheme invalid under the holding in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 . Under Georgia's scheme, the jury is required to find and identify in writing at least one valid statutory aggravating circumstance, an individualized [462 U.S. 862, 863] determination must be made on the basis of the defendant's character and the circumstances of the crime, and the State Supreme Court reviews the record of every death penalty proceeding to determine whether the sentence was arbitrary or disproportionate. The narrowing function of statutory aggravating circumstances was properly achieved in this case by the two valid aggravating circumstances upheld by the Georgia Supreme Court, because these two findings adequately differentiate this case in an objective, evenhanded, and substantively rational way from the many Georgia murder cases in which the death penalty may not be imposed. Moreover, the Georgia Supreme Court reviewed respondent's death sentence to determine whether it was arbitrary, excessive, or disproportionate. Thus the Georgia capital sentencing statute is not invalid as applied here. Pp. 873-880. </s> 2. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 , does not require that respondent's death sentence be vacated. Stromberg requires that a general guilty verdict be set aside if the jury was instructed that it could rely on any of two or more independent grounds, and one of those grounds is insufficient, because the verdict may have rested exclusively on the insufficient ground. In this case, however, the jury did not merely return a general verdict stating that it had found at least one aggravating circumstance, but instead expressly found two aggravating circumstances that were valid and legally sufficient to support the death penalty. Nor is a second rule derived from Stromberg - requiring that a general guilty verdict on a single-count indictment or information be set aside where it rests on both a constitutional and an unconstitutional ground - applicable here. There is no suggestion that any of the aggravating circumstances involved any conduct protected by the Constitution. Pp. 880-884. </s> 3. Respondent's death sentence was not impaired on the asserted ground that the jury instruction with regard to the invalid statutory aggravating circumstance may have unduly affected the jury's deliberations. Although the aggravating circumstance was struck down by the Georgia Supreme Court because it failed to provide an adequate basis for distinguishing a murder case in which the death penalty may be imposed from those cases in which such a penalty may not be imposed, the underlying evidence as to respondent's history of serious assaultive criminal convictions was fully admissible under Georgia law at the sentencing phase of the trial. Pp. 884-891. </s> 631 F.2d 397 and 648 F.2d 446, reversed. </s> STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and BLACKMUN, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, [462 U.S. 862, 864] post, p. 891. REHNQUIST, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 893. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 904. </s> After the Georgia Supreme Court's response to the certified question, supplemental briefs were filed by Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General of Georgia, William B. Hill, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney General, Robert S. Stubbs II, Executive Assistant Attorney General, and Marion O. Gordon, First Assistant Attorney General, for petitioner, and by James C. Bonner, Jr., Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Joel Berger, John Charles Boger, Deborah Fins, and Anthony G. Amsterdam for respondent. </s> JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The question presented is whether respondent's death penalty must be vacated because one of the three statutory aggravating circumstances found by the jury was subsequently held to be invalid by the Supreme Court of Georgia, although the other two aggravating circumstances were specifically upheld. The answer depends on the function of the jury's finding of an aggravating circumstance under Georgia's capital sentencing statute, and on the reasons that the aggravating circumstance at issue in this particular case was found to be invalid. </s> In January 1975 a jury in Bleckley County, Georgia, convicted respondent of the murder of Roy Asbell and sentenced him to death. The evidence received at the guilt phase of his trial, which included his confessions and the testimony of a number of witnesses, described these events: On August 19, 1974, while respondent was serving sentences for several burglary convictions and was also awaiting trial for escape, he again escaped from the Houston County Jail. In the next two days he committed two auto thefts, an armed robbery, and several burglaries. On August 21st, Roy Asbell interrupted respondent and an accomplice in the course of burglarizing the home of Asbell's son in Twiggs County. Respondent [462 U.S. 862, 865] beat Asbell, robbed him, and, with the aid of the accomplice, drove him in his own vehicle a short distance into Bleckley County. There they killed Asbell by shooting him twice through the ear at point blank range. </s> At the sentencing phase of the trial the State relied on the evidence adduced at the guilt phase and also established that respondent's prior criminal record included convictions on two counts of armed robbery, five counts of burglary, and one count of murder. Respondent testified that he was "sorry" and knew he deserved to be punished, that his accomplice actually shot Asbell, and that they had both been "pretty high" on drugs. The State requested the jury to impose the death penalty and argued that the evidence established the aggravating circumstances identified in subparagraphs (b)(1), (b)(7), and (b)(9) of the Georgia capital sentencing statute. 1 </s> The trial judge instructed the jury that under the law of Georgia "every person [found] guilty of Murder shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life, the sentence to be fixed by the jury trying the case." App. 18. He explained that the jury was authorized to consider all of the evidence [462 U.S. 862, 866] received during the trial as well as all facts and circumstances presented in extenuation, mitigation, or aggravation during the sentencing proceeding. He then stated: </s> "You may consider any of the following statutory aggravating circumstances which you find are supported by the evidence. One, the offense of Murder was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a Capital felony, or the offense of Murder was committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions. Two, the offense of Murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim. Three, the offense of Murder was committed by a person who has escaped from the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement. These possible statutory circumstances are stated in writing and will be out with you during your deliberations on the sentencing phase of this case. They are in writing here, and I shall send this out with you. If the jury verdict on sentencing fixes punishment at death by electrocution you shall designate in writing, signed by the foreman, the aggravating circumstances or circumstance which you found to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Unless one or more of these statutory aggravating circumstances are proven beyond a reasonable doubt you will not be authorized to fix punishment at death." 2 </s> The jury followed the court's instruction and imposed the death penalty. It designated in writing that it had found the aggravating circumstances described as "One" and "Three" in the judge's instruction. 3 It made no such finding with respect [462 U.S. 862, 867] to "Two." 4 It should be noted that the jury's finding under "One" encompassed both alternatives identified in the judge's instructions and in subsection (b)(1) of the statute - that respondent had a prior conviction of a capital felony and that he had a substantial history of serious assaultive convictions. These two alternatives and the finding that the murder was committed by an escapee are described by the parties as the three aggravating circumstances found by the jury, but they may also be viewed as two statutory aggravating circumstances, one of which rested on two grounds. </s> In his direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia respondent did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the aggravating circumstances found by the jury. Nor did he argue that there was any infirmity in the statutory definition of those circumstances. While his appeal was pending, however, the Georgia Supreme Court held in Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 539-542, 224 S. E. 2d 386, 391-392 (1976), that the aggravating circumstance described in the second clause of (b)(1) - "a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions" - was unconstitutionally vague. 5 Because such a finding had been made by the jury in this case, the Georgia Supreme Court, on its own motion, [462 U.S. 862, 868] considered whether it impaired respondent's death sentence. It concluded that the two other aggravating circumstances adequately supported the sentence. Stephens v. State, 237 Ga. 259, 261-262, 227 S. E. 2d 261, 263, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 986 (1976). The state court reaffirmed this conclusion in a subsequent appeal from the denial of state habeas corpus relief. Stephens v. Hopper, 241 Ga. 596, 603-604, 247 S. E. 2d 92, 97-98, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 991 (1978). 6 </s> After the Federal District Court had denied a petition for habeas corpus, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered two constitutional challenges to respondent's death sentence. 631 F.2d 397 (1980). That court first rejected his contention that the jury was not adequately instructed that it was permitted to impose life imprisonment rather than the death penalty even if it found an aggravating circumstance. 7 The court then held, however, that the death penalty was invalid because one of the aggravating circumstances found by the jury was later held unconstitutional. </s> The Court of Appeals gave two reasons for that conclusion. First, it read Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), as requiring that a jury verdict based on multiple grounds be set aside if the reviewing court cannot ascertain [462 U.S. 862, 869] whether the jury relied on an unconstitutional ground. The court concluded: </s> "It is impossible for a reviewing court to determine satisfactorily that the verdict in this case was not decisively affected by an unconstitutional statutory aggravating circumstance. The jury had the authority to return a life sentence even if it found statutory aggravating circumstances. It is possible that even if the jurors believed that the other aggravating circumstances were established, they would not have recommended the death penalty but for the decision that the offense was committed by one having a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions, an invalid ground." 631 F.2d, at 406. </s> Second, it believed that the presence of the invalid circumstance "made it possible for the jury to consider several prior convictions of [respondent] which otherwise would not have been before it." Ibid. </s> In a petition for rehearing, the State pointed out that the evidence of respondent's prior convictions would have been admissible at the sentencing hearing even if it had not relied on the invalid circumstance. 8 The Court of Appeals then modified its opinion by deleting its reference to the possibility that the jury had relied on inadmissible evidence. 648 F.2d 446 (1981). It maintained, however, that the reference in the instructions to the invalid circumstance "may have unduly directed the jury's attention to his prior convictions." Ibid. The court concluded: "It cannot be determined with the degree of certainty required in capital cases that the instruction did not make a critical difference in the jury's decision to impose the death penalty." Ibid. [462 U.S. 862, 870] </s> We granted Warden Zant's petition for certiorari, 454 U.S. 814 (1981). The briefs on the merits revealed that different state appellate courts have reached varying conclusions concerning the significance of the invalidation of one of multiple aggravating circumstances considered by a jury in a capital case. 9 Although the Georgia Supreme Court had consistently stated that the failure of one aggravating circumstance does not invalidate a death sentence that is otherwise adequately supported, 10 we concluded that an exposition of the state-law premises for that view would assist in framing the precise federal constitutional issues presented by the Court of Appeals' holding. We therefore sought guidance from the Georgia Supreme Court pursuant to Georgia's statutory certification procedure. Ga. Code 24-4536 (Supp. 1980). Zant v. Stephens, 456 U.S. 410 (1982). 11 </s> In its response to our certified question, the Georgia Supreme Court first distinguished Stromberg as a case in which the jury might have relied exclusively on a single invalid ground, noting that the jury in this case had expressly relied on valid and sufficient grounds for its verdict. The court then explained the state-law premises for its treatment of aggravating circumstances by analogizing the entire body of Georgia law governing homicides to a pyramid. It explained: </s> "All cases of homicide of every category are contained within the pyramid. The consequences flowing to the [462 U.S. 862, 871] perpetrator increase in severity as the cases proceed from the base to the apex, with the death penalty applying only to those few cases which are contained in the space just beneath the apex. To reach that category a case must pass through three planes of division between the base and the apex. </s> "The first plane of division above the base separates from all homicide cases those which fall into the category of murder. This plane is established by the legislature in statutes defining terms such as murder, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, and justifiable homicide. In deciding whether a given case falls above or below this plane, the function of the trier of facts is limited to finding facts. The plane remains fixed unless moved by legislative act. </s> "The second plane separates from all murder cases those in which the penalty of death is a possible punishment. This plane is established by statutory definitions of aggravating circumstances. The function of the factfinder is again limited to making a determination of whether certain facts have been established. Except where there is treason or aircraft hijacking, a given case may not move above this second plane unless at least one statutory aggravating circumstance exists. Code Ann. 27-2534.1(c). </s> "The third plane separates, from all cases in which a penalty of death may be imposed, those cases in which it shall be imposed. There is an absolute discretion in the factfinder to place any given case below the plane and not impose death. The plane itself is established by the factfinder. In establishing the plane, the factfinder considers all evidence in extenuation, mitigation and aggravation of punishment. Code Ann. 27-2503 and 27-2534.1. There is a final limitation on the imposition of the death penalty resting in the automatic appeal procedure: This court determines whether the penalty of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, [462 U.S. 862, 872] or any other arbitrary factor; whether the statutory aggravating circumstances are supported by the evidence; and whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. Code Ann. 27-2537. Performance of this function may cause this court to remove a case from the death penalty category but can never have the opposite result. </s> "The purpose of the statutory aggravating circumstances is to limit to a large degree, but not completely, the factfinder's discretion. Unless at least one of the ten statutory aggravating circumstances exists, the death penalty may not be imposed in any event. If there exists at least one statutory aggravating circumstance, the death penalty may be imposed but the factfinder has a discretion to decline to do so without giving any reason. Waters v. State, 248 Ga. 355, 369, 283 S. E. 2d 238 (1981); Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327, 334, 240 S. E. 2d 833 (1977); Fleming v. State, 240 Ga. 142, 240 S. E. 2d 37 1977). In making the decision as to the penalty, the factfinder takes into consideration all circumstances before it from both the guilt-innocence and the sentence phases of the trial. These circumstances relate both to the offense and the defendant. </s> "A case may not pass the second plane into that area in which the death penalty is authorized unless at least one statutory aggravating circumstance is found. However, this plane is passed regardless of the number of statutory aggravating circumstances found, so long as there is at least one. Once beyond this plane, the case enters the area of the factfinder's discretion, in which all the facts and circumstances of the case determine, in terms of our metaphor, whether or not the case passes the third plane and into the area in which the death penalty is imposed." 250 Ga. 97, 99-100, 297 S. E. 2d 1, 3-4 (1982). [462 U.S. 862, 873] </s> The Georgia Supreme Court then explained why the failure of the second ground of the (b)(1) statutory aggravating circumstance did not invalidate respondent's death sentence. It first noted that the evidence of respondent's prior convictions had been properly received and could properly have been considered by the jury. The court expressed the opinion that the mere fact that such evidence was improperly designated "statutory" had an "inconsequential impact" on the jury's death penalty decision. Finally, the court noted that a different result might be reached if the failed circumstance had been supported by evidence not otherwise admissible or if there was reason to believe that, because of the failure, the sentence was imposed under the influence of an arbitrary factor. Id., at 100, 297 S. E. 2d, at 4. </s> We are indebted to the Georgia Supreme Court for its helpful response to our certified question. That response makes it clear that we must confront three separate issues in order to decide this case. First, does the limited purpose served by the finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance in Georgia allow the jury a measure of discretion that is forbidden by Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and subsequent cases? Second, has the rule of Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), been violated? Third, in this case, even though respondent's prior criminal record was properly admitted, does the possibility that the reference to the invalid statutory aggravating circumstance in the judge's instruction affected the jury's deliberations require that the death sentence be set aside? We discuss these issues in turn. </s> I </s> In Georgia, unlike some other States, 12 the jury is not instructed to give any special weight to any aggravating circumstance, [462 U.S. 862, 874] to consider multiple aggravating circumstances any more significant than a single such circumstance, or to balance aggravating against mitigating circumstances pursuant to any special standard. Thus, in Georgia, the finding of an aggravating circumstance does not play any role in guiding the sentencing body in the exercise of its discretion, apart from its function of narrowing the class of persons convicted of murder who are eligible for the death penalty. For this reason, respondent argues that Georgia's statutory scheme is invalid under the holding in Furman v. Georgia. </s> A fair statement of the consensus expressed by the Court in Furman is that "where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). After thus summarizing the central mandate of Furman, the joint opinion in Gregg set forth a general exposition of sentencing procedures that would satisfy the concerns of Furman. 428 U.S., at 189 -195. But it expressly stated: "We do not intend to suggest that only the above-described procedures would be permissible under Furman or that any sentencing system constructed along these [462 U.S. 862, 875] general lines would inevitably satisfy the concerns of Furman, for each distinct system must be examined on an individual basis." Id., at 195. The opinion then turned to specific consideration of the constitutionality of Georgia's capital sentencing procedures. Id., at 196-207. </s> Georgia's scheme includes two important features which the joint opinion described in its general discussion of sentencing procedures that would guide and channel the exercise of discretion. Georgia has a bifurcated procedure, see id., at 190-191, and its statute also mandates meaningful appellate review of every death sentence, see id., at 195. The statute does not, however, follow the Model Penal Code's recommendation that the jury's discretion in weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances against each other should be governed by specific standards. See id., at 193. Instead, as the Georgia Supreme Court has unambiguously advised us, the aggravating circumstance merely performs the function of narrowing the category of persons convicted of murder who are eligible for the death penalty. </s> Respondent argues that the mandate of Furman is violated by a scheme that permits the jury to exercise unbridled discretion in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed after it has found that the defendant is a member of the class made eligible for that penalty by statute. But that argument could not be accepted without overruling our specific holding in Gregg. For the Court approved Georgia's capital sentencing statute even though it clearly did not channel the jury's discretion by enunciating specific standards to guide the jury's consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 13 </s> [462 U.S. 862, 876] </s> The approval of Georgia's capital sentencing procedure rested primarily on two features of the scheme: that the jury was required to find at least one valid statutory aggravating circumstance and to identify it in writing, and that the State Supreme Court reviewed the record of every death penalty proceeding to determine whether the sentence was arbitrary or disproportionate. These elements, the opinion concluded, adequately protected against the wanton and freakish imposition of the death penalty. 14 This conclusion rested, of course, on the fundamental requirement that each statutory aggravating circumstance must satisfy a constitutional standard derived from the principles of Furman itself. For a system [462 U.S. 862, 877] "could have standards so vague that they would fail adequately to channel the sentencing decision patterns of juries with the result that a pattern of arbitrary and capricious sentencing like that found unconstitutional in Furman could occur." 428 U.S., at 195 , n. 46. To avoid this constitutional flaw, an aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder. 15 </s> [462 U.S. 862, 878] </s> Thus in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), the Court struck down an aggravating circumstance that failed to narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. Justice Stewart's opinion for the plurality concluded that the aggravating circumstance described in subsection (b)(7) of the Georgia statute, as construed by the Georgia Supreme Court, failed to create any "inherent restraint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death sentence," because a person of ordinary sensibility could find that almost every murder fit the stated criteria. Id., at 428-429. 16 Moreover, the facts of the case itself did not distinguish the murder from any other murder. The plurality concluded that there was "no principled way to distinguish this case, in which the death penalty was imposed, from the many in which it was not." Id., at 433. </s> Our cases indicate, then, that statutory aggravating circumstances play a constitutionally necessary function at the stage of legislative definition: they circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. But the Constitution does not require the jury to ignore other possible aggravating factors in the process of selecting, from among that class, those defendants who will actually be sentenced to death. 17 </s> [462 U.S. 862, 879] What is important at the selection stage is an individualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 -112 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 601 -605 (1978) (plurality opinion); Roberts (Harry) v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 636 -637 (1977); Gregg, 428 U.S., at 197 (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S., at 251 -252 (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 -304 (1976) (plurality opinion). 18 </s> The Georgia scheme provides for categorical narrowing at the definition stage, and for individualized determination and appellate review at the selection stage. We therefore remain convinced, as we were in 1976, that the structure of the statute is constitutional. Moreover, the narrowing function has been properly achieved in this case by the two valid aggravating circumstances upheld by the Georgia Supreme Court - that respondent had escaped from lawful confinement, and that he had a prior record of conviction for a capital felony. These two findings adequately differentiate this case in an objective, evenhanded, and substantively rational way from the many Georgia murder cases in which the death penalty may not be imposed. Moreover, the Georgia Supreme Court in this case reviewed the death sentence to determine whether it was arbitrary, excessive, or disproportionate. 19 </s> [462 U.S. 862, 880] Thus the absence of legislative or court-imposed standards to govern the jury in weighing the significance of either or both of those aggravating circumstances does not render the Georgia capital sentencing statute invalid as applied in this case. </s> II </s> Respondent contends that under the rule of Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), and subsequent cases, the invalidity of one of the statutory aggravating circumstances underlying the jury's sentencing verdict requires that its entire death sentence be set aside. In order to evaluate this contention, it is necessary to identify two related but different rules that have their source in the Stromberg case. </s> In Stromberg, a member of the Communist Party was convicted of displaying a red flag in violation of the California Penal Code. The California statute prohibited such a display (1) as a "sign, symbol or emblem" of opposition to organized government; (2) as an invitation or stimulus to anarchistic action; or (3) as an aid to seditious propaganda. This Court held that the first clause of the statute was repugnant to the Federal Constitution and found it unnecessary to pass on the validity of the other two clauses because the jury's guilty verdict might have rested exclusively on a conclusion that Stromberg had violated the first. The Court explained: [462 U.S. 862, 881] </s> "The verdict against the appellant was a general one. It did not specify the ground upon which it rested. As there were three purposes set forth in the statute, and the jury were instructed that their verdict might be given with respect to any one of them, independently considered, it is impossible to say under which clause of the statute the conviction was obtained. If any one of these clauses, which the state court has held to be separable, was invalid, it cannot be determined upon this record that the appellant was not convicted under that clause." Id., at 367-368. </s> "The first clause of the statute being invalid upon its face, the conviction of the appellant, which so far as the record discloses may have rested upon that clause exclusively, must be set aside." Id., at 369-370. </s> One rule derived from the Stromberg case is that a general verdict must be set aside if the jury was instructed that it could rely on any of two or more independent grounds, and one of those grounds is insufficient, because the verdict may have rested exclusively on the insufficient ground. The cases in which this rule has been applied all involved general verdicts based on a record that left the reviewing court uncertain as to the actual ground on which the jury's decision rested. See, e. g., Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 292 (1942); Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 36 , n. 45 (1945); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 5 -6 (1949); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 311 -312 (1957). This rule does not require that respondent's death sentence be vacated, because the jury did not merely return a general verdict stating that it had found at least one aggravating circumstance. The jury expressly found aggravating circumstances that were valid and legally sufficient to support the death penalty. </s> The second rule derived from the Stromberg case is illustrated by Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 528 -529 (1945), and Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 586 -590 (1969). In [462 U.S. 862, 882] those cases we made clear that the reasoning of Stromberg encompasses a situation in which the general verdict on a single-count indictment or information rested on both a constitutional and an unconstitutional ground. In Thomas v. Collins, a labor organizer's contempt citation was predicated both upon a speech expressing a general invitation to a group of nonunion workers, which the Court held to be constitutionally protected speech, and upon solicitation of a single individual. The Court declined to consider the State's contention that the judgment could be sustained on the basis of the individual solicitation alone, 20 for the record showed that the penalty had been imposed on account of both solicitations. "The judgment therefore must be affirmed as to both or as to neither." 323 U.S., at 529 . Similarly, in Street, the record indicated that petitioner's conviction on a single-count indictment could have been based on his protected words as well as on his arguably unprotected conduct, flag burning. We stated that, "unless the record negates the possibility that the conviction was based on both alleged violations," the judgment could not be affirmed unless both were valid. 394 U.S., at 588 . </s> The Court's opinion in Street explained: </s> "We take the rationale of Thomas to be that when a single-count indictment or information charges the commission of a crime by virtue of the defendant's having done both a constitutionally protected act and one which may be unprotected, and a guilty verdict ensues without elucidation, there is an unacceptable danger that the trier of fact will have regarded the two acts as `inter-twined' and have rested the conviction on both together. See 323 U.S., at 528 -529, 540-541. There is no comparable [462 U.S. 862, 883] hazard when the indictment or information is in several counts and the conviction is explicitly declared to rest on findings of guilt on certain of these counts, for in such instances there is positive evidence that the trier of fact considered each count on its own merits and separately from the others." Ibid. (footnote omitted). </s> The rationale of Thomas and Street applies to cases in which there is no uncertainty about the multiple grounds on which a general verdict rests. If, under the instructions to the jury, one way of committing the offense charged is to perform an act protected by the Constitution, the rule of these cases requires that a general verdict of guilt be set aside even if the defendant's unprotected conduct, considered separately, would support the verdict. It is a difficult theoretical question whether the rule of Thomas and Street applies to the Georgia death penalty scheme. The jury's imposition of the death sentence after finding more than one aggravating circumstance is not precisely the same as the jury's verdict of guilty on a single-count indictment after finding that the defendant has engaged in more than one type of conduct encompassed by the same criminal charge, because a wider range of considerations enters into the former determination. On the other hand, it is also not precisely the same as the imposition of a single sentence of imprisonment after guilty verdicts on each of several separate counts in a multiple-count indictment, 21 because the qualitatively different sentence of death is imposed only after a channeled sentencing procedure. We need not answer this question here. The second rule derived from Stromberg, embodied in Thomas and Street, applies only in cases in which the State has based its prosecution, [462 U.S. 862, 884] at least in part, on a charge that constitutionally protected activity is unlawful. No such charge was made in respondent's sentencing proceeding. </s> In Stromberg, Thomas, and Street, the trial courts' judgments rested, in part, on the fact that the defendant had been found guilty of expressive activity protected by the First Amendment. In contrast, in this case there is no suggestion that any of the aggravating circumstances involved any conduct protected by the First Amendment or by any other provision of the Constitution. Accordingly, even if the Stromberg rules may sometimes apply in the sentencing context, a death sentence supported by at least one valid aggravating circumstance need not be set aside under the second Stromberg rule simply because another aggravating circumstance is "invalid" in the sense that it is insufficient by itself to support the death penalty. In this case, the jury's finding that respondent was a person who has a "substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions" did not provide a sufficient basis for imposing the death sentence. But it raised none of the concerns underlying the holdings in Stromberg, Thomas, and Street, for it did not treat constitutionally protected conduct as an aggravating circumstance. </s> III </s> Two themes have been reiterated in our opinions discussing the procedures required by the Constitution in capital sentencing determinations. On the one hand, as the general comments in the Gregg joint opinion indicated, 428 U.S., at 192 -195, and as THE CHIEF JUSTICE explicitly noted in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S., at 605 (plurality opinion), there can be "no perfect procedure for deciding in which cases governmental authority should be used to impose death." See also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638 , n. 13 (1980). On the other hand, because there is a qualitative difference between death and any other permissible form of punishment, "there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability [462 U.S. 862, 885] in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case." Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S., at 305 . "It is of vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion." Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977). Thus, although not every imperfection in the deliberative process is sufficient, even in a capital case, to set aside a state-court judgment, the severity of the sentence mandates careful scrutiny in the review of any colorable claim of error. </s> Respondent contends that the death sentence was impaired because the judge instructed the jury with regard to an invalid statutory aggravating circumstance, a "substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions," for these instructions may have affected the jury's deliberations. In analyzing this contention it is essential to keep in mind the sense in which that aggravating circumstance is "invalid." It is not invalid because it authorizes a jury to draw adverse inferences from conduct that is constitutionally protected. Georgia has not, for example, sought to characterize the display of a red flag, cf. Stromberg v. California, the expression of unpopular political views, cf. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), or the request for trial by jury, cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), as an aggravating circumstance. Nor has Georgia attached the "aggravating" label to factors that are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process, such as for example the race, religion, or political affiliation of the defendant, cf. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937), or to conduct that actually should militate in favor of a lesser penalty, such as perhaps the defendant's mental illness. Cf. Miller v. Florida, 373 So.2d 882, 885-886 (Fla. 1979). If the aggravating circumstance at issue in this case had been invalid for reasons such as these, due process of law would require that the jury's decision to impose death be set aside. [462 U.S. 862, 886] </s> But the invalid aggravating circumstance found by the jury in this case was struck down in Arnold because the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that it fails to provide an adequate basis for distinguishing a murder case in which the death penalty may be imposed from those cases in which such a penalty may not be imposed. See nn. 5 and 16, supra. The underlying evidence is nevertheless fully admissible at the sentencing phase. As we noted in Gregg, 428 U.S., at 163 , the Georgia statute provides that, at the sentencing hearing, the judge or jury </s> "`shall hear additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of punishment, including the record of any prior criminal convictions and pleas of guilty or pleas of nolo contendere of the defendant, or the absence of any prior conviction and pleas: Provided, however, that only such evidence in aggravation as the State has made known to the defendant prior to his trial shall be admissible.'" Ga. Code 27-2503 (1975) (emphasis supplied). 22 </s> We expressly rejected petitioner's objection to the wide scope of evidence and argument allowed at presentence hearings. </s> "We think that the Georgia court wisely has chosen not to impose unnecessary restrictions on the evidence that can be offered at such a hearing and to approve open and far-ranging argument . . . . So long as the evidence introduced and the arguments made at the presentence hearing do not prejudice a defendant, it is preferable not to impose restrictions. We think it desirable for the jury to have as much information before it as possible [462 U.S. 862, 887] when it makes the sentencing decision." 428 U.S., at 203 -204. </s> See id., at 206-207; see also n. 17, supra. </s> Thus, any evidence on which the jury might have relied in this case to find that respondent had previously been convicted of a substantial number of serious assaultive offenses, as he concedes he had been, was properly adduced at the sentencing hearing and was fully subject to explanation by the defendant. 23 Cf. Gardner v. Florida, supra (requiring that the defendant have the opportunity to rebut evidence and State's theory in sentencing proceeding); Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14, 16 , n. 3 (1978) (same). 24 This case involves a statutory aggravating circumstance, invalidated by the State Supreme Court on grounds of vagueness, whose terms plausibly described aspects of the defendant's background that were properly before the jury and whose accuracy was unchallenged. Hence the erroneous instruction does not implicate [462 U.S. 862, 888] our repeated recognition that the "qualitative difference between death and other penalties calls for a greater degree of reliability when the death sentence is imposed." Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S., at 604 (opinion of BURGER, C. J.). </s> Although the Court of Appeals acknowledged on rehearing that the evidence was admissible, it expressed the concern that the trial court's instructions "may have unduly directed the jury's attention to his prior conviction." 648 F.2d, at 446. But, assuming that the instruction did induce the jury to place greater emphasis upon the respondent's prior criminal record than it would otherwise have done, the question remains whether that emphasis violated any constitutional right. In answering this question, it is appropriate to compare the instruction that was actually given, see supra, at 866, with an instruction on the same subject that would have been unobjectionable. Cf. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 -157 (1977). Nothing in the United States Constitution prohibits a trial judge from instructing a jury that it would be appropriate to take account of a defendant's prior criminal record in making its sentencing determination, see n. 17, supra, even though the defendant's prior history of noncapital convictions could not by itself provide sufficient justification for imposing the death sentence. There would have been no constitutional infirmity in an instruction stating, in substance: "If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is a person who has previously been convicted of a capital felony, or that he has escaped from lawful confinement, you will be authorized to impose the death sentence, and in deciding whether or not that sentence is appropriate you may consider the remainder of his prior criminal record." </s> The effect the erroneous instruction may have had on the jury is therefore merely a consequence of the statutory label "aggravating circumstance." That label arguably might have caused the jury to give somewhat greater weight to respondent's prior criminal record than it otherwise would have given. But we do not think the Georgia Supreme [462 U.S. 862, 889] Court erred in its conclusion that the "mere fact that some of the aggravating circumstances presented were improperly designated `statutory'" had "an inconsequential impact on the jury's decision regarding the death penalty." 250 Ga., at 100, 297 S. E. 2d, at 4. The instructions, see supra, at 866, did not place particular emphasis on the role of statutory aggravating circumstances in the jury's ultimate decision. Instead the trial court instructed the jury to "consider all of the evidence received in court throughout the trial before you" and to "consider all facts and circumstances presented in extinuation [sic], mitigation and aggravation of punishment as well as such arguments as have been presented for the State and for the Defense." App. 18. More importantly, for the reasons discussed above, any possible impact cannot fairly be regarded as a constitutional defect in the sentencing process. 25 </s> [462 U.S. 862, 890] </s> Our decision in this case depends in part on the existence of an important procedural safeguard, the mandatory appellate review of each death sentence by the Georgia Supreme Court to avoid arbitrariness and to assure proportionality. 26 We accept that court's view that the subsequent invalidation of one of several statutory aggravating circumstances does not automatically require reversal of the death penalty, having been assured that a death sentence will be set aside if the invalidation of an aggravating circumstance makes the penalty arbitrary or capricious. 250 Ga., at 101, 297 S. E. 2d, at 4. The Georgia Supreme Court, in its response to our certified question, expressly stated: "A different result might be reached in a case where evidence was submitted in support of a statutory aggravating circumstance which was not otherwise admissible, and thereafter the circumstance failed." Ibid. As we noted in Gregg, 428 U.S., at 204 -205, we have also been assured that a death sentence will be vacated if it is excessive or substantially disproportionate to the penalties that have been imposed under similar circumstances. </s> Finally, we note that in deciding this case we do not express any opinion concerning the possible significance of a holding that a particular aggravating circumstance is "invalid" under a statutory scheme in which the judge or jury is specifically instructed to weigh statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances in exercising its discretion whether to impose the death penalty. See n. 12, supra. As we have discussed, see supra, at 873-880, the Constitution does not require a State to adopt specific standards for instructing the jury in its consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and Georgia has not adopted such a system. [462 U.S. 862, 891] Under Georgia's sentencing scheme, and under the trial judge's instructions in this case, no suggestion is made that the presence of more than one aggravating circumstance should be given special weight. Whether or not the jury had concluded that respondent's prior record of criminal convictions merited the label "substantial" or the label "assaultive," the jury was plainly entitled to consider that record, together with all of the other evidence before it, in making its sentencing determination. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is </s> Reversed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Georgia Code 27-2534.1(b) (1978) provided, in part: </s> "In all cases of other offenses for which the death penalty may be authorized, the judge shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions to the jury for it to consider, any mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances otherwise authorized by law and any of the following statutory aggravating circumstances which may be supported by the evidence: </s> "(1) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony, or the offense of murder was committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions. </s> . . . . . </s> "(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim. </s> . . . . . </s> "(9) The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has escaped from, the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement." </s> [Footnote 2 The instruction to the sentencing jury, App. 18-19, is quoted in full in our opinion in Zant v. Stephens, 456 U.S. 410, 412 -413, n. 1 (1982). </s> [Footnote 3 The jury made the following special findings: </s> "(1) The offense of Murder was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony. The offense of Murder was committed by [462 U.S. 862, 867] a person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions. (2) The offense of Murder was committed by a person who has escaped from the lawful custody of a peace officer and place of lawful confinement." App. 23. </s> [Footnote 4 Thus, this case does not implicate our holding in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), that the (b)(7) aggravating circumstance as construed by the Georgia Supreme Court was unconstitutionally broad and vague. </s> [Footnote 5 The defendant in Arnold had been sentenced to death by a jury which found no other aggravating circumstance. On appeal, he contended that the language of the clause "does not provide the sufficiently `clear and objective standards' necessary to control the jury's discretion in imposing the death penalty. Coley v. State, [231 Ga. 829, 834, 204 S. E. 2d 612, 615 (1974)]; Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1971)." The Georgia Supreme Court agreed that the statutory language was too vague and nonspecific to be applied evenhandedly by a jury. 236 Ga., at 540-542, 224 S. E. 2d, at 391-392. </s> [Footnote 6 In his state habeas petition, respondent unsuccessfully challenged the aggravating circumstance that he had a prior conviction for a capital felony. He was admittedly under such a conviction at the time of his trial in this case, but not at the time of the murder. The Supreme Court of Georgia interpreted the statute, Ga. Code 27-2534.1(b)(1) (1978), as referring to the defendant's record at the time of sentencing. Accordingly, respondent's contention was rejected. 241 Ga., at 602-603, 247 S. E. 2d, at 96-97. Respondent renewed his challenge to that aggravating circumstance in his federal habeas petition, but the Court of Appeals correctly recognized that it had no authority to question the Georgia Supreme Court's interpretation of state law. 631 F.2d 397, 405 (CA5 1980). The contention is not renewed here. </s> [Footnote 7 Id., at 404-405. This aspect of the Court of Appeals' decision is not before us. </s> [Footnote 8 Ga. Code 27-2503(a) (1978); 241 Ga., at 603-604, 247 S. E. 2d, at 97-98; see infra, at 886-887. </s> [Footnote 9 Brief for Respondent 40-45; Brief for State of Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae 13-15. </s> [Footnote 10 456 U.S., at 414 ; cf. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 201 , n. 53 (1976) (noting cases in which the Georgia Supreme Court had not explicitly relied on one of several aggravating circumstances when it upheld the death sentence). </s> [Footnote 11 We certified the following question: </s> "What are the premises of state law that support the conclusion that the death sentence in this case is not impaired by the invalidity of one of the statutory aggravating circumstances found by the jury?" 456 U.S., at 416 -417. </s> [Footnote 12 See, e. g., Williams v. State, 274 Ark. 9, 10, 621 S. W. 2d 686, 687 (1981); State v. Irwin, 304 N.C. 93, 107-108, 282 S. E. 2d 439, 448-449 [462 U.S. 862, 874] (1981); State v. Moore, 614 S. W. 2d 348, 351-352 (Tenn. 1981); Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 90, n. 1, 171-172 (Wyo. 1981). In each of these cases, the State Supreme Court set aside a death sentence based on both valid and invalid aggravating circumstances. Respondent advances these cases in support of his contention that a similar result is required here. However, examination of the relevant state statutes shows that in each of these States, not only must the jury find at least one aggravating circumstance in order to have the power to impose the death sentence; in addition, the law requires the jury to weigh the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances when it decides whether or not the death penalty should be imposed. See Ark. Stat. Ann. 41-1302(1) (1977); N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-2000(b) (1978); Tenn. Code Ann. 39-2-203(g) (1982); Wyo. Stat. 6-2-102(d)(i) (1983). </s> [Footnote 13 The joint opinion specifically described the Georgia scheme in these terms: </s> "Georgia did act, however, to narrow the class of murderers subject to capital punishment by specifying 10 statutory aggravating circumstances, one of which must be found by the jury to exist beyond a reasonable doubt before a death sentence can ever be imposed. In addition, the jury is [462 U.S. 862, 876] authorized to consider any other appropriate aggravating or mitigating circumstances. 27-2534.1(b) (Supp. 1975). The jury is not required to find any mitigating circumstance in order to make a recommendation of mercy that is binding on the trial court, see 27-2302 (Supp. 1975), but it must find a statutory aggravating circumstance before recommending a sentence of death." 428 U.S., at 196 -197; see also id., at 161, 165, 206-207. Cf. id., at 208, 218, 222 (opinion of WHITE, J., concurring in judgment). </s> The joint opinion issued the same day in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), makes clear that specific standards for balancing aggravating against mitigating circumstances are not constitutionally required. In Jurek we held that the State's action in "narrowing the categories of murders for which a death sentence may ever be imposed" served much the same purpose as the lists of statutory aggravating circumstances that Georgia and Florida had adopted. Id., at 270. We also held that one of the three questions presented to the sentencing jury permitted the defendant to bring mitigating circumstances to the jury's attention. Id., at 273-274. Thus, in Texas, aggravating and mitigating circumstances were not considered at the same stage of the criminal prosecution and certainly were not explicitly balanced against each other. </s> [Footnote 14 "While the jury is permitted to consider any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, it must find and identify at least one statutory aggravating factor before it may impose a penalty of death. In this way the jury's discretion is channeled. No longer can a jury wantonly and freakishly impose the death sentence; it is always circumscribed by the legislative guidelines. In addition, the review function of the Supreme Court of Georgia affords additional assurance that the concerns that prompted our decision in Furman are not present to any significant degree in the Georgia procedure applied here." 428 U.S., at 206 -207. </s> [Footnote 15 These standards for statutory aggravating circumstances address the concerns voiced by several of the opinions in Furman v. Georgia. See 408 U.S., at 248 , n. 11 (Douglas, J., concurring); id., at 294 (BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("it is highly implausible that only the worst criminals or the criminals who commit the worst crimes are selected for this punishment"); id., at 309-310 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("of all the people convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed"); id., at 313 (WHITE, J., concurring) ("there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not"). </s> In Gregg, the joint opinion again recognized the need for legislative criteria to limit the death penalty to certain crimes: "[T]he decision that capital punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the community's belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death." 428 U.S., at 184 . The opinion also noted with approval the efforts of legislatures to "define those crimes and those criminals for which capital punishment is most probably an effective deterrent." Id., at 186. The opinion of JUSTICE WHITE concurring in the judgment in Gregg asserted that, over time, as the aggravating circumstance requirement was applied, "the types of murders for which the death penalty may be imposed [would] become more narrowly defined and [would be] limited to those which are particularly serious or for which the death penalty is peculiarly appropriate." Id., at 222. Cf. Roberts (Harry) v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 636 (1977) (the State may consider as an aggravating circumstance the fact that the murder victim was a peace officer performing his regular duties, because there is "a special interest in affording protection to those public servants who regularly must risk their lives in order to guard the safety of other persons and property"). </s> [Footnote 16 This Court's conclusion in Godfrey was analogous to the Georgia Supreme Court's holding in Arnold v. State that the second clause of the (b)(1) aggravating circumstance, which is at issue in this case, was "too vague and nonspecific to be applied evenhandedly by a jury." 236 Ga., at 541, 224 S. E. 2d, at 391. The defendant in that case, who had two prior convictions, had been sentenced to death by the jury solely on a finding that he had a "`substantial history' of `serious assaultive criminal convictions.'" The court concluded that the words "substantial history" were so highly subjective as to be unconstitutional. Id., at 542, 224 S. E. 2d, at 392; see n. 5, supra. That aggravating circumstance, in the view of the Georgia Supreme Court, did not provide a principled basis for distinguishing Arnold's case from the many other murder cases in which the death penalty was not imposed under the statute. </s> [Footnote 17 See Gregg, 428 U.S., at 164 , 196-197, 206; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 256 -257, n. 14 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). Similarly, the Model Penal Code draft discussed in Gregg, [462 U.S. 862, 879] supra, at 192-195, sets forth lists of aggravating and mitigating circumstances but also provides that the sentencer "shall take into account . . . any other facts that it deems relevant . . . ." ALI, Model Penal Code 201.6 (Prop. Off. Draft, 1962). </s> A State is, of course, free to decide as a matter of state law to limit the evidence of aggravating factors that the prosecution may offer at the sentencing hearing. A number of States do not permit the sentencer to consider aggravating circumstances other than those enumerated in the statute. See Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 101-119 (1980); see, e. g., Ark. Stat. Ann. 41-1301(4) (1977); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 9711(a)(2) (1980). </s> [Footnote 18 See Gillers, supra n. 17, at 26-27. </s> [Footnote 19 The Georgia Supreme Court conducts an independent review of the propriety of the sentence even when the defendant has not specifically raised objections at trial. See Stephens v. State, 237 Ga. 259, 260, 227 S. E. 2d 261, 262, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 986 (1976). In this case, the Georgia Supreme Court explained: </s> "In performing the sentence comparison required by Code Ann. 27-2537(c)(3), this court uses for comparison purposes not only similar cases in which death was imposed, but similar cases in which death was not imposed." 237 Ga., at 262, 227 S. E. 2d, at 263. </s> As an appendix to the opinion it provided a list of the similar cases it had considered, as the statute requires. Id., at 263, 227 S. E. 2d, at 264. See also Ross v. State, 233 Ga. 361, 364-367, 211 S. E. 2d 356, 358-360 (1974); Tucker v. State, 245 Ga. 68, 74, 263 S. E. 2d 109, 113 (1980). </s> [Footnote 20 The State neither conceded nor unequivocally denied that the sentence was imposed on account of both acts. "Nevertheless the State maintains that the invitation to O'Sullivan in itself is sufficient to sustain the judgment and sentence and that nothing more need be considered to support them." 323 U.S., at 528 , n. 14. </s> [Footnote 21 In this situation the Court has held that the single sentence may stand, even if one or more of the counts is invalid, as long as one of the counts is valid and the sentence is within the range authorized by law. See Claassen v. United States, 142 U.S. 140 (1891); Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). </s> [Footnote 22 See Fair v. State, 245 Ga. 868, 873, 268 S. E. 2d 316, 321 (1980) ("Any lawful evidence which tends to show the motive of the defendant, his lack of remorse, his general moral character, and his predisposition to commit other crimes is admissible in aggravation, subject to the notice provisions of the statute"). </s> [Footnote 23 "The purpose of Code Ann. 27-2503(a) is to allow a defendant to examine his record to determine if the convictions are in fact his, if he was represented by counsel, and any other defect which would render such documents inadmissible during the pre-sentencing phase of the trial." Herring v. State, 238 Ga. 288, 290, 232 S. E. 2d 826, 828 (1977). See Franklin v. State, 245 Ga. 141, 149-150, 263 S. E. 2d 666, 671-672 (1980). As we held in United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 -449 (1972), even in a noncapital sentencing proceeding, the sentence must be set aside if the trial court relied at least in part on "misinformation of constitutional magnitude" such as prior uncounseled convictions that were unconstitutionally imposed. See Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740 -741 (1948) (reversing a sentence imposed on uncounseled defendant because it was based on "extensively and materially false" assumptions concerning the defendant's prior criminal record). </s> [Footnote 24 Petitioner acknowledges that, if an invalid statutory aggravating circumstance were supported by material evidence not properly before the jury, a different case would be presented. Brief for Petitioner 13; Supplemental Memorandum for Petitioner 18; Tr. of Oral Arg. 14, 18-20. We need not decide in this case whether the death sentence would be impaired in other circumstances, for example, if the jury's finding of an aggravating circumstance relied on materially inaccurate or misleading information. </s> [Footnote 25 The Georgia Supreme Court's affirmance of this case on direct appeal implicitly approves the jury instructions as an accurate reflection of state law. Moreover, the instructions are entirely consistent with the explanation of Georgia's statutory scheme given in the Georgia Supreme Court's response to our certified question. According to the response, see supra, at 872, "[u]nless at least one of the ten statutory aggravating circumstances exists, the death penalty may not be imposed in any event. If there exists at least one statutory aggravating circumstance, the death penalty may be imposed but the factfinder has a discretion to decline to do so without giving any reason. . . . In making the decision as to the penalty, the factfinder takes into consideration all circumstances before it from both the guilt-innocence and the sentence phases of the trial." 250 Ga., at 100, 297 S. E. 2d, at 3-4. This is precisely what the trial court told the jury: "Now in arriving at your determinations in this regard you are authorized to consider all of the evidence received in court throughout the trial before you. You are further authorized to consider all facts and circumstances presented in extinuation [sic], mitigation and aggravation of punishment as well as such arguments as have been presented for the State and for the Defense. . . . Unless one or more of these statutory aggravating circumstances are proven beyond a reasonable doubt you will not be authorized to fix punishment at death. . . . If you fix punishment at death by electrocution you would recite in the exact words which I have given you the one or more circumstances you found to be proven beyond a reasonable [462 U.S. 862, 890] doubt. . . . [If you recommend life imprisonment] it would not be necessary for you to recite any mitigating or aggravating circumstances as you may find, and you would simply state in your verdict, We fix punishment at life in prison." App. 18-19. See Zant v. Stephens, 456 U.S., at 411 -412, n. 1. </s> [Footnote 26 See n. 19, supra. </s> JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. </s> In Claassen v. United States, 412 U.S. 140 (1891), the defendant in a criminal case was found guilty on 5 of 11 counts on which the jury was instructed. The verdict was a general one and one 6-year sentence was imposed. On writ of error, this Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, saying that the first "count an the verdict of guilty returned upon it being sufficient to support the judgment and sentence, the question of the sufficiency of the other counts need not be considered." Id., at 146. Similarly, in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959), a defendant was convicted on each of five counts, and a general sentence was imposed. The Court said, id., at 115: "Since this sentence was less than the maximum punishment authorized by the statute for conviction under any one Count, the judgment below must be upheld if the conviction upon any of the Counts is sustainable" (footnote omitted). Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 641 , n. 1 (1946); Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431, 438 (1936); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 619 (1919); and Evans v. United States, 153 U.S. 584, 595 (1894), were similar holdings. It is therefore clear that in cases such as Claassen and Barenblatt, there is no Stromberg, Thomas, or Street problem. [462 U.S. 862, 892] </s> Here, the jury imposing the sentence found three aggravating circumstances and based on all the evidence imposed the death sentence. One of the aggravating circumstance was found invalid on an intervening appeal in another case, and the claim is that under Stromberg, Thomas, and Street, the death sentence must be set aside. I agree with the Court that there is no such problem since the evidence supporting the invalid aggravating circumstances was properly before the jury. The Court, however, suggests that if the evidence had been inadmissible under the Federal Constitution, there might be a Stromberg, Thomas, or Street problem. The Court says, ante, at 883: "The jury's imposition of the death sentence after finding more than one aggravating circumstance . . . is also not precisely the same as the imposition of a single sentence of imprisonment after guilty verdicts on each of several separate counts in a multiple-count indictment, because the qualitatively different sentence of death is imposed only after a channeled sentencing procedure" (footnote omitted). The Court thus suggests that the Claassen-Barenblatt line of cases may not be applicable to sentencing proceedings in capital punishment cases. I fail to grasp the distinction, however, between those cases and the sentencing procedures involved here. In Claassen and Barenblatt, there was only one sentence on several counts and one could be no surer there than here that the sentence did or did not rest on any one of the counts. Those cases, however, would sustain the sentence if it was authorized under any of the valid counts. Stromberg, Thomas, and Street should no more invalidate the single sentence in this case. </s> Thus in may view there would be no Stromberg-Thomas-Street problem, as such, if the invalid count had rested on constitutionally inadmissible evidence. But since the jury is instructed to take into account all the evidence, there would remain the question whether the inadmissible evidence invalidates the sentence. Perhaps it would, but at least there [462 U.S. 862, 893] would be room for the application of the harmless-error rule, which would not be the case, it seems to me, under the per se rule of Stromberg, Street, and Thomas. </s> Except for the foregoing, I join the Court's opinion and its judgment as well. </s> JUSTICE REHNQUIST, concurring in the judgment. </s> While agreeing with the Court's judgment, I write separately to make clear my understanding of the application of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the capital sentencing procedures and used in this case. I agree with the Court's treatment of the factual and procedural background of the case, and with its characterization of the question presented for review. In brief, we must decide whether the procedure by which Georgia imposed the death sentence comports with the Eight and Fourteenth Amendments; whether, in this case, imposition of the death sentence violates the rule of Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931); and whether the erroneous presentation to a jury of an invalid aggravating circumstance requires vacating the death sentence imposed by that jury. </s> I </s> The Georgia death sentencing procedure is comprehensively detailed in the statutes of the State, decisions of the Georgia courts, the opinion issued by the Georgia Supreme Court in response to the questioned certified by this Court, Zant v. Stephens, 455 U.S. 410 (1982), and the jury instructions in this case. As these materials reveal, two separate proceedings are necessary to imposition of the death sentence in Georgia. The first stage is simply a traditional criminal trial on the question of guilt or innocence. If the defendant is found guilty of a capital offense, a separate sentencing proceedings is then conducted. </s> At this second proceeding, the State and the defendant are permitted to introduce a wide range of evidence in "extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of punishment." Ga. Code [462 U.S. 862, 894] 27-2503 (1978). The Sentencing body is then directed to make two separate decisions. First, it decides whether any of a number of specific, statutorily defined aggravating circumstances have been proved beyond a reasonably doubt. Ga. Code 27-2534.1(b)(1978). In addition, the jury is instructed that, if it finds one or more of the statutory aggravating circumstances, it is to make the further judgment whether the defendant deserves the death sentence. In making this second decision, statutory aggravating circumstances found by the sentence are considered together with all the other evidence in mitigation and aggravation. The sentencer is not, however, instructed to formally "weigh" the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances. If a death sentence is imposed, then the case receives both conventional appellate consideration and expedited direct review by the Supreme Court of Georgia. </s> Respondent challenges the Georgia death sentencing system as violative of the Eight Amendment, on the grounds that it fails adequately to channel the discretion of the sentencing body. In particular, respondent urges that the absence of an instruction that the sentence must balance statutory aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances before imposing the death sentence render the scheme unconstitutional under the reasoning in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Respondent's claim is, in my opinion, completely foreclosed by this Court's precedents. </s> Except in minor detail, Georgia's current system is identical to the sentencing procedure we held constitutional in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); id., at 207 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment). The joint opinion in Gregg fully recognized that the Georgia scheme did not direct the sentencing body that statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances were to be weighed against each other in any formal sense. This is evident from its careful description of the Georgia scheme, id., at 196-197, and its treatment of the [462 U.S. 862, 895] Model Penal Code's proposed system, id., at 193, where the fact that the sentencing body is formally instructed to weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances was specifically noted. Notwithstanding the lack of an explicit "balancing" directive, the joint opinion upheld the statutory scheme, since, taken as a whole, it provided the sentencing authority with sufficient guidance to prevent the "freakish" imposition of death barred in Furman. Likewise, in JUSTICE WHITE's concurrence, 428 U.S., at 211 , the role of aggravating circumstances was squarely discussed, and approved. To accept respondent's contention that the sentencing body must be specifically instructed to balance statutory aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances would require rejecting the judgment in Gregg that the Georgia statute provided the sentencing body with adequate guidance to permit it to impose death. 1 </s> II </s> Respondent next contends that Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), requires that his death sentence be set aside. Respondent's argument rests on the fact that one of the three aggravating circumstances specified by the jury in [462 U.S. 862, 896] his case was later found invalid under a state-court decision holding the statutory definition of the circumstance impermissibly vague under the United States Constitution. Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 224 S. E. 2d 386 (1976). 2 Respondent reasons that Stromberg establishes a rule requiring that any general verdict returned by a factfinder be set aside if it is based, even in part, upon "an invalid factor." Supplemental Brief for Respondent 8. According to respondent, because one of the aggravating circumstances found by the jury was invalid, the general verdict of death returned by the jury fails the Stromberg test. </s> Careful examination of Stromberg, cases following that decision, and the role of aggravating circumstances in a jury's imposition of the death penalty compels rejection of respondent's claim. Stromberg presented a straightforward case. The defendant was convicted for violating a California statute prohibiting the display of a red flag for any of three separate purposes. At trial the jury was instructed that the defendant should be convicted if he acted with any one of the proscribed purposes; it returned a general verdict of guilty without indicating which purpose it believed motivated the defendant. This Court concluded that the first of the clauses of the statute detailing impermissible purposes was unconstitutional, and held that it was unnecessary to decide the validity of the remaining two clauses. The Court observed that the prosecutor had "emphatically urged upon the jury that they could convict the appellant under the first clause alone, without regard to the other clauses." 283 U.S., at 368 . It concludes that it was "impossible to say under which clause of the statute the conviction was obtained," ibid., and that, given this complete uncertainty, the conviction could not stand. See also Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 , [462 U.S. 862, 897] 292 (1942); Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 36 , n. 45 (1945); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 5 -6 (1949); Yates v. Untied States, 354 U.S. 298, 311 -312 (1957). Of course, if the jury does indicate which statutory elements supported its verdict, and if these are valid, then Stromberg is inapplicable. </s> As the Court points out, the Stromberg doctrine subsequently was extended - albeit without lengthy analysis. In Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 586 -590(1969), the Court vacated a conviction based on a single-count indictment, for casting contempt on the United States flag. The statute under which petitioner was convicted criminalized casting contempt upon the flag by "words or act." Id., at 578. The information filed against petitioner alleged that he violated this statute because he both burned the flag and shouted derogatory statement about it. Likewise, the State introduced evidence at the bench trial of both the petitioners act and his speech. The Court concluded that petitioners constitutional rights would have been violated had he been punished for his speech. It thought, moreover, that the trial judge might have rested his finding solely on petitioners speech, which presented a situation similar to that in Stromberg. </s> In addition, however, the Court believed that, on the record of the case, there was an "unacceptable danger that the trier of fact . . . regarded the two acts as `intertwined' and . . . rested the conviction on both together." 394 U.S., at 588 . In short, when an element of a crime is defined to included constitutionally projected actions, and when the States alleges, argues, and offer proof that the defendant's protected conduct satisfied the element, then a general verdict of guilty must be set aside, even if the State also alleged and proved another course of conduct that could have satisfied the element. As in Stromberg, however, the Court also noted that when the record indicates that he jury's verdict did not rest on an "intertwined" combination of protected and [462 U.S. 862, 898] unprotected conduct, but instead rested sufficiently on unprotected conduct, then the verdict would stand. </s> Neither the Stromberg line of case nor Street provides respondent with appreciable support. I agree with the Court that the Stromberg rule is plainly distinguished since the jury explicated returned two concededly valid aggravation circumstances, thereby conclusively negating the inference that it rested solely on the invalid circumstances. Likewise, I conclude that the analysis in Street is inapposite. 3 It is helpful in explaining why this is the case to discuss separately the two decision made by the sentencing body during the Georgia death penalty proceedings. I initially consider the applicability of Street to the jury's first decision that is the finding of statutory aggravating circumstances. </s> As indicated above, Street explicitly stated that its rule regarding the treatment of aggravating circumstance is inapplicable "when the indictment or information is in several counts and the conviction is explicitly declared to rest on finding of guilt on certain of those counts, for in such instances there is positive evidence that the trier of fact considered each count on its own merits and separately from the others." 394 U.S., at 588 (footnote omitted.) This exception to the Street rule extends to the jury's determination in this case that certain specified aggravating circumstances existed. The jury received separate instructions as to each of several aggravating circumstances, and returned a verdict from separately listing three circumstances. The fact that one of these subsequently proved to be invalid does not affect the validity of the remaining two jury findings, just as the reversal on appeal of one of several convictions returned to separate [462 U.S. 862, 899] counts does not affect the remaining convictions. There was "positive evidence" that Stephens' jury considered each aggravating circumstance "on its own merits and separately from the others." Ibid. Because of this, Street provides no basis for questioning the jury's first decision, which, if supported, permitted it to go further and consider whether Stephens deserved the death sentence. </s> Street's logic is even less applicable to a Georgia death jury's second decision, namely, that the defendant deserved the death sentence. Under the respondent's theory, the jury's verdict of death was based in part on an aggravating circumstances that later proved invalid, and which, according to respondent must thus fall under the rule of Street. Whatever its proper application elsewhere, Street's rule cannot fairly be extended to the sentencing context. As discussed below, the significant difference between the role of aggravating circumstances in the jury's decision to imposed the death sentence and role played by instructions or allegations in a jury's determination of guilt preclude applying Street to the sentencing context. </s> The rule relied upon by respondent was developed in a situation where a factfinder returns a verdict of guilty on a specific criminal charge. In returning this verdict, the jury decides whether the defendant committed a specific set of defined acts with a particular mental state. These elements each of which is necessary to the verdict of guilty, are specifically and carefully enumerated and defined in the indictment or information and the instructions to the jury. Only evidence relevant to the particular elements alleged by the State is admissible, even then, subject to exclusion of prejudicial evidence which might distract the jury from the specific factfinding task it performs. Based on this evidence the jury decides whether each of the elements constituting the offense was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court's observation in Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 -247 (1949), accurately captures the character of the procedure [462 U.S. 862, 900] leading to a criminal conviction: "In a trial before verdict the issue is whether a defendant is guilty of having engaged in certain criminal conduct of which he has been specifically accused. Rules of evidence have been fashioned for criminal trials . . . narrowly confin[ing] the trial contest . . . ." </s> The decision by a Georgia death jury at the final stage of its deliberations to impose death is a significantly different decision from the model just described. A wide range of evidence is admissible on literally countless subjects: "We have long recognized that `[f]or the determination of sentence, justice generally requires . . . that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender." Gregg, 428 U.S., at 189 (emphasis added. In considering this evidence, the jury does not attempt to decide whether particular elements have been proved, but instead makes a unique, individualized judgment regarding the punishment that a particular person deserves. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602 -605 (1978). </s> The role of aggravating circumstances in making this judgment is substantially more limited than the role played by jury instructions or allegations in an indictment in an ordinary trial. In Georgia, aggravating circumstances serve principally to restrict the class of defendants subject to the death sentence; once a single aggravating circumstances is specified, the jury then considers all the evidence in aggravation-mitigation in deciding whether to impose the death penalty, see Part I, supra. An aggravating circumstance in this latter stage is simply one of the countless considerations weighed by the jury in seeking to judge the punishment appropriate to the individual defendant. </s> If an aggravating circumstance is revealed to be invalid, the probable effect of this fact alone on the jury's second decision - whether the death sentence is appropriate - is minimal. If one of the few theories of guilt presented to the jury [462 U.S. 862, 901] in the trial judge's instructions, or the indictment, proves invalid, there is substantial risk that the jury may have based its verdict on an improper theory. This follows from the necessarily limited number of theories presented to the jury, and from the fact that the jury's decisionmaking is carefully routed along paths specifically set out in the instructions. When an aggravating circumstance proves invalid, however, the effect ordinarily is only to diminish the probative value of one of literally countless factors that the jury considered. The inference that this diminution would alter the result reached by the jury is all but nonexistent. Given this, the rule developed in Street simply cannot be applied sensibly to sentencing decisions resulting from proceedings involving aggravating circumstances. Instead, as developed in the following Part, a difference analysis has been applied to the question whether to set aside sentencing decisions based in part upon invalid factors. </s> III </s> Respondent contends next that, even if Street is inapplicable the erroneous submission to the jury of an instruction which we are bound to regard as unconstitutionally vague, see n. 3, supra, must have had sufficient effect on the jury's deliberations to require vacating its verdict. Although our prior decisions are not completely consistent regarding the effect of constitutional error in sentencing proceedings on the sentence imposed on the defendant, in general sentencing decisions are accorded far greater finality than convictions. </s> Ordinarily, a sentence within statutory limits is beyond appellate review. Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958). In Street, 394 U.S., at 588 , n. 9, we cited approval to several of a long line of sentencing decisions. In Claassen v. United States, 142 U.S. 140 (1891); Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946); and Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959), defendants were convicted on several separate counts and received "general sentence," [462 U.S. 862, 902] not linked to any one or combination of the counts. The defendants than challenged all their conviction on writ of error or appeal. The Court, following a well-settled rule, stated in Barenblatt: "Since this sentence was less than the maximum punishment authorized by the statute for conviction under any one Count, the judgment below must be upheld if the conviction upon any of the Counts is sustainable." Id., at 115 (footnote omitted). In Claassen we said: "[I]t is settled law in this court, and in this country generally, that in any criminal case a general verdict and judgment on an indictment or information containing several counts cannot be reversed on error, if any one of the counts is good and warrants the judgment, because, in the absence of anything in the record to show the contrary, the presumption of law is that the court awarded sentence on the good count only." 142 U.S., at 146 -147. </s> The practical basis for the rules articulated in Gore and the Claassen line of cases is clear. As indicated above, sentencing decisions rest on a far-reaching inquiry into countless facts and circumstances and not on the type of proof of particular elements that returning a conviction does. The fact that one of the countless considerations that the sentencer would have taken into account was erroneous, misleading, or otherwise improperly before him, ordinarily can be assumed not to have been a necessary basis for his decision. Nonetheless in limited cases, non capital sentencing decisions are vacated for resentencing. </s> In United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972), two uncounseled - and therefore unconstitutionally obtained - convictions were introduced against the defendant in the sentencing proceeding. The Court observed that the sentencing judge gave "explicit" and specific" attention, id., at 444, 447, to these convictions. Moreover, it noted that the defendant would have "appeared in a dramatically different light" had the true character of the unconstitutional convictions been known: the judge would have been dealing with a [462 U.S. 862, 903] man unconstitutionally imprisoned, beginning at age 17, for more than 10 years, including 5 1/2 years on a chain gang. Id., at 448. Finally, the Court reemphasized the unconstitutional character of the respondent's prior convictions, and opined that to permit his sentence to stand would "erode" the rule in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Given all this, respondent's sentence was held improper, and the case was remanded for resentencing. </s> Similarly, in Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948), an uncounseled defendant was sentenced following a proceeding in which the trial judge explicitly an repeatedly relied upon the incorrect assumption that the defendant had been convicted of several crimes. The Court observed that "[i]t is not the duration of severity of this sentence that renders it constitutionally invalid; it is the careless or designed pronouncement of sentence on a foundation so extensively and materially false, which the prisoner had no opportunity to correct by the services which counsel would provide, that renders the proceedings lacking in due process." Id., at 741. </s> The approach taken in Tucker, Townsend, and the Claassen line of cases begins with the presumption that, since the sentencer's judgment rested on countless variables, an error made in one portion of the sentencing proceeding ordinarily should not affect the sentence. This presumption is most plainly revealed by the Claassen line of cases, where a sentence will stand even if it turns out that the crimes for which the defendant was sentenced had not all been committed. Nonetheless, the defendant may adduce evidence that the sentencing body likely would have acted differently had the error not occurred. In order to prevail on such a claim, however, we have required a convincing showing that the introduction of specific constitutionally infirm evidence had an ascertainable and "dramatic" impact on the sentencing authority. See United States v. Tucker, supra; Townsend v. Burke, supra. Of course, a more careful application of this standard is appropriate in capital cases. [462 U.S. 862, 904] </s> In the present case, however, the erroneous submission to the jury of an invalid aggravating circumstance simply cannot satisfy whatever standard may plausibly be based on the cases discussed above. As the Court points out, the only real impact resulting from the error was the evidence properly before the jury was capable of being fit within a category that the judge's instructions labeled "aggravating." The evidence in question - respondent's prior convictions - plainly was an aggravating factor, which, as we held in Gregg, the jury was free to consider. The fact that the instruction gave added weight to this no doubt played some role in the deliberations of some jurors. Yet, the Georgia Supreme Court was plainly right in saying that the "mere fact that some of the aggravating circumstances presented were improperly designated `statutory;" had "an inconsequential impact on the jury's decision regarding the death penalty." 250 Ga. 97, 100, 297 S. E. 2d 1, 4 (1982). The plurality recognized in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S., at 605 , that there can be "no perfect procedure for deciding in which cases governmental authority should be used to impose death." Whatever a defendant must show to set aside a death sentence, the present case involved only a remote possibility that the error had any effect on the jury's judgment; the Eighth Amendment did not therefore require that the defendant's sentence be vacated. </s> [Footnote 1 In Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), we approved a death penalty statute providing even less explicitly for the type of "weighing" that respondent claims is necessary. In Texas, persons convicted of five types of homicide faced a second proceeding in which the jury was required to answer three question - whether the defendant's acts were committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that they would result in death; whether there was a probability that the defendant would commit violent acts constituting a continuing threat to society; and whether the defendant's acts were in response to some sort of provocation. As the joint opinion recognized, the sole function of the "aggravating circumstances" in the Texas system was to "narro[w] the categories of murders for which a death sentence may ever be imposed," id., at 270. Since these "aggravating circumstance" were only considered at the guilt determination phase of trial, not at sentencing, the system could not contain a requirement that the jury "balance" these circumstances against mitigating circumstances - as respondent contends is constitutionally required in this case. </s> [Footnote 2 I assume, for purpose of this decision, that Arnold was correctly decided and that it was properly applied to respondent's case. I express no view as to the correctness of that decision or its application. </s> [Footnote 3 As the Court points out, Street properly has been confirmed to situations where there is a substantial risk that the jury has imposed criminal punishment because of activity protected by the Constitution. Respondent's history of violent conduct, on which the invalid aggravating circumstance was based, plainly falls outside this category, and Street therefore is inapplicable to this case. </s> JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins dissenting. </s> Even if I accepted the prevailing view that the death penalty may constitutionally be imposed under certain circumstances, I could scarcely join in upholding a death sentence based in part upon a statutory aggravating circumstance so vague that its application turns solely on the "whim" of the jury. Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 541, 224 S. E. 2d 386, 391 (1976). </s> The submission of the unconstitutional statutory aggravating circumstance to the jury cannot be deemed harmless error on the theory that "in Georgia, the finding of an aggravating [462 U.S. 862, 905] circumstance does not play any role in guiding the sentencing body in the exercise of its discretion, apart from its function of narrowing the class of persons convicted of murder who are eligible for the death penalty." Ante, at 874 (emphasis added). If the trial judge's instructions had apprised the jury of this theory, it might have been proper to assume that the unconstitutional statutory factor did not affect the jury's verdict. But such instructions would have suffered from an even more fundamental constitutional defect - a failure to provide any standards whatsoever to guide the jury's actual sentencing decision. If this Court's decisions concerning the death penalty establish anything, it is that a capital sentencing scheme based on "standardless jury discretion" violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 , n. 47 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.,) citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). </s> In any event, the jury that sentenced respondent to death was never informed of this "threshold" theory, which was invented for the first time by the Georgia Supreme Court more than seven years later. Under the instruction actually given, a juror might reasonably have concluded, as has this Court in construing essentially identical instructions, that any aggravating circumstances, including statutory aggravating circumstances, should be balanced against any mitigating circumstances in the determination of the defendant's sentence. There is no way of knowing whether the jury would have sentenced respondent to death if its attention had not been drawn to the unconstitutional statutory factor. </s> I </s> I continue to adhere to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 231 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Furman v. Georgia, supra, at 314 (MARSHALL, J., concurring). [462 U.S. 862, 906] </s> II </s> Today the Court upholds a death sentence that was based in part on a statutory aggravating Circumstance which the State concedes was so amorphous that it invited "subjective decision-making without . . . minimal, objective guidelines for its application." Arnold v. State, supra, at 541, 224 S. E. 2d, at 391. In order to reach this surprising result, the Court embraces the theory, which it infers from the Georgia Supreme Court's response to this Court's certified question, 1 that the only function of statutory aggravating circumstances in Georgia is to screen out at the threshold defendants to whom none of the 10 circumstances applies. According to this theory, once 1 of the 10 statutory factors has been found, they drop out of the picture entirely and play no part in the jury's decision whether to sentence the defendant to death. Relying on this "threshold" theory, the Court concludes that [462 U.S. 862, 907] the submission of the unconstitutional statutory factor did not prejudice respondent. </s> If the jury instructions given some eight years ago were consistent with this new theory, we could assume that the jury did not focus on the vague statutory aggravating circumstance in making its actual sentencing decision. But if the jury had been so instructed, the instructions would have been constitutionally defective for a more basic reason, since they would have left the jury totally without guidance once it found a single statutory aggravating circumstance. </s> A </s> Until this Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia in 1972, the capital sentencing procedures in most States delegated to judges and juries plenary authority to decide when a death sentence should be imposed. The sentencer was given "practically untrammeled discretion to let an accused live or insist that he die." Furman v. Georgia, supra, at 248 (Douglas, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). </s> In Furman this Court held that the system of capital punishment then in existence in this country was incompatible with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. As was later recognized in Gregg v. Georgia, Furman established one basic proposition if it established nothing else: "where the ultimate punishment of death is at issue a system of standardless jury discretion violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." 428 U.S., at 195 , n. 47 (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). The basic teaching of Furman is that a State may not leave the decision whether a defendant lives or dies to the unfettered discretion of the jury, since such a scheme is "pregnant with discrimination," 408 U.S., at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring), and inevitably results in death sentences which are "wantonly and . . . freakishly imposed," id., at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring), and for which "there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many [462 U.S. 862, 908] cases in which it is not." Id., at 313 (WHITE, J., concurring). 2 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S., at 195 , n. 47 (noting that Furman "ruled that death sentences imposed under statutes that left juries with untrammeled discretion to impose or withhold the death penalty violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments"). </s> Four years after Furman was decided, this Court upheld the capital sentencing statutes of Georgia, Florida, and Texas against constitutional attack, concluding that those statutes contained safeguards that promised to eliminate the constitutional deficiencies found in Furman. See Gregg v. Georgia; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). The Court's conclusion was based on the premise that the statutes ensured that sentencers would be "given guidance regarding the factors about the crime and the defendant that the State, representing organized society, deems particularly relevant to the sentencing decision." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S., at 192 (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). 3 The Court assumed that the identification [462 U.S. 862, 909] of specific statutory aggravating circumstances would put an end to standardless sentencing discretion: </s> "These procedures require the jury to consider the circumstances of the crime and the criminal before it recommends sentence. No longer can a Georgia jury do as Furman's jury did: reach a finding of the defendant's guilt and then, without guidance or direction, decide whether he should live or die. Instead, the jury's attention is directed to the specific circumstances of the crime: Was it committed in the course of another capital felony? Was it committed for money? Was it committed upon a peace officer or judicial officer? Was it committed in a particularly heinous way or in a manner that endangered the lives of many persons? In addition, the jury's attention is focused on the characteristics of the person who committed the crime: Does he have a record of prior convictions for capital offenses? Are there any special facts about this defendant that mitigate against imposing capital punishment . . . . As a result, while some jury discretion still exists, `the discretion to be exercised is controlled by clear and objective standards so as to produce non-discriminatory application.'" Id., at 197-198 (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.) (emphasis added; footnote and citation omitted). </s> In Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), the Court reiterated that a State "must channel the sentencer's discretion by `clear and objective standards' that provide `specific and detailed guidance.'" Id., at 428 (plurality opinion) (citations [462 U.S. 862, 910] omitted). The Court reaffirmed the teaching of Furman and Gregg that "the penalty of death may not be imposed under sentencing procedures that create a substantial risk that the punishment will be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner." 446 U.S., at 427 . "[I]f a State wishes to authorize capital punishment it has a constitutional responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty." Id., at 428. </s> B </s> Today we learn for the first time that the Court did not mean what it said in Gregg v. Georgia. We now learn that the actual decision whether a defendant lives or dies may still be left to the unfettered discretion of the jury. Although we were assured in Gregg that sentencing discretion was "`to be exercised . . . by clear and objective standards,'" 428 U.S., at 198 (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.), we are now told that the State need do nothing whatsoever to guide the jury's ultimate decision whether to sentence a defendant to death or spare his life. </s> Under today's decision all the State has to do is require to jury to make some threshold finding. Once that finding is made, the jurors can be left completely at large, with nothing to guide them but their whims and prejudices. They need not even consider any statutory aggravating circumstances that they have found to be applicable. Their sentencing decision is to be the product of their discretion and of nothing else. </s> If this is not a scheme based on "standardless jury discretion," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S., at 195 , n. 47 (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.), I do not know what is. Today's decision makes at absolute mockery of this Court's precedents concerning capital sentencing procedures. There is no point in requiring state legislatures to identify specific aggravating circumstances if sentencers are to be left free to ignore them in deciding which defendants are to die. If this is all Gregg v. Georgia stands for, the States may as well be [462 U.S. 862, 911] permitted to reenact the statutes that were on the books before Furman. </s> The system of discretionary sentencing that the Court approves today differs only in form from the capital sentencing procedures that this Court held unconstitutional more than a decade ago. The only difference between Georgia's pre-Furman capital sentencing scheme and the "threshold" theory that the Court embraces today is that the unchecked discretion previously conferred in all cases of murder is now conferred in cases of murder with one statutory aggravating circumstances. But merely circumscribing the category of cases eligible for the death penalty cannot remove from constitutional scrutiny the procedure by which those actually sentenced to death are selected. </s> More than a decade ago this Court struck down an Ohio statute that permitted a death sentence only if the jury found that the victim of the murder was a police officer, but gave the jury unbridled discretion once that aggravating factor was found. Duling v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 936 (1972), summarily rev'g 21 Ohio St. 2d 13, 254 N. E. 2d 670 (1970). See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2901.04 (1953). There is no difference of any consequence between the Ohio scheme held impermissible in Duling and the "threshold" scheme that the Court endorses today. If, as Duling establishes, the Constitution prohibits a State from defining a crime (such as murder of a police officer) and then leaving the decision whether to impose the death sentence to the unchecked discretion of the jury, it must also prohibit a State from defining a lesser crime (such as murder) and then permitting the jury to make a standardless sentencing decision once it has found a single aggravating factor (such as that the victim was a police officer). In both cases the ultimate decision whether the defendant will be killed is left to the discretion of the sentencer, unguided by any legislative standards. 4 Whether a particular [462 U.S. 862, 912] preliminary finding was made at the guilt phase of the trial or at the sentencing phase is irrelevant; a requirement that the finding be made at the sentencing phase in no way channels the sentencer's discretion once that finding has been made. 5 If the Constitution forbids one form of standardless discretion, it must forbid the other as well. </s> III </s> A </s> In any event, the jury that sentenced respondent to death was never apprised of the "threshold" theory relied upon by the Court. There is no basis for the Court's assumption, [462 U.S. 862, 913] ante, at 891, that the jury did not attribute special significance to the statutory aggravating circumstances and did not weigh them, along with any other evidence in aggravation, against the evidence offered by respondent in mitigation. </s> In the first place, </s> "everything about the judge's charge highlighted the importance of the aggravating circumstances. Not only were the circumstances submitted to the jury in writing, but also the jury was in turn required to write down each and every aggravating circumstance that it found to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . The jury instructions provide absolutely no indication that, after carefully considering each of the statutory aggravating circumstances submitted by the trial judge, the jury should, or even could, discard the list of officially sanctioned grounds for imposing the death penalty in deciding whether to actually sentence respondent to death." Zant v. Stephens, 456 U.S. 410, 427 (1982) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). </s> In deciding whether respondent deserved to die, the jurors might well have deemed his prior assaults unimportant if the judge had not specifically focused on them in his charge. </s> Second, the Court's assertion that "in Georgia, the finding of an aggravating circumstance does not play any role in guiding the sentencing body in the exercise of its discretion," ante, at 874, is flatly inconsistent with this Court's own previous characterizations of the function of statutory aggravating circumstances in the Georgia scheme. In Gregg v. Georgia, where the jury instructions were essentially identical to those given here, 6 the joint opinion of Justices Stewart, [462 U.S. 862, 914] POWELL, and STEVENS took great pains to point out that the statutory aggravating circumstances served to apprise the sentencer "of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence and [to] provid[e] standards to guide its use of the information." 428 U.S., at 195 . There was not the slightest hint that the statutory factors are relevant only to the threshold determination of whether the defendant is eligible to receive the death penalty. On the contrary, the joint opinion emphasized that they informed the sentencer of "the factors . . . that the State . . . deems particularly relevant to the sentencing decision." Id., at 192 (emphasis added). If it had been thought that statutory aggravating circumstances were to play only a threshold role in the sentencing process, it would have made no sense at all to say that a jury's verdict identifying one or more of those circumstances served to apprise appellate courts of "the factors it relied upon in reaching its decision." Id., at 195 (emphasis added). The very premise of the "threshold" theory adopted today is that statutory aggravating circumstances are not relied upon by the jury in reaching its ultimate sentencing decision, but are considered only in deciding whether the defendant is eligible to receive the death penalty. </s> The Court's assumption that respondent's jury did not balance aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances is also inconsistent with this Court's characterization of the almost identical instructions given in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion). See App. in Coker v. Georgia, O. T. 1976, No. 75-5444, pp. 298-302. In Coker, as in this case, the jury was not expressly instructed to weigh aggravating against mitigating circumstances, but the plurality opinion sensibly recognized that such a weighing is inherent in any determination of whether mitigating circumstances warrant a life sentence notwithstanding the existence of aggravating circumstances: </s> "The jury was instructed that it could consider as aggravating circumstances whether the rape had been committed by a person with a prior record of conviction [462 U.S. 862, 915] for a capital felony and whether the rape had been committed in the course of committing another capital felony, namely, the armed robbery of Allen Carver. The court also instructed, pursuant to statute, that even if aggravating circumstances were present, the death penalty need not be imposed if the jury found they were out-weighed by mitigating circumstances. . . ." 433 U.S., at 587 -590 (emphasis added). </s> I would like to know how the jury that sentenced respondent to death in 1975 could have known that statutory aggravating circumstances were to play only a threshold role in their deliberations, when this Court itself has interpreted essentially identical instructions to require a weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and as recently as last Term found it necessary to ask the Georgia Supreme Court to clarify what the instructions in this case meant. We are presented with "different and conflicting theories regarding a charge designed to guide the jury . . ., and yet we are asked to sustain the [death sentence] on the assumption that the jury was properly guided." Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 613 (1946). For my part, I believe that a death sentence "ought not to rest on an equivocal direction to the jury on a basic issue." Ibid. It is patently unfair to assume that the jury that sentenced respondent somehow understood that statutory aggravating circumstances were to receive no special weight and were not to be balanced against mitigating circumstances. Respondent is "entitled to have the validity of [his sentence] appraised on consideration of the case as it was tried and as the issues were determined in the trial court," Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 202 (1948); see Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14, 16 (1978), not on a theory that has been adopted for the first time after the fact. </s> B </s> Once it is recognized that respondent's jury may well have assumed that statutory aggravating circumstances deserve [462 U.S. 862, 916] special weight, the injustice of today's decision becomes apparent. Under the Georgia capital sentencing procedure, the sentencer always has discretion not to impose a death sentence regardless of whether there is proof of one or more statutory aggravating circumstances, and regardless of whether there are any mitigating circumstances. </s> There is simply no way for this Court to know whether the jury would have sentenced respondent to death if the unconstitutional statutory aggravating circumstance had not been included in the judge's charge. If it is important for the State to authorize and for the prosecution to request the submission of a particular statutory aggravating circumstance to the jury, "we must assume that in some cases [that circumstance] will be decisive in the [jury's] choice between a life sentence and a death sentence." Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 359 (1977) (opinion of STEVENS, J.). </s> As Justice Stewart pointed out in a similar case, "under Georgia's capital punishment scheme, only the trial judge or jury can know and determine what to do when upon appellate review it has been concluded that a particular aggravating circumstance should not have been considered in sentencing the defendant to death." Drake v. Zant, 449 U.S. 999, 1001 (1980) (dissenting from denial of certiorari) (emphasis added). Although the Court labors mightily in an effort to demonstrate that submission of the unconstitutional statutory aggravating circumstance did not affect the jury's verdict, there is no escape from the conclusion - reached by JUSTICE POWELL only last Term - that respondent was sentenced to death "under instructions that could have misled the jury." Zant v. Stephens, 456 U.S., at 429 (POWELL, J., dissenting). 7 Where a man's life is at stake, this inconvenient fact should not be simply swept under the rug. [462 U.S. 862, 917] </s> C </s> As I read the Court's opinion, the Court does not deny that respondent might have received only a life sentence if the unconstitutional aggravating circumstance had not been submitted to the jury. Rather, the Court assumes that "the instruction did induce the jury to place greater emphasis upon the respondent's prior criminal record than it would otherwise have done." Ante, at 888. The Court concludes, however, that the submission of this unconstitutional statutory factor does not amount to "a constitutional defect in the sentencing process," ante, at 889, because the jury could properly have been instructed to decide whether either of the other two statutory factors applied and told in addition that "in deciding whether or not [a death] sentence is appropriate you may consider the remainder of [the defendant's] prior criminal record," ante, at 888. The Court finds no constitutional difference between this charge and the charge actually given. </s> Even assuming that it is proper to sustain a death sentence by reference to a hypothetical instruction that might have been given but was not, the Court errs in assuming that the hypothetical instruction would satisfy the Constitution. As elaborated in Part II above, this Court's decisions establish that the actual determination whether a defendant shall live or die - and not merely the threshold decision whether he is eligible for a death sentence - must be guided by clear and objective standards. The focus of the sentencer's attention must be directed to specific factors whose existence or nonexistence can be determined with reasonable certainty. Since the hypothetical instruction would fail to channel the [462 U.S. 862, 918] sentencer's discretion in this fashion, the Court's assumption that it would be constitutional is unwarranted. 8 </s> IV </s> For the foregoing reasons, I would vacate respondent's death sentence. </s> [Footnote 1 Although the Court asserts that "the Georgia Supreme Court has unambiguously advised us" that the finding of one or more of the statutory aggravating circumstances "merely performs the function of narrowing the category of persons convicted of murder who are eligible for the death penalty" and serves no other function, ante, at 875, the Georgia Supreme Court's answer to our certified question is in fact far from clear. The answer states only that the threshold "is passed regardless of the number of statutory aggravating circumstances found, so long as there is at least one," and that thereafter the sentencer may consider "all the facts and circumstances of the case." 250 Ga. 97, 100, 297 S. E. 2d 1, 4 (1982). To say that all aggravating circumstances, statutory and nonstatutory, may be considered once one statutory circumstance has been found, is not to say that "the finding of an aggravating circumstance does not play any role in guiding the sentencing body in the exercise of its discretion, apart from its function of narrowing the class of persons convicted of murder who are eligible for the death penalty." Ante, at 874 (emphasis added). There is nothing in the Georgia Supreme Court's opinion to suggest that jurors are not to give special attention to statutory aggravating circumstances throughout their deliberations, rather than simply in making the threshold determination whether any such circumstances apply. </s> Nonetheless, for the purposes of this opinion I will assume that the majority has correctly characterized the Georgia Supreme Court's explanation of the Georgia capital sentencing procedure. </s> [Footnote 2 JUSTICE BRENNAN and I were the other two Members of the Furman majority. We concluded that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment. 408 U.S., at 257 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); id., at 314 (MARSHALL, J., concurring). </s> [Footnote 3 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S., at 221 (WHITE, J., joined by BURGER, C. J., and REHNQUIST, J., concurring in judgment) ("The Georgia Legislature has made an effort to identify those aggravating factors which it considers necessary and relevant to the question whether a defendant convicted of capital murder should be be sentenced to death") (emphasis added; footnote omitted); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 251 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.)("The sentencing authority in Florida, the trial judge, is directed to weigh eight aggravating factors against seven mitigating factors to determine whether the death penalty shall be imposed"); id., at 260 (WHITE, J., joined by BURGER, C. J., and REHNQUIST, J., concurring in judgment) ("although the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances are not susceptible of mechanical application, they are by no means so vague and overbroad as to leave the discretion of the sentencing authority unfettered"); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 273 -274 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.) ("It . . . appears that . . . the Texas capital-sentencing procedure guides and focuses the jury's objective consideration of the particularized circumstances of the individual offense and the individual offender before it can impose a sentence of death"); id., at 279 (WHITE, J., joined by BURGER, C. J., and REHNQUIST, J., concurring in judgment) ("the Texas capital punishment statute limits the imposition of the death penalty to a narrowly defined group of the most brutal crimes and aims at limiting its imposition to similar offenses occurring under similar circumstances"). </s> [Footnote 4 This remains true whether or not the aggravating factor satisfies the Court's requirement that it "genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible [462 U.S. 862, 912] for the death penalty and . . . reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder." Ante, at 877. </s> [Footnote 5 This Court has repeatedly recognized that a capital sentencing statute does not satisfy the Constitution simply because it requires a bifurcated trial and permits presentation at the penalty phase of evidence concerning the circumstances of the crime, the defendant's background and history, and other factors in aggravation and mitigation of punishment. E. g., Delgado v. Connecticut, 408 U.S. 940 (1942), summarily rev'g 161 Conn. 536, 290 A. 2d 338 (1971) (see Conn. Gen. Stat., 53-10 (1968)); Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972) (see Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, 1-7 (1963)); Scoleri v. Pennsylvania, 408 U.S. 934 (1972), summarily rev'g 432 Pa. 571, 248 A. 2d 295 (1968) (see Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 18, 4701 (1963)). Although the creation of a separate sentencing proceeding permits the exclusion from the guilt phase of information that is relevant only to sentencing and that might prejudice the determination of guilt, merely bifurcating the trial obviously does nothing to guide the discretion of the sentencer. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S., at 192 (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). </s> Nor is mandatory appellate review a substitute for legislatively defined criteria to guide the jury in imposing sentence. Ante, at 890. Although appellate review may serve to reduce arbitrariness and caprice "[w]here the sentencing authority is required to specify the factors it relied upon in reaching its decision," Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 195 (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.), appellate review cannot serve this function where statutory aggravating circumstances play only a threshold role and an appellate court therefore has no means of ascertaining the factors underlying the jury's ultimate sentencing decision. </s> [Footnote 6 The instructions given in this case are set forth in the Court's opinion last Term certifying a question to the Georgia Supreme Court. See Zant v. Stephens, 456 U.S. 410, 411 -412, n. 1 (1982). The instructions given in Gregg are quoted in JUSTICE WHITE'S opinion concurring in the judgment in that case. See 428 U.S., at 217 -218. </s> [Footnote 7 Although JUSTICE POWELL stated in his dissent that he would leave it to the Georgia Supreme Court to decide "whether it has authority to find that the instruction was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt," 456 [462 U.S. 862, 917] U.S., at 429, the per curiam opinion rejected this approach and asked the Georgia Supreme Court only to clarify the state-law premises underlying its decision to sustain respondent's death sentence. The Georgia Supreme Court was not asked to conduct, and it did not conduct, a review of the evidence to determine whether the instruction was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. </s> [Footnote 8 Even if the hypothetical instruction were permissible, it would not follow that there was no constitutional defect in the instructions given in this case. There is nothing particularly vague about the phrase "prior criminal record"; it would be reasonably clear to any juror of ordinary intelligence that a defendant's prior criminal record consists of his past convictions. By contrast, it is common ground in this case that the statutory aggravating circumstances "substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions" is so vague that no two juries could be expected to agree as to whether a particular defendant had such a history. </s> It is one thing to bring to the jury's attention a readily identifiable factor such as the defendant's prior criminal record, and leave it to the jury to decide what weight that factor should receive. It is quite another thing to ask the jury to determine the applicability of a statutory factor that no group of individuals of ordinary intelligence can be expected to apply in any objective way, and then, if the issue is resolved against the defendant, to take that factor into account in imposing sentence. Both instructions invite the exercise of discretion as to the weight to be given to the statutory factor, but the instruction given here has the further vice of requiring an arbitrary determination that can only be made in a haphazard way. It is as if the jurors were asked to flip a coin and weigh the result in their sentencing decision. Even if the hypothetical charge cited by the Court were proper, the charge given in this case would still be impermissible because it injected an arbitrary determination into the sentencing process. </s> [462 U.S. 862, 919]

United States Supreme Court GOJACK v. UNITED STATES(1966) No. 594 Argued: April 21, 1966Decided: June 13, 1966 </s> In an appearance before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities in 1955, petitioner refused to answer certain questions concerning his affiliation with the Communist Party, the affiliation of others, and his connection with a "Peace Crusade." He did not invoke the Fifth Amendment, but challenged the jurisdiction of the Committee and the Subcommittee, the authorization of each and the constitutionality of the inquiry. He was indicted and convicted for contempt of Congress under 2 U.S.C. 192 as a result of his refusals to answer. In Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 , this Court reversed, holding the indictment defective because it did not allege the "subject under inquiry." Petitioner was re-indicted, the indictment reciting that "the subject of these hearings was Communist party activities within the field of labor." Petitioner was again convicted and his conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Held: </s> 1. "A specific, properly authorized subject of inquiry is an essential element of the offense under 192," and must be properly pleaded and proved. Pp. 706-712. </s> 2. In this case the House Committee never authorized the hearings on "Communist party activities within the field of labor" which is alleged to be the subject of inquiry. Pp. 706-712. </s> (a) The House Committee's own Rule I requires that a "major investigation" be specifically approved by the Committee. This is concededly a "major investigation." The record shows that it was never authorized or approved by the Committee. "When a committee rule relates to a matter of such importance, it must be strictly observed." Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 . Pp. 706-709. </s> (b) The Committee's failure to authorize the investigation cannot be cured by an "inference" of Committee approval. Pp. 709-711. </s> 3. Additionally, the subcommittee before which petitioner testified was not properly empowered to conduct the inquiry. "Absent [384 U.S. 702, 703] proof of a clear delegation to the subcommittee of authority to conduct an inquiry into a designated subject, the subcommittee was without authority which can be vindicated by criminal sanctions under 192 . . . ." Hence, even if the Committee itself had properly approved the making of the investigation, this prosecution would fail because the subcommittee was not properly empowered. "The legislative history of 192 makes plain that a clear chain of authority from the House to the questioning body is an essential element of the offense. If the contempt occurs before a subcommittee, the line of authority from the House to the Committee and then to the subcommittee must plainly and explicitly appear, and it must appear in terms of a delegation with respect to a particular, specific subject matter." Pp. 713-717. </s> 121 U.S. App. D.C. 126, 348 F.2d 355, reversed. </s> Frank J. Donner argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Edward J. Ennis, Osmond K. Fraenkel, Melvin L. Wulf and David Rein. </s> Assistant Attorney General Yeagley argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Marshall, Richard A. Posner, Kevin T. Maroney and Robert L. Keuch. </s> MR. JUSTICE FORTAS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case is a sequel to this Court's decision in Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 , and companion cases. One of those cases related to the same person who is petitioner here and to the same events. </s> Petitioner appeared before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities on February 28 and March 1, 1955. He answered certain questions, but refused to answer others concerning his affiliation with the Communist Party, the affiliation of others, and his connection with a "Peace Crusade." He had challenged the jurisdiction of the Committee and the Subcommittee, the authorization of each, and the constitutionality of the inquiry in general and with specific reference [384 U.S. 702, 704] to the questions which he declined to answer. 1 He did not and does not invoke the Fifth Amendment. </s> He was indicted for contempt of Congress under Rev. Stat. 102, as amended, 52 Stat. 942, 2 U.S.C. 192 (1964 ed.) 2 (hereafter, 192) as a result of his refusals to answer. He was convicted. In Russell v. United States, supra, this Court reversed, holding that the indictment was defective because it did not allege the "subject under inquiry." The Court noted that under 192 specification of the subject of the inquiry is fundamental to a charge of violating its provisions. Absent an allegation of the subject matter of the inquiry, this Court held, there is no way in which it can be determined whether the factual recitals of the indictment charged a crime under 192 - that is, a refusal to answer questions [384 U.S. 702, 705] "pertinent to the inquiry," and within the legislative competence of Congress. 3 </s> Petitioner was thereafter re-indicted. The deficiency in the first indictment was sought to be cured by a recital that "[t]he subject of these hearings was Communist Party activities within the field of labor . . . ." Petitioner was again convicted and given a general sentence of three months' imprisonment and a $200 fine. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed per curiam. 121 U.S. App. D.C. 126, 348 F.2d 355 (1965). We granted certiorari. 382 U.S. 937 . We reverse. It is now clear that the fault in these proceedings is more fundamental than the omission from the indictment of an allegation of the "subject of the inquiry" being conducted by the Subcommittee. The subject of the inquiry was never specified or authorized by the Committee, as required by its own rules, nor was there a lawful delegation of authority to the Subcommittee to conduct the investigation. </s> Petitioner here urges that we reconsider this Court's decision in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 . In Barenblatt this Court upheld the authority of the [384 U.S. 702, 706] Committee to investigate Communist infiltration into the field of education. In the circumstances of that case, the Court sustained the constitutionality of the investigation and of the Committee's inquiry into petitioner's alleged membership in the Communist Party. Since we decide the present case on other grounds, it is not necessary nor would it be appropriate to reach the constitutional question. </s> I. </s> Rule I of the Rules of Procedure of the House Committee on Un-American Activities provides that "No major investigation shall be initiated without approval of a majority of the Committee." Rule XI, par. 26, of the Rules of the House of Representatives requires each Committee of the House to keep a record of all committee actions. There is no resolution, minute or record of the Committee authorizing the inquiry with which we are concerned. </s> The Solicitor General's brief in this Court states that: "Admittedly, there is no direct evidence that the Committee approved the investigation of Communist activities in the field of labor of which the hearings at which petitioner was called to testify were a part." A footnote to this statement concedes that "We do not dispute that this investigation was a `major' one and that approval by a majority of the Committee was therefore required." </s> The Government's only plea in avoidance of this obvious deficiency is that we should "infer" Committee approval of the inquiry at which petitioner was required to respond to questions, because it was part of the Committee's alleged "continuing investigation" of Communist activities in the labor field. 4 But this is clearly impermissible. [384 U.S. 702, 707] We are not here dealing with the justification for an investigation by a committee of the Congress as a matter of congressional administration. That is a legislative matter. We are here concerned with a criminal proceeding. It is clear as a matter of law that the usual standards of the criminal law must be observed, including proper allegation and proof of all the essential elements of the offense. 5 Moreover, the Congress, in enacting 192, specifically indicated that it relied upon the courts to apply the exacting standards of criminal jurisprudence to charges of contempt of Congress in order to assure that the congressional investigative power, when enforced by penal sanctions, would not be abused. 6 </s> [384 U.S. 702, 708] </s> It can hardly be disputed that a specific, properly authorized subject of inquiry is an essential element of the offense under 192. In Russell, this Court held that the definition of the subject under inquiry is "the basic preliminary question which the federal courts . . . [would] have to decide in determining whether a criminal offense had been alleged or proved." "Our decisions have pointed out that the obvious first step in determining whether the questions asked were pertinent to the subject under inquiry is to ascertain what that subject was." 369 U.S., at 756 -757, 758-759. See also Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 407 -409; Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456, 467 -469; Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 208 -215; Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 295 -296. In United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 , Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed that the resolution defining the subject of a committee's inquiry is the committee's "controlling charter" and delimits its "right to exact testimony." 345 U.S., at 44 . Cf. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 295 -298. This Court made it clear in Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 201 , 206, that pertinency is a "jurisdictional concept" and it must be determined by reference to the authorizing resolution of an investigation. The House Committee on Un-American Activities has itself recognized the fundamental importance of specific authorization by providing in its Rule I that a major inquiry must be initiated by vote of a majority of the Committee. When a committee rule relates to a matter of such importance, it must be strictly observed. Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 . Since the present inquiry is concededly part of a "major investigation" and [384 U.S. 702, 709] the Committee did not authorize it as required by its own Rule I, this prosecution must fail. There is no basis for invoking criminal sanctions to punish a witness for refusal to cooperate in an inquiry which was never properly authorized. </s> Indeed, the present case illustrates the wisdom of the Committee's Rule requiring specific authorization of a major investigation. Here, in the absence of official authorization of a specific inquiry, statements were made as to the subject and purpose of the inquiry which, to say the least, might have caused confusion as to the subject of the investigation, and might well have inspired respectable doubts as to legal validity of the Committee's purposes. 7 A brief recapitulation of the relevant facts will demonstrate this: </s> 1. On November 19, 1954, about a month and a half before appointment of the Subcommittee, the Chairman of the Committee was reported as having announced that "large public hearings in industrial communities" would be held to expose active Communists as part of "a new plan for driving Reds out of important industries." 8 </s> [384 U.S. 702, 710] </s> 2. On February 14, when a representative of petitioner's union appeared to request a postponement, the Chairman of the Committee stated that "all of us are interested in seeing your union go out of business." A similar statement by the Chairman of the Subcommittee was reported in the press on February 15. </s> 3. On February 21, the record shows that a newspaper in St. Joseph, Michigan, reported a statement of the Committee Chairman that the hearing would expose petitioner and another subpoenaed witness as "card carrying Communists" and that "The rest is up to the community." The story noted that the rescheduled hearing would precede by three days a representation election, involving the union, at St. Joseph. </s> 4. Near the close of the testimony of the first witness at the hearing, the Chairman and other members of the Subcommittee disavowed any effort "to break or bust unions," but added that the Committee's purpose was to expose and break up Communist control of unions. </s> 5. At one point in the hearing, the member of the Subcommittee who was then presiding stated that the purpose of the hearing was to consider testimony relating to Communist Party activities within the field of labor, but [384 U.S. 702, 711] went on to refer to other purposes. He said that the hearing would also consider "the circumstances under which members of the Communist Party in the United States were recruited for military service in the Spanish Civil War, and to ascertain the method used by the Communist Party in securing assistance from the medical profession in carrying out its objectives." </s> We do not characterize these statements or appraise their legal effect. They are relevant here only to demonstrate the insuperable hurdle of "inferring," as the Government suggests, the authorization of the inquiry in the absence of a specific statement and the particularized authorization required by the Committee's own rules. Obviously, some of the statements made as to the Committee's purposes exceed the bounds which would be enforced by criminal sanctions, 9 and others do not correspond to the allegation in the second indictment that the subject of the inquiry was "Communist Party activities within the field of labor." </s> It should be noted that Rule I of the Committee has a special significance in the case of the House Un-American Activities Committee. The Committee is a standing committee of the House, not a special committee with a specific, narrow mandate. Its charter is phrased in [384 U.S. 702, 712] exceedingly broad language. It is authorized to make investigations of un-American and subversive "propaganda" and "propaganda activities" and "all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation." To support criminal prosecution under 192, this generality must be refined as Rule I contemplated. Otherwise, it is not possible for witnesses to judge the appropriateness of questions addressed to them, or for the Committee, the Congress, or the courts to make the essential judgment which 192 requires: whether the accused person has refused "to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry." 10 </s> It now appears that the investigation and the "question under inquiry" in petitioner's case were neither properly authorized nor specifically stated. Nor was the purpose of the inquiry clearly understood, apparently, even by the members of the Subcommittee themselves. Although at the outset of the hearings the Subcommittee Chairman did allude to "Communist Party activities within the field of labor" as the subject matter under investigation, statements and declarations of Committee members were at variance with this purported purpose. The recital in the second and revised indictment that it was "Communist Party activities within the field of labor" was therefore based on quicksand. Obviously, this Court's decision in Russell cannot be satisfied by a mere statement in the indictment, having no underpinning in an authorizing resolution, that the recited subject was in fact the subject of the inquiry. Russell called for more than a draftsman's exercise. [384 U.S. 702, 713] </s> II. </s> There is in this case another fatal defect. The hearings in which petitioner was called to testify were before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Pursuant to Committee authorization, the Chairman on February 9, 1955, appointed a Subcommittee of three members to conduct hearings at which three named witnesses, including petitioner, were to be called. Neither the resolution nor any minutes or other records of the Committee stated the subject matter committed to the Subcommittee or otherwise described or defined its jurisdiction in terms of subject matter. 11 </s> [384 U.S. 702, 714] Once again, we emphasize that we express no view as to the appropriateness of this procedure as a method of conducting congressional business. But, once again, we emphasize that we must consider this procedure from the viewpoint not of the legislative process, but of the administration of criminal justice, and specifically the application of the criminal statute which has been invoked. </s> Viewed in this perspective, the problem admits of only one answer. Courts administering the criminal law cannot apply sanctions for violation of the mandate of an agency - here, the Subcommittee - unless that agency's authority is clear and has been conferred in accordance with law. </s> We do not question the authority of the Committee appropriately to delegate functions to a subcommittee of its members, nor do we doubt the availability of 192 for punishment of contempt before such a subcommittee in proper cases. But here, not only did the Committee fail to authorize its own investigation, but also it failed to specify the subject of inquiry that the Subcommittee was to undertake. The criminal law cannot be used to implement jurisdiction so obtained, without metes and bounds, without statement or description of the subject committed to the Subcommittee. United States v. Seeger, 303 F.2d 478 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1962). Cf. United States v. Lamont, 18 F. R. D. 27 (D.C. S. D. N. Y. 1955), aff'd, 236 F.2d 312 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1956). In Seeger, a contempt conviction had been obtained for [384 U.S. 702, 715] refusal to answer questions of a subcommittee. The resolution establishing the Subcommittee, like that in the present case, announced the date for the hearing and stated the Subcommittee's members, but stated no subject matter. As Judge Moore, concurring, put it: </s> "Even the most liberal construction cannot transform . . . [this] into a resolution of the Committee vesting its authority in a subcommittee . . . ." 303 F.2d, at 487. </s> See also United States v. Kamin, 136 F. Supp. 791 (D.C. D. Mass. 1956). </s> We need not consider whether the Committee, by express resolution, might have delegated all of its authority to the Subcommittee. It did not attempt this, nor did it otherwise specify the subject matter as to which the Subcommittee was authorized to act. 12 Accordingly, even if we were able to establish proper authorization by the Committee itself pursuant to Rule I to conduct the inquiry at which the questions were asked which petitioner refused to answer, this prosecution would fail. The jurisdiction of the courts cannot be invoked to impose criminal sanctions in aid of a roving commission. The subject of the inquiry of the specific body before which the alleged contempt occurred must be clear and certain. As Chief Judge Clark stated in United States v. Lamont, supra, at 315, it is necessary to "[link] the inquiry conducted by the subcommittee to the grant of authority dispensed to its parent committee." [384 U.S. 702, 716] </s> Reference to 192 emphasizes the importance of this requirement. The statute requires that a witness, to be found guilty of contempt, must have "been summoned as a witness by the authority of either House of Congress to give testimony . . . upon any matter under inquiry before either House . . . ." The authority being exercised is that of the House of Representatives. See Watkins, 354 U.S., at 200 -205. It is the investigatory power of the House that is vindicated by 192. The legislative history of 192 makes plain that a clear chain of authority from the House to the questioning body is an essential element of the offense. 13 If the contempt occurs before a subcommittee, the line of authority from the House to the Committee and then to the subcommittee must plainly and explicitly appear, and it must appear in terms of a delegation with respect to a particular, specific subject matter. As Judge Weinfeld stated in United States v. Lamont, supra, at 32, </s> "No committee of either the House or Senate, and no Senator and no Representative, is free on its or his own to conduct investigations unless authorized. Thus it must appear that Congress empowered the Committee to act, and further that at the time the witness allegedly defied its authority the Committee was acting within the power granted to it." </s> Absent proof of a clear delegation to the Subcommittee of authority to conduct an inquiry into a designated subject, the Subcommittee was without authority which can be vindicated by criminal sanctions under 192, nor [384 U.S. 702, 717] was there an authoritative specification of the "subject matter of the inquiry" necessary for the determination of pertinency required by the section. </s> For the foregoing reasons, the judgment below is </s> Reversed. </s> While concurring in the Court's judgment and opinion, MR. JUSTICE BLACK would prefer to reverse the judgment by holding that the House Un-American Activities Committee's inquiries here amounted to an unconstitutional encroachment on the judicial power for reasons stated in his dissent in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 135 . </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 At the outset of the hearings, petitioner's counsel filed a motion which asked that the subpoenas be vacated and the hearings "set aside" on the grounds, among others, that the Committee was not engaged in "a legislative investigation for a bona fide legislative purpose," but rather in an effort to destroy the labor union of which petitioner was an officer; that the "committee's basic resolution" is unconstitutional because "no person can determine from it the boundaries of the Committee's power," and that in any event it did not authorize this investigation; and that the First Amendment forbids compulsory disclosure of political beliefs and affiliations. </s> [Footnote 2 This provision, enacted in 1857, now (with minor changes) reads as follows: </s> "Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of either House of Congress to give testimony or to produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before either House, or any joint committee established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or any committee of either House of Congress, willfully makes default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less than $100 and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one month nor more than twelve months." </s> [Footnote 3 The leading case on the requirement of legislative purpose is Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 . Kilbourn did not arise under 192, but was a damage suit arising out of a direct exercise by the House of Representatives of a claimed power to punish for contempt. The Court held that since the subject matter of the investigation had not been legislative in character, the order of contempt of the House, directing its Sergeant-at-Arms to imprison the contumacious witness, afforded the Sergeant no protection from liability. See, for cases under 192, In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 667 -670; McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 173 -180; Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 291 -295; Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 160 -161; Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 , 200; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 133 ; Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 410 -412. See also note 6, infra. </s> [Footnote 4 There is some evidence in the record that the House Committee had "intermittently" (Brief for the United States, p. 4) investigated the union of which petitioner was an officer as a part of its alleged [384 U.S. 702, 707] "continuing investigation." However, nowhere in the record does any authorization of such a continuing investigation appear. In any event, the authorization of a "major investigation" by the full Committee must occur during the term of the Congress in which the investigation takes place. Neither the House of Representatives nor its committees are continuing bodies. Cf. Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 231; Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 542 . It is the practice of the House to adopt its Rules - including the Rule which establishes the Un-American Activities Committee and defines the scope of its authority - at the beginning of each Congress. See, e. g., 109 Cong. Rec. 14, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); 101 Cong. Rec. 11, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). </s> [Footnote 5 See, e. g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 208 ; Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 755 ; United States v. Lamont, 18 F. R. D. 27, 37 (D.C. S. D. N. Y. 1955), aff'd, 236 F.2d 312 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1956). </s> [Footnote 6 For example, in connection with the debates on 192, Senator Bayard, who bore the brunt of the argument for the bill in the Senate, said: "It is a rule of law very well settled, that if there is no jurisdiction over the subject-matter, the proceeding is void. In such a case, of course, a court of justice would decide that the witness could not be compelled to answer for want of jurisdiction." Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 439 (1857). See also id., at 439-440. </s> In Russell, this Court said, "The obvious consequence [of the Congressional purpose in 192], as the Court has repeatedly emphasized, [384 U.S. 702, 708] was to confer upon the federal courts the duty to accord a person prosecuted for this statutory offense every safeguard which the law accords in all other federal criminal cases." 369 U.S., at 755 . </s> [Footnote 7 In the absence - as here - of any specific authorization of the inquiry and in view of the broad and conflicting statements of the committee members as to the purpose of the inquiry, the present case presents a formidable problem of the "vice of vagueness" which troubled the Court in Watkins, 354 U.S., at 209 . We do not reach that problem because we decide the case on other grounds. </s> [Footnote 8 The record contains the following news account, the accuracy of which was not controverted: </s> "Rep. Francis E. Walter (D., Pa.), who will take charge in the new Congress of House activities against communists and their sympathizers, has a new plan for driving Reds out of important industries. </s> "He said today he plans to hold large public hearings in industrial communities where subversives are known to be operating, and to give known or suspected commies a chance in a full glare of publicity [384 U.S. 702, 710] to deny or affirm their connection with a revolutionary conspiracy - or to take shelter behind constitutional amendments. </s> "By this means, he said, active communists will be exposed before their neighbors and fellow workers, `and I have every confidence that the loyal Americans who work with them will do the rest of the job.' </s> . . . . . </s> "Hearings of a similar nature have been held in local areas, but Rep. Walter wants to make them bigger, with the public being urged as well as invited to attend. </s> "`We will force these people we know to be communists to appear by the power of subpena,' Rep. Walter said, `and will demonstrate to their fellow workers that they are part of a foreign conspiracy.'" </s> [Footnote 9 This Court has emphasized that there is no congressional power to investigate merely for the sake of exposure or punishment, particularly in the First Amendment area. In Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 , the Court stated: </s> "We have no doubt that there is no congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure." Id., at 200. </s> "There is no general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals without justification in terms of the functions of the Congress. . . . Investigations conducted solely . . . to `punish' those investigated are indefensible." Id., at 187. </s> See also cases cited at note 3, supra; and see note 6, supra. </s> [Footnote 10 In Watkins, 354 U.S., at 200 -216, this Court considered the bearing upon the statutory requirement of pertinency of the Committee's status as a standing committee, of its vague charter, and of failure to define the scope of its activities within that charter. </s> [Footnote 11 The indictment refers to Committee action taken on three dates, and the proof at trial provided no other source of authority for the Subcommittee. None of these designates or describes the subject matter of the inquiry or authorizes the subcommittee to conduct it. The Committee's minutes for these three dates are as follows: </s> On January 20, 1955, the House Committee authorized its Chairman </s> "from time to time to appoint subcommittees composed of three or more members of the Committee on Un-American Activities, at least one of whom shall be of the minority political party, and a majority of whom shall constitute a quorum, for the purpose of performing any and all acts which the Committee as a whole is authorized to perform." </s> Thereafter, on February 9, a meeting of the House Committee was held, the minutes of which record the following: </s> "Mr. Scherer moved that David Mates and John Gojack be subpenaed to appear before a subcommittee of the Committee on Internal Security [sic] in open hearing at Fort Wayne, Indiana; and that a Dr. Scharfman [sic - Dr. Shafarman] be subpenaed to appear in executive session at Fort Wayne, Indiana. The Chairman designated Mr. Moulder, Mr. Doyle, and Mr. Scherer as a subcommittee to conduct the hearings in Fort Wayne, Indiana, and set the time at February 21, 1955." </s> The House Committee met again on February 23, and the following took place: </s> "The hearings scheduled to be held at Fort Wayne, Indiana, were discussed. The Chairman stated that upon learning that a National [384 U.S. 702, 714] Labor Board election was to be held in Fort Wayne on February 24, he continued the hearings until February 28 and set the place for the hearings in Washington, D.C. Mr. Scherer moved that the Committee hold hearings at a subsequent date in Fort Wayne. The motion died for want of a second. The Committee agreed that after the hearings on February 28 it would then be determined whether further hearings in Fort Wayne would be necessary." </s> [Footnote 12 The action of the full Committee in reporting petitioner's contempt to the House, and the House's action in certifying the contempt to the United States Attorney for prosecution, cannot be taken as retroactive authorization of the investigation and definition of the delegated authority. Petitioner's "duty to answer must be judged as of the time of his refusal." United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 48 . </s> [Footnote 13 See Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., 3d Sess., particularly at pages 406, 409-410, 427, 435 (1857). See also Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 -201. </s> [384 U.S. 702, 718]

United States Supreme Court MILLS v. ALABAMA(1966) No. 597 Argued: April 19, 1966Decided: May 23, 1966 </s> Appellant, a Birmingham, Alabama, newspaper editor, was arrested on a complaint of violating 285 of the Alabama Corrupt Practices Act by writing and publishing on election day an editorial urging adoption in that election of the mayor-council form of government. Section 285 proscribes electioneering or soliciting votes on election day for or against any proposition or candidate involved in the election. The trial court sustained demurrers on the grounds that the statute violated state and federal free speech guarantees. The Alabama Supreme Court, holding the statutory election-day restriction reasonable or "within the field of reasonableness," reversed and remanded the case for trial. Held: </s> 1. This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal. Notwithstanding the remand of the case, the Alabama Supreme Court's judgment was "final" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1257, because appellant's conviction in any subsequent trial is inevitable in view of that court's ruling that the Alabama statute is constitutional and appellant's concession that he wrote and published the editorial. Pp. 217-218. </s> 2. A state statute making it a crime for a newspaper editor to publish an editorial on election day urging people to vote in a particular way flagrantly violates the First Amendment, applied to the States by the Fourteenth, a major purpose of which was to protect free discussion of governmental affairs. Pp. 218-220. </s> 278 Ala. 188, 176 So.2d 884, reversed and remanded. </s> Kenneth Perrine and Alfred Swedlaw argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant. </s> Leslie Hall, Assistant Attorney General of Alabama, and Burgin Hawkins argued the cause for appellee. With them on the brief was Richmond M. Flowers, Attorney General. </s> Briefs of amici curiae, urging reversal, were filed by James C. Barton for the Alabama Press Association et al., [384 U.S. 214, 215] and by Charles Morgan, Jr., Melvin L. Wulf and C. H. Erskine Smith for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The question squarely presented here is whether a State, consistently with the United States Constitution, can make it a crime for the editor of a daily newspaper to write and publish an editorial on election day urging people to vote a certain way on issues submitted to them. </s> On November 6, 1962, Birmingham, Alabama, held an election for the people to decide whether they preferred to keep their existing city commission form of government or replace it with a mayor-council government. On election day the Birmingham Post-Herald, a daily newspaper, carried an editorial written by its editor, appellant, James E. Mills, which strongly urged the people to adopt the mayor-council form of government. 1 Mills was later arrested on a complaint charging that by [384 U.S. 214, 216] publishing the editorial on election day he had violated 285 of the Alabama Corrupt Practices Act, Ala. Code, 1940, Tit. 17, 268-286, which makes it a crime "to do any electioneering or to solicit any votes . . . in support of or in opposition to any proposition that is being voted on on the day on which the election affecting such candidates or propositions is being held." 2 The trial court sustained demurrers to the complaint on the grounds that the state statute abridged freedom of speech and press in violation of the Alabama Constitution and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. On appeal by the State, the Alabama Supreme Court held that publication of the editorial on election day undoubtedly violated the state law and then went on to reverse the trial court by holding that the state statute as applied did not unconstitutionally abridge freedom of speech or press. Recognizing that the state law did limit and restrict both speech and press, the State Supreme Court nevertheless sustained it as a valid exercise of the State's police power chiefly because, as that court said, the press "restriction, everything considered, is within the field of reasonableness" and "not an unreasonable limitation upon free speech, which includes [384 U.S. 214, 217] free press." 278 Ala. 188, 195, 196, 176 So.2d 884, 890. The case is here on appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1257 (1964 ed.). </s> I. </s> The State has moved to dismiss this appeal on the ground that the Alabama Supreme Court's judgment is not a "final judgment" and therefore not appealable under 1257. 3 The State argues that since the Alabama Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion (which would include a trial), the Supreme Court's judgment cannot be considered "final." This argument has a surface plausibility, since it is true the judgment of the State Supreme Court did not literally end the case. It did, however, render a judgment binding upon the trial court that it must convict Mills under this state statute if he wrote and published the editorial. Mills concedes that he did, and he therefore has no defense in the Alabama trial court. Thus if the case goes back to the trial court, the trial, so far as this record shows, would be no more than a few formal gestures leading inexorably towards a conviction, and then another appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court for it formally to repeat its rejection of Mills' constitutional contentions whereupon the case could then once more wind its weary way back to us as a judgment unquestionably final and appealable. Such a roundabout process would not only be an inexcusable delay of the benefits Congress intended to grant by providing for appeal to this Court, but it would also result in a completely unnecessary waste of time and energy in judicial systems already troubled by delays due [384 U.S. 214, 218] to congested dockets. 4 The language of 1257 as we construed it in Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 345 U.S. 379, 381 -383, does not require a result leading to such consequences. See also Construction Laborers v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542, 548 -551; Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board, 329 U.S. 69, 72 -74. Following those cases we hold that we have jurisdiction. </s> II. </s> We come now to the merits. The First Amendment, which applies to the States through the Fourteenth, prohibits laws "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." The question here is whether it abridges freedom of the press for a State to punish a newspaper editor for doing no more than publishing an editorial on election day urging people to vote a particular way in the election. We should point out at once that this question in no way involves the extent of a State's power to regulate conduct in and around the polls in order to maintain peace, order and decorum there. The sole reason for the charge that Mills violated the law is that he wrote and published an editorial on election day urging Birmingham voters to cast their votes in favor of changing their form of government. </s> Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. This of course includes discussions of candidates, structures and forms of government, the manner in which government is operated or should be operated, and all such [384 U.S. 214, 219] matters relating to political processes. The Constitution specifically selected the press, which includes not only newspapers, books, and magazines, but also humble leaflets and circulars, see Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 , to play an important role in the discussion of public affairs. Thus the press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping officials elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve. Suppression of the right of the press to praise or criticize governmental agents and to clamor and contend for or against change, which is all that this editorial did, muzzles one of the very agencies the Framers of our Constitution thoughtfully and deliberately selected to improve our society and keep it free. The Alabama Corrupt Practices Act by providing criminal penalties for publishing editorials such as the one here silences the press at a time when it can be most effective. It is difficult to conceive of a more obvious and flagrant abridgment of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press. </s> Admitting that the state law restricted a newspaper editor's freedom to publish editorials on election day, the Alabama Supreme Court nevertheless sustained the constitutionality of the law on the ground that the restrictions on the press were only "reasonable restrictions" or at least "within the field of reasonableness." The court reached this conclusion because it thought the law imposed only a minor limitation on the press - restricting it only on election days - and because the court thought the law served a good purpose. It said: </s> "It is a salutary legislative enactment that protects the public from confusive last-minute charges and countercharges and the distribution of propaganda in an effort to influence voters on an election day; [384 U.S. 214, 220] when as a practical matter, because of lack of time, such matters cannot be answered or their truth determined until after the election is over." 278 Ala. 188, 195-196, 176 So.2d 884, 890. </s> This argument, even if it were relevant to the constitutionality of the law, has a fatal flaw. The state statute leaves people free to hurl their campaign charges up to the last minute of the day before election. The law held valid by the Alabama Supreme Court then goes on to make it a crime to answer those "last-minute" charges on election day, the only time they can be effectively answered. Because the law prevents any adequate reply to these charges, it is wholly ineffective in protecting the electorate "from confusive last-minute charges and countercharges." We hold that no test of reasonableness can save a state law from invalidation as a violation of the First Amendment when that law makes it a crime for a newspaper editor to do no more than urge people to vote one way or another in a publicly held election. </s> The judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The editorial said in part: "Mayor Hanes' proposal to buy the votes of city employees with a promise of pay raises which would cost the taxpayers nearly a million dollars a year was cause enough to destroy any confidence the public might have had left in him. </s> "It was another good reason why the voters should vote overwhelmingly today in favor of Mayor-Council government. </s> "Now Mr. Hanes, in his arrogance, proposes to set himself up as news censor at City Hall and `win or lose' today he says he will instruct all city employees under him to neither give out news regarding the public business with which they are entrusted nor to discuss it with reporters either from the Post-Herald or the News. </s> . . . . . </s> "If Mayor Hanes displays such arrogant disregard of the public's right to know on the eve of the election what can we expect in the future if the City Commission should be retained? </s> "Let's take no chances. </s> "Birmingham and the people of Birmingham deserve a better break. A vote for Mayor-Council government will give it to them." </s> [Footnote 2 " 285 (599) Corrupt practices at elections enumerated and defined. - It is a corrupt practice for any person on any election day to intimidate or attempt to intimidate an elector or any of the election officers; or, obstruct or hinder or attempt to obstruct or hinder, or prevent or attempt to prevent the forming of the lines of the voters awaiting their opportunity or time to enter the election booths; or to hire or to let for hire any automobile or other conveyance for the purpose of conveying electors to and from the polls; or, to do any electioneering or to solicit any votes or to promise to cast any votes for or against the election or nomination of any candidate, or in support of or in opposition to any proposition that is being voted on on the day on which the election affecting such candidates or propositions is being held." Ala. Code, 1940, Tit. 17. </s> [Footnote 3 Section 1257 provides in part: "Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court . . . ." </s> [Footnote 4 This case was instituted more than three and one-half years ago. If jurisdiction is refused, we cannot know that it will not take another three and one-half years to get this constitutional question finally determined. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, concurring. </s> Although I join the opinion of the Court, I think it appropriate to add a few words about the finality of the judgment we reverse today, particularly in view of the observation in the separate opinion of MR. JUSTICE HARLAN that "limitations on the jurisdiction of this Court . . . should be respected and not turned on and off at the pleasure of its members or to suit the convenience of litigants." </s> The decision of the Alabama Supreme Court approved a law which, in my view, is a blatant violation of freedom [384 U.S. 214, 221] of the press. The threat of penal sanctions has, we are told, already taken its toll in Alabama: the Alabama Press Association and the Southern Newspaper Publishers Association, as amici curiae, tell us that since November 1962 editorial comment on election day has been nonexistent in Alabama. The chilling effect of this prosecution is thus anything but hypothetical; it is currently being experienced by the newspapers and the people of Alabama. </s> We deal here with the rights of free speech and press in a basic form: the right to express views on matters before the electorate. In light of appellant's concession that he has no other defense to offer should the case go to trial, compare Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 345 U.S. 379 ; Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board, 329 U.S. 69 , and considering the importance of the First Amendment rights at stake in this litigation, it would require regard for some remote, theoretical interests of federalism to conclude that this Court lacks jurisdiction because of the unlikely possibility that a jury might disregard a trial judge's instructions and acquit. </s> Indeed, even had appellant been unwilling to concede that he has no defense - apart from the constitutional question - to the charges against him, we would be warranted in reviewing this case. That result follows a fortiori from our holdings that where First Amendment rights are jeopardized by a state prosecution which, by its very nature, threatens to deter others from exercising their First Amendment rights, a federal court will take the extraordinary step of enjoining the state prosecution. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 ; Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741 . As already noted, this case has brought editorial comment on election day to a halt throughout the State of Alabama. Our observation in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 , has grim relevance here: "The threat of sanctions may deter . . . [384 U.S. 214, 222] exercise [of First Amendment rights] almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions." * </s> For these reasons, and for the reasons stated in the opinion of the Court, I conclude that the judgment is final. </s> [Footnote * In California v. Stewart, 383 U.S. 903 , where a state court reversed a criminal conviction on federal grounds, we ruled on a motion to dismiss that the State may obtain review in this Court even though a new trial remained to be held. We reached that conclusion because otherwise the State would be permanently precluded from raising the federal question, state law not permitting the prosecution to appeal from an acquittal. And see Construction Laborers v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 ; Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555 . </s> Separate opinion of MR. JUSTICE HARLAN. </s> In my opinion the appellant is not here on a "final" state judgment and therefore under 28 U.S.C. 1257 (1964 ed.) the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62 ; cf. Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513 . </s> Although his demurrer to the criminal complaint has been overruled by the highest court of the State, the appellant still faces a trial on the charges against him. If the jury 1 fails to convict - a possibility which, unless the courtroom antennae of a former trial lawyer have become dulled by his years on the bench, is by no means remote in a case so unusual as this one is - the constitutional issue now decided will have been prematurely adjudicated. But even were one mistaken in thinking that a jury might well take the bit in its teeth and acquit, despite the Alabama Supreme Court's ruling on the demurrer and the appellant's admitted authorship of the editorial in question, the federal statute nonetheless commands us not to adjudicate the issue decided until the [384 U.S. 214, 223] prosecution has run its final course in the state courts, adversely to the appellant. </s> Although of course much can be said in favor of deciding the constitutional issue now, and both sides have indicated their desire that we do so, I continue to believe that constitutionally permissible limitations on the jurisdiction of this Court, such as those contained in 1257 undoubtedly are, should be respected and not turned on and off at the pleasure of its members or to suit the convenience of litigants. 2 If the traditional federal policy of "finality" is to be changed, Congress is the body to do it. I would dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. </s> Since the Court has decided otherwise, however, I feel warranted in making a summary statement of my views on the merits of the case. I agree with the Court that the decision below cannot stand. But I would rest reversal on the ground that the relevant provision of the Alabama statute - "to do any electioneering or to solicit any votes [on election day] . . . in support of or in opposition to any proposition that is being voted on the day on which the election affecting such candidates or propositions is being held" - did not give the appellant, particularly in the context of the rest of the statute (ante, p. 216, n. 2) and in the absence of any relevant authoritative state judicial decision, fair warning that the publication of an editorial of this kind was reached by the foregoing provisions of the Alabama Corrupt Practices Act. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 . I deem a broader holding unnecessary. </s> [Footnote 1 At oral argument in this Court appellant's counsel conceded that a jury trial was still obtainable, see Ala. Code, Tit. 13, 326; Tit. 15, 321 (1958 Recomp.), and that it might result in an acquittal. </s> [Footnote 2 Compare Construction Laborers v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 , and Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555 . The three cases cited by the Court, ante, p. 218, fall short of supporting the "finality" of the judgment before us. None of them involved jury trials, and in each instance the case was returned to the lower court in a posture where as a practical matter all that remained to be done was to enter judgment. What is done today more than ever erodes the final judgment rule. </s> [384 U.S. 214, 224]

United States Supreme Court LEHNHAUSEN v. LAKE SHORE AUTO PARTS CO.(1973) No. 71-685 Argued: January 15, 1973Decided: February 22, 1973 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 71-691, Barrett, County Clerk of Cook County, Illinois, et al. v. Shapiro et al., also on certiorari to the same court. </s> An Illinois constitutional provision subjecting corporations and similar entities, but not individuals, to ad valorem taxes on personalty comports with equal protection requirements, the States being accorded wide latitude in making classifications and drawing lines that in their judgment produce reasonable taxation systems. Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389 , disapproved. Pp. 359-365. </s> 49 Ill. 2d 137, 273 N. E. 2d 592, reversed. </s> DOUGLAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. </s> William J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois, argued the cause for petitioner in No. 71-685. With him on the briefs was Jayne A. Carr, Assistant Attorney General. Aubrey F. Kaplan argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners in No. 71-691. </s> Arnold M. Flamm argued the cause for respondents in No. 71-685. With him on the brief was Arthur T. Susman. Louis L. Biro argued the cause for respondents in No. 71-691 and filed a brief for corporation respondents M. Weil & Sons, Inc., et al. Gust W. Dickett filed a brief for respondents Shapiro et al. in No. 71-691. Edward A. Berman, Eugene T. Sherman, and Lewis W. [410 U.S. 356, 357] Schlifkin filed a brief for proprietor respondents Herman, dba The Spot, et al. in both cases.Fn </s> Fn [410 U.S. 356, 357] Richard B. Ogilvie, Governor of Illinois, filed a brief as amicus curiae urging reversal in No. 71-685. Louis Ancel, Stewart H. Diamond, and Samuel W. Witwer filed a brief for Proviso Township High School District No. 209 et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance in both cases. William R. Dillon filed a brief for Members of the Corporate Fiduciaries Association of Illinois as amici curiae in both cases. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> In 1970 the people of Illinois amended its constitution 1 adding Art. IX-A to become effective January 1, 1971, and reading: </s> "Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution, the taxation of personal property by valuation is prohibited as to individuals." </s> There apparently appeared on the ballot when Art. IX-A was approved the following: </s> "The amendment would abolish the personal property tax by valuation levied against individuals. It would not affect the same tax levied against corporations and other entities not considered in law to be individuals. The amendment would achieve this result by adding a new article to the Constitution of 1870, Article IX-A, thus setting aside existing provisions of Article IX, Section 1, that require the taxation by valuation of all forms of property, real and personal or other, owned by individuals and corporations." </s> Respondent Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., a corporation, brought an action against Illinois officials on its behalf [410 U.S. 356, 358] and on behalf of all other corporations and "non-individuals" subject to the personal property tax, claiming that the tax violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since it exempts from personal property taxes all personal property owned by individuals but retains such taxes as to personal property owned by corporations and other "non-individuals." The Circuit Court held the Revenue Act of Illinois, as amended by Art. IX-A, unconstitutional as respects corporations by reason of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. </s> Shapiro and other individuals also brought suit alleging they are natural persons who own personal property, one for himself and his family, one as a sole proprietor of a business, and one as a partnership. A different trial judge entered an order in these cases dismissing the complaints except as to Shapiro and members of his class. The trial judge held that all other provisions of Illinois law imposing personal property taxes on property owned by corporations and other "non-individuals" were unaffected by Art. IX-A, in line with the statement on the ballot, quoted above. </s> All respondents in both cases appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, which held that Art. IX-A did not affect all forms of real and personal property taxes but only personal property taxes on individuals, which it construed to mean "ad valorem taxation of personal property owned by a natural person or by two or more natural persons as joint tenants or tenants in common." 49 Ill. 2d 137, 148, 273 N. E. 2d 592, 597. As so construed, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the tax violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 151, 273 N. E. 2d, at 599, one Justice dissenting. 2 </s> [410 U.S. 356, 359] The cases are here on writs of certiorari which we granted. 405 U.S. 1039 . </s> The Equal Protection Clause does not mean that a State may not draw lines that treat one class of individuals or entities differently from the others. The test is whether the difference in treatment is an invidious discrimination. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 . Where taxation is concerned and no specific federal right, apart from equal protection, is imperiled, 3 the States have large leeway in making classifications and drawing lines which in their judgment produce reasonable systems of taxation. As stated in Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526 -527: </s> "The States have a very wide discretion in the laying of their taxes. When dealing with their proper domestic concerns, and not trenching upon the prerogatives of the National Government or violating the guaranties of the Federal Constitution, the States have the attribute of sovereign powers in devising their fiscal systems to ensure revenue and foster their local interests. Of course, the States, in the exercise of their taxing power, are subject to the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But that clause imposes no iron rule of equality, prohibiting the flexibility and variety that are appropriate to reasonable schemes of state taxation. The State may impose different specific taxes upon different trades and [410 U.S. 356, 360] professions and may vary the rate of excise upon various products. It is not required to resort to close distinctions or to maintain a precise, scientific uniformity with reference to composition, use or value." </s> In that case we used the phrase "palpably arbitrary" or "invidious" as defining the limits placed by the Equal Protection Clause on state power. Id., at 530. State taxes which have the collateral effect of restricting or even destroying an occupation or a business have been sustained, so long as the regulatory power asserted is properly within the limits of the federal-state regime created by the Constitution. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 44 -47. When it comes to taxes on corporations and taxes on individuals, great leeway is permissible so far as equal protection is concerned. They may be classified differently with respect to their right to receive or earn income. In Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276, 283 , a state statute relieved domestic corporations of an income tax derived from activities carried on outside the State, but imposed the tax on individuals obtaining such income. We upheld the tax against the claim that it violated the Equal Protection Clause, saying: </s> "We cannot say that investigation in these fields would not disclose a basis for the legislation which would lead reasonable men to conclude that there is just ground for the difference here made. The existence, unchallenged, of differences between the taxation of incomes of individuals and of corporations in every federal revenue act since the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment, demonstrates that there may be." Id., at 283-284. </s> It is true that in Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389 , the Court held that a gross receipts tax [410 U.S. 356, 361] levied on corporations doing a taxi business violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, when no such tax was levied on individuals and partnerships operating taxicabs in competition with the corporate taxpayers. Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone dissented. Id., at 403-412. Mr. Justice Holmes stated: </s> "If usually there is an important difference of degree between the business done by corporations and that done by individuals, I see no reason why the larger business may not be taxed and the small ones disregarded, and I think it would be immaterial if here and there exceptions were found to the general rule. . . . Furthermore if the State desired to discourage this form of activity in corporate form and expressed its desire by a special tax I think that there is nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent it." Id., at 403. </s> Each of these dissenters thought Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 , should govern Quaker City Cab. The Flint case involved a federal tax upon the privilege of doing business in a corporate capacity, but it was not laid on businesses carried on by a partnership or private individual. It was, therefore, contended that the tax was "so unequal and arbitrary" as to be beyond the power of Congress. Id., at 158. We had not yet held that the Fifth Amendment in its use of due process carries a mandate of equal protection. 4 But the Court in dictum stated: </s> "[I]t could not be said, even if the principles of the Fourteenth Amendment were applicable to the present case, that there is no substantial difference between [410 U.S. 356, 362] the carrying on of business by the corporations taxed, and the same business when conducted by a private firm or individual. The thing taxed is not the mere dealing in merchandise, in which the actual transactions may be the same, whether conducted by individuals or corporations, but the tax is laid upon the privileges which exist in conducting business with the advantages which inhere in the corporate capacity of those taxed, and which are not enjoyed by private firms or individuals. These advantages are obvious, and have led to the formation of such companies in nearly all branches of trade. The continuity of the business, without interruption by death or dissolution, the transfer of property interests by the disposition of shares of stock, the advantages of business controlled and managed by corporate directors, the general absence of individual liability, these and other things inhere in the advantages of business thus conducted, which do not exist when the same business is conducted by private individuals or partnerships. It is this distinctive privilege which is the subject of taxation, not the mere buying or selling or handling of goods which may be the same, whether done by corporations or individuals." Id., at 161-162. </s> While Quaker City Cab came after Flint, cases following Quaker City Cab have somewhat undermined it. White River Co. v. Arkansas, 279 U.S. 692 , involved a state statute for collection of back taxes on lands owned by corporations but not individuals. The Court sustained the statute. Mr. Justice Butler, Mr. Chief Justice Taft, and Mr. Justice Van Devanter dissented, asserting that Quaker City Cab was not distinguishable. The majority made no effort to distinguish Quaker City Cab beyond saying that it did not involve, as did White River, back taxes. Id., at 696. [410 U.S. 356, 363] </s> In Rapid Transit Co. v. New York, 303 U.S. 573 , an excise tax was levied on every utility but not on other business units. In sustaining the tax against the claim of lack of equal protection, the Court said: </s> "Since carriers or other utilities with the right of eminent domain, the use of public property, special franchises or public contracts, have many points of distinction from other businesses, including relative freedom from competition, especially significant with increasing density of population and municipal expansion, these public service organizations have no valid ground by virtue of the equal protection clause to object to separate treatment related to such distinctions." Id., at 579. </s> We reached the same result in Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 , where Tennessee had used one system for making assessments under its ad valorem tax law as respects most taxpayers and a totally different one for public service corporations. So far as equal protection was concerned, we said that the grievance of the particular complainant was "common to the whole class" and not "invidious to a particular taxpayer." 5 Id., at 368. [410 U.S. 356, 364] </s> Approval of the treatment "with that separateness" which distinguishes public service corporations from others, ibid., leads us to conclude in the present cases that making corporations and like entities, but not individuals, liable for ad valorem taxes on personal property does not transcend the requirements of equal protection. </s> In Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 , a State laid an ad valorem tax of 50 per $100 on deposits in banks outside the State and only 10 per $1,000 on deposits within the State. The classification was sustained against the charge of invidious discrimination, the Court noting that "in taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classification." Id., at 88. There is a presumption of constitutionality which can be overcome "only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and classes." Ibid. And the Court added, "The burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it." Ibid. That idea has been elaborated. Thus, in Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U.S. 495 , the Court, in sustaining an unemployment tax on employers, 6 said: </s> "A state legislature, in the enactment of laws, has the widest possible latitude within the limits of the Constitution. In the nature of the case it cannot record a complete catalogue of the considerations which move its members to enact laws. In the absence of such a record courts cannot assume that its action is capricious, or that, with its informed acquaintance with local conditions to which the legislation [410 U.S. 356, 365] is to be applied, it was not aware of facts which afford reasonable basis for its action. Only by faithful adherence to this guiding principle of judicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the legislative branch its rightful independence and its ability to function." Id., at 510. </s> Illinois tells us that the individual personal property tax was discriminatory, unfair, almost impossible to administer, and economically unsound. Assessment practices varied from district to district. About a third of the individuals paid no personal property taxes at all, while the rest paid on their bank accounts, automobiles, household furniture, and other resources, and in rural areas they paid on their livestock, grain, and farm implements as well. As respects corporations, the State says, the tax is uniformly enforceable. Illinois says, moreover, that Art. IX-A is only the first step in totally eliminating the ad valorem personal property tax by 1979 but for fiscal reasons it was impossible to abolish the tax all at once. </s> We could strike down this tax as discriminatory only if we substituted our judgment on facts of which we can be only dimly aware for a legislative judgment that reflects a vivid reaction to pressing fiscal problems. Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania is only a relic of a bygone era. We cannot follow it and stay within the narrow confines of judicial review, which is an important part of our constitutional tradition. </s> Reversed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 In 1969, the Illinois Legislature had provided for the submission of the proposed amendment to a referendum vote. </s> [Footnote 2 The result was either to reverse with directions to dismiss the complaints or to affirm the judgment that dismissed the complaints. Those two cases were heard by the Illinois Supreme Court along with [410 U.S. 356, 359] a petition to file original suit with that court by one Maynard, who owned nonbusiness personal property, and by three school districts. That petition was dismissed. </s> [Footnote 3 Classic examples are the taxes that discriminated against newspapers, struck down under the First Amendment (Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 ) or that discriminated against interstate commerce (see Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 ) or required licenses to engage in interstate commerce. </s> [Footnote 4 See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 , decided May 17, 1954, which held that federal discrimination (in that case racial in nature) may be so arbitrary as to be violative of due process as the term is used in the Fifth Amendment. </s> [Footnote 5 In Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412 , a State classified chain stores for purposes of a chain store tax according to the number of stores - inside and outside the State. The Court sustained the tax, saying: "The statute bears equally upon all who fall into the same class, and this satisfies the guaranty of equal protection." Id., at 424. In Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U.S. 495 , a State laid an unemployment tax on employers, excluding, inter alia, agriculture, domestic service, crews of vessels on navigable waters, and eleemosynary institutions. The Court sustained the tax, saying: "This Court has repeatedly held that inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption, infringe no constitutional limitation." Id., at 509. And it added: "A legislature is not bound to tax every member of a class or none. It may make distinctions of degree having a rational basis, and when [410 U.S. 356, 364] subjected to judicial scrutiny they must be presumed to rest on that basis if there is any conceivable state of facts which would support it." Ibid. </s> [Footnote 6 Note 5, supra. </s> [410 U.S. 356, 366]

United States Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. MECHANIK(1986) No. 84-1640 Argued: December 2, 1985Decided: February 25, 1986 </s> * </s> [475 U.S. 66, 66] Together with No. 84-1700, Lill v. United States, and No. 84-1704, Mechanik v. United States, also on certiorari to the same court. </s> A federal grand jury returned an indictment charging respondents and cross-petitioners (hereafter defendants) with drug-related offenses and conspiracy, and later returned a superseding indictment expanding the conspiracy charge. Two law enforcement agents testified in tandem before the grand jury in support of the superseding indictment. The defendants did not learn about this until the second week of their trial when the Government furnished them with a transcript of the grand jury testimony. The defendants were found guilty after a jury trial, and the District Court denied their motion to dismiss the superseding indictment on the ground that the two agents' simultaneous presence before the grand jury violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(d), which provides that only specified persons including "the witness under examination" may be present at a grand jury proceeding. The Court of Appeals reversed the conspiracy convictions and dismissed the conspiracy portion of the indictment, holding that although Rule 6(d) was violated, the violation tainted only that portion of the indictment. </s> Held: </s> However diligent the defendants may have been in seeking to discover the basis for the claimed violation of Rule 6(d), the petit jury's guilty verdict rendered harmless any error in the grand jury's charging decision that may have flowed from the violation. In such case, the societal costs of retrial are far too substantial to justify setting aside the verdict simply because of an error in the grand jury proceeding. Pp. 69-73. </s> 756 F.2d 994, affirmed in part and reversed in part. </s> REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and WHITE, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. BURGER, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 73. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which BRENNAN and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 73. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 80. </s> Bruce J. Rosen argued the cause for petitioners in Nos. 84-1700 and 84-1704 and respondents in No. 84-1640. [475 U.S. 66, 67] With him on the briefs were Michael D. Graves and Stephen J. Rogers. </s> Mark I. Levy argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Trott, Deputy Solicitor General Frey, and Vincent L. Gambale. </s> JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(d) states that only specified persons including "the witness under examination" may be present at a grand jury proceeding. In these cases, two Government witnesses testified in tandem before the grand jury, which indicted respondents and cross-petitioners (hereafter defendants) Mechanik and Lill for various drug-related offenses and conspiracy to commit such offenses. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the simultaneous presence of these two witnesses violated Rule 6(d), and that even though the petit jury subsequently returned a verdict of guilty against defendants, the verdict must be set aside on any count that corresponds to a "tainted" portion of the indictment. We believe that the petit jury's verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt demonstrates a fortiori that there was probable cause to charge the defendants with the offenses for which they were convicted. Therefore, the convictions must stand despite the rule violation. </s> A fairly detailed summary of the District Court proceedings will help to illustrate the nature and extent of our holding. A grand jury returned an indictment charging defendants with drug-related offenses and conspiracy. This indictment was concededly free from any claim of error. The grand jury then returned a superseding indictment in which the conspiracy charge was expanded. In support of this superseding indictment, the United States Attorney presented the testimony of two law enforcement agents who were sworn together and questioned in tandem before the grand jury. [475 U.S. 66, 68] </s> The defendants did not learn about this joint testimony until after trial began. Before trial, they filed an omnibus motion requesting, inter alia, the names of all the people who appeared before the grand jury. The Government responded that there were no unauthorized persons appearing before the grand jury, and the District Court denied the motion. Trial began in February 1980, and concluded in early July of the same year. During the second week of trial, one Jerry Rinehart, an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration, testified as a Government witness. At the time of his testimony, the Government furnished the defendants with a portion of the transcript of his grand jury testimony as required by the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. 3500. The transcript disclosed that Rinehart and his fellow agent, Randolph James, had testified in tandem before the grand jury. </s> The defendants moved for dismissal of the indictment on the ground that the simultaneous presence of the two agents had violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(d). Chief Judge Knapp, presiding over the trial, concluded that the presence and testimony of the two agents had not violated Rule 6(d), and he denied the motion. In May 1980, however, Chief Judge Knapp was unexpectedly hospitalized, and Judge Copenhaver took over as the trial judge. The defendants then moved for a rehearing of their motion to dismiss the indictment. Judge Copenhaver took the motion under advisement until the conclusion of trial. </s> In August 1980, after the jury had returned its guilty verdict, Judge Copenhaver ruled upon and denied the defendants' motion for dismissal of the indictment. 511 F. Supp. 50 (SD W. Va. 1980). He first decided, contrary to Chief Judge Knapp's earlier ruling, that the joint testimony of Agents Rinehart and James did constitute a violation of Rule 6(d). Id., at 53-58. But he declined to set aside the defendants' indictment and convictions because, on the basis of a comparison between the two indictments and the evidence on which the indictments rested, the violation of Rule 6(d) had [475 U.S. 66, 69] not harmed the defendants. Id., at 58-61. He justified this conclusion with respect to the substantive counts on the ground that they were materially unchanged from the valid initial indictment to the superseding indictment. Id., at 58-59. With respect to the conspiracy count, which had been expanded by the superseding indictment, he justified his conclusion on the ground that the grand jury "had before it ample independent evidence [apart from the joint testimony] to support a probable cause finding of the charges." Id., at 61. In light of these conclusions, Judge Copenhaver determined that a post-trial dismissal of the indictment would simply confer a windfall benefit on the defendants "who stand convicted after a three-month trial conducted at enormous expense to the United States and the defendants." Ibid. The judge nevertheless undertook to ensure future compliance with the one-witness rule by directing the Government to keep the court advised concerning compliance with Rule 6(d) in future criminal cases. Ibid. </s> A divided Court of Appeals reversed the conspiracy convictions, affirmed the others, and dismissed the conspiracy portion of the indictment. 735 F.2d 136 (1984). It reasoned that the language of Rule 6(d) is so "plain and unequivocal in limiting who may appear before a grand jury," id., at 139, that its transgression requires automatic reversal of any subsequent conviction regardless of the lack of prejudice. Id., at 139-140. But the court reversed only the conspiracy convictions because it found that the violation of Rule 6(d) tainted only the portion of the superseding indictment that related to them. Id., at 140. A divided en banc decision agreed. 756 F.2d 994 (1985) (per curiam). </s> We assume for the sake of argument that the simultaneous presence and testimony of the two Government witnesses before the grand jury violated Rule 6(d), and that the District Court would have been justified in dismissing portions of the indictment on that basis had there been actual prejudice and had the matter been called to its attention before the commencement [475 U.S. 66, 70] of the trial. But although the defendants appear to have been reasonably diligent in attempting to discover any error at the grand jury proceeding, they did not acquire the transcript showing that the two agents had appeared jointly in the grand jury proceeding until the second week of trial. Nor is there any suggestion that the Government designedly withheld the information. When the defendants made their motion to dismiss the indictment based on the joint testimony, Chief Judge Knapp denied the motion because of his view that there had been no violation of Rule 6(d). Judge Copenhaver eventually issued a contrary ruling on the resubmitted motion, but not until after the long and costly trial had been brought to its conclusion. Although we do not believe that the defendants can be faulted for any lack of diligence, we nonetheless hold that the supervening jury verdict made reversal of the conviction and dismissal of the indictment inappropriate. </s> Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals observed that Rule 6(d) was designed, in part, "to ensure that grand jurors, sitting without the direct supervision of a judge, are not subject to undue influence that may come with the presence of an unauthorized person." 735 F.2d, at 139. The Rule protects against the danger that a defendant will be required to defend against a charge for which there is no probable cause to believe him guilty. The error involving Rule 6(d) in these cases had the theoretical potential to affect the grand jury's determination whether to indict these particular defendants for the offenses with which they were charged. But the petit jury's subsequent guilty verdict means not only that there was probable cause to believe that the defendants were guilty as charged, but also that they are in fact guilty as charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Measured by the petit jury's verdict, then, any error in the grand jury proceeding connected with the charging decision was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 1 </s> [475 U.S. 66, 71] </s> It might be argued in some literal sense that because the Rule was designed to protect against an erroneous charging decision by the grand jury, the indictment should not be compared to the evidence produced by the Government at trial, but to the evidence produced before the grand jury. But even if this argument were accepted, there is no simple way after the verdict to restore the defendant to the position in which he would have been had the indictment been dismissed before trial. He will already have suffered whatever inconvenience, expense, and opprobrium that a proper indictment may have spared him. In courtroom proceedings as elsewhere, "the moving finger writes; and, having writ, moves on." Thus reversal of a conviction after a trial free from reversible error cannot restore to the defendant whatever benefit might have accrued to him from a trial on an indictment returned in conformity with Rule 6(d). </s> We cannot accept the Court of Appeals' view that a violation of Rule 6(d) requires automatic reversal of a subsequent conviction regardless of the lack of prejudice. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) provides that errors not affecting substantial rights shall be disregarded. We see no reason not to apply this provision to "errors, defects, irregularities, or variances" occurring before a grand jury just as we have [475 U.S. 66, 72] applied it to such error occurring in the criminal trial itself. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509 (1983); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21 -24 (1967); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438 (1986). </s> The reversal of a conviction entails substantial social costs: it forces jurors, witnesses, courts, the prosecution, and the defendants to expend further time, energy, and other resources to repeat a trial that has already once taken place; victims may be asked to relive their disturbing experiences. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983). The "[p]assage of time, erosion of memory, and dispersion of witnesses may render retrial difficult, even impossible." Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127 -128 (1982). Thus, while reversal "may, in theory, entitle the defendant only to retrial, in practice it may reward the accused with complete freedom from prosecution," id., at 128, and thereby "cost society the right to punish admitted offenders." Id., at 127. Even if a defendant is convicted in a second trial, the intervening delay may compromise society's "interest in the prompt administration of justice," United States v. Hasting, supra, at 509, and impede accomplishment of the objectives of deterrence and rehabilitation. These societal costs of reversal and retrial are an acceptable and often necessary consequence when an error in the first proceeding has deprived a defendant of a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence. But the balance of interest tips decidedly the other way when an error has had no effect on the outcome of the trial. </s> We express no opinion as to what remedy may be appropriate for a violation of Rule 6(d) that has affected the grand jury's charging decision and is brought to the attention of the trial court before the commencement of trial. 2 We hold only [475 U.S. 66, 73] that however diligent the defendants may have been in seeking to discover the basis for the claimed violation of Rule 6(d), the petit jury's verdict rendered harmless any conceivable error in the charging decision that might have flowed from the violation. In such a case, the societal costs of retrial after a jury verdict of guilty are far too substantial to justify setting aside the verdict simply because of an error in the earlier grand jury proceedings. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed to the extent it set aside the conspiracy convictions and dismissed the indictment, but is otherwise affirmed. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 In Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986), the Court set aside a final judgment of conviction because of racial discrimination in the composition [475 U.S. 66, 71] of the grand jury that indicted the defendant. It found this result to be compelled by precedent directly applicable to the special problem of racial discrimination. Id., at 260-262. It also reasoned that racial discrimination in the selection of grand jurors is so pernicious, and other remedies so impractical, that the remedy of automatic reversal was necessary as a prophylactic means of deterring grand jury discrimination in the future, id., at 262, and that one could presume that a discriminatorily selected grand jury would treat defendants of excluded races unfairly. Id., at 263-264. </s> We think that these considerations have little force outside the context of racial discrimination in the composition of the grand jury. No long line of precedent requires the setting aside of a conviction based on a rule violation in the antecedent grand jury proceedings, and the societal interest in deterring this sort of error does not rise to the level of the interest in deterring racial discrimination. See, e. g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 -123 (1975); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10 -11 (1970); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). </s> [Footnote 2 The Government argues that it was improper to reverse the conspiracy convictions because "[a]n indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, like an information drawn by the prosecutor, if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits." Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956). We need not reach [475 U.S. 66, 73] this argument of the Government because of the narrower ground upon which we rest our decision. </s> CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring. </s> I concur in JUSTICE REHNQUIST's opinion for the Court. I write separately only to state my view that this case is controlled by Justice Black's opinion for the Court in Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956). </s> JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, concurring in the judgment. </s> I agree with the Court that the convictions obtained in the trial court against defendants Mechanik and Lill should not have been set aside. I write separately because I believe that the analysis adopted by the Court for determining the effect of a violation of the rules governing the conduct of grand juries effectively renders those rules a dead letter, thereby seriously undermining the grand jury's traditional function of protecting the innocent from unwarranted public accusation. </s> The grand jury has two principal functions. First, it bears the weighty responsibility of investigating crime and determining whether there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed. United States v. Calandra, [475 U.S. 66, 74] 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974). The second, and no less important, task of the grand jury is to "serv[e] the invaluable function in our society of standing between the accuser and the accused, whether the latter be an individual, minority group, or other, to determine whether a charge is founded upon reason or dictated by an intimidating power or by malice and personal ill will." Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962). To further the grand jury's investigative function, the grand jury traditionally has been given "wide latitude" in its inquiries. Calandra, supra, at 343. See also United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 -18 (1973). Prosecutors have been accorded similar leeway in presenting their cases to the grand jury, see, e. g., United States v. Adamo, 742 F.2d 927, 936-938 (CA6 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1193 (1985), but they are bound by a few, clear rules which were carefully drafted and approved by this Court and by Congress to ensure the integrity of the grand jury's functions. </s> Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(d) is one such rule; it is designed to guard the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings, prevent intimidation of jurors, and guarantee that the grand jury is given the opportunity to make an independent examination of the evidence and render its probable cause and charging determinations free of undue prosecutorial influence. See, e. g., United States v. Echols, 542 F.2d 948, 951 (CA5 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 904 (1977); United States v. Lill, 511 F. Supp. 50, 55-57 (SD W. Va. 1980); 1 C. Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure 105, p. 237, and n. 1 (2d ed. 1982). For example, if the Government, in violation of Rule 6(d), were to have all witnesses remain in the courtroom while the grand jury investigation was going on to ensure that all testified in a consistent manner, it cannot seriously be doubted that this practice would hinder the grand jury in its task of uncovering the truth. Similarly, if the prosecuting attorney were to remain in the jury room during the jury's deliberations in contravention of the Rule, a very real possibility would arise that the jury's deliberations [475 U.S. 66, 75] or vote would be unduly influenced by the prosecutor's presence. </s> The Federal Rules clearly envision that dismissal of the indictment may be an appropriate remedy for such violations of Rule 6(d). See, e. g., Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 12(b)(2). Indeed, courts have consistently employed the remedy of dismissal of the indictment for deviations from Rule 6(d) which may imperil the grand jury's independence. See, e. g., Lill, supra, at 58 (collecting federal cases). See also Nadel, Presence of Unauthorized Persons During State Grand Jury Proceedings as Affecting Indictment, 23 A. L. R. 4th 397 (1983) (hereinafter Nadel) (collecting state cases dealing with similar violations of state rules). To be sure, a violation must be clearly established before dismissal may be contemplated. The grand jury proceeding is accorded a presumption of regularity, which generally may be dispelled only upon particularized proof of irregularities in the grand jury process. See, e. g., United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 512 -513 (1943). And not every violation of Rule 6(d) will create such a likelihood of prejudice as to warrant the drastic remedy of dismissal. The Federal Rules dictate that dismissal is appropriate only when a violation has impaired the substantial rights of the accused. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 52. </s> Rule 52(a) provides that its harmless error inquiry extends to "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance." The Advisory Committee's notes to Rule 52 state that "[t]his rule is a restatement of existing law," which specifically provided for a harmless error analysis of objections going to the validity of the indictment in 18 U.S.C. 556 (1946 ed.). See 18 U.S.C. App., p. 657. The language of Rule 6 does not exempt the Rule from a harmless error scrutiny. In fact, the commentary accompanying it states that the Rule "generally continues existing law" and expressly refers to the harmless error rule of 18 U.S.C. 556 (1946 ed.), thereby confirming the rulemakers' intent that violations of Rule 6(d) would be among those errors subject to harmless error review. See [475 U.S. 66, 76] Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 6(d), 18 U.S.C. App., p. 568. </s> A Rule 6(d) violation is one affecting the grand jury proceeding and is not in any sense a trial error. Accordingly, the logical focus of the harmless error inquiry is an examination of the influence of the error on the charging decision. Indeed, in most Rule 6(d) cases, a court conducting a harmless error inquiry will of necessity focus on the effect of the alleged error on the grand jury's charging decision, rather than the verdict, because the rules governing the disclosure of grand jury materials to defendants and the waiver provision of Rule 12(f) virtually ensure that all claims of violations of Rule 6(d) will be made before or during trial. See, e. g., 18 U.S.C. 3500; Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 6(e)(3)(C)(i), (ii); Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 868 -875 (1966); 8 J. Moore, Federal Practice § 6.053. (2d ed. 1985) (discussing defendants' access to grand jury materials under the above cited authorities). See also Lill, supra, at 58, 61 (most reported Rule 6(d) claims raised and disposed of before trial). </s> In my view, when, as in these cases, a court decides to reserve the ruling on a timely raised and diligently pursued motion to dismiss based on an alleged violation of Rule 6(d) until after a verdict is returned, the focus of the court's inquiry should remain on the grand jury's charging decision. Yet the Court shifts the focus of the harmless error analysis in such circumstances from an examination of the violation's effect on the indictment to an assessment of the violation's effect on the trial verdict, without regard to the timing of the defendants' objection. See ante, at 70-71. The Court then concludes that a conviction automatically renders harmless any violation of Rule 6(d). This holding is not justified by the applicable rules, nor can it be reconciled with precedent. </s> A number of federal courts have employed a rule directly in conflict with that adopted by the Court: they presume the existence of prejudice from the presence of unauthorized persons [475 U.S. 66, 77] in the grand jury room and apply a rule of automatic dismissal of the tainted indictment. See, e. g., United States v. Fulmer, 722 F.2d 1192, 1195, n. 5 (CA5 1983); Echols, 542 F.2d, at 951; Latham v. United States, 226 F. 420 (CA5 1915); Lill, 511 F. Supp., at 58 (collecting lower federal cases). See also Nadel 4 (collecting state cases); 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure 15.6 (1984). Other courts have applied a harmless error test to Rule 6(d) violations, but have uniformly evaluated the prejudice to the defendant by looking to the violation's likely effect on the grand jury's deliberations, not merely to its significance in light of the trial verdict. See, e. g., United States v. Condo, 741 F.2d 238, 239 (CA9 1984) (per curiam), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1164 (1985); United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1185-1186 (CA4 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983); United States v. Kahan & Lessin Co., 695 F.2d 1122, 1124 (CA9 1982) (per curiam); United States v. Rath, 406 F.2d 757, (CA6), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 920 (1969). I have found no Rule 6(d) cases in which a per se rule based on the ultimate verdict at trial has been applied. Cf. also United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 447 -448 (1986) (disapproving use of per se rules in harmless error analysis). </s> The Court's focus on the effect of the verdict, in combination with its per se rule, gives judges and prosecutors a powerful incentive to delay consideration of motions to dismiss based on an alleged defect in the indictment until the jury has spoken. If the jury convicts, the motion is denied; if the jury acquits, the matter is mooted. The Court's approach thus undermines the authority of Rule 6(d), exposes to the ordeal of trial any defendants who would otherwise have a right to dismissal of the indictment, and undermines adherence to the very measures that this Court proposed and Congress implemented to guarantee that the grand jury is able to perform properly its screening function. [475 U.S. 66, 78] </s> In my view, when a defendant makes a timely objection to the grand jury indictment based on a violation of Rule 6(d), the remedy of dismissal of the indictment is appropriate if it is established that the violation substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict, or if there is grave doubt as to whether it had such effect. See Lane, supra, at 449; Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946). The focus of the prejudice inquiry should be on the effect of the alleged error on the grand jury's decision to indict even if the court postpones its decision until the conclusion of the trial. </s> This approach would not impose unwarranted costs on the criminal justice system. The prosecution has it within its power to avoid dismissals by adhering to the simple dictates of Rule 6(d), and to remedy any violation of the Rule by obtaining a superseding indictment so as to avoid the risks of subsequent dismissals. Even where an unremedied violation is proved, the trial judge must still be satisfied that the violation resulted in grand jury intimidation or improper influence on important witnesses' testimony and thus had a "substantial influence" on the indictment returned, or that there is grave doubt as to whether it had such effect. Kotteakos, supra, at 765. See also Lane, supra, at 449. </s> In these cases, the District Court found, after a scrupulous examination of the record, that the violation was harmless, a finding which was not found wanting on appeal. The District Court preliminarily observed: </s> "It is especially significant to note that the two indictments were returned by the same grand jury. The court's review of the attendance and voting records of that grand jury reveals that each of these indictments was returned by a unanimous vote. A nucleus of the same seventeen grand jurors voted for each indictment. In addition, one other grand juror voted for the first indictment but did not vote on the second, while two others voted for the second indictment but did not vote on the first." 511 F. Supp., at 58-59. [475 U.S. 66, 79] </s> Both agents had testified separately before the same grand jury in support of the first, untainted indictment, giving the jury ample opportunity to weigh the credibility of each agent prior to their joint appearance. Moreover, both agents had access to all grand jury materials in the case pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii), and thus the likelihood that their joint testimony created a potential for collusion not already available is minute. </s> Turning to an examination of the indictment itself, the District Court found that the substantive counts of which the defendants were convicted were "identical or virtually so" to the counts returned in the superseded indictment and that those counts had "a probable cause basis entirely independent of the testimony presented to the grand jury after the return of the [superseded] first indictment." Id., at 59. It concluded that as to the substantive counts, "there was neither prejudice nor potential for prejudice." Ibid. Thus, the only count upon which the defendants could have been prejudiced by the objectionable joint testimony of the Drug Enforcement Administration agents was the conspiracy count. </s> Although the District Court conducted its post-trial harmless error review in part with an eye to the effect of the error on the verdicts, its findings also make clear that the effect of the joint testimony on the grand jury's decision to indict on the conspiracy count was negligible. The District Court carefully isolated the alternations and additions to that count which were the subject of the joint testimony. After examining the testimony given by other grand jury witnesses, the trial judge concluded that "the grand jury would, in my view, undoubtedly have returned the very same second indictment even had [the] Agents . . . testified separately." Id., at 61. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it set aside the defendants' conspiracy convictions and affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment regarding the defendants' cross-petitions. [475 U.S. 66, 80] </s> JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting. </s> The Court concedes that federal prosecutors violated Rule 6(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in presenting their case against defendants Mechanik and Lill to the grand jury. The Court holds, however, that because defendants were ultimately convicted of some of the counts against them, "any error in the grand jury proceeding connected with the charging decision was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Ante, at 70. Because I believe that the majority's rule misconceives the role both of the grand jury and of the harmless-error doctrine, I dissent. </s> I </s> The Court's decision today renders Rule 6(d) almost unenforceable. As the facts of this litigation demonstrate, Rule 6(d) violations are difficult for defendants to uncover. The grand jury conducts its investigation in secret, aided only by the prosecutors and witnesses. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974). Defendants are not entitled to grand jury transcripts before trial; due to the strictly enforced tradition of grand jury secrecy, defendants generally have access to no information whatsoever regarding the conduct of the grand jury proceedings. See M. Frankel & G. Naftalis, The Grand Jury 81-89 (1977). Requests by defendants pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(ii) for disclosure of grand jury materials, "upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury," are rarely granted; a defendant often can make the necessary showing only with the aid of the materials he seeks to discover. See 1 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure 108, pp. 263-265 (2d ed. 1982). Defendants' only access to grand jury materials is likely to be through the medium of the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. 3500, which requires the prosecutor, after direct examination of a Government witness, to produce the witness' prior statements. That disclosure, however, does not [475 U.S. 66, 81] take place until after trial has begun, and then only on a piecemeal and incomplete basis. </s> There is thus little likelihood that a defendant can raise a substantial claim under Rule 6(d) before his trial begins. After the start of trial, overwork and the press of events may prevent the district judge from disposing of a newly raised Rule 6(d) claim. The most attractive course for the district judge will be to defer a ruling until the close of trial, the course ultimately followed in this case. Indeed, the district judge may not have the opportunity to rule until that time. Under today's decision, however, deferring a meritorious Rule 6(d) claim until the close of trial disposes of it permanently. If the movant is acquitted, then his Rule 6(d) motion is moot; if the movant is convicted, under the majority's reasoning, then any error was harmless. The Court's decision thus offers busy district judges a new and unique way to reduce their workload; one need not believe in a judicial conspiracy against the assertion of Rule 6(d) rights to suspect that district judges, faced with Rule 6(d) motions necessarily raised in the middle of trial, will follow the Court's invitation. </s> Should a district judge decide a Rule 6(d) motion during trial, the majority's scheme insulates that ruling from appellate review. Appeal before judgment is unlikely; the Court has never allowed immediate appeal of an order issued after the start of a criminal trial. See Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 269 (1984). 1 And under the decision today, [475 U.S. 66, 82] such rulings cannot be appealed after judgment. Enforcement of Rule 6(d) is thus left to the unreviewable largesse of the district court. </s> II </s> A </s> We have no reason to believe that Congress intended Rule 6(d) to have so little practical meaning. The legislative history of Rule 6, indeed, belies that approach. In 1933, Congress was faced with "a conflict of legal decision as to the right, under existing law, to permit stenographers in grand jury rooms without invalidating the subsequent conviction of defendant." S. Rep. No. 64, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1933). It responded by adding a narrow clause to the harmless-error statute, Rev. Stat. 1025 (later codified as 18 U.S.C. 556 (1946 ed.)), providing that no indictment should be found insufficient, or conviction be reversed, because of the presence of stenographers in the grand jury room. But Congress nowhere expressed disagreement with the general proposition that the presence of an unauthorized person in the grand jury room invalidates a subsequent conviction. E. g., United States v. Fall, 56 App. D.C. 83, 84, 10 F.2d 648, 649 (1925); Latham v. United States, 226 F. 420, 424 (CA5 1915). </s> More recently, Congress amended Rule 6 in 1972 to incorporate by reference the provisions of the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968; it provided that a defendant may move to dismiss the indictment based on the Government's failure to comply with that Act in the selection of the grand jury array or of individual grand jurors. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 6(b)(2). The advisory notes expressly state that the district judge may rule on such a challenge to the grand jury either before or after the verdict. Advisory Committee Notes on Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 6, 18 U.S.C. App., p. 568 (1972 amendment). There is no hint that Congress, in providing for a [475 U.S. 66, 83] ruling after the verdict, intended that ruling to be a mere intellectual exercise. </s> B </s> The majority's opinion misconceives the role of harmless-error analysis. We have recognized that harmless-error doctrine, denying any remedy in cases of clear prosecutorial misconduct, "can work very unfair and mischievous results." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967). Denying defendants relief for clear violations of their procedural rights reduces the law to "`pretend-rules,'" United States v. Borello, 766 F.2d 46, 58 (CA2 1985), quoting United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 661 (CA2) (Frank, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 742 (1946); it means that prosecutors are free to engage in prohibited conduct subject only to "purely ceremonial" words of appellate displeasure. 155 F.2d, at 661. </s> The Court's rule that all grand jury misconduct becomes harmless after conviction, however, is especially pernicious. Contrary to the majority's suggestion that reversal is too costly a remedy for grand jury misconduct, ante, at 72, it is the majority's refusal to reverse convictions for demonstrated grand jury misconduct that imposes unacceptable costs. There are few limitations on the conduct of the prosecutor before the grand jury. Those limitations are found only in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6, the text of which takes up little more than a page in the official compilation of United States laws. Violations of even those isolated restrictions, in by far the majority of cases, will go undetected by defendants. The only way to allow even minimally effective enforcement of those rules is to reverse the convictions of defendants whose indictments were tainted by Rule 6 violations. </s> Such an approach would not hamper the enforcement of the criminal law. Violations of Rule 6(d) will be nonexistent if the prosecutor exercises proper control over access to the grand jury chambers. The substantive law is not onerous or [475 U.S. 66, 84] ambiguous, and most violations are the product of the prosecutor's failure to adopt safeguards to ensure compliance. See 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure 15.6, p. 333 (1984). There is no danger of a prosecutor slipping into an inadvertent Rule 6(d) violation comparable to that, say, of making an ill-worded remark in the heat of trial. Courts would not often have cause to reverse convictions because of Rule 6(d) violations. </s> The majority's goal of upholding criminal convictions not marred by substantial defect does not justify reducing Congress' command regarding the proper conduct of grand jury proceedings to a mere form of words, without practical effect. Respect for the rule of law demands that improperly procured indictments be quashed even after conviction, because "only by upsetting convictions so obtained can the ardor of prosecuting officials be kept within legal bounds and justice be secured; for in modern times all prosecution is in the hands of officials." United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567, 574 (CA2 1953) (L. Hand, J., dissenting). 2 </s> [475 U.S. 66, 85] </s> III </s> The opinion concurring in the judgment suggests that the Rule 6(d) violation in this litigation should be viewed as harmless on the theory that the grand jury would have returned the same indictment regardless of the prosecutor's misconduct. Under that approach, a district court faced with a Rule 6(d) violation should examine the grand jury transcripts in an attempt to divine the effect of the violation on the jury's charging decision, and allow the indictment or conviction to stand only if it finds that there was no such effect. Such a rule would be contrary to the traditional black-letter law that "[a]ny violation of Rule 6(d) is per se prejudicial to the defendant and will result in dismissal of the indictment," 8 J. Moore, Federal Practice § 6.047., p. 6-91 (2d ed. 1985). 3 I believe that such an approach would be unworkable and would undermine the limits Congress imposed on the conduct of grand jury investigations. </s> Many of the reasons given above for rejecting the majority's view that grand jury impropriety is always harmless [475 U.S. 66, 86] once a verdict is reached, apply in this context as well. Given defendants' difficulty in discovering Rule 6(d) violations, it is all the more important that dismissal of the indictment be certain when violations of the Rule are found. Only such a sanction can come close to providing prosecutors with an incentive to obey the Rule's commands. See United States v. Pignatiello, 582 F. Supp. 251, 255 (Colo. 1984). </s> Such harmless-error analysis, moreover, overlooks the practical impossibility of determining the effect of a Rule 6(d) violation. The prejudicial impact of the unauthorized presence of persons in the grand jury room will often be impossible to quantify, and may not be apparent from the grand jury transcript. As one court wrote: </s> "A change in expression, a pressure on the hand or a warning glance would not be shown upon the minutes but might well influence, suppress or alter testimony to the prejudice of the defendant. There may have been prior expressions or conversations between the two witnesses which the one then giving testimony might well hesitate to repudiate or modify in the presence of the other. The District Attorney here contends . . . that defendant suffered no prejudice by the joint presence of the two sisters, but . . . `[t]he court cannot know that this suggestion represents the fact.' We think the practice offers too great a possibility for the exercise of undue influence to be condoned." State v. Revere, 232 La. 184, 207, 94 So.2d 25, 34 (1957) (emphasis omitted; citations omitted; internal quotations omitted). </s> Any case-by-case analysis to determine whether the defendant was actually prejudiced is simply too speculative to afford defendants meaningful protection, and imposes a difficult burden on the courts that outweighs the benefits to be derived. The distinction between the truly harmless error and the more dangerous one is not "such a pronounced one that the Court can cloak the one with the mantle of legality and [475 U.S. 66, 87] yet recognize the dangers of the other and prohibit it." United States v. Carper, 116 F. Supp. 817, 821 (DC 1953). </s> That approach, finally, is likely to require a detailed inquiry that will frustrate and undermine the secrecy of grand jury inquiry. See United States v. Treadway, 445 F. Supp. 959 (ND Tex. 1978). The district court may have to discuss the testimony of grand jury witnesses who did not appear at trial. The goals of grand jury secrecy, however, counsel that such analysis should not be spread across the public record. See United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 424 -425 (1983). 4 </s> IV </s> This litigation illustrates the extent to which the Court is willing to reduce the substantive law to "pretend-rules," Borello, 766 F.2d, at 58, in order to affirm a criminal conviction. But by denigrating Congress' commands and eviscerating enforcement of Rule 6(d), the Court creates "a greater danger to a free people than the escape of some criminals from punishment." United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948). I believe that the District Court in this case [475 U.S. 66, 88] should have reversed defendants' conspiracy convictions without inquiry into the prejudice done to defendants by the Rule 6(d) violation. I therefore would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. </s> [Footnote 1 Denial of a Rule 6(d) motion could conceivably be subject to interlocutory appeal under the collateral-order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). Such an order may be both collateral to the main action and, as a result of today's opinion, wholly unreviewable after final judgment. Cf. United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 267 (1982) (claim that indictment should be dismissed on grounds of prosecutorial vindictiveness not subject to interlocutory appeal because reviewable after conviction); United States v. Garner, 632 F.2d 758 (CA9 1980) (claim that indictment should be dismissed on grounds of grand jury irregularities not subject to interlocutory appeal [475 U.S. 66, 82] because reviewable after conviction); United States v. Bird, 709 F.2d 388, 391, and n. 17 (CA5 1983) (collecting cases). </s> [Footnote 2 Our case law, further, is inconsistent with the majority's broad holding that any error in the grand jury proceedings, no matter how egregious, is rendered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt by a petit jury's subsequent guilty verdict. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986), involving the "grave constitutional trespass" of racial discrimination, id., at 262, belies that holding. The Court's assessment of the nature of the grand jury process refutes the rationale articulated by the majority today: </s> "Nor are we persuaded that discrimination in the grand jury has no effect on the fairness of the criminal trials that result from that grand jury's actions. The grand jury does not determine only that probable cause exists to believe that a defendant committed a crime, or that it does not. In the hands of the grand jury lies the power to charge a greater offense or a lesser offense; numerous counts or a single count; and perhaps most significant of all, a capital offense or a noncapital offense - all on the basis of the same facts. Moreover, `[t]he grand jury is not bound to indict in every case where a conviction can be obtained.' United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 629 (CA2 1979) (Friendly, J., dissenting). Thus, even if a grand jury's determination of probable cause is confirmed in hindsight by a conviction on the indicted offense, that confirmation in no way suggests [475 U.S. 66, 85] that the discrimination did not impermissibly infect the framing of the indictment and, consequently, the nature or very existence of the proceedings to come." Vasquez v. Hillery, supra, at 263 (emphasis added). </s> [Footnote 3 See also 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure 15.6, p. 332 (1984) ("Most federal courts . . . treat unauthorized presence as a per se ground for dismissal, requiring no showing of prejudice"). Cases cited by the Solicitor General as requiring harmless-error analysis are distinguishable. Those cases involved only brief, inadvertent interruptions of the grand jury, during which the grand jury proceedings came to an immediate halt, United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1185-1186 (CA4 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983); United States v. Kahan & Lessin Co., 695 F.2d 1122, 1124 (CA9 1982); United States v. Rath, 406 F.2d 757 (CA6), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 920 (1969), or a "fleeting" appearance in the grand jury room by a person assisting in the movement of bulky documents, United States v. Condo, 741 F.2d 238, 239 (CA9 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1164 (1985). Indeed, the Fourth Circuit panel, whose reasoning was adopted by the en banc court, saw no inconsistency between Computer Sciences, supra, and the per se rule of the instant case. 735 F.2d 136, 139-140 (1984). </s> [Footnote 4 JUSTICE O'CONNOR suggests, noting the reference to 18 U.S.C. 556 (1946 ed.) in the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 6, that the rulemakers intended violations of Rule 6(d) to be subject to the harmless-error rule. Ante, at 75-76. The legislative history of former 556 does not support that view. The section, as first enacted in 1872, provided that "[n]o indictment . . . shall be deemed insufficient, nor shall the trial, judgment, or other proceeding thereon be affected by reason of any defect or imperfection in matter of form only, which shall not tend to the prejudice of the defendant." Rev. Stat. 1025 (emphasis added). There is no indication that this law was meant to disturb the settled law regarding unauthorized persons in the grand jury room, see United States v. Edgerton, 80 F. 374 (Mont. 1897); rather, it seems likely that the statute was directed at technical defects in the wording of the indictment, see, e. g., People v. St. Clair, 56 Cal. 406 (1880) (reversing conviction because word "larceny" in indictment was misspelled); People v. Vice, 21 Cal. 344 (1864) (reversing conviction because indictment, while alleging that defendant took certain property by threats and force, failed to allege that the property did not belong to defendant). See also supra, at 82. </s> [475 U.S. 66, 89]

United States Supreme Court LYNAUGH v. PETTY(1987) No. 85-1656 Argued: March 3, 1987Decided: March 25, 1987 </s> Certiorari dismissed. Reported below: 779 F.2d 299. </s> Charles A. Palmer, Assistant Attorney General of Texas, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Jim Mattox, Attorney General, Mary F. Keller, Executive Assistant Attorney General, and F. Scott McCown and William C. Zapalac, Assistant Attorneys General. </s> John R. Breihan by appointment of the Court, 479 U.S. 808 , argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. * </s> PER CURIAM. </s> The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted. </s> [Footnote * Larry W. Yackle and George Kannar filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. </s> [480 U.S. 699, 700]

United States Supreme Court DOUGLAS v. SEACOAST PRODUCTS, INC.(1977) No. 75-1255 Argued: January 17, 1977Decided: May 23, 1977 </s> The federal enrollment and licensing laws, under which vessels engaged in domestic or coastwise trade or used for fishing are "enrolled" for the purpose of evidencing their national character and to enable them to obtain licenses regulating the use to which the vessels may be put held to pre-empt Virginia statutes that in effect prohibit nonresidents of Virginia from catching menhaden in the Virginia portion of Chesapeake Bay and that bar noncitizens (regardless of where they reside) from obtaining commercial fishing licenses for any kind of fish from Virginia. Hence, under the Supremacy Clause, the Virginia laws cannot prevent appellees, whose fishing vessels, though foreign owned, have been federally licensed, from fishing for menhaden in Virginia's waters. Pp. 271-287. </s> (a) Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat, 1 (1824), decided three decades after the federal enrollment and licensing laws were enacted (and which have been re-enacted without substantial change), established the invalidity of discriminatory state regulation of shipping as applied to vessels federally licensed to engage in the coasting trade, though subsequent decisions have permitted States to impose upon federal licensees reasonable nondiscriminatory conservation and environmental protection measures otherwise within the state police power. Pp. 274-279. </s> (b) The license does not merely establish the nationality of the vessel (which is performed by the enrollment) but "implies, unequivocally, an authority to licensed vessels to carry on" the activity for which they are licensed. Gibbons, supra, at 212. Pp. 280-282. </s> (c) The Virginia statutes, by prohibiting federally licensed vessels owned by nonresidents of Virginia from fishing in Chesapeake Bay and by not allowing such ships owned by noncitizens to catch fish anywhere in the Commonwealth, deny licensees their federally granted right to engage in fishing activities on the same terms as state residents. P. 283. [431 U.S. 265, 266] </s> (d) The broad language of the Submerged Lands Act did not impliedly repeal the federal licensing laws. Pp. 283-284. </s> 432 F. Supp. 1, affirmed. </s> MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, STEWART, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, and in all but Parts II-D and III of which POWELL and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment and concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which POWELL, J., joined, post, p. 287. </s> James E. Moore, Assistant Attorney General of Virginia, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Andrew P. Miller, Attorney General, and Anthony F. Troy and James E. Kulp, Deputy Attorneys General. </s> John J. Loflin, Jr., argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Thomas H. Willcox, Jr., James C. Howell, and Franklin G. Hunt. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Joseph E. Brennan, Attorney General of Maine, Edward F. Bradley, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, David H. Souter, Attorney General of New Hampshire, Donald W. Stever, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, and Julius C. Michaelson, Attorney General of Rhode Island, for the States of Maine, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island; by Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General, and Terence P. O'Malley and Howard Whitehead, Assistant Attorneys General, for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; by Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General, Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General, and Philip Weinberg and John G. Proudfit, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of New York; and by Ammon G. Dunton, Jr., and Philip B. Kurland for the Virginia Seafood Council et al. Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Taft, Deputy Solicitor General Randolph, Bruce C. Rashkow, and Ralph J. Gillis filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Richard R. Wier, Jr., Attorney General, and June D. MacArtor and Harrison F. Turner, Deputy Attorneys General, for the State of Delaware; and by Francis B. Burch, Attorney General, Henry R. Lord, Deputy Attorney General, and Warren K. Rich, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Maryland. [431 U.S. 265, 267] </s> MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The issue in this case is the validity of two Virginia statutes that limit the right of nonresidents and aliens to catch fish in the territorial waters of the Commonwealth. </s> I </s> Persons or corporations wishing to fish commercially in Virginia must obtain licenses. Section 28.1-81.1 of the Virginia Code ( 81.1) (Supp. 1976), 1 enacted in 1975, limits the [431 U.S. 265, 268] issuance of commercial fishing licenses to United States citizens. Under this law, participants in any licensed partnership, firm, or association must be citizens. A fishing business organized in corporate form may be licensed only if it is chartered in this country; American citizens own and control at least 75% of its stock; and its president, board chairman, and controlling board majority are citizens. </s> Section 28.1-60 of the Virginia Code ( 60) (Supp. 1976) 2 </s> [431 U.S. 265, 269] governs licensing of nonresidents of Virginia to fish for menhaden, an inedible but commercially valuable species of fin fish. 3 Section 60 allows nonresidents who meet the citizenship requirements of 81.1 to obtain licenses to fish for menhaden in the three-mile-wide belt of Virginia's territorial sea off the Commonwealth's eastern coastline. At the same time, however, 60 prohibits nonresidents from catching menhaden in the Virginia portion of Chesapeake Bay. </s> Appellee Seacoast Products, Inc., is one of three companies that dominate the menhaden industry. The other two firms, unlike Seacoast, have fish-processing plants in Virginia and are owned by American citizens. Hence, they are not affected by either of the restrictions challenged in this case. Seacoast was founded in New Jersey in 1911 and maintains its principal offices in that State; it is incorporated in Delaware and qualified to do business in Virginia. The other appellees are subsidiaries of Seacoast; they are incorporated and maintain plants and offices in States other than Virginia. In 1973, [431 U.S. 265, 270] the family of Seacoast's founder sold the business to Hanson Trust, Ltd., a United Kingdom company almost entirely owned by alien stockholders. Seacoast continued its operations unchanged after the sale. All of its officers, directors, boat captains, and crews are American citizens, as are over 95% of its plant employees. </s> At the time of its sale, Seacoast's fishing vessels were enrolled and licensed American-flag ships. See infra, at 272-274. Under 46 U.S.C. 808, 835, the transfer of these vessels to a foreign-controlled corporation required the approval of the Department of Commerce. This was granted unconditionally over the opposition of Seacoast's competitors after a full public hearing that considered the effect of the transfer on fish conservation and management, on American workers and consumers, and on competition and other social and economic concerns. See 38 Fed. Reg. 29239-29240 (1973); 39 Fed. Reg. 7819, 33812-33813 (1974); App. 29-32. Following this approval, appellees' fishing vessels were re-enrolled and relicensed pursuant to 46 U.S.C. 251-252, 263. They remain subject to all United States laws governing maritime commerce. </s> In past decades, although not recently, Seacoast had operated processing plants in Virginia and was thereby entitled to fish in Chesapeake Bay as a resident. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28-29, 34. More recently, Seacoast obtained nonresident menhaden licenses as restricted by 60 to waters outside Chesapeake Bay. In 1975, however, 81.1 was passed by the Virginia Legislature, c. 338, 1975 Va. Acts, and appellant James E. Douglas, Jr., the Commissioner of Marine Resources for Virginia, denied appellees' license applications on the basis of the new law. Seacoast and its subsidiaries were thereby completely excluded from the Virginia menhaden fishery. </s> Appellees accordingly filed a complaint in the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, seeking to have 60 and 81.1 declared unconstitutional and their enforcement enjoined. A three-judge court was convened and it [431 U.S. 265, 271] struck down both statutes. It held that the citizenship requirement of 81.1 was pre-empted by the Bartlett Act, 16 U.S.C. 1081 et seq., and that the residency restriction of 60 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We noted probable jurisdiction of the Commissioner's appeal, 425 U.S. 949 (1976), and we affirm. 4 </s> II </s> Seacoast advances a number of theories to support affirmance of the judgment below. See Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 387 n. 13 (1975); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 475 n. 6 (1970). Among these is the claim that the Virginia statutes are pre-empted by federal enrollment and licensing laws for fishing vessels. 5 The United States has filed a brief as amicus curiae supporting this contention. Although [431 U.S. 265, 272] the claim is basically constitutional in nature, deriving its force from the operation of the Supremacy Clause, Art. VI, cl. 2, it is treated as "statutory" for purposes of our practice of deciding statutory claims first to avoid unnecessary constitutional adjudications. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 549 (1974). 6 Since we decide the case on this ground, we do not reach the constitutional issues raised by the parties. </s> The well-known principles of pre-emption have been rehearsed only recently in our decisions. See, e. g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 -526 (1977); De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). No purpose would be served by repeating them here. It is enough to note that we deal in this case with federal legislation arguably superseding state law in a "field which . . . has been traditionally occupied by the States." Jones v. Rath Packing Co., supra, at 525. Pre-emption accordingly will be found only if "`that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)." Ibid. We turn our focus, then, to the congressional intent embodied in the enrollment and licensing laws. </s> A </s> The basic form for the comprehensive federal regulation of trading and fishing vessels was established in the earliest days of the Nation and has changed little since. Ships engaged in trade with foreign lands are "registered," a documentation procedure set up by the Second Congress in the Act of Dec. 31, 1792, 1 Stat. 287. 7 and now codified in 46 U.S.C., c. 2. "The purpose of a register is to declare the nationality of a [431 U.S. 265, 273] vessel . . . and to enable her to assert that nationality wherever found." The Mohawk, 3 Wall. 566, 571 (1866); Anderson v. Pacific Coast S. S. Co., 225 U.S. 187, 199 (1912). Vessels engaged in domestic or coastwise trade or used for fishing are "enrolled" under procedures established by the Enrollment and Licensing Act of Feb. 18, 1793, 1 Stat. 305, codified in 46 U.S.C., c. 12. "The purpose of an enrollment is to evidence the national character of a vessel . . . and to enable such vessel to procure a . . . license." The Mohawk, supra; Anderson v. Pacific Coast S. S. Co., supra. </s> A "license," in turn, regulates the use to which a vessel may be put and is intended to prevent fraud on the revenue of the United States. See 46 U.S.C. 262, 263, 319, 325; 46 CFR 67.01-13 (1976). The form of a license is statutorily mandated: "license is hereby granted for the . . . [vessel] to be employed in carrying on the (. . . `coasting trade,' `whale fishery,' `mackerel fishery,' or `cod fishery,' 8 as the case may be), for one year from the date hereof, and no longer." 46 U.S.C. 263. The law also provides that properly enrolled and licensed vessels 9 "and no others, shall be deemed vessels of the United States entitled to the privileges of vessels employed in the coasting trade or fisheries." 251. Appellees' vessels were granted licenses for the "mackerel [431 U.S. 265, 274] fishery" 10 after their transfer was approved by the Department of Commerce. </s> The requirements for enrollment and registration are the same. 46 U.S.C. 252; The Mohawk, supra, at 571-572. Insofar as pertinent here, enrolled and registered vessels must meet identification, measurement, and safety standards, generally must be built in the United States, and must be owned by citizens. An exception to the latter rule permits a corporation having alien stockholders to register or enroll ships if it is organized and chartered under the laws of the United States or of any State, if its president or chief executive officer and the chairman of its board of directors are American citizens, and if no more of its directors than a minority of the number necessary to constitute a quorum are noncitizens. 46 U.S.C. 11; 46 CFR 67.03-5 (a) (1976). The Shipping Act, 1916, further limits foreign ownership of American vessels by requiring the Secretary of Commerce to approve any transfer of an American-owned vessel to noncitizens. 46 U.S.C. 808. 11 </s> B </s> Deciphering the intent of Congress is often a difficult task, and to do so with a law the vintage of the Enrollment and Licensing Act verges on the impossible. There is virtually no surviving legislative history for the Act. 12 What we do have, [431 U.S. 265, 275] however, is the historic decision of Mr. Chief Justice John Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824), rendered only three decades after passage of the Act. Gibbons invalidated a discriminatory state regulation of shipping as applied to vessels federally licensed to engage in the coasting trade. Although its historic importance lies in its general discussion of the commerce power, Gibbons also provides substantial illumination on the narrower question of the intended meaning of the Licensing Act. </s> The case challenged a New York law intended to encourage development of steamboats by granting Robert Fulton and Robert Livingston the exclusive right to operate steam-powered vessels in all of the State's territorial waters. The right to navigate steamboats between Elizabethtown Point, N. J., and New York City was, by assignment from Fulton and Livingston, granted to Aaron Ogden. Thomas Gibbons began operating two passenger ferries in violation of Ogden's submonopoly. Gibbons' steamboats had been enrolled and granted "license . . . to be employed in carrying on the coasting trade" under the Enrollment and Licensing Act. Id., at 203. </s> Ogden nevertheless obtained an injunction from the New York courts enforcing the monopoly by restraining Gibbons from running his ferries in New York waters. Chancellor James Kent rejected Gibbons' pre-emption claim based upon his federal licenses. Kent found that the sole purpose of the license was to "giv[e] to the vessel an American character," i. e., to establish its nationality as an American-flag ship. This would have reduced various duties and taxes assessed under federal law, but in Kent's view, it did not oust the power of the State to regulate the use of chattels within its borders. 4 Johns. Ch. 150, 156-159 (1819). The highest state court affirmed, ruling that "the only effect" of the license was "to determine [the vessel's] national character, and the rate of duties which she is to pay." 17 Johns. 488, 509 (1820). [431 U.S. 265, 276] </s> On appeal to this Court, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall held that the rights granted to Gibbons by federal law superseded the conflicting state-created rights asserted by Ogden. Marshall first considered the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. He concluded that "[c]ommerce among the States, cannot stop at the external boundary line of each State, but may be introduced into the interior," 9 Wheat., at 194, and that "[t]he power of Congress . . ., whatever it may be, must be exercised within the territorial jurisdiction of the several States." Id., at 196. The Court next defined the nature of the commerce power: "the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed." Ibid. Ogden's claim that the States may exercise concurrent power over commerce, or even exercise their police powers, where that exercise conflicts with express federal law was rejected. Id., at 200-210. </s> The Court then turned to the question whether "the laws of New-York" did "come into collision with an act of Congress" so that "the acts of New-York must yield to the law of Congress." Id., at 210. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall found the conflict unquestionable: "To the Court it seems very clear, that the whole act on the subject of the coasting trade, according to those principles which govern the construction of statutes, implies, unequivocally, an authority to licensed vessels to carry on the coasting trade." Id., at 212. The license granted to Gibbons under the Act "must be understood to be what it purports to be, a legislative authority to [Gibbons'] steamboat . . . `to be employed in carrying on the coasting trade, for one year from this date.'" Id., at 214. The Court rejected Ogden's argument - and the holding of the New York courts - that the license "gives no right to trade; and that its sole purpose is to confer the American character." Ibid. Finally, the Court decided that the statutory phrase "coasting trade" encompassed the carriage of passengers for hire as well as the transport of goods. Id., at 215-219. [431 U.S. 265, 277] </s> Although Gibbons is written in broad language which might suggest that the sweep of the Enrollment and Licensing Act ousts all state regulatory power over federally licensed vessels, neither the facts before the Court nor later interpretations extended that far. Gibbons did not involve an absolute ban on steamboats in New York waters. Rather, the monopoly law allowed some steam vessels to ply their trade while excluding others that were federally licensed. The case struck down this discriminatory treatment. Subsequent decisions spelled out the negative implication of Gibbons: that States may impose upon federal licensees reasonable, nondiscriminatory conservation and environmental protection measures otherwise within their police power. </s> For example, in Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71 (1855), the Court upheld a conservation law which limited the fishing implements that could be used by a federally licensed vessel to take oysters from state waters. The Court held that an "enrolment and license confer no immunity from the operation of valid laws of a State," id., at 74, and that the law was valid because the State "may forbid all such acts as would render the public right [of fishery] less valuable, or destroy it altogether." id., at 75. At the same time, the Court explicitly reserved the question of the validity of a statute discriminating against nonresidents. Ibid. To the same effect is the holding in Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891). There, state law prohibited the use by any person of certain types of fishing tackle in specified areas. Though Manchester was a Rhode Island resident basing a claim on his federal fisheries license, the Court held that the statute </s> "was evidently passed for the preservation of the fish, and makes no discrimination in favor of citizens of Massachusetts and against citizens of other States. . . . [T]he statute may well be considered as an impartial and reasonable regulation . . . and the subject is one which a State may well be permitted to regulate within its [431 U.S. 265, 278] territory, in the absence of any regulation by the United States. The preservation of fish . . . is for the common benefit; and we are of opinion that the statute is not repugnant to the Constitution and the laws of the United States." Id., at 265. </s> More recently, the same principle was applied in Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960), where we held that the city's Smoke Abatement Code was properly applicable to licensed vessels. Relying on earlier cases, we noted that "[t]he mere possession of a federal license . . . does not immunize a ship from the operation of the normal incidents of local police power." Id., at 447. As an "[e]venhanded local regulation to effectuate a legitimate local public interest," id., at 443, the ordinance was valid. </s> Although it is true that the Court's view in Gibbons of the intent of the Second Congress in passing the Enrollment and Licensing Act is considered incorrect by commentators, 13 its [431 U.S. 265, 279] provisions have been repeatedly re-enacted in substantially the same form. 14 We can safely assume that Congress was aware of the holding, as well as the criticism, 15 of a case so renowned as Gibbons. We have no doubt that Congress has ratified the statutory interpretation of Gibbons and its progeny. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n. 8 (1975); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 339 (1969); Francis v. Southern Pacific Co., 333 U.S. 445, 449 -450 (1948). We consider, then, its impact on the Virginia statutes challenged in this case. [431 U.S. 265, 280] </s> C </s> The federal licenses granted to Seacoast are, as noted above, identical in pertinent part to Gibbons' licenses except that they cover the "mackerel fishery" rather than the "coasting trade." Appellant contends that because of the difference this case is distinguishable from Gibbons. He argues that Gibbons upheld only the right of the federal licensee, as an American-flag vessel, to navigate freely in state territorial waters. He urges that Congress could not have intended to grant an additional right to take fish from the waters of an unconsenting State. Appellant points out that the challenged statutes in no way interfere with the navigation of Seacoast's fishing boats. They are free to cross the State's waters in search of fish in jurisdictions where they may lawfully catch them, and they may transport fish through the State's waters with equal impunity. </s> Appellant's reading of Gibbons is too narrow. Gibbons emphatically rejects the argument that the license merely establishes the nationality of the vessel. That function is performed by the enrollment. 9 Wheat., at 214. Rather, the license "implies, unequivocally, an authority to licensed vessels to carry on" the activity for which they are licensed. Id., at 212. In Gibbons, the "authority . . . to carry on" the licensed activity included not only the right to navigate in, or to travel across, state waters, but also the right to land passengers in New York and thereby provide an economically valuable service. The right to perform that additional act of landing cargo in the State - which gave the license its real value - was part of the grant of the right to engage in the "coasting trade." See Harman v. Chicago, 147 U.S. 396, 405 (1893). </s> The same analysis applies to a license to engage in the mackerel fishery. Concededly, it implies a grant of the right to navigate in state waters. But, like the trading license, it must give something more. It must grant "authority [431 U.S. 265, 281] . . . to carry on" the "mackerel fishery." And just as Gibbons and its progeny found a grant of the right to trade in a State without discrimination, we conclude that appellees have been granted the right to fish in Virginia waters on the same terms as Virginia residents. </s> Moreover, 46 U.S.C. 251 states that properly documented vessels "and no others" are "entitled to the privileges of vessels employed in the coasting trade or fisheries." Referring to this section, Gibbons held: "[T]hese privileges . . . cannot be enjoyed, unless the trade may be prosecuted. The grant of the privilege . . . convey[s] the right [to carry on the licensed activity] to which the privilege is attached." 9 Wheat., at 213. Thus, under 251 federal licensees are "entitled" to the same "privileges" of fishery access as a State affords to its residents or citizens. </s> Finally, our interpretation of the license is reaffirmed by the specific discussion in Gibbons of the section granting the license, now 46 U.S.C. 263. The Court pointed out that "a license to do any particular thing, is a permission or authority to do that thing; and if granted by a person having power to grant it, transfers to the grantee the right to do whatever it purports to authorize. It certainly transfers to him all the right which the grantor can transfer, to do what is within the terms of the license." 9 Wheat., at 213-214. Gibbons recognized that the "grantor" was Congress. Id., at 213. Thus Gibbons expressly holds that the words used by Congress in the vessel license transfer to the licensee "all the right" which Congress has the power to convey. While appellant may be correct in arguing that at earlier times in our history there was some doubt whether Congress had power under the Commerce Clause to regulate the taking of fish in state waters, 16 there can be no question today that such power [431 U.S. 265, 282] exists where there is some effect on interstate commerce. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). The movement of vessels from one State to another in search of fish, and back again to processing plants, is certainly activity which Congress could conclude affects interstate commerce. Cf. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 403 -406 (1948). 17 Accordingly, we hold that, at the least, when Congress re-enacted the license form in 1936, 18 using language which, according to Gibbons, gave licensees "all the right which the grantor can transfer," it necessarily extended the license to cover the taking of fish in state waters, subject to valid state conservation regulations. 19 </s> [431 U.S. 265, 283] </s> D </s> Application of the foregoing principles to the present case is straightforward. Section 60 prohibits federally licensed vessels owned by nonresidents of Virginia from fishing in the Chesapeake Bay. Licensed ships owned by noncitizens are prevented by 81.1 from catching fish anywhere in the Commonwealth. On the other hand, Virginia residents are permitted to fish commercially for menhaden subject only to seasonal and other conservation restrictions not at issue here. The challenged statutes thus deny appellees their federally granted right to engage in fishing activities on the same terms as Virginia residents. They violate the "indisputable" precept that "no State may completely exclude federally licensed commerce." Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963). They must fall under the Supremacy Clause. </s> Appellant seeks to escape this conclusion by arguing that the Submerged Lands Act, 67 Stat. 29, 43 U.S.C. 1301-1315, and a number of this Court's decisions 20 recognize that the States have a title or ownership interest in the fish swimming in their territorial waters. It is argued that because the States "own" the fish, they can exclude federal licensees. The contention is of no avail. </s> The Submerged Lands Act does give the States "title," "ownership," and "the right and power to manage, administer, lease, develop, and use" the lands beneath the oceans and [431 U.S. 265, 284] natural resources in the waters within state territorial jurisdiction. 43 U.S.C. 1311 (a). But when Congress made this grant pursuant to the Property Clause of the Constitution, see Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954), it expressly retained for the United States "all constitutional powers of regulation and control" over these lands and waters "for purposes of commerce, navigation, national defense, and international affairs." United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 10 (1960); see 43 U.S.C. 1314 (a). Since the grant of the fisheries license is made pursuant to the commerce power, see supra, at 281-282; Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U.S. 365, 377 (1883), the Submerged Lands Act did not alter its pre-emptive effect. Certainly Congress did not repeal by implication, in the broad language of the Submerged Lands Act, the Licensing Act requirement of equal treatment for federal licensees. </s> In any event, "[t]o put the claim of the State upon title is," in Mr. Justice Holmes' words, "to lean upon a slender reed." Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920). A State does not stand in the same position as the owner of a private game preserve and it is pure fantasy to talk of "owning" wild fish, birds, or animals. Neither the States nor the Federal Government, any more than a hopeful fisherman or hunter, has title to these creatures until they are reduced to possession by skillful capture. Ibid.; Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 539 -540 (1896) (Field, J., dissenting). The "ownership" language of cases such as those cited by appellant must be understood as no more than a 19th-century legal fiction expressing "the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource." Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S., at 402 ; see also Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 420 -421 (1948). Under modern analysis, the question is simply whether the State has exercised its police power in [431 U.S. 265, 285] conformity with the federal laws and Constitution. As we have demonstrated above, Virginia has failed to do so here. 21 </s> III </s> Our decision is very much in keeping with sound policy considerations of federalism. The business of commercial fishing must be conducted by peripatetic entrepreneurs moving, like their quarry, without regard for state boundary lines. Menhaden that spawn in the open ocean or in coastal waters of a Southern State may swim into Chesapeake Bay and live there for their first summer, migrate south for the following winter, and appear off the shores of New York or Massachusetts in succeeding years. A number of coastal States have discriminatory fisheries laws, 22 and with all natural resources [431 U.S. 265, 286] becoming increasingly scarce and more valuable, more such restrictions would be a likely prospect, as both protective and retaliatory measures. 23 Each State's fishermen eventually might be effectively limited to working in the territorial waters of their residence, or in the federally controlled fishery beyond the three-mile limit. 24 Such proliferation of residency requirements for commercial fishermen would create precisely the sort of Balkanization of interstate commercial activity that the Constitution was intended to prevent. See, e. g., H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 532 -539 (1949); cf. Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20 (1974). We cannot find that Congress intended to allow any such result given the well-known construction of federal vessel licenses in Gibbons. </s> For these reasons, we conclude that 60 and 81.1 are preempted by the federal Enrollment and Licensing Act. Insofar as these state laws subject federally licensed vessels owned by nonresidents or aliens to restrictions different from those applicable to Virginia residents and American citizens, they [431 U.S. 265, 287] must fall under the Supremacy Clause. As we have noted above, however, reasonable and evenhanded conservation measures, so essential to the preservation of our vital marine sources of food supply, stand unaffected by our decision. </s> The judgment of the District Court is </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Section 28.1-81.1 provides: "Licenses for taking of fish restricted to United States citizens. - (a) No commercial license for the taking of food fish or fish for the manufacture into fish meal, fish oil, fish scrap or other purpose shall be granted to any person not a citizen of the United States, nor to any firm, partnership, or association unless each participant therein shall be a citizen of the United States, nor to any corporation unless the same be a citizen of the United States as hereinafter defined. This requirement shall be in addition to, and not in lieu of, any other requisite to the issuance of a license imposed by this chapter or any other provision of the Code of Virginia as amended from time to time. "(b) Within the meaning of this section, no corporation shall be deemed a citizen of the United States unless seventy-five per centum of the interest therein shall be owned by citizens of the United States and unless its president or other chief executive officer and the chairman of its board of directors are citizens of the United States and unless no more of its directors than a minority of the number necessary to constitute a quorum are noncitizens and the corporation is organized under the laws of the United States or of a state, territory, district, or possession thereof. "(c) Seventy-five per centum of the interest in a corporation shall not be deemed to be owned by citizens of the United States (i) if the title to seventy-five per centum of its stock is not vested in such citizens free from any trust or fiduciary obligation in favor of any person not a citizen of the United States; or (ii) if seventy-five per centum of the voting power in such corporation is not vested in citizens of the United States; or (iii) if, through any contract or understanding, it is so arranged that more than twenty-five per centum of the voting power in such corporation may be exercised, directly or indirectly, in behalf of any person who is not a citizen of the United States; or (iv) if by any other means whatsoever [431 U.S. 265, 268] control of any interest in the corporation in excess of twenty-five per centum is conferred upon or permitted to be exercised by any person who is not a citizen of the United States." </s> [Footnote 2 Section 28.1-60 provides in pertinent part: "Nonresidents generally. - (1) Catching fish for oil or guano prohibited. - No nonresident of this State shall take or catch any fish, in the waters of the Commonwealth, or in the waters under its joint jurisdiction, for the purpose of converting the same into oil, fish scrap, fish meal or guano, except as hereinafter provided; nor shall any nonresident be concerned or interested with any resident as partner or otherwise, except as a stockholder in a domestic corporation, in taking or catching fish in any of the waters of this State to be manufactured into oil, fish scrap, fish meal or guano, or in such manufacture, except as hereinafter provided. "(2) Resident not to be interested. - Nor shall any resident of this State be concerned or interested with any nonresident as partner or otherwise, except as stockholder in a domestic corporation, in taking or catching fish in any of the waters of this State to be manufactured into oil, fish scrap, fish meal or guano, or in such manufacture, except as hereinafter provided, or knowingly permit any nonresident to use his name for either purpose. "(3) License for taking menhaden fish. - A nonresident person, firm or corporation may take or catch the fish known as `menhaden,' within the three-mile limit on the seacoast of Virginia and east of a straight line drawn from Cape Charles Lighthouse to Cape Henry Lighthouse for the purpose of converting the same into oil, fish scrap, fish meal or guano between the third Monday of May and the Third Friday of November, inclusive, of each year; provided such person, firm or corporation has applied for and obtained license to take and catch such fish within the above-defined area and in accordance with the following requirements. . . . . . "(6) Penalty for violation. - Any person, firm or corporation violating any of the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." </s> [Footnote 3 The menhaden industry is, in terms of landed tonnage, the largest fishery in the United States, accounting for about 45% of our total commercial fish catch. The 1975 harvest was valued at about $50 million fresh and $80 million after processing. Menhaden are processed and used for industrial purposes including the manufacture of antibiotics, poultry and animal feed, paint, soap, lubricants, and, in Canada and Europe, margarine. The fish spend much of their life cycle in coastal estuaries or shallow water close to the ocean shore. Indeed, over 95% of the 1.8 billion pounds of menhaden taken in 1975 were caught within three miles of the coast. The fish are only found far offshore in deep water during the winter months along the South Atlantic coast. In March, they begin a northward migration traveling up the east coast in enormous schools, with some ultimately reaching north of Cape Cod. Most of the fish reverse this migration path in the fall. It is feasible to fish commercially for menhaden only during the migratory period when they are in large, dense schools close to the surface. Estuaries like the Chesapeake Bay are important nurturing grounds for the species. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Fisheries of the United States, 1975, pp. 18, 37 (1976); App. 24-25, 32-33, 73-89, 92-113. </s> [Footnote 4 Appellant's contention that the District Court should have abstained in this case to allow the Virginia courts to decide the validity of the statutes is without merit. Appellant suggests that under recent decisions, e. g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), the alienage classification established in 81.1 might well be ruled unconstitutional by the state courts as applied to individual resident aliens. That result is certainly plausible. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948). It is also irrelevant. Abstention is proper in this context only where it can be "fairly concluded that the underlying state statute is susceptible of an interpretation that might avoid the necessity for constitutional adjudication." Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 55 (1973). But appellant's suggestion would not resolve any of the claims raised by appellees. In such circumstances, it is the "solemn responsibility" of "all levels of the federal judiciary to give due respect to a suitor's choice of a federal forum for the hearing and decision of his federal constitutional claims." Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967). </s> [Footnote 5 Appellees argue in addition that federal fisheries law constitutes a comprehensive regulatory scheme not admitting of conflicting state laws. They also urge that the Virginia statutes violate the Equal Protection and Commerce Clauses and interfere with federal control of international relations. </s> [Footnote 6 The claim is, of course, statutory in the sense that it depends on interpretation of an Act of Congress, and like any other statutory decision, the result we reach here is subject to legislative overruling. </s> [Footnote 7 Vessel documentation actually dates from the first months of the Federal Government. See Act of Sept. 1, 1789, 1 Stat. 55, repealed by the Acts discussed in the text. </s> [Footnote 8 The quaint categories of the statute have remained unchanged since the "mackerel fishery" was added by the Act of May 24, 1828, c. 119, 4 Stat. 312. They seem to correspond to the only three types of sea creatures sought by organized fishing fleets at that time. See L. Sabine, Report on the Principal Fisheries of the American Seas, H. R. Exec. Doc. No. 23, 32d Cong., 2d Sess., 181 (1853). A license for the "mackerel fishery" entitles the holder to catch "cod or fish of any other description whatever." Act of Apr. 20, 1836, c. 55, 5 Stat. 16, 46 U.S.C. 325; 46 CFR 67.07-13 (b) (1976). </s> [Footnote 9 A vessel of more than 5 but less than 20 tons need not be enrolled in order to obtain a license. See 46 U.S.C. 251, 262, 263; 46 CFR 67.01-1, 67.07-13 (a) (1976). No documentation is required for a vessel of less than five net tons. 46 CFR 67.01-11 (a) (5) (1976). </s> [Footnote 10 See n. 8, supra. </s> [Footnote 11 A corporation is considered to be a citizen for purposes of this requirement only if it meets the same citizenship tests imposed for registration of a vessel and, in addition, if citizens own a controlling interest in it, or for a vessel used in the coastwise trade, if citizens own a 75% interest. 46 U.S.C. 802. As noted above, appellees received approval from the Secretary of Commerce for the transfer of their vessels to the ultimate ownership of the noncitizen Hanson Trust, Ltd. </s> [Footnote 12 See 3 Annals of Cong. 671, 728, 738, 748, 750, 752 (1972). This history contains no debates; it merely records the legislative steps in passage of the Act. There are no committee reports available. </s> [Footnote 13 Criticism began in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Johnson, 9 Wheat., at 222, 231-233. He thought the Enrollment and Licensing Act was simply the American formulation of a navigation Act, commonly used by commercial nations to encourage shipping on vessels owned and manned by their citizens to promote the local economy and assure maritime strength in case of war. See generally G. Gilmore & C. Black, Jr., The Law of Admiralty 11-3, 11-4 (2d ed. 1975). Chancellor Kent soon exercised his prerogative as the country's foremost legal scholar to take sharp exception to Marshall's statutory construction: "If congress had intended that a coasting license should confer power and control, and a claim of sovereignty subversive of local laws of the states within their own jurisdictions, it was supposed they would have said so in plain and intelligible language, and not have left their claim of supremacy to be hidden from the observation and knowledge of the state governments, in the unpretending and harmless shape of a coasting license, obviously intended for other purposes. . . . . . "The only great point on which the Supreme Court of the United States, and the courts of this state, have differed, is in the construction and effect given to a coasting license. . . . The formidable effect which has been given [431 U.S. 265, 279] to a coasting license, was a perfect surprise upon the judicial authorities of this state; and none of the persons concerned in the former decisions in our state courts on this subject, ever entertained the idea, as I apprehend, that congress intended, by a coasting license, a grant of power that was to bear down all state regulations of internal commerce that stood in its way." 1 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law 408, 411 (1st ed. 1826). Mr. Justice Frankfurter agreed, calling Marshall's view "esoteric statutory construction." F. Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause 15, 17, 20 (1937). See also R. Faulkner, The Jurisprudence of John Marshall 85 (1968); M. Baxter, The Steamboat Monopoly 34-35, 52 (1972); Campbell, Chancellor Kent, Chief Justice Marshall and the Steamboat Cases, 25 Syracuse L. Rev. 497, 519-532 (1974); Mann, The Marshall Court: Nationalization of Private Rights and Personal Liberty from the Authority of the Commerce Clause, 38 Ind. L. J. 117, 180-181, 209-212, 236-237 (1963). </s> [Footnote 14 See Act of May 24, 1828, c. 119, 4 Stat. 312 (adding "mackerel fishery" category); Act of Apr. 20, 1836, c. 55, 5 Stat. 16 (permitting capture of all types of fish on mackerel license); Rev. Stat. 4311, 4321 (1878) (codifying license provisions); Act of Apr. 18, 1874, c. 110, 18 Stat. 31 (exempting canal boats); Act of May 20, 1936, c. 434, 49 Stat. 1367 (license form amended and re-enacted). Cf. Act of Feb. 28, 1887, c. 288, 24 Stat. 435 (temporarily applying a fishing season for mackerel to federal licenses). </s> [Footnote 15 In addition to the contemporary comments of Mr. Justice Johnson and Chancellor Kent, see n. 13, supra, Thomas Jefferson's well-publicized letters were highly critical of what he saw as undue expansion of federal power, exemplified by Gibbons. See 1 C. Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 620-621 (1937 ed.). </s> [Footnote 16 See, e. g., McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 395 (1877) ("There has been . . . no . . . grant of power over the fisheries [to the United States]. These remain under the exclusive control of the State. . ."); [431 U.S. 265, 282] Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 258 -260 (1891); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896); 17 Cong. Rec. 4734 (1886) (conservation amendment to fisheries license, Act of Feb. 28, 1887, c. 288, 24 Stat. 435, see n. 14, supra, believed not to apply to state territorial waters). </s> [Footnote 17 Appellant also cites cases describing fishing as a "local activity," Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. 199, 203 (1961), and as one that "occurs before the [fish] can be said to have entered the flow of interstate commerce," Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S., at 395 . But these statements were made in upholding the right of States to tax what was argued to be interstate commerce. Pronouncements made in that context are not used interchangeably as statements of law where the issue is the power of Congress to regulate under the Commerce Clause. The restrictions imposed by the Commerce Clause standing alone may well be less than the pre-emptive reach of statutes passed by Congress pursuant to the power. Cf. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S., at 121 -122. No federal statutory claim was raised in Toomer or Arctic Maid, and in both cases the Court noted that the challenged statute did not discriminate against interstate commerce. </s> [Footnote 18 Act of May 20, 1936, c. 434, 49 Stat. 1367. We are confident that Congress, in the midst of the New Deal legislative program, broadly construed its powers under the Commerce Clause at this time. See, e. g., Wickard v. Filburn. </s> [Footnote 19 Indeed, an amendment to the license form made at the time of the 1936 re-enactment specifically authorizes "the taking of fish." Acting to reverse a Circuit Court of Appeals decision, The Pueblos, 77 F.2d 618 [431 U.S. 265, 283] (CA2 1935), Congress authorized issuance of licenses for the "coasting trade and mackerel fishery." The amendment explains that vessels so documented "shall be deemed to have sufficient license for engaging in the coasting trade and the taking of fish of every description, including shellfish." 49 Stat. 1368, 46 U.S.C. 263. See also S. Rep. No. 83, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. (1836), describing the modification in the Enrollment and Licensing Act, 5 Stat. 16, see nn. 8, 14, supra, as intended "to enable those engaged in the mackerel fishery to take other fish without incurring a penalty." </s> [Footnote 20 See cases cited in n. 16, supra. </s> [Footnote 21 Appellant claims that the challenged statutes have a legitimate conservation purpose. He argues that 81.1 is a valid response to the grave problem of overfishing of American marine stocks by foreign fleets. Similarly, 60 is said to be an essential enforcement mechanism for net-size restrictions on menhaden fishermen. The claims are specious. Virginia makes no attempt to restrict the quantity of menhaden caught by her own residents. A statute that leaves a State's residents free to destroy a natural resource while excluding aliens or nonresidents is not a conservation law at all. It bears repeating that a "state may not use its admitted powers to protect the health and safety of its people as a basis for suppressing competition." H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 538 (1949). A State cannot escape this principle by cloaking objectionable legislation in the currently fashionable garb of environmental protection. Moreover, despite its foreign ownership, Seacoast is subject to all United States shipping and fisheries laws. And the record does not support the claim based on enforcement of the net-size restriction. Furthermore, the cases upon which appellant relies are factually distinguishable. In McCready v. Virginia and Geer v. Connecticut neither petitioner asserted a claim under a pre-emptive Act of Congress. Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71 (1855), Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891), and Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960), did raise Licensing Act claims, but the statutes there upheld operated equally against residents and nonresidents. </s> [Footnote 22 Among those States filing briefs as amici curiae in support of Virginia, [431 U.S. 265, 286] see, e. g., Md. Nat. Res. Ann. Code 4-703, 4-704 (b) (1974); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 130, 99 (1974); Act of Feb. 20, 1923, 1923 Mass. Acts c. 35, as amended by Act of Mar. 13, 1962, 1962 Mass. Acts c. 219; Act of Mar. 23, 1936, 1936 Mass. Acts c. 158; N. Y. Envir. Conserv. Law 13-0333 (4), 13-0335 (2), 13-0341 (7) (McKinney 1973). See also Va. Code Ann. 28.1-57 (1973). </s> [Footnote 23 The Court was aware of this threat in Gibbons. A number of States had enacted steamboat monopoly legislation. See, e. g., Abel, Commerce Regulation before Gibbons v. Ogden: Interstate Transportation Facilities, 25 N.C. L. Rev. 121, 159-160 (1947); M. Baxter, The Steamboat Monopoly 7, 16 (1972). Connecticut and Ohio retaliated against the Livingston-Fulton monopoly by forbidding its licensees from entering their waters; New Jersey not only did that, but also granted a right of action for treble damages against anyone obtaining an injunction under New York law. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat., at 4-5 (argument of Daniel Webster); Abel, supra, at 160; Baxter, supra, at 25-30. </s> [Footnote 24 As of March 1, 1977, United States jurisdiction for fishery management was extended from 12 to 200 nautical miles from our coasts. 90 Stat. 336, 16 U.S.C. 1811 (1976 ed.). </s> MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom MR. JUSTICE POWELL joins, concurring in the judgment and concurring in part and dissenting in part. </s> I concur in the judgment of the Court and join in all but Parts II-D, and III of its opinion. As the Court states, it appears that licenses issued to appellees' ships under the federal licensing statute, 46 U.S.C. 263, confer upon their grantees an affirmative right to engage in fishing activities in the coastal waters of the United States on the same terms as any other fishermen. I also agree that the federal statute pre-empts similar state licensing legislation which would allow some to engage in the fishery while absolutely excluding any federal licensees. This, I believe, is as much as need be said to decide the case before us. Rather than stopping there, however, the Court embroiders upon this holding a patchwork of broader language whose purpose is almost as uncertain as its long-run effect. </s> The Court's treatment of the States' interests in their coastal fisheries appears to me to cut a somewhat broader swath than is justifiable in this context. True enough, the States do not "own" free-swimming creatures within their territorial limits in any conventional sense of that term, Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920); Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N. Y. 1805). It is therefore no answer to an assertion of federal pre-emptive power that such action amounts to an unconstitutional appropriation of state property. But it is also clear that the States have a substantial proprietary interest - sometimes described as "common ownership," Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896) - in [431 U.S. 265, 288] the fish and game within their boundaries. This is worthy of mention not because it is inconsistent with anything contained in the Court's opinion, but because I am not sure that the States' substantial regulatory interests are given adequate shrift by a single sentence casting the issue of state regulation as "simply whether the State has exercised its police power in conformity with the federal laws and Constitution." Ante, at 284-285. </s> The precedents of this Court, none of which are disputed today, have upheld a variety of regulations designed to conserve and maintain the collective natural resources of the State. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914); Geer v. Connecticut, supra; Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877); Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71 (1855); see Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 420 -421 (1948). The exact bases for these decisions vary, but the cases are consistent in recognizing that the retained interests of States in such common resources as fish and game are of substantial legal moment, whether or not they rise to the level of a traditional property right. The range of regulations which a State may invoke under these circumstances is extremely broad. Neither mere displeasure with the asymmetry of the pattern of state regulation, nor a sensed tension with a federal statute will suffice to override a state enactment affecting exploitation of such a resource. Barring constitutional infirmities, only a direct conflict with the operation of federal law - such as exists here - will bar the state regulatory action. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963). This is true no matter how "peripatetic" the objects of the regulation or however "Balkanized" the resulting pattern of commercial activity. Ante, at 285-287. </s> Also, I think the Court has decided more than it properly [431 U.S. 265, 289] can in its reading of the Submerged Lands Act. While recognizing the Act as effecting a conveyance to the States of primary ownership and control of both "the lands beneath the oceans and natural resources in the waters within state territorial jurisdiction," ante, at 283-284, the Court makes more than can be justified of the statute's clause reserving federal control for "purposes of commerce, navigation, national defense, and international affairs." 43 U.S.C. 1314 (a). It concludes on the basis of this reservation clause that since the enrollment and licensing statute was enacted under the commerce power, the Submerged Lands Act cannot have altered its pre-emptive effect. </s> I agree that the Submerged Lands Act does not countermand the pre-emption worked by the federal licensing legislation, but this is not because that legislation was enacted pursuant to one of the four categories of constitutional powers explicitly reserved to the Federal Government in the Act. It seems to me a difficult issue, not to be decided in a single sentence, whether the States take only a statutory title and right of control subject to those encumbrances previously created by exercise of the commerce, navigation, national defense, and international affairs powers. An alternative reading would be that the reservation-of-powers clause only gives fair warning of the possibility that the Government may, at some future time and in furtherance of these specified powers, find it necessary to intrude upon state ownership and management of the coastal submerged lands and natural resources. Such a view would take the statute for what it appears to be on its face - a quitclaim of the entire interest held by the Government when the Act was enacted - rather than a transfer of that interest subject to regulatory enactments previously passed under one of the four powers. </s> Interpretation of this reservation clause seems unnecessary to me at this time because the primary grant of the Act does not extend to any interest over free-swimming fish. The [431 U.S. 265, 290] title of the statutory section, as originally enacted and as codified, is "Lands Beneath Navigable Waters Within State Boundaries." 67 Stat. 30, 43 U.S.C., c. 29, subch. II. From this and from its language, the statute appears primarily to be a transfer of all property interest in land and natural resources within the three-mile limit. See United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184, 187 (1975). Section 1311 (a) (1) conveys "title" and "ownership" - to such land and resources and for that reason could not reasonably refer to free-swimming fish which are incapable of such ownership. Section 1311 (a) (2) confers right of administration and control, and identifies the object of the conveyance again as the land and natural resources. Unless the Federal Government had an exclusive power of administration and control over fish - and the background of the legislation does not suggest that it did, see United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 36 (1947); Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 74 -75 (1941) - then the 1311 (a) (2) transfer of the power of administration did not, in fact, alter the pre-existing powers of the States over fish at all, even assuming that it purported to encompass "natural resources" beyond those as to which title was transferred in 1311 (a) (1). Such legislation which neither affects the actual regulatory powers of the States, nor is explicit in stating that pre-existing federal regulatory measures are repealed, lacks the indicia of intent that would justify finding an implied repeal of federal legislation licensing the taking of fish in the coastal area. This is true quite apart from the reservation of powers in 1314. I would limit our holding accordingly. </s> [431 U.S. 265, 291]

United States Supreme Court CITY OF WEST COVINA v. PERKINS et al.(1999) No. 97-1230 Argued: November 3, 1998Decided: January 13, 1999 </s> Petitioner City's police officers lawfully seized respondents' personal property from their home, leaving a notice form specifying the fact of the search, its date, the searching agency, the warrant's date, the issuing judge and his court, and the persons to be contacted for information, and an itemized list of the property seized. The officers did not leave the search warrant number, but the warrant's issuance was recorded by respondents' address and the warrant number in a public index. After attempts to obtain return of the seized property failed, respondents filed this suit, and the Federal District Court ultimately granted the City summary judgment. In reversing, the Ninth Circuit held, by analogy to Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 , that the Due Process Clause required that respondents be provided, in addition to the information set forth in the City's form, detailed notice of the state procedures for return of seized property and the information necessary to invoke those procedures, including the search warrant number or a method for obtaining it. </s> Held: When police seize property for a criminal investigation, the Due Process Clause does not require them to provide the owner with notice of state-law remedies for the property's return. The Ninth Circuit's expansive notice requirement lacks support in this Court's precedent. Individualized notice that officers have taken property is necessary in a case such as this one because the owner has no other reasonable means of ascertaining who is responsible for his loss. However, no similar rationale justifies requiring notice of state-law remedies which, like those at issue here, are established by published, generally available state statutes and case law. Cf., e.g., </s> Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 509 . Memphis, supra, is not to the contrary. See id., at 14, n.14. To sustain the Ninth Circuit's holding, this Court would have to find that due process requires notice that not one State or the Federal Government has seen fit to require, in the context of law enforcement practices that have existed for centuries. Respondents' alternative argument that the notice given them was inadequate because it did not provide the vital search warrant number is undermined by the District Court's explicit finding that they failed to establish they needed the number to file a motion for return of their property. Pp. 5-10. </s> 113 F. 3d 1004, reversed and remanded. </s> Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Scalia, J., joined. </s> CITY OF WEST COVINA, PETITIONER v. </s> LAWRENCE PERKINS etal . </s> on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit </s> [January 13, 1999] </s> Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> We consider in this case whether the Constitution requires a State or its local entities to give detailed and specific instructions or advice to owners who seek return of property lawfully seized but no longer needed for police investigation or criminal prosecution. Interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit imposed a series of specific notice requirements on the city responsible for the seizure. We conclude these requirements are not mandated by the Due Process Clause, and we reverse. </s> I </s> The case began when police officers of petitioner, the City of West Covina, California, acting in accordance with law and pursuant to a valid search warrant, seized personal property. The property belonged to the owner of the searched home, respondent Lawrence Perkins, and to his family. The suspect in the crime was neither Perkins nor anyone in his family, but one Marcus Marsh. Marsh had been a boarder in the Perkins' home. After leaving their home, and unknown to them, he became the subject of a homicide investigation. </s> During the search of respondents' home for evidence incriminating Marsh, the police seized a number of items, including photos of Marsh, an address book, a 12-gauge shotgun, a starter pistol, ammunition, and $2,629 in cash. 113 F.3d 1004, 1006 (CA9 1997). At the conclusion of the search, the officers left respondents a form entitled "Search Warrant: Notice of Service," which stated: </s> "TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: </s> "1. THESE PREMISES HAVE BEEN SEARCHED BY PEACE OFFICERS OF THE (name of searching agency) West Covina Police DEPARTMENT PURSUANT TO A SEARCH WARRANT ISSUED ON (date) 5-20-93 , BY THE HONORABLE (name of magistrate) Dan Oki , JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR/MUNICIPAL COURT, Citrus JUDICIAL DISTRICT. </s> "2. THE SEARCH WAS CONDUCTED ON (date) </s> 5-21-93 . A LIST OF THE PROPERTY SEIZED PURSUANT TO THE SEARCH WARRANT IS ATTACHED. </s> "3. IF YOU WISH FURTHER INFORMATION, YOU MAY CONTACT: </s> (name of investigator) Det. Ferrari or Det. Melnyk AT [telephone number]. </s> "LT. SCHIMANSKI [telephone number]." App. 76-77 (italicized characters represent those portions of the original document which were handwritten on the form). </s> In accordance with the Notice, the officers also left respondents an itemized list of the property seized. 113 F.3d, at 1011-1012. The officers did not leave the search warrant number because the warrant was under seal to avoid compromising the ongoing investigation. Id ., at 1007. In a public index maintained by the court clerk, however, the issuance of the warrant was recorded by the address of the home searched and the search warrant number. Ibid . </s> Not long after the search, Perkins called Ferrari, one of the detectives listed on the Notice, and inquired about return of the seized property. No.CV 93-7084 SVW (CD Cal., July 8, 1996), App. to Pet. for Cert. E-3. One of the detectives told Perkins he needed to obtain a court order authorizing the property's return. Ibid . </s> About a month after the search, Perkins went to the Citrus Municipal Court to see Judge Oki, who had issued the warrant. He learned Judge Oki was on vacation. Ibid . He tried to have another judge release his property but was told the court had nothing under Perkins' name. Ibid. </s> Rather than continuing to pursue a court order releasing the property by filing a written motion with the court, making other inquiries, or returning to the courthouse at some later date, ibid ., respondents filed suit in United States District Court against the City and the officers who conducted the search. They alleged the officers had violated their Fourth Amendment rights by conducting a search without probable cause and exceeding the scope of the warrant. App. 7-9. They further alleged that the City had a policy of permitting unlawful searches. Id., at10. </s> The District Court granted summary judgment for the City and its officers. App. to Pet. for Cert. B1-B11. The court, however, invited supplemental briefing on an issue respondents had not raised: whether available remedies for the return of seized property were adequate to satisfy due process. Id., at B-7. The parties submitted briefs on the issue, but the court did not rule on it. Respondents appealed the District Court's holding on their Fourth Amendment claims, but the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court for resolution of the due process question. No.94-56365 (CA9, Apr. 30, 1996), App. to Pet. for Cert. D1-D3. </s> The District Court held on remand that the remedies provided by California law for return of the seized property satisfied due process, and it granted summary judgment for the City. No.CV 93-7084 SVW, supra , App. to Pet. for Cert. E-2. In particular, the court rejected respondents' claim that the procedure for return of their property was unavailable to them because the City did not give them adequate notice of the remedy and the information needed to invoke it. Id ., at E-6. </s> On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment for the City. 113 F.3d, at 1006. As an initial matter, the court noted that, under Fuentes v. Shevin , 407 U.S. 67 (1972), respondents were entitled only to an adequate postdeprivation remedy, and not to a predeprivation hearing prior to the seizure. 113 F.3d, at1010. The Court of Appeals also agreed with the District Court that the postdeprivation remedies for return of property established by California statute and case law satisfied the requirements of due process. Id ., at 1011. </s> Nevertheless, the court held, by analogy to this Court's decision in Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978), that the City was required to give respondents notice of the state procedures for return of seized property and the information necessary to invoke those procedures (including the search warrant number or a method for obtaining the number). 113 F.3d, at 1012. While acknowledging that it was not the court's place "to specify the exact phrasing of an adequate notice," the court proceeded to explicate, in some detail, the content of the required notice: </s> "In cases where property is taken under California law ... the notice should include the following: as on the present notice, the fact of the search, its date, and the searching agency; the date of the warrant, the issuing judge, and the court in which he or she serves; and the persons to be contacted for further information. In addition, the notice must inform the recipient of the procedure for contesting the seizure or retention of the property taken, along with any additional information required for initiating that procedure in the appropriate court. In circumstances such as those presented by this record, the notice must include the search warrant number or, if it is not available or the record is sealed, the means of identifying the court file. It also must explain the need for a written motion or request to the court stating why the property should be returned." 113 F.3d, at 1013. </s> This expansive requirement lacks support in our case law and mandates notice not now prescribed by the Federal Government or by any one of the 50 States. </s> II </s> At this stage, no one contests the right of the State to have seized the property in the first instance or its ultimate obligation to return it. So rules restricting the substantive power of the State to take property are not implicated by this case. What is at issue is the obligation of the State to provide fair procedures to ensure return of the property when the State no longer has a lawful right to retain it. </s> Respondents acknowledge, as they must, that the City notified them of the initial seizure and gave them an inventory of the property taken. Accordingly, we need not decide how detailed the notice of the seizure must be or when the notice must be given. They also raise no independent challenge to the Court of Appeals' conclusion that California law provides adequate remedies for return of their property, including a motion under Cal. Penal Code Ann. §1536 (West 1982) or a motion under §1540. See 113 F.3d, at 1011. Rather, they contend the City deprived them of due process by failing to provide them notice of their remedies and the factual information necessary to invoke the remedies under California law. When the police seize property for a criminal investigation, however, due process does not require them to provide the owner with notice of state law remedies. </s> A primary purpose of the notice required by the Due Process Clause is to ensure that the opportunity for a hearing is meaningful. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) ("Th[e] right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter [affecting one's property rights] is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest"). It follows that when law enforcement agents seize property pursuant to warrant, due process requires them to take reasonable steps to give notice that the property has been taken so the owner can pursue available remedies for its return. Cf. Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 214 (1962) (requiring a city to provide adequate notice of the deprivation--the city's condemnation of certain water rights--which created the property owner's right to pursue damages claims and triggered the statute of limitations on those claims). Individualized notice that the officers have taken the property is necessary in a case such as the one before us because the property owner would have no other reasonable means of ascertaining who was responsible for his loss. </s> No similar rationale justifies requiring individualized notice of state-law remedies which, like those at issue here, are established by published, generally available state statutes and case law. Once the property owner is informed that his property has been seized, he can turn to these public sources to learn about the remedial procedures available to him. The City need not take other steps to inform him of his options. Cf. Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 509 (1903) (holding that a statute fixing the time and place of meetings of a medical licensing board provided license applicants adequate notice of the procedure for obtaining a hearing on their applications because: "When a statute fixes the time and place of meeting of any board or tribunal, no special notice to parties interested is required. The statute is itself sufficient notice"); Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 131 (1985) (noting that "[t]he entire structure of our democratic government rests on the premise that the individual citizen is capable of informing himself about the particular policies that affect his destiny"). In prior cases in which we have held that postdeprivation state-law remedies were sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process and the laws were public and available, we have not concluded that the State must provide further information about those procedures. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer , 468 U.S. 517 (1984). </s> Memphis Light , the case on which the Court of Appeals relied, is not to the contrary. In Memphis Light , the Court held that a public utility must make available to its customers the opportunity to discuss a billing dispute with a utility employee who has authority to resolve the matter before terminating utility service for nonpayment. 436 U.S., at 16 -17. The Court also held that due process required the utility to inform the customer not only of the planned termination, but also of the availability and general contours of the internal administrative procedure for resolving the accounting dispute. Id ., at 13-15. In requiring notice of the administrative procedures, however, we relied not on any general principle that the government must provide notice of the procedures for protecting one's property interests but on the fact that the administrative procedures at issue were not described in any publicly available document. A customer who was informed that the utility planned to terminate his service could not reasonably be expected to educate himself about the procedures available to protect his interests: </s> "[T]here is no indication in the record that a written account of [the utility's dispute resolution] procedure was accessible to customers who had complaints about their bills. [The plaintiff's] case reveals that the opportunity to invoke that procedure, if it existed at all, depended on the vagaries of `word of mouth referral.'" Id., at 14, n.14. </s> While Memphis Light demonstrates that notice of the procedures for protecting one's property interests may be required when those procedures are arcane and are not set forth in documents accessible to the public, it does not support a general rule that notice of remedies and procedures is required. </s> The Court of Appeals' far-reaching notice requirement not only lacks support in our precedent but also conflicts with the well-established practice of the States and the Federal Government. The notice required by the Court of Appeals far exceeds that which the States and the Federal Government have traditionally required their law enforcement agencies to provide. Indeed, neither the Federal Government nor any State requires officers to provide individualized notice of the procedures for seeking return of seized property. See Appendix., infra, at___. </s> Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(d), for example, requires federal agents seizing property pursuant to a warrant to "give to the person from whom or from whose premises the property was taken a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken or [to] leave the copy and receipt at the place from which the property was taken." The Rule makes no provision for notifying property owners of the procedures for seeking return of their property. The Court of Appeals' analysis would render the notice required by this Federal Rule--and by every analogous state statute--inadequate as a constitutional matter. In the shadow of this unwavering state and federal tradition, the Court of Appeals' holding is all the more untenable; to sustain it, we would be required to find that due process requires notice that not one State or the Federal Government has seen fit to require, in the context of law enforcement practices that have existed for centuries. </s> Respondents urge that if we cannot uphold the Court of Appeals' broad notice requirement, we should, at least, affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment on the narrower ground that the notice provided respondents was inadequate because it did not provide them with the factual information--specifically, the search warrant number--they needed to invoke their judicial remedies. The District Court, however, made an explicit factual finding that respondents failed to establish that they needed the search warrant number to file a court motion seeking return of their property: </s> "Perkins argues that this [court] procedure was not available to him because he did not know the number of the warrant pursuant to which his property was seized. Unfortunately for Perkins, there is no evidence either way about whether one must have the warrant number in order to obtain a court order releasing seized property. Defendants assert that it is not necessary, that as long as the claimant can sufficiently identify the property he seeks ( i.e. , by providing the date of the warrant, the name of the seizing agency and officer, and the identity of the issuing court and judge, all of which information was in Perkins' possession), the court will release it. Plaintiffs want the Court simply to assume that if Perkins had filed a request with the court, it would have been denied because he did not have the warrant number. But there is no evidence to support that speculation." </s> No.CV 93-7084 SVW, App. to Pet. for Cert. E-6. This finding undermines the factual predicate for respondents' alternative argument, and we need not discuss it further. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT </s> Federal and State Laws Governing Execution of Search Warrants and Procedures for Return of Seized Property </s> Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 41(d); Ala. Code §15-5-11 (1995); Ala. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.11 (1996); Alaska Stat. Ann. §12.35.025 (1996); Alaska Rule Crim. Proc. 37 (1998); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§13-3919 to 13-3922 (West 1989); Ark. Rule Crim. Proc. 13.3 (1998); Cal. Penal Code Ann. §1535 (West 1982); Colo. Rev. Stat. §16-3-305 (1997); Colo. Rule Crim. Proc. 41 (1997); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§54-33c, 54-36f (West Supp. 1998); Del. Ct. Common Pleas Rule Crim. Proc. 41 (1997); Del. Super. Ct. Rule Crim. Proc. 41 (1997); D.C. Code Ann. §23-524 (1996); D.C. Super. Ct. Rule Crim. Proc. 41(1998); Fla. Stat. Ann. §933.11 (West Supp. 1998); Ga. Code. Ann. §§17-5-25, 17-5-29 (1990); Haw. Rule Penal Proc. 41 (1997); Idaho Code §§19-4413, 19-4415, 19-4416 (1997); Idaho Rule Crim. Proc. 41 (1998); Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann., ch. 725, §§5/108-6, 5/108-10 (West 1992); Ind. Code Ann. §§35-33-5-2 to 35-33-5-7 (West 1998); Iowa Code Ann. §808.8 (West 1994); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§22-2506, 22-2512 (1988 and Supp. 1997); Ky. Rule Crim. Proc. 13.10 (1993); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 166 (West 1991); Me. Rule Crim. Proc. 41 (1998); Md. Rule Crim. Proc. 4-601 (1997); Mass. Ann. Laws, ch.276, §§1 to 4 (Law Co-op. 1992 ed. and Supp. 1998); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §780.655 (West 1998); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§626.16, 626.17 (West Supp. 1998); Miss. Code Ann. §§41-29-157(a)(3) (1981), §99-27-15 (1994); Mo. Ann. Stat. §542.291 (Vernon Supp. 1998); Mont. Code Ann. §§46-5-227, 46-5-301 (1997); Neb. Rev. Stat. §29-815 (1995); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §179.075 (Michie 1997); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §595-A:5 (1986); N.J. Stat. Ann. §33:1-61 (West 1994); N.J. Rule Crim. Prac. 3:5-5 (1998); N.M. Dist. Ct. Rule Crim. Proc. §5-211 (1996); N.M. Magis. Ct. Rule Crim. Proc. §6.208 (1996); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §690.50 (McKinney 1995); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§15A-252, 15A-254 (1997); N.D. Rule Crim. Proc. 41 (Supp. 1987); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2933.241 (1997); Ohio Rule Crim. Proc. 41 (1994); Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 22, §§1232 to 1234 (West 1986 and Supp. 1998); Ore. Rev. Stat. §§133.575, 133.595 (1991); Pa. Rules Crim. Proc. 2008, 2009 (1998); R.I. Super. Ct. Rule Crim. Proc. 41 (1998); S.C. Code Ann. §17-13-150 (1985); S.D. Codified Laws §23A-35-10 (Rule 41(d) (1998); Tenn. Rule Crim. Proc. 41 (1998); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. §18.06 (Vernon 1977 ed. and Supp. 1997); Utah Code Ann. §77-23-206 (1995); Vt. Rule Crim. Proc. 41 (1993 and Supp. 1998); Va. Code Ann. 19.2-57 (Michie 1995); Wash. Super. Ct. Rule Crim. Proc. 2.3 (1996); W.Va. Code §62-1A-4 (1997); W.Va. Rule Crim. Proc. 41 (1997); Wisc. Stat. Ann. §968.17 (West 1985); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §7-7-102 (Michie 1997); Wyo. Rule Crim. Proc. 41 (1998). </s> CITY OF WEST COVINA, PETITIONER v. </s> LAWRENCE PERKINS etal . </s> on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit </s> [January 13, 1999] </s> J ustice T homas , with whom J ustice S calia joins, concurring in the judgment. </s> I agree with the holding of the majority's opinion, ante, at 6, that the Due Process Clause does not compel the City to provide respondents with detailed notice of state-law post deprivation remedies. I write separately, however, because I cannot endorse the suggestion, in dicta , that "when law enforcement agents seize property pursuant to warrant, due process requires them to take reasonable steps to give notice that the property has been taken so the owner can pursue available remedies for its return." Ibid. In my view, the majority's conclusion represents an unwarranted extension of procedural due process principles developed in civil cases into an area of law that has heretofore been governed exclusively by the Fourth Amendment. </s> As far as I am aware, we have never before suggested that procedural due process governs the execution of a criminal search warrant. Indeed, we have assumed that "[t]he Fourth Amendment was tailored explicitly for the criminal justice system, and its balance between individual and public interests always has been thought to define the `process that is due' for seizures of person or property in criminal cases ...." Gerstein v. Pugh , 420 U.S. 103, 125 , n.27 (1975). In my view, if the Constitution imposes a "notice" requirement on officers executing a search warrant, it does so because the failure to provide such notice renders an otherwise-lawful search "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. </s> 1 </s> We have previously suggested that the procedure for executing the common-law warrant for stolen goods "furnished the model for a `reasonable' search under the Fourth Amendment." Id. , </s> at 116, n.17. At common law, officers executing a warrant for stolen goods were required to furnish an inventory of property seized. T.Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 82 (1969); see also 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 137 (6th ed. 1787) ("The officer executing such warrant, if required, shall shew the same to the person whose goods and chattels are distrained, and shall suffer a copy thereof to be taken"). Furthermore, the failure to adhere to this procedure was denounced in Wilkes v. Wood , Lofft 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B. 1763), and Entick v. Carrington , 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (C.P. 1765), two celebrated cases that profoundly influenced the Founders' view of what a "reasonable" search entailed. </s> 2 </s> In both cases, Lord Camden criticized the fact that the officers executing the general warrants were not constrained by the safeguards built up around the warrant for stolen goods. He specifically complained that the officers did not provide an inventory of the property seized. </s> 3 </s> In light of this historical evidence, I would be open to considering, in an appropriate case, whether the Fourth Amendment mandates the notice requirement adopted by the majority today. See Wilson v. Arkansas , 514 U.S. 927 (1995) (relying on common-law antecedents to define a "reasonable search"). I am unwilling, however, to endorse the majority's ahistorical reliance on procedural due process as the source of the requirement. I therefore concur in the judgment. </s> FOOTNOTES </s> Footnote 1 </s> Although we have never addressed the issue, there is near unanimous agreement among the lower courts that the notice requirements imposed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(d) and the state statutes cited in the Appendix to the majority's opinion, ante , at 11-12, are not required by the Fourth Amendment. See W.LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment §4.12 (3d ed. 1996). </s> Footnote 2 </s> See, e.g. , T.Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 39-41 (1969); Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L.Rev. 757, 775 (1994); Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 Yale L.J. 393, 400 (1995). </s> Footnote 3 </s> See Entick , 19 How. St. Tr., at 1067 ("[T]he same law which has with so much circumspection guarded the case of stolen goods from mischief, would likewise in this case protect the subject, by adding proper checks; ... would require him to take an exact inventory, and deliver a copy .... [W]ant of [these safeguards] is an undeniable argument against the legality of the thing"); Wilkes , Lofft, at 19, 98 Eng. Rep., at 499 ("As to the proof of what papers were taken away, the plaintiff could have no account of them; and those who were able to have given an account ... have produced none").

United States Supreme Court BRAEN v. PFEIFER TRANSPORTATION CO.(1959) No. 32 Argued: November 16, 1959Decided: December 14, 1959 </s> Petitioner, a mate on respondent's barge, was ordered to do some carpentry work on a raft used to facilitate chipping, painting and welding on respondent's vessels but which was not being used at the time to repair the barge on which petitioner was mate. While on a catwalk used to board or leave the barge and while attempting to move the raft into position for boarding preparatory to carrying out this order, petitioner was injured when the catwalk gave way. Held: He was injured while acting "in the course of his employment" and he was entitled to recover from respondent under the Jones Act. Pp. 129-133. </s> (a) At the time of his injury, petitioner had a status as a seaman and as a member of the crew of his vessel. Pp. 131-132. </s> (b) The fact that he was injured while not on his vessel is immaterial. Pp. 132-133. </s> (c) Petitioner was acting "in the course of his employment," within the meaning of the Jones Act. P. 133. </s> 263 F.2d 147, reversed. </s> Benjamin H. Siff argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Bernard Rolnick. Arthur N. Seiff was of counsel for petitioner. </s> Edmund F. Lamb argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Petitioner brought this suit under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 688, and recovered judgment after a jury trial. He was employed as mate on respondent's barge. On the day prior to the injury the barge came to respondent's [361 U.S. 129, 130] repair yard to have a cargo pump fixed. At this repair yard respondent maintained a covered lighter, known as the Winisook, which was used as a work barge. Its inshore side was connected with the dock by a plank runway. Between the Winisook and the dock was a raft used for chipping, painting, and welding on such barges as might need that service. The barge on which petitioner worked was not at this time being serviced by the raft. But the raft had been used in repair work on the barge at other times and now needed new decking. </s> The barge was moored to adjoin the open water side of the Winisook, the crew of the barge using a catwalk around the sides of the Winisook whenever they left or boarded the barge. The morning after the barge was moored, petitioner's supervisor ordered him to lay some decking on the raft, as petitioner had experience as a carpenter. Petitioner accordingly prepared to go to work on this new job assignment. As he was standing on the catwalk, preparatory to starting his work, releasing a line on the raft to permit him to maneuver it into place so he could board it, the catwalk gave way, causing the injury. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment for petitioner. 263 F.2d 147. We granted the petition for certiorari because that decision seemed to be out of line with the authorities. 359 U.S. 952 . </s> In O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Co., 318 U.S. 36 , a seaman was allowed to recover under the Jones Act even though he was injured on shore. The seaman was a deckhand. The ship was discharging her cargo through a conduit that was connected at its outer end to a land pipe by means of a gasket. The seaman in question was ordered by the master to go ashore to assist in repairing the gasket. While so engaged, he was injured by reason of the negligence of a fellow employee. We held that the words "in the course of his employment" as used in the Jones Act were not restricted to injuries occurring on navigable [361 U.S. 129, 131] waters, that they were broadly used by Congress in support of "all the constitutional power it possessed," id., at 39, and that it was constitutionally permissible for Congress to supplement the remedy of maintenance and cure by extending a right of recovery in trial by jury to a seaman injured "while in the service of his vessel by negligence." Id., at 43. </s> The test, as the O'Donnell case holds, is not whether the injury occurred on navigable waters, for that had been applied by the lower court, id., at 38, which we reversed. Rather it is whether the seaman was injured by negligence while "in the course of his employment." </s> The injured party must of course have "status as a member of the vessel" for it is seamen, not others who may work on the vessel (Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U.S. 1, 4 ), to whom Congress extended the protection of the Jones Act. Nice questions often arise concerning the status of particular workmen and whether their duties give them the status of "seamen" as that word is used in the Act. Desper v. Starved Rock Ferry Co., 342 U.S. 187 . And see Gianfala v. Texas Co., 350 U.S. 879 , reversing 222 F.2d 382; Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370 ; Butler v. Whiteman, 356 U.S. 271 . The court below apparently thought that at the moment petitioner was injured he was not a "seaman"; and that conclusion apparently turned on its view that to be such he had to be engaged at the time of the injury in work which was in furtherance of the navigation of the vessel. The court, indeed, held it error not to have given instructions to that effect. </s> At times the work done by an employee will be crucial in determining what his status is for purposes of recovery. South Chicago Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251, 260 ; Swanson v. Marra Bros., supra; Desper v. Starved Rock Ferry Co., supra; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. O'Rourke, 344 U.S. 334 ; Grimes v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co., 356 U.S. 252 ; [361 U.S. 129, 132] Butler v. Whiteman, supra. Those cases, however, are not relevant to our present problem since the question whether petitioner's duties on the raft assignment were of the type to bring one not otherwise a member of a ship's crew within the scope of the Act is not presented in this case. Here we start with an employee who had the status of mate. The issue is whether petitioner, a mate and therefore a "seaman," was injured "in the course of his employment." We conclude that he was. </s> The fact that the injury did not occur on the vessel is not controlling, as Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp., supra, 373, holds. A "seaman" may often be sent off ship to perform duties of his employment. O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Co., supra. In Marceau v. Great Lakes Transit Corp., 146 F.2d 416, a ship's cook was allowed to recover under the Jones Act when, pursuant to duty, he was returning to the ship and was injured on the dock while approaching a ladder used as ingress to the vessel. </s> We held that a seaman who was injured on the dock while departing from the ship on shore leave was in the service of the vessel and was entitled to recover for maintenance and cure in Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724 . It was there recognized that a seaman is as much in the service of his ship when boarding it on first reporting for duty, quitting it on being discharged, or going to and from the ship while on shore leave, as he is while on board at high sea. Id., at 736-737. We also held that a seaman injured in a dance hall while on shore leave was in the service of his ship in Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523, 529 . These two cases were not brought under the Jones Act but involved maintenance and cure. Yet they make clear that the scope of a seaman's employment or the activities which are related to the furtherance of the vessel are not measured by the standards applied to land-based employment relationships. They also supply relevant guides to the meaning of the term "course of [361 U.S. 129, 133] employment" under the Act since it is the equivalent of the "service of the ship" formula used in maintenance and cure cases. See Gilmore and Black, The Law of Admiralty, p. 284. And see O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Co., supra, at 43; Marceau v. Great Lakes Transit Corp., supra. </s> Petitioner in the present case was ordered by a superior to perform some carpentry work on a raft which lay between the lighter and the dock. Petitioner was injured, as we have said, while on the catwalk attempting to move the raft into position for boarding. The raft was used to facilitate chipping, painting and welding on respondent's vessels. Cf. Grant Smith-Porter Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 . New decking was to be installed on the raft. The fact that the raft was not presently being used to repair respondent's barge is in our view immaterial. Petitioner was acting "in the course of his employment" at the time of the injury, for at that moment he was doing the work of his employer pursuant to his employer's orders. No more is required by the Jones Act, as the O'Donnell case indicates, petitioner being a seaman who was injured as a consequence of the negligence of his employer. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the judgment of the District Court is reinstated. </s> So ordered. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, whom MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER and MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. </s> To assert a right of action under the Jones Act, a plaintiff must not only be a seaman, that is, a "member of a crew of any vessel." but must have been injured "in the course of his employment." 46 U.S.C. 688; 33 U.S.C. 903 (a) (1). Petitioner was concededly a member of the [361 U.S. 129, 134] crew of a vessel at the time the events in question took place. The controverted issue is whether a jury could have found that he was injured "in the course of his employment." I cannot agree that the nature of a seaman's duties at the time of injury is irrelevant to this latter issue. </s> Until today it has not been intimated in any opinion of the Court that I know of that a seaman may recover under the Jones Act for injuries arising out of activities unrelated to the maintenance or operation of his vessel, and not incidental to its affairs. In other words, the status of being a seaman does not alone bring the Jones Act into play. The character of the activities giving rise to the injury complained of is also an indispensable element to the existence of a federal right to relief under this statute. In the O'Donnell case, 318 U.S. 36 , cited by the Court, it was stated (at 42-43): "The right of recovery in the Jones Act is given to the seaman as such, and . . . depends . . . on the nature of the service and its relationship to the operation of the vessel plying in navigable waters." There a crew member was ordered to go ashore momentarily to assist in the repair of a fixture being used in unloading the ship. That the work was being done on the dock was held immaterial to Jones Act liability. But that work was plainly in aid of the operations of the vessel on which O'Donnell was employed. See Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U.S. 1, 4 . 1 It is a far different matter to say, as the Court seems to say here, that a crew member [361 U.S. 129, 135] may recover under the Jones Act for injuries arising out of activities not directly related to the affairs of the vessel, as in O'Donnell, and not incidental to his shipboard work, see Thompson v. Eargle, 182 F.2d 717; Marceau v. Great Lakes Transit Corp., 146 F.2d 416. "In the service of the ship" is something quite different than "in the service of the shipowner." 2 In this case the seaman's employer also had a nonseaman-employing business, the repair yard, for which nonseaman activities were needed. </s> The Jones Act extended to maritime workers the negligence remedy provided for interstate railroad workers by the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51. Under the FELA, and the uniform course of our decisions under it, see, e. g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Gileo, 351 U.S. 493 ; Reed v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 351 U.S. 502 , the remedy given by that Act applies only "to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such [interstate] carrier in such commerce." Under the Jones Act the remedy is given to "[a]ny seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment." I think this means that a seaman's injury must have arisen out of his work as a seaman, just as a railroad worker's injury must have arisen out of his employment in interstate commerce. Otherwise it is difficult to see what purpose the "in the course of his employment" requirement of the Jones Act serves. Both the FELA and the Jones Act give a federal cause of action in negligence only in respect of particular kinds of injuries - under the FELA, those [361 U.S. 129, 136] suffered in interstate commerce, under the Jones Act, those suffered in work as a seaman. </s> Thus, I think the issue of liability in this case turns on whether petitioner, when he fell from the faulty catwalk, was already engaged in the performance of his raft assignment, or whether he was simply en route to that assignment. If the former, there would, in my opinion, be no liability, for the record contains no basis for an inference that petitioner's assignment was related to the business of the vessel and, lacking such relationship, petitioner's injury cannot be deemed to have occurred "in the course of his employment." In that event any remedy would be that afforded by local law. Cf. Swanson v. Marra Bros., supra, at p. 7; 2 Larson, Law of Workmen's Compensation, 90.22. 3 If, however, petitioner was injured en route to his raft assignment, the Jones Act would apply, for "the course of his employment," I think, continued until he commenced that assignment. Considering that the evidence presents a jury issue on this score, I concur in the reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing the complaint. </s> However, I dissent from the reinstatement of the judgment of the District Court. The relevant portion of the charge, to which respondent excepted, was vague and lacking in guidance as to the nature of the factual issue presented in this respect. 4 Moreover, in making liability [361 U.S. 129, 137] turn on the question whether crew members normally performed work of this nature, the charge was in error. 5 Such a factor might well be relevant in a case where there was doubt as to the ultimate issue whether an injury was suffered in the course of work 6 in some way related to the vessel in which the plaintiff seaman served. However, here it was not disputed that the petitioner's assignment to work on the raft was at the time wholly unrelated to any of the affairs of his vessel. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 In referring to the O'Donnell case, it was stated in Swanson (at p. 4): "We there held the ship owner liable, under the Jones Act, for injuries caused to a seaman by a fellow servant while the former was on shore engaged in repairing a conduit which was a part of the vessel and used for discharging its cargo. But in that case we sustained the recovery because the injured person was a seaman and an employee of the vessel, engaged in the course of his employment as such." (Emphasis supplied.) </s> [Footnote 2 The maintenance and cure decisions relied on by the Court are all, like the Marceau case, instances of injuries incurred during leave-time activities, and are inapposite here. Whether, on the facts in the case before us, the petitioner would be found to have been working "in the service of his ship" for purposes of the doctrine of maintenance and cure, we need not decide, for the Court advances no reason for assimilating the issue of Jones Act coverage to that of the availability of maintenance and cure. </s> [Footnote 3 I think the Court of Appeals was mistaken in considering that the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act would apply, for that Act, 33 U.S.C. 902 (3), 903 (a) (1), excludes from its coverage a "member of a crew of any vessel," which this petitioner admittedly was. </s> [Footnote 4 The charge, in pertinent part, read as follows: "While it seemed at the outset to be some question as to whether or not he was a member of the crew, it does not seem to be seriously disputed that at the time of the accident he was a member of the crew. "Whether or not at the time of the accident he was engaged in [361 U.S. 129, 137] functions which are normally performed by a member of the crew, and as he stated, some functions he gave in detail, that he did perform various functions prior to the date of the accident, are for you to determine." Subsequently the court amended the charge in this language: "I did state that it is not seriously disputed that the plaintiff was not a member of the crew. Apparently according to the defendant's statement, he says that is a serious issue. "So I will leave that as an issue." </s> [Footnote 5 The two lower courts seem to have failed to come sharply to grips with the distinction between the two separate requirements of the Jones Act, namely, that the plaintiff have the status of a "seaman," and that his injury must have been suffered "in the course of his employment" as such. Most of the Jones Act cases decided by this Court have involved only the "seaman" issue. See, e. g., Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370 ; Grimes v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co., 356 U.S. 252 ; Butler v. Whiteman, 356 U.S. 271 . Such decisions are only remotely apposite here where the petitioner's status as a seaman is not disputed. It only confuses things to equate the issue of being a "seaman" with the issue whether the injuries suffered were "in the course of his employment." </s> [Footnote 6 Shore leave cases such as Marceau, supra, present a different problem. </s> [361 U.S. 129, 138]

United States Supreme Court FIREFIGHTERS v. BOSTON CHAPTER, NAACP(1983) No. 82-185 Argued: April 18, 1983Decided: May 16, 1983 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 82-246, Boston Police Patrolmen's Assn., Inc. v. Castro et al.; and No. 82-259, Beecher et al. v. Boston Chapter, NAACP, et al., also on certiorari to the same court. </s> Held: </s> The Court of Appeals' judgment - upholding the District Court's orders enjoining the Boston Police and Fire Departments from laying off policemen and firemen in a manner that would reduce the percentage of minority officers below the level obtaining at the commencement of the layoffs - is vacated, and the cases are remanded for consideration of mootness in light of Massachusetts' intervening enactment of legislation relating to the layoffs. </s> 679 F.2d 965, vacated and remanded. </s> John F. McMahon argued the cause for petitioners in Nos. 82-185 and 82-246 and filed briefs for petitioner in No. 82-185. Thomas A. Barnico, Assistant Attorney General of Massachusetts, argued the cause pro hac vice for petitioners in No. 82-259. With him on the briefs were Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General, Thomas R. Kiley, First Assistant Attorney General, E. Michael Sloman, Assistant Attorney General, and Marc S. Seigle, Special Assistant Attorney General. Kevin P. Phillips filed a brief for petitioner in No. 82-246. </s> James S. Dittmar argued the cause for respondents in all cases. With him on the brief were Judith Bernstein Tracy, Peggy A. Wiesenberg, and Gerald Gillerman.Fn </s> Fn [461 U.S. 477, 477] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Cooper, Carter G. Phillips, Brian K. Landsberg, Walter W. Barnett, and Dennis J. Dimsey for the United States; by Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, and Daniel R. Levinson for the Equal Employment Advisory Council; by J. Albert [461 U.S. 477, 478] Woll, Michael H. Gottesman, Robert M. Weinberg, George H. Cohen, and Laurence Gold for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al.; by Edward J. Hickey, Jr., Michael S. Wolly, and Erick J. Genser for the International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO; by Robert A. Helman, Michele Odorizzi, Daniel M. Harris, Justin J. Finger, Jeffrey P. Sinensky, and Meyer Eisenberg for the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith; and by Daniel J. Popeo, Paul D. Kamenar, and Nicholas E. Calio for the Washington Legal Foundation. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by J. Clay Smith, Jr., and Herbert O. Reid, Sr., for the National Bar Association, Inc., et al.; by O. Peter Sherwood, Clyde E. Murphy, and Barry L. Goldstein for the City of Detroit; by Joaquin G. Avila, Morris J. Baller, and Carmen A. Estrada for the League of United American Citizens et al.; by Robert L. Harris and Eva Jefferson Paterson for the Officers For Justice et al.; by Judith I. Avner and Anne E. Simon for the National Organization for Women et al.; by Robert H. Chanin, Richard B. Sobol, and Michael B. Trister for the National Education Association; by E. Richard Larson, Burt Neuborne, and Paulette M. Caldwell for the National Black Association et al.; and by Robert Lipshutz, pro se, for Robert Lipshutz et al. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Ronald A. Zumbrun and John H. Findley for the Pacific Legal Foundation; by Jack Greenberg and Eric Schnapper for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.; by Arthur Kinoy and Michael Ratner for the Affirmative Action Coordinating Center et al.; and by Walter S. Nussbaum and Donald J. Mooney, Jr., for the Detroit Police Officers Association. [461 U.S. 477, 478] </s> PER CURIAM. </s> In these cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the District Court's August 7, 1981, orders enjoining the Boston Police and Fire Departments from laying off policemen and firefighters in a manner that would reduce the percentage of minority officers below the level obtaining at the commencement of layoffs in July 1981. 679 F.2d 965 (1982). These orders had the effect of partially superseding the operation of the State's statutory last-hired, first-fired scheme for civil service layoffs, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 31, 39 (West 1979). Following the Court of Appeals' decision, Massachusetts enacted legislation providing the city of Boston with new revenues, requiring reinstatement of all police and firefighters laid off during the reductions in force, [461 U.S. 477, 479] securing these personnel against future layoffs for fiscal reasons, and requiring the maintenance of minimum staffing levels in the Police and Fire Departments through June 30, 1983. See 1982 Mass. Acts, ch. 190, 25. In light of these changed circumstances, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for consideration of mootness in light of 1982 Mass. Acts, ch. 190, 25. </s> It is so ordered. </s> JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. </s> [461 U.S. 477, 480]

United States Supreme Court ABINGTON SCHOOL DIST. v. SCHEMPP(1963) No. 142 Argued: Decided: June 17, 1963 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 119, Murray et al. v. Curlett et al., Constituting the Board of School Commissioners of Baltimore City, on certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, argued February 27, 1963. </s> Because of the prohibition of the First Amendment against the enactment by Congress of any law "respecting an establishment of religion," which is made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, no state law or school board may require that passages from the Bible be read or that the Lord's Prayer be recited in the public schools of a State at the beginning of each school day - even if individual students may be excused from attending or participating in such exercises upon written request of their parents. Pp. 205-227. </s> 201 F. Supp. 815, affirmed. </s> 228 Md. 239, 179 A. 2d 698, reversed. </s> John D. Killian III, Deputy Attorney General of Pennsylvania, and Philip H. Ward III argued the cause for appellants in No. 142. With them on the brief were David Stahl, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Percival R. Rieder and C. Brewster Rhoads. </s> Henry W. Sawyer III argued the cause for appellees in No. 142. With him on the brief was Wayland H. Elsbree. </s> Leonard J. Kerpelman argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners in No. 119. </s> Francis B. Burch and George W. Baker, Jr. argued the cause for respondents in No. 119. With them on the brief were Nelson B. Seidman and Philip Z. Altfeld. [374 U.S. 203, 204] </s> Thomas B. Finan, Attorney General of Maryland, argued the cause for the State of Maryland, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance in No. 119. With him on the brief were James P. Garland and Robert F. Sweeney, Assistant Attorneys General of Maryland. Richmond M. Flowers, Attorney General of Alabama, Robert Pickrell, Attorney General of Arizona, Bruce Bennett, Attorney General of Arkansas, Richard W. Ervin, Attorney General of Florida, Eugene Cook, Attorney General of Georgia, Allan G. Shepard, Attorney General of Idaho, William M. Ferguson, Attorney General of Kansas, Jack P. F. Gremillion, Attorney General of Louisiana, Frank E. Hancock, Attorney General of Maine, Joe T. Patterson, Attorney General of Mississippi, William Maynard, Attorney General of New Hampshire, Arthur J. Sills, Attorney General of New Jersey, Earl E. Hartley, Attorney General of New Mexico, Thomas Wade Bruton, Attorney General of North Carolina, J. Joseph Nugent, Attorney General of Rhode Island, Daniel R. McLeod, Attorney General of South Carolina, Frank R. Farrar, Attorney General of South Dakota, and George F. McCanless, Attorney General of Tennessee, joined in the brief on behalf of their respective States, as amici curiae. </s> Briefs of amici curiae, urging affirmance in No. 142 and reversal in No. 119, were filed by Morris B. Abram, Edwin J. Lukas, Burnett Roth, Arnold Forster, Paul Hartman, Theodore Leskes and Sol Rabkin for the American Jewish Committee et al.; by Leo Pfeffer, Lewis H. Weinstein, Albert Wald, Shad Polier, Samuel Lawrence Brennglass and Theodore R. Mann for the Synagogue Council of America et al.; and by Herbert A. Wolff, Leo Rosen, Morris L. Ernst and Nancy F. Wechsler for the American Ethical Union. [374 U.S. 203, 205] </s> MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Once again we are called upon to consider the scope of the provision of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution which declares that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . ." These companion cases present the issues in the context of state action requiring that schools begin each day with readings from the Bible. While raising the basic questions under slightly different factual situations, the cases permit of joint treatment. In light of the history of the First Amendment and of our cases interpreting and applying its requirements, we hold that the practices at issue and the laws requiring them are unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. </s> I. </s> The Facts in Each Case: No. 142. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by law, 24 Pa. Stat. 15-1516, as amended, Pub. Law 1928 (Supp. 1960) Dec. 17, 1959, requires that "At least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, without comment, at the opening of each public school on each school day. Any child shall be excused from such Bible reading, or attending such Bible reading, upon the written request of his parent or guardian." The Schempp family, husband and wife and two of their three children, brought suit to enjoin enforcement of the statute, contending that their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States are, have been, and will continue to be violated unless this statute be declared unconstitutional as violative of these provisions of the First Amendment. They sought to enjoin the appellant school district, wherein the Schempp children attend school, and its officers and the [374 U.S. 203, 206] Superintendent of Public Instruction of the Commonwealth from continuing to conduct such readings and recitation of the Lord's Prayer in the public schools of the district pursuant to the statute. A three-judge statutory District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the statute is violative of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as applied to the States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and directed that appropriate injunctive relief issue. 201 F. Supp. 815. 1 On appeal by the District, its officials and the Superintendent, under 28 U.S.C. 1253, we noted probable jurisdiction. 371 U.S. 807 . </s> The appellees Edward Lewis Schempp, his wife Sidney, and their children, Roger and Donna, are of the Unitarian faith and are members of the Unitarian church in Germantown, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where they, as well as another son, Ellory, regularly attend religious services. The latter was originally a party but having graduated from the school system pendente lite was voluntarily dismissed from the action. The other children attend the Abington Senior High School, which is a public school operated by appellant district. </s> On each school day at the Abington Senior High School between 8:15 and 8:30 a. m., while the pupils are attending their home rooms or advisory sections, opening exercises [374 U.S. 203, 207] are conducted pursuant to the statute. The exercises are broadcast into each room in the school building through an intercommunications system and are conducted under the supervision of a teacher by students attending the school's radio and television workshop. Selected students from this course gather each morning in the school's workshop studio for the exercises, which include readings by one of the students of 10 verses of the Holy Bible, broadcast to each room in the building. This is followed by the recitation of the Lord's Prayer, likewise over the intercommunications system, but also by the students in the various classrooms, who are asked to stand and join in repeating the prayer in unison. The exercises are closed with the flag salute and such pertinent announcements as are of interest to the students. Participation in the opening exercises, as directed by the statute, is voluntary. The student reading the verses from the Bible may select the passages and read from any version he chooses, although the only copies furnished by the school are the King James version, copies of which were circulated to each teacher by the school district. During the period in which the exercises have been conducted the King James, the Douay and the Revised Standard versions of the Bible have been used, as well as the Jewish Holy Scriptures. There are no prefatory statements, no questions asked or solicited, no comments or explanations made and no interpretations given at or during the exercises. The students and parents are advised that the student may absent himself from the classroom or, should he elect to remain, not participate in the exercises. </s> It appears from the record that in schools not having an intercommunications system the Bible reading and the recitation of the Lord's Prayer were conducted by the [374 U.S. 203, 208] home-room teacher, 2 who chose the text of the verses and read them herself or had students read them in rotation or by volunteers. This was followed by a standing recitation of the Lord's Prayer, together with the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag by the class in unison and a closing announcement of routine school items of interest. </s> At the first trial Edward Schempp and the children testified as to specific religious doctrines purveyed by a literal reading of the Bible "which were contrary to the religious beliefs which they held and to their familial teaching." 177 F. Supp. 398, 400. The children testified that all of the doctrines to which they referred were read to them at various times as part of the exercises. Edward Schempp testified at the second trial that he had considered having Roger and Donna excused from attendance at the exercises but decided against it for several reasons, including his belief that the children's relationships with their teachers and classmates would be adversely affected. 3 </s> [374 U.S. 203, 209] </s> Expert testimony was introduced by both appellants and appellees at the first trial, which testimony was summarized by the trial court as follows: </s> "Dr. Solomon Grayzel testified that there were marked differences between the Jewish Holy Scriptures and the Christian Holy Bible, the most obvious of which was the absence of the New Testament in the Jewish Holy Scriptures. Dr. Grayzel testified that portions of the New Testament were offensive to Jewish tradition and that, from the standpoint of Jewish faith, the concept of Jesus Christ as the Son of God was `practically blasphemous.' He cited instances in the New Testament which, assertedly, were not only sectarian in nature but tended to bring the Jews into ridicule or scorn. Dr. Grayzel gave as his expert opinion that such material from the New Testament could be explained to Jewish children in such a way as to do no harm to them. But if portions of the New Testament were read without explanation, they could be, and in his specific experience with children Dr. Grayzel observed, had been, psychologically harmful to the child and had caused a divisive force within the social media of the school. </s> "Dr. Grayzel also testified that there was significant difference in attitude with regard to the respective Books of the Jewish and Christian Religions in that Judaism attaches no special significance to the reading of the Bible per se and that the Jewish Holy Scriptures are source materials to be studied. But Dr. Grayzel did state that many portions of the New, [374 U.S. 203, 210] as well as of the Old, Testament contained passages of great literary and moral value. </s> "Dr. Luther A. Weigle, an expert witness for the defense, testified in some detail as to the reasons for and the methods employed in developing the King James and the Revised Standard Versions of the Bible. On direct examination, Dr. Weigle stated that the Bible was non-sectarian. He later stated that the phrase `non-sectarian' meant to him non-sectarian within the Christian faiths. Dr. Weigle stated that his definition of the Holy Bible would include the Jewish Holy Scriptures, but also stated that the `Holy Bible' would not be complete without the New Testament. He stated that the New Testament `conveyed the message of Christians.' In his opinion, reading of the Holy Scriptures to the exclusion of the New Testament would be a sectarian practice. Dr. Weigle stated that the Bible was of great moral, historical and literary value. This is conceded by all the parties and is also the view of the court." 177 F. Supp. 398, 401-402. </s> The trial court, in striking down the practices and the statute requiring them, made specific findings of fact that the children's attendance at Abington Senior High School is compulsory and that the practice of reading 10 verses from the Bible is also compelled by law. It also found that: </s> "The reading of the verses, even without comment, possesses a devotional and religious character and constitutes in effect a religious observance. The devotional and religious nature of the morning exercises is made all the more apparent by the fact that the Bible reading is followed immediately by a recital in unison by the pupils of the Lord's Prayer. The fact that some pupils, or theoretically all pupils, might be excused from attendance at the exercises [374 U.S. 203, 211] does not mitigate the obligatory nature of the ceremony for . . . Section 1516 . . . unequivocally requires the exercises to be held every school day in every school in the Commonwealth. The exercises are held in the school buildings and perforce are conducted by and under the authority of the local school authorities and during school sessions. Since the statute requires the reading of the `Holy Bible,' a Christian document, the practice . . . prefers the Christian religion. The record demonstrates that it was the intention of . . . the Commonwealth . . . to introduce a religious ceremony into the public schools of the Commonwealth." 201 F. Supp., at 819. </s> No. 119. In 1905 the Board of School Commissioners of Baltimore City adopted a rule pursuant to Art. 77, 202 of the Annotated Code of Maryland. The rule provided for the holding of opening exercises in the schools of the city, consisting primarily of the "reading, without comment, of a chapter in the Holy Bible and/or the use of the Lord's Prayer." The petitioners, Mrs. Madalyn Murray and her son, William J. Murray III, are both professed atheists. Following unsuccessful attempts to have the respondent school board rescind the rule, this suit was filed for mandamus to compel its rescission and cancellation. It was alleged that William was a student in a public school of the city and Mrs. Murray, his mother, was a taxpayer therein; that it was the practice under the rule to have a reading on each school morning from the King James version of the Bible; that at petitioners' insistence the rule was amended 4 to permit children to [374 U.S. 203, 212] be excused from the exercise on request of the parent and that William had been excused pursuant thereto; that nevertheless the rule as amended was in violation of the petitioners' rights "to freedom of religion under the First and Fourteenth Amendments" and in violation of "the principle of separation between church and state, contained therein. . . ." The petition particularized the petitioners' atheistic beliefs and stated that the rule, as practiced, violated their rights </s> "in that it threatens their religious liberty by placing a premium on belief as against non-belief and subjects their freedom of conscience to the rule of the majority; it pronounces belief in God as the source of all moral and spiritual values, equating these values with religious values, and thereby renders sinister, alien and suspect the beliefs and ideals of your Petitioners, promoting doubt and question of their morality, good citizenship and good faith." </s> The respondents demurred and the trial court, recognizing that the demurrer admitted all facts well pleaded, sustained it without leave to amend. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed, the majority of four justices holding the exercise not in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, with three justices dissenting. 228 Md. 239, 179 A. 2d 698. We granted certiorari. 371 U.S. 809 . </s> II. </s> It is true that religion has been closely identified with our history and government. As we said in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 434 (1962), "The history of man is inseparable from the history of religion. And . . . since [374 U.S. 203, 213] the beginning of that history many people have devoutly believed that `More things are wrought by prayer than this world dreams of.'" In Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952), we gave specific recognition to the proposition that "[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." The fact that the Founding Fathers believed devotedly that there was a God and that the unalienable rights of man were rooted in Him is clearly evidenced in their writings, from the Mayflower Compact to the Constitution itself. This background is evidenced today in our public life through the continuance in our oaths of office from the Presidency to the Alderman of the final supplication, "So help me God." Likewise each House of the Congress provides through its Chaplain an opening prayer, and the sessions of this Court are declared open by the crier in a short ceremony, the final phrase of which invokes the grace of God. Again, there are such manifestations in our military forces, where those of our citizens who are under the restrictions of military service wish to engage in voluntary worship. Indeed, only last year an official survey of the country indicated that 64% of our people have church membership, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States (83d ed. 1962), 48, while less than 3% profess no religion whatever. Id., at p. 46. It can be truly said, therefore, that today, as in the beginning, our national life reflects a religious people who, in the words of Madison, are "earnestly praying, as . . . in duty bound, that the Supreme Lawgiver of the Universe . . . guide them into every measure which may be worthy of his [blessing . . . .]" Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, quoted in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 71 -72 (1947) (Appendix to dissenting opinion of Rutledge, J.). [374 U.S. 203, 214] </s> This is not to say, however, that religion has been so identified with our history and government that religious freedom is not likewise as strongly imbedded in our public and private life. Nothing but the most telling of personal experiences in religious persecution suffered by our forebears, see Everson v. Board of Education, supra, at 8-11, could have planted our belief in liberty of religious opinion any more deeply in our heritage. It is true that this liberty frequently was not realized by the colonists, but this is readily accountable by their close ties to the Mother Country. 5 However, the views of Madison and Jefferson, preceded by Roger Williams, 6 came to be incorporated not only in the Federal Constitution but likewise in those of most of our States. This freedom to worship was indispensable in a country whose people came from the four quarters of the earth and brought with them a diversity of religious opinion. Today authorities list 83 separate religious bodies, each with membership exceeding 50,000, existing among our people, as well as innumerable smaller groups. Bureau of the Census. op. cit., supra, at 46-47. </s> III. </s> Almost a hundred years ago in Minor v. Board of Education of Cincinnati, 7 Judge Alphonso Taft, father [374 U.S. 203, 215] of the revered Chief Justice, in an unpublished opinion stated the ideal of our people as to religious freedom as one of </s> "absolute equality before the law, of all religious opinions and sects . . . . </s> . . . . . </s> "The government is neutral, and, while protecting all, it prefers none, and it disparages none." </s> Before examining this "neutral" position in which the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment place our Government it is well that we discuss the reach of the Amendment under the cases of this Court. </s> First, this Court has decisively settled that the First Amendment's mandate that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof" has been made wholly applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Twenty-three years ago in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940), this Court, through Mr. Justice Roberts, said: </s> "The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that [Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment. The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment [374 U.S. 203, 216] has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws. . . ." 8 </s> In a series of cases since Cantwell the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that doctrine, and we do so now. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943); Everson v. Board of Education, supra; Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 210 -211 (1948); Zorach v. Clauson, supra; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); and Engel v. Vitale, supra. </s> Second, this Court has rejected unequivocally the contention that the Establishment Clause forbids only governmental preference of one religion over another. Almost 20 years ago in Everson, supra, at 15, the Court said that "[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another." And Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting, agreed: </s> "There is no answer to the proposition . . . that the effect of the religious freedom Amendment to our Constitution was to take every form of propagation of religion out of the realm of things which could directly or indirectly be made public business and thereby be supported in whole or in part at taxpayers' expense. . . . This freedom was first in the Bill of Rights because it was first in the forefathers' minds; it was set forth in absolute terms, and its strength is its rigidity." Id., at 26. [374 U.S. 203, 217] </s> Further, Mr. Justice Rutledge, joined by Justices Frankfurter, Jackson and Burton, declared: </s> "The [First] Amendment's purpose was not to strike merely at the official establishment of a single sect, creed or religion, outlawing only a formal relation such as had prevailed in England and some of the colonies. Necessarily it was to uproot all such relationships. But the object was broader than separating church and state in this narrow sense. It was to create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion." Id., at 31-32. </s> The same conclusion has been firmly maintained ever since that time, see Illinois ex rel. McCollum, supra, at pp. 210-211; McGowan v. Maryland, supra, at 442-443; Torcaso v. Watkins, supra, at 492-493, 495, and we reaffirm it now. </s> While none of the parties to either of these cases has questioned these basic conclusions of the Court, both of which have been long established, recognized and consistently reaffirmed, others continue to question their history, logic and efficacy. Such contentions, in the light of the consistent interpretation in cases of this Court, seem entirely untenable and of value only as academic exercises. </s> IV. </s> The interrelationship of the Establishment and the Free Exercise Clauses was first touched upon by Mr. Justice Roberts for the Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, at 303-304, where it was said that their "inhibition of legislation" had </s> "a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of [374 U.S. 203, 218] conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts, - freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be." </s> A half dozen years later in Everson v. Board of Education, supra, at 14-15, this Court, through MR. JUSTICE BLACK, stated that the "scope of the First Amendment . . . was designed forever to suppress" the establishment of religion or the prohibition of the free exercise thereof. In short, the Court held that the Amendment </s> "requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them." Id., at 18. </s> And Mr. Justice Jackson, in dissent, declared that public schools are organized </s> "on the premise that secular education can be isolated from all religious teaching so that the school can inculcate all needed temporal knowledge and also maintain a strict and lofty neutrality as to religion. The assumption is that after the individual has been instructed in worldly wisdom he will be better fitted to choose his religion." Id., at 23-24. </s> Moreover, all of the four dissenters, speaking through Mr. Justice Rutledge, agreed that </s> "Our constitutional policy . . . does not deny the value or the necessity for religious training, teaching or observance. Rather it secures their free exercise. But to that end it does deny that the state can undertake or sustain them in any form or degree. For this [374 U.S. 203, 219] reason the sphere of religious activity, as distinguished from the secular intellectual liberties, has been given the twofold protection and, as the state cannot forbid, neither can it perform or aid in performing the religious function. The dual prohibition makes that function altogether private." Id., at 52. </s> Only one year later the Court was asked to reconsider and repudiate the doctrine of these cases in McCollum v. Board of Education. It was argued that "historically the First Amendment was intended to forbid only government preference of one religion over another . . . . In addition they ask that we distinguish or overrule our holding in the Everson case that the Fourteenth Amendment made the `establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment applicable as a prohibition against the States." 333 U.S., at 211 . The Court, with Mr. Justice Reed alone dissenting, was unable to "accept either of these contentions." Ibid. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices Jackson, Rutledge and Burton, wrote a very comprehensive and scholarly concurrence in which he said that "[s]eparation is a requirement to abstain from fusing functions of Government and of religious sects, not merely to treat them all equally." Id., at 227. Continuing, he stated that: </s> "the Constitution . . . prohibited the Government common to all from becoming embroiled, however innocently, in the destructive religious conflicts of which the history of even this country records some dark pages." Id., at 228. </s> In 1952 in Zorach v. Clauson, supra, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS for the Court reiterated: </s> "There cannot be the slightest doubt that the First Amendment reflects the philosophy that Church and State should be separated. And so far as interference with the `free exercise' of religion and an [374 U.S. 203, 220] `establishment' of religion are concerned, the separation must be complete and unequivocal. The First Amendment within the scope of its coverage permits no exception; the prohibition is absolute. The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State. Rather, it studiously defines the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall be no concert or union or dependency one on the other. That is the common sense of the matter." 343 U.S., at 312 . </s> And then in 1961 in McGowan v. Maryland and in Torcaso v. Watkins each of these cases was discussed and approved. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN in McGowan, for a unanimous Court on this point, said: </s> "But, the First Amendment, in its final form, did not simply bar a congressional enactment establishing a church; it forbade all laws respecting an establishment of religion. Thus, this Court has given the Amendment a `broad interpretation . . . in the light of its history and the evils it was designed forever to suppress. . . .'" 366 U.S., at 441 -442. </s> And MR. JUSTICE BLACK for the Court in Torcaso, without dissent but with Justices Frankfurter and HARLAN concurring in the result, used this language: </s> "We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person `to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.' Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs." 367 U.S., at 495 . </s> Finally, in Engel v. Vitale, only last year, these principles were so universally recognized that the Court, without [374 U.S. 203, 221] the citation of a single case and over the sole dissent of MR. JUSTICE STEWART, reaffirmed them. The Court found the 22-word prayer used in "New York's program of daily classroom invocation of God's blessings as prescribed in the Regents' prayer . . . [to be] a religious activity." 370 U.S., at 424 . It held that "it is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government." Id., at 425. In discussing the reach of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment the Court said: </s> "Although these two clauses may in certain instances overlap, they forbid two quite different kinds of governmental encroachment upon religious freedom. The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce non-observing individuals or not. This is not to say, of course, that laws officially prescribing a particular form of religious worship do not involve coercion of such individuals. When the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain." Id., at 430-431. </s> And in further elaboration the Court found that the "first and most immediate purpose [of the Establishment Clause] rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion." Id., at 431. When government, the Court said, allies itself with one particular form of religion, the [374 U.S. 203, 222] inevitable result is that it incurs "the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of those who held contrary beliefs." Ibid. </s> V. </s> The wholesome "neutrality" of which this Court's cases speak thus stems from a recognition of the teachings of history that powerful sects or groups might bring about a fusion of governmental and religious functions or a concert or dependency of one upon the other to the end that official support of the State or Federal Government would be placed behind the tenets of one or of all orthodoxies. This the Establishment Clause prohibits. And a further reason for neutrality is found in the Free Exercise Clause, which recognizes the value of religious training, teaching and observance and, more particularly, the right of every person to freely choose his own course with reference thereto, free of any compulsion from the state. This the Free Exercise Clause guarantees. Thus, as we have seen, the two clauses may overlap. As we have indicated, the Establishment Clause has been directly considered by this Court eight times in the past score of years and, with only one Justice dissenting on the point, it has consistently held that the clause withdrew all legislative power respecting religious belief or the expression thereof. The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. Everson v. Board of Education, supra; McGowan v. Maryland, supra, at 442. The Free Exercise Clause, likewise considered many times here, withdraws from legislative power, state and federal, the exertion of any restraint on the free exercise [374 U.S. 203, 223] of religion. Its purpose is to secure religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil authority. Hence it is necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion. The distinction between the two clauses is apparent - a violation of the Free Exercise Clause is predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause violation need not be so attended. </s> Applying the Establishment Clause principles to the cases at bar we find that the States are requiring the selection and reading at the opening of the school day of verses from the Holy Bible and the recitation of the Lord's Prayer by the students in unison. These exercises are prescribed as part of the curricular activities of students who are required by law to attend school. They are held in the school buildings under the supervision and with the participation of teachers employed in those schools. None of these factors, other than compulsory school attendance, was present in the program upheld in Zorach v. Clauson. The trial court in No. 142 has found that such an opening exercise is a religious ceremony and was intended by the State to be so. We agree with the trial court's finding as to the religious character of the exercises. Given that finding, the exercises and the law requiring them are in violation of the Establishment Clause. </s> There is no such specific finding as to the religious character of the exercises in No. 119, and the State contends (as does the State in No. 142) that the program is an effort to extend its benefits to all public school children without regard to their religious belief. Included within its secular purposes, it says, are the promotion of moral values, the contradiction to the materialistic trends of our times, the perpetuation of our institutions and the teaching of literature. The case came up [374 U.S. 203, 224] on demurrer, of course, to a petition which alleged that the uniform practice under the rule had been to read from the King James version of the Bible and that the exercise was sectarian. The short answer, therefore, is that the religious character of the exercise was admitted by the State. But even if its purpose is not strictly religious, it is sought to be accomplished through readings, without comment, from the Bible. Surely the place of the Bible as an instrument of religion cannot be gainsaid, and the State's recognition of the pervading religious character of the ceremony is evident from the rule's specific permission of the alternative use of the Catholic Douay version as well as the recent amendment permitting nonattendance at the exercises. None of these factors is consistent with the contention that the Bible is here used either as an instrument for nonreligious moral inspiration or as a reference for the teaching of secular subjects. </s> The conclusion follows that in both cases the laws require religious exercises and such exercises are being conducted in direct violation of the rights of the appellees and petitioners. 9 Nor are these required exercises mitigated by the fact that individual students may absent [374 U.S. 203, 225] themselves upon parental request, for that fact furnishes no defense to a claim of unconstitutionality under the Establishment Clause. See Engel v. Vitale, supra, at 430. Further, it is no defense to urge that the religious practices here may be relatively minor encroachments on the First Amendment. The breach of neutrality that is today a trickling stream may all too soon become a raging torrent and, in the words of Madison, "it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties." Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, quoted in Everson, supra, at 65. </s> It is insisted that unless these religious exercises are permitted a "religion of secularism" is established in the schools. We agree of course that the State may not establish a "religion of secularism" in the sense of affirmatively opposing or showing hostility to religion, thus "preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do believe." Zorach v. Clauson, supra, at 314. We do not agree, however, that this decision in any sense has that effect. In addition, it might well be said that one's education is not complete without a study of comparative religion or the history of religion and its relationship to the advancement of civilization. It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its literary and historic qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, may not be effected consistently with the First Amendment. But the exercises here do not fall into those categories. They are religious exercises, required by the States in violation of the command of the First Amendment that the Government maintain strict neutrality, neither aiding nor opposing religion. </s> Finally, we cannot accept that the concept of neutrality, which does not permit a State to require a religious exercise even with the consent of the majority of those [374 U.S. 203, 226] affected, collides with the majority's right to free exercise of religion. 10 While the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the use of state action to deny the rights of free exercise to anyone, it has never meant that a majority could use the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs. Such a contention was effectively answered by Mr. Justice Jackson for the Court in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943): </s> "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to . . . freedom of worship . . . and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections." </s> The place of religion in our society is an exalted one, achieved through a long tradition of reliance on the home, the church and the inviolable citadel of the individual heart and mind. We have come to recognize through bitter experience that it is not within the power of government to invade that citadel, whether its purpose or effect be to aid or oppose, to advance or retard. In the relationship between man and religion, the State is firmly committed to a position of neutrality. Though the application of that rule requires interpretation of a delicate sort, the rule itself is clearly and concisely stated in the words of the First Amendment. Applying that rule to the facts of these cases, we affirm the judgment in No. 142. [374 U.S. 203, 227] In No. 119, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the Maryland Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The action was brought in 1958, prior to the 1959 amendment of 15-1516 authorizing a child's nonattendance at the exercises upon parental request. The three-judge court held the statute and the practices complained of unconstitutional under both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. 177 F. Supp. 398. Pending appeal to this Court by the school district, the statute was so amended, and we vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. 364 U.S. 298 . The same three-judge court granted appellees' motion to amend the pleadings, 195 F. Supp. 518, held a hearing on the amended pleadings and rendered the judgment, 201 F. Supp. 815, from which appeal is now taken. </s> [Footnote 2 The statute as amended imposes no penalty upon a teacher refusing to obey its mandate. However, it remains to be seen whether one refusing could have his contract of employment terminated for "wilful violation of the school laws." 24 Pa. Stat. (Supp. 1960) 11-1122. </s> [Footnote 3 The trial court summarized his testimony as follows: </s> "Edward Schempp, the children's father, testified that after careful consideration he had decided that he should not have Roger or Donna excused from attendance at these morning ceremonies. Among his reasons were the following. He said that he thought his children would be `labeled as "odd balls"' before their teachers and classmates every school day; that children, like Roger's and Donna's classmates, were liable `to lump all particular religious difference[s] or religious objections [together] as "atheism"' and that today the word `atheism' is often connected with `atheistic communism,' and has `very bad' connotations, such as `un-American' or `anti-Red,' with overtones of possible immorality. Mr. Schempp pointed out that due to the events of the morning exercises following in rapid succession, the Bible reading, the Lord's Prayer, the Flag Salute, and [374 U.S. 203, 209] the announcements, excusing his children from the Bible reading would mean that probably they would miss hearing the announcements so important to children. He testified also that if Roger and Donna were excused from Bible reading they would have to stand in the hall outside their `homeroom' and that this carried with it the imputation of punishment for bad conduct." 201 F. Supp., at 818. </s> [Footnote 4 The rule as amended provides as follows: </s> "Opening Exercises. Each school, either collectively or in classes, shall be opened by the reading, without comment, of a chapter in the Holy Bible and/or the use of the Lord's Prayer. The Douay version may be used by those pupils who prefer it. Appropriate [374 U.S. 203, 211] patriotic exercises should be held as a part of the general opening exercise of the school or class. Any child shall be excused from participating in the opening exercises or from attending the opening exercises upon the written request of his parent or guardian." </s> [Footnote 5 There were established churches in at least eight of the original colonies, and various degrees of religious support in others as late as the Revolutionary War. See Engel v. Vitale, supra, at 428, n. 10. </s> [Footnote 6 "There goes many a ship to sea, with many hundred souls in one ship, whose weal and woe is common, and is a true picture of a commonwealth, or human combination, or society. It hath fallen out sometimes, that both Papists and Protestants, Jews and Turks, may be embarked in one ship; upon which supposal, I affirm that all the liberty of conscience I ever pleaded for, turns upon these two hinges, that none of the Papists, Protestants, Jews, or Turks be forced to come to the ship's prayers or worship, nor compelled from their own particular prayers or worship, if they practice any." </s> [Footnote 7 Superior Court of Cincinnati, February 1870. The opinion is not reported but is published under the title, The Bible in the Common [374 U.S. 203, 215] Schools (Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co. 1870). Judge Taft's views, expressed in dissent, prevailed on appeal. See Board of Education of Cincinnati v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211, 253 (1872), in which the Ohio Supreme Court held that: </s> "The great bulk of human affairs and human interests is left by any free government to individual enterprise and individual action. Religion is eminently one of these interests, lying outside the true and legitimate province of government." </s> [Footnote 8 Application to the States of other clauses of the First Amendment obtained even before Cantwell. Almost 40 years ago in the opinion of the Court in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925), Mr. Justice Sanford said: "For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press - which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress - are among the fundamental personal rights and `liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States." </s> [Footnote 9 It goes without saying that the laws and practices involved here can be challenged only by persons having standing to complain. But the requirements for standing to challenge state action under the Establishment Clause, unlike those relating to the Free Exercise Clause, do not include proof that particular religious freedoms are infringed. McGowan v. Maryland, supra, at 429-430. The parties here are school children and their parents, who are directly affected by the laws and practices against which their complaints are directed. These interests surely suffice to give the parties standing to complain. See Engel v. Vitale, supra. Cf. McCollum v. Board of Education, supra; Everson v. Board of Education, supra. Compare Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952), which involved the same substantive issues presented here. The appeal was there dismissed upon the graduation of the school child involved and because of the appellants' failure to establish standing as taxpayers. </s> [Footnote 10 We are not of course presented with and therefore do not pass upon a situation such as military service, where the Government regulates the temporal and geographic environment of individuals to a point that, unless it permits voluntary religious services to be conducted with the use of government facilities, military personnel would be unable to engage in the practice of their faiths. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring. </s> I join the opinion of the Court and add a few words in explanation. </s> While the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment is written in terms of what the State may not require of the individual, the Establishment Clause, serving the same goal of individual religious freedom, is written in different terms. </s> Establishment of a religion can be achieved in several ways. The church and state can be one; the church may control the state or the state may control the church; or the relationship may take one of several possible forms of a working arrangement between the two bodies. 1 Under all of these arrangements the church typically has a place in the state's budget, and church law usually governs such matters as baptism, marriage, divorce and separation, at least for its members and sometimes for the entire body politic. 2 Education too, is usually high on the priority [374 U.S. 203, 228] list of church interests. 3 In the past schools were often made the exclusive responsibility of the church. Today in some state-church countries the state runs the public schools, but compulsory religious exercises are often required of some or all students. Thus, under the agreement Franco made with the Holy See when he came to power in Spain, "The Church regained its place in the national budget. It insists on baptizing all children and has made the catechism obligatory in state schools." 4 </s> The vice of all such arrangements under the Establishment Clause is that the state is lending its assistance to a church's efforts to gain and keep adherents. Under the First Amendment it is strictly a matter for the individual and his church as to what church he will belong to and how much support, in the way of belief, time, activity or money, he will give to it. "This pure Religious Liberty" "declared . . . [all forms of church-state relationships] and their fundamental idea to be oppressions of conscience and abridgments of that liberty which God and nature had conferred on every living soul." 5 </s> In these cases we have no coercive religious exercise aimed at making the students conform. The prayers announced are not compulsory, though some may think they have that indirect effect because the nonconformist student may be induced to participate for fear of being called an "oddball." But that coercion, if it be present, [374 U.S. 203, 229] has not been shown; so the vices of the present regimes are different. </s> These regimes violate the Establishment Clause in two different ways. In each case the State is conducting a religious exercise; and, as the Court holds, that cannot be done without violating the "neutrality" required of the State by the balance of power between individual, church and state that has been struck by the First Amendment. But the Establishment Clause is not limited to precluding the State itself from conducting religious exercises. It also forbids the State to employ its facilities or funds in a way that gives any church, or all churches, greater strength in our society than it would have by relying on its members alone. Thus, the present regimes must fall under that clause for the additional reason that public funds, though small in amount, are being used to promote a religious exercise. Through the mechanism of the State, all of the people are being required to finance a religious exercise that only some of the people want and that violates the sensibilities of others. </s> The most effective way to establish any institution is to finance it; and this truth is reflected in the appeals by church groups for public funds to finance their religious schools. 6 Financing a church either in its strictly religious activities or in its other activities is equally unconstitutional, as I understand the Establishment Clause. Budgets for one activity may be technically separable from budgets for others. 7 But the institution is an inseparable whole, a living organism, which is strengthened in proselytizing when it is strengthened in any department by contributions from other than its own members. [374 U.S. 203, 230] </s> Such contributions may not be made by the State even in a minor degree without violating the Establishment Clause. It is not the amount of public funds expended; as this case illustrates, it is the use to which public funds are put that is controlling. For the First Amendment does not say that some forms of establishment are allowed; it says that "no law respecting an establishment of religion" shall be made. What may not be done directly may not be done indirectly lest the Establishment Clause become a mockery. </s> [Footnote 1 See Bates, Religious Liberty: An Inquiry (1945), 9-14, 239-252; Cobb, Religious Liberty in America (1902), 1-2, cc. IV, V; Gledhill, Pakistan, The Development of its Laws and Constitution (8 British Commonwealth, 1957), 11-15: Keller, Church and State on the European Continent (1936), c. 2; Pfeffer, Church, State, and Freedom (1953), c. 2; I Stokes, Church and State in the United States (1950), 151-169. </s> [Footnote 2 See III Stokes, op. cit., supra, n. 1, 42-67; Bates, op. cit., supra, n. 1, 9-11, 58-59, 98, 245; Gledhill, op. cit., supra, n. 1, 128, 192, 205, 208; Rackman, Israel's Emerging Constitution (1955), 120-134; Drinan, Religious Freedom in Israel, America (Apr. 6, 1963), 456-457. </s> [Footnote 3 See II Stokes, op. cit., supra, n. 1, 488-548; Boles, The Bible, Religion, and the Public Schools (2d ed. 1963), 4-10; Rackman, op. cit., supra, n. 2, at 136-141; O'Brien, The Engel Case From A Swiss Perspective, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 1069; Freund, Muslim Education in West Pakistan, 56 Religious Education 31. </s> [Footnote 4 Bates, op. cit., supra, n. 1, at 18; Pfeffer, op. cit., supra, n. 1, at 28-31; Thomas, The Balance of Forces in Spain, 41 Foreign Affairs 208, 210. </s> [Footnote 5 Cobb, op. cit., supra, n. 1, at 2. </s> [Footnote 6 See II Stokes, op. cit., supra, n. 1, at 681-695. </s> [Footnote 7 See Accountants' Handbook (4th ed. 1956) 4.8-4.15. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring. </s> Almost a century and a half ago, John Marshall, in M'Culloch v. Maryland, enjoined: ". . . we must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding." 4 Wheat. 316, 407. The Court's historic duty to expound the meaning of the Constitution has encountered few issues more intricate or more demanding than that of the relationship between religion and the public schools. Since undoubtedly we are "a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being," Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 , deep feelings are aroused when aspects of that relationship are claimed to violate the injunction of the First Amendment that government may make "no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . ." Americans regard the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government. It is therefore understandable that the constitutional prohibitions encounter their severest test when they are sought to be applied in the school classroom. Nevertheless it is this Court's inescapable duty to declare whether exercises in the public schools of the States, such as those of Pennsylvania and Maryland questioned here, are involvements of religion in public institutions of a kind which offends the First and Fourteenth Amendments. [374 U.S. 203, 231] </s> When John Locke ventured in 1689, "I esteem it above all things necessary to distinguish exactly the business of civil government from that of religion and to settle the just bounds that lie between the one and the other," 1 he anticipated the necessity which would be thought by the Framers to require adoption of a First Amendment, but not the difficulty that would be experienced in defining those "just bounds." The fact is that the line which separates the secular from the sectarian in American life is elusive. The difficulty of defining the boundary with precision inheres in a paradox central to our scheme of liberty. While our institutions reflect a firm conviction that we are a religious people, those institutions by solemn constitutional injunction may not officially involve religion in such a way as to prefer, discriminate against, or oppress, a particular sect or religion. Equally the Constitution enjoins those involvements of religious with secular institutions which (a) serve the essentially religious activities of religious institutions; (b) employ the organs of government for essentially religious purposes; or (c) use essentially religious means to serve governmental ends where secular means would suffice. The constitutional mandate expresses a deliberate and considered judgment that such matters are to be left to the conscience of the citizen, and declares as a basic postulate of the relation between the citizen and his government that "the rights of conscience are, in their nature, of peculiar delicacy, and will little bear the gentlest touch of governmental hand . . . ." 2 </s> I join fully in the opinion and the judgment of the Court. I see no escape from the conclusion that the exercises [374 U.S. 203, 232] called in question in these two cases violate the constitutional mandate. The reasons we gave only last Term in Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 , for finding in the New York Regents' prayer an impermissible establishment of religion, compel the same judgment of the practices at bar. The involvement of the secular with the religious is no less intimate here; and it is constitutionally irrelevant that the State has not composed the material for the inspirational exercises presently involved. It should be unnecessary to observe that our holding does not declare that the First Amendment manifests hostility to the practice or teaching of religion, but only applies prohibitions incorporated in the Bill of Rights in recognition of historic needs shared by Church and State alike. While it is my view that not every involvement of religion in public life is unconstitutional, I consider the exercises at bar a form of involvement which clearly violates the Establishment Clause. </s> The importance of the issue and the deep conviction with which views on both sides are held seem to me to justify detailing at some length my reasons for joining the Court's judgment and opinion. </s> I. </s> The First Amendment forbids both the abridgment of the free exercise of religion and the enactment of laws "respecting an establishment of religion." The two clauses, although distinct in their objectives and their applicability, emerged together from a common panorama of history. The inclusion of both restraints upon the power of Congress to legislate concerning religious matters shows unmistakably that the Framers of the First Amendment were not content to rest the protection of religious liberty exclusively upon either clause. "In assuring the free exercise of religion," Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said, [374 U.S. 203, 233] "the Framers of the First Amendment were sensitive to the then recent history of those persecutions and impositions of civil disability with which sectarian majorities in virtually all of the Colonies had visited deviation in the matter of conscience. This protection of unpopular creeds, however, was not to be the full extent of the Amendment's guarantee of freedom from governmental intrusion in matters of faith. The battle in Virginia, hardly four years won, where James Madison had led the forces of disestablishment in successful opposition to Patrick Henry's proposed Assessment Bill levying a general tax for the support of Christian teachers, was a vital and compelling memory in 1789." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 464 -465. </s> It is true that the Framers' immediate concern was to prevent the setting up of an official federal church of the kind which England and some of the Colonies had long supported. But nothing in the text of the Establishment Clause supports the view that the prevention of the setting up of an official church was meant to be the full extent of the prohibitions against official involvements in religion. It has rightly been said: </s> "If the framers of the Amendment meant to prohibit Congress merely from the establishment of a `church,' one may properly wonder why they didn't so state. That the words church and religion were regarded as synonymous seems highly improbable, particularly in view of the fact that the contemporary state constitutional provisions dealing with the subject of establishment used definite phrases such as `religious sect,' `sect,' or `denomination.'. . . With such specific wording in contemporary state constitutions, why was not a similar wording adopted for the First Amendment if its framers intended to prohibit nothing more than what the States were prohibiting?" [374 U.S. 203, 234] Lardner, How Far Does the Constitution Separate Church and State? 45 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 110, 112 (1951). </s> Plainly, the Establishment Clause, in the contemplation of the Framers, "did not limit the constitutional proscription to any particular, dated form of state-supported theological venture." "What Virginia had long practiced, and what Madison, Jefferson and others fought to end, was the extension of civil government's support to religion in a manner which made the two in some degree interdependent, and thus threatened the freedom of each. The purpose of the Establishment Clause was to assure that the national legislature would not exert its power in the service of any purely religious end; that it would not, as Virginia and virtually all of the Colonies had done, make of religion, as religion, an object of legislation. . . . The Establishment Clause withdrew from the sphere of legitimate legislative concern and competence a specific, but comprehensive, area of human conduct: man's belief or disbelief in the verity of some transcendental idea and man's expression in action of that belief or disbelief." McGowan v. Maryland, supra, at 465-466 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). </s> In sum, the history which our prior decisions have summoned to aid interpretation of the Establishment Clause permits little doubt that its prohibition was designed comprehensively to prevent those official involvements of religion which would tend to foster or discourage religious worship or belief. </s> But an awareness of history and an appreciation of the aims of the Founding Fathers do not always resolve concrete problems. The specific question before us has, for example, aroused vigorous dispute whether the architects of the First Amendment - James Madison and Thomas Jefferson particularly - understood the prohibition against any "law respecting an establishment of [374 U.S. 203, 235] religion" to reach devotional exercises in the public schools. 3 It may be that Jefferson and Madison would have held such exercises to be permissible - although even in Jefferson's case serious doubt is suggested by his admonition against "putting the Bible and Testament into the hands of the children at an age when their judgments are not sufficiently matured for religious inquiries . . . ." 4 But [374 U.S. 203, 236] I doubt that their view, even if perfectly clear one way or the other, would supply a dispositive answer to the question presented by these cases. A more fruitful inquiry, it seems to me, is whether the practices here challenged threaten those consequences which the Framers deeply feared; whether, in short, they tend to promote that type of interdependence between religion and state which the First Amendment was designed to prevent. 5 Our task is to translate "the majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights, conceived as part of the pattern of liberal government in the eighteenth century, into concrete restraints on officials [374 U.S. 203, 237] dealing with the problems of the twentieth century . . . ." West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 . </s> A too literal quest for the advice of the Founding Fathers upon the issues of these cases seems to me futile and misdirected for several reasons: First, on our precise problem the historical record is at best ambiguous, and statements can readily be found to support either side of the proposition. The ambiguity of history is understandable if we recall the nature of the problems uppermost in the thinking of the statesmen who fashioned the religious guarantees; they were concerned with far more flagrant intrusions of government into the realm of religion than any that our century has witnessed. 6 While it is clear to me that the Framers meant the Establishment Clause to prohibit more than the creation of an established federal church such as existed in England, I have no doubt that, in their preoccupation with the imminent question of established churches, they gave no distinct [374 U.S. 203, 238] consideration to the particular question whether the clause also forbade devotional exercises in public institutions. </s> Second, the structure of American education has greatly changed since the First Amendment was adopted. In the context of our modern emphasis upon public education available to all citizens, any views of the eighteenth century as to whether the exercises at bar are an "establishment" offer little aid to decision. Education, as the Framers knew it, was in the main confined to private schools more often than not under strictly sectarian supervision. Only gradually did control of education pass largely to public officials. 7 It would, therefore, [374 U.S. 203, 239] hardly be significant if the fact was that the nearly universal devotional exercises in the schools of the young Republic did not provoke criticism; even today religious ceremonies in church-supported private schools are constitutionally unobjectionable. [374 U.S. 203, 240] </s> Third, our religious composition makes us a vastly more diverse people than were our forefathers. They knew differences chiefly among Protestant sects. Today the Nation is far more heterogeneous religiously, including as it does substantial minorities not only of Catholics and Jews but as well of those who worship according to no version of the Bible and those who worship no God at all. 8 </s> [374 U.S. 203, 241] See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 . In the face of such profound changes, practices which may have been objectionable to no one in the time of Jefferson and Madison may today be highly offensive to many persons, the deeply devout and the nonbelievers alike. </s> Whatever Jefferson or Madison would have thought of Bible reading or the recital of the Lord's Prayer in what few public schools existed in their day, our use of the history of their time must limit itself to broad purposes, not specific practices. By such a standard, I am persuaded, as is the Court, that the devotional exercises carried on in the Baltimore and Abington schools offend the First Amendment because they sufficiently threaten in our day those substantive evils the fear of which called forth the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. It is "a constitution we are expounding," and our interpretation of the First Amendment must necessarily be responsive to the much more highly charged nature of religious questions in contemporary society. </s> Fourth, the American experiment in free public education available to all children has been guided in large measure by the dramatic evolution of the religious diversity among the population which our public schools serve. The interaction of these two important forces in our national life has placed in bold relief certain positive values in the consistent application to public institutions generally, and public schools particularly, of the constitutional decree against official involvements of religion which might produce the evils the Framers meant the Establishment Clause to forestall. The public schools are supported entirely, in most communities, by public funds - funds exacted not only from parents, nor alone from those who hold particular religious views, nor indeed from those who subscribe to any creed at all. It is implicit in the history and character of American public education that the public schools serve a uniquely [374 U.S. 203, 242] public function: the training of American citizens in an atmosphere free of parochial, divisive, or separatist influences of any sort - an atmosphere in which children may assimilate a heritage common to all American groups and religions. See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 . This is a heritage neither theistic nor atheistic, but simply civic and patriotic. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 -403. </s> Attendance at the public schools has never been compulsory; parents remain morally and constitutionally free to choose the academic environment in which they wish their children to be educated. The relationship of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the public school system is preeminently that of reserving such a choice to the individual parent, rather than vesting it in the majority of voters of each State or school district. The choice which is thus preserved is between a public secular education with its uniquely democratic values, and some form of private or sectarian education, which offers values of its own. In my judgment the First Amendment forbids the State to inhibit that freedom of choice by diminishing the attractiveness of either alternative - either by restricting the liberty of the private schools to inculcate whatever values they wish, or by jeopardizing the freedom of the public schools from private or sectarian pressures. The choice between these very different forms of education is one - very much like the choice of whether or not to worship - which our Constitution leaves to the individual parent. It is no proper function of the state or local government to influence or restrict that election. The lesson of history - drawn more from the experiences of other countries than from our own - is that a system of free public education forfeits its unique contribution to the growth of democratic citizenship when that choice ceases to be freely available to each parent. [374 U.S. 203, 243] </s> II. </s> The exposition by this Court of the religious guarantees of the First Amendment has consistently reflected and reaffirmed the concerns which impelled the Framers to write those guarantees into the Constitution. It would be neither possible nor appropriate to review here the entire course of our decisions on religious questions. There emerge from those decisions, however, three principles of particular relevance to the issue presented by the cases at bar, and some attention to those decisions is therefore appropriate. </s> First. One line of decisions derives from contests for control of a church property or other internal ecclesiastical disputes. This line has settled the proposition that in order to give effect to the First Amendment's purpose of requiring on the part of all organs of government a strict neutrality toward theological questions, courts should not undertake to decide such questions. These principles were first expounded in the case of Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, which declared that judicial intervention in such a controversy would open up "the whole subject of the doctrinal theology, the usages and customs, the written laws, and fundamental organization of every religious denomination . . . ." 13 Wall., at 733. Courts above all must be neutral, for "[t]he law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect." 9 13 Wall., at 728. This principle has recently [374 U.S. 203, 244] been reaffirmed in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 ; and Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 . </s> The mandate of judicial neutrality in theological controversies met its severest test in United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 . That decision put in sharp relief certain principles which bear directly upon the questions presented in these cases. Ballard was indicted for fraudulent use of the mails in the dissemination of religious literature. He requested that the trial court submit to the jury the question of the truthfulness of the religious views he championed. The requested charge was refused, and we upheld that refusal, reasoning that the First Amendment foreclosed any judicial inquiry into the truth or falsity of the defendant's religious beliefs. We said: "Man's relation to his God was made no concern of the state. He was granted the right to worship as he pleased and to answer to no man for the verity of his religious views." "Men may believe what they cannot [374 U.S. 203, 245] prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. . . . Many take their gospel from the New Testament. But it would hardly be supposed that they could be tried before a jury charged with the duty of determining whether those teachings contained false representations." 322 U.S., at 86 -87. </s> The dilemma presented by the case was severe. While the alleged truthfulness of nonreligious publications could ordinarily have been submitted to the jury, Ballard was deprived of that defense only because the First Amendment forbids governmental inquiry into the verity of religious beliefs. In dissent Mr. Justice Jackson expressed the concern that under this construction of the First Amendment "[p]rosecutions of this character easily could degenerate into religious persecution." 322 U.S., at 95 . The case shows how elusive is the line which enforces the Amendment's injunction of strict neutrality, while manifesting no official hostility toward religion - a line which must be considered in the cases now before us. 10 Some might view the result of the Ballard case as a manifestation of hostility - in that the conviction stood because the defense could not be raised. To others it [374 U.S. 203, 246] might represent merely strict adherence to the principle of neutrality already expounded in the cases involving doctrinal disputes. Inevitably, insistence upon neutrality, vital as it surely is for untrammeled religious liberty, may appear to border upon religious hostility. But in the long view the independence of both church and state in their respective spheres will be better served by close adherence to the neutrality principle. If the choice is often difficult, the difficulty is endemic to issues implicating the religious guarantees of the First Amendment. Freedom of religion will be seriously jeopardized if we admit exceptions for no better reason than the difficulty of delineating hostility from neutrality in the closest cases. </s> Second. It is only recently that our decisions have dealt with the question whether issues arising under the Establishment Clause may be isolated from problems implicating the Free Exercise Clause. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 , is in my view the first of our decisions which treats a problem of asserted unconstitutional involvement as raising questions purely under the Establishment Clause. A scrutiny of several earlier decisions said by some to have etched the contours of the clause shows that such cases neither raised nor decided any constitutional issues under the First Amendment. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 , for example, involved challenges to a federal grant to a hospital administered by a Roman Catholic order. The Court rejected the claim for lack of evidence that any sectarian influence changed its character as a secular institution chartered as such by the Congress. 11 </s> Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 , is also illustrative. The immediate question there was one of statutory construction, although the issue had originally involved the [374 U.S. 203, 247] constitutionality of the use of federal funds to support sectarian education on Indian reservations. Congress had already prohibited federal grants for that purpose, thereby removing the broader issue, leaving only the question whether the statute authorized the appropriation for religious teaching of Treaty funds held by the Government in trust for the Indians. Since these were the Indians' own funds, the Court held only that the Indians might direct their use for such educational purposes as they chose, and that the administration by the Treasury of the disbursement of the funds did not inject into the case any issue of the propriety of the use of federal moneys. 12 Indeed, the Court expressly approved the reasoning of the Court of Appeals that to deny the Indians the right to spend their own moneys for religious purposes of their choice might well infringe the free exercise of their religion: "it seems inconceivable that Congress should have intended to prohibit them from receiving religious education at their own cost if they so desired it . . . ." 210 U.S., at 82 . This case forecast, however, an increasingly troublesome First Amendment paradox: that the logical interrelationship between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses may produce situations where an injunction against an apparent establishment must be withheld in order to avoid infringement of rights of free exercise. That paradox was not squarely presented in Quick Bear, but the care taken by the Court [374 U.S. 203, 248] to avoid a constitutional confrontation discloses an awareness of possible conflicts between the two clauses. I shall come back to this problem later, infra, pp. 296-299. </s> A third case in this group is Cochran v. Louisiana State Board, 281 U.S. 370 , which involved a challenge to a state statute providing public funds to support a loan of free textbooks to pupils of both public and private schools. The constitutional issues in this Court extended no further than the claim that this program amounted to a taking of private property for nonpublic use. The Court rejected the claim on the ground that no private use of property was involved; ". . . we can not doubt that the taxing power of the State is exerted for a public purpose." 281 U.S., at 375 . The case therefore raised no issue under the First Amendment. 13 </s> In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 , a Catholic parochial school and a private but nonsectarian military academy challenged a state law requiring all children between certain ages to attend the public schools. This Court held the law invalid as an arbitrary and unreasonable interference both with the rights of the schools and with the liberty of the parents of the children who attended them. The due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment "excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only." 268 U.S., at 535 . While one of the plaintiffs was indeed a parochial school, the case obviously decided no First Amendment question but recognized only the constitutional right to establish and patronize private schools - including parochial schools - which meet the state's reasonable minimum curricular requirements. [374 U.S. 203, 249] </s> Third. It is true, as the Court says, that the "two clauses [Establishment and Free Exercise] may overlap." Because of the overlap, however, our decisions under the Free Exercise Clause bear considerable relevance to the problem now before us, and should be briefly reviewed. The early free exercise cases generally involved the objections of religious minorities to the application to them of general nonreligious legislation governing conduct. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 , involved the claim that a belief in the sanctity of plural marriage precluded the conviction of members of a particular sect under nondiscriminatory legislation against such marriage. The Court rejected the claim, saying: </s> "Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious beliefs and opinions, they may with practices. . . . Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances." 14 </s> 98 U.S., at 166 -167. [374 U.S. 203, 250] </s> Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 , similarly involved the claim that the First Amendment insulated from civil punishment certain practices inspired or motivated by religious beliefs. The claim was easily rejected: "It was never intended or supposed that the amendment could be invoked as a protection against legislation for the punishment of acts inimical to the peace, good order and morals of society." 133 U.S., at 342 . See also Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 ; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 ; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 ; Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 . </s> But we must not confuse the issue of governmental power to regulate or prohibit conduct motivated by religious beliefs with the quite different problem of governmental authority to compel behavior offensive to religious principles. In Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, 293 U.S. 245 , the question was that of the power of a State to compel students at the State University to participate in military training instruction against their religious convictions. The validity of the statute was sustained against claims based upon the First Amendment. But the decision rested on a very narrow principle: since there was neither a constitutional right nor a legal obligation to attend the State University, the obligation to participate in military training courses, [374 U.S. 203, 251] reflecting a legitimate state interest, might properly be imposed upon those who chose to attend. Although the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments were presumed to include "the right to entertain the beliefs, to adhere to the principles and to teach the doctrines on which these students base their objections to the order prescribing military training," those Amendments were construed not to free such students from the military training obligations if they chose to attend the University. Justices Brandeis, Cardozo and Stone, concurring separately, agreed that the requirement infringed no constitutionally protected liberties. They added, however, that the case presented no question under the Establishment Clause. The military instruction program was not an establishment since it in no way involved "instruction in the practice or tenets of a religion." 293 U.S., at 266 . Since the only question was one of free exercise, they concluded, like the majority, that the strong state interest in training a citizen militia justified the restraints imposed, at least so long as attendance at the University was voluntary. 15 </s> Hamilton has not been overruled, although United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 , and United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 , upon which the Court in Hamilton relied, have since been overruled by Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 . But if Hamilton retains any vitality with respect to higher education, we recognized its inapplicability to cognate questions in the public primary and secondary schools when we held in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, supra, that a State had no power to expel from public schools students who refused on religious grounds to comply with a daily flag [374 U.S. 203, 252] salute requirement. Of course, such a requirement was no more a law "respecting an establishment of religion" than the California law compelling the college students to take military training. The Barnette plaintiffs, moreover, did not ask that the whole exercise be enjoined, but only that an excuse or exemption be provided for those students whose religious beliefs forbade them to participate in the ceremony. The key to the holding that such a requirement abridged rights of free exercise lay in the fact that attendance at school was not voluntary but compulsory. The Court said: </s> "This issue is not prejudiced by the Court's previous holding that where a State, without compelling attendance, extends college facilities to pupils who voluntarily enroll, it may prescribe military training as part of the course without offense to the Constitution. . . . Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245 . In the present case attendance is not optional." 319 U.S., at 631 -632. </s> The Barnette decision made another significant point. The Court held that the State must make participation in the exercise voluntary for all students and not alone for those who found participation obnoxious on religious grounds. In short, there was simply no need to "inquire whether non-conformist beliefs will exempt from the duty to salute" because the Court found no state "power to make the salute a legal duty." 319 U.S., at 635 . </s> The distinctions between Hamilton and Barnette are, I think, crucial to the resolution of the cases before us. The different results of those cases are attributable only in part to a difference in the strength of the particular state interests which the respective statutes were designed to serve. Far more significant is the fact that Hamilton dealt with the voluntary attendance at college of young adults, while Barnette involved the compelled attendance [374 U.S. 203, 253] of young children at elementary and secondary schools. 16 This distinction warrants a difference in constitutional results. And it is with the involuntary attendance of young school children that we are exclusively concerned in the cases now before the Court. </s> III. </s> No one questions that the Framers of the First Amendment intended to restrict exclusively the powers of the Federal Government. 17 Whatever limitations that Amendment now imposes upon the States derive from the Fourteenth Amendment. The process of absorption of the religious guarantees of the First Amendment as protections against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment began with the Free Exercise Clause. In 1923 the Court held that the protections of the Fourteenth included at least a person's freedom "to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience. . . ." 18 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 . See also Hamilton v. Regents, supra, at 262. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 , completed in 1940 the process of absorption [374 U.S. 203, 254] of the Free Exercise Clause and recognized its dual aspect: the Court affirmed freedom of belief as an absolute liberty, but recognized that conduct, while it may also be comprehended by the Free Exercise Clause, "remains subject to regulation for the protection of society." 310 U.S., at 303 -304. This was a distinction already drawn by Reynolds v. United States, supra. From the beginning this Court has recognized that while government may regulate the behavioral manifestations of religious beliefs, it may not interfere at all with the beliefs themselves. </s> The absorption of the Establishment Clause has, however, come later and by a route less easily charted. It has been suggested, with some support in history, that absorption of the First Amendment's ban against congressional legislation "respecting an establishment of religion" is conceptually impossible because the Framers meant the Establishment Clause also to foreclose any attempt by Congress to disestablish the existing official state churches. 19 Whether or not such was the understanding of the Framers and whether such a purpose would have inhibited the absorption of the Establishment Clause at the threshold of the Nineteenth Century are questions not dispositive of our present inquiry. For it is [374 U.S. 203, 255] clear on the record of history that the last of the formal state establishments was dissolved more than three decades before the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, and thus the problem of protecting official state churches from federal encroachments could hardly have been any concern of those who framed the post-Civil War Amendments. 20 Any such objective of the First Amendment, having become historical anachronism by 1868, cannot be thought to have deterred the absorption of the Establishment Clause to any greater degree than it would, for example, have deterred the absorption of the Free Exercise Clause. That no organ of the Federal Government possessed in 1791 any power to restrain the interference of the States in religious matters is indisputable. See Permoli v. New Orleans, 3 How. 589. It is equally plain, on the other hand, that the Fourteenth Amendment created a panoply of new federal rights for the protection of citizens of the various States. And among those rights was freedom from such state governmental involvement in the affairs of religion as the Establishment Clause had originally foreclosed on the part of Congress. [374 U.S. 203, 256] </s> It has also been suggested that the "liberty" guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment logically cannot absorb the Establishment Clause because that clause is not one of the provisions of the Bill of Rights which in terms protects a "freedom" of the individual. See Corwin, A Constitution of Powers in a Secular State (1951), 113-116. The fallacy in this contention, I think, is that it underestimates the role of the Establishment Clause as co-guarantor, with the Free Exercise Clause, of religious liberty. The Framers did not entrust the liberty of religious beliefs to either clause alone. The Free Exercise Clause "was not to be the full extent of the Amendment's guarantee of freedom from governmental intrusion in matters of faith." McGowan v. Maryland, supra, at 464 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). </s> Finally, it has been contended that absorption of the Establishment Clause is precluded by the absence of any intention on the part of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment to circumscribe the residual powers of the States to aid religious activities and institutions in ways which fell short of formal establishments. 21 That argument relies in part upon the express terms of the [374 U.S. 203, 257] abortive Blaine Amendment - proposed several years after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment - which would have added to the First Amendment a provision that "[n]o State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion . . . ." Such a restriction would have been superfluous, it is said, if the Fourteenth Amendment had already made the Establishment Clause binding upon the States. </s> The argument proves too much, for the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of the free exercise of religion can hardly be questioned; yet the Blaine Amendment would also have added an explicit protection against state laws abridging that liberty. 22 Even if we assume that the draftsmen of the Fourteenth Amendment saw no immediate connection between its protections against state action infringing personal liberty and the guarantees of the First Amendment, it is certainly too late in the day to suggest that their assumed inattention to the question dilutes the force of these constitutional guarantees in their application to the States. 23 It is enough to conclude [374 U.S. 203, 258] that the religious liberty embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment would not be viable if the Constitution were interpreted to forbid only establishments ordained by Congress. 24 </s> [374 U.S. 203, 259] </s> The issue of what particular activities the Establishment Clause forbids the States to undertake is our more immediate concern. In Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 -16, a careful study of the relevant history led the Court to the view, consistently recognized in decisions since Everson, that the Establishment Clause embodied the Framers' conclusion that government and religion have discrete interests which are mutually best served when each avoids too close a proximity to the other. It is not only the nonbeliever who fears the injection of sectarian doctrines and controversies into the civil polity, but in as high degree it is the devout believer who fears the secularization of a creed which becomes too deeply involved with and dependent upon the government. 25 It [374 U.S. 203, 260] has rightly been said of the history of the Establishment Clause that "our tradition of civil liberty rests not only on the secularism of a Thomas Jefferson but also on the fervent sectarianism . . . of a Roger Williams." Freund, The Supreme Court of the United States (1961), 84. </s> Our decisions on questions of religious education or exercises in the public schools have consistently reflected this dual aspect of the Establishment Clause. Engel v. Vitale unmistakably has its roots in three earlier cases which, on cognate issues, shaped the contours of the Establishment Clause. First, in Everson the Court held that reimbursement by the town of parents for the cost of transporting their children by public carrier to parochial (as well as public and private nonsectarian) schools did not offend the Establishment Clause. Such reimbursement, by easing the financial burden upon Catholic parents, may indirectly have fostered the operation of the Catholic schools, and may thereby indirectly have facilitated the teaching of Catholic principles, thus serving ultimately a religious goal. But this form of governmental assistance was difficult to distinguish from myriad other incidental if not insignificant government benefits enjoyed by religious institutions - fire and police protection, tax exemptions, and the pavement of streets and sidewalks, for example. "The State contributes no money to the schools. It does not support them. Its legislation, as applied, does no more than provide a general program to help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from [374 U.S. 203, 261] accredited schools." 330 U.S., at 18 . Yet even this form of assistance was thought by four Justices of the Everson Court to be barred by the Establishment Clause because too perilously close to that public support of religion forbidden by the First Amendment. </s> The other two cases, Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 , and Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 , can best be considered together. Both involved programs of released time for religious instruction of public school students. I reject the suggestion that Zorach overruled McCollum in silence. 26 The distinction which the Court drew in Zorach between the two cases is, in my view, faithful to the function of the Establishment Clause. </s> I should first note, however, that McCollum and Zorach do not seem to me distinguishable in terms of the free exercise claims advanced in both cases. 27 The nonparticipant in the McCollum program was given secular instruction in a separate room during the times his classmates had religious lessons; the nonparticipant in any Zorach program also received secular instruction, while his classmates repaired to a place outside the school for religious instruction. </s> The crucial difference, I think, was that the McCollum program offended the Establishment Clause while the Zorach program did not. This was not, in my view, because of the difference in public expenditures involved. True, the McCollum program involved the regular use of school facilities, classrooms, heat and light and time from the regular school day - even though the actual [374 U.S. 203, 262] incremental cost may have been negligible. All religious instruction under the Zorach program, by contrast, was carried on entirely off the school premises, and the teacher's part was simply to facilitate the children's release to the churches. The deeper difference was that the McCollum program placed the religious instructor in the public school classroom in precisely the position of authority held by the regular teachers of secular subjects, while the Zorach program did not. 28 The McCollum program, [374 U.S. 203, 263] in lending to the support of sectarian instruction all the authority of the governmentally operated public school system, brought government and religion into that proximity which the Establishment Clause forbids. To be sure, a religious teacher presumably commands substantial respect and merits attention in his own right. But the Constitution does not permit that prestige and capacity for influence to be augmented by investiture of all the symbols of authority at the command of the lay teacher for the enhancement of secular instruction. </s> More recent decisions have further etched the contours of Establishment. In the Sunday Law Cases, we found in state laws compelling a uniform day of rest from worldly labor no violation of the Establishment Clause (McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 ). The basic [374 U.S. 203, 264] ground of our decision was that, granted the Sunday Laws were first enacted for religious ends, they were continued in force for reasons wholly secular, namely, to provide a universal day of rest and ensure the health and tranquillity of the community. In other words, government may originally have decreed a Sunday day of rest for the impermissible purpose of supporting religion but abandoned that purpose and retained the laws for the permissible purpose of furthering overwhelmingly secular ends. </s> Such was the evolution of the contours of the Establishment Clause before Engel v. Vitale. There, a year ago, we held that the daily recital of the State-composed Regents' Prayer constituted an establishment of religion because, although the prayer itself revealed no sectarian content or purpose, its nature and meaning were quite clearly religious. New York, in authorizing its recitation, had not maintained that distance between the public and the religious sectors commanded by the Establishment Clause when it placed the "power, prestige and financial support of government" behind the prayer. In Engel, as in McCollum, it did not matter that the amount of time and expense allocated to the daily recitation was small so long as the exercise itself was manifestly religious. Nor did it matter that few children had complained of the practice, for the measure of the seriousness of a breach of the Establishment Clause has never been thought to be the number of people who complain of it. </s> We also held two Terms ago in Torcaso v. Watkins, supra, that a State may not constitutionally require an applicant for the office of Notary Public to swear or affirm that he believes in God. The problem of that case was strikingly similar to the issue presented 18 years before in the flag salute case, West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, supra. In neither case was there any claim of establishment of religion, but only of infringement of [374 U.S. 203, 265] the individual's religious liberty - in the one case, that of the nonbeliever who could not attest to a belief in God; in the other, that of the child whose creed forbade him to salute the flag. But Torcaso added a new element not present in Barnette. The Maryland test oath involved an attempt to employ essentially religious (albeit nonsectarian) means to achieve a secular goal to which the means bore no reasonable relationship. No one doubted the State's interest in the integrity of its Notaries Public, but that interest did not warrant the screening of applicants by means of a religious test. The Sunday Law Cases were different in that respect. Even if Sunday Laws retain certain religious vestiges, they are enforced today for essentially secular objectives which cannot be effectively achieved in modern society except by designating Sunday as the universal day of rest. The Court's opinions cited very substantial problems in selecting or enforcing an alternative day of rest. But the teaching of both Torcaso and the Sunday Law Cases is that government may not employ religious means to serve secular interests, however legitimate they may be, at least without the clearest demonstration that nonreligious means will not suffice. 29 </s> [374 U.S. 203, 266] </s> IV. </s> I turn now to the cases before us. 30 The religious nature of the exercises here challenged seems plain. Unless Engel v. Vitale is to be overruled, or we are to engage in wholly disingenuous distinction, we cannot sustain [374 U.S. 203, 267] these practices. Daily recital of the Lord's Prayer and the reading of passages of Scripture are quite as clearly breaches of the command of the Establishment Clause as was the daily use of the rather bland Regents' Prayer in the New York public schools. Indeed, I would suppose that, if anything, the Lord's Prayer and the Holy Bible are more clearly sectarian, and the present violations of the First Amendment consequently more serious. But the religious exercises challenged in these cases have a long history. And almost from the beginning, Bible reading and daily prayer in the schools have been the subject of debate, criticism by educators and other public officials, and proscription by courts and legislative councils. At the outset, then, we must carefully canvass both aspects of this history. </s> The use of prayers and Bible readings at the opening of the school day long antedates the founding of our Republic. The Rules of the New Haven Hopkins Grammar School required in 1684 "[t]hat the Scholars being [374 U.S. 203, 268] called together, the Mr. shall every morning begin his work with a short prayer for a blessing on his Laboures and their learning . . . ." 31 More rigorous was the provision in a 1682 contract with a Dutch schoolmaster in Flatbush, New York: </s> "When the school begins, one of the children shall read the morning prayer, as it stands in the catechism, and close with the prayer before dinner; in the afternoon it shall begin with the prayer after dinner, and end with the evening prayer. The evening school shall begin with the Lord's prayer, and close by singing a psalm." 32 </s> After the Revolution, the new States uniformly continued these long-established practices in the private and the few public grammar schools. The school committee of Boston in 1789, for example, required the city's several schoolmasters "daily to commence the duties of their office by prayer and reading a portion of the Sacred Scriptures . . . ." 33 That requirement was mirrored throughout the original States, and exemplified the universal practice well into the nineteenth century. As the free public schools gradually supplanted the private academies and sectarian schools between 1800 and 1850, morning devotional exercises were retained with few alterations. Indeed, public pressures upon school administrators in many parts of the country would hardly have condoned abandonment of practices to which a century or more of private religious education had accustomed the American people. 34 The controversy centered, in [374 U.S. 203, 269] fact, principally about the elimination of plainly sectarian practices and textbooks, and led to the eventual substitution of nonsectarian, though still religious, exercises and materials. 35 </s> Statutory provision for daily religious exercises is, however, of quite recent origin. At the turn of this century, there was but one State - Massachusetts - which had a law making morning prayer or Bible reading obligatory. Statutes elsewhere either permitted such practices or simply left the question to local option. It was not until after 1910 that 11 more States, within a few years, joined Massachusetts in making one or both exercises compulsory. 36 The Pennsylvania law with which we are [374 U.S. 203, 270] concerned in the Schempp case, for example, took effect in 1913; and even the Rule of the Baltimore School Board involved in the Murray case dates only from 1905. In no State has there ever been a constitutional or statutory prohibition against the recital of prayers or the reading of Scripture, although a number of States have outlawed these practices by judicial decision or administrative order. What is noteworthy about the panoply of state and local regulations from which these cases emerge is the relative recency of the statutory codification of practices which have ancient roots, and the rather small number of States which have ever prescribed compulsory religious exercises in the public schools. </s> The purposes underlying the adoption and perpetuation of these practices are somewhat complex. It is beyond question that the religious benefits and values realized from daily prayer and Bible reading have usually been considered paramount, and sufficient to justify the continuation of such practices. To Horace Mann, embroiled in an intense controversy over the role of sectarian instruction and textbooks in the Boston public schools, there was little question that the regular use of the Bible - which he thought essentially nonsectarian - would bear fruit in the spiritual enlightenment of his pupils. 37 A contemporary of Mann's, the Commissioner of Education of a neighboring State, expressed a view which many enlightened educators of that day shared: </s> "As a textbook of morals the Bible is pre-eminent, and should have a prominent place in our schools, [374 U.S. 203, 271] either as a reading book or as a source of appeal and instruction. Sectarianism, indeed, should not be countenanced in the schools; but the Bible is not sectarian . . . . The Scriptures should at least be read at the opening of the school, if no more. Prayer may also be offered with the happiest effects." 38 </s> Wisconsin's Superintendent of Public Instruction, writing a few years later in 1858, reflected the attitude of his eastern colleagues, in that he regarded "with special favor the use of the Bible in public schools, as pre-eminently first in importance among text-books for teaching the noblest principles of virtue, morality, patriotism, and good order - love and reverence for God - charity and good will to man." 39 </s> Such statements reveal the understanding of educators that the daily religious exercises in the schools served broader goals than compelling formal worship of God or fostering church attendance. The religious aims of the educators who adopted and retained such exercises were comprehensive, and in many cases quite devoid of sectarian bias - but the crucial fact is that they were nonetheless religious. While it has been suggested, see pp. 278-281, infra, that daily prayer and reading of Scripture now serve secular goals as well, there can be no doubt that the origins of these practices were unambiguously religious, even where the educator's aim was not to win adherents to a particular creed or faith. </s> Almost from the beginning religious exercises in the public schools have been the subject of intense criticism, vigorous debate, and judicial or administrative prohibition. Significantly, educators and school boards [374 U.S. 203, 272] early entertained doubts about both the legality and the soundness of opening the school day with compulsory prayer or Bible reading. Particularly in the large Eastern cities, where immigration had exposed the public schools to religious diversities and conflicts unknown to the homogeneous academies of the eighteenth century, local authorities found it necessary even before the Civil War to seek an accommodation. In 1843, the Philadelphia School Board adopted the following resolutions: </s> "RESOLVED, that no children be required to attend or unite in the reading of the Bible in the Public Schools, whose parents are conscientiously opposed thereto: </s> "RESOLVED, that those children whose parents conscientiously prefer and desire any particular version of the Bible, without note or comment, be furnished with same." 40 </s> A decade later, the Superintendent of Schools of New York State issued an even bolder decree that prayers could no longer be required as part of public school activities, and that where the King James Bible was read, Catholic students could not be compelled to attend. 41 This type of accommodation was not restricted to the East Coast; the Cincinnati Board of Education resolved in 1869 that "religious instruction and the reading of religious books, including the Holy Bible, are prohibited in the common schools of Cincinnati, it being the true object and intent of this rule to allow the children of the parents of all sects and opinions, in matters of faith and worship, [374 U.S. 203, 273] to enjoy alike the benefit of the common-school fund." 42 The Board repealed at the same time an earlier regulation which had required the singing of hymns and psalms to accompany the Bible reading at the start of the school day. And in 1889, one commentator ventured the view that "[t]here is not enough to be gained from Bible reading to justify the quarrel that has been raised over it." 43 </s> Thus a great deal of controversy over religion in the public schools had preceded the debate over the Blaine Amendment, precipitated by President Grant's insistence that matters of religion should be left "to the family altar, the church, and the private school, supported entirely by private contributions." 44 There was ample precedent, too, for Theodore Roosevelt's declaration that in the interest of "absolutely nonsectarian public schools" it was "not our business to have the Protestant Bible or the Catholic Vulgate or the Talmud read in those schools." 45 The same principle appeared in the message of an Ohio Governor who vetoed a compulsory Bible-reading bill in 1925: </s> "It is my belief that religious teaching in our homes, Sunday schools, churches, by the good [374 U.S. 203, 274] mothers, fathers, and ministers of Ohio is far preferable to compulsory teaching of religion by the state. The spirit of our federal and state constitutions from the beginning . . . [has] been to leave religious instruction to the discretion of parents." 46 </s> The same theme has recurred in the opinions of the Attorneys General of several States holding religious exercises or instruction to be in violation of the state or federal constitutional command of separation of church and state. 47 Thus the basic principle upon which our decision last year in Engel v. Vitale necessarily rested, and which we reaffirm today, can hardly be thought to be radical or novel. </s> Particularly relevant for our purposes are the decisions of the state courts on questions of religion in the public schools. Those decisions, while not, of course, authoritative in this Court, serve nevertheless to define the problem before us and to guide our inquiry. With the growth of religious diversity and the rise of vigorous dissent it was inevitable that the courts would be called upon to enjoin religious practices in the public schools which offended certain sects and groups. The earliest of such decisions declined to review the propriety of actions taken by school authorities, so long as those actions were within [374 U.S. 203, 275] the purview of the administrators' powers. 48 Thus, where the local school board required religious exercises, the courts would not enjoin them; 49 and where, as in at least one case, the school officials forbade devotional practices, the court refused on similar grounds to overrule that decision. 50 Thus, whichever way the early cases came up, the governing principle of nearly complete deference to administrative discretion effectively foreclosed any consideration of constitutional questions. </s> The last quarter of the nineteenth century found the courts beginning to question the constitutionality of public school religious exercises. The legal context was still, of course, that of the state constitutions, since the First Amendment had not yet been held applicable to state action. And the state constitutional prohibitions against church-state cooperation or governmental aid to religion were generally less rigorous than the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. It is therefore remarkable that the courts of a half dozen States found compulsory religious exercises in the public schools in violation of their respective state constitutions. 51 These [374 U.S. 203, 276] courts attributed much significance to the clearly religious origins and content of the challenged practices, and to the impossibility of avoiding sectarian controversy in their conduct. The Illinois Supreme Court expressed in 1910 the principles which characterized these decisions: </s> "The public school is supported by the taxes which each citizen, regardless of his religion or his lack of it, is compelled to pay. The school, like the government, is simply a civil institution. It is secular, and not religious, in its purposes. The truths of the Bible are the truths of religion, which do not come within the province of the public school. . . . No one denies that they should be taught to the youth of the State. The constitution and the law do not interfere with such teaching, but they do banish theological polemics from the schools and the school districts. This is done, not from any hostility to religion, but because it is no part of the duty of the State to teach religion, - to take the money of all and apply it to teaching the children of all the religion of a part, only. Instruction in religion must be voluntary." People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Education, 245 Ill. 334, 349, 92 N. E. 251, 256 (1910). </s> The Supreme Court of South Dakota, in banning devotional exercises from the public schools of that State, also cautioned that "[t]he state as an educator must keep out of this field, and especially is this true in the common schools, where the child is immature, without fixed religious convictions . . . ." State ex rel. Finger v. Weedman, 55 S. D. 343, 357, 226 N. W. 348, 354 (1929). [374 U.S. 203, 277] </s> Even those state courts which have sustained devotional exercises under state law 52 have usually recognized the primarily religious character of prayers and Bible readings. If such practices were not for that reason unconstitutional, it was necessarily because the state constitution forbade only public expenditures for sectarian instruction, or for activities which made the school-house a "place of worship," but said nothing about the subtler question of laws "respecting an establishment of religion." 53 Thus the panorama of history permits no [374 U.S. 203, 278] other conclusion than that daily prayers and Bible readings in the public schools have always been designed to be, and have been regarded as, essentially religious exercises. Unlike the Sunday closing laws, these exercises appear neither to have been divorced from their religious origins nor deprived of their centrally religious character by the passage of time, 54 cf. McGowan v. Maryland, supra, at 442-445. On this distinction alone we might well rest a constitutional decision. But three further contentions have been pressed in the argument of these cases. These contentions deserve careful consideration, for if the position of the school authorities were correct in respect to any of them, we would be misapplying the principles of Engel v. Vitale. </s> A. </s> First, it is argued that however clearly religious may have been the origins and early nature of daily prayer and Bible reading, these practices today serve so clearly secular educational purposes that their religious attributes may be overlooked. I do not doubt, for example, that morning devotional exercises may foster better discipline in the classroom, and elevate the spiritual level on which the school day opens. The Pennsylvania Superintendent of Public Instruction, testifying by deposition in the Schempp case, offered his view that daily Bible reading "places upon the children or those hearing the reading of this, and the atmosphere which goes on in the reading . . . one of the last vestiges of moral value [374 U.S. 203, 279] that we have left in our school system." The exercise thus affords, the Superintendent concluded, "a strong contradiction to the materialistic trends of our time." Baltimore's Superintendent of Schools expressed a similar view of the practices challenged in the Murray case, to the effect that "[t]he acknowledgement of the existence of God as symbolized in the opening exercises establishes a discipline tone which tends to cause each individual pupil to constrain his overt acts and to consequently conform to accepted standards of behavior during his attendance at school." These views are by no means novel, see, e. g., Billard v. Board of Education, 69 Kan. 53, 57-58, 76 P. 422, 423 (1904). 55 </s> It is not the business of this Court to gainsay the judgments of experts on matters of pedagogy. Such decisions must be left to the discretion of those administrators charged with the supervision of the Nation's public schools. The limited province of the courts is to determine whether the means which the educators have chosen to achieve legitimate pedagogical ends infringe the constitutional freedoms of the First Amendment. The secular purposes which devotional exercises are said to serve fall into two categories - those which depend upon an immediately religious experience shared by the participating children; and those which appear sufficiently divorced from the religious content of the devotional material that they can be served equally by nonreligious [374 U.S. 203, 280] materials. With respect to the first objective, much has been written about the moral and spiritual values of infusing some religious influence or instruction into the public school classroom. 56 To the extent that only religious materials will serve this purpose, it seems to me that the purpose as well as the means is so plainly religious that the exercise is necessarily forbidden by the Establishment Clause. The fact that purely secular benefits may eventually result does not seem to me to justify the exercises, for similar indirect nonreligious benefits could no doubt have been claimed for the released time program invalidated in McCollum. </s> The second justification assumes that religious exercises at the start of the school day may directly serve solely secular ends - for example, by fostering harmony and tolerance among the pupils, enhancing the authority of the teacher, and inspiring better discipline. To the extent that such benefits result not from the content of the readings and recitation, but simply from the holding of such a solemn exercise at the opening assembly or the first class of the day, it would seem that less sensitive materials might equally well serve the same purpose. I have previously suggested that Torcaso and the Sunday Law Cases forbid the use of religious means to achieve secular [374 U.S. 203, 281] ends where nonreligious means will suffice. That principle is readily applied to these cases. It has not been shown that readings from the speeches and messages of great Americans, for example, or from the documents of our heritage of liberty, daily recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, or even the observance of a moment of reverent silence at the opening of class, may not adequately serve the solely secular purposes of the devotional activities without jeopardizing either the religious liberties of any members of the community or the proper degree of separation between the spheres of religion and government. 57 Such substitutes would, I think, be unsatisfactory or inadequate only to the extent that the present activities do in fact serve religious goals. While I do not question the judgment of experienced educators that the challenged practices may well achieve valuable secular ends, it seems to me that the State acts unconstitutionally if it either sets about to attain even indirectly religious ends by religious means, or if it uses religious means to serve secular ends where secular means would suffice. </s> B. </s> Second, it is argued that the particular practices involved in the two cases before us are unobjectionable [374 U.S. 203, 282] because they prefer no particular sect or sects at the expense of others. Both the Baltimore and Abington procedures permit, for example, the reading of any of several versions of the Bible, and this flexibility is said to ensure neutrality sufficiently to avoid the constitutional prohibition. One answer, which might be dispositive, is that any version of the Bible is inherently sectarian, else there would be no need to offer a system of rotation or alternation of versions in the first place, that is, to allow different sectarian versions to be used on different days. The sectarian character of the Holy Bible has been at the core of the whole controversy over religious practices in the public schools throughout its long and often bitter history. 58 To [374 U.S. 203, 283] vary the version as the Abington and Baltimore schools have done may well be less offensive than to read from the King James version every day, as once was the practice. But the result even of this relatively benign procedure is that majority sects are preferred in approximate proportion to their representation in the community and in the student body, while the smaller sects suffer commensurate discrimination. So long as the subject matter of the exercise is sectarian in character, these consequences cannot be avoided. </s> The argument contains, however, a more basic flaw. There are persons in every community - often deeply devout - to whom any version of the Judaeo-Christian Bible is offensive. 59 There are others whose reverence for the Holy Scriptures demands private study or reflection and to whom public reading or recitation is sacrilegious, as one of the expert witnesses at the trial of the Schempp case explained. To such persons it is not the fact of using the Bible in the public schools, nor the content of any particular version, that is offensive, but only the manner in [374 U.S. 203, 284] which it is used. 60 For such persons, the anathema of public communion is even more pronounced when prayer is involved. Many deeply devout persons have always regarded prayer as a necessarily private experience. 61 One Protestant group recently commented, for example: "When one thinks of prayer as sincere outreach of a [374 U.S. 203, 285] human soul to the Creator, `required prayer' becomes an absurdity." 62 There is a similar problem with respect to comment upon the passages of Scripture which are to be read. Most present statutes forbid comment, and this practice accords with the views of many religious groups as to the manner in which the Bible should be read. However, as a recent survey discloses, scriptural passages read without comment frequently convey no message to the younger children in the school. Thus there has developed a practice in some schools of bridging the gap between faith and understanding by means of "definitions," even where "comment" is forbidden by statute. 63 The present practice therefore poses a difficult dilemma: While Bible reading is almost universally required to be without comment, since only by such a prohibition can sectarian interpretation be excluded from the classroom, [374 U.S. 203, 286] the rule breaks down at the point at which rudimentary definitions of Biblical terms are necessary for comprehension if the exercise is to be meaningful at all. </s> It has been suggested that a tentative solution to these problems may lie in the fashioning of a "common core" of theology tolerable to all creeds but preferential to none. 64 But as one commentator has recently observed, "[h]istory is not encouraging to" those who hope to fashion a "common denominator of religion detached from its manifestation in any organized church." Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 25, 51 (1962). Thus, the notion of a "common core" litany or supplication offends many deeply devout worshippers who do not find clearly sectarian practices objectionable. 65 Father Gustave Weigel has recently expressed [374 U.S. 203, 287] a widely shared view: "The moral code held by each separate religious community can reductively be unified, but the consistent particular believer wants no such reduction." 66 And, as the American Council on Education warned several years ago, "The notion of a common core suggests a watering down of the several faiths to the point where common essentials appear. This might easily lead to a new sect - a public school sect - which would take its place alongside the existing faiths and compete with them." 67 Engel is surely authority that nonsectarian religious practices, equally with sectarian exercises, violate the Establishment Clause. Moreover, even if the Establishment Clause were oblivious to nonsectarian religious practices, I think it quite likely that the "common core" approach would be sufficiently objectionable to many groups to be foreclosed by the prohibitions of the Free Exercise Clause. </s> C. </s> A third element which is said to absolve the practices involved in these cases from the ban of the religious guarantees of the Constitution is the provision to excuse or exempt students who wish not to participate. Insofar as these practices are claimed to violate the Establishment [374 U.S. 203, 288] Clause, I find the answer which the District Court gave after our remand of Schempp to be altogether dispositive: </s> "The fact that some pupils, or theoretically all pupils, might be excused from attendance at the exercises does not mitigate the obligatory nature of the ceremony . . . . The exercises are held in the school buildings and perforce are conducted by and under the authority of the local school authorities and during school sessions. Since the statute requires the reading of the `Holy Bible,' a Christian document, the practice, as we said in our first opinion, prefers the Christian religion. The record demonstrates that it was the intention of the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to introduce a religious ceremony into the public schools of the Commonwealth." 201 F. Supp., at 819. </s> Thus the short, and to me sufficient, answer is that the availability of excusal or exemption simply has no relevance to the establishment question, if it is once found that these practices are essentially religious exercises designed at least in part to achieve religious aims through the use of public school facilities during the school day. </s> The more difficult question, however, is whether the availability of excusal for the dissenting child serves to refute challenges to these practices under the Free Exercise Clause. While it is enough to decide these cases to dispose of the establishment questions, questions of free exercise are so inextricably interwoven into the history and present status of these practices as to justify disposition of this second aspect of the excusal issue. The answer is that the excusal procedure itself necessarily operates in such a way as to infringe the rights of free exercise of those children who wish to be excused. We have held in Barnette and Torcaso, respectively, that a State may require neither public school students nor candidates [374 U.S. 203, 289] for an office of public trust to profess beliefs offensive to religious principles. By the same token the State could not constitutionally require a student to profess publicly his disbelief as the prerequisite to the exercise of his constitutional right of abstention. And apart from Torcaso and Barnette, I think Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 , suggests a further answer. We held there that a State may not condition the grant of a tax exemption upon the willingness of those entitled to the exemption to affirm their loyalty to the Government, even though the exemption was itself a matter of grace rather than of constitutional right. We concluded that to impose upon the eligible taxpayers the affirmative burden of proving their loyalty impermissibly jeopardized the freedom to engage in constitutionally protected activities close to the area to which the loyalty oath related. Speiser v. Randall seems to me to dispose of two aspects of the excusal or exemption procedure now before us. First, by requiring what is tantamount in the eyes of teachers and schoolmates to a profession of disbelief, or at least of nonconformity, the procedure may well deter those children who do not wish to participate for any reason based upon the dictates of conscience from exercising an indisputably constitutional right to be excused. 68 Thus the excusal [374 U.S. 203, 290] provision in its operation subjects them to a cruel dilemma. In consequence, even devout children may well avoid claiming their right and simply continue to participate in exercises distasteful to them because of an understandable reluctance to be stigmatized as atheists or nonconformists simply on the basis of their request. </s> Such reluctance to seek exemption seems all the more likely in view of the fact that children are disinclined at this age to step out of line or to flout "peer-group norms." Such is the widely held view of experts who have studied the behaviors and attitudes of children. 69 This is also [374 U.S. 203, 291] the basis of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's answer to a similar contention made in the McCollum case: </s> "That a child is offered an alternative may reduce the constraint; it does not eliminate the operation of influence by the school in matters sacred to conscience and outside the school's domain. The law of imitation operates, and non-conformity is not an [374 U.S. 203, 292] outstanding characteristic of children. The result is an obvious pressure upon children to attend." 333 U.S., at 227 . </s> Also apposite is the answer given more than 70 years ago by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin to the argument that an excusal provision saved a public school devotional exercise from constitutional invalidation: </s> ". . . the excluded pupil loses caste with his fellows, and is liable to be regarded with aversion, and subjected to reproach and insult. But it is a sufficient refutation of the argument that the practice in question tends to destroy the equality of the pupils which the constitution seeks to establish and protect, and puts a portion of them to serious disadvantage in many ways with respect to the others." State ex rel. Weiss v. District Board of School District No. 8, 76 Wis. 177, 200, 44 N. W. 967, 975. </s> And 50 years ago a like answer was offered by the Louisiana Supreme Court: </s> "Under such circumstances, the children would be excused from the opening exercises . . . because of their religious beliefs. And excusing such children on religious grounds, although the number excused might be very small, would be a distinct preference in favor of the religious beliefs of the majority, and would work a discrimination against those who were excused. The exclusion of a pupil under such circumstances puts him in a class by himself; it subjects him to a religious stigma; and all because of his religious belief. Equality in public education would be destroyed by such act, under a Constitution which seeks to establish equality and freedom in religious matters." Herold v. Parish Board of School Directors, 136 La. 1034, 1049-1050, 68 So. 116, 121. See also Tudor v. Board of Education, 14 N. J. 31, 48-52, [374 U.S. 203, 293] 100 A. 2d 857, 867-868; Brown v. Orange County Board of Public Instruction, 128 So.2d 181, 185 (Fla. App.). </s> Speiser v. Randall also suggests the answer to a further argument based on the excusal procedure. It has been suggested by the School Board, in Schempp, that we ought not pass upon the appellees' constitutional challenge at least until the children have availed themselves of the excusal procedure and found it inadequate to redress their grievances. Were the right to be excused not itself of constitutional stature, I might have some doubt about this issue. But we held in Speiser that the constitutional vice of the loyalty oath procedure discharged any obligation to seek the exemption before challenging the constitutionality of the conditions upon which it might have been denied. 357 U.S., at 529 . Similarly, we have held that one need not apply for a permit to distribute constitutionally protected literature, Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 , or to deliver a speech, Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 , before he may attack the constitutionality of a licensing system of which the defect is patent. Insofar as these cases implicate only questions of establishment, it seems to me that the availability of an excuse is constitutionally irrelevant. Moreover, the excusal procedure seems to me to operate in such a way as to discourage the free exercise of religion on the part of those who might wish to utilize it, thereby rendering it unconstitutional in an additional and quite distinct respect. </s> To summarize my views concerning the merits of these two cases: The history, the purpose and the operation of the daily prayer recital and Bible reading leave no doubt that these practices standing by themselves constitute an impermissible breach of the Establishment Clause. Such devotional exercises may well serve legitimate nonreligious purposes. To the extent, however, that such purposes [374 U.S. 203, 294] are really without religious significance, it has never been demonstrated that secular means would not suffice. Indeed, I would suggest that patriotic or other nonreligious materials might provide adequate substitutes - inadequate only to the extent that the purposes now served are indeed directly or indirectly religious. Under such circumstances, the States may not employ religious means to reach a secular goal unless secular means are wholly unavailing. I therefore agree with the Court that the judgment in Schempp, No. 142, must be affirmed, and that in Murray, No. 119, must be reversed. </s> V. </s> These considerations bring me to a final contention of the school officials in these cases: that the invalidation of the exercises at bar permits this Court no alternative but to declare unconstitutional every vestige, however slight, of cooperation or accommodation between religion and government. I cannot accept that contention. While it is not, of course, appropriate for this Court to decide questions not presently before it, I venture to suggest that religious exercises in the public schools present a unique problem. For not every involvement of religion in public life violates the Establishment Clause. Our decision in these cases does not clearly forecast anything about the constitutionality of other types of interdependence between religious and other public institutions. </s> Specifically, I believe that the line we must draw between the permissible and the impermissible is one which accords with history and faithfully reflects the understanding of the Founding Fathers. It is a line which the Court has consistently sought to mark in its decisions expounding the religious guarantees of the First Amendment. What the Framers meant to foreclose, and what our decisions under the Establishment Clause have forbidden, [374 U.S. 203, 295] are those involvements of religious with secular institutions which (a) serve the essentially religious activities of religious institutions; (b) employ the organs of government for essentially religious purposes; or (c) use essentially religious means to serve governmental ends, where secular means would suffice. When the secular and religious institutions become involved in such a manner, there inhere in the relationship precisely those dangers - as much to church as to state - which the Framers feared would subvert religious liberty and the strength of a system of secular government. On the other hand, there may be myriad forms of involvements of government with religion which do not import such dangers and therefore should not, in my judgment, be deemed to violate the Establishment Clause. Nothing in the Constitution compels the organs of government to be blind to what everyone else perceives - that religious differences among Americans have important and pervasive implications for our society. Likewise nothing in the Establishment Clause forbids the application of legislation having purely secular ends in such a way as to alleviate burdens upon the free exercise of an individual's religious beliefs. Surely the Framers would never have understood that such a construction sanctions that involvement which violates the Establishment Clause. Such a conclusion can be reached, I would suggest, only by using the words of the First Amendment to defeat its very purpose. </s> The line between permissible and impermissible forms of involvement between government and religion has already been considered by the lower federal and state courts. I think a brief survey of certain of these forms of accommodation will reveal that the First Amendment commands not official hostility toward religion, but only a strict neutrality in matters of religion. Moreover, it may serve to suggest that the scope of our holding today [374 U.S. 203, 296] is to be measured by the special circumstances under which these cases have arisen, and by the particular dangers to church and state which religious exercises in the public schools present. It may be helpful for purposes of analysis to group these other practices and forms of accommodation into several rough categories. </s> A. The Conflict Between Establishment and Free Exercise. - There are certain practices, conceivably violative of the Establishment Clause, the striking down of which might seriously interfere with certain religious liberties also protected by the First Amendment. 70 Provisions for churches and chaplains at military establishments for those in the armed services may afford one such example. 71 </s> [374 U.S. 203, 297] The like provision by state and federal governments for chaplains in penal institutions may afford another example. 72 It is argued that such provisions may be assumed to contravene the Establishment Clause, yet be sustained on constitutional grounds as necessary to secure to the members of the Armed Forces and prisoners those rights of worship guaranteed under the Free Exercise Clause. Since government has deprived such persons of the opportunity [374 U.S. 203, 298] to practice their faith at places of their choice, the argument runs, government may, in order to avoid infringing the free exercise guarantees, provide substitutes where it requires such persons to be. Such a principle might support, for example, the constitutionality of draft exemptions for ministers and divinity students, 73 cf. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 389 -390; of the excusal of children from school on their respective religious holidays; and of the allowance by government of temporary use of public buildings by religious organizations when their own churches have become unavailable because of a disaster or emergency. 74 </s> Such activities and practices seem distinguishable from the sponsorship of daily Bible reading and prayer recital. For one thing, there is no element of coercion present in the appointment of military or prison chaplains; the soldier or convict who declines the opportunities for worship would not ordinarily subject himself to the suspicion or obloquy of his peers. Of special significance to this distinction is the fact that we are here usually dealing [374 U.S. 203, 299] with adults, not with impressionable children as in the public schools. Moreover, the school exercises are not designed to provide the pupils with general opportunities for worship denied them by the legal obligation to attend school. The student's compelled presence in school for five days a week in no way renders the regular religious facilities of the community less accessible to him than they are to others. The situation of the school child is therefore plainly unlike that of the isolated soldier or the prisoner. </s> The State must be steadfastly neutral in all matters of faith, and neither favor nor inhibit religion. In my view, government cannot sponsor religious exercises in the public schools without jeopardizing that neutrality. On the other hand, hostility, not neutrality, would characterize the refusal to provide chaplains and places of worship for prisoners and soldiers cut off by the State from all civilian opportunities for public communion, the withholding of draft exemptions for ministers and conscientious objectors, or the denial of the temporary use of an empty public building to a congregation whose place of worship has been destroyed by fire or flood. I do not say that government must provide chaplains or draft exemptions, or that the courts should intercede if it fails to do so. </s> B. Establishment and Exercises in Legislative Bodies. - The saying of invocational prayers in legislative chambers, state or federal, and the appointment of legislative chaplains, might well represent no involvements of the kind prohibited by the Establishment Clause. 75 Legislators, federal and state, are mature adults who may presumably absent themselves from such public and ceremonial [374 U.S. 203, 300] exercises without incurring any penalty, direct or indirect. It may also be significant that, at least in the case of the Congress, Art. I, 5, of the Constitution makes each House the monitor of the "Rules of its Proceedings" so that it is at least arguable whether such matters present "political questions" the resolution of which is exclusively confided to Congress. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 232 . Finally, there is the difficult question of who may be heard to challenge such practices. See Elliott v. White, 23 F.2d 997. </s> C. Non-Devotional Use of the Bible in the Public Schools. - The holding of the Court today plainly does not foreclose teaching about the Holy Scriptures or about the differences between religious sects in classes in literature or history. Indeed, whether or not the Bible is involved, it would be impossible to teach meaningfully many subjects in the social sciences or the humanities without some mention of religion. 76 To what extent, and at what points in the curriculum, religious materials should be cited are matters which the courts ought to entrust very largely to the experienced officials who superintend our Nation's public schools. They are experts in such matters, and we are not. We should heed Mr. Justice Jackson's caveat that any attempt by this Court to announce curricular standards would be "to decree a uniform, rigid and, if we are consistent, an unchanging standard for countless school boards representing [374 U.S. 203, 301] and serving highly localized groups which not only differ from each other but which themselves from time to time change attitudes." Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, supra, at 237. </s> We do not, however, in my view usurp the jurisdiction of school administrators by holding as we do today that morning devotional exercises in any form are constitutionally invalid. But there is no occasion now to go further and anticipate problems we cannot judge with the material now before us. Any attempt to impose rigid limits upon the mention of God or references to the Bible in the classroom would be fraught with dangers. If it should sometime hereafter be shown that in fact religion can play no part in the teaching of a given subject without resurrecting the ghost of the practices we strike down today, it will then be time enough to consider questions we must now defer. </s> D. Uniform Tax Exemptions Incidentally Available to Religious Institutions. - Nothing we hold today questions the propriety of certain tax deductions or exemptions which incidentally benefit churches and religious institutions, along with many secular charities and nonprofit organizations. If religious institutions benefit, it is in spite of rather than because of their religious character. For religious institutions simply share benefits which government makes generally available to educational, charitable, and eleemosynary groups. 77 There is no indication that taxing authorities have used such benefits in any way to subsidize worship or foster belief in God. And as [374 U.S. 203, 302] among religious beneficiaries, the tax exemption or deduction can be truly nondiscriminatory, available on equal terms to small as well as large religious bodies, to popular and unpopular sects, and to those organizations which reject as well as those which accept a belief in God. 78 </s> E. Religious Considerations in Public Welfare Programs. - Since government may not support or directly aid religious activities without violating the Establishment Clause, there might be some doubt whether nondiscriminatory programs of governmental aid may constitutionally include individuals who become eligible wholly or partially for religious reasons. For example, it might be suggested that where a State provides unemployment compensation generally to those who are unable to find suitable work, it may not extend such benefits to persons who are unemployed by reason of religious beliefs or practices without thereby establishing the religion to which those persons belong. Therefore, the argument runs, the State may avoid an establishment only by singling out and excluding such persons on the ground that religious beliefs or practices have made them potential beneficiaries. Such a construction would, it seems to me, require government to impose religious discriminations and disabilities, thereby jeopardizing the free exercise of religion, in order to avoid what is thought to constitute an establishment. </s> The inescapable flaw in the argument, I suggest, is its quite unrealistic view of the aims of the Establishment Clause. The Framers were not concerned with the effects of certain incidental aids to individual worshippers which come about as by-products of general and nondiscriminatory welfare programs. If such benefits serve to make [374 U.S. 203, 303] easier or less expensive the practice of a particular creed, or of all religions, it can hardly be said that the purpose of the program is in any way religious, or that the consequence of its nondiscriminatory application is to create the forbidden degree of interdependence between secular and sectarian institutions. I cannot therefore accept the suggestion, which seems to me implicit in the argument outlined here, that every judicial or administrative construction which is designed to prevent a public welfare program from abridging the free exercise of religious beliefs, is for that reason ipso facto an establishment of religion. </s> F. Activities Which, Though Religious in Origin, Have Ceased to Have Religious Meaning. - As we noted in our Sunday Law decisions, nearly every criminal law on the books can be traced to some religious principle or inspiration. But that does not make the present enforcement of the criminal law in any sense an establishment of religion, simply because it accords with widely held religious principles. As we said in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 , "the `Establishment' Clause does not ban federal or state regulation of conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions." This rationale suggests that the use of the motto "In God We Trust" on currency, on documents and public buildings and the like may not offend the clause. It is not that the use of those four words can be dismissed as "de minimis" - for I suspect there would be intense opposition to the abandonment of that motto. The truth is that we have simply interwoven the motto so deeply into the fabric of our civil polity that its present use may well not present that type of involvement which the First Amendment prohibits. </s> This general principle might also serve to insulate the various patriotic exercises and activities used in the public schools and elsewhere which, whatever may have been [374 U.S. 203, 304] their origins, no longer have a religious purpose or meaning. The reference to divinity in the revised pledge of allegiance, for example, may merely recognize the historical fact that our Nation was believed to have been founded "under God." Thus reciting the pledge may be no more of a religious exercise than the reading aloud of Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, which contains an allusion to the same historical fact. </s> The principles which we reaffirm and apply today can hardly be thought novel or radical. They are, in truth, as old as the Republic itself, and have always been as integral a part of the First Amendment as the very words of that charter of religious liberty. No less applicable today than they were when first pronounced a century ago, one year after the very first court decision involving religious exercises in the public schools, are the words of a distinguished Chief Justice of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Jeremiah S. Black: </s> "The manifest object of the men who framed the institutions of this country, was to have a State without religion, and a Church without politics - that is to say, they meant that one should never be used as an engine for any purpose of the other, and that no man's rights in one should be tested by his opinions about the other. As the Church takes no note of men's political differences, so the State looks with equal eye on all the modes of religious faith. . . . Our fathers seem to have been perfectly sincere in their belief that the members of the Church would be more patriotic, and the citizens of the State more religious, by keeping their respective functions entirely separate." Essay on Religious Liberty, in Black, ed., Essays and Speeches of Jeremiah S. Black (1886), 53. </s> [Footnote 1 Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in 35 Great Books of the Western World (Hutchins ed. 1952), 2. </s> [Footnote 2 Representative Daniel Carroll of Maryland during debate upon the proposed Bill of Rights in the First Congress, August 15, 1789, I Annals of Cong. 730. </s> [Footnote 3 See Healey, Jefferson on Religion in Public Education (1962); Boles, The Bible, Religion, and the Public Schools (1961), 16-21; Butts, The American Tradition in Religion and Education (1950), 119-130; Cahn, On Government and Prayer, 37 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 981 (1962); Costanzo, Thomas Jefferson, Religious Education and Public Law, 8 J. Pub. Law 81 (1959); Comment, The Supreme Court, the First Amendment, and Religion in the Public Schools, 63 Col. L. Rev. 73, 79-83 (1963). </s> [Footnote 4 Jefferson's caveat was in full: </s> "Instead, therefore, of putting the Bible and Testament into the hands of the children at an age when their judgments are not sufficiently matured for religious inquiries, their memories may here be stored with the most useful facts from Grecian, Roman, European and American history." 2 Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Memorial ed. 1903), 204. </s> Compare Jefferson's letter to his nephew, Peter Carr, when the latter was about to begin the study of law, in which Jefferson outlined a suggested course of private study of religion since "[y]our reason is now mature enough to examine this object." Letter to Peter Carr, August 10, 1787, in Padover, The Complete Jefferson (1943), 1058. Jefferson seems to have opposed sectarian instruction at any level of public education, see Healey, Jefferson on Religion in Public Education (1962), 206-210, 256, 264-265. The absence of any mention of religious instruction in the projected elementary and secondary schools contrasts significantly with Jefferson's quite explicit proposals concerning religious instruction at the University of Virginia. His draft for "A Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge" in 1779, for example, outlined in some detail the secular curriculum for the public schools, while avoiding any references to religious studies. See Padover, supra, at 1048-1054. The later draft of an "Act for Establishing Elementary Schools" which Jefferson submitted to the Virginia General Assembly in 1817 provided that "no religious reading, instruction or exercise, shall be prescribed or practiced [374 U.S. 203, 236] inconsistent with the tenets of any religious sect or denomination." Padover, supra, at 1076. Reliance upon Jefferson's apparent willingness to permit certain religious instruction at the University seems, therefore, to lend little support to such instruction in the elementary and secondary schools. Compare, e. g., Corwin, A Constitution of Powers in a Secular State (1951), 104-106; Costanzo, Thomas Jefferson, Religious Education and Public Law, 8 J. Pub. Law 81, 100-106 (1959). </s> [Footnote 5 Cf. Mr. Justice Rutledge's observations in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 53 -54 (dissenting opinion). See also Fellman, Separation of Church and State in the United States: A Summary View, 1950 Wis. L. Rev. 427, 428-429; Rosenfield, Separation of Church and State in the Public Schools, 22 U. of Pitt. L. Rev. 561, 569 (1961); MacKinnon, Freedom? - or Toleration? The Problem of Church and State in the United States, 1959. Pub. Law 374. One author has suggested these reasons for cautious application of the history of the Constitution's religious guarantees to contemporary problems: </s> "First, the brevity of Congressional debate and the lack of writings on the question by the framers make any historical argument inconclusive and open to serious question. Second, the amendment was designed to outlaw practices which had existed before its writing, but there is no authoritative declaration of the specific practices at which it was aimed. And third, most of the modern religious-freedom cases turn on issues which were at most academic in 1789 and perhaps did not exist at all. Public education was almost nonexistent in 1789, and the question of religious education in public schools may not have been foreseen." Beth, The American Theory of Church and State (1958), 88. </s> [Footnote 6 See generally, for discussion of the early efforts for disestablishment of the established colonial churches, and of the conditions against which the proponents of separation of church and state contended, Sweet, The Story of Religion in America (1950), c. XIII; Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty in America (1902), c. IX; Eckenrode, Separation of Church and State in Virginia (1910); Brant, James Madison - The Nationalist, 1780-1787 (1948), c. XXII; Bowers, The Young Jefferson (1945), 193-199; Butts, The American Tradition in Religion and Education (1950), c. II; Kruse, The Historical Meaning and Judicial Construction of the Establishment of Religion Clause of the First Amendment, 2 Washburn L. J. 65, 79-83 (1962). Compare also Alexander Hamilton's conception of "the characteristic difference between a tolerated and established religion" and his grounds of opposition to the latter, in his remarks on the Quebec Bill in 1775, 2 Works of Alexander Hamilton (Hamilton ed. 1850), 133-138. Compare, for the view that contemporary evidence reveals a design of the Framers to forbid not only formal establishment of churches, but various forms of incidental aid to or support of religion, Lardner, How Far Does the Constitution Separate Church and State? 45 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 110, 112-115 (1951). </s> [Footnote 7 The origins of the modern movement for free state-supported education cannot be fixed with precision. In England, the Levellers unavailingly urged in their platform of 1649 the establishment of free primary education for all, or at least for boys. See Brailsford, The Levellers and the English Revolution (1961), 534. In the North American Colonies, education was almost without exception under private sponsorship and supervision, frequently under control of the dominant Protestant sects. This condition prevailed after the Revolution and into the first quarter of the nineteenth century. See generally Mason, Moral Values and Secular Education (1950), c. II; Thayer, The Role of the School in American Society (1960), c. X; Greene, Religion and the State: The Making and Testing of an American Tradition (1941), 120-122. Thus, Virginia's colonial Governor Berkeley exclaimed in 1671: "I thank God there are no free schools nor printing, and I hope we shall not have them these hundred years; for learning has brought disobedience, and heresy, and sects into the world . . . ." (Emphasis deleted.) Bates, Religious Liberty: An Inquiry (1945), 327. </s> The exclusively private control of American education did not, however, quite survive Berkeley's expectations. Benjamin Franklin's proposals in 1749 for a Philadelphia Academy heralded the dawn of publicly supported secondary education, although the proposal did not bear immediate fruit. See Johnson and Yost, Separation of Church and State in the United States (1948), 26-27. Jefferson's elaborate plans for a public school system in Virginia came to naught after the defeat in 1796 of his proposed Elementary School Bill, which found little favor among the wealthier legislators. See Bowers, The [374 U.S. 203, 239] Young Jefferson (1945), 182-186. It was not until the 1820's and 1830's under the impetus of Jacksonian democracy, that a system of public education really took root in the United States. See 1 Beard, The Rise of American Civilization (1937), 810-818. One force behind the development of secular public schools may have been a growing dissatisfaction with the tightly sectarian control over private education, see Harner, Religion's Place in General Education (1949), 29-30. Yet the burgeoning public school systems did not immediately supplant the old sectarian and private institutions; Alexis de Tocqueville, for example, remarked after his tour of the Eastern States in 1831 that "[a]lmost all education is entrusted to the clergy." 1 Democracy in America (Bradley ed. 1945) 309, n. 4. And compare Lord Bryce's observations, a half century later, on the still largely denominational character of American higher education, 2 The American Commonwealth (1933), 734-735. </s> Efforts to keep the public schools of the early nineteenth century free from sectarian influence were of two kinds. One took the form of constitutional provisions and statutes adopted by a number of States forbidding appropriations from the public treasury for the support of religious instruction in any manner. See Moehlman, The Wall of Separation Between Church and State (1951), 132-135; Lardner, How Far Does the Constitution Separate Church and State? 45 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 110, 122 (1951). The other took the form of measures directed against the use of sectarian reading and teaching materials in the schools. The texts used in the earliest public schools had been largely taken over from the private academies, and retained a strongly religious character and content. See Nichols, Religion and American Democracy (1959), 64-80; Kinney, Church and State, The Struggle for Separation in New Hampshire, 1630-1900 (1955), 150-153. In 1827, however, Massachusetts enacted a statute providing that school boards might not thereafter "direct any school books to be purchased or used, in any of the schools . . . which are calculated to favor any particular religious sect or tenet." 2 Stokes, Church and State in the United States (1950), 53. For further discussion of the background of the Massachusetts law and difficulties in its early application, see Dunn, [374 U.S. 203, 240] What Happened to Religious Education? (1958), c. IV. As other States followed the example of Massachusetts, the use of sectarian texts was in time as widely prohibited as the appropriation of public funds for religious instruction. </s> Concerning the evolution of the American public school systems free of sectarian influence, compare Mr. Justice Frankfurter's account: </s> "It is pertinent to remind that the establishment of this principle of Separation in the field of education was not due to any decline in the religious beliefs of the people. Horace Mann was a devout Christian, and the deep religious feeling of James Madison is stamped upon the Remonstrance. The secular public school did not imply indifference to the basic role of religion in the life of the people, nor rejection of religious education as a means of fostering it. The claims of religion were not minimized by refusing to make the public schools agencies for their assertion. The non-sectarian or secular public school was the means of reconciling freedom in general with religious freedom. The sharp confinement of the public schools to secular education was a recognition of the need of a democratic society to educate its children, insofar as the State undertook to do so, in an atmosphere free from pressures in a realm in which pressures are most resisted and where conflicts are most easily and most bitterly engendered." Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 216 . </s> [Footnote 8 The comparative religious homogeneity of the United States at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted has been considered in Haller, The Puritan Background of the First Amendment, in Read ed., The Constitution Reconsidered (1938), 131, 133-134; Beth, The American Theory of Church and State (1958), 74; Kinney, Church and State, The Struggle for Separation in New Hampshire, 1630-1900 (1955), 155-161. However, Madison suggested in the Fifty-first Federalist that the religious diversity which existed at the time of the Constitutional Convention constituted a source of strength for religious freedom, much as the multiplicity of economic and political interests enhanced the security of other civil rights. The Federalist (Cooke ed. 1961), 351-352. </s> [Footnote 9 See Comment, The Power of Courts Over the Internal Affairs of Religious Groups, 43 Calif. L. Rev. 322 (1955); Comment, Judicial Intervention in Disputes Within Independent Church Bodies, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 102 (1955); Note, Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over the Use of Church Property, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1142 (1962). Compare Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 2 How. 127. . The principle of judicial nonintervention in essentially religious disputes appears to have been reflected in the decisions of several state courts declining to enforce essentially private agreements concerning the religious education [374 U.S. 203, 244] and worship of children of separated or divorced parents. See, e. g., Hackett v. Hackett, 78 Ohio Abs. 485, 150 N. E. 2d 431; Stanton v. Stanton, 213 Ga. 545, 100 S. E. 2d 289; Friedman, The Parental Right to Control the Religious Education of a Child, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 485 (1916); 72 Harv. L. Rev. 372 (1958); Note, 10 West. Res. L. Rev. 171 (1959). </s> Governmental nonintervention in religious affairs and institutions seems assured by Article 26 of the Constitution of India, which provides: </s> "Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right - </s> "(a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; </s> "(b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion; </s> "(c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and </s> "(d) to administer such property in accordance with law." See 1 Chaudhri, Constitutional Rights and Limitations (1955), 875. This Article does not, however, appear to have completely foreclosed judicial inquiry into the merits of intradenominational disputes. See Gledhill, Fundamental Rights in India (1955), 101-102. </s> [Footnote 10 For a discussion of the difficulties inherent in the Ballard case, see Kurland, Religion and the Law (1962), 75-79. This Court eventually reversed the convictions on the quite unrelated ground that women had been systematically excluded from the jury, Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 . For discussions of the difficulties in interpreting and applying the First Amendment so as to foster the objective of neutrality without hostility, see, e. g., Katz, Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 426, 438 (1953); Kauper, Church, State, and Freedom: A Review, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 829, 842 (1954). Compare, for an interesting apparent attempt to avoid the Ballard problem at the international level, Article 3 of the Multilateral Treaty between the United States and certain American Republics, which provides that extradition will not be granted, inter alia, when "the offense is . . . directed against religion." Blakely, American State Papers and Related Documents of Freedom in Religion (4th rev. ed. 1949), 316. </s> [Footnote 11 See Kurland, Religion and the Law (1962), 32-34. </s> [Footnote 12 Compare the treatment of an apparently very similar problem in Article 28 of the Constitution of India: </s> "(1) No religious instruction shall be provided in any educational institution wholly maintained out of State funds. </s> "(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to an educational institution which is administered by the State but has been established under any endowment or trust which requires that religious instruction shall be imparted in such institution." 1 Chaudhri, Constitutional Rights and Limitations (1955), 875-876, 939. </s> [Footnote 13 See Kurland, Religion and the Law (1962), 28-31; Fellman, Separation of Church and State in the United States: A Summary View, 1950 Wis. L. Rev. 427, 442. </s> [Footnote 14 This distinction, implicit in the First Amendment, had been made explicit in the original Virginia Bill of Rights provision that "all men should enjoy the fullest toleration in the exercise of religion according to the dictates of conscience, unpunished and unrestrained by the magistrate, unless under color of religion any man disturb the peace, the happiness, or safety of society." See Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty in America (1902), 491. Concerning various legislative limitations and restraints upon religiously motivated behavior which endangers or offends society, see Manwaring, Render Unto Caesar: The Flag-Salute Controversy (1962), 41-52. Various courts have applied this principle to proscribe certain religious exercises or activities which were thought to threaten the safety or morals of the participants or the rest of the community, e. g., State v. Massey, [374 U.S. 203, 250] 229 N.C. 734, 51 S. E. 2d 179; Harden v. State, 188 Tenn. 17, 216 S. W. 2d 708; Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S. W. 2d 972; cf. Sweeney v. Webb, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 324, 76 S. W. 766. </s> That the principle of these cases, and the distinction between belief and behavior, are susceptible of perverse application, may be suggested by Oliver Cromwell's mandate to the besieged Catholic community in Ireland: </s> "As to freedom of conscience, I meddle with no man's conscience; but if you mean by that, liberty to celebrate the Mass, I would have you understand that in no place where the power of the Parliament of England prevails shall that be permitted." Quoted in Hook, The Paradoxes of Freedom (1962), 23. </s> [Footnote 15 With respect to the decision in Hamilton v. Regents, compare two recent comments: Kurland, Religion and the Law (1962), 40; and French, Comment, Unconstitutional Conditions: An Analysis, 50 Geo. L. J. 234, 246 (1961). </s> [Footnote 16 See generally as to the background and history of the Barnette case, Manwaring, Render Unto Caesar: The Flag-Salute Controversy (1962), especially at 252-253. Compare, for the interesting treatment of a problem similar to that of Barnette, in a nonconstitutional context, Chabot v. Les Commissaires D'Ecoles de Lamorandiere, 1957. Que. B. R. 707, noted in 4 McGill L. J. 268 (1958). </s> [Footnote 17 See Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243; Permoli v. New Orleans, 3 How. 589, 609; cf. Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410, 434-435; Withers v. Buckley, 20 How. 84, 89-91. As early as 1825, however, at least one commentator argued that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, excepting only those of the First and Seventh Amendments, were meant to limit the powers of the States. Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States of America (1825), 120-130. </s> [Footnote 18 In addition to the statement of this Court in Meyer, at least one state court assumed as early as 1921 that claims of abridgment of the free exercise of religion in the public schools must be tested under the guarantees of the First Amendment as well as those of the state [374 U.S. 203, 254] constitution. Hardwick v. Board of School Trustees, 54 Cal. App. 696, 704-705, 205 P. 49, 52. See Louisell and Jackson, Religion, Theology, and Public Higher Education, 50 Cal. L. Rev. 751, 772 (1962). Even before the Fourteenth Amendment, New York State enacted a general common school law in 1844 which provided that no religious instruction should be given which could be construed to violate the rights of conscience "as secured by the constitution of this state and the United States." N. Y. Laws, 1844, c. 320, 12. </s> [Footnote 19 See, e. g., Snee, Religious Disestablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954 Wash. U. L. Q. 371, 373-394; Kruse, The Historical Meaning and Judicial Construction of the Establishment of Religion Clause of the First Amendment, 2 Washburn L. J. 65, 84-85, 127-130 (1962); Katz, Religion and American Constitutions, Address at Northwestern University Law School, March 20, 1963, pp. 6-7. But [374 U.S. 203, 255] see the debate in the Constitutional Convention over the question whether it was necessary or advisable to include among the enumerated powers of the Congress a power "to establish an University, in which no preferences or distinctions should be allowed on account of religion." At least one delegate thought such an explicit delegation "is not necessary," for "[t]he exclusive power at the Seat of Government, will reach the object." The proposal was defeated by only two votes. 2 Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (1911), 616. </s> [Footnote 20 The last formal establishment, that of Massachusetts, was dissolved in 1833. The process of disestablishment in that and other States is described in Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty in America (1902), c. X; Sweet, The Story of Religion in America (1950), c. XIII. The greater relevance of conditions existing at the time of adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment is suggested in Note, State Sunday Laws and the Religious Guarantees of the Federal Constitution, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 729, 739, n. 79 (1960). </s> [Footnote 21 See Corwin, A Constitution of Powers in a Secular State (1951), 111-114; Fairman and Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5 (1949); Meyer, Comment, The Blaine Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 939 (1951); Howe, Religion and Race in Public Education, 8 Buffalo L. Rev. 242, 245-247 (1959). Cf. Cooley, Principles of Constitutional Law (2d ed. 1891), 213-214. Compare Professor Freund's comment: </s> "Looking back, it is hard to see how the Court could have done otherwise, how it could have persisted in accepting freedom of contract as a guaranteed liberty without giving equal status to freedom of press and speech, assembly, and religious observance. What does not seem so inevitable is the inclusion within the Fourteenth Amendment of the concept of nonestablishment of religion in the sense of forbidding nondiscriminatory aid to religion, where there is no interference with freedom of religious exercise." Freund, The Supreme Court of the United States (1961), 58-59. </s> [Footnote 22 The Blaine Amendment, 4 Cong. Rec. 5580, included also a more explicit provision that "no money raised by taxation in any State for the support of public schools or derived from any public fund therefor, nor any public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious sect or denomination . . . ." The Amendment passed the House but failed to obtain the requisite two-thirds vote in the Senate. See 4 Cong. Rec. 5595. The prohibition which the Blaine Amendment would have engrafted onto the American Constitution has been incorporated in the constitutions of other nations; compare Article 28 (1) of the Constitution of India ("No religious instruction shall be provided in any educational institution wholly maintained out of State funds"); Article XX of the Constitution of Japan (". . . the State and its organs shall refrain from religious education or any other religious activity"). See 1 Chaudhri, Constitutional Rights and Limitations (1955), 875, 876. </s> [Footnote 23 Three years after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, Mr. Justice Bradley wrote a letter expressing his views on a proposed constitutional amendment designed to acknowledge the dependence [374 U.S. 203, 258] of the Nation upon God, and to recognize the Bible as the foundation of its laws and the supreme ruler of its conduct: </s> "I have never been able to see the necessity or expediency of the movement for obtaining such an amendment. The Constitution was evidently framed and adopted by the people of the United States with the fixed determination to allow absolute religious freedom and equality, and to avoid all appearance even of a State religion, or a State endorsement of any particular creed or religious sect. . . . And after the Constitution in its original form was adopted, the people made haste to secure an amendment that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. This shows the earnest desire of our Revolutionary fathers that religion should be left to the free and voluntary action of the people themselves. I do not regard it as manifesting any hostility to religion, but as showing a fixed determination to leave the people entirely free on the subject. </s> "And it seems to me that our fathers were wise; that the great voluntary system of this country is quite as favorable to the promotion of real religion as the systems of governmental protection and patronage have been in other countries. And whilst I do not understand that the association which you represent desire to invoke any governmental interference, still the amendment sought is a step in that direction which our fathers (quite as good Christians as ourselves) thought it wise not to take. In this country they thought they had settled one thing at least, that it is not the province of government to teach theology. </s> ". . . Religion, as the basis and support of civil government, must reside, not in the written Constitution, but in the people themselves. And we cannot legislate religion into the people. It must be infused by gentler and wiser methods." Miscellaneous Writings of Joseph P. Bradley (1901), 357-359. </s> For a later phase of the controversy over such a constitutional amendment as that which Justice Bradley opposed, see Finlator, Christ in Congress, 4 J. Church and State 205 (1962). </s> [Footnote 24 There is no doubt that, whatever "establishment" may have meant to the Framers of the First Amendment in 1791, the draftsmen of the Fourteenth Amendment three quarters of a century later understood the Establishment Clause to foreclose many incidental [374 U.S. 203, 259] forms of governmental aid to religion which fell far short of the creation or support of an official church. The Report of a Senate Committee as early as 1853, for example, contained this view of the Establishment Clause: </s> "If Congress has passed, or should pass, any law which, fairly construed, has in any degree introduced, or should attempt to introduce, in favor of any church, or ecclesiastical association, or system of religious faith, all or any one of these obnoxious particulars - endowment at the public expense, peculiar privileges to its members, or disadvantages or penalties upon those who should reject its doctrines or belong to other communions - such law would be a `law respecting an establishment of religion,' and, therefore, in violation of the constitution." S. Rep. No. 376, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2. </s> Compare Thomas M. Cooley's exposition in the year in which the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified: </s> "Those things which are not lawful under any of the American constitutions may be stated thus: - </s> "1. Any law respecting an establishment of religion. . . . </s> "2. Compulsory support, by taxation or otherwise, of religious instruction. . Not only is no one denomination to be favored at the expense of the rest, but all support of religious instruction must be entirely voluntary." Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (1st ed. 1868), 469. </s> [Footnote 25 Compare, e. g., Miller, Roger Williams: His Contribution to the American Tradition (1953), 83, with Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, reprinted as an Appendix [374 U.S. 203, 260] to the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Rutledge, Everson v. Board of Education, supra, at 63-72. See also Cahn, On Government and Prayer, 37 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 981, 982-985 (1962); Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in Padover, The Complete Jefferson (1943), 946-947; Moulton and Myers, Report on Appointing Chaplains to the Legislature of New York, in Blau, Cornerstones of Religious Freedom in America (1949), 141-156; Bury, A History of Freedom of Thought (2d ed. 1952), 75-76. </s> [Footnote 26 See, e. g., Spicer, The Supreme Court and Fundamental Freedoms (1959), 83-84; Kauper, Church, State, and Freedom: A Review, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 829, 839 (1954); Reed, Church-State and the Zorach Case, 27 Notre Dame Lawyer 529, 539-541 (1952). </s> [Footnote 27 See 343 U.S., at 321 -322 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Kurland, Religion and the Law (1962), 89. I recognize that there is a question whether in Zorach the free exercise claims asserted were in fact proved. 343 U.S., at 311 . </s> [Footnote 28 Mr. Justice Frankfurter described the effects of the McCollum program thus: </s> "Religious education so conducted on school time and property is patently woven into the working scheme of the school. The Champaign arrangement thus presents powerful elements of inherent pressure by the school system in the interest of religious sects. . . . As a result, the public school system of Champaign actively furthers inculcation in the religious tenets of some faiths, and in the process sharpens the consciousness of religious differences at least among some of the children committed to its care." 333 U.S., at 227 -228. </s> For similar reasons some state courts have enjoined the public schools from employing or accepting the services of members of religious orders even in the teaching of secular subjects, e. g., Zellers v. Huff, 55 N. M. 501, 236 P.2d 949; Berghorn v. Reorganized School Dist. No. 8, 364 Mo. 121, 260 S. W. 2d 573; compare ruling of Texas Commissioner of Education, Jan. 25, 1961, in 63 American Jewish Yearbook (1962), 188. Over a half century ago a New York court sustained a school board's exclusion from the public schools of teachers wearing religious garb on similar grounds: </s> "Then all through the school hours these teachers . . . were before the children as object lessons of the order and church of which they were members. It is within our common observation that young children . . . are very susceptible to the influence of their teachers and of the kind of object lessons continually before them in schools conducted under these circumstances and with these surroundings." O'Connor v. Hendrick, 109 App. Div. 361, 371-372, 96 N. Y. Supp. 161, 169. See also Commonwealth v. Herr, 229 Pa. 132, 78 A. 68; Comment, Religious Garb in the Public Schools - A Study in Conflicting Liberties, 22 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 888 (1955). </s> Also apposite are decisions of several courts which have enjoined the use of parochial schools as part of the public school system, Harfst [374 U.S. 203, 263] v. Hoegen, 349 Mo. 808, 163 S. W. 2d 609; or have invalidated programs for the distribution in public school classrooms of Gideon Bibles, Brown v. Orange County Board of Public Instruction, 128 So.2d 181 (Fla. App.); Tudor v. Board of Education, 14 N. J. 31, 100 A. 2d 857. See Note, The First Amendment and Distribution of Religious Literature in the Public Schools, 41 Va. L. Rev. 789, 803-806 (1955). In Tudor, the court stressed the role of the public schools in the Bible program: </s> ". . . the public school machinery is used to bring about the distribution of these Bibles to the children . . . . In the eyes of the pupils and their parents the board of education has placed its stamp of approval upon this distribution and, in fact, upon the Gideon Bible itself. . . . This is more than mere `accommodation' of religion permitted in the Zorach case. The school's part in this distribution is an active one and cannot be sustained on the basis of a mere assistance to religion." 14 N. J., at 51-52, 100 A. 2d, at 868. </s> The significance of the teacher's authority was recognized by one early state court decision: </s> "The school being in session, the right to command was vested in the teacher, and the duty of obedience imposed upon the pupils. Under such circumstances a request and a command have the same meaning. A request from one in authority is understood to be a mere euphemism. It is in fact a command in an inoffensive form." State ex rel. Freeman v. Scheve, 65 Neb. 876, 880, 93 N. W. 169, 170. </s> [Footnote 29 See for other illustrations of the principle that where First Amendment freedoms are or may be affected, government must employ those means which will least inhibit the exercise of constitutional liberties, Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 ; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 ; Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 ; Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 ; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 -489; Bantam Books, Inc., v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 , 69-71. See also Note, State Sunday Laws and the Religious Guarantees of the Federal Constitution, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 729, 743-745 (1960); Freund, The Supreme Court of the United States (1961), 86-87; 74 Harv. L. Rev. 613 (1961). And compare Miller v. Cooper, 56 N. M. 355, 244 P.2d 520 (1952), in which a state court permitted the holding of public school commencement exercises in a church building only because no public buildings in the community were adequate to accommodate the ceremony. </s> [Footnote 30 No question has been raised in these cases concerning the standing of these parents to challenge the religious practices conducted in the schools which their children presently attend. Whatever authority Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 , might have on the question of the standing of one not the parent of children affected by the challenged exercises is not before us in these cases. Neither in McCollum nor in Zorach was there any reason to question the standing of the parent-plaintiffs under settled principles of justiciability and jurisdiction, whether or not their complaints alleged pecuniary loss or monetary injury. The free-exercise claims of the parents alleged injury sufficient to give them standing. If, however, the gravamen of the lawsuit were exclusively one of establishment, it might seem illogical to confer standing upon a parent who - though he is concededly in the best position to assert a free-exercise claim - suffers no financial injury, by reason of being a parent, different from that of the ordinary taxpayer, whose standing may be open to question. See Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 25, 41-43 (1962). I would suggest several answers to this conceptual difficulty. First, the parent is surely the person most directly and immediately concerned about and affected by the challenged establishment, and to deny him standing either in his own right or on behalf of his child might effectively foreclose judicial inquiry into serious breaches of the prohibitions of the First Amendment - even though no special monetary injury could be shown. See Schempp v. School District of Abington Township, 177 F. Supp. 398, 407; Kurland, The Regents' Prayer Case: "Full of Sound and Fury, Signifying . . .," 1962 Supreme Court Review 1, 22. Second, the complaint in every case thus far challenging an establishment has set forth at least a colorable claim of infringement of free exercise. When the complaint includes both claims, and neither is frivolous, it would surely be overtechnical to say that a parent who does not detail the monetary cost of the exercises to him may ask the court to pass only upon the free-exercise claim, however logically the two may be related. Cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra; Truax v. Raich, [374 U.S. 203, 267] 239 U.S. 33, 38 -39; NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 458 -460; Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 ; Bantam Books, Inc., v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 64 , n. 6. Finally, the concept of standing is a necessarily flexible one, designed principally to ensure that the plaintiffs have "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions . . . ." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 . It seems to me that even a cursory examination of the complaints in these two cases and the opinions below discloses that these parents have very real grievances against the respective school authorities which cannot be resolved short of constitutional adjudication. See generally Arthur Garfield Hays Civil Liberties Conference: Public Aid to Parochial Schools and Standing to Bring Suit, 12 Buffalo L. Rev. 35 (1962); Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1265 (1961); Sutherland, Due Process and Disestablishment, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1306, 1327-1332 (1949); Comment, The Supreme Court, the First Amendment, and Religion in the Public Schools, 63 Col. L. Rev. 73, 94, n. 153 (1963). </s> [Footnote 31 Quoted in Dunn, What Happened to Religious Education? (1958), 21. </s> [Footnote 32 Quoted, id., at 22. </s> [Footnote 33 Quoted in Hartford, Moral Values in Public Education: Lessons From the Kentucky Experience (1958), 31. </s> [Footnote 34 See Culver, Horace Mann and Religion in the Massachusetts Public Schools (1929), for an account of one prominent educator's [374 U.S. 203, 269] efforts to satisfy both the protests of those who opposed continuation of sectarian lessons and exercises in public schools, and the demands of those who insisted upon the retention of some essentially religious practices. Mann's continued use of the Bible for what he regarded as nonsectarian exercises represented his response to these cross-pressures. See Mann, Religious Education, in Blau, Cornerstones of Religious Freedom in America (1949), 163-201 (from the Twelfth Annual Report for 1848 of the Secretary of the Board of Education of Massachusetts). See also Boles, The Bible, Religion, and the Public Schools (1961), 22-27. </s> [Footnote 35 See 2 Stokes, Church and State in the United States (1950), 572-579; Greene, Religion and the State: The Making and Testing of an American Tradition (1941), 122-126. </s> [Footnote 36 E. g., Ala. Code, Tit. 52, 542; Del. Code Ann., Tit. 14, 4101-4102; Fla. Stat. Ann. 231.09 (2); Mass. Ann. Laws, c. 71, 31; Tenn. Code Ann. 49-1307 (4). Some statutes, like the recently amended Pennsylvania statute involved in Schempp, provide for the excusal or exemption of children whose parents do not wish them to participate. See generally Johnson and Yost, Separation of Church and State in the United States (1948), 33-36; Thayer, The Role of the School in American Society (1960), 374-375; Beth, The American Theory of Church and State (1958), 106-107. Compare with the American statutory approach Article 28 (3) of the Constitution of India: </s> "(3) No person attending any educational institution recognised by the State or receiving aid out of State funds shall be required to [374 U.S. 203, 269] take part in any religious instruction that may be imparted in such institution or to attend any religious worship that may be conducted in such institution or in any premises attached thereto unless such person or, if such person is a minor, his guardian has given his consent thereto." See 1 Chaudhri, Constitutional Rights and Limitations (1955), 876, 939. </s> [Footnote 37 See note 34, supra. </s> [Footnote 38 Quoted from New Hampshire School Reports, 1850, 31-32, in Kinney, Church and State: The Struggle for Separation in New Hampshire, 1630-1900 (1955), 157-158. </s> [Footnote 39 Quoted in Boyer, Religious Education of Public School Pupils in Wisconsin, 1953 Wis. L. Rev. 181, 186. </s> [Footnote 40 Quoted in Dunn, What Happened to Religious Education? (1958), 271. </s> [Footnote 41 Quoted in Butts, The American Tradition in Religion and Education (1950), 135-136. </s> [Footnote 42 See Board of Education v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211; Blakely, American State Papers and Related Documents on Freedom in Religion (4th rev. ed. 1949), 864. </s> [Footnote 43 Report of the United States Commissioner of Education for the Year 1888-1889, part I, H. R. Exec. Doc. No. 1, part 5, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. 627. </s> [Footnote 44 Quoted in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, supra, at 218 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). See also President Grant's Annual Message to Congress, Dec. 7, 1875, 4 Cong. Rec. 175 et seq., which apparently inspired the drafting and submission of the Blaine Amendment. See Meyer, Comment, The Blaine Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 939 (1951). </s> [Footnote 45 Theodore Roosevelt to Michael A. Schaap, Feb. 22, 1915, 8 Letters of Theodore Roosevelt (Morison ed. 1954), 893. </s> [Footnote 46 Quoted in Boles, The Bible, Religion, and the Public Schools (1961), 238. </s> [Footnote 47 E. g., 1955 Op. Ariz. Atty. Gen. 67; 26 Ore. Op. Atty. Gen. 46 (1952); 25 Cal. Op. Atty. Gen. 316 (1955); 1948-1950 Nev. Atty. Gen. Rep. 69 (1948). For a 1961 opinion of the Attorney General of Michigan to the same effect, see 63 American Jewish Yearbook (1962) 189. In addition to the Governor of Ohio, see note 46, supra, a Governor of Arizona vetoed a proposed law which would have permitted "reading the Bible, without comment, except to teach Historical or Literary facts." See 2 Stokes, Church and State in the United States (1950), 568. </s> [Footnote 48 See Johnson and Yost, Separation of Church and State in the United States (1948), 71; Note, Bible Reading in Public Schools, 9 Vand. L. Rev. 849, 851 (1956). </s> [Footnote 49 E. g., Spiller v. Inhabitants of Woburn, 12 Allen (Mass.) 127 (1866); Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Maine 376, 413 (1854); cf. Ferriter v. Tyler, 48 Vt. 444, 471-472 (1876). </s> [Footnote 50 Board of Education v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211 (1873). </s> [Footnote 51 People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Education, 245 Ill. 334, 92 N. E. 251 (1910); Herold v. Parish Board of School Directors, 136 La. 1034, 68 So. 116 (1915); State ex rel. Weiss v. District Board, 76 Wis. 177, 44 N. W. 967 (1890); State ex rel. Finger v. Weedman, 55 S. D. 343, 226 N. W. 348 (1929); State ex rel. Dearle v. Frazier, 102 Wash. 369, 173 P. 35 (1918); cf. State ex rel. Clithero v. Showalter, 159 Wash. 519, 293 P. 1000 (1930); State ex rel. Freeman v. Scheve, 65 Neb. 853, 91 N. W. 846 (1902), modified, 65 Neb. 876, 93 [374 U.S. 203, 276] N. W. 169 (1903). The cases are discussed in Boles, The Bible, Religion, and the Public Schools (1961), c. IV; Harrison, The Bible, the Constitution and Public Education, 29 Tenn. L. Rev. 363, 386-389 (1962). </s> [Footnote 52 Moore v. Monroe, 64 Iowa 367, 20 N. W. 475 (1884); Hackett v. Brooksville Graded School District, 120 Ky. 608, 87 S. W. 792 (1905); Billard v. Board of Education, 69 Kan. 53, 76 P. 422 (1904); Pfeiffer v. Board of Education, 118 Mich. 560, 77 N. W. 250 (1898); Kaplan v. School District, 171 Minn. 142, 214 N. W. 18 (1927); Lewis v. Board of Education, 157 Misc. 520, 285 N. Y. Supp. 164 (Sup. Ct. 1935), modified on other grounds, 247 App. Div. 106, 286 N. Y. Supp. 174 (1936), appeal dismissed, 276 N. Y. 490, 12 N. E. 2d 172 (1937); Doremus v. Board of Education, 5 N. J. 435, 75 A. 2d 880 (1950), appeal dismissed, 342 U.S. 429 ; Church v. Bullock, 104 Tex. 1, 109 S. W. 115 (1908); People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 255 P. 610 (1927); Wilkerson v. City of Rome, 152 Ga. 762, 110 S. E. 895 (1922); Carden v. Bland, 199 Tenn. 665, 288 S. W. 2d 718 (1956); Chamberlin v. Dade County Board of Public Instruction, 143 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1962). </s> [Footnote 53 For discussion of the constitutional and statutory provisions involved in the state cases which sustained devotional exercises in the public schools, see Boles, The Bible, Religion, and the Public Schools (1961), c. III; Harrison, The Bible, the Constitution and Public Education, 29 Tenn. L. Rev. 363, 381-385 (1962); Fellman, Separation of Church and State in the United States: A Summary View, 1950 Wis. L. Rev. 427, 450-452; Note, Bible Reading in Public Schools, 9 Vand. L. Rev. 849, 854-859 (1956); Note, Nineteenth Century Judicial Thought Concerning Church-State Relations, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 672, 675-678 (1956). State courts appear to have been increasingly influenced in sustaining devotional practices by the availability of an excuse or exemption for dissenting students. See Cushman, The Holy Bible and the Public Schools, 40 Cornell L. Q. 475, 477 (1955); 13 Vand. L. Rev. 552 (1960). </s> [Footnote 54 See Rosenfield, Separation of Church and State in the Public Schools, 22 U. of Pitt. L. Rev. 561, 571-572 (1961); Harrison, The Bible, the Constitution and Public Education, 29 Tenn. L. Rev. 363, 399-400 (1962); 30 Ford. L. Rev. 801, 803 (1962); 45 Va. L. Rev. 1381 (1959). The essentially religious character of the materials used in these exercises is, in fact, strongly suggested by the presence of excusal or exemption provisions, and by the practice of rotating or alternating the use of different prayers and versions of the Holy Bible. </s> [Footnote 55 In the Billard case, the teacher whose use of the Lord's Prayer and the Twenty-third Psalm was before the court testified that the exercise served disciplinary rather than spiritual purposes: </s> "It is necessary to have some general exercise after the children come in from the playground to prepare them for their work. You need some general exercise to quiet them down." </s> When asked again if the purpose were not at least partially religious, the teacher replied, "[i]t was religious to the children that are religious, and to the others it was not." 69 Kan., at 57-58, 76 P., at 423. </s> [Footnote 56 See, e. g., Henry, The Place of Religion in Public Schools (1950); Martin, Our Public Schools - Christian or Secular (1952); Educational Policies Comm'n of the National Educational Assn., Moral and Spiritual Values in the Public Schools (1951), c. IV; Harner, Religion's Place in General Education (1949). Educators are by no means unanimous, however, on this question. See Boles, The Bible, Religion, and the Public Schools (1961), 223-224. Compare George Washington's advice in his Farewell Address: </s> "And let us with caution indulge the supposition, that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to expect that National morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle." 35 Writings of George Washington (Fitzpatrick ed. 1940), 229. </s> [Footnote 57 Thomas Jefferson's insistence that where the judgments of young children "are not sufficiently matured for religious inquiries, their memories may here be stored with the most useful facts from Grecian, Roman, European and American history," 2 Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Memorial ed. 1903), 204, is relevant here. Recent proposals have explored the possibility of commencing the school day "with a quiet moment that would still the tumult of the playground and start a day of study," Editorial, Washington Post, June 28, 1962, A, p. 22, col. 2. See also New York Times, Aug. 30, 1962, 1, p. 18, col. 2. For a consideration of these and other alternative proposals see Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitutional Standard, 47 Minn. L. Rev. 329, 370-371 (1963). See also 2 Stokes, Church and State in the United States (1950), 571. </s> [Footnote 58 The history, as it bears particularly upon the role of sectarian differences concerning Biblical texts and interpretation, has been summarized in Tudor v. Board of Education, 14 N. J. 31, 36-44, 100 A. 2d 857, 859-864. See also State ex rel. Weiss v. District Board, 76 Wis. 177, 190-193, 44 N. W. 967, 972-975. One state court adverted to these differences a half century ago: </s> "The Bible, in its entirety, is a sectarian book as to the Jew and every believer in any religion other than the Christian religion, and as to those who are heretical or who hold beliefs that are not regarded as orthodox . . . its use in the schools necessarily results in sectarian instruction. There are many sects of Christians, and their differences grow out of their differing constructions of various parts of the Scriptures - the different conclusions drawn as to the effect of the same words. The portions of Scripture which form the basis of these sectarian differences cannot be thoughtfully and intelligently read without impressing the reader, favorably or otherwise, with reference to the doctrines supposed to be derived from them." People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Education, 245 Ill. 334, 347-348, 92 N. E. 251, 255. But see, for a sharply critical comment, Schofield, Religious Liberty and Bible Reading in Illinois Public Schools, 6 Ill. L. Rev. 17 (1911). </s> See also Dunn, What Happened to Religious Education? (1958), 268-273; Dawson, America's Way in Church, State, and Society (1953), 53-54; Johnson and Yost, Separation of Church and State in the United States (1948), c. IV; Harpster, Religion, Education and [374 U.S. 203, 283] the Law, 36 Marquette L. Rev. 24, 44-45 (1952); 20 Ohio State L. J. 701, 702-703 (1959). </s> [Footnote 59 See Torcaso v. Watkins, supra, at 495, n. 11; Cushman, The Holy Bible and the Public Schools, 40 Cornell L. Q. 475, 480-483 (1955); Note, Separation of Church and State: Religious Exercises in the Schools, 31 U. of Cinc. L. Rev. 408, 411-412 (1962). Few religious persons today would share the universality of the Biblical canons of John Quincy Adams: </s> "You ask me what Bible I take as the standard of my faith - the Hebrew, the Samaritan, the old English translation, or what? I answer, the Bible containing the sermon upon the mount - any Bible that I can read and understand. . . . I take any one of them for my standard of faith. If Socinus or Priestley had made a fair translation of the Bible, I would have taken that, but without their comments." John Quincy Adams to John Adams, Jan. 3, 1817, in Koch and Peden, Selected Writings of John and John Quincy Adams (1946), 292. </s> [Footnote 60 Rabbi Solomon Grayzel testified before the District Court, "In Judaism the Bible is not read, it is studied. There is no special virtue attached to a mere reading of the Bible; there is a great deal of virtue attached to a study of the Bible." See Boles, The Bible, Religion, and the Public Schools (1961), 208-218; Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitutional Standard, 47 Minn. L. Rev. 329, 372-375 (1963). One religious periodical has suggested the danger that "an observance of this sort is likely to deteriorate quickly into an empty formality with little, if any, spiritual significance. Prescribed forms of this sort, as many colleges have concluded after years of compulsory chapel attendance, can actually work against the inculcation of vital religion." Prayers in Public Schools Opposed, 69 Christian Century, Jan. 9, 1952, p. 35. </s> [Footnote 61 See Cahn, On Government and Prayer, 37 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 981, 993-994 (1962). A leading Protestant journal recently noted: </s> "Agitation for removal of religious practices in public schools is not prompted or supported entirely by Jews, humanists, and atheists. At both local and national levels, many Christian leaders, concerned both for civil rights of minorities and for adequate religious education, are opposed to religious exercises in public schools. . . . Many persons, both Jews and Christians, believe that prayer and Bible reading are too sacred to be permitted in public schools in spite of their possible moral value." Smith, The Religious Crisis In Our Schools, 128 The Episcopalian, May 1963, pp. 12-13. See, e. g., for other recent statements on this question, Editorial, Amending the Amendment, 108 America, May 25, 1963, p. 736; Sissel, A Christian View: Behind the Fight Against School Prayer, 27 Look, June 18, 1963, p. 25. </s> It should be unnecessary to demonstrate that the Lord's Prayer, more clearly than the Regents' Prayer involved in Engel v. Vitale, is an essentially Christian supplication. See, e. g., Scott, The Lord's Prayer: Its Character, Purpose, and Interpretation (1951), 55: Buttrick, So We Believe, So We Pray (1951), 142; Levy, Lord's Prayer, in 7 Universal Jewish Encyclopedia (1948), 192-193. </s> [Footnote 62 Statement of the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, in 4 J. Church and State 144 (1962). </s> [Footnote 63 See Harrison, The Bible, the Constitution and Public Education, 29 Tenn. L. Rev. 363, 397 (1962). The application of statutes and regulations which forbid comment on scriptural passages is further complicated by the view of certain religious groups that reading without comment is either meaningless or actually offensive. Compare Rabbi Grayzel's testimony before the District Court that "the Bible is misunderstood when it is taken without explanation." A recent survey of the attitudes of certain teachers disclosed concern that "refusal to answer pupil questions regarding any curricular activity is not educationally sound," and that reading without comment might create in the minds of the pupils the impression that something was "hidden or wrong." Boles, The Bible, Religion, and the Public Schools (1961), 235-236. Compare the comment of a foreign observer: "In no other field of learning would we expect a child to draw the full meaning from what he reads without accompanying explanatory comment. But comment by the teacher will inevitably reveal his own personal preferences; and the exhibition of preferences is what we are seeking to eliminate." MacKinnon, Freedom? - or Toleration? The Problem of Church and State in the United States, 1959. Pub. Law 374, 383. </s> [Footnote 64 See Abbott, A Common Bible Reader for Public Schools, 56 Religious Education 20 (1961); Note, 22 Albany L. Rev. 156-157 (1958); 2 Stokes, Church and State in the United States (1950), 501-506 (describing the "common denominator" or "three faiths" plan and certain programs of instruction designed to implement the "common core" approach). The attempts to evolve a universal, nondenominational prayer are by no means novel. See, e. g., Madison's letter to Edward Everett, March 19, 1823, commenting upon a "project of a prayer . . . intended to comprehend & conciliate College Students of every [Christian] denomination, by a Form composed wholly of texts & phrases of scripture." 9 Writings of James Madison (Hunt ed. 1910), 126. For a fuller description of this and other attempts to fashion a "common core" or nonsectarian exercise, see Engel v. Vitale, 18 Misc. 2d 659, 660-662, 191 N. Y. S. 2d 453, 459-460. </s> [Footnote 65 See the policy statement recently drafted by the National Council of the Churches of Christ: ". . . neither true religion nor good education is dependent upon the devotional use of the Bible in the public school program. . . . Apart from the constitutional questions involved, attempts to establish a `common core' of religious beliefs to be taught in public schools for the purpose of indoctrination are unrealistic and unwise. Major faith groups have not agreed on a formulation of religious beliefs common to all. Even if they had [374 U.S. 203, 287] done so, such a body of religious doctrine would tend to become a substitute for the more demanding commitments of historic faiths." Washington Post, May 25, 1963, A, p. 1, col. 4. See also Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitutional Standard, 47 Minn. L. Rev. 329, 341, 368-369 (1963). See also Hartford, Moral Values in Public Education: Lessons from the Kentucky Experience (1958), 261-262; Moehlman, The Wall of Separation Between Church and State (1951), 158-159. Cf. Mosk, "Establishment Clause" Clarified, 22 Law in Transition 231, 235-236 (1963). </s> [Footnote 66 Quoted in Kurland, The Regents' Prayer Case: "Full of Sound and Fury, Signifying . . .," 1962 Supreme Court Review (1962), 1, 31. </s> [Footnote 67 Quoted in Harrison, The Bible, the Constitution and Public Education, 29 Tenn. L. Rev. 363, 417 (1962). See also Dawson, America's Way in Church, State, and Society (1953), 54. </s> [Footnote 68 See the testimony of Edward L. Schempp, the father of the children in the Abington schools and plaintiff-appellee in No. 142, concerning his reasons for not asking that his children be excused from the morning exercises after excusal was made available through amendment of the statute: </s> "We originally objected to our children being exposed to the reading of the King James version of the Bible . . . and under those conditions we would have theoretically liked to have had the children excused. But we felt that the penalty of having our children labelled as `odd balls' before their teachers and classmates every day in the year was even less satisfactory than the other problem. . . . </s> "The children, the classmates of Roger and Donna are very liable to label and lump all particular religious difference or religious [374 U.S. 203, 290] objections as atheism, particularly, today the word `atheism' is so often tied to atheistic communism, and atheism has very bad connotations in the minds of children and many adults today." </s> A recent opinion of the Attorney General of California gave as one reason for finding devotional exercises unconstitutional the likelihood that "[c]hildren forced by conscience to leave the room during such exercises would be placed in a position inferior to that of students adhering to the State-endorsed religion." 25 Cal. Op. Atty. Gen. 316, 319 (1955). Other views on this question, and possible effects of the excusal procedure, are summarized in Rosenfield, Separation of Church and State in the Public Schools, 22 U. of Pitt. L. Rev. 561, 581-585 (1961); Note, Separation of Church and State: Religious Exercises in the Schools, 31 U. of Cinc. L. Rev. 408, 416 (1962); Note, 62 W. Va. L. Rev. 353, 358 (1960). </s> [Footnote 69 Extensive testimony by behavioral scientists concerning the effect of similar practices upon children's attitudes and behaviors is discussed in Tudor v. Board of Education, 14 N. J. 31, 50-52, 100 A. 2d 857, 867-868. See also Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitutional Standard, 47 Minn. L. Rev. 329, 344 (1963). There appear to be no reported experiments which bear directly upon the question under consideration. There have, however, been numerous experiments which indicate the susceptibility of school children to peer-group pressures, especially where important group norms and values are involved. See, e. g., Berenda, The Influence of the Group on the Judgments of Children (1950), 26-33; Argyle, Social Pressure in Public and Private Situations, 54 J. Abnormal & Social Psych. 172 (1957); cf. Rhine, The Effect of Peer [374 U.S. 203, 291] Group Influence Upon Concept-Attitude Development and Change, 51 J. Social Psych. 173 (1960); French, Morrison and Levinger, Coercive Power and Forces Affecting Conformity, 61 J. Abnormal and Social Psych. 93 (1960). For a recent and important experimental study of the susceptibility of students to various factors in the school environment, see Zander, Curtis and Rosenfeld, The Influence of Teachers and Peers on Aspirations of Youth (U.S. Office of Education Cooperative Research Project No. 451, 1961), 24-25, 78-79. It is also apparent that the susceptibility of school children to prestige suggestion and social influence within the school environment varies inversely with the age, grade level, and consequent degree of sophistication of the child, see Patel and Gordon, Some Personal and Situational Determinants of Yielding to Influence, 61 J. Abnormal and Social Psych. 411, 417 (1960). </s> Experimental findings also shed some light upon the probable effectiveness of a provision for excusal when, as is usually the case, the percentage of the class wishing not to participate in the exercises is very small. It has been demonstrated, for example, that the inclination even of adults to depart or dissent overtly from strong group norms varies proportionately with the size of the dissenting group - that is, inversely with the apparent or perceived strength of the norm itself - and is markedly slighter in the case of the sole or isolated dissenter. See, e. g., Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity: I. A Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority (Psych. Monographs No. 416, 1956), 69-70; Asch, Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments, in Cartwright and Zander, Group Dynamics (2d ed. 1960), 189-199; Luchins and Luchins, On Conformity With True and False Communications, 42 J. Social Psych. 283 (1955). Recent important findings on these questions are summarized in Hare, Handbook of Small Group Research (1962), c. II. </s> [Footnote 70 See, on the general problem of conflict and accommodation between the two clauses, Katz, Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 426, 429 (1953); Griswold, Absolute Is In the Dark, 8 Utah L. Rev. 167, 176-179 (1963); Kauper, Church, State, and Freedom: A Review, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 829, 833 (1954). One author has suggested that the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses must be "read as stating a single precept: that government cannot utilize religion as a standard for action or inaction because these clauses, read together as they should be, prohibit classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden." Kurland, Religion and the Law (1962), 112. Compare the formula of accommodation embodied in the Australian Constitution, 116: </s> "The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth." Essays on the Australian Constitution (Else-Mitchell ed. 1961), 15. </s> [Footnote 71 There has been much difference of opinion throughout American history concerning the advisability of furnishing chaplains at government expense. Compare, e. g., Washington's order regarding chaplains for the Continental Army, July 9, 1776, in 5 Writings of George Washington (Fitzpatrick ed. 1932), 244, with Madison's views on a very similar question, letter to Edward Livingston, July 10, 1822, 9 Writings of James Madison (Hunt ed. 1910), 100-103. [374 U.S. 203, 297] Compare also this statement by the Armed Forces Chaplains Board concerning the chaplain's obligation: </s> "To us has been entrusted the spiritual and moral guidance of the young men and women in the Armed Services of this country. A chaplain has many duties - yet, first and foremost is that of presenting God to men and women wearing the military uniform. What happens to them while they are in military service has a profound effect on what happens in the community as they resume civilian life. We, as chaplains, must take full cognizance of that fact and dedicate our work to making them finer, spiritually strengthened citizens." Builders of Faith (U.S. Department of Defense 1955), ii. It is interesting to compare in this regard an express provision, Article 140, of the Weimar Constitution: "Necessary free time shall be accorded to the members of the armed forces for the fulfilment of their religious duties." McBain and Rogers, The New Constitutions of Europe (1922), 203. </s> [Footnote 72 For a discussion of some recent and difficult problems in connection with chaplains and religious exercises in prisons, see, e. g., Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233; In re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 663, 361 P.2d 417; McBride v. McCorkle, 44 N. J. Super. 468, 130 A. 2d 881; Brown v. McGinnis, 10 N. Y. 2d 531, 180 N. E. 2d 791; discussed in Comment, 62 Col. L. Rev. 1488 (1962); 75 Harv. L. Rev. 837 (1962). Compare Article XVIII of the Hague Convention Regulations of 1899: </s> "Prisoners of war shall enjoy every latitude in the exercise of their religion, including attendance at their own church services, provided only they comply with the regulations for order and police issued by the military authorities." Quoted in Blakely, American State Papers and Related Documents on Freedom in Religion (4th rev. ed. 1949), 313. </s> [Footnote 73 Compare generally Sibley and Jacob, Conscription of Conscience: The American State and the Conscientious Objector, 1940-1947 (1952), with Conklin, Conscientious Objector Provisions: A View in the Light of Torcaso v. Watkins, 51 Geo. L. J. 252 (1963). </s> [Footnote 74 See, e. g., Southside Estates Baptist Church v. Board of Trustees, 115 So.2d 697 (Fla.); Lewis v. Mandeville, 201 Misc. 120, 107 N. Y. S. 2d 865; cf. School District No. 97 v. Schmidt, 128 Colo. 495, 263 P.2d 581 (temporary loan of school district's custodian to church). A different problem may be presented with respect to the regular use of public school property for religious activities, State ex rel. Gilbert v. Dilley, 95 Neb. 527, 145 N. W. 999; the erection on public property of a statue of or memorial to an essentially religious figure, State ex rel. Singelmann v. Morrison, 57 So.2d 238 (La. App.); seasonal displays of a religious character, Baer v. Kolmorgen, 14 Misc. 2d 1015, 181 N. Y. S. 2d 230; or the performance on public property of a drama or opera based on religious material or carrying a religious message, cf. County of Los Angeles v. Hollinger, 200 Cal. App. 2d 877, 19 Cal. Rptr. 648. </s> [Footnote 75 Compare Moulton and Myers, Report on Appointing Chaplains to the Legislature of New York, in Blau, Cornerstones of Religious Freedom in America (1949), 141-156; Comment, 63 Col. L. Rev. 73, 97 (1963). </s> [Footnote 76 A comprehensive survey of the problems raised concerning the role of religion in the secular curriculum is contained in Brown, ed., The Study of Religion in the Public Schools: An Appraisal (1958). See also Katz, Religion and American Constitutions, Lecture at Northwestern University Law School, March 21, 1963, pp. 37-41; Educational Policies Comm'n of the National Education Assn., Moral and Spiritual Values in the Public Schools (1951), 49-80. Compare, for a consideration of similar problems in state-supported colleges and universities, Louisell and Jackson, Religion, Theology, and Public Higher Education, 50 Cal. L. Rev. 751 (1962). </s> [Footnote 77 See generally Torpey, Judicial Doctrines of Religious Rights in America (1948), c. VI; Van Alstyne, Tax Exemption of Church Property, 20 Ohio State L. J. 461 (1959); Sutherland, Due Process and Disestablishment, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1306, 1336-1338 (1949); Louisell and Jackson, Religion, Theology, and Public Higher Education, 50 Cal. L. Rev. 751, 773-780 (1962); 7 De Paul L. Rev. 206 (1958); 58 Col. L. Rev. 417 (1958); 9 Stan. L. Rev. 366 (1957). </s> [Footnote 78 See, e. g., Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia, 101 U.S. App. D.C. 371, 249 F.2d 127; Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394. [374 U.S. 203, 305] </s> MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG, with whom MR. JUSTICE HARLAN joins, concurring. </s> As is apparent from the opinions filed today, delineation of the constitutionally permissible relationship between religion and government is a most difficult and sensitive task, calling for the careful exercise of both judicial and public judgment and restraint. The considerations which lead the Court today to interdict the clearly religious practices presented in these cases are to me wholly compelling; I have no doubt as to the propriety of the decision and therefore join the opinion and judgment of the Court. The singular sensitivity and concern which surround both the legal and practical judgments involved impel me, however, to add a few words in further explication, while at the same time avoiding repetition of the carefully and ably framed examination of history and authority by my Brethren. </s> The First Amendment's guarantees, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, foreclose not only laws "respecting an establishment of religion" but also those "prohibiting the free exercise thereof." These two proscriptions are to be read together, and in light of the single end which they are designed to serve. The basic purpose of the religion clause of the First Amendment is to promote and assure the fullest possible scope of religious liberty and tolerance for all and to nurture the conditions which secure the best hope of attainment of that end. </s> The fullest realization of true religious liberty requires that government neither engage in nor compel religious practices, that it effect no favoritism among sects or between religion and nonreligion, and that it work deterrence of no religious belief. But devotion even to these simply stated objectives presents no easy course, for the unavoidable accommodations necessary to achieve the [374 U.S. 203, 306] maximum enjoyment of each and all of them are often difficult of discernment. There is for me no simple and clear measure which by precise application can readily and invariably demark the permissible from the impermissible. </s> It is said, and I agree, that the attitude of government toward religion must be one of neutrality. But untutored devotion to the concept of neutrality can lead to invocation or approval of results which partake not simply of that noninterference and noninvolvement with the religious which the Constitution commands, but of a brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the religious. Such results are not only not compelled by the Constitution, but, it seems to me, are prohibited by it. </s> Neither government nor this Court can or should ignore the significance of the fact that a vast portion of our people believe in and worship God and that many of our legal, political and personal values derive historically from religious teachings. Government must inevitably take cognizance of the existence of religion and, indeed, under certain circumstances the First Amendment may require that it do so. And it seems clear to me from the opinions in the present and past cases that the Court would recognize the propriety of providing military chaplains and of the teaching about religion, as distinguished from the teaching of religion, in the public schools. The examples could readily be multiplied, for both the required and the permissible accommodations between state and church frame the relation as one free of hostility or favor and productive of religious and political harmony, but without undue involvement of one in the concerns or practices of the other. To be sure, the judgment in each case is a delicate one, but it must be made if we are to do loyal service as judges to the ultimate First Amendment objective of religious liberty. [374 U.S. 203, 307] </s> The practices here involved do not fall within any sensible or acceptable concept of compelled or permitted accommodation and involve the state so significantly and directly in the realm of the sectarian as to give rise to those very divisive influences and inhibitions of freedom which both religion clauses of the First Amendment preclude. The state has ordained and has utilized its facilities to engage in unmistakably religious exercises - the devotional reading and recitation of the Holy Bible - in a manner having substantial and significant import and impact. That it has selected, rather than written, a particular devotional liturgy seems to me without constitutional import. The pervasive religiosity and direct governmental involvement inhering in the prescription of prayer and Bible reading in the public schools, during and as part of the curricular day, involving young impressionable children whose school attendance is statutorily compelled, and utilizing the prestige, power, and influence of school administration, staff, and authority, cannot realistically be termed simply accommodation, and must fall within the interdiction of the First Amendment. I find nothing in the opinion of the Court which says more than this. And, of course, today's decision does not mean that all incidents of government which import of the religious are therefore and without more banned by the strictures of the Establishment Clause. As the Court declared only last Term in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 , n. 21: </s> "There is of course nothing in the decision reached here that is inconsistent with the fact that school children and others are officially encouraged to express love for our country by reciting historical documents such as the Declaration of Independence which contain references to the Deity or by singing officially espoused anthems which include the composer's professions of faith in a Supreme Being, or [374 U.S. 203, 308] with the fact that there are many manifestations in our public life of belief in God. Such patriotic or ceremonial occasions bear no true resemblance to the unquestioned religious exercise that the State . . . has sponsored in this instance." </s> The First Amendment does not prohibit practices which by any realistic measure create none of the dangers which it is designed to prevent and which do not so directly or substantially involve the state in religious exercises or in the favoring of religion as to have meaningful and practical impact. It is of course true that great consequences can grow from small beginnings, but the measure of constitutional adjudication is the ability and willingness to distinguish between real threat and mere shadow. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART, dissenting. </s> I think the records in the two cases before us are so fundamentally deficient as to make impossible an informed or responsible determination of the constitutional issues presented. Specifically, I cannot agree that on these records we can say that the Establishment Clause has necessarily been violated. 1 But I think there exist serious questions under both that provision and the Free Exercise Clause - insofar as each is imbedded in the Fourteenth Amendment - which require the remand of these cases for the taking of additional evidence. </s> I. </s> The First Amendment declares that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . ." It is, I [374 U.S. 203, 309] think, a fallacious oversimplification to regard these two provisions as establishing a single constitutional standard of "separation of church and state," which can be mechanically applied in every case to delineate the required boundaries between government and religion. We err in the first place if we do not recognize, as a matter of history and as a matter of the imperatives of our free society, that religion and government must necessarily interact in countless ways. Secondly, the fact is that while in many contexts the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause fully complement each other, there are areas in which a doctrinaire reading of the Establishment Clause leads to irreconcilable conflict with the Free Exercise Clause. </s> A single obvious example should suffice to make the point. Spending federal funds to employ chaplains for the armed forces might be said to violate the Establishment Clause. Yet a lonely soldier stationed at some faraway outpost could surely complain that a government which did not provide him the opportunity for pastoral guidance was affirmatively prohibiting the free exercise of his religion. And such examples could readily be multiplied. The short of the matter is simply that the two relevant clauses of the First Amendment cannot accurately be reflected in a sterile metaphor which by its very nature may distort rather than illumine the problems involved in a particular case. Cf. Sherbert v. Verner, post, p. 398. </s> II. </s> As a matter of history, the First Amendment was adopted solely as a limitation upon the newly created National Government. The events leading to its adoption strongly suggest that the Establishment Clause was primarily an attempt to insure that Congress not only would be powerless to establish a national church, but [374 U.S. 203, 310] would also be unable to interfere with existing state establishments. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 440 -441. Each State was left free to go its own way and pursue its own policy with respect to religion. Thus Virginia from the beginning pursued a policy of disestablishmentarianism. Massachusetts, by contrast, had an established church until well into the nineteenth century. </s> So matters stood until the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, or more accurately, until this Court's decision in Cantwell v. Connecticut, in 1940. 310 U.S. 296 . In that case the Court said: "The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws." 2 </s> I accept without question that the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment against impairment by the States embraces in full the right of free exercise of religion protected by the First Amendment, and I yield to no one in my conception of the breadth of that freedom. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 616 (dissenting opinion). I accept too the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment has somehow absorbed the Establishment Clause, although it is not without irony that a constitutional provision evidently designed to leave the States free to go their own way should now have become a restriction upon their autonomy. But I cannot agree with what seems to me the insensitive definition of the Establishment Clause contained in the Court's opinion, nor with the different but, I think, equally mechanistic definitions contained in the separate opinions which have been filed. [374 U.S. 203, 311] </s> III. </s> Since the Cantwell pronouncement in 1940, this Court has only twice held invalid state laws on the ground that they were laws "respecting an establishment of religion" in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 ; Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 . On the other hand, the Court has upheld against such a challenge laws establishing Sunday as a compulsory day of rest, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 , and a law authorizing reimbursement from public funds for the transportation of parochial school pupils. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 . </s> Unlike other First Amendment guarantees, there is an inherent limitation upon the applicability of the Establishment Clause's ban on state support to religion. That limitation was succinctly put in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18 : "State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them." 3 And in a later case, this Court recognized that the limitation was one which was itself compelled by the free exercise guarantee. "To hold that a state cannot consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments utilize its public school system to aid any or all religious faiths or sects in the dissemination of their doctrines and ideals does not . . . manifest a governmental hostility to religion or religious teachings. A manifestation of such hostility would be at war with our national tradition as embodied in the First Amendment's guaranty of the free [374 U.S. 203, 312] exercise of religion." McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 211 -212. </s> That the central value embodied in the First Amendment - and, more particularly, in the guarantee of "liberty" contained in the Fourteenth - is the safeguarding of an individual's right to free exercise of his religion has been consistently recognized. Thus, in the case of Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245, 265 , Mr. Justice Cardozo, concurring, assumed that it was ". . . the religious liberty protected by the First Amendment against invasion by the nation [which] is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against invasion by the states." (Emphasis added.) And in Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, the purpose of those guarantees was described in the following terms: "On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion." 310 U.S., at 303 . </s> It is this concept of constitutional protection embodied in our decisions which makes the cases before us such difficult ones for me. For there is involved in these cases a substantial free exercise claim on the part of those who affirmatively desire to have their children's school day open with the reading of passages from the Bible. </s> It has become accepted that the decision in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 , upholding the right of parents to send their children to nonpublic schools, was ultimately based upon the recognition of the validity of the free exercise claim involved in that situation. It might be argued here that parents who wanted their children to be exposed to religious influences in school could, under Pierce, send their children to private or parochial [374 U.S. 203, 313] schools. But the consideration which renders this contention too facile to be determinative has already been recognized by the Court: "Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion are available to all, not merely to those who can pay their own way." Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 . </s> It might also be argued that parents who want their children exposed to religious influences can adequately fulfill that wish off school property and outside school time. With all its surface persuasiveness, however, this argument seriously misconceives the basic constitutional justification for permitting the exercises at issue in these cases. For a compulsory state educational system so structures a child's life that if religious exercises are held to be an impermissible activity in schools, religion is placed at an artificial and state-created disadvantage. Viewed in this light, permission of such exercises for those who want them is necessary if the schools are truly to be neutral in the matter of religion. And a refusal to permit religious exercises thus is seen, not as the realization of state neutrality, but rather as the establishment of a religion of secularism, or at the least, as government support of the beliefs of those who think that religious exercises should be conducted only in private. </s> What seems to me to be of paramount importance, then, is recognition of the fact that the claim advanced here in favor of Bible reading is sufficiently substantial to make simple reference to the constitutional phrase "establishment of religion" as inadequate an analysis of the cases before us as the ritualistic invocation of the nonconstitutional phrase "separation of church and state." What these cases compel, rather, is an analysis of just what the "neutrality" is which is required by the interplay of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, as imbedded in the Fourteenth. [374 U.S. 203, 314] </s> IV. </s> Our decisions make clear that there is no constitutional bar to the use of government property for religious purposes. On the contrary, this Court has consistently held that the discriminatory barring of religious groups from public property is itself a violation of First and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 ; Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 . A different standard has been applied to public school property, because of the coercive effect which the use by religious sects of a compulsory school system would necessarily have upon the children involved. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 . But insofar as the McCollum decision rests on the Establishment rather than the Free Exercise Clause, it is clear that its effect is limited to religious instruction - to government support of proselytizing activities of religious sects by throwing the weight of secular authority behind the dissemination of religious tenets. 4 </s> The dangers both to government and to religion inherent in official support of instruction in the tenets of various religious sects are absent in the present cases, which involve only a reading from the Bible unaccompanied by comments which might otherwise constitute instruction. Indeed, since, from all that appears in either record, any teacher who does not wish to do so is free not to participate, 5 it cannot even be contended that some [374 U.S. 203, 315] infinitesimal part of the salaries paid by the State are made contingent upon the performance of a religious function. </s> In the absence of evidence that the legislature or school board intended to prohibit local schools from substituting a different set of readings where parents requested such a change, we should not assume that the provisions before us - as actually administered - may not be construed simply as authorizing religious exercises, nor that the designations may not be treated simply as indications of the promulgating body's view as to the community's preference. We are under a duty to interpret these provisions so as to render them constitutional if reasonably possible. Compare Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 592 -595; Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 4 , and n. 2. In the Schempp case there is evidence which indicates that variations were in fact permitted by the very school there involved, and that further variations were not introduced only because of the absence of requests from parents. And in the Murray case the Baltimore rule itself contains a provision permitting another version of the Bible to be substituted for the King James version. </s> If the provisions are not so construed, I think that their validity under the Establishment Clause would be extremely doubtful, because of the designation of a particular religious book and a denominational prayer. But since, even if the provisions are construed as I believe they must be, I think that the cases before us must be remanded for further evidence on other issues - thus affording the plaintiffs an opportunity to prove that local variations are not in fact permitted - I shall for the balance [374 U.S. 203, 316] of this dissenting opinion treat the provisions before us as making the variety and content of the exercises, as well as a choice as to their implementation, matters which ultimately reflect the consensus of each local school community. In the absence of coercion upon those who do not wish to participate - because they hold less strong beliefs, other beliefs, or no beliefs at all - such provisions cannot, in my view, be held to represent the type of support of religion barred by the Establishment Clause. For the only support which such rules provide for religion is the withholding of state hostility - a simple acknowledgment on the part of secular authorities that the Constitution does not require extirpation of all expression of religious belief. </s> V. </s> I have said that these provisions authorizing religious exercises are properly to be regarded as measures making possible the free exercise of religion. But it is important to stress that, strictly speaking, what is at issue here is a privilege rather than a right. In other words, the question presented is not whether exercises such as those at issue here are constitutionally compelled, but rather whether they are constitutionally invalid. And that issue, in my view, turns on the question of coercion. </s> It is clear that the dangers of coercion involved in the holding of religious exercises in a schoolroom differ qualitatively from those presented by the use of similar exercises or affirmations in ceremonies attended by adults. Even as to children, however, the duty laid upon government in connection with religious exercises in the public schools is that of refraining from so structuring the school environment as to put any kind of pressure on a child to participate in those exercises; it is not that of providing an atmosphere in which children are kept scrupulously insulated from any awareness that some of their fellows [374 U.S. 203, 317] may want to open the school day with prayer, or of the fact that there exist in our pluralistic society differences of religious belief. </s> These are not, it must be stressed, cases like Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 , in which this Court held that, in the sphere of public education, the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws required that race not be treated as a relevant factor. A segregated school system is not invalid because its operation is coercive; it is invalid simply because our Constitution presupposes that men are created equal, and that therefore racial differences cannot provide a valid basis for governmental action. Accommodation of religious differences on the part of the State, however, is not only permitted but required by that same Constitution. </s> The governmental neutrality which the First and Fourteenth Amendments require in the cases before us, in other words, is the extension of evenhanded treatment to all who believe, doubt, or disbelieve - a refusal on the part of the State to weight the scales of private choice. In these cases, therefore, what is involved is not state action based on impermissible categories, but rather an attempt by the State to accommodate those differences which the existence in our society of a variety of religious beliefs makes inevitable. The Constitution requires that such efforts be struck down only if they are proven to entail the use of the secular authority of government to coerce a preference among such beliefs. </s> It may well be, as has been argued to us, that even the supposed benefits to be derived from noncoercive religious exercises in public schools are incommensurate with the administrative problems which they would create. The choice involved, however, is one for each local community and its school board, and not for this Court. For, as I have said, religious exercises are not constitutionally invalid if they simply reflect differences which exist in the [374 U.S. 203, 318] society from which the school draws its pupils. They become constitutionally invalid only if their administration places the sanction of secular authority behind one or more particular religious or irreligious beliefs. </s> To be specific, it seems to me clear that certain types of exercises would present situations in which no possibility of coercion on the part of secular officials could be claimed to exist. Thus, if such exercises were held either before or after the official school day, or if the school schedule were such that participation were merely one among a number of desirable alternatives, 6 it could hardly be contended that the exercises did anything more than to provide an opportunity for the voluntary expression of religious belief. On the other hand, a law which provided for religious exercises during the school day and which contained no excusal provision would obviously be unconstitutionally coercive upon those who did not wish to participate. And even under a law containing an excusal provision, if the exercises were held during the school day, and no equally desirable alternative were provided by the school authorities, the likelihood that children might be under at least some psychological compulsion to participate would be great. In a case such as the latter, however, I think we would err if we assumed such coercion in the absence of any evidence. 7 </s> [374 U.S. 203, 319] </s> VI. </s> Viewed in this light, it seems to me clear that the records in both of the cases before us are wholly inadequate to support an informed or responsible decision. Both cases involve provisions which explicitly permit any student who wishes, to be excused from participation in the exercises. There is no evidence in either case as to whether there would exist any coercion of any kind upon a student who did not want to participate. No evidence at all was adduced in the Murray case, because it was decided upon a demurrer. All that we have in that case, therefore, is the conclusory language of a pleading. While such conclusory allegations are acceptable for procedural purposes, I think that the nature of the constitutional problem involved here clearly demands that no decision be made except upon evidence. In the Schempp case the record shows no more than a subjective prophecy by a parent of what he thought would happen if a request were made to be excused from participation in the exercises under the amended statute. No such request was ever made, and there is no evidence whatever as to what might or would actually happen, nor of what administrative arrangements the school actually might or could make to free from pressure of any kind those who do not want to participate in the exercises. There were no District Court findings on this issue, since the case under the amended statute was decided exclusively on Establishment Clause grounds. 201 F. Supp. 815. </s> What our Constitution indispensably protects is the freedom of each of us, be he Jew or Agnostic, Christian or [374 U.S. 203, 320] Atheist, Buddhist or Freethinker, to believe or disbelieve, to worship or not worship, to pray or keep silent, according to his own conscience, uncoerced and unrestrained by government. It is conceivable that these school boards, or even all school boards, might eventually find it impossible to administer a system of religious exercises during school hours in such a way as to meet this constitutional standard - in such a way as completely to free from any kind of official coercion those who do not affirmatively want to participate. 8 But I think we must not assume that school boards so lack the qualities of inventiveness and good will as to make impossible the achievement of that goal. </s> I would remand both cases for further hearings. </s> [Footnote 1 It is instructive, in this connection, to examine the complaints in the two cases before us. Neither complaint attacks the challenged practices as "establishments." What both allege as the basis for their causes of actions are, rather, violations of religious liberty. </s> [Footnote 2 310 U.S., at 303 . The Court's statement as to the Establishment Clause in Cantwell was dictum. The case was decided on free exercise grounds. </s> [Footnote 3 See also, in this connection, Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 : </s> "Government may not finance religious groups nor undertake religious instruction nor blend secular and sectarian education nor use secular institutions to force one or some religion on any person. But we find no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence." </s> [Footnote 4 "This is beyond all question a utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported public school system to aid religious groups to spread their faith." McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 210 . (Emphasis added.) </s> [Footnote 5 The Pennsylvania statute was specifically amended to remove the compulsion upon teachers. Act of December 17, 1959, P. L. 1928, 24 Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann. 15-1516. Since the Maryland case is [374 U.S. 203, 315] here on a demurrer, the issue of whether or not a teacher could be dismissed for refusal to participate seems, among many others, never to have been raised. </s> [Footnote 6 See, e. g., the description of a plan permitting religious instruction off school property contained in McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 224 (separate opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter). </s> [Footnote 7 Cf. "The task of separating the secular from the religious in education is one of magnitude, intricacy and delicacy. To lay down a sweeping constitutional doctrine as demanded by complainant and apparently approved by the Court, applicable alike to all school boards of the nation, . . . is to decree a uniform, rigid and, if we are consistent, an unchanging standard for countless school boards representing and serving highly localized groups which not only differ from each other but which themselves from time to time change attitudes. It seems to me that to do so is to allow zeal for our own [374 U.S. 203, 319] ideas of what is good in public instruction to induce us to accept the role of a super board of education for every school district in the nation." McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 237 (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson). </s> [Footnote 8 For example, if the record in the Schempp case contained proof (rather than mere prophecy) that the timing of morning announcements by the school was such as to handicap children who did not want to listen to the Bible reading, or that the excusal provision was so administered as to carry any overtones of social inferiority, then impermissible coercion would clearly exist. </s> [374 U.S. 203, 321]

United States Supreme Court PIONEER INVESTMENT SERVICES v. BRUNSWICK ASSOC. LTD.(1993) No. 91-1695 Argued: November 30, 1992Decided: March 24, 1993 </s> As unsecured creditors of petitioner - a company seeking relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code - respondents were required to file proofs of claim with the Bankruptcy Court before the deadline, or bar date, established by that court. An August 3, 1989, bar date was included in a "Notice for Meeting of Creditors" received from the court by Mark Berlin, an official for respondents. Respondents' attorney was provided with a complete copy of the case file and, when asked, assertedly assured Berlin that no bar date had been set. On August 23, 1989, respondents asked the court to accept their proofs under Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1), which allows a court to permit late filings where the movant's failure to comply with the deadline "was the result of excusable neglect." The court refused, holding that a party may claim excusable neglect only if the failure to timely perform was due to circumstances beyond its reasonable control. The District Court remanded the case, ordering the Bankruptcy Court to evaluate respondents' conduct under a more liberal standard. The Bankruptcy Court applied that standard and again denied the motion, finding that several factors - the danger of prejudice to the debtor, the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, and whether the creditor acted in good faith - favored respondents, but that the delay was within their control and that they should be penalized for their counsel's mistake. The District Court affirmed, but the Court of Appeals reversed. It found that the Bankruptcy Court had inappropriately penalized respondents for their counsel's error, since Berlin had asked the attorney about the impending deadlines and since the peculiar and inconspicuous placement of the bar date in a notice for a creditors' meeting, without any indication of the date's significance, left a dramatic ambiguity in the notification that would have confused even a person experienced in bankruptcy. </s> Held: </s> 1. An attorney's inadvertent failure to file a proof of claim by the bar date can constitute "excusable neglect" within the meaning of Rule 9006(b)(1). Pp. 387-397. [507 U.S. 380, 381] </s> (a) Contrary to petitioner's suggestion, Congress plainly contemplated that the courts would be permitted to accept late filings caused by inadvertence, mistake, or carelessness, not just those caused by intervening circumstances beyond the party's control. This flexible understanding comports with the ordinary meaning of "neglect." It also accords with the underlying policies of Chapter 11 and the bankruptcy rules, which entrust broad equitable powers to the courts in order to ensure the success of a debtor's reorganization. In addition, this view is confirmed by the history of the present bankruptcy rules, and is strongly supported by the fact that the phrase "excusable neglect," as used in several of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is understood to be a somewhat "elastic concept." Pp. 387-395. </s> (b) The determination of what sorts of neglect will be considered "excusable" is an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances. These include the first four factors applied in the instant case. However, the Court of Appeals erred in not attributing to respondents the fault of their counsel. Clients may be held accountable for their attorney's acts and omissions. See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 . Thus, in determining whether respondents' failure to timely file was excusable, the proper focus is upon whether the neglect of respondents and their counsel was excusable. Pp. 395-397. </s> 2. The neglect of respondents' counsel was, under all the circumstances, excusable. As the Court of Appeals found, the lack of any prejudice to the debtor or to the interest of efficient judicial administration, combined with the good faith of respondents and their counsel, weigh strongly in favor of permitting the tardy claim. As for the culpability of respondents' counsel, it is significant that the notice of the bar date in this case was outside the ordinary course in bankruptcy cases. Normally, such a notice would be prominently announced and accompanied by an explanation of its significance, not inconspicuously placed in a notice regarding a creditors' meeting. Pp. 397-399. </s> 943 F.2d 673, affirmed. </s> WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SCALIA, SOUTER, and THOMAS, JJ., joined, post, p. 399. </s> Craig J. Donaldson argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. [507 U.S. 380, 382] </s> John A. Lucas argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Lansing R. Palmer. </s> JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Rule 3003(c) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure sets out the requirements for filing proofs of claim in Chapter 9 Municipality and Chapter 11 Reorganization cases. 1 Rule 3003(c)(3) provides that the "court shall fix and for cause shown may extend the time within which proofs of claim or interest may be filed." Rule 9006 is a general rule governing the computation, enlargement, and reduction of periods of time prescribed in other bankruptcy rules. Rule 9006(b)(1) empowers a bankruptcy court to permit a late filing if the movant's failure to comply with an earlier deadline "was the result of excusable neglect." 2 In this case, we are [507 U.S. 380, 383] called upon to decide whether an attorney's inadvertent failure to file a proof of claim within the deadline set by the court can constitute "excusable neglect" within the meaning of the rule. Finding that it can, we affirm. </s> I </s> On April 12, 1989, petitioner filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. The petition sought relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Petitioner also filed a list of its 20 largest unsecured creditors, including all but one of respondents here. The following month, after obtaining extensions of time from the Bankruptcy Court, petitioner filed a statement of financial affairs and schedules of its assets and liabilities. The schedules, as amended, listed all of the respondents except Ft. Oglethorpe Associates Limited Partnership as creditors holding contingent, unliquidated, or disputed claims; the Ft. Oglethorpe partnership was not listed at all. Under 1111 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 1111(a), and Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(2), all such creditors are required to file a proof of claim with the bankruptcy court before the deadline, or "bar date," established by the court. </s> On April 13, 1989, the day after petitioner filed its Chapter 11 petition, the Bankruptcy Court mailed a "Notice for Meeting of Creditors" to petitioner's creditors. Along with the announcement of a May 5 meeting was the following passage: [507 U.S. 380, 384] </s> "You must file a proof of claim if your claim is scheduled as disputed, contingent or unliquidated, is unlisted or you do not agree with the amount. See 11 U.S.C. 1111 & Bankruptcy rule 3003. Bar date is August 3, 1989." App. 29a. </s> The notice was received and read by Mark A. Berlin, president of the corporate general partners of each of the respondents. Berlin duly attended the creditors' meeting on May 5. The following month, respondents retained an experienced bankruptcy attorney, Marc Richards, to represent them in the proceedings. Berlin stated in an affidavit that he provided Richards with a complete copy of the case file, including a copy of the court's April 13, 1989, notice to creditors. Berlin also asserted that he inquired of Richards whether there was a deadline for filing claims, and that Richards assured him that no bar date had been set and that there was no urgency in filing proofs of claim. Id., at 121a. Richards and Berlin both attended a subsequent meeting of creditors on June 16, 1989. </s> Respondents failed to file any proofs of claim by the August 3, 1989, bar date. On August 23, 1989, respondents filed their proofs, along with a motion that the court permit the late filing under Rule 9006(b)(1). In particular, respondents' counsel explained that the bar date, of which he was unaware, came at a time when he was experiencing "a major and significant disruption" in his professional life caused by his withdrawal from his former law firm on July 31, 1989. Id., at 56a. Because of this disruption, counsel did not have access to his copy of the case file in this matter until mid-August. Ibid. </s> The Bankruptcy Court refused the late filing. Following precedent from the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the court held that a party may claim "excusable neglect" only if its "`failure to timely perform a duty was due to circumstances which were beyond [its] reasonable [c]ontrol.'" Id., at 124a (quoting In re South Atlantic Financial [507 U.S. 380, 385] Corp., 767 F.2d 814, 817 (CA11 1985) (some internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Biscayne 21 Condominium Associates, Inc. v. South Atlantic Financial Corp., 475 U.S. 1015 (1986)). Finding that respondents had received notice of the bar date and could have complied, the court ruled that they could not claim "excusable neglect." </s> On appeal, the District Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court found "respectable authority for the narrow reading of `excusable neglect'" adopted by the Bankruptcy Court, but concluded that the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit would follow "a more liberal approach." App. 157a. Embracing a test announced by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the District Court remanded with instructions that the Bankruptcy Court evaluate respondents' conduct against several factors, including: "`"(1) whether granting the delay will prejudice the debtor; (2) the length of the delay and its impact on efficient court administration; (3) whether the delay was beyond the reasonable control of the person whose duty it was to perform; (4) whether the creditor acted in good faith; and (5) whether clients should be penalized for their counsel's mistake or neglect."'" Id., at 158a-159a (quoting In re Dix, 95 B.R. 134, 138 (CA9 Bkrtcy. Appellate Panel 1988) (in turn quoting In re Magouirk, 693 F.2d 948, 951 (CA9 1982))). The District Court also suggested that the Bankruptcy Court consider whether the failure to comply with the bar date "resulted from negligence, indifference or culpable conduct on the part of a moving creditor or its counsel." App. 159a. </s> On remand, the Bankruptcy Court applied the so-called Dix factors and again denied respondents' motion. Specifically, the Bankruptcy Court found (1) that petitioner would not be prejudiced by the late filings; (2) that the 20-day delay in filing the proofs of claim would have no adverse impact on efficient court administration; (3) that the reason for the delay was not outside respondents' control; (4) that respondents and their counsel acted in good faith; and (5) that, in [507 U.S. 380, 386] light of Berlin's business sophistication and his actual knowledge of the bar date, it would not be improper to penalize respondents for the neglect of their counsel. App. 168a-172a. The court also found that respondents' counsel was negligent in missing the bar date and, "[t]o a degree," indifferent to it. Id., at 172a. In weighing these considerations, the Bankruptcy Court "attache[d] considerable importance to Dix factors 3 and 5," and concluded that a ruling in respondents' favor, notwithstanding their actual notice of the bar date, "would render nugatory the fixing of the claims' bar date in this case." Id., at 173a. The District Court affirmed the ruling. </s> The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that "excusable neglect" was not limited to cases where the failure to act was due to circumstances beyond the movant's control. The Court of Appeals also agreed with the District Court that the five "Dix factors" were helpful, although not necessarily exhaustive, guides. In re Pioneer Investment Services Co., 943 F.2d 673, 677 (1991). The court found, however, that the Bankruptcy Court had misapplied the fifth Dix factor to this case. Because Berlin had inquired of counsel whether there were any impending filing deadlines and been told that none existed, the Court of Appeals ruled that the Bankruptcy Court had "inappropriately penalized the [respondents] for the errors of their counsel." 943 F. 2d, at 677. </s> The Court of Appeals also found "it significant that the notice containing the bar date was incorporated in a document entitled `Notice for Meeting of Creditors.'" Id., at 678. "Such a designation," the court explained, "would not have put those without extensive experience in bankruptcy on notice that the date appended to the end of this notice was intended to be the final date for filing proof of claims." Ibid. Indeed, based on a comparison between the notice in this case and the model notice set out in Official Bankruptcy Form 16, the court concluded that the notice given [507 U.S. 380, 387] respondents contained a "dramatic ambiguity," which could well have confused "[e]ven persons experienced in bankruptcy." Ibid. Having determined that the fifth Dix factor favored respondents rather than petitioner, the Court of Appeals found that the record demonstrated "excusable neglect." </s> Because of the conflict in the Courts of Appeals over the meaning of "excusable neglect," 3 we granted certiorari, 504 U.S. 984 (1992), and now affirm. </s> II </s> A </s> There is, of course, a range of possible explanations for a party's failure to comply with a court-ordered filing deadline. At one end of the spectrum, a party may be prevented from complying by forces beyond its control, such as by an act of God or unforeseeable human intervention. At the other, a [507 U.S. 380, 388] party simply may choose to flout a deadline. In between lie cases where a party may choose to miss a deadline, although for a very good reason, such as to render first aid to an accident victim discovered on the way to the courthouse, as well as cases where a party misses a deadline through inadvertence, miscalculation, or negligence. Petitioner contends that the Bankruptcy Court was correct when it first interpreted Rule 9006(b)(1) to require a showing that the movant's failure to comply with the court's deadline was caused by circumstances beyond its reasonable control. Petitioner suggests that exacting enforcement of filing deadlines is essential to the Bankruptcy Code's goals of certainty and finality in resolving disputed claims. Under petitioner's view, any showing of fault on the part of the late filer would defeat a claim of "excusable neglect." </s> We think that petitioner's interpretation is not consonant with either the language of the rule or the evident purposes underlying it. First, the rule grants a reprieve to out-of-time filings that were delayed by "neglect." The ordinary meaning of "neglect" is "to give little attention or respect" to a matter, or, closer to the point for our purposes, "to leave undone or unattended to esp[ecially] through carelessness." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 791 (1983) (emphasis added). The word therefore encompasses both simple, faultless omissions to act and, more commonly, omissions caused by carelessness. Courts properly assume, absent sufficient indication to the contrary, that Congress intends the words in its enactments to carry "their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979). Hence, by empowering the courts to accept late filings "where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect," Rule 9006(b)(1), Congress plainly contemplated that the courts would be permitted, where appropriate, to accept late filings caused by inadvertence, mistake, or carelessness, as well as by intervening circumstances beyond the party's control. [507 U.S. 380, 389] </s> Contrary to petitioner's suggestion, this flexible understanding of "excusable neglect" accords with the policies underlying Chapter 11 and the bankruptcy rules. The "excusable neglect" standard of Rule 9006(b)(1) governs late filings of proofs of claim in Chapter 11 cases, but not in Chapter 7 cases. 4 The rules' differentiation between Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 filings corresponds with the differing policies of the two chapters. Whereas the aim of a Chapter 7 liquidation is the prompt closure and distribution of the debtor's estate, Chapter 11 provides for reorganization with the aim of rehabilitating the debtor and avoiding forfeitures by creditors. See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983). In overseeing this latter process, the bankruptcy courts are necessarily entrusted with broad equitable powers to balance the interests of the affected parties, guided by the overriding goal of ensuring the success of the reorganization. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 -528 (1984). This context suggests that Rule 9006's allowance for late filings due to "excusable neglect" entails a correspondingly equitable inquiry. </s> The history of the present bankruptcy rules confirms this view. Rule 9006(b) is derived from Rule 906(b) of the former bankruptcy rules, which governed bankruptcy [507 U.S. 380, 390] proceedings under the former Bankruptcy Act. Like Rule 9006(b)(1), former Rule 906(b) permitted courts to accept late filings "where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect." The forerunner of Rule 3003(c), which now establishes the requirements for filing claims in Chapter 11 cases, was former Rule 10-401(b), which established the filing requirements for proofs of claim in reorganization cases under Chapter X of the former Act, Chapter 11's predecessor. The Advisory Committee's Notes accompanying that former rule make clear that courts were entrusted with the authority under Rules 10-401(b) and 906(b) to accept tardy filings "in accordance with the equities of the situation:" </s> "If the court has fixed a bar date for the filing of proofs of claim, it may still enlarge that time within the provisions of Bankruptcy Rule 906(b) which is made applicable in this subdivision. This policy is in accord with Chapter X generally which is to preserve rather than to forfeit rights. In 102, it rejects the notion expressed in 57n of the Act that claims must be filed within a six-month period to participate in any distribution. Section 224(4) of Chapter X of the Act permits distribution to certain creditors even if they fail to file claims and 204 fixes a minimum period of 5 years before distribution rights under a plan may be forfeited. This approach was intentional as expressed in Senate Report 1916 (75th Cong., 3d Sess., April 20, 1938): </s> "`Sections 204 and 205 insure participation in the benefits of the reorganization to those who, through inadvertence or otherwise, have failed to file their claims or otherwise evidence their interests during the pendency of the proceedings.' </s> "This attitude is carried forward in the rules, first by dispensing with the need to file proofs of claims and stock interests in most instances, and secondly, by permitting enlargement of the fixed bar date in a particular [507 U.S. 380, 391] case with leave of court and for cause shown in accordance with the equities of the situation." Advisory Committee's Note accompanying Rule 10-401(b), reprinted in 13A J. Moore & L. King, Collier on Bankruptcy § 10-401.01, p. 10-401-4 (14th ed. 1977). </s> This history supports our conclusion that the enlargement of prescribed time periods under the "excusable neglect" standard of Rule 9006(b)(1) is not limited to situations where the failure to timely file is due to circumstances beyond the control of the filer. </s> Our view that the phrase "excusable neglect" found in Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1) is not limited, as petitioner would have it, is also strongly supported by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which use that phrase in several places. Indeed, Rule 9006(b)(1) was patterned after Rule 6(b) of those rules. 5 Under Rule 6(b), where the specified period for the performance of an act has elapsed, a District Court may enlarge the period and permit the tardy act where the omission is the "result of excusable neglect." 6 As with Rule 9006(b)(1), there is no indication that anything other than the commonly accepted meaning of the phrase was intended by its drafters. It is not surprising, then, that, in applying Rule 6(b), the Courts of Appeals have generally recognized that [507 U.S. 380, 392] "excusable neglect" may extend to inadvertent delays. 7 Although inadvertence, ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing the rules do not usually constitute "excusable" neglect, it is clear that "excusable neglect" under Rule 6(b) is a somewhat "elastic concept," 8 and is not limited strictly to omissions caused by circumstances beyond the control of the movant. 9 </s> The "excusable neglect" standard for allowing late filings is also used elsewhere in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. When a party should have asserted a counterclaim but did not, Rule 13(f) permits the counterclaim to be set up by amendment where the omission is due to "oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires." In the context of such a provision, it is difficult indeed to imagine that "excusable neglect" was intended to be limited as petitioner insists it should be. 10 </s> [507 U.S. 380, 393] </s> The same is true of Rule 60(b)(1), which permits courts to reopen judgments for reasons of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect," but only on motion made within one year of the judgment. Rule 60(b)(6) goes further, however, and empowers the court to reopen a judgment even after one year has passed for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." These provisions are mutually exclusive, and thus a party who failed to take timely action due to "excusable neglect" may not seek relief more than a year after the judgment by resorting to subsection (6). Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863 , and n. 11 (1988). To justify relief under subsection (6), a party must show "extraordinary circumstances" suggesting that the party is faultless in the delay. See ibid.; Ackerman v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 197 -200 (1950); Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 613 -614 (1949). If a party is partly to blame for the delay, relief must be sought within one year under subsection (1) and the party's neglect must be excusable. In Klapprott, for example, the petitioner had been effectively prevented from taking a timely appeal of a judgment by incarceration, ill health, and other factors beyond his reasonable control. Four years after a default judgment had been entered against him, he sought to reopen the matter under Rule 60(b) and was permitted to do so. As explained by JUSTICE Black: </s> "It is contended that the one-year limitation [of subsection (1)] bars petitioner on the premise that the petition to set aside the judgment showed, at most, nothing but "excusable neglect." And of course, the one-year limitation would control if no more than `neglect' was disclosed by the petition. In that event, the petitioner could not avail himself of the broad `any other reason' clause of [507 U.S. 380, 394] 60(b). But petitioner's allegations set up an extraordinary situation which cannot fairly or logically be classified as mere "neglect" on his part. The undenied facts set out in the petition reveal far more than a failure to defend . . . due to inadvertence, indifference, or careless disregard of consequences." Id., at 613. </s> Justice Frankfurter, although dissenting on other grounds, agreed that Klapprott's allegations of inability to comply with earlier deadlines took his case outside the scope of "excusable neglect" "because `neglect,' in the context of its subject matter, carries the idea of negligence, and not merely of nonaction." Id., at 630. </s> Thus, at least for purposes of Rule 60(b), "excusable neglect" is understood to encompass situations in which the failure to comply with a filing deadline is attributable to negligence. Because of the language and structure of Rule 60(b), a party's failure to file on time for reasons beyond his or her control is not considered to constitute "neglect." See Klapprott, supra. 11 This latter result, however, would not obtain under Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1). Had respondents here been prevented from complying with the bar date by an act of God or some other circumstance beyond their control, the Bankruptcy Court plainly would have been permitted to find "excusable neglect." At the same time, reading Rule 9006(b)(1) inflexibly to exclude every instance of an inadvertent or negligent omission would ignore the most natural [507 U.S. 380, 395] meaning of the word "neglect," and would be at odds with the accepted meaning of that word in analogous contexts. 12 </s> B </s> This leaves, of course, the Rule's requirement that the party's neglect of the bar date be "excusable." It is this requirement that we believe will deter creditors or other parties from freely ignoring court-ordered deadlines in the hopes of winning a permissive reprieve under Rule 9006(b)(1). With regard to determining whether a party's neglect of a deadline is excusable, we are in substantial agreement with the factors identified by the Court of Appeals. Because Congress has provided no other guideposts for determining what sorts of neglect will be considered "excusable," we conclude that the determination is, at bottom, an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's omission. 13 These include, as the Court of Appeals found, the danger of prejudice to the debtor, the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith. See 943 F.2d, at 677. 14 </s> [507 U.S. 380, 396] </s> There is one aspect of the Court of Appeals' analysis, however, with which we disagree. The Court of Appeals suggested that it would be inappropriate to penalize respondents for the omissions of their attorney, reasoning that "the ultimate responsibility of filing the . . . proof[s] of clai[m] rested with [respondents'] counsel." Ibid. The court also appeared to focus its analysis on whether respondents did all they reasonably could in policing the conduct of their attorney, rather than on whether their attorney, as respondents' agent, did all he reasonably could to comply with the court-ordered bar date. In this, the court erred. </s> In other contexts, we have held that clients must be held accountable for the acts and omissions of their attorneys. In Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962), we held that a client may be made to suffer the consequence of dismissal of its lawsuit because of its attorney's failure to attend a scheduled pretrial conference. In so concluding, we found "no merit to the contention that dismissal of petitioner's claim because of his counsel's unexcused conduct imposes an unjust penalty on the client." Id., at 633. To the contrary, the Court wrote: [507 U.S. 380, 397] </s> "Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his representative in the action, and he cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent. Any other notion would be wholly inconsistent with our system of representative litigation, in which each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have `notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney.'" Id., at 633-634 (quoting Smith v. Ayer, 101 U.S. 320, 326 (1880)). </s> This principle also underlies our decision in United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241 (1985), that a client could be penalized for counsel's tardy filing of a tax return. This principle applies with equal force here, and requires that respondents be held accountable for the acts and omissions of their chosen counsel. Consequently, in determining whether respondents' failure to file their proofs of claim prior to the bar date was excusable, the proper focus is upon whether the neglect of respondents and their counsel was excusable. </s> III </s> Although the Court of Appeals in this case erred in not attributing to respondents the fault of their counsel, we conclude that its result was correct nonetheless. First, petitioner does not challenge the findings made below concerning the respondents' good faith and the absence of any danger of prejudice to the debtor or of disruption to efficient judicial administration posed by the late filings. Nor would we be inclined in any event to unsettle factual findings entered by a Bankruptcy Court and affirmed by both the District Court and Court of Appeals. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 665 (1987). Indeed, in this case, the Bankruptcy Court took judicial notice of the fact that the debtor's second amended plan of reorganization, offered after this litigation was well underway, takes account of respondents' claims. App. 168a-169a. As the Court of Appeals found, [507 U.S. 380, 398] the lack of any prejudice to the debtor or to the interests of efficient judicial administration, combined with the good faith of respondents and their counsel, weigh strongly in favor of permitting the tardy claim. </s> In assessing the culpability of respondents' counsel, we give little weight to the fact that counsel was experiencing upheaval in his law practice at the time of the bar date. We do, however, consider significant that the notice of the bar date provided by the Bankruptcy Court in this case was outside the ordinary course in bankruptcy cases. As the Court of Appeals noted, ordinarily the bar date in a bankruptcy case should be prominently announced and accompanied by an explanation of its significance. See 943 F.2d, at 678. We agree with the court that the "peculiar and inconspicuous placement of the bar date in a notice regarding a creditors['] meeting," without any indication of the significance of the bar date, left a "dramatic ambiguity" in the notification. Ibid. 15 This is not to say, of course, that respondents' counsel was not remiss in failing to apprehend the notice. To be sure, were there any evidence of prejudice to petitioner or to judicial administration in this case, or any indication at all of bad faith, we could not say that the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion in declining to find the neglect to be "excusable." In the absence of such a showing, however, we [507 U.S. 380, 399] conclude that the unusual form of notice employed in this case requires a finding that the neglect of respondents' counsel was, under all the circumstances, "excusable." </s> For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c), in relevant part, provides </s> "(c) Filing Proof of Claim. </s> "(1) Who May File. Any creditor or indenture trustee may file a proof of claim within the time prescribed by subdivision (c)(3) of this rule. </s> "(2) Who Must File. Any creditor or equity security holder whose claim or interest is not scheduled or scheduled as disputed, contingent, or unliquidated shall file a proof of claim or interest within the time prescribed by subdivision (c)(3) of this rule; any creditor who fails to do so shall not be treated as a creditor with respect to such claim for the purposes of voting and distribution. </s> "(3) Time for Filing. The court shall fix and for cause shown may extend the time within which proofs of claim or interest may be filed. Notwithstanding the expiration of such time, a proof of claim may be filed to the extent and under the conditions stated in Rule 3002(c)(2), (c)(3), and (c)(4)." </s> [Footnote 2 Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) provides: </s> "(b) Enlargement. </s> "(1) In General. Except as provided m paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subdivision, when an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified period by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if the request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order or (2) on motion made after the expiration [507 U.S. 380, 383] of the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect. </s> "(2) Enlargement Not Permitted. The court may not enlarge the time for taking action under Rules 1007(d), 1017(b)(3), 2003(a) and (d), 7052, 9023, and 9024. </s> "(3) Enlargement Limited. The court may enlarge the time for taking action under Rules 1006(b)(2), 1017(e), 3002(c), 4003(b), 4004(a), 4007(c), 8002, and 9033, only to the extent and under the conditions stated in those rules." </s> [Footnote 3 The Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have taken a narrow view of "excusable neglect" under Rule 9006(b)(1), requiring a showing that the delay was caused by circumstances beyond the movant's control. See In re Davis, 936 F.2d 771, 774 (CA4 1991); In re Danielson, 981 F.2d 296, 298 (CA7 1992); Hanson v. First Bank of South Dakota, N.A., 828 F.2d 1310, 1314-1315 (CA8 1987); In re Analytical Systems, Inc., 933 F.2d 939, 942 (CA1 1 1991). The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, by contrast, has applied a more flexible analysis similar to that employed by the Court of Appeals in the present case. In re Centric Corp., 901 F.2d 1514, 1517-1518, cert. denied sub nom. Trustees of Centennial State Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v. Centric Corp., 498 U.S. 852 (1990). The Courts of Appeals similarly have divided in their interpretations of "excusable neglect" as found in Rule 4(a)(5) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Some courts have required a showing that the movant's failure to meet the deadline was beyond its control, see, e.g., 650 Park Ave. Corp. v. McRae, 836 F.2d 764, 767 (CA2 1988); Pratt v. McCarthy, 850 F.2d 590, 592 (CA9 1988), while others have adopted a more flexible approach similar to that employed by the Court of Appeals in this case, see, e.g., Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware v. Larson, 827 F.2d 916 (CA3 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Secretary of Transp. of Pennsylvania, 484 U.S. 1032 (1988); Lorenzen v. Employees Retirement Plan of Sperry-Hutchinson Co., 896 F.2d 228, 232-233 (CA7 1990). </s> [Footnote 4 The time-computation and time-extension provisions of Rule 9006, like those of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6, are generally applicable to any time requirement found elsewhere in the rules, unless expressly excepted. Subsections (b)(2) and (b)(3) of Rule 9006 enumerate those time requirements excluded from the operation of the "excusable neglect" standard. One of the time requirements listed as excepted in Rule 9006(b)(3) is that governing the filing of proofs of claim in Chapter 7 cases. Such filings are governed exclusively by Rule 3002(c). See Rule 9006(b)(3); In re Coastal Alaska Lines, Inc., 920 F.2d 1428, 1432 (CA9 1990). By contrast, Rule 9006(b) does not make a similar exception for Rule 3003(c), which, as noted earlier, establishes the time requirements for proofs of claim in Chapter 11 cases. Consequently, Rule 9006(b)(1) must be construed to govern the permissibility of late filings in Chapter 11 bankruptcies. See Advisory Committee's Note accompanying Rule 9006(b)(1). </s> [Footnote 5 See Advisory Committee's Note accompanying Rule 9006(b). </s> [Footnote 6 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b) provides: </s> "(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order, or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any action under Rules 50(b) and (c)(2), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b), and 74(a), except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them. </s> [Footnote 7 See, e.g., United States v. Borromeo, 945 F.2d 750, 753-754 (CA4 1991); Hill v. Marshall, No. 86-3987, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 14742, *4 (CA6, Nov. 4, 1988); Dominic v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 841 F.2d 513, 517 (CA3 1988); Sony Corp. v. Elm State Electronics, Inc., 800 F.2d 317, 319 (CA2 1986); United States ex rel. Robinson v. Bar Assn. of District of Columbia, 89 U.S. App. D.C. 185, 186, 190 F.2d 664, 665 (1951). But see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Olympus Corp., 931 F.2d 1551, 1552-1553 (CA Fed. 1991). </s> [Footnote 8 4A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 1165, p. 479 (2d ed. 1987). </s> [Footnote 9 The Courts of Appeals generally have given a similar interpretation to "excusable neglect" in the context of Rule 45(b) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which, like Rule 9006(b), was modeled after Rule 6(b). See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 978 F.2d 17, 21-24 (CA1 1992); Warren v. United States, 123 U.S. App. D.C. 160, 163, 358 F.2d 527, 530 (1965); Calland v. United States, 323 F.2d 405, 407-408 (CA7 1963). </s> [Footnote 10 In assessing what constitutes "excusable neglect" under Rule 13(f), the lower courts have looked, inter alia, to the good faith of the claimant, the extent of the delay, and the danger of prejudice to the opposing party. See, e.g., New York Petroleum Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 757 F.2d 288, 291 (Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. 1985); Gaines v. Farese, No. 87-5567, 1990 WL 153937, *3, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 18086, 9 (CA6, Oct. 11, 1990); Barrett v. United States Banknote Corp., 1992-2 Trade Cases § 69,956, p. 68,607, 1992 WL 232055 (SDNY 1992); [507 U.S. 380, 393] Technographics, Inc. v. Mercer Corp., 142 F.R.D. 429, 430 (MD Pa. 1992). Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7013 contains a similar allowance for late counterclaims brought by a trustee or debtor in possession. </s> [Footnote 11 A similar, but even more explicit, dichotomy can be found in a former rule of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit governing the late filing of appeals. That rule permitted late filings "`upon a showing . . . (a) that the delay has been due to cause beyond the control of the moving party or (b) that the delay has been due to circumstances which shall be deemed to be merely excusable neglect. . . .'" Rule 15(2), U.S.C.C.A. Second Circuit, quoted in Pyramid Motor Freight Corp. v. Ispass, 330 U.S. 695, 703 , n. 10 (1947). Although the meaning given "excusable neglect" for purposes of this rule obviously is not controlling for purposes of Rule 9006(b)(1), it does suggest that the meaning of "excusable neglect" urged by petitioner is far from natural. </s> [Footnote 12 See also United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 245 , n. 3 (1985) ("neglect" as used in statute governing late filing of tax returns "impl[ies] carelessness"). </s> [Footnote 13 The dissent discerns in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990), an indication that the factors relevant to this inquiry extend no further than the movant's culpability and the reason for the delay, see post, at 401. We cannot agree. Lujan held that a District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to permit a late filing under Rule 6(b) of the Civil Rules on grounds of excusable neglect. 497 U.S., at 897 -898. The Court did not, however, define "excusable neglect" or even decide whether that standard could have been met on the facts of that case. </s> [Footnote 14 The dissent would permit judges to take account of the full range of equitable considerations only if they have first made a threshold determination that the movant is "sufficiently blameless" in the delay, see post, at 400. The dissent believes that this formulation of the Rule's requirements [507 U.S. 380, 396] would bring needed clarity to the Rule's application and save judicial resources. See post, at 408. But narrowing the range of factors to be considered in making the "excusable neglect" determination will not eliminate disputes over how the remaining factors should be applied in any given case. For purposes of the present case at least, the dissent appears willing to draw a line between ordinary negligence and partial "indifference" to deadlines, see post, at 407, but parties with valuable interests at stake will no doubt find this distinction susceptible of litigation. The only reliable means of eliminating the "indeterminacy" the dissent finds so troubling would be to adopt a bright-line rule of the sort embraced by some Courts of Appeals, erecting a rigid barrier against late filings attributable in any degree to the movant's negligence. As we have suggested, however, such a construction is irreconcilable with our cases assigning a more flexible meaning to "excusable neglect." Faced with a choice between our own precedent and Black's Law Dictionary, we adhere to the former. </s> [Footnote 15 Indeed, one commentator has warned expressly of the deficiency in the method of notification employed by the Bankruptcy Court here: "Prior to the adoption of the present bankruptcy rules, some bankruptcy courts placed a time to close the receipt of claims in chapter 11 in the notice sent to the listed creditors for the first meeting of creditors. This practice should be strongly discouraged. It conflicts with some of the factual circumstances giving rise to a claim in chapter 11 and can ambush unwitting creditors. Since creditors are notorious for failing to read all of the boilerplate language in the xeroxed form distributed as the notice of the first meeting of creditors, counsel for creditors will be wise to double check and ask for a prompt receipt of the notice from the client or examine the notice on file in the particular bankruptcy case." R. Aaron, Bankruptcy Law Fundamentals 8.027., p. 8-21 (rev. ed. 1991). </s> JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA, JUSTICE SOUTER, and JUSTICE THOMAS join, dissenting. </s> Today the Court replaces the straightforward analysis commended by the language of Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1) with a balancing test. Because the Court's approach is inconsistent with the Rule's plain language and unduly complicates the task of courts called upon to apply it, I respectfully dissent. </s> I </s> Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1) provides that, if a party moves for permission to act after having missed a deadline, the court "may at any time in its discretion . . . permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect." This language establishes two requirements that must be met before untimely action will be permitted. First, no relief is available unless the failure to comply with the deadline "was the result of excusable neglect." Bkrtcy.Rule 9006(b)(1). Second, the court may withhold relief if it believes forbearance inappropriate; the statute does not require the court to forgive every omission caused by excusable neglect, but states that the court "may" grant relief "in its discretion." Ibid. (emphasis added). Thus, the court must, at the threshold, determine its authority to allow untimely action by asking whether the failure to meet the deadline resulted from excusable neglect; if the answer is yes, then the court should consider the equities and decide whether to excuse the error. </s> Instead of following the plain meaning of the statute and examining this case in these two steps, the Court employs a [507 U.S. 380, 400] multifactor balancing test covering numerous equitable considerations, including (and perhaps not limited to) "the danger of prejudice to the debtor, the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, . . . and whether the movant acted in good faith." Ante, at 395. But Rule 9006(b) does not simply command courts to permit late filing whenever it would be "equitable" in light of all the circumstances. Rather, it establishes that the courts may exercise their discretion in accord with the equities only if the failure to meet the deadline resulted from excusable neglect in the first place. Whether the failure resulted from excusable neglect depends on the nature of the omission itself, both in terms of cause and culpability. Consequently, until the reason for the omission is determined to be sufficiently blameless, the consequences of the failure, such as the effect on the parties or the impact on the judicial system, are not relevant. In re Vertientes, Ltd., 845 F.2d 57, 60 (CA3 1988) ("The court has no discretion to grant an extension simply because no prejudice would result, or for any other equitable reason"); In re South Atlantic Financial Corp., 767 F.2d 814, 819 (CA11 1985) (The focus of the Rule is on the omission and the reasons therefor, rather than on the effect on others), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1015 (1986); see also Maressa v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 220, 221 (CA4 1988) (no exception to claim filing deadlines based on general equitable principles). </s> Although the Court pays lipservice to the existence of a threshold determination regarding excusable neglect, see ante, at 382 ("Rule 9006(b)(1) empowers a bankruptcy court to permit a late filing if the movant's failure to comply with an earlier deadline `was the result of excusable neglect'"), it holds that the threshold question is, "at bottom, an equitable one." Ante, at 395. Our case law is to the contrary. </s> In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990), we applied the virtually identical language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b). Under that Rule, as under [507 U.S. 380, 401] this one, a court may not permit untimely filing unless it "find[s] as a substantive matter . . . that the failure to file on time `was the result of excusable neglect.'" 497 U.S., at 897 . Characterizing that "obstacle" as "the greatest of all," ibid., we examined the reasons for the movant's failure to make a timely filing. Nowhere in our discussion did we mention the equities or the consequences of the movant's failure to file. Instead, we concentrated exclusively on the asserted cause of the failure and the movant's culpability. See ibid. </s> The Court concedes that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b) and Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) have virtually identical language; indeed, it even relies on the former to support its interpretation of the latter. Ante, at 391-392. Yet the majority provides no reason why we should depart from the analysis we so recently employed in Lujan, except to say it reads that case differently. See ante, at 395, n. 13. While it is true that we did not "define" the phrase "excusable neglect" in Lujan, ante, at 395, n. 13, there is no denying that we applied that phrase to the facts before us: there is simply no other explanation for the opinion's discussion of whether the movant had overcome that "greatest" of "substantive obstacle[s]," 497 U.S., at 897 . But even if Lujan might be read differently, the majority offers no affirmative reason to believe that the equities should bear on whether neglect is "excusable." Instead it states: </s> "Because Congress has provided no other guideposts for determining what sorts of neglect will be considered "excusable," we conclude that the determination is at bottom, an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's omission." Ante, at 395. </s> In my view, Congress has provided "guideposts" as to how courts should determine whether "neglect will be considered `excusable.'" The majority simply fails to follow them. [507 U.S. 380, 402] First is the remaining language of Rule 9006(b)(1) itself, a good portion of which the majority fails to consult. The Rule, read in its entirety, establishes that the excusable neglect determination requires inquiry into causation, rather than consequences: unless "the failure to act was the result" of the excusable neglect, relief is unavailable. "It is clear from this language that the focus of [the Rule] is on the movant's actions and the reasons for those actions, not on the effect that an extension might have on the other parties' positions." In re South Atlantic Financial Corp., supra, at 819. Moreover, Rule 9006(b)(1) indicates that the court must determine whether the neglect was "excusable" as of the moment it occurred, rather than in light of facts known when untimely action is proposed. The Rule authorizes relief in cases where the failure "was" the result of excusable neglect, not as to incidents where the neglect is excusable in light of current knowledge. </s> The majority also overlooks a second and dispositive guidepost - the accepted dictionary definition of "excusable neglect." That definition does not incorporate the results or consequences of a failure to take appropriate and timely action; to the contrary, it turns on the cause or reasons for the failure and the culpability involved. According to Black's Law Dictionary 566 (6th ed. 1990), "excusable neglect" is: </s> "[A] failure to take the proper steps at the proper time, not in consequence of the party's own carelessness, inattention, or willful disregard of the process of the court, but in consequence of some unexpected or unavoidable hindrance or accident, or reliance on the care and vigilance of his counsel or on promises made by the adverse party. As used in rule (e.g. Fed.R. Civil P. 6(b)) authorizing court to permit an act to be done after expiration of the time within which under the rules such act was required to be done, where failure to act was the result of "excusable neglect," quoted phrase is ordinarily [507 U.S. 380, 403] understood to be the act of a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances." </s> Cf. 4A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 1165, pp. 480, 482 (2d ed. 1987) ("Excusable neglect [in Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 6(b)] seems to require a demonstration of good faith on the part of the party seeking an enlargement and some reasonable basis for noncompliance. . . . Absent a showing along these lines, relief will be denied."). Of course, we are not bound to accept Black's Law Dictionary as the authoritative expositor of American law. But if Congress had intended to depart from the accepted meaning of excusable neglect - supplementing its exclusive focus on the reason for the error with an emphasis on its effect - surely it would have so indicated. </s> In any event, it is quite unnatural to read the term "excusable neglect" to mean a variety of neglect that, in light of subsequent events and all the equities, turns out to be excusable. Not only does such an interpretation suffer from circularity - excusable neglect becomes the neglect that the court, in its equitable discretion, chooses to excuse - but it also renders critical language in the Rule superfluous. After all, the majority's interpretation would be no different if Rule 9006(b) afforded courts discretion to give relief in cases of "neglect," rather than "excusable neglect." The term "neglect" would describe the acceptable level of culpability, see ante, at 387-395, and the equities still would move the court's discretionary decision on whether it, in fact, would excuse the error once "neglect" was shown. The Court's interpretation thus reads the word "excusable" right out of the Rule. In my view, Congress included the word "excusable" to convey the notion that some types of neglect - at a minimum, the highly culpable and the willful - cannot be forgiven, regardless of the consequences. </s> The Court does recognize one guidepost. It states that the requirement of "excusable neglect" should be construed so as to "deter creditors or other parties from freely ignoring [507 U.S. 380, 404] court-ordered deadlines in the hopes of winning a permissive reprieve under Rule 9006(b)(1)." Ante, at 395. But rather than concentrating on the types of culpable neglect that ought to be deterred, the majority immediately shifts its focus to considerations such as the effect of the failure to take timely action, including prejudice to the debtor and the effect on judicial proceedings. Ibid. If the goal of requiring neglect to be "excusable" is to deter culpable noncompliance, the consequences of such noncompliance should be irrelevant. To held otherwise not only undermines deterrence, but excuses the inexcusable. </s> II </s> The Court's approach also undermines the interests the Bankruptcy Rules seek to promote. Because the majority's balancing test is indeterminate, its results frequently will be called into question. Reasonable minds often differ greatly on what the equities require. This case is a prime example. Applying much the same test the Court applies today, two courts below held that respondents' neglect was inexcusable. Then the Court of Appeals substituted its view, and held otherwise. Today the Court evens the score at two to two. We ought not unnecessarily introduce so much uncertainty into a routine matter like an "excusable neglect" determination. Nor should we unhesitatingly endorse an approach that invites litigants to seek redetermination of their procedural disputes from four different courts. </s> Direct application of Rule 9006(b)(1)'s plain language to this case, in contrast, is straightforward. First, we must examine the failure to act itself and ask if it resulted from excusable neglect. If it did, then the lower court may, in its discretion, permit untimely action in accord with the equities. But if the failure did not result from excusable neglect, there is no reason to consider the effects of the failure. </s> That, of course, brings us to the question to which the majority devotes the bulk of its discussion: whether mere [507 U.S. 380, 405] negligence can qualify as excusable neglect. Ante, at 387-395. As the majority points out, ante, at 387, the Courts of Appeals have disagreed on this matter. Some require the omission to result from circumstances beyond counsel's reasonable control. See, e.g., In re South Atlantic Financial Corp., 767 F.2d, at 819, and cases cited ante, at 387, n. 3. Others hold that negligence may constitute excusable neglect, but distinguish among different types of negligence. Cf. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware v. Larson, 827 F.2d 916, 919 (CA3 1987) ("Excusable neglect" inquiry entails a "qualitative distinction between inadvertence which occurs despite counsel's affirmative efforts to comply and inadvertence which results from counsel's lack of diligence") (Fed.Rule App. Proc. 4(a)), cert. denied sub nom. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware v. Secretary of Transp. of Pennsylvania, 484 U.S. 1032 (1988). In my view, we need not resolve that dispute in this case. Once we properly clarify the factors that are relevant to the excusable neglect determination, the Bankruptcy Court's findings compel the conclusion that respondents' neglect was inexcusable under any standard. </s> The Bankruptcy Court expressly found that respondents' former counsel's failure to file a timely proof of claim resulted from negligence and, to some degree, an attitude of "indifference" toward the deadline. App. 172a. In addition, the court noted that the client, a sophisticated business person and an active participant in the bankruptcy proceedings, had received actual notice of, and was aware of, the deadline. Id., at 171a. Thus, this is not a case of a clerical or other minor error yielding an untoward result despite counsel's best efforts; it is a case in which counsel simply failed to look after his business properly, even if that failure was not the result of bad faith. </s> The Court of Appeals held the neglect excusable nonetheless for two reasons. First, it thought it inequitable to saddle the client with the mistakes of its attorney. The Court [507 U.S. 380, 406] today properly rejects that rationale. Ante, at 396-397. The second reason offered by the Court of Appeals was that the notice containing the deadline was incorporated in a document entitled "Notice for Meeting of Creditors." That designation, the court explained, was not enough to put those without extensive bankruptcy experience on notice that the "bar date" at the end of the notice was the final date for filing proofs of claims. In re Pioneer Investment Services Co., 943 F.2d 673, 678 (CA6 1991). In addition, the court noted that use of the term "bar date" to designate the deadline for filing a proof of claim was "dramatic[ally] ambigu[ous]," since there are many bar dates in bankruptcy, not all of them for the filing of proofs of claims. Ibid. The Court today signals its agreement. Ante, at 398, and n. 15. The majority and the Court of Appeals may be correct that the form of notice was unorthodox; they also may be correct in asserting that, if the inadequacy of notice caused respondents to miss the deadline, respondents' failure was the result of "excusable neglect." But they are not correct in asserting that respondents' former lawyer overlooked the deadline "as a result of" the unorthodox form of notice. The Bankruptcy Court made no such finding. Nor did it find that the notice's ambiguity somehow led counsel astray. On the contrary, the Bankruptcy Court found that both counsel and client had actual notice of the deadline, and that the cause of their failure to file on time was indifference and negligence. App. 172a. </s> To be sure, we would not be obligated to accept those findings if they were not supported by the record. But they are supported by the record. Indeed, in a commendable display of candor, respondents' former counsel admitted that the "foul-up" was "particularly" his own. Id., at 72a. Accord, id., at 112a ("[T]he foul-up I can't lay to the clients' shoes, because it really is probably mine"). There is no indication that he blamed his error on petitioner's form of notice. Rather, he appealed to the Bankruptcy Court's sense of fairness, [507 U.S. 380, 407] arguing that it would be inequitable to penalize his client so greatly where the "delay was occasioned not by [the client], but by its counsel." Id., at 73a. Accord, id., at 102(a) ("[U]nder all the circumstances, we think it would be unfair and inequitable to visit the sins of the lawyer on the client"); id., at 112a (Although the foul-up was respondents' attorney's, given "the lack of prejudice [and] the totality of all the circumstances, [it would be] inherently inequitable to visit the sins on the client for this situation"). </s> Perhaps it would have been desirable for the Bankruptcy Court to make a specific factual finding on whether the unorthodox form of notice actually caused respondents' former counsel to miss the deadline. Given that respondents' lawyer offered no reason why he overlooked the bar date, it is not inconceivable that the notice's unorthodoxy led him astray. Id., at 57a (no recollection of seeing the order setting the deadline); id., at 103a (same). But if there is uncertainty, the answer is to remand to the Bankruptcy Court for appropriate factual findings. Based on the current state of the record and the findings the Bankruptcy Court did make, I cannot accept the majority's finding that counsel's failure in fact resulted from the inadequacy of notice. </s> Respondents' former counsel's error may represent a relatively unaggravated instance of negligence. He did not miss deadlines repeatedly despite clear warnings. Nor did he act in bad faith. But respondents, their former lawyer, the Court of Appeals, and the majority today have all failed to produce a reasonable explanation for this rather major error. More important still, the Bankruptcy Court did explain the error. It found that respondents' failure to meet the deadline resulted at least in part from counsel's "indifference." The majority offers no reason for ignoring that finding. Even accepting the conclusion that excusable neglect may cover some instances of negligence, indifference falls outside the range of the "excusable." Because the failure to act in this case did not result from excusable neglect, there is no [507 U.S. 380, 408] occasion to consider whether the Bankruptcy Court properly exercised its discretion in light of the equities; respondents were ineligible for relief in any event. </s> The Court's only response is that, even if one focuses exclusively on the nature of the error and why it occurred, the parties can still litigate the Rule's application. Ante, at 395-396, n. 14. But that objection can be made to any approach; courts always must apply law to facts. The point is that following the plain language of Rule 9006(b)(1) renders the law's application both easier and more certain. A determination that a party missed the filing deadline on account of "indifference" or some other reason is not as "susceptible of litigation," ibid., as the result of multifactor balancing. The determination is factual, and, as such, may be overturned on review only if clearly erroneous. In fact, no one - neither the parties nor any of the many courts that have reviewed this case - has suggested that there was clear error here. Rather, in this case, as in most others like it, the Bankruptcy Court's findings are more than adequately supported by the record. </s> Indeed, the majority succeeds in circumventing the finding of "indifference" only by ignoring it, concentrating instead on other considerations in the multifactor test. The Court's technique will no doubt prove instructive to anyone appealing an excusable neglect determination in the future, for it highlights the indeterminacy of the test: a simple shift in focus from one factor to another - here, from cause to effects - shifts the balance and the result. The approach required by the Rule itself, in contrast, precludes that slippery tactic. At the threshold, there is but one question on which to focus: the reason the deadline was missed. Contrary to the Court's assertion, ibid., that singular focus does not require us to hold today that all incidents of negligence are inexcusable. We need hold only that indifference is inexcusable. That, I would have thought, goes without saying. [507 U.S. 380, 409] </s> III </s> When courts depart from the language of a congressional command, they often create unintended difficulties in the process. This case, I fear, may prove no exception. The majority's single-step, multifactor, equitable balancing approach to "excusable neglect" is contrary to the language of Rule 9006(h) and inconsistent with sensible notions of judicial economy. Its indeterminacy not only renders consistent application unlikely, but also invites unproductive recourse to appeal. Such consequences are especially unfortunate in the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. An entity in bankruptcy can ill afford to waste resources on litigation; every dollar spent on lawyers is a dollar creditors will never see. Congress established in Rule 9006(b) the inquiry that should be made when courts contemplate permitting untimely action. Under the approach commended by that Rule, respondent is barred from filing an untimely proof of claim because its omission resulted from a neglect that, on this record, was simply inexcusable; the equities, no matter how compelling, cannot propel respondents over that hurdle. I therefore respectfully dissent. </s> [507 U.S. 380, 410]

United States Supreme Court TRAIN v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL(1975) No. 73-1742 Argued: January 15, 1975Decided: April 16, 1975 </s> Under the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, which establish a program for controlling air pollution, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is required to set "ambient air" quality standards which, in the EPA's judgment, are "requisite to protect the public health," 109 (b) (1) ("primary" standards), and "requisite to protect the public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the presence of such air pollutant in the ambient air," 109 (b) (2) ("secondary" standards). Each State after promulgation of these standards must submit an implementing and maintenance plan, which must be approved by the EPA if, inter alia, it meets eight general conditions set forth in 110 (a) (2), the principal one of which is that the plan provide for the attainment of the national primary ambient air quality standards in the State "as expeditiously as practicable" but no later than three years from the date of the plan's approval. 110 (a) (2) (A). The State's plan must include emission limitations, schedules, compliance timetables, and other measures insuring timely attainment and subsequent maintenance of the national standards. In order to develop the requisite plan within the statutory deadline, Georgia elected to follow an EPA-endorsed approach providing for immediately effective categorical emission limitations accompanied, however, by a variance procedure whereby particular sources could obtain individually tailored relief from the general requirements. Section 110 (a) (3) provides that the EPA shall approve any "revision" of an implementation plan that meets the 110 (a) (2) requirements applicable to an original plan, and the EPA, concluding that that provision permits a State to grant individual variances meeting 110 (a) (2) requirements from generally applicable emission standards, both before and after the attainment date, approved the Georgia plan. Respondents initiated review proceedings in the Court of Appeals, taking the position that variances applicable to individual sources may be approved only if they meet the much [421 U.S. 60, 61] more stringent procedural and substantive standards of 110 (f), which, upon application prior to the compliance date for a stationary source or class of moving sources, permits "postponements" of no more than one year of any requirement of a plan, subject to specified conditions. That court upheld respondents' contentions and ordered the EPA to disapprove Georgia's variance provision. Held: The EPA's construction of the Act permitting treatment of individual variances from state requirements as "revisions," under 110 (a) (3), of state implementation plans if they will not interfere with timely attainment and subsequent maintenance of national air quality standards, rather than as "postponements" under 110 (f), was sufficiently reasonable to preclude the Court of Appeals from substituting its judgment for that of the EPA. Pp. 75-99. </s> (a) Section 110 (f) is a safety valve by which may be accorded, under certain carefully specified circumstances, exceptions to the mandatory deadlines for meeting national standards, and, contrary to respondents' contention, does not constitute the sole mechanism by which exceptions to a plan's requirements may be obtained. Pp. 78-84. </s> (b) This concept of 110 (f)'s limited role is reinforced by comparison with 110 (e), which permits a two-year extension of the three-year period referred to in 110 (a) (2) (A) (i) on a showing far less stringent than that required for a 110 (f) one-year postponement, which would be inexplicable were 110 (f) the sole mechanism for States to modify their initial formulations of emission limitations. Pp. 84-86. </s> (c) Noting that 110 (f) provides that a postponement may be granted with respect to the date that "any stationary source" must comply with "any requirement of an applicable state implementation plan," the Court of Appeals reached an erroneous conclusion that the 110 (f) procedure was exclusive; the language of that provision does not mandate that all modifications of a plan's requirements necessarily be treated as postponements, precluding other forms of relief. Pp. 87-88. </s> (d) The Court of Appeals also erred in its conclusion that "a revision is a change in a generally applicable requirement," whereas a "postponement or variance" deals with particular parties, for here the implementation plans being revised are quite detailed; moreover, the court's analysis overlooks obvious distinctions between revisions and postponements in the statutory context. Pp. 88-90. [421 U.S. 60, 62] </s> (e) Section 110 (a) (3) revisions are granted by the EPA only if they comport with the 110 (a) (2) (A) requirement that the national standards be attained as expeditiously as practicable and thereafter maintained, so the "technology forcing" nature of the Amendments is no reason for judging under 110 (f) variances which qualify for approval under 110 (a) (3). Pp. 90-91. </s> (f) Congress felt that the EPA could feasibly and reliably perform the measurement and predictive functions necessary to pass on variances as revisions under 110 (a) (3). Pp. 91-94. </s> (g) Respondents' argument that because any variance would delay attainment of national standards beyond what was previously considered as the earliest practicable date, and that because the Act requires attainment as soon as practicable, any variance must therefore be treated as a postponement, is not supported by the legislative history or otherwise. Pp. 94-97. </s> (h) Respondents' contention, based on 110 (a) (2) (H), that revision authority is limited to general changes initiated by the EPA in order to "accelerate abatement or attain it in greater concert with other national goals," is specious. That provision, which does no more than impose a minimum requirement that state plans be capable of such modifications as are necessary to meet the basic goal of cleansing the ambient air to the extent necessary to protect public health, as expeditiously as possible within the three-year period, does not prevent the States from also permitting ameliorative revisions not contrary to that goal. Pp. 97-98. </s> 489 F.2d 390, reversed and remanded. </s> REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS, J., dissented. POWELL, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. </s> Gerald P. Norton argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Johnson, and Edmund B. Clark </s> Richard E. Ayres argued the cause for respondents With him on the brief was Stephen P. Duggan. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by John C. Danforth, Attorney General, and Walter W. Nowotny, Jr., and Dan Summers, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of Missouri; [421 U.S. 60, 63] by John L. Hill, Attorneys General, Larry F. York, First Assistant Attorney General, and Philip K. Maxwell and Douglas G. Caroom, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of Texas; by Max N. Edwards and John Hardin Young for the American Iron and Steel Institute; by Cameron F. MacRae, Harry H. Voigt, and Henry V. Nickel for the Edison Electric Institute; and by R. Gordon Gooch and Larry B. Feldcamp for Exxon Corp. et al. [421 U.S. 60, 63] </s> MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> We granted certiorari in this case, 419 U.S. 823 (1974), to review a judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit which required petitioner Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to disapprove a portion of the implementation plan submitted to him by the State of Georgia pursuant to the Clean Air Amendments of 1970. 1 The case presents an issue of statutory construction which is illuminated by the anatomy of the statute itself, by its legislative history, and by the history of congressional efforts to control air pollution. </s> I </s> Congress initially responded to the problem of air pollution by offering encouragement and assistance to the States. In 1955 the Surgeon General was authorized to study the problem of air pollution, to support research, training, and demonstration projects, and to provide technical assistance to state and local governments attempting to abate pollution. 69 Stat. 322. In 1960 Congress directed the Surgeon General to focus his attention on the health hazards resulting from motor vehicle emissions. Pub. L. 86-493, 74 Stat. 162. The Clean Air Act of 1963, 77 Stat. 392, authorized federal authorities to expand their research efforts, to make grants to state air pollution [421 U.S. 60, 64] control agencies, and also to intervene directly to abate interstate pollution in limited circumstances. Amendments in 1965, 101, 79 Stat. 992, and in 1966, 80 Stat. 954, broadened federal authority to control motor vehicle emissions and to make grants to state pollution control agencies. </s> The focus shifted somewhat in the Air Quality Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 485. It reiterated the premise of the earlier Clean Air Act "that the prevention and control of air pollution at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local governments." Ibid. Its provisions, however, increased the federal role in the prevention of air pollution, by according federal authorities certain powers of supervision and enforcement. But the States generally retained wide latitude to determine both the air quality standards which they would meet and the period of time in which they would do so. </s> The response of the States to these manifestations of increasing congressional concern with air pollution was disappointing. Even by 1970, state planning and implementation under the Air Quality Act of 1967 had made little progress. Congress reacted by taking a stick to the States in the form of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, enacted on December 31 of that year. These Amendments sharply increased federal authority and responsibility in the continuing effort to combat air pollution. Nonetheless, the Amendments explicitly preserved the principle: "Each State shall have the primary responsibility for assuring air quality within the entire geographic area comprising such State . . . ." 107 (a) of the Clean Air Act, as added, 84 Stat. 1678, 42 U.S.C. 1857c-2 (a). The difference under the Amendments was that the States were no longer given any choice as to whether they would meet this responsibility. For the first time they were required to [421 U.S. 60, 65] attain air quality of specified standards, and to do so within a specified period of time. </s> The Amendments directed that within 30 days of their enactment the Environmental Protection Agency should publish proposed regulations describing national quality standards for the "ambient air," which is the statute's term for the outdoor air used by the general public. After allowing 90 days for comments on the proposed standards, the Agency was then obliged to promulgate such standards. 109 (a) (1) of the Clean Air Act, as added, 84 Stat. 1679, 42 U.S.C. 1857c-4 (a) (1). The standards were to be of two general types: "primary" standards, which in the judgment of the Agency were "requisite to protect the public health," 109 (b) (1), and "secondary" standards, those that in the judgment of the Agency were "requisite to protect the public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the presence of such air pollutant in the ambient air." 109 (b) (2). </s> Within nine months after the Agency's promulgation of primary and secondary air quality standards, each of the 50 States was required to submit to the Agency a plan designed to implement and maintain such standards within its boundaries. 110 (a) (1) of the Clean Air Act, as added, 84 Stat. 1680, 42 U.S.C. 1857c-5 (a) (1). The Agency was in turn required to approve each State's plan within four months of the deadline for submission, if it had been adopted after public hearings and if it satisfied eight general conditions set forth in 110 (a) (2). 2 </s> [421 U.S. 60, 66] Probably the principal of these conditions, and the heart of the 1970 Amendments, is that the plan provide for the attainment of the national primary ambient air [421 U.S. 60, 67] quality standards in the particular State "as expeditiously as practicable but . . . in no case later than three years from the date of approval of such plan." 110 (a) (2) (A). In providing for such attainment, a State's plan must include "emission limitations, schedules, and timetables for compliance with such limitations"; it must also contain such other measures as may be necessary to insure both timely attainment and subsequent maintenance of national ambient air standards. 110 (a) (2) (B). </s> Although the Agency itself was newly organized, the States looked to it for guidance in formulating the plans they were required to submit. On April 7, 1971 - scarcely three months after the enactment of the Clean Air Amendments - the Agency published proposed guidelines for the preparation, adoption, and submission of such plans. 36 Fed. Reg. 6680. After receiving numerous comments, including those from respondent Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC), it issued final guidelines on August 14, 1971, 36 Fed. Reg. 1586. See 40 CFR Part 51 (1974). The national standards themselves were timely promulgated on April 30, 1971, 36 Fed. Reg. 8186. See 40 CFR Part 50 (1974). [421 U.S. 60, 68] </s> No one can doubt that Congress imposed upon the Agency and States a comprehensive planning task of the first magnitude which was to be accomplished in a relatively short time. In the case of the States, it was soon realized that in order to develop the requisite plans within the statutory nine-month deadline, efforts would have to be focused on determining the stringent emission limitations necessary to comply with national standards. This was true even though compliance with the standards would not be necessary until the attainment date, which normally would be three years after Agency approval of a plan. The issue then arose as to how these stringent limitations, which often could not be satisfied without substantial research and investment, should be applied during the period prior to that date. </s> One approach was that adopted by Florida, under which the plan's emission limitations would not take effect until the attainment date. Under this approach, no source is subject to enforcement actions during the preattainment period, but all are put on notice of the limitations with which they must eventually comply. 3 Since the Florida approach basically does not require preattainment date pollution reductions on the part of those sources which might be able to effect them, 4 the Agency encouraged an alternative approach. Under it a State's emission limitations would be immediately effective. The State, however, [421 U.S. 60, 69] would have the authority to grant variances to particular sources which could not immediately comply with the stringent emission limitations necessary to meet the standards. </s> Georgia chose the Agency's preferred approach. 5 Its plan provided for immediately effective categorical emission limitations, but also incorporated a variance procedure whereby particular sources could obtain individually tailored relief from general requirements. This variance provision, Ga. Code Ann. 88-912 (1971), 6 was one of the [421 U.S. 60, 70] bases upon which the Agency's approval of the Georgia plan was successfully challenged by respondents in the Court of Appeals. It is the only aspect of that court's decision as to which the Agency petitioned for certiorari. </s> II </s> The Agency's approval of Georgia's variance provision was based on its interpretation of 110 (a) (3), 7 which provides that the Agency shall approve any revision of an implementation plan which meets the 110 (a) (2) requirements applicable to an original plan. The Agency concluded that 110 (a) (3) permits a State to grant individual variances from generally applicable emission standards, both before and after the attainment date, so long as the variance does not cause the plan to fail to comply with the requirements of 110 (a) (2). Since that section requires, inter alia, that primary ambient air standards be attained by a particular date, it is of some consequence under this approach whether the period for which the variance is sought extends beyond that date. If it does not, the practical effect of treating such preattainment date variances as revisions is that they can be granted rather freely. </s> This interpretation of 110 (a) (3) was incorporated in the Agency's original guidelines for implementation [421 U.S. 60, 71] plans, 40 CFR 51.6 (c), 51.32 (f) (1973). 8 Although a spokesman for respondent NRDC had earlier stated that the Agency's guideline in this regard "correctly provides that variances which do not threaten attainment of a national standard are to be considered revisions of the plan," 9 that organization later developed second thoughts on the matter. Its present position, in which it is joined by another environmental organization and by two individual respondents who reside in affected air quality control regions within the State of Georgia, is that variances applicable to individual sources may be approved only if they meet the stringent procedural and substantive standards of 110 (f). 10 This section permits one-year "postponements" of any requirement of a plan, subject to conditions which will be discussed below. </s> The Court of Appeals agreed with respondents, and ordered the Agency to disapprove Georgia's variance provision, although it did not specify which of the 110 (a) (2) requirements were thereby violated. 11 It held [421 U.S. 60, 72] that while the revision authority of 110 (a) (3) was available for generally applicable changes of an implementation plan, the postponement provision of 110 (f) was the only method by which individual sources could obtain relief from applicable emission limitations. In reaching this conclusion the court rejected petitioners' suggestion that whether a proposed variance should be treated as a "revision" under 110 (a) (3), or as a "postponement" under 110 (f), depended on whether it would affect attainment of a national ambient air standard, rather than on whether it applied to one source or to many. </s> Other Circuits have also been confronted with this issue, and while none has adopted the Agency's position, all have differed from the Fifth Circuit. The first case was Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 478 F.2d 875 (CA1 1973). For reasons to be discussed, infra, at 91-94, the First Circuit rejected the revision authority as a basis for a variance procedure. It nonetheless concluded that prior to the three-year date for mandatory attainment of primary standards, a State could grant variances to sources which could not immediately meet applicable emission limitations. The court reasoned: </s> "We can see value in permitting a state to impose strict emission limitations now, subject to individual exemptions if practicability warrants; otherwise it may be forced to adopt less stringent limitations in order to accommodate those who, notwithstanding reasonable efforts, are as yet unable to comply. </s> "The Administrator sees his power to allow such exemption procedures as deriving from the `revision' authority in 110. (a) (3). We tend to view it more as a necessary adjunct to the statutory scheme, which anticipates greater flexibility during the preattainment period." 478 F.2d, at 887. [421 U.S. 60, 73] </s> The First Circuit's resolution, which has been described as "Solomonesque," is not tied to any specific provision of the Clean Air Act. Rather, it is quite candidly a judicial creation providing flexibility which, according to its creators, Congress may be inferred to have intended to provide. Two other Circuits subsequently followed the First Circuit. Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 483 F.2d 690, 693-694 (CA8 1973); Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 494 F.2d 519, 523 (CA2 1974). Neither expanded on the First Circuit's reasoning. </s> The Ninth Circuit has adopted a third approach to this question, in Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 507 F.2d 905, 911-917 (1974). After considering legislative history, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress did not intend the postponement mechanism to be the exclusive source for variances. But the court also did not adopt the Agency's view that variances could be authorized as 110 (a) (3) revisions, although it did not explain its rejection of this interpretation. Rather, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the First Circuit that flexibility was "a necessary adjunct to the statutory scheme." It explained: </s> "As long as a possible variance from a state plan will not preclude the attainment or maintenance of such standards, we discern no legislative intent to commit a state, in toto, to its initial plan, without any flexibility whatsoever." 507 F.2d, at 913. </s> The Ninth Circuit, however, rejected the First Circuit's distinction between the preattainment and postattainment periods. It concluded that statutory support for flexibility was as strong after the attainment date as before, especially in light of the Act's encouragement of the States to adopt plans even stricter than those required [421 U.S. 60, 74] to attain national standards. 12 The court thus adopted an approach which differs from the Agency's, but which reaches the same result - authorization of variances on standards other than those required for 110 (f) postponements, both before and after the attainment date, so long as the variance does not prevent timely attainment and subsequent maintenance of national ambient air standards. </s> After the Courts of Appeals for the First, Eighth, Fifth, and Second Circuits had spoken, but prior to the decision of the Ninth Circuit, the Agency modified its guidelines to comply with the then-unanimous rulings that after the attainment date the postponement provision was the only basis for obtaining a variance. 39 Fed. Reg. 34533-34535, adding 40 CFR 51.11 (g), 51.15 (d) and revising 51.32 (f). At the same time, the Agency formally disapproved variance provisions to the extent they authorized variances extending beyond attainment dates, unless the standards of 110 (f) were met. 39 Fed. Reg. 34535, adding 40 CFR 52.26. </s> Because the Agency has conformed its regulations to the decisions of the First, Eighth, and Second Circuits, this case on its facts is now limited to the validity of the Georgia variance provision insofar as it authorizes variances effective before Georgia's attainment date, which is in July 1975. 13 The Agency nonetheless has not abandoned its original view that the revision section authorizes variances which do not interfere with the attainment or maintenance of national ambient air standards. Moreover, the Agency is candid in admitting that should we [421 U.S. 60, 75] base our decision on its interpretation of 110 (a) (3), the decision would support the approval of implementation plans which provide for variances effective after the attainment date. </s> The disparity among the Courts of Appeals rather strongly indicates that the question does not admit of an easy answer. Without going so far as to hold that the Agency's construction of the Act was the only one it permissibly could have adopted, we conclude that it was at the very least sufficiently reasonable that it should have been accepted by the reviewing courts. </s> III </s> Both of the sections in controversy are contained in 110 of the amended Clean Air Act, which is entitled "Implementation Plans." Section 110 (a) (3) provides in pertinent part: </s> "(A) The Administrator shall approve any revision of an implementation plan applicable to an air quality control region if he determines that it meets the requirement of paragraph (2) and has been adopted by the State after reasonable notice and public hearings." </s> Section 110 (f) provides: </s> "(1) Prior to the date on which any stationary source or class of moving sources is required to comply with any requirement of an applicable implementation plan the Governor of the State to which such plan applies may apply to the Administrator to postpone the applicability of such requirement to such source (or class) for not more than one year. If the Administrator determines that - </s> "(A) good faith efforts have been made to comply with such requirement before such date, </s> "(B) such source (or class) is unable to comply [421 U.S. 60, 76] with such requirement because the necessary technology or other alternative methods of control are not available or have not been available for a sufficient period of time, </s> "(C) any available alternative operating procedures and interim control measures have reduced or will reduce the impact of such source on public health, and </s> "(D) the continued operation of such source is essential to national security or to the public health or welfare, </s> "then the Administrator shall grant a postponement of such requirement." 14 </s> [421 U.S. 60, 77] </s> As previously noted, respondents contend that "variances" applicable to individual sources - for example, a particular factory - may be approved only if they meet the stringent procedural and substantive standards set forth in 110 (f). As is apparent from the text of 110 (f), its postponements may be for no more than one year, may be granted only if application is made prior to the date of required compliance, and must be supported by the Agency's determination that the source's continued operation "is essential to national security or to the public health or welfare." Petitioners, on the other hand, rely on the revision authority of 110 (a) (3) for the contention that a state plan may provide for an individual variance from generally applicable emission limitations so long as the variance does not cause the plan to fail to comply with the requirements of 110 (a) (2). Since a variance would normally implicate only the 110 (a) (2) (A) requirement that plans provide for attainment and maintenance of national ambient air standards, treatment as revisions would result in variances being readily approved in two situations: first, where the variance does not defer compliance beyond the attainment date; 15 and second, where the national standards have been attained and the variance is not so great that a plan incorporating it could not insure their continued maintenance. Moreover, a 110 (a) (3) revision may be granted on the basis of hearings conducted by the State, whereas a 110 (f) [421 U.S. 60, 78] postponement is available only after the Agency itself conducts hearings. </s> There is thus considerable practical importance attached to the issue of whether variances are to be treated as revisions or as postponements, or for that matter, as the First Circuit would have it, as neither until the mandatory attainment date but as postponements thereafter. This practical importance reaches not merely the operator of a particular source who believes that circumstances justify his receiving a variance from categorical limitations. It also reaches the broader issue of whether Congress intended the States to retain any significant degree of control of the manner in which they attain and maintain national standards, at least once their initial plans have been approved or, under the First Circuit's approach, once the mandatory attainment date has arrived. To explain our conclusion as to Congress' intent, it is necessary that we consider the revision and postponement sections in the context of other provisions of the amended Clean Air Act, particularly those which distinguish between national ambient air standards and emission limitations. </s> As we have already noted, primary ambient air standards deal with the quality of outdoor air, and are fixed on a nationwide basis at levels which the Agency determines will protect the public health. It is attainment and maintenance of these national standards which 110 (a) (2) (A) requires that state plans provide. In complying with this requirement a State's plan must include "emission limitations," which are regulations of the composition of substances emitted into the ambient air from such sources as power plants, service stations, and the like. They are the specific rules to which operators of pollution sources are subject, and which if enforced should result in ambient air which meets the national standards. [421 U.S. 60, 79] </s> The Agency is plainly charged by the Act with the responsibility for setting the national ambient air standards. Just as plainly, however, it is relegated by the Act to a secondary role in the process of determining and enforcing the specific, source-by-source emission limitations which are necessary if the national standards it has set are to be met. 16 Under 110 (a) (2), the Agency is required to approve a state plan which provides for the timely attainment and subsequent maintenance of ambient air standards, and which also satisfies that section's other general requirements. The Act gives the Agency no authority to question the wisdom of a State's choices of emission limitations if they are part of a plan which satisfies the standards of 110 (a) (2), and the Agency may devise and promulgate a specific plan of its own only if a State fails to submit an implementation plan which satisfies those standards. 110 (c). Thus, so long as the ultimate effect of a State's choice of emission limitations is compliance with the national standards for ambient air, the State is at liberty to adopt whatever mix of emission limitations it deems best suited to its particular situation. </s> This analysis of the Act's division of responsibilities is not challenged by respondents insofar as it concerns the process of devising and promulgating an initial implementation [421 U.S. 60, 80] plan. Respondents do, however, deny that the States have such latitude once the initial plan is approved. Yet the third paragraph of 110 (a), and the one immediately following the paragraphs which specify that States shall file implementation plans and that the Agency shall approve them if they satisfy certain broad criteria, is the section which requires the Agency to "approve any revision of an implementation plan" if it "determines that it meets the requirements" of 110 (a) (2). On its face, this provision applies to any revision, without regard either to its breadth of applicability, or to whether it is to be effective before or after the attainment date; rather, Agency approval is subject only to the condition that the revised plan satisfy the general requirements applicable to original implementation plans. Far from evincing congressional intent that the Agency assume control of a State's emission limitations mix once its initial plan is approved, the revision section is to all appearances the mechanism by which the States may obtain approval of their developing policy choices as to the most practicable and desirable methods of restricting total emissions to a level which is consistent with the national ambient air standards. </s> In order to challenge this characterization of 110 (a) (3), respondents principally rely on the contention that the postponement provision, 110 (f), is the only mechanism by which exceptions to a plan's requirements may be obtained, under any circumstances. Were this an accurate description of 110 (f), we would agree that the revision authority does not have the broad application asserted by the Agency. Like the Ninth Circuit, 17 however, we believe that 110 (f) serves a function different from that of supervising state efforts to modify the initial [421 U.S. 60, 81] mix of emission limitations by which they implement national standards. </s> In our view, 110 (f) is a safety valve by which may be accorded, under certain carefully specified circumstances, exceptions to the national standards themselves. That this is its role is strongly suggested by the process by which it became a part of the Clean Air Act. The House version of the Amendment, H. R. 17255, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., contained no provisions for either postponements or, most significantly, mandatory deadlines for the attainment of national ambient air standards. The Senate bill, S. 4358, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., did contain both the three-year deadline, which now appears in 110 (a) (2), and the predecessor of the present 110 (f). That predecessor 18 permitted the governor of a [421 U.S. 60, 82] State to petition a three-judge district court for "relief from the effect" of expiration of the three-year deadline as to a region or persons, and provided for the grant of such relief upon a showing of conditions similar to those [421 U.S. 60, 83] now appearing in 110 (f). Under its language the postponement provision plainly applied only when deferral of a national deadline was sought. 19 </s> The Conference Committee adopted the Senate's general approach to the deadline issue. Its report states: </s> "The conference substitute follows the Senate amendment is establishing deadlines for implementing primary ambient air quality standards but leaves the States free to establish a reasonable time period within which secondary ambient air quality standards will be implemented. The conference substitute modifies the Senate amendment in that it allows the Administrator to grant extensions for good causes shown upon application by the Governors." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1783, p. 45 (1970). (Emphasis added.) </s> Nowhere does the report suggest that other changes in the Senate's proposed 111 (f) were intended to dramatically broaden its reach, such that it would not merely be available to obtain deferral of the strict deadlines for compliance with national standards, but would also be the exclusive mechanism for any ameliorative modification of a plan, no matter how minor. [421 U.S. 60, 84] </s> That the postponement provision was intended merely as a method of escape from the mandatory deadlines becomes even clearer when one considers the summary of the conference's work which Senator Muskie presented to the Senate. The summary referred to a provision under which a single two-year extension of the deadline could be obtained were it shown to be necessary at the time a State's initial plan was submitted. It then immediately discussed the postponement provision, as follows: </s> "A Governor may also apply for a postponement of the deadline if, when the deadline approaches, it is impossible for a source to meet a requirement under an implementation plan, interim control measures have reduced (or will reduce) the adverse health effects of the source, and the continued operation of the source is essential to national security or the public health or welfare of that State." 116 Cong. Rec. 42384-42385. (Emphasis added.) </s> This limited view of the role of 110 (f) is reinforced by comparison with the section which immediately precedes it in the statute, 110 (e). 20 This is the provision [421 U.S. 60, 85] to which Senator Muskie's summary was obviously referring when it stated that the three-year deadline could be extended for up to two years if proper application were made at the time a State first submitted its plan. Like 110 (f), 110 (e) is available only if an emission source is unable to comply with plan requirements because "the necessary technology or other alternatives are not available or will not be available soon enough to permit compliance." Section 110 (e) also contains a requirement parallel to that of 110 (f) (1) (C), that available alternative procedures and control measures have been considered and utilized. Unlike 110 (f), however, 110 (e) contains no requirement that "the continued operation of such source is essential to national security or to the public health or welfare." Section 110 (e) thus permits a two-year extension on a showing considerably less stringent than that required for a 110 (f) one-year postponement. This disparity is quite logical, however, because the relief under 110 (e) is limited to an initial two-year period, whereas that under 110 (f) is available at any time, so long as application is made prior to the effective date of the relevant requirement. 21 </s> [421 U.S. 60, 86] </s> On the other hand, the disparity between the standards of 110 (e) and those of 110 (f) would be inexplicable were 110 (f) also the sole mechanism by which States could modify the particular emission limitations mix incorporated in their initial implementation plans, even though the desired modifications would have no impact on the attainment or maintenance of national standards. Respondents' interpretation requires the anomalous conclusion that Congress, having stated its goal to be the attainment and maintenance of specified ambient air standards, nonetheless made it significantly more difficult for a State to modify an emission limitations mix which met those standards both before and after modification than for a State to obtain a two-year deferral in the attainment of the standards themselves. The interpretation suffers, therefore, not only from its contrariety to the revision authority which Congress provided, but also from its willingness to ascribe inconsistency to a carefully considered congressional enactment. </s> We believe that the foregoing analysis of the structure and legislative history of the Clean Air Amendments shows that Congress intended to impose national ambient air standards to be attained within a specific period of time. It also shows that in 110 (e) and (f) Congress carefully limited the circumstances in which timely attainment and subsequent maintenance of these standards could be compromised. We also believe that Congress, consistent with its declaration that "[e]ach State [421 U.S. 60, 87] shall have the primary responsibility for assuring air quality" within its boundaries, 107 (a), left to the States considerable latitude in determining specifically how the standards would be met. This discretion includes the continuing authority to revise choices about the mix of emission limitations. We therefore conclude that the Agency's interpretation of 110 (a) (3) and 110 (f) was "correct," to the extent that it can be said with complete assurance that any particular interpretation of a complex statute such as this is the "correct" one. Given this conclusion, as well as the facts that the Agency is charged with administration of the Act, and that there has undoubtedly been reliance upon its interpretation by the States and other parties affected by the Act, we have no doubt whatever that its construction was sufficiently reasonable to preclude the Court of Appeals from substituting its judgment for that of the Agency. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 -18 (1965); McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U.S. 477, 480 -481 (1921). We are not persuaded to the contrary by any of the arguments advanced by respondents or by the Courts of Appeals which have rejected 110 (a) (3) as authority for granting variances. To these various arguments we now turn. </s> IV </s> The principal basis on which the Fifth Circuit rejected the Agency's view of the revision and postponement sections was its analysis of their language. The court focused first on the fact that 110 (f) speaks in terms of "any stationary source," and of the postponement of "any requirement of an applicable implementation plan." (Emphasis added.) This language, according to the Fifth Circuit, belies the Agency's contention that the postponement section is inapplicable to those variances which do not jeopardize the attainment or maintenance [421 U.S. 60, 88] of national standards. The court went on to state, without citation or supporting reasoning: </s> "A revision is a change in a generally applicable requirement; a postponement or variance [is a] change in the application of a requirement to a particular party. The distinction between the two is familiar and clear." 489 F.2d 390, 401. </s> We think that the Fifth Circuit has read more into 110 (f), and more out of 110 (a) (3), than careful analysis can sustain. In the first place, the "any stationary source" and "any requirement" language of 110 (f) serves only to define the matters with respect to which the governor of a State may apply for a postponement. The language does not, as the Fifth Circuit would have it, state that all sources desirous of any form of relief must rely solely on the postponement provision. While 110 (f) makes its relief available to any source which can qualify for it, regardless of whether the relief would jeopardize national standards, the section does not even suggest that other forms of relief, having no impact on the national goal of achieving air quality standards, are not also available on appropriately less rigorous showings. </s> As for the Fifth Circuit's observation that "a revision is a change in a generally applicable requirement," whereas a "postponement or variance" deals with particular parties, we are not satisfied that the distinction is so "familiar and clear." While a variance is generally thought to be of specific applicability, 22 whether a revision [421 U.S. 60, 89] is general or specific depends on what is being revised. In this instance, it is implementation plans which are being revised, and it is clear that such plans may be quite detailed, both as to sources and the remedial steps required of the sources. Not only does 110 (a) (2) (B) specify that a plan shall include "emission limitations, schedules, and timetables for compliance," 23 but respondents themselves have urged that the very specific variances which have already been granted in Georgia should have been, and may still be, treated as "compliance schedules" contained within the original plan. 24 </s> A further difficulty with the Fifth Circuit's analysis of the language of 110 (a) (3) and 110 (f) is that it entirely overlooks an obvious distinction between revisions and postponements. In normal usage, to "postpone" is to defer, whereas to "revise" is to remake or amend. In the implementation plan context, normal usage would suggest that a postponement is a deferral of the effective date of a requirement which remains a part of the applicable plan, whereas a revision is a change in the plan itself which deletes or modifies the requirement. If by revision a requirement of a plan is removed, then a person seeking relief from that requirement has no [421 U.S. 60, 90] need to seek its postponement, and 110 (f) is by its terms inapplicable. But if such a person cannot obtain a revision, because for example the plan as so revised would no longer insure timely attainment of the national standards, then under the Act he has no alternative but to comply or to obtain a postponement of the requirement's effective date - if he can satisfy the stringent conditions of 110 (f). This distinction between the two is so straightforward, and so consistent with the structure and history of the Act, as discussed in Part III of this opinion, that we perceive no basis for the Fifth Circuit's strained line of analysis. 25 </s> The Fifth Circuit also relied on the "technology forcing" nature of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970. It reasoned that because the statute was intended to force technology to meet specified, scheduled standards, [421 U.S. 60, 91] it was essential to insure that commitments made at the planning stage could not be readily abandoned when the time for compliance arrived. According to the Fifth Circuit, 110 (f) "is the device Congress chose to assure this." 489 F.2d, at 401. Clearly 110 (f) does present a formidable hurdle for those proposed departures from earlier commitments which are in fact subject to its stringent conditions. What the Fifth Circuit failed to consider, however, is that so long as the national standards are being attained and maintained, there is no basis in the present Clean Air Act for forcing further technological developments. Agency review assures that variances granted under 110 (a) (3) will be consistent with the 110 (a) (2) (A) requirement that the national standards be attained as expeditiously as practicable and maintained thereafter. Thus 110 (a) (3) variances ex hypothesi do not jeopardize national standards, and the technology-forcing character of the Amendments is no reason at all for judging them under the provisions of 110 (f). </s> The First Circuit also rejected the Agency's contention that variances could be handled under the revision procedure, supra, at 72-73, but it did so for reasons different from those relied upon by the Fifth Circuit. 26 It stated: </s> "Had Congress meant [ 110 (f)] to be followed only if a polluter, besides violating objective state [421 U.S. 60, 92] requirements, was shown to be preventing maintenance of a national standard, it would have said so. To allow a polluter to raise and perhaps litigate that issue is to invite protracted delay. The factual question could have endless refinements: is it the individual variance-seeker or others whose pollution is preventing maintenance of standards? See e. g., Getty Oil Company v. Ruckelshaus, 342 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Del. 1972), remanded with directions, 467 F.2d 349 (3rd Cir. 1972), . . . where Getty raised this issue in various forums." 478 F.2d, at 886. </s> Respondents also stress this argument: treating variances as revisions rather than as postponements would invite litigation, would be impractical in application, and would therefore result in degradation of the environment. Aside from the fact that it goes more to the wisdom of what Congress has chosen to do than to determining what Congress has done, we believe this argument to be overstated. As made clear in the Getty case cited by the First Circuit, a polluter is subject to existing requirements until such time as he obtains a variance, and variances are not available under the revision authority until they have been approved by both the State and the Agency. Should either entity determine that granting the variance would prevent attainment or maintenance of national air standards, the polluter is presumably within his rights in seeking judicial review. This litigation, however, is carried out on the polluter's time, not the public's, for during its pendency the original regulations remain in effect, and the polluter's failure to comply may subject him to a variety of enforcement procedures. 27 </s> [421 U.S. 60, 93] </s> We are further impressed that the Agency itself has displayed no concern for the purported administrative difficulty of treating variances as revisions. Ordinarily, an agency may be assumed capable of meeting the responsibilities which it contends are placed upon it. Were respondents able to make a contrary showing, that fact might have some weight in interpreting Congress' intent, although we would doubt its relevance unless Congress were also shown to have been aware of the problem when it drafted legislation which otherwise is consistent with the Agency's contentions. Respondents have made no such showings. The judgments which the Agency must make when passing on variances under 110 (a) (3) are whether the ambient air complies with national standards, and if so whether a proposed variance would cause a plan to fail to insure maintenance of those standards. These judgments are little different from those which the Agency had to make when it approved the initial plans into which respondents seek to have the States frozen. In each instance the Agency must measure the existing level of pollution, compare it with the national standards, and determine the effect on this comparison of specified emission modifications. 28 That Congress is of the opinion [421 U.S. 60, 94] that the Agency can feasibly and reliably perform these functions is manifest not only in its 1970 legislation, but also in a 1974 amendment designed to conserve energy. The amendment provides that the Agency should report to each State on whether its implementation plan could be revised in relation to fuel burning stationary sources, "without interfering with the attainment and maintenance of any national ambient air quality standard." 110 (a) (3) (B) of the Clean Air Act, as added, 88 Stat. 256, 42 U.S.C. 1857c-5 (a) (3) (B) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). (Emphasis added.) </s> V </s> Respondents have put forward several additional arguments which have not been specifically adopted by any court of appeals. The first is based on legislative history. Respondents focus on the fact that while the Conference Committee accepted the Senate's concept of a three-year maximum deadline for attainment of national standards, [421 U.S. 60, 95] it also strengthened the Senate's provision by specifying that attainment should be achieved "as expeditiously as practicable but . . . in no case later than three years." (Emphasis added.) Respondents further make the contention that the Conference Committee altered the Senate's version of the postponement provision to "provide that a source's attempt to delay compliance with `any requirement' of a State Plan would be considered a `postponement.'" Brief for Respondents 36. According to respondents the latter change "was necessary to conform" the postponement provision with the Conference Committee's "as expeditiously as practicable" requirement. 29 </s> [421 U.S. 60, 96] The argument is that because any variance would delay attainment of national standards beyond the date previously considered the earliest practicable, and that because the Act requires attainment as soon as practicable, any variance must therefore be treated as a postponement. This argument is not persuasive, for multiple reasons. </s> First, this interpretation of the Conference Committee's work finds no specific support in legislative documents or debates. This is true despite the significance of the change which, under respondents' interpretation, was made - the expansion of 110 (f) from a safety valve against mandatory deadlines into the exclusive mechanism by which a State could make even minor modifications of its emission limitations mix. Respondents' interpretation arises instead from their own reading of the statute and inferences as to legislative purpose. Second, as we have already discussed, and contrary to respondents' contention, 110 (f) simply does not state that any deferral of compliance with "any requirement" of a state plan "would be considered a postponement." Rather, it merely states that a postponement may be sought with respect to any source and any requirement. </s> Third, respondents' reading equates "practicable" in 110 (a) (2) (A) with 110 (f)'s "essential to national security or to the public health or welfare." Yet plainly there could be many circumstances in which attainment in less than three years would be impracticable, and thus not required, but in which deferral could not possibly be justified as essential to the national security, or public [421 U.S. 60, 97] health or welfare. 30 Fourth, the statute requires only attainment as expeditiously as practicable, not attainment as expeditiously as was thought practicable when the initial implementation plan was devised. Finally, even if respondents' argument had force with regard to a preattainment variance, it would still be of no relevance whatsoever once the national standards were attained. A variance which does not compromise national standards that have been attained does no damage to the congressional goals of attaining the standards as expeditiously as practicable and maintaining them thereafter. </s> The last of respondents' arguments which merit our attention is related to the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that revisions are restricted to general requirements, and that all specific modifications must therefore be funneled through the postponement provision. Respondents go one step further and contend that the revision authority is limited not only to general changes, but to those which also are initiated by the Agency in order to "accelerate abatement or attain it in greater concert with other national goals." Brief for Respondents 26. This highly restrictive view of 110 (a) (3) is based on 110 (a) (2) (H), 31 which specifies that to obtain Agency approval [421 U.S. 60, 98] a State's plan must provide a mechanism for revision to take account of revised national standards, of more expeditious methods of achieving the standards, and of Agency determinations that a plan is substantially inadequate. </s> The argument is specious. Section 110 (a) (2) (H) does nothing more than impose a minimum requirement that state plans be capable of such modifications as are necessary to meet the basic goal of cleansing the ambient air to the extent necessary to protect public health, as expeditiously as practicable within a three-year period. The section in no way prevents the States from also permitting ameliorative revisions which do not compromise the basic goal. Nor does it, by requiring a particular type of revision, preclude those of a different type. As we have already noted, 110 (a) (3) requires the Agency to approve "any revision" which is consistent with 110 (a) (2)'s minimum standards for an initial plan, and which the State adopted after reasonable public notice and hearing; no other restrictions whatsoever are placed on the Agency's duty to approve revisions. 32 </s> VI </s> For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was in error when it concluded that the postponement provision of 110 (f) is the sole method by which may be obtained specific ameliorative modifications [421 U.S. 60, 99] of state implementation plans. The Agency had properly concluded that the revision mechanism of 110 (a) (3) is available for the approval of those variances which do not compromise the basic statutory mandate that, with carefully circumscribed exceptions, the national primary ambient air standards be attained in not more than three years, and maintained thereafter. To the extent that the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was to the contrary, it is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS dissents. </s> MR. JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390 (1974). We issued a stay of the contested portion of the court's judgment on June 10, 1974, 417 U.S. 942 . </s> [Footnote 2 Section 110 (a) (2), 42 U.S.C. 1857c-5 (a) (2), reads as follows: "The Administrator shall, within four months after the date required for submission of a plan under paragraph (1), approve or disapprove such plan, or each portion thereof. The Administrator shall approve such plan, or any portion thereof, if he determines that it was adopted after reasonable notice and hearing and that - "(A) (i) in the case of a plan implementing a national primary [421 U.S. 60, 66] ambient air quality standard, it provides for the attainment of such primary standard as expeditiously as practicable but (subject to subsection (e)) in no case later than three years from the date of approval of such plan (or any revision thereof to take account of a revised primary standard); and (ii) in the case of a plan implementing a national secondary ambient air quality standard, it specifies a reasonable time at which such secondary standard will be attained; "(B) it includes emission limitations, schedules, and timetables for compliance with such limitations, and such other measures as may be necessary to insure attainment and maintenance of such primary or secondary standard, including, but not limited to, land-use and transportation controls; "(C) it includes provision for establishment and operation of appropriate devices, methods, systems, and procedures necessary to (i) monitor, compile, and analyze data on ambient air quality and, (ii) upon request, make such data available to the Administrator; "(D) it includes a procedure, meeting the requirements of paragraph (4), for review (prior to construction or modification) of the location of new sources to which a standard of performance will apply; "(E) it contains adequate provisions for intergovernmental cooperation, including measures necessary to insure that emissions of air pollutants from sources located in any air quality control region will not interfere with the attainment or maintenance of such primary or secondary standard in any portion of such region outside of such State or in any other air quality control region; "(F) it provides (i) necessary assurances that the State will have adequate personnel, funding, and authority to carry out such implementation plan, (ii) requirements for installation of equipment by owners or operators of stationary sources to monitor emissions from such sources, (iii) for periodic reports on the nature and amounts of such emissions; (iv) that such reports shall be correlated by the State agency with any emission limitations or standards established pursuant to this Act, which reports shall be available at reasonable times for public inspection; and (v) for authority comparable [421 U.S. 60, 67] to that in section 303, and adequate contingency plans to implement such authority; "(G) it provides, to the extent necessary and practicable, for periodic inspection and testing of motor vehicles to enforce compliance with applicable emission standards; and "(H) it provides for revision, after public hearings, of such plan (i) from time to time as may be necessary to take account of revisions of such national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard or the availability of improved or more expeditious methods of achieving such primary or secondary standard; or (ii) whenever the Administrator finds on the basis of information available to him that the plan is substantially inadequate to achieve the national ambient air quality primary or secondary standard which it implements." </s> [Footnote 3 While sources would not be subject to enforcement actions based on their levels of emissions prior to the attainment date, they could be required to adhere to schedules for the planning, contracting, and construction necessary to assure that their emissions would be within permissible levels as of the attainment date. See 40 CFR 51.15 (c), 52.524 (b) (1974). </s> [Footnote 4 At least in the case of Florida, this approach has apparently been modified by subsequent adoption of schedules which require compliance by a number of specified sources prior to July 1, 1975. See 40 CFR 52.524 (c) (1974). </s> [Footnote 5 All other States within the Fifth Circuit, except Florida, also adopted plans with limitations which were effective immediately or, in the case of Texas, only a few months thereafter. </s> [Footnote 6 Georgia Code Ann. 88-912 (1971) reads as follows: "Variances. - "The department may grant specific or general classes of variances from the particular requirements of any rule, regulation or general order to such specific persons or class of persons or such specific source or general classes of sources of air contaminants upon such conditions as it may deem necessary to protect the public health and welfare, if it finds that strict compliance with such rule, regulation or general order is inappropriate because of conditions beyond the control of the person or classes of persons granted such variances, or because of special circumstances which would render strict compliance unreasonable, unduly burdensome, or impractical due to special physical conditions or causes, or because strict compliance would result in substantial curtailment or closing down of one or more businesses, plants or operations, or because no alternative facility or method of handling is yet available. Such variances may be limited in time. In determining whether or not such variances shall be granted, the department shall give consideration to the protection of the public health, safety and general welfare of the public, and weigh the equities involved and the relative advantages and disadvantages to the resident and the occupation or activity affected. Any person or persons seeking a variance shall do so by filing a petition therefor with the director of the department. The director shall promptly investigate such petition and make a recommendation as to the disposition thereof. If such recommendation is against the granting of the variance, a hearing shall be held thereon within 15 days after notice to the petitioner. If the recommendation of the director is for the granting of a variance, the department may do so without a hearing: Provided, however, that upon the petition of any person aggrieved by the granting of a variance, a public hearing shall be held thereon. A variance granted may be revoked or modified by the department after a public hearing which shall be held after giving at least 15 days prior notice. Such notice shall be served upon all persons, known to the department, who will be subjected to greater restrictions if such variance is revoked or modified, or are likely to be affected or who have filed with the department a written request for such notification." </s> [Footnote 7 The pertinent text of 110 (a) (3) appears infra, at 75. </s> [Footnote 8 Title 40 CFR 51.32 (f) (1973) reads as follows: "A State's determination to defer the applicability or any portion(s) of the control strategy with respect to such source(s) will not necessitate a request for postponement under this section unless such deferral will prevent attainment or maintenance of a national standard within the time specified in such plan: Provided, however, That any such determination will be deemed a revision of an applicable plan under 51.6." </s> [Footnote 9 Hearings, on Implementation of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 - Part I (Title I), before the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Committee on Public Works, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 45 n. 51 (statement of Richard E. Ayres). </s> [Footnote 10 The text of 110 (f) appears infra, at 75-76, and n. 14. </s> [Footnote 11 Other Circuits which have ordered the disapproval of implementation plan variance procedures have likewise failed to identify the offended requirement, even though 110 (a) (2) quite clearly mandates approval of any plan which satisfies its minimum conditions. See n. 2, supra. Since petitioners have not raised the point in this Court, we have no occasion to consider it. </s> [Footnote 12 See 116 of the Clean Air Act, as amended, 84 Stat. 1689 and 88 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C. 1857d-1 (1970 ed., Supp. IV). </s> [Footnote 13 The attainment dates for several air quality control regions within other Fifth Circuit States are as late as May 31, 1977, by virtue of two-year extensions granted pursuant to 110 (e). See n. 20, infra. </s> [Footnote 14 Section 110 (f) (2) specifies the procedural requirements for postponement. It reads as follows: "(2) (A) Any determination under paragraph (1) shall (i) be made on the record after notice to interested persons and opportunity for hearing, (ii) be based upon a fair evaluation of the entire record at such hearing, and (iii) include a statement setting forth in detail the findings and conclusions upon which the determination is based. "(B) Any determination made pursuant to this paragraph shall be subject to judicial review by the United States court of appeals for the circuit which includes such State upon the filing in such court within 30 days from the date of such decision of a petition by any interested person praying that the decision be modified or set aside in whole or in part. A copy of the petition shall forthwith be sent by registered or certified mail to the Administrator and thereupon the Administrator shall certify and file in such court the record upon which the final decision complained of was issued, as provided in section 2112 of Title 28, United States Code. Upon the filing of such petition the court shall have jurisdiction to affirm or set aside the determination complained of in whole or in part. The findings of the Administrator with respect to questions of fact (including each determination made under subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), and (D) of paragraph (1)) shall be sustained if based upon a fair evaluation of the entire record at such hearing. "(C) Proceedings before the court under this paragraph shall take precedence over all the other causes of action on the docket and [421 U.S. 60, 77] shall be assigned for hearing and decision at the earliest practicable date and expedited in every way. "(D) Section 307 (a) of this title (relating to subpoenas) shall be applicable to any proceeding under this subsection." </s> [Footnote 15 We recognize that attainment of the standards is required as soon as "practicable," and that a preattainment variance could not be granted under the revision authority if immediate compliance by a particular source were "practicable" and such compliance would expedite attainment. See infra, at 96-97, and n. 30. </s> [Footnote 16 Exceptions are the Agency's authority to set emission limitations for new motor vehicles, 202 et seq. of the Clean Air Act, as amended, 84 Stat. 1690-1698 and 88 Stat. 258, 42 U.S.C. 1857f-1 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. IV); to set emission limitations for aircraft, 231 et seq. of the Clean Air Act, as added, 84 Stat. 1703-1705, 42 U.S.C. 1857f-9 et seq.; to set emission limitations for categories of new stationary sources, 111 of the Clean Air Act, as added, 84 Stat. 1683, and amended, 85 Stat. 464, 42 U.S.C. 1857c-6 (1970 ed. and Supp. I); and to regulate the sale of fuels and fuel additives, 211 of the Clean Air Act, as amended, 84 Stat. 1698 and 85 Stat. 464, 42 U.S.C. 1857f-6c (1970 ed. and Supp. I). </s> [Footnote 17 Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 507 F.2d 905, 911-913 (1974). </s> [Footnote 18 Section 111 (f) of the Clean Air Act, as would have been added by S. 4358, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., read as follows: "(1) No later than one year before the expiration of the period for the attainment of ambient air of the quality established for any national ambient air quality standard promulgated pursuant to section 110 of this Act, the Governor of a State in which is located all or part of an air quality control region designated or established pursuant to this Act may file a petition in the district court of the United States for the district in which all or a part of such air quality control region is located against the United States for relief from the effect of such expiration (A) on such region or portion thereof, or (B) on a person or persons in such air quality control region. In the event that such region is an interstate air quality control region or portion thereof, any Governor of any State which is wholly or partially included in such interstate region shall be permitted to intervene for the presentation of evidence and argument on the question of such relief. "(2) Any action brought pursuant to this subsection shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of title 28 of the United States Code and appeal shall be to the Supreme Court. Proceedings before the three judge court, as authorized by this subsection, shall take precedence on the docket over all other causes of action and shall be assigned [421 U.S. 60, 82] for hearing and decision at the earliest practicable date and expedited in every way. "(3) (A) In any such proceeding the Secretary shall intervene for the purpose of presenting evidence and argument on the question of whether relief should be granted. "(B) The court, in its discretion, may permit any interested person residing in any affected State to intervene for the presentation of evidence and argument on the question of relief. "(4) The court, in view of the paramount interest of the United States in achieving ambient air quality necessary to protect the health of persons shall grant relief only if it determines such relief is essential to the public interest and the general welfare of the persons in such region, after finding - "(A) that substantial efforts have been made to protect the health of persons in such region; and "(B) that means to control emissions causing or contributing to such failure are not available or have not been available for a sufficient period to achieve compliance prior to the expiration of the period to attain an applicable standard; or "(C) that the failure to achieve such ambient air quality standard is caused by emissions from a Federal facility for which the President has granted an exemption pursuant to section 118 of this Act. "(5) The court, in granting such relief shall not extend the period established by this Act for more than one year and may grant renewals for additional one year periods only after the filing of a new petition with the court. "(6) The Secretary, in consultation with any affected State or States, shall take such action as may be necessary to modify any implementation plan or formulate any new implementation plan for the period of such extension. "(7) No extension granted pursuant to this section shall effect compliance with any emission requirement, timetable, schedule of compliance, or other element of any implementation plan unless such requirement, timetable, schedule of compliance, or other element of such plan is the subject of the specific order extending the time for compliance with such national ambient air quality standard." </s> [Footnote 19 This fact, as well as the "safety valve" nature of the Senate's predecessor to the postponement provision, is also apparent from the Senate report: "Finally, the Committee would recognize that compliance with the national ambient air quality standards deadline may not be possible. If a Governor judges that any region or regions or portions thereof within his State will not meet the national ambient air quality standard within the time provided, [ 111 (f) of] the bill would authorize him - one year before the deadline - to file a petition against the United States in the District Court of the United States for the district where such region or portion thereof is located for relief from the effect of such expiration." S. Rep. No. 91-1196, pp. 14-15 (1970). </s> [Footnote 20 Section 110 (e), 42 U.S.C. 1857c-5 (e), reads as follows: "(1) Upon application of a Governor of a State at the time of submission of any plan implementing a national ambient air quality primary standard, the Administrator may (subject to paragraph (2)) extend the three-year period referred to in subsection (a) (2) (A) (i) for not more than two years for an air quality control region if after review of such plan the Administrator determines that - "(A) one or more emission sources (or classes of moving sources) are unable to comply with the requirements of such plan which implement such primary standard because the necessary technology or other alternatives are not available or will not be available soon enough to permit compliance within such three-year period, and "(B) the State has considered and applied as a part of its plan reasonably available alternative means of attaining such primary [421 U.S. 60, 85] standard and has justifiably concluded that attainment of such primary standard within the three years cannot be achieved. "(2) The Administrator may grant an extension under paragraph (1) only if he determines that the State plan provides for - "(A) application of the requirements of the plan which implement such primary standard to all emission sources in such region other than the sources (or classes) described in paragraph (1) (A) within the three-year period, and "(B) such interim measures of control of the sources (or classes) described in paragraph (1) (A) as the Administrator determines to be reasonable under the circumstances." </s> [Footnote 21 The language of 110 (f) would also seem to support any number of successive one-year postponements, so long as application is timely. There is potentially some dispute as to this, however, because the Conference Committee deleted, without comment, language [421 U.S. 60, 86] in the Senate predecessor to 110 (f) that explicitly permitted successive postponements. See proposed 111 (f) (5) of the Clean Air Act, as would have been added by S. 4358, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., n. 18, supra. This question is not presented by this case, and we do not decide it. We simply note the possibility of successive postponements as an additional element which would reasonably explain the imposition of harsher standards in 110 (f) than in 110 (e). </s> [Footnote 22 We note, however, that there may be substantial difficulties in determining whether a proposed modification is of general or specific application. Requirements written in general terms may in fact be of very specific impact, as a result of the limited number of similar sources, or even of conscious efforts to evade restrictions on "specific" changes. For example, the regulation at issue in Getty [421 U.S. 60, 89] Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349 (CA3 1972), spoke of all fuel-burning equipment having a maximum rate of heat input equal to or greater than 500 million Btu per hour, and located in New Castle County, Del., south of U.S. Route 40. There was only one such installation. </s> [Footnote 23 The Florida plan, for example, presently contains compliance schedules which specify not merely particular business operations, but also the principal emission sources within particular operations. See 40 CFR 52.524 (c) (1974). </s> [Footnote 24 Brief for Respondents 48-49. Respondents do not, however, suggest any statutory basis for incorporating compliance schedules into a plan once it has been approved. We know of none save the revision authority which respondents would have us declare unavailable for modifications of a specific nature. </s> [Footnote 25 Much of the confusion which has afflicted the Fifth Circuit and the other Courts of Appeals probably has been generated by the States' practice of referring to exceptions from categorical limitations as "variances" rather than as "revised compliance schedules," and also by the fact that in practice a "variance" typically has the effect of deferring the date on which compliance with categorical limitations is required. Our concern, however, is not with the nomenclature assigned to exceptions, but rather with whether they are of a nature that may be authorized as 110 (a) (3) revisions. That an exception which does not jeopardize national standards may in effect be a deferral does not change the facts (1) that it revises a plan from one which requires a source to comply by, say, July 1972, to one which requires its compliance as of, say, May 1975, and (2) that the plan as so revised still possesses all of the characteristics which it must under 110 (a) (2). An exception which does jeopardize national standards, on the other hand, cannot be a revision because it would deprive the revised plan of a characteristic without which it cannot under the Act be an applicable plan. See 110 (d) which defines "applicable implementation plan" as the "implementation plan, or most recent revision thereof, which has been approved under [ 110 (a) (2)] . . . ." Such an exception must be obtained, if at all, as a postponement of the requirements of the applicable plan. </s> [Footnote 26 The First Circuit's decision was strongly criticized in Comment, Variance Procedures under the Clean Air Act: The Need for Flexibility, 15 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 324 (1973). The Comment was especially concerned with the conclusion that 110 (f) was the exclusive postattainment variance mechanism, focusing on this conclusion's lack of support in the statute and legislative history, on its inconsistency with other provisions of the statute, and on its untoward results. A second commentator, writing prior to any of the Court of Appeals decisions, reached conclusions similar to those we today express. Luneburg, Federal-State Interaction under the Clean Air [421 U.S. 60, 92] Amendments of 1970, 14 B. C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 637 (1973). (At the time he wrote this article, Mr. Luneburg was an attorney in the Enforcement Division, Environmental Protection Agency, Region I.) </s> [Footnote 27 Emission limitations contained in an implementation plan may [421 U.S. 60, 93] be enforced in several ways. Aside from whatever state procedures are available under the plan, 113 of the Clean Air Act, as added, 84 Stat. 1686, and amended, 88 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C. 1857c-8 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), imposes a duty of enforcement on the Agency. The Agency may issue compliance orders (the violation of which carries severe monetary penalties), or it may bring civil actions for injunctive relief. In addition, 304 of the Clean Air Act, as added, 84 Stat. 1706, 42 U.S.C. 1857h-2, provides for citizen suits against any person alleged to be in violation of an emission limitation, and against the Administrator where he is alleged to have failed to perform a nondiscretionary act. Plaintiffs in such actions may be awarded attorneys' fees. 304 (d). </s> [Footnote 28 We recognize that numerous applications for changes of a specific nature have a potential for creating a different kind of problem from [421 U.S. 60, 94] that posed by the formulation of general regulations. Such a problem would arise when the grant of a variance to one source would not affect national standards, but the simultaneous or subsequent grant of similar variances to similar sources could result in the plan's failure to insure the attainment and maintenance of the standards. As we have noted in the text, however, the Agency charged with the administration of the Act, and made ultimately responsible for the attainment and maintenance of the national standards, does not view this problem as anywhere near insurmountable. Variances under 110 (a) (3) cannot be granted until first the State, and then the Agency, have determined that they will not jeopardize the standards. We cannot and do not attempt to foresee, at this stage in the administration of the statute, all of the questions, to say nothing of the answers, that may arise in the allocation of a limited number of available variances. The fact that the interpretation placed on the section by the Agency may on occasion require administrative flexibility and ingenuity to a greater degree than would a more rigid alternative is not, of course, a reason for rejecting the Agency's otherwise reasonable construction. </s> [Footnote 29 Compare the language of 110 (f), supra, at 75-76, and n. 14, with that of the Senate's proposed 111 (f), n. 18, supra. In light of our textual comments concerning respondents' interpretation of the Conference Committee's changes, we think that a considerably simpler and more satisfactory explanation is available. The most substantial difference between the two, other than the forum for decision, would have been that 110 (f) is triggered by an application filed prior to the date of compliance with any requirement of a plan, whereas 111 (f) is triggered by a filing at least a year prior to the deadline for attainment. The Conference Committee's change can be quite reasonably viewed as a recognition that the extreme circumstances justifying breach of the national standards could be present with respect to a requirement taking effect either before or after the attainment date. That might occur, for example, if technological difficulties should prevent required preattainment construction of necessary abatement equipment, or if increasing population density should eventually cause more stringent limitations to be necessary to maintain the national standards. Once it is determined that postponements should be available with regard to any requirement of a plan, and not merely to those tied directly to the attainment date, then the change from "region" and "person or persons" to "any stationary source or class of moving sources" follows rather naturally. The latter phrase is far more convenient for use in conjunction with "any requirement of an applicable implementation plan," yet is not significantly more or less inclusive than the former (while the final version requires source-by-source postponements, and does not provide for relief with respect to [421 U.S. 60, 96] an entire region, that requirement was in any event implicit in proposed 111 (f) (4)'s conditions for granting relief; and while "class of moving sources" is less inclusive than "person or persons," the restriction is not only sensible in light of the small emissions from any single moving source, but it also has no discernible relevance to our inquiry). </s> [Footnote 30 Whether the Georgia variance provision meets the practicability standard with regard to preattainment variances is a different issue. It authorizes variances on the basis of conditions beyond the control of the persons involved, on the basis of circumstances which would render strict compliance "unreasonable, unduly burdensome, or impractical," on the basis of findings that strict compliance would result in substantial curtailment or closing down of business operations, and because alternatives are not yet available. See n. 6, supra. Respondents, however, did not attack the Georgia variance procedure on this more limited ground, and we need not consider the issue. </s> [Footnote 31 See n. 2, supra. </s> [Footnote 32 Respondents also claim that their view of revisions is supported by the context in which the term is used in other parts of the amended Act. We disagree. Two instances, 110 (a) (2) (A) (i) and 110 (c) (1) (C), are references to the revision mechanism required by 110 (a) (2) (H), but do not suggest that there may not also be other types of revisions. The other two, 110 (a) (1) and 110 (d), are entirely neutral both in terms of whether revisions are specific or general and in terms of whether they may occur independently of 110 (a) (2) (H). </s> [421 U.S. 60, 100]

United States Supreme Court ROGERS v. RICHMOND(1961) No. 40 Argued: Decided: March 20, 1961 </s> At the trial in a state court in which petitioner was convicted of murder, two confessions which he claimed had been obtained by coercion were admitted in evidence over his objection. In determining that the confessions were "voluntary," both the trial court and the State Supreme Court, which affirmed the conviction, gave consideration to the question whether or not the confessions were reliable. Petitioner applied to a Federal District Court for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his conviction violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. On the basis of the record in the state trial court and that court's finding that the confessions were "voluntary," the District Court denied the writ and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: The admissibility of the confessions was not determined in accordance with standards satisfying the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals to be held in order to give the State an opportunity to retry petitioner, in the light of this opinion, within a reasonable time. In default thereof, petitioner is to be discharged. Pp. 534-549. </s> 271 F.2d 364, reversed. </s> Louis H. Pollak and Jacob D. Zeldes argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. </s> Abraham S. Ullman, State's Attorney for Connecticut, and Robert C. Zampano argued the cause for respondent. With them on the brief was Arthur T. Gorman, Assistant State's Attorney. </s> MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case has a long history. It must be told with some particularity in order to unravel issues ensnarled in protracted litigation in both state and federal courts, turning essentially on the admissibility of confessions. [365 U.S. 534, 535] </s> The Trial. - Petitioner was found guilty of murder by a jury in the Superior Court, New Haven County, Connecticut. The undisputed evidence leading to the conviction may be briefly told. On January 9, 1954, New Haven, Connecticut, police arrested petitioner on charges of committing attempted robbery and other crimes on that day at a local hotel. At the time of his arrest petitioner had in his possession a revolver. Subsequent ballistic tests tended to show that this weapon, which had been reported stolen from the home of petitioner's nephew, was used in a fatal shooting during a liquor store robbery in West Haven, Connecticut, on November 21, 1953, the same day its disappearance was discovered. </s> Petitioner was lodged in the New Haven County Jail pending trial on the charges that prompted his arrest. On January 30, 1954, he was transported without court order from the jail to the office of the State's Attorney for questioning in connection with the West Haven killing. The interrogation commenced at approximately 2 p.m. of that day and continued throughout the afternoon and evening. During the interrogation petitioner was allowed to smoke, was brought a sandwich and coffee, and was at no time subjected to violence or threat of violence. </s> After petitioner had been intermittently questioned without success by a team of at least three police officers from 2 p. m. to 8 p. m., New Haven Assistant Chief of Police Eagan was called in to conduct the investigation. When petitioner persisted in his denial that he had done the shooting, Chief Eagan pretended, in petitioner's hearing, to place a telephone call to police officers, directing them to stand in readiness to bring in petitioner's wife for questioning. After the passage of approximately one hour, during which petitioner remained silent, Chief Eagan indicated that he was about to have petitioner's wife taken into custody. At this point petitioner [365 U.S. 534, 536] announced his willingness to confess and did confess in a statement which was taken down in shorthand by an official court reporter. </s> The following morning the Coroner of New Haven County issued an order that petitioner be held incommunicado at the jail. When a lawyer associated with counsel whom petitioner had previously retained to defend him on the attempted robbery charge called at the jail to see petitioner, he was turned away on the authority of the Coroner's order. Petitioner was then transported to the County Court House for interrogation by the Coroner, who had been informed of his confession of the previous night. There he was put on oath to tell the truth but warned that he might refuse to say anything further and advised that he might obtain the assistance of counsel. Petitioner again confessed to the shooting in a statement recorded by the same official court reporter. </s> Petitioner's defense at the trial was directed toward discrediting the confessions as the product of coercion. In accordance with Connecticut practice, see, e. g., State v. Willis, 71 Conn. 293, 41 A. 820; State v. Guastamachio, 137 Conn. 179, 75 A. 2d 429, the trial judge heard the evidence bearing on admissibility of the confessions without the jury present. At this hearing petitioner testified that shortly after the commencement of the interrogation he asked to see a lawyer but was never permitted to do so. He also testified, with reference to Chief Eagan's pretense of bringing petitioner's wife in for questioning, that this move took the form of a threat to do so unless he confessed and that in making this threat Chief Eagan told him that he would be "less than a man" if he failed to confess and thereby caused her to be taken into custody. According to petitioner his wife suffered from arthritis, and he confessed to spare her being transported to the scene of the interrogation. [365 U.S. 534, 537] </s> The State met petitioner's account with the testimony of Chief Eagan. He testified that petitioner made no request to see a lawyer during his presence in the room. However, it will be recalled that Chief Eagan did not arrive until the questioning had run a course of six hours and that petitioner claimed to have requested counsel during that period. Chief Eagan also denied that he had framed his remarks about bringing petitioner's wife in for questioning as a threat or that he had suggested that petitioner would be "less than a man," etc. </s> On the basis of the evidence summarized, the trial judge concluded that the confessions were voluntary and allowed them to go to the jury for consideration of the weight to be given them under all the circumstances that led to them. Conviction of petitioner for murder followed. </s> Review by the Connecticut Supreme Court. - On appeal, the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, finding no error in the trial judge's admission of the confessions, affirmed the conviction, State v. Rogers, 143 Conn. 167, 120 A. 2d 409. </s> First Federal Habeas Corpus Proceeding. - In August of 1956, after satisfying the rule of Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 , petitioner sought a federal writ of habeas corpus, basically on the ground that since the confessions were secured under circumstances rendering them constitutionally inadmissible, he was denied due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut held a hearing based on the evidence offered by the parties. This evidence included excerpts from the record of the state proceedings as well as testimony of petitioner and various state officials. Neither petitioner nor respondent submitted the entire transcript of the state proceedings and the district judge did not call for it. Petitioner again testified that before he confessed he had requested an opportunity [365 U.S. 534, 538] to confer with his lawyer. His testimony was flatly contradicted by three police officers called by the State's Attorney, none of whom had testified at the trial. </s> On the testimony before him, the district judge made findings which differed from those of the state trial judge in several important respects. He accepted petitioner's testimony that during the police interrogation he had asked to see his lawyer before he yielded to Chief Eagan's efforts to have him confess. He also found that the confession before the Coroner was the product of fear that repudiation of the earlier confession would lead the police to take his wife and foster children into custody. Accordingly, he concluded that "The confessions were the result of pressure overcoming Rogers' powers of resistance and were not voluntary on his part." United States ex rel. Rogers v. Cummings, 154 F. Supp. 663, 665. He therefore set aside the judgment of conviction. </s> First Court of Appeals Review. - On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the District Court's judgment, finding that it was error to hold a hearing de novo on issues of basic evidentiary fact that had been considered and adjudicated by the state courts. Relying on Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 , the Court of Appeals concluded that the district judge should have called for the entire state record before reaching his decision. It held </s> "that in the case now before us the nature of the issues presented and proper regard for the delicate balance of federal-state relationships required the District Judge to obtain and examine the State proceedings . . . . Only on an adequate state record can the District Court determine if a vital flaw exists which warrants correction by extrinsic evidence." United States ex rel. Rogers v. Richmond, 252 F.2d 807, 810, 811. [365 U.S. 534, 539] </s> The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court with the following instructions: </s> "Unless the judge below shall find in the record thus before him material which he deems to constitute `vital flaws' and `unusual circumstances' within the meaning of Brown v. Allen, we hold that he should make the necessary constitutional determinations exclusively on the basis of the historical facts as found by the State trial court." 252 F.2d, at 811. </s> Certiorari Proceeding. - The petitioner sought certiorari here and we denied the petition with this per curiam opinion: </s> "The petition for writ of certiorari is denied. We read the opinion of the Court of Appeals as holding that while the District Judge may, unless he finds a vital flaw in the State Court proceedings, accept the determination in such proceedings, he need not deem such determination binding, and may take testimony. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 506 , et seq." Rogers v. Richmond, 357 U.S. 220 . </s> Second Federal Habeas Corpus Proceeding. - On remand, the district judge had before him the entire transcript of the state proceedings and on the basis of it dismissed the petition. United States ex rel. Rogers v. Richmond, 178 F. Supp. 69. While he adhered to his belief in petitioner's testimony in the first habeas corpus hearing, he now considered himself obliged to accept the state court's "Findings," rather than his own, on all points of historical fact "unless some vital flaw or unusual circumstance exists or some other basis appears for consideration of testimony outside the record." 178 F. Supp., at 71-72. The district judge found no such "flaw" or "circumstance" to permit retrial of the issue of the voluntariness of the confessions. He thus stated his position: </s> "The issue of whether request for counsel was made and the issue of voluntary character of the confessions [365 U.S. 534, 540] were fully and conscientiously tried by an experienced judge. Subsequent disagreement with his weighing of essentially similar evidence is not in itself sufficient under the limitations now imposed in the interest of proper balance in our dual court system, to permit consideration of the matter heard at the trial of the issue de novo here." 178 F. Supp., at 73. </s> On this basis the district judge could not find that the confessions were the product of coercion. </s> Second Court of Appeals Review. - The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed this judgment, one judge dissenting. United States ex rel. Rogers v. Richmond, 271 F.2d 364. The court held that the district judge was correct in restricting himself to the state court's "Findings" regarding petitioner's request to see his lawyer before confessing, and agreed with him that the facts in the record did not justify the conclusion that petitioner's confessions were not voluntary. </s> Because issues concerning the appropriate procedure for dealing with petitions for federal habeas corpus in relation to state convictions were urged, we brought the case here. 361 U.S. 959 . </s> A critical analysis of the Connecticut proceedings leads to disposition of the case on a more immediate issue. For it compels the conclusion that the trial judge in admitting the confessions as "voluntary," and the Supreme Court of Errors in affirming the conviction into which the confessions entered, failed to apply the standard demanded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for determining the admissibility of a confession. </s> Our decisions under that Amendment have made clear that convictions following the admission into evidence of confessions which are involuntary, i. e., the product of coercion, either physical or psychological, cannot stand. This is so not because such confessions are unlikely to be [365 U.S. 534, 541] true but because the methods used to extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system - a system in which the State must establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and may not by coercion prove its charge against an accused out of his own mouth. See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 ; Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 ; Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 -174; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 -321; Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 -207. And see Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 -55. To be sure, confessions cruelly extorted may be and have been, to an unascertained extent, found to be untrustworthy. But the constitutional principle of excluding confessions that are not voluntary does not rest on this consideration. Indeed, in many of the cases in which the command of the Due Process Clause has compelled us to reverse state convictions involving the use of confessions obtained by impermissible methods, independent corroborating evidence left little doubt of the truth of what the defendant had confessed. Despite such verification, confessions were found to be the product of constitutionally impermissible methods in their inducement. Since a defendant had been subjected to pressures to which, under our accusatorial system, an accused should not be subjected, we were constrained to find that the procedures leading to his conviction had failed to afford him that due process of law which the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. </s> In the present case, while the trial judge ruled that each of petitioner's confessions was "freely and voluntarily made and accordingly was admissible in evidence," he reached that conclusion on the basis of considerations that undermine its validity. He found that the pretense of bringing petitioner's wife in for questioning "had no tendency to produce a confession that was not in accord [365 U.S. 534, 542] with the truth." Again, in his charge to the jury, he thus enunciated the reasoning which had guided him in admitting the confessions for its consideration: </s> "No confession or admission of an accused is admissible in evidence unless made freely and voluntarily and not under the influence of promises or threats. The fact that a confession was procured by the employment of some artifice or deception does not exclude the confession if it was not calculated, that is to say, if the artifice or deception was not calculated to procure an untrue statement. The motive of a person in confessing is of no importance provided the particular confession does not result from threats, fear or promises made by persons in actual or seeming authority. The object of evidence is to get at the truth, and a trick or device which has no tendency to produce a confession except one in accordance with the truth does not render the confession inadmissible . . . . The rules which surround the use of a confession are designed and put into operation because of the desire expressed in the law that the confession, if used, be probably a true confession." </s> The same view - that the probable reliability of a confession is a circumstance of weight in determining its voluntariness - entered the opinion of the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut in sustaining the trial judge's admission of the confession: </s> "If we concede that this [petitioner's claims of illegal removal from jail and incommunicado detention] was all true and that such conduct was unlawful, it does not, standing alone, render the defendant's confessions inadmissible. The question is whether, under these and other circumstances of the case, that conduct induced the defendant to confess falsely that he [365 U.S. 534, 543] had committed the crime being investigated. Unless it did, it cannot be said that its illegality vitiated his confessions." 143 Conn., at 173; 120 A. 2d, at 412. </s> And again: </s> "Proper court authorization should have been secured before the defendant was removed from the jail. There is nothing about his illegal removal, however, to demonstrate that he was thereby forced to make an untrue statement. The same can be said concerning the refusal to admit counsel to see the defendant on the morning of January 31 before he was brought before the coroner." 143 Conn., at 173-174; 120 A. 2d, at 412. </s> Concerning the feigned phone call that petitioner's wife be brought in to headquarters, the Supreme Court concluded: </s> "Here again, the question for the court to decide was whether this conduct induced the defendant to make an involuntary and hence untrue statement." 143 Conn., at 174; 120 A. 2d, at 412. </s> From a fair reading of these expressions, we cannot but conclude that the question whether Rogers' confessions were admissible into evidence was answered by reference to a legal standard which took into account the circumstance of probable truth or falsity. 1 And this is not a [365 U.S. 534, 544] permissible standard under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The attention of the trial judge should have been focused, for purposes of the Federal Constitution, on the question whether the behavior of the State's law enforcement officials was such as to overbear petitioner's will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined - a question to be answered with complete disregard of whether or not petitioner in fact spoke the truth. The employment instead, by the trial judge and the Supreme Court of Errors, of a standard infected by the inclusion of references to probable reliability resulted in a constitutionally invalid conviction, pursuant to which Rogers is now detained "in violation of the Constitution." 2 A defendant has the right to be [365 U.S. 534, 545] tried according to the substantive and procedural due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. This means that a vital confession, such as is involved in this case, may go to the jury only if it is subjected to screening in accordance with correct constitutional standards. To the extent that in the trial of Rogers evidence was allowed to go to the jury on the basis of standards that departed from constitutional requirements, to that extent he was unconstitutionally tried and the conviction was vitiated by error of constitutional dimension. 3 </s> It is not for this Court, any more than for a Federal District Court, in habeas corpus proceedings, to make an independent appraisal of the legal significance of facts gleaned from the record after such a conviction. We are barred from speculating - it would be an irrational process - about the weight attributed to the impermissible consideration of truth and falsity which, entering into the Connecticut trial court's deliberations concerning the admissibility of the confessions, may well have distorted, by putting in improper perspective, even its findings of historical fact. Any consideration of this "reliability" element was constitutionally precluded, precisely because the force which it carried with the trial judge cannot be known. </s> As a matter of abstract logic it is arguable that Rogers may not have been deprived of a constitutional right, nor held in custody in violation of the Constitution, within 28 U.S.C. 2241 (c) (3), solely because the Connecticut trial court applied an impermissible constitutional standard [365 U.S. 534, 546] in admitting his confession - that Rogers was not so deprived, or so held, unless "in fact" his confession was coerced, a "fact" to be ascertained from the state record on direct review here, or de novo by a federal district judge in habeas corpus proceedings. Such a view ignores both the volatile and amorphous character of "fact" as fact is found by courts, and the distributive functions of the dual judicial system in our federalism for the finding of fact and the application of law to fact. In coerced confession cases coming directly to this Court from the highest court of a State in which review may be had, we look for "fact" to the undisputed, the uncontested evidence of record. See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 50 -52. This is all that we may look to, in the absence of detailed state-court findings of historical fact, because this Court cannot sit as a trial tribunal to hear and assess the credibility of witnesses. Of course, so-called facts and their constitutional significance may be so blended that they cannot be severed in consideration. And in any event, there must be a foundation in fact for the legal result. See Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 . With due regard to these considerations, it would be manifestly unfair, and afford niggardly protection for federal constitutional rights, were we to sustain a state conviction in which the trial judge or trial jury - whichever is charged by state law with the duty of finding fact pertinent to a claim of coercion - passes upon that claim under an erroneous standard of constitutional law. 4 In such a case, to look [365 U.S. 534, 547] to the wholly undisputed evidence, in the event conflicting evidence is presented, would deprive the state criminal defendant of the benefit of whatever credit his testimony might have been given by the state judge or the state jury, had the judge or jury employed a proper legal standard. Nor, in a case where specific findings are made concerning the allegedly coercive circumstances, can those findings be fairly looked to for the "facts," since findings of fact may often be (to what extent, in a particular case, cannot be known) influenced by what the finder is looking for. Historical facts "found" in the perspective framed by an erroneous legal standard cannot plausibly be expected to furnish the basis for correct conclusions if and merely because a correct standard is later applied to them. </s> Of course, where the issue of coercion is raised not on direct review in this Court but by petition for habeas corpus in a Federal District Court, one alternative method of proceeding impossible on direct review is available. The District Court might conceivably hold a hearing de novo on the issue of coercion. But such a procedure would neither adequately protect the federal rights of state criminal defendants nor duly take account of the large leeway which must be left to the States in their administration of their own criminal justice. A state defendant should have the opportunity to have all issues which may be determinative of his guilt tried by a state judge or a state jury under appropriate state procedures [365 U.S. 534, 548] which conform to the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. Where he has not had that opportunity he should not be required to establish in a Federal District Court, before a federal district judge who must consider the issue of the voluntariness of the confession in a certain abstraction from the whole, living complex of a criminal trial, and perhaps many years after the occurrence of the events surrounding the confession, facts establishing coercion. On the other hand, the State, too, has a weighty interest in having valid federal constitutional criteria applied in the administration of its criminal law by its own courts and juries. To require a federal judge exercising habeas corpus jurisdiction to attempt to combine within himself the proper functions of judge and jury in a state trial - to ask him to approximate the sympathies of the defendant's peers or to make the rulings which the state trial judge might make, within the exercise of his discretion concerning the admission of evidence at the borderline of constitutional permissibility - is potentially to prejudice state defendants claiming federal rights and to pre-empt functions that belong to state machinery in the administration of state criminal law. </s> In view, therefore, of the constitutionally inadequate test applied by the Connecticut courts for determining whether the confessions were voluntarily given, we need not, on this record, consider whether the circumstances of the interrogation and the manner in which it was pressed barred admissibility of the confessions as a matter of federal law. 5 In the case before us, the state trial court [365 U.S. 534, 549] misconstrued the applicable law of the Constitution and was sustained in doing so by Connecticut's Supreme Court. It was error for the court below to affirm the District Court's denial of petitioner's application for habeas corpus. The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals to be held in order to give the State opportunity to retry petitioner, in light of this opinion, within a reasonable time. In default thereof the petitioner is to be discharged. </s> Reversed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 We find support for this conclusion in a line of Connecticut cases, some of which are cited by the Supreme Court of Errors in Rogers. See State v. Willis, 71 Conn. 293, 307-312, 41 A. 820, 824-826; State v. Cross, 72 Conn. 722, 727, 46 A. 148, 150; State v. DiBattista, 110 Conn. 549, 563, 148 A. 664, 669; State v. Palko, 121 Conn. 669, 680, 186 A. 657, 662; State v. Tomassi, 137 Conn. 113, 127-128, 75 A. 2d 67, 74; State v. Guastamachio, 137 Conn. 179, 182, 75 A. 2d 429, 431; State v. Lorain, 141 Conn. 694, 700, 109 A. 2d 504, 507. But see State v. Wakefield, 88 Conn. 164, 90 A. 230; State v. Castelli, 92 Conn. 58, 101 A. 476; State v. Zukauskas, 132 Conn. 450, 45 A. 2d 289; State v. Buteau, 136 Conn. 113, 68 A. 2d 681; State v. Malm, [365 U.S. 534, 544] 142 Conn. 113, 111 A. 2d 685, containing no reference to a "truth-falsity" test. Connecticut case law regarding the admissibility of confessions allegedly secured under circumstances which render them involuntary, or by means of promises, "artifices," "deception" or illegal police practices not amounting to coercion, is not free from uncertainty. We need not now endeavor to ascertain the extent to which, or the circumstances under which, Connecticut courts generally look to reliability as the criterion, alone or in conjunction with other criteria, of admissibility. If petitioner in the present case has been convicted through the use of a constitutionally impermissible standard, it is indifferent that Connecticut law, in its operation in other cases, may be unimpeachable. What that law does reveal of relevance here is that conceptions of probable truth or probable falsity have had and appear still to have a place in the reasoning of Connecticut judges in classes of cases having similarities to Rogers and relied on therein. Without meaning to consider the validity of such reasoning, under the Fourteenth Amendment, in any applications but the one now before us, we do derive from its currency in a continuing line of Connecticut decisions confirmation of our conclusion that the language of the trial judge and of the Supreme Court of Errors in the Rogers case is not the product of mere verbal inadvertence or unreflective phraseology, but an accurate embodiment of the mode of reasoning which led to holding that petitioner's confessions were admissible as "voluntary." </s> [Footnote 2 28 U.S.C. 2241 (c) (3). </s> [Footnote 3 Determination of the admissibility of confessions is, of course, a matter of local procedure. But whether the question of admissibility is left to the jury or is determinable by the trial judge, it must be determined according to constitutional standards satisfying the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. If the question of admissibility is left to the jury, they must not be misdirected by wrong constitutional standards; if the question is decided by the trial judge, he must not misdirect himself. </s> [Footnote 4 A different question was implicitly presented in Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 . In that case the trial judge permitted the confessions to go to the jury under instructions which told it to disregard them if it found that they were not voluntarily made, and which adequately defined the "voluntariness" required by due process. See Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 601 . Thus, there was no flaw in the verdict as rendered. An erroneous legal standard for determining the admissibility of allegedly coerced confessions was interjected into the proceeding only at the level of the Supreme [365 U.S. 534, 547] Court of California. Had the State Supreme Court, under similar circumstances reversed the conviction, not on the basis of local law but solely by reason of a misinterpretation of this Court's principles governing coerced confessions, and had the case been brought here for review on certiorari, the jury's verdict would have had to be reinstated. In any event, the question presented in Stroble was not faced squarely, and in illuminating isolation, in that case. Compare Lee v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 742 , with Stroble. </s> [Footnote 5 We do not deal in this case with a situation in which the record - taking all of petitioner's evidence, and the inferences reasonably to be drawn from it, in the light most favorable to him - nevertheless fails to make out a claim of coercion. Since the issue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way on the whole of the testimony, petitioner has clearly been prejudiced by the application of an erroneous standard to his federal claim by the state trial judge in allowing the confessions to go to the jury. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART, whom MR. JUSTICE CLARK joins, dissenting. </s> Although the matter is not free from doubt, I accept the Court's conclusion that both state courts gave some weight to the probable truth of the confessions in determining that they were voluntary. * But I cannot accept the proposition that the petitioner is entitled to his release by way of federal habeas corpus merely because of the state courts' failure properly to verbalize the correct Fourteenth Amendment test of admissibility. Cf. Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 . </s> The writ can be extended to Rogers only if he is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. 2241 (c) (3). See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 -468; Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 274 -276. In the context of the present case this means that the writ should be granted, if, and [365 U.S. 534, 550] only if, a coerced confession was in fact admitted at the trial. See Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 . I think, as did the District Court, that in deciding that question the appropriate inquiry for the habeas corpus court is not what test of admissibility the State applied or purported to apply, but whether a confession was admitted which was in fact involuntary under Fourteenth Amendment standards. </s> I would, therefore, remand the case to the District Court for a plenary hearing to determine this question. Where, as here, the state trial court's determination of admissibility was at least partly affected by the impermissible factor of probable reliability, I think there can be no question of the federal court's duty to hold such a hearing. While the state court's failure to enunciate the correct standard was not itself an error of constitutional dimensions, it did make impossible the federal court's unquestioning reliance on the trial court's findings of fact. Even the most narrow view of what was said in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 , would require a plenary hearing in these circumstances. </s> [Footnote * In Connecticut the jury plays no part in determining the voluntariness of a confession. Connecticut follows the orthodox rule of leaving the determination of admissibility exclusively to the trial judge. State v. McCarthy, 133 Conn. 171, 177, 49 A. 2d 594, 597; State v. Guastamachio, 137 Conn. 179, 182, 75 A. 2d 429, 431; State v. Lorain, 141 Conn. 694, 699, 109 A. 2d 504, 507. Compare Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 . If a confession is admitted, the jury is left to weigh its truthfulness as it weighs other evidence. There is no claim in this case of any error in the instructions to the jury. </s> [365 U.S. 534, 551]

United States Supreme Court TOWNSEND V. BURKE(1948) No. 542 Argued: April 27, 1948Decided: June 14, 1948 </s> [ Townsend v. Burke 334 U.S. 736 (1948) ] </s> [334 U.S. 736 , 737] </s> Mr. Archibald Cox, of Cambridge, Mass., for petitioner. Mr. Franklin E. Barr, of Philadelphia, Pa., for respondent. </s> Mr. Justice JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania holds petitioner prisoner under two indeterminate sentences, not exceeding 10 to 20 years, upon a plea of guilty to burglary and robbery. On review here of the State Supreme Court's denial of habeas corpus,1 the prisoner demands a discharge by this Court on federal constitutional grounds. Petitioner, while a fugitive, was indicted on June 1, 1945, for burglary and armed robbery. Four of his alleged accomplices had been arrested on May 18, 1945, and signed a joint confession, while a fifth had been arrested on May 21, 1945, and had also June 3, 1945, and confessed on June 4. On confessed. Petitioner was arrested on June 5, after pleading guilty to two charges of robbery and two charges of burglary and not guilty to other charges, he was sentenced. Petitioner now alleges violation of his constitutional rights in that, excet for a ten-minute conversation with his wife, he was held incommunicado for a period of 40 </s> [334 U.S. 736 , 738] </s> hours between his arrest and his plea of guilty. He does not allege that he was beaten, misused, threatened or intimidated, but only that he was held for that period and was several times interrogated. He does not allege that the questioning was continuous or that it had any coercive effect. The plea for relief because he was detained as he claims, unlawfully is based on McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 . But the rule there applied was one against use of confessions obtained during illegal detention and it was limited to federal courts, to which it was applied by virtue of our supervisory power. In this present case no confession was used because the plea of guilty in open court dispensed with proof of the crime. Hence, lawfulness of the detention is not a factor in determining admissibility of any confession and if he were temporarily detained illegally it would have no bearing on the validity of his present confinement based on his plea of guilty, particularly since he makes no allegation that it induced the plea. Petitioner also relies on Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 , in which this Court reversed a state court murder conviction because it was believed to have been based on a confession wrung from an uncounseled 15-year-old boy held incommunicado during questioning by relays of police for several hours late at night. Even aside from the differing facts, that case provides no precedent for relief to this prisoner since, as has been said, no confession was used against him, and he does not allege that his pleas of guilty resulted from his allegedly illegal detention. Petitioner also says that when he was brought into court to plead, he was not represented by counsel, offered assignment of counsel, advised of his right to counsel or instructed with particularity as to the nature of the crimes with which he was charged. This, he says, under the circumstances deprived his conviction and sentence </s> [334 U.S. 736 , 739] </s> of constitutional validity by reason of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 </s> Only recently a majority of this Court reaffirmed that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit a State from accepting a plea of guilty in a non-capital case from an uncounseled defendant. Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 . In that, and in earlier cases, we have indicated, however, that the disadvantage from absence of counsel, when aggravated by circumstances showing that it resulted in the prisoner actually being taken advantage of, or prejudiced, does make out a case of violation of due process. The proceedings as to this petitioner, following his plea of guilty, consisted of a recital by an officer of details of the crimes to which petitioner and others had pleaded guilty and of the following action by the court: (Italics supplied). 'By the Court (addressing Townsend): </s> 'Q. Townsend, how old are you? A. 29. </s> 'Q. You have been here before, haven't you? A. Yes, sir. </s> 'Q. 1933, larceny of automobile. 1934, larceny of produce. 1930, larceny of bicycle. 1931, entering to steal and larceny. 1938, entering to steal and larceny in Doylestown. Were you tried up there? No, no. Arrested inDoylestown. That was up on Ger- </s> [334 U.S. 736 , 740] </s> mantown Avenue, wasn't it? You robbed a paint store. A. No. That was my brother. </s> 'Q. You were tried for it, weren't you? A. Yes, but I was not guilty. </s> 'Q. And 1945, this. 1936, entering to steal and a rceny, 1350 Ridge Avenue. Is that your brother too? A. No. </s> 'Q. 1937, receiving stolen goods, a saxophone. What did you want with a saxophone? Didn't hope to play in the prison band then, did you? The Court: Ten to twenty in the Penitentiary.' </s> The trial court's facetiousness casts a somewhat somber reflection on the fairness of the proceeding when we learn from the record that actually the charge of receiving the stolen saxophone had been dismissed and the prisoner discharged by the magistrate. But it savors of foul play or of carelessness when we find from the record that, on two other of the charges which the court recited against the defendant, he had also been found not guilty. Both the 1933 charge of larceny of an automobile, and the 1938 charge of entry to steal and larceny, resulted in his discharge after he was adjudged not guilty. We are not at liberty to assume that items given such emphasis by the sentencing court, did not influence the sentence which the prisoner is now serving. We believe that on the record before us, it is evident that this uncounseled defendant was either overreached by the prosecution's submission of misinformation to the court or was prejudiced by the court's own misreading of the record. Counsel, had any been present, would have been under a duty to prevent the court from proceeding on such false assumptions and perhaps under a duty to seek remedy elsewhere if they persisted. Consequently, on this record we conclude that, while disadvantage by </s> [334 U.S. 736 , 741] </s> lack of counsel, this prisoner was sentenced on the basis of assumptions concerning his criminal record which were materially untrue. Such a result, whether caused by carelessness or design, is inconsistent with due process of law, and such a conviction cannot stand. We would make clear that we are not reaching this result because of petitioner's allegation that his sentence was unduly severe. The sentence being within the limits set by the statute, its severity would not be grounds for relief here even on direct review of the conviction, much less on review of the state court's denial of habeas corpus. It is not the duration or severity of this sentence that renders it constitutionally invalid; it is the careless or designed pronouncement of sentence on a foundation so extensively and materially false, which the prisoner had no opportunity to correct by the services which counsel would provide, that renders the proceedings lacking in due process. Nor do we mean that mere error in resolving a question of fact on a plea of guilty by an uncounseled defendant in a non-capital case would necessarily indicate a want of due process of law. Fair prosecutors and conscientious judges sometimes are misinformed or draw inferences from conflicting evidence with which we would not agree. But even an erroneous judgment, based on a scrupulous and diligent search for truth, may be due process of law. In this case, counsel might not have changed the sentence, but he could have taken steps to see that the conviction and sentence were not predicated on misinformation or misreading of court records, a requirement of fair play which absence of counsel withheld from this prisoner. Reversed. The CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice REED, and Mr. Justice BURTON, dissent. Footnotes </s> [Footnote 1 Respondent raised no procedural or jurisdictional issues in this Court or in the State Supreme Court. Since petitioner has throughout based his claim for relief solely on alleged deprivation of federal constitutional rights, we assume that those questions were considered by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and are therefore open here. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 247 , 734. </s> [Footnote 2 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has frequently held that the state constitutional provision according defendants the right to be heard by counsel does not require appointment of counsel in noncapital cases. See, for example, Commonwealth ex rel. McGlinn v. Smith, 344 Pa. 41, 24 A. 2d 1; Commonwealth ex rel. Withers v. Ashe, 350 Pa. 493, 39 A.2d 610. See also Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 465 , 1257.

United States Supreme Court MARYLAND v. UNITED STATES(1965) No. 345 Argued: March 15, 1965Decided: May 3, 1965 </s> Petitioners' decedents were passengers on an airliner which collided with a jet trainer assigned to the Maryland Air National Guard. The only survivor was the jet trainer pilot, whose negligence is not disputed. The pilot held a commission from the Governor of Maryland as an officer in the Maryland Air National Guard where he served on alternate Saturdays as a fighter pilot and Squadron Maintenance Officer. He was otherwise employed by the Guard as a civilian Aircraft Maintenance Chief under 32 U.S.C. 709, as a so-called "caretaker" of Guard property. This suit was brought against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The principal issue below was whether the pilot was in his military or civilian capacity at the time of the accident. The District Court found he was in a civilian status and awarded judgment for petitioners, but the Court of Appeals reversed. Held: In both his civilian and military capacities the pilot was an employee of the State of Maryland and thus the United States is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for his negligence in either capacity. Pp. 46-53. </s> (a) Except when called into federal service, the Guard is in charge of the Governor of the State and its military members are state employees. Pp. 47-48. </s> (b) Civilian caretakers, while meeting federal requirements and receiving payment from the United States, are under the jurisdiction of the State Adjutant General and are performing a state function. Pp. 48-49. </s> (c) United States v. Holly, 192 F.2d 221, which held that civilian caretakers were employees of the United States, was decided on an incorrect construction of the National Defense Act. P. 50. </s> (d) Congressional enactments, despite the Holly line of cases, treat both military and civilian employees of the National Guard as state employees. Pp. 51-52. </s> 329 F.2d 722, affirmed. [381 U.S. 41, 42] </s> Theodore E. Wolcott argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners. </s> David L. Rose argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Douglas, Nathan Lewin and Morton Hollander. </s> Louis G. Davidson, Richard W. Galiher, William E. Stewart, Jr., and Peter J. McBreen filed a brief as amici curiae, urging reversal. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The question we decide here is whether a civilian employee and military member of the National Guard is an "employee" of the United States for purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act when his National Guard unit is not in active federal service. 1 </s> [381 U.S. 41, 43] </s> Petitioners' decedents were passengers on a Capital Airlines plane that collided over Maryland with a jet trainer assigned to the Maryland Air National Guard. The only survivor of the accident was the pilot of the trainer, Captain McCoy, and it is not disputed that the collision was caused by his negligence. The estates of the pilot and co-pilot of the Capital plane, and Capital Airlines itself, filed suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act in the District Court for the District of Columbia, and recovered judgments. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. United States v. Maryland for the use of Meyer, 116 U.S. App. D.C. 259, 322 F.2d 1009, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 954 , motion for leave to file petition for rehearing pending, No. 543, 1963 Term. Meanwhile, petitioners filed a similar suit in the Western District of Pennsylvania, and all parties agreed to proceed solely on the record made in the Meyer case. The District Court rendered judgment for petitioners, but the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 329 F.2d 722. We granted certiorari, 379 U.S. 877 , to resolve the conflict between the two Circuits on this single record, and, more broadly, to settle authoritatively the basic question stated at the outset of this opinion which is at the core of other litigation arising out of this same disaster, now pending in a number of courts in different parts of the country. 2 </s> [381 U.S. 41, 44] </s> Captain McCoy held a commission from the Governor of Maryland as an officer in the Maryland Air National Guard, and he served on alternate Saturdays as a fighter pilot and Squadron Maintenance Officer with the 104th Fighter Interceptor Squadron. During the rest of the month Captain McCoy was employed by the Guard in a civilian capacity as Aircraft Maintenance Chief under 32 U.S.C. 709 (1958 ed.), the so-called federal "caretaker" statute. 3 In his civilian capacity Captain McCoy [381 U.S. 41, 45] supervised the maintenance of the squadron aircraft assigned to the Air National Guard but owned by the United States. On the day of the accident, Captain McCoy had obtained permission from his superior to take a passenger on a flight in order to interest the passenger in joining the Air National Guard. The principal factual dispute below was whether at the time of the accident Captain McCoy was performing his duties with the Guard in a military or civilian capacity. A line of cases in the courts of appeals beginning with United States v. Holly, 192 F.2d 221 (C. A. 10th Cir., 1951), has held that civilian "caretakers" are employees of the United States for purposes of suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 4 Another line of cases has been equally consistent in treating military members of the Guard as employees of the States, not the Federal Government. 5 We do not deal with the factual question, on which the decision below turned. 6 since, in agreement with the views [381 U.S. 41, 46] of Judge Smith 7 and in disagreement with the Court of Appeals in the Meyer case, we hold that in both capacities Captain McCoy was an employee of the State of Maryland, and not of the United States. Hence the United States cannot be held liable under the Tort Claims Act for his negligence in either capacity. </s> I. </s> The National Guard is the modern Militia reserved to the States by Art. I. 8, cl. 15, 16, of the Constitution. 8 It has only been in recent years that the National Guard has been an organized force, capable of being assimilated with ease into the regular military establishment of the United States. From the days of the Minutemen of Lexington and Concord until just before World War I, the various militias embodied the concept of a citizen army, but lacked the equipment and training necessary for their use as an integral part of the reserve force of the United States Armed Forces. 9 The passage of the National Defense Act of 1916 10 materially altered the status of the militias by constituting them as the National Guard. Pursuant to power vested in Congress by the Constitution (see n. 8), the Guard was to be [381 U.S. 41, 47] uniformed, equipped, and trained in much the same way as the regular army, subject to federal standards and capable of being "federalized" by units, rather than by drafting individual soldiers. 11 In return, Congress authorized the allocation of federal equipment to the Guard, and provided federal compensation for members of the Guard, supplementing any state emoluments. The Governor, however, remained in charge of the National Guard in each State except when the Guard was called into active federal service; in most instances the Governor administered the Guard through the State Adjutant General, 12 who was required by the Act to report periodically to the National Guard Bureau, a federal organization, on the Guard's reserve status. 13 The basic structure of the 1916 Act has been preserved to the present day. </s> Section 90 of the National Defense Act authorized the payment of federal funds for the employment by the Guard of civilian "caretakers" to be responsible for the upkeep of federal equipment allocated to the National Guard. 14 This section was later amended to make explicit that employment as a caretaker could be held by officers in the Guard, who would receive a full-time salary [381 U.S. 41, 48] as civilian caretakers, and in addition would receive compensation for service as military members of the Guard. 15 The legislative history of these amendments makes clear that the State Adjutant General could appoint officers of the Guard to serve as civilian caretakers, provided only that the appointees met the requirements established by the federal authorities. 16 </s> II. </s> It is not argued here that military members of the Guard are federal employees, even though they are paid with federal funds and must conform to strict federal requirements in order to satisfy training and promotion standards. Their appointment by state authorities and the immediate control exercised over them by the States make it apparent that military members of the Guard are employees of the States, and so the courts of appeals have uniformly held. See n. 5. supra. Civilian caretakers should not be considered as occupying a different status. Caretakers, like military members of the Guard, are also paid with federal funds and must observe federal requirements in order to maintain their positions. 17 Although they are employed to maintain federal property, it is property for which the States are responsible, and its maintenance is for the purpose of keeping the state militia in a ready status. The National Defense Act of 1916 authorized the allocation of federal property to the National Guard, but provided </s> "That as a condition precedent to the issue of any property as provided for by this Act, the State, Territory, [381 U.S. 41, 49] or the District of Columbia desiring such issue shall make adequate provision, to the satisfaction of the Secretary of War, for the protection and care of such property . . . ." 18 </s> The Act also provided that damage or loss of federal property would be charged to the States, unless the Secretary of War determined that the damage or loss was unavoidable. 19 Caretakers appointed under 90 of the Act were thus to perform a state function, the maintenance of federal equipment allocated to the Guard. 20 The caretakers have been termed the "backbone" of the Guard, 21 and are the only personnel on duty with Guard units during the greater part of the year. Like their military counterpart, caretakers are appointed by the State Adjutant General, 22 and are responsible to him in the performance of their daily duties. They can be discharged and promoted only by him. 23 Civilian caretakers are treated as state employees for purposes of the Social Security Act, 24 for state retirement funds, 25 and under the regulations [381 U.S. 41, 50] issued by the Department of the Air Force. 26 As early as 1920 the Comptroller of the Treasury ruled that a civilian caretaker was not a federal employee entitled to the annual leave provisions applicable to the War Department, 27 an opinion that was reiterated in 1941 by the Comptroller General 28 and that reflects the consistent position of the Department of Defense. 29 </s> United States v. Holly, supra, decided in 1951, held that civilian caretakers were employees of the United States, and has since been followed in other courts of appeals (n. 4, supra). Holly rested on a construction of the National Defense Act which, in our view, is not supported by the legislative history. Although the original section provided that caretakers were to "be detailed by the battery or troop commander" (who was a state employee), n. 14, supra, in 1935 Congress amended the statute to provide that the Secretary of the military establishment concerned (here the Secretary of the Air Force) "shall designate the person to employ" the caretaker. 30 The court in Holly read this amendment to mean that caretakers could be employed directly by federal authorities or by the State Adjutant General acting as a federal agent. However, the purpose of the amendment was simply to permit a State to pool its caretakers, and not to restrict the employment of such personnel only to those on the military roster of the unit where the equipment was allotted. The Senate report indicates that [381 U.S. 41, 51] Congress envisaged that caretakers would continue to be employed only by the state authorities. It stated: </s> "Section 6 of S. 2710 will authorize the pooling of National Guard caretakers. Under present law States are required to select the caretakers from the units that have the material. Section 6 will permit the handling under the adjutant general or other proper State official of the caretakers as a pool." 31 </s> It seems clear, then, that no significant distinction was intended between the method of employing military and civilian personnel of the National Guard. </s> Congress again in 1954 accepted the Defense Department understanding that civilian caretakers were employees of the States. In amending the Social Security Act (68 Stat. 1059, 42 U.S.C. 418 (b) (5) (1958 ed.)) to provide coverage for civilian caretakers as state employees, the committee reports stated: </s> "This provision would establish as a separate coverage group civilian employees of State National Guard units who are employed pursuant to section 90 of the National Defense Act . . . and paid from funds allotted to such units by the Department of Defense. These employees would also be deemed to be employees of the State. The Department of Defense does not regard these employees as Federal employees . . . ." 32 </s> In 1956 Congress authorized federal disbursing officers to withhold from the salaries of civilian caretakers amounts needed by the States for their retirement systems. Although Congress was aware of the Holly line of cases, 33 the Senate report stated that authority was [381 U.S. 41, 52] necessary since "[t]hese employees, although paid from Federal funds, are considered to be State rather than Federal employees. Accordingly, State authorities have been unable to make the usual deduction of the employee's contribution into the retirement system." S. Rep. No. 2045, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956). </s> In 1960 it was proposed to extend the coverage of the Federal Tort Claims Act to include civilian and military personnel of the National Guard. 34 This proposal was rejected, and the bill that finally passed provides an administrative procedure whereby the proper Secretary can pay claims up to $5,000 for damage to persons or property caused by National Guard personnel. 35 The Act includes liability for personal injury caused by civilian caretakers, even though the Justice Department called to the attention of Congress the line of cases indicating that acts of civilian caretakers were already covered under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 36 The committee reports of both the House and Senate reflect acceptance of the position advocated by the Department of the Army that civilian caretakers should be included in the bill along with their military counterparts. 37 </s> In sum, we conclude that the congressional purpose in authorizing the employment by state authorities of civilian caretakers, the administrative practice of the Defense Department in treating caretakers as state employees, the consistent congressional recognition of that [381 U.S. 41, 53] status, and the like supervision exercised by the States over both military and civilian personnel of the National Guard, unmistakably lead in combination to the view that civilian as well as military personnel of the Guard are to be treated for the purposes of the Tort Claims Act as employees of the States and not of the Federal Government. This requires a decision that the United States is not liable to petitioners for the negligent conduct of McCoy. 38 </s> In so holding we are not unmindful that this doubtless leaves those who suffered from this accident without effective legal redress for their losses. 39 It is nevertheless our duty to take the law as we find it, remitting those aggrieved to whatever requirement may be deemed appropriate by Congress. which in affording the administrative remedies, unfortunately not available here (see n. 37), has shown itself not impervious to the moral demands of such distressing situations. </s> Affirmed. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS dissents. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The Federal Tort Claims Act provides in pertinent part: </s> 28 U.S.C. 1346 (1958 ed.): </s> "(b) Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." </s> 28 U.S.C. 2671: </s> "As used in this chapter and sections 1346 (b) and 2401 (b) of this title, the term - </s> "`Federal agency' includes the executive departments and independent establishment of the United States, and corporations primarily acting as, instrumentalities or agencies of the United States but does not include any contractor with the United States. </s> "`Employee of the government' includes officers or employees of any federal agency, members of the military or naval forces of the [381 U.S. 41, 43] United States, and persons acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity, temporarily or permanently in the service of the United States, whether with or without compensation." </s> 28 U.S.C. 2674: </s> "The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages." </s> [Footnote 2 We are informed that such litigation is pending in Illinois, Ohio, and New York. </s> [Footnote 3 National Defense Act of 1916, 90, 39 Stat. 166, as amended, now 32 U.S.C. 709 (1958 ed.): </s> "(a) Under such regulations as the Secretary of the Army may prescribe, funds allotted by him for the Army National Guard may be spent for the compensation of competent persons to care for material, armament, and equipment of the Army National Guard. Under such regulations as the Secretary of the Air Force may prescribe, funds allotted by him for the Air National Guard may be spent for the compensation of competent persons to care for material, armament, and equipment of the Air National Guard. A caretaker employed under this subsection may also perform clerical duties incidental to his employment and other duties that do not interfere with the performance of his duties as caretaker. </s> "(b) Enlisted members of the National Guard and civilians may be employed as caretakers under this section. However, if a unit has more than one caretaker, one of them must be an enlisted member. Compensation under this section is in addition to compensation otherwise provided for a member of the National Guard. </s> "(c) Under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary concerned, material, armament, and equipment of the Army National Guard or Air National Guard of a State or Territory, Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone, or the District of Columbia may be placed in a common pool for care, maintenance, and storage. Not more than 15 caretakers may be employed for each of those pools. </s> "(d) Under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary concerned, one commissioned officer of the National Guard in a grade below major may be employed for each pool set up under subsection (c) and for each squadron of the Air National Guard. Commissioned officers may not be otherwise employed under this section. </s> "(e) Funds appropriated by Congress for the National Guard are in addition to funds appropriated by the several States and Territories, [381 U.S. 41, 45] Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone, and the District of Columbia for the National Guard, and are available for the hire of caretakers and clerks. </s> "(f) The Secretary concerned shall fix the salaries of clerks and caretakers authorized to be employed under this section, and shall designate the person to employ them." </s> [Footnote 4 Elmo v. United States, 197 F.2d 230 (C. A. 5th Cir.); United States v. Duncan, 197 F.2d 233 (C. A. 5th Cir.); Courtney v. United States, 230 F.2d 112 (C. A. 2d Cir.); United States v. Wendt, 242 F.2d 854 (C. A. 9th Cir.). </s> [Footnote 5 Williams v. United States, 189 F.2d 607 (C. A. 10th Cir.); Dover v. United States, 192 F.2d 431 (C. A. 5th Cir.); McCranie v. United States, 199 F.2d 581 (C. A. 5th Cir.); Storer Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 251 F.2d 268 (C. A. 5th Cir.); Bristow v. United States, 309 F.2d 465 (C. A. 6th Cir.); Pattno v. United States, 311 F.2d 604 (C. A. 10th Cir.); Blackwell v. United States, 321 F.2d 96 (C. A. 5th Cir.). </s> [Footnote 6 A majority of the Court of Appeals held, contrary to the District Court, that McCoy was acting in his military capacity at the time of the accident. </s> [Footnote 7 Of the other two members of the panel, Judge Hastie did not reach the question whether civilian Guard employees were embraced within the Tort Claims Act, and Judge Staley was in accord with the views of the District of Columbia Circuit in Meyer. </s> [Footnote 8 "The Congress shall have Power . . . </s> "To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions: </s> "To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress." </s> [Footnote 9 See generally, Wiener, The Militia Clause of the Constitution, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 181 (1940). </s> [Footnote 10 39 Stat. 166 (1916). </s> [Footnote 11 National Defense Act, 111, now 10 U.S.C. 672 (1964 ed.). See Wiener, supra, n. 9. </s> [Footnote 12 See 32 U.S.C. 314 (1958 ed.). </s> [Footnote 13 National Defense Act, 66, as amended, now 32 U.S.C. 314 (d) (1958 ed.). </s> [Footnote 14 "Funds allotted by the Secretary of War for the support of the National Guard shall be available . . . for the compensation of competent help for the care of the material, animals, and equipment thereof, under such regulations as the Secretary of War may prescribe: Provided, That the men to be compensated, not to exceed five for each battery or troop, shall be duly enlisted therein and shall be detailed by the battery or troop commander, under such regulations as the Secretary of War may prescribe, and shall be paid by the United States disbursing officer in each State, Territory, and the District of Columbia." 39 Stat. 205. </s> [Footnote 15 Act of June 19, 1935, 49 Stat. 391. </s> [Footnote 16 See S. Rep. No. 635, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 2-3, quoted infra, p. 51. </s> [Footnote 17 Detailed requirements for civilian caretakers are set out in Air National Guard Regulation No. 40-01, dated December 20, 1954 (hereinafter ANGR 40-01), and Air National Guard Manual No. 40-01, dated March 1, 1958. </s> [Footnote 18 National Defense Act, 83, 39 Stat. 203, 204, now 32 U.S.C. 702 (d) (1958 ed.). </s> [Footnote 19 Id., 87, now 32 U.S.C. 710 (1958 ed.). </s> [Footnote 20 In 1926 Congress authorized the employment of National Guard officers as caretakers, limited to one per squadron, in order to provide "an officer constantly on duty at the flying field for the supervision of flying training." H. R. Rep. No. 1031, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 3, explaining the amendment to 90 of the National Defense Act, enacted as Act of May 28, 1926, 44 Stat. 673, now 32 U.S.C. 709 (d) (1958 ed.). See also S. Rep. No. 785, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. Training, of course, was a duty reserved to the States by 91 of the National Defense Act and by Art. I, 8, cl. 16, of the Constitution. </s> [Footnote 21 Hearings before the Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 1303. </s> [Footnote 22 ANGR 40-01, §§ 3 (b), 7 (a). </s> [Footnote 23 Id., § 3. </s> [Footnote 24 Act of Aug. 14, 1935, c. 531, 49 Stat. 620, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 418 (b) (5) (1958 ed.). </s> [Footnote 25 Act of June 15, 1956, c. 390, 70 Stat. 283, as amended, 5 U.S.C. 84d (1964 ed.). </s> [Footnote 26 ANGR 40-01, § 4, provides: </s> "Air National Guard civilian personnel are considered to be employees of the State, Territory, Puerto Rico, or the District of Columbia (21 Comp Gen Dec. 305)." </s> [Footnote 27 27 Comp. Dec. 344 (1920). </s> [Footnote 28 21 Comp. Gen. 305 (1941). </s> [Footnote 29 See S. Rep. No. 1502, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 6; H. R. Rep. No. 1928, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 6. </s> [Footnote 30 Supra, n. 15, now 32 U.S.C. 709 (f) (1958 ed.) (emphasis supplied). </s> [Footnote 31 S. Rep. No. 635, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 2-3. </s> [Footnote 32 S. Rep. No. 1987, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 45-46; H. R. Rep. No. 1698, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 50. </s> [Footnote 33 S. Rep. No. 2045, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4. </s> [Footnote 34 S. 1764 and H. R. 5435, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. </s> [Footnote 35 Act of September 13, 1960, 74 Stat. 878, 32 U.S.C. 715 (1958 ed., Supp. IV). If the claim is for more than $5,000 and the Secretary deems it meritorious he may award up to $5,000 and certify the balance to Congress for appropriate action. </s> [Footnote 36 See S. Rep. No. 1502, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 11; Hearings before Subcommittee No. 2 of the House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 5435 and H. R. 9315, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 6-7. </s> [Footnote 37 See S. Rep. No. 1502, supra; H. R. Rep. No. 1928, supra. The 1960 Act does not cover the accident involved in these cases, since the collision occurred in 1958. </s> [Footnote 38 Petitioners contend that the judgments of the District of Columbia Circuit in Meyer should be given collateral estoppel effect here, even though petitioners were not parties in Meyer. See Restatement, Judgments 93, comment b; Developments in the Law - Res Judicata, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 818, 865, 870-871 (1952); but see United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709, aff'd on other grounds sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379, writ of cert. dismissed under Rule 60, 379 U.S. 951 . We reject the Government's contention that the point was not preserved below. Having regard to the fact that the decision in Meyer came down during the interval between the argument and decision of Levin, we think that the estoppel challenge was properly and timely raised in the petition for rehearing in Levin. However, we need not reach the merits of the challenge since the judgment in Meyer, also pending in this Court (see p. 43, supra), must, in any event, now fall in consequence of our decision in the cases before us. </s> [Footnote 39 The State of Maryland has not, so far as we know, waived its sovereign immunity, and petitioners are not eligible for benefits under 32 U.S.C. 715, supra, n. 35. </s> [381 U.S. 41, 54]

United States Supreme Court U.S. v. CARMACK(1946) No. 40 Argued: October 18, 1946Decided: December 9, 1946 </s> Rehearing Denied Feb. 3, 1947 </s> See 329 U.S. 834 , 67 S.Ct. 627. </s> [329 U.S. 230, 232] Mr.John J. Cooney, of Washington, D.C., for petitioner. Mr. J. R. Kelso, of Cape Girardeau, Mo., for respondent. </s> Mr. Justice BURTON delivered the opinion of the Court. This proceeding was instituted by the United States to condemn land as a site for a post office and customhouse in the City of Cape Girardeau, Missouri, in reliance upon several federal statutes, including the general Condemnation Act of August 1, 1888, and the Public Buildings Act of May 25, 1926.1 The City and site were selected by the Federal Works Administrator and the Postmaster General acting jointly under the Public Buildings Act. The principal [329 U.S. 230, 233] issue is: Was the Federal Works Administrator authorized by the foregoing statutes to acquire by condemnation land held in trust and used by the City for such public purposes as those of a local park, courthouse, city hall and public library? In 1941, the United States petitioned the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri to condemn as a site for a United States post office and customhouse about one and one-half acres, near the center of the City of Cape Girardeau, together with the improvements thereon except a public library building. This site was part of a four acre public park and the improvements to be condemned included a building used as the county [329 U.S. 230, 234] courthouse and city hall, a memorial fountain, a small memorial monument and a portion of a bandstand. The library building apparently was to be removed by its owners on 30 days' notice from the United States. The petition included as parties defendant the City and County, numerous officials and all known and unknown heirs or others who might claim an interest in this site especially through those who conveyed it, in trust, in 1807 to the Commissioners of the District or, in trust, in 1820 to the inhabitants of the Town of Cape Girardeau. Respondent was the only defendant to file an answer. Finding that she had no interest permitting her to maintain the defenses she asserted, the District Court entered a preliminary decree in favor of the United States. On respondent's appeal the Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the cause for further proceedings consistent with its opinion holding that the respondent had a special interest entitling her to object to the property being taken for a purpose destructive of the public use to which it had been dedicated by her ancestors. Carmack v. United States, 8 Cir., 135 F. 2d 196. In 1944, on retrial before a different judge, the District Court recognized the respondent as entitled to contest the condemnation and, at the direction of the Circuit Court of Appeals, heard evidence as to whether or not the officials of the United States acted capriciously and arbitrarily in selecting this site. It held that 'the selection of the site described in the petition, under all the facts re erred to, amounts in law to an arbitrary and unnecessary act' and dismissed the petition. United States v. Certain Land Situate in City of Cape Girardeau, Mo., D.C., 55 F.Supp. 555, 564. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment on the ground that the Federal Works Administrator and the Postmaster General did not have sufficient statutory authority 'to take the particular land sought to be condemned.' It then expressly found it unnecessary to consider whether or not the [329 U.S. 230, 235] federal officials had acted 'capriciously or arbitrarily.' United States v. Carmack, 151 F.2d 881, 882. Because of the importance of the construction of the statutes authorizing the condemnation of land for federal uses, we granted certiorari. 327 U.S. 775 , 66 S.Ct. 959.2 Both the general Condemnation Act and the Public Buildings Act3 expressly authorized the acquisition of land by the United States by condemnation as a site for a United States post office, customhouse or courthouse. Neither Act expressly named the City or designated the site to be condemned in this case. Neither expressly stated whether or not sites already in use for conflicting federal, state or local public purposes were subject to condemnation. The Condemnation Act supplemented the federal right 'to procure real estate for the erection of a public building or for other public uses,' by adding to it a general federal power of condemnation under judicial process to be exercised by an officer of the Government 'whenever in his opinion it is necessary or advantageous to the Government to do so.' The Public Buildings Act, as an incident to an original $150,000,000 program, gave authority and direction to the Secretary of the Treasury (later substituting the Federal Works Administrator) 'to acquire by purchase, condemnation, or otherwise, such [329 U.S. 230, 236] sites ... as he may deem necessary, ....' It specified that as to 'buildings to be used in whole or in part for postoffice purposes, the Federal Works Administrator, under regulations to be prescribed by him, shall act jointly with the Postmaster General in the selection of towns or cities in which buildings are to be constructed and the selection of sites therein: ....'4 These Acts were natural means for Congress to adopt in putting its constitutional powers into use on a scale commensurate with the size of the nation and the need of the time. Neither Act imposed expressly any limitations upon the authority of the officials designated by Congress to exercise its power of condemnation in procuring sites for public buildings deemed necessary by such officials to enable the Government to perform certain specified functions. 5 Far removed from the time and circumstances that led to the enactment of these statutes in 1888 and 1926, this Court must be slow to read into them today unexpressed limitations restricting the authority of the very officials named in the Acts as the ones upon whom Congress chose to rely. The power of eminent domain is essential to a sovereign government. If the United States has determined its need for certain land for a public use that is within its federal sovereign powers, it must have the right to appropriate that land. Otherwise, the owner of the land, by refusing to sell it or by consenting to do so only at an unreasonably high price, is enabled to subordinate the constitutional powers of Congress to his personal will. The Fifth Amendment, in turn, provides him with important [329 U.S. 230, 237] protection against abuse of the power of eminent domain by the Federal Government. 6 </s> While in its early days the Federal Government filed its condemnation cases in the State courts, this Court, in Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 , disposed of the idea that this was necessary. In that case, which has become the leading case on the federal power of eminent domain, Mr. Justice Strong also said: 'It has not been seriously contended during the argument that the United States government is without power to appropriate lands or other property within the States for its own uses, and to enable it to perform its proper functions. Such an authority is essential to its independent existence and perpetuity. These cannot be preserved if the obstinacy of a private person, or if any other authority, can prevent the acquisition of the means or instruments by which alone governmental functions can be performed. The powers vested by the Constitution in the general government demand for their exercise the acquisition of lands in all the States. These are needed for forts, armories, and arsenals, for navy-yards and light-houses for custom-houses, post-offices, and court-houses, and for other public uses. If the right to acquire property for such uses may be made a barren right by the unwillingness of property-holders to sell, or by the action of a State prohibiting a sale to the Federal government, the constitutional grants of power may be rendered nugatory, and the government is dependent for its practical existence upon the will of a State, or even upon that of a private citizen. This cannot be. No one doubts the existence in the State governments of the right of eminent domain,-a [329 U.S. 230, 238] right distinct from and paramount to the right of ultimate ownership. It grows out of the necessities of their being, not out of the tenure by which lands are held. It may be exercised, though the lands are not held by grant from the government, either mediately or immediately, and independent of the consideration whether they would escheat to the government in case of a failure of heirs. The right is the offspring of political necessity; and it is inseparable from sovereignty, unless denied to it by its fundamental law. ... But it is no more necessary for the exercise of the powers of a State government than it is for the exercise of the conceded powers of the Federal government. That government is as sovereign within its sphere as the States are within theirs. True, its sphere is limited. Certain subjects only are committed to it; but its power over those subjects is as full and complete as is the power of the States over the subjects to which their sovereignty extends. </s> 'If the United States have the power, it must be complete in itself. It can neither be enlarged nor diminished by a State. Nor can any State prescribe the manner in which it must be exercised. The consent of a State can never be a condition precedent to its enjoyment.' (Italics supplied.) Kohl v. United States, supra, 91 U.S. 371, 372 , 374 S.. </s> The Kohl case approved the condemnation of privately owned land, then subject to a perpetual leasehold, for a post office site in Cincinnati, Ohio, under an Act of Congress expressly naming that City but not expressly naming the site. The respondent here seeks, by judicial interpretation of the general Condemnation Act and the Public Buildings Act, to exclude from condemnation a particular site in Cape Girardeau selected for a post office by the appropriate federal officials. She depends upon the fact [329 U.S. 230, 239] that the site already is being used by a governmental subdivision of Missouri for other public purposes impressed upon it by its private owners over a century ago. The principle of federal supremacy, so well expressed in the Kohl case, argues against such a subordination of the decisions of federal representatives to those of individual grantors or local officials as to the means of carrying out an admittedly federal governmental function. 7 </s> It makes little difference that the site here sought to be condemned is held by the City in trust instead of in fee. The city government is not resisting the condemnation. The Federal Government can obtain, by voluntary conveyance, whatever title the City can convey. The weakness in the City's right to sell or exchange this site arises from restrictions in the conveyance to it. Through the inclusion, as defendants, of all claimants who might rely upon such restrictions or might claim an interest through the grantors of this site, a decree of condemnation will dispose of the suggested defects. By giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing better title against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance. Both in themselves and from the relation of these Acts to the Constitution, we find substantial reason for making their broad language effective to its full constitutional limit. While the federal power of eminent domain is limited to taking property for federal public uses, the question of the existence of a federal public use presents no difficulty here because the constitutional power of Congress to establish post offices is express. 8 </s> [329 U.S. 230, 240] The considerations that made it appropriate for the Constitution to declare that the Constitution of the United States, and the laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land9 make it appropriate to recognize that the power of eminent domain, when exercised by Congress within its constitutional powers, be equally supreme. Mr. Justice Bradley stated this principle clearly, while on circuit, in Stockton v. Baltimore & N.Y.R. Co., C.C., 32 F. 9, 19: 'The argument based upon the doctrine that the states have the eminent domain or highest dominion in the lands comprised within their limits, and that the United States have no dominion in such lands, cannot avail to frustrate the supremacy given by the constitution to the government of the United States in all matters within the scope of its sovereignty. This is not a matter of words, but of things. If it is necessary that the United States government should have an eminent domain still higher than that of the state, in order that it may fully carry out the objects and purposes of the constitution, then it has it. Whatever may be the necessities or conclusions of theoretical law as to eminent domain or anything else, it must be received as a postulate of the constitution that the government of the United States is invested with full and complete power to execute and carry out its purposes.' 10 </s> [329 U.S. 230, 241] The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution says 'nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.' This is a tacit recognition of a preexisting power to take private property for public use, rather [329 U.S. 230, 242] than a grant of new power. 11 It imposes on the Federal Government the obligation to pay just compensation when it takes another's property for public use in accordance with the federal sovereign power to appropriate it. Accordingly, when the Federal Government thus takes for a federal public use the independently held and controlled property of a state or of a local subdivision, the Federal Government recognizes its obligation to pay just compensation for it and it is conceded in this ca e that the Federal Government must pay must compensation for the land condemned. 12 </s> The foregoing establishes the principle of the supremacy of a federal public use over all other uses in a clearly designated field such as that of establishing post offices. The Government here contends that the officials designated by Congress have been authorized by Congress to use their best judgment in selecting post office sites. It contends also that if the officials so designated have used such judgment, in good faith, in selecting the proposed park site in spite of its conflicting local public uses, the Federal Works Administrator has express authority to direct the condemnation of that site. We agree with those contentions. We find in the broad terms of the Public Buildings Act authority for the designated officials to select the site they did. We find, in both Acts, authority for them to acquire by condemnation the site thus lawfully selected. The judgment exercised by the designated officials in se- [329 U.S. 230, 243] lecting this site out of 22 sites suggested, and out of two closely balanced alternatives, constituted an administrative and legislative decision not subject to judicial review on its merits. It was within the legislative power of Congress to choose or reject this site by direct action. It would have been within its legislative power to exclude from the consideration of its representatives this or other sites, the selection of which might interfere with local governmental functions. Such an exclusion would have been an act of legislative policy. We find no such express or necessarily implied exclusion in the broad language of these Acts. 13 </s> In this case, it is unnecessary to determine whether or not this selection could have been set aside by the courts as unauthorized by Congress if the designated officials had acted in bad faith or so 'capriciously and arbitrarily' that their action was without adequate determining principle or was unreasoned. 14 The record presents no such issue [329 U.S. 230, 244] here. The procedure followed in making the selection of the site showed extraordinary effort to arrive at a fair and reasoned conclusion. 15 The site inspector, in his original [329 U.S. 230, 245] report, recommended the park site as his second choice and demonstrated the reasonableness of a choice, by his superiors, of either of his first two selections. 16 His esti- [329 U.S. 230, 246] mate of divided community sentiment, with apparent community preference for the park site, indicates the absence of capriciousness and arbitrariness in the Government's final selection of the park site. 17 The popular referendum vote of 1612 to 1344 in favor of the transfer of the park site by the City to the Federal Government, in exchange for the Government's transfer of its present post office site to the City, confirms his estimate. These federal officials had the right, if not the obligation, to consider at this time the necessity of disposing of the present post office site and of the single purpose governmental building thereon. That issue inevitably would confront the Government at some time if a new site were chosen. The opportunity to exchange or sell the present site to the City in connection with the acquisition of the park site for a new post office was, therefore, a reasonable rather than a capricious consideration. [329 U.S. 230, 247] On the present record, the petitioner was entitled to a preliminary judgment of condemnation. The fin ing of the District Court on the second trial that the selection of the park site 'amounts in law to an arbitrary and unnecessary act' appears, from the context, to have been a finding largely of the comparative undesirability and lack of necessity for the selection of that site and not to have been a finding that the selection had been made without adequate determining principle and without reason. 18 The comparative desirability and necessity for the site were matters for legislative or administrative determination rather than for a judicial finding. 19 Even if the word [329 U.S. 230, 248] 'arbitrary', as used by the District Court, was intended by it to have the ordinary meaning which that word has when used alone, we are unable to conclude on the record before us that the selection of the park site for a post office in Cape Girardeau, was, as a matter of law, capricious and arbitrary in any sense that, under any construction of the Acts before us, would invalidate the selection here made. The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals, therefore, is reversed and the cause remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED. Mr. Justice DOUGLAS concurs in the result and substantially agrees with the opinion of the Court. But he reserves judgment as to the circumstances under which authority to condemn land owned by a city or a state should be inferred from a general condemnation statute, if the local government challenged the taking. </s> Footnotes </s> [Footnote 1 '... in every case in which the Secretary of the Treasury or any other officer of the Government has been, or hereafter shall be, authorized to procure real estate for the erection of a public building or or other public uses he shall be, and hereby is, authorized to acquire the same for the United States by condemnation, under judicial process, whenever in his opinion it is necessary or advantageous to the Government to do so, ....' Sec. 1, Condemnation Act of August 1, 1888, 25 Stat. 357, 40 U.S.C. 257, 40 U.S.C.A. 257. 'To enable the Federal Works Administrator to provide suitable accommodations ... for courthouses, post offices, immigration stations, customhouses, marine hospitals, quarantine stations, and other public buildings of the classes under the control of the Federal Works Agency in the States, Territories, and possessions of the United States, he is hereby authorized and directed to acquire, by purchase, condemnation, or otherwise, such sites and additions to sites as he may deem necessary , ... Provided, That ... insofar as relates to buildings to be used in whole or in part for post office purposes, the Federal Works Administrator, under regulations to be prescribed by him, shall act jointly with the Postmaster General in the selection of towns or cities in which buildings are to be constructed and the selection of sites therein: ....' 40 U.S.C . 341, 40 U.S.C.A. 341. This is codified from 1 of the Public Buildings Act of May 25, 1926, 44 Stat. 630-631, as modified by Reorganization Plan I, 301-303, 53 Stat. 1426-1427, 5 U.S.C. following section 133t, 5 U.S.C.A. following section 133t. See also, 40 U.S.C. 342-350, 40 U.S.C.A. 342-350, and the balance of the original Act. </s> The petition likewise relied upon the Declaration of Taking Act of February 26, 1931, 46 Stat. 1421, 40 U.S.C. 258a-258e, 40 U.S.C.A. 258a-258e; Third Deficiency Appropriation Act, fiscal year 1937, 50 Stat. 755, 773; Federal Public Buildings Appropriation Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 818; and the Reorganization Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 561, 5 U.S.C. 133 et seq., 5 U.S.C.A. 133 et seq., under which Reorganization Plan I was submitted to Congress and made effective July 1, 1939, 53 Stat. 813, 5 U.S.C. 133s, 5 U.S.C.A. 133s. </s> [Footnote 2 The right of the respondent to contest the condemnation turns upon the effect of the deeds, executed by certain of her ancestors in 1807 and 1820, pursuant to which this site long has been put to local public use. Her interest, turning largely on Missouri law, was upheld by the Circuit Court of Appeals, following the first trial, Carmack v. United States, 8 Cir., 135 F.2d 196, and, as we do not have to question that interest in order to reach our decision, we do not reexamine it. Board of Regents for Normal School Dist. No. 3 v. Painter, 102 Mo. 464, 14 S.W. 938, 10 L.R.A. 493; Mott v. Morris, 249 Mo. 137, 155 S.W. 434; and 25 Stat. 357, 40 U.S.C . 258, 40 U.S.C.A. 258. The proceeding to condemn the land being in rem, the jurisdiction of the court does not turn upon her participation in the case. Cf. United States v. Dunnington, 146 U.S. 338, 352 , 13 S.Ct. 79, 83; In re Condemnation Suits by United States, D.C., 234 F. 443, 445. [Footnote 3 See note 1, supra. </s> [Footnote 4 For the three foregoing quotations, see note 1, supra. [Footnote 5 Noth ng has been found in the legislative history of these Acts to indicate that Congress intended to give its agents less than the fullest possible authority of Congress in selecting cities and sites. See H.R. Rep. No. 132, especially minority views at pp. 6, 7, 10, and H.R. Rep. No. 1223, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.; S. Rep. No. 197, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.; 67 Cong.Rec. 4023-4028, 8356, 8357, 8359, 8494, 8567. </s> [Footnote 6 'No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property by taken for public use, without just compensation.' U.S.Const. Amend. V. </s> [Footnote 7 See also, Albert Hanson Lumber Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 581, 587 , 43 S.Ct. 442, 444, for emphasis on the all- inclusiveness of the general Condemnation Act of August 1, 1888. [Footnote 8 U.S.Const. Art. I, 8, Cls. 7 and 18. </s> [Footnote 9 U.S.Const. Art. VI. [Footnote 10 An appeal in Stockton v. Baltimore & N.Y.R. Co., supra, was dismissed in this Court, 140 U.S. 699 , 11 S.Ct. 1028, and, in the meantime, Mr. Justice Bradley's statement was quoted with approval in Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 656 , 10 S.Ct. 965, 970; See also, United States v. Gettysburg Electric Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 681 , 16 S.Ct. 427, 429; Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525, 529 , 530 S., 14 S.Ct. 891, 892. When Congress has wished to subordinate its selection of state lands to state approval it has done so by express provision. In the Weeks Forestry Act of March 1, 1911, 36 Stat. 961, 962, 43 Stat. 1215, 45 Stat. 1010, 48 Stat. 955, 16 U.S.C. 516, 16 U.S.C.A. 516, and the Migratory Bird Conservation Act of February 18, 1929, 45 Stat. 1222, 1223, 16 U.S.C . 715f, 16 U.S.C.A. 715f, the consent of the state legislature to the federal acquisition of land is made an express condition of the acceptance of such land. Such consent does not deprive the state of civil or criminal jurisdiction over the land. 36 Stat. 963, 16 U.S.C. 480, 16 U.S.C.A. 480, and 45 Stat. 1224, 16 U.S.C. 715g, 16 U.S.C.A. 715g. See also, The Upper Mississippi River Wild Life and Fish Refuge Act of June 7, 1924, 43 Stat. 650, 16 U.S.C. 724, 16 U.S.C.A. 724. The acquisition of federal legislative jurisdiction, as distinguished from federal title to the land, is a different matter. If the Federal Government desires exclusive legislative jurisdiction over land acquired by it, the Constitution indicates that the consent of the state in which the land is located is necessary. Art. I, 8, Cl. 17, provides that 'The Congress shall have Power ... To exercise exclusive Legislation ... over all Places purchased by the consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings; ....' See Stockton v. Baltimore & N.Y.R. Co., C.C., 32 F. 9, 18, appeal dismissed, 140 U.S. 699 , 11 S.Ct. 1028. See also, Joint Resolution of September 11, 1841, 5 Stat. 468, and Rev.Stat. 355, which formerly required the consent of state legislatures to federal purchases of certain sites as a condition of expending federal funds to pay for them. Since February 1, 1940, such consent has not been required except where the United States has sought 'exclusive or partial' legislative jurisdiction. Unless and until the United States accepts such jurisdiction over lands acquired since February 1, 1940, it is presumed conclusively that no such jurisdiction has been accepted. 54 Stat. 19, 54 Stat. 1083, 40 U.S.C. 255, 40 U.S.C.A. 255. The exercise of exclusive legislative jurisdiction is not an issue in this case and, in any event, Missouri has consented to it. 'The consent of the State of Missouri is hereby given in accordance with the seventeenth clause, eighth section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States to the acquisition by the United States by purchase or grant of any land in this State which has been or may hereafter be acquired, for the purpose of establishing and maintaining postoffices, ....' Mo.R.S.A. ( 1939), 12691. </s> [Footnote 11 See United States v. Cooper, 20 D.C. 104, 116, affirmed sub nom., Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282 , 13 S.Ct. 361; In re Rugheimer, D.C., 36 F. 369, 371. [Footnote 12 When, however, a sovereign state transfers its own public property from one governmental use to another, or when the Federal Government takes property from state ownership merely so as to put it to a federal public use for which the state already holds it in trust, a like obligation does not arise to pay just compensation for it. See In re Certain Land in Lawrence, D.C., 119 F. 453; Stockton v. Baltimore & N.Y.R. Co., C.C., 32 F. 9, 19, appeal dismissed, 140 U.S. 699 , 11 S.Ct. 1028. </s> [Footnote 13 In the instant case, we deal with broad language employed to authorize officials to exercise the sovereign's power of eminent domain on behalf of the sovereign itself. This is a general authorization which carries with it the sovereign's full powers except such as are excluded expressly or by necessary implication. A distinction exists however, in the case of statutes which grant to others, such as public utilities, a right to exercise the power of eminent domain on behalf of themselves. These are, in their very nature, grants of limited powers. They do not include sovereign powers greater than those expressed or necessarily implied, especially against others exercising equal or greater public powers. In such cases the absence of an express grant of superiority over conflicting public uses reflects an absence of such superiority. See United States v. Jotham Bixby Co., D.C., 55 F.2d 317, 319, affirmed sub nom., C.M. Patten & Co. v. United States, 9 Cir., 61 F.2d 970, decree vacated as moot, 289 U.S. 705 , 53 S.Ct. 687; In re Condemnations for Improvement of Rouge River, D.C., 266 F. 105; United States v. City of Tiffin, C.C., 190 F. 279, 281. [Footnote 14 'Arbitrary' is defined by Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English Language (1944), as '1 ...; without adequate determining principle; ...' and by Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d Ed. ( 1945), as '2. Fixed or arrived at through an exercise of will or by caprice, without consideration or adjustment with reference to principles, circumstances, or significance, ... decisive but unreasoned; ....' 'Capricious' in defined by Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d Ed. (1945), as '2. ...; apt to change suddenly; freakish; whimsical; humorsome.' Cf. Fox Film Corp. v. Trumbull, D.C., 7 F.2d 715, 727; Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Public Utility Dist. No. 1, of Whatcom County, 9 Cir., 123 F.2d 286, 290, certiorari denied, 315 U.S. 814 , 62 S.Ct. 798; United States v. Eighty Acres of Land in Williamson County, D.C., 26 F.Supp. 315, 319. </s> See, also, United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Town of Denton of Caroline County, Md., D.C., 30 F.Supp. 372, 379; United States v. Parcel of Land in Town of Middletown, New Castle County, D.C., 32 F.Supp. 718, 721. </s> [Footnote 15 It apparently followed regulations of the Federal Works Agency and Post Office Department as authorized by 5 U.S.C. 22, 369, 5 U.S.C.A. 22, 369; 40 U.S.C. 341, 347, 40 U.S.C.A. 341, 347. Among its principal steps were the following: June 12, 1940, approval of the general project for Cape Girardeau by Federal Works Administrator and Acting Postmaster General based upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Public Buildings and the Fourth Assistant Postmaster General; July 23-26, 29-31, 1940, Post Office Inspector and Site Agent visited Cape Girardeau; August 20, 1940, he submitted his recommendations, showing that he inspected 22 proposals, eliminated all but 6 on general grounds, carefully considered the remainder and submitted full report on 3. His first choice was to enlarge the present post office site; his second, to acquire the site here in controversy; his third, to acquire a site between the two. Further studies were made in Cape Girardeau or in Washington by the Associate Architect for the Federal Works Agency, the Fiscal Manager of the Public Buildings Administration and the Superintendent of the Division of Post Office Quarters in the Post Office Department. All wishing to be heard were heard. February 11, 1941, the City Council passed an ordinance proposing an exchange of the park site for the present post office site and submitting this proposal to a special election. March 4, 1941, a majority of those voting in 8 of the 10 wards approved the exchange, the city wide vote being 1612 to 1344. May 26, 1941, the Acting Commissioner of Public Buildings notified the Mayor of the Government's acceptance of the proposed exchange. September 25, 1941, the Actin Administrator of the Federal Works Agency advised the Attorney General that, under authority of the Public Buildings Act, the Agency had contracted for the exchange. After referring to his failure to secure title by voluntary conveyance from the City in spite of the willingness of the City officials to make the exchange if they had legal authority to do so, he asked the Attorney General to file this condemnation proceeding. It was done November 22, 1941. In accordance with the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals after the first trial, the Government, on June 10, 1943, secured evidence of a formal joint action, signed personally by the Federal Works Administrator and the Postmaster General, expressly selecting the site in suit. This was included in the record of the second trial. The actions of June 12, 1940, and June 10, 1943, refer to the project as one for a post office and courthouse, whereas the petition for condemnation refers to it as one for a post office and customhouse. This variation was not pressed in the litigation and is not material to the main issue of statutory construction. The foregoing narration of the steps taken in this instance in not intended as an indication that all or any of them are essential to the exercise of the statutory authority to select sites in other cases. They are set forth to help demonstrate that, in the face of them, the selection here cannot be classed as 'capricious and arbitrary,' under any appropriate definition of those words. </s> [Footnote 16 'For First Choice I recommend that the present government-owned site be retained and that the adjoining property, Site 2 offered by H. Bermermann be purchased for $15,000, and that a counter offer be made to the owner of Site 3, Ella M. Drum to purchase this site for $600. 'This recommendation is made because it is believed that the present location is the most outstanding site in this city, and because of the numerous limitations on all of the other competing sites which would prevent an advantageous or desirable transaction. </s> 'For Second Choice I have selected Site No. 1, the city-owned park, which could be developed into an attractive setting for the new building, and which could no doubt be secured in an exchange resulting in mutual benefit to the city and Government. The bid submitted by the City is not intended to be a final offer, and it is expected that after a review of the facts by the Site Committee a counter-offer could be made with respect to a definite area of about 175 x 215 within the park grounds and with respect to improvements in surrounding approaches, removal of trees and fountain, and demolition of present city building. The mayor and city council verbally agreed to favor any reasonable counter-offer to be made by the Government. It is my opinion that the government-owned site is valued at approximately $225 per front foot, whereas the park site has a value of about $100 per front foot, and this must be taken into consideration in submitting a counter-offer. The question of the City Council's authority to make an exchange of this property is in dispute, but this could no doubt be settled by friendly condemnation proceedings, as the city officials are willing and desirous for the trade.' </s> [Footnote 17 '... the city park property, is actively favored by the City Council, and almost unanimously favored by the business men on Main Street . ... 'Because of the divergence of opinion, the Chamber of Commerce in a recent meeting decided not to make any official comment as to a certain location. ... </s> 'The postmaster, who has no financial or personal interest in any of the locations, but who is conscientiously interested in civic development, regards the government-owned site as an outstanding location but recommends the city park as first choice because this trade would allow the city to retain a good improvement and allow the Federal Government to secure a site with attractive surroundings.' </s> [Footnote 18 The District Court said: 'The right of plaintiff to condemn the land must stand or fall on the determination by this court of the question, Did the Acting Administrator of Federal Works Agency and the Postmaster General, under the circumstances here presented, act arbitrarily and capriciously in selecting the site-was the act necessary? The term 'arbitrarily and capriciously' has been defined to mean an act done 'without adequate determining principle; not founded in the nature of things; not done or acting according to reason or judgment'; an unnecessary act. </s> 'That this action was taken by the Joint Committee, with information in their possession with respect to availability of other sites which shows unquestionably that the action of the plaintiff is unnecessary and the site selected is not now, nor was it when selected, the most desirable and available.' (Italics supplied.) United States v. Certain Land Situate in City of Cape Girardeau, Mo., D.C., 55 F.Supp. 555, 557, 563. </s> [Footnote 19 United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546 , 66 S.Ct. 715; Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700 , 708-710, 43 S.Ct. 689, 693; Joslin Mfg. Co. v. City of Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 678 , 43 S.Ct. 684, 689; Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 58 , 40 S. Ct. 62, 63; Sears v. City of Akron, 246 U.S. 242, 251 , 38 S. Ct. 245, 248; Adirondack Ry. Co. v. People of State of New York, 176 U.S. 335, 349 , 20 S.Ct. 460, 465; Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 298 , 13 S.Ct. 361, 390; Mississippi & Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 , 406. See also: 'The federal statute ... does not require proof of 'necessity,' but makes that question depend solely on the 'opinion' of the federal officer. It is controlling here.' United States v. State of Montana, 9 Cir., 134 F.2d 194, 197, certiorari denied, 319 U.S. 772 , 63 S. Ct. 1438.

United States Supreme Court DUKES v. WARDEN(1972) No. 71-5172 Argued: March 21, 1972Decided: May 15, 1972 </s> Petitioner's claim that his guilty plea was not voluntarily and intelligently made because of an alleged conflict of interest on the part of his counsel has no merit, and that alleged conflict of interest is therefore not a reason for vacating his plea. Pp. 251-257. </s> 161 Conn. 337, 288 A. 2d 58, affirmed. </s> BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 257. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which DOUGLAS, J., joined, post, p. 259. </s> James A. Wade argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. </s> John D. LaBelle argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> On May 16, 1967, petitioner, on advice of counsel, pleaded guilty in the Superior Court of Hartford County, Connecticut, to charges of narcotics violation and larceny of goods. On June 16, 1967, before being sentenced, he informed the court that he had retained new counsel and desired to withdraw his plea and stand trial. The court refused to permit him to withdraw his plea and sentenced him to a term of five to 10 years on the narcotics charge and to a term of two years on the larceny charge. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed this conviction on his direct appeal challenging the voluntariness of his plea, State v. Dukes, 157 Conn. 498, 255 A. 2d 614 (1969), and the United States District [406 U.S. 250, 251] Court for the District of Connecticut denied his application for federal habeas corpus relief sought in Civil Action No. 13029. He then brought this state habeas corpus action in the Superior Court for Hartford County, and attacked the voluntariness of his plea under the Federal Constitution on a ground not raised either on his direct appeal or in his action for federal habeas corpus relief. He alleged that a conflict of interest arising from his lawyer's representation of two girls with whom petitioner had been charged in an unrelated false pretenses case was known to the judge who sentenced him and rendered his plea involuntary and unintelligent. After a full hearing, the Superior Court denied relief. The Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed, 161 Conn. 337, 288 A. 2d 58 (1971). The Supreme Court stated that, although the petition for state habeas relief alleged that the guilty plea was not voluntary and intelligent on several grounds, "[o]n appeal, however, [petitioner] has asserted in essence only that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, which rendered his plea involuntary . . . ." 161 Conn., at 339, 288 A. 2d, at 60. We granted certiorari. 404 U.S. 937 (1971). </s> The two girls were represented by Mr. Zaccagnino of the firm of Zaccagnino, Linardos, & Delaney in the false pretenses case, and petitioner by another lawyer, when petitioner retained the firm to defend him in the narcotics and larceny case. There were also charges pending against petitioner in New Haven and Fairfield counties. He also faced the possibility of prosecution as a second offender, having been convicted in state court in 1961 of breaking and entry and assault. </s> Petitioner, accompanied by Mr. Zaccagnino, appeared on May 9, 1967, to plead to the narcotics and larceny charges. The lawyer advised him to plead guilty if a plea bargain could be negotiated whereby the State's Attorney would consolidate all outstanding charges in and out of Hartford County and agree not to prosecute [406 U.S. 250, 252] petitioner as a second offender, but to recommend a sentence of five to 10 years on the narcotics charge, two years on the larceny charge, and concurrent sentences on all the other charges. Under Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. 54-17a (1958) the New Haven County and Fairfield County charges would be transferred to Hartford County for disposition only if the State's Attorney of the counties consented and petitioner pleaded guilty to the charges. When petitioner refused to accept this advice, Mr. Zaccagnino asked the court to be relieved as petitioner's counsel. The court denied the request but accepted petitioner's plea of not guilty and continued the trial to the next day so that petitioner might try to retain another lawyer. As petitioner went to the corridor outside the courtroom, however, Hartford police officers arrested him on still another charge. Petitioner attempted suicide at the police station to which he was taken and was hospitalized for several days. Accordingly the trial date was postponed to May 16. </s> Petitioner did not engage new counsel but appeared for trial on May 16 represented by Mr. Delaney, partner of Mr. Zaccagnino who was engaged in another court. Petitioner now showed interest in a plea bargain, and Mr. Delaney and the State's Attorney engaged in negotiations, which were interrupted from time to time while Mr. Delaney consulted with petitioner. A plea bargain on the terms Mr. Zaccagnino had urged petitioner on May 9 to accept was finally struck, and petitioner withdrew his not-guilty plea and entered the guilty plea he now attacks. The State's Attorney had misgivings because of petitioner's expressed dissatisfaction with Mr. Zaccagnino the week before, and the following occurred: </s> "[State's Attorney]: . . . The record also ought to appear that Mr. Delaney is here with him today and he is in the office of Mr. Zaccagnino. I think [406 U.S. 250, 253] the Court might inquire with respect to the representation since there had been some indication that counsel had asked to withdraw the other day. </s> "The Court: Well now, Mr. Dukes, I want to be sure that everything is in order here. . . . Now I want, now Mr. Delaney is here, are you fully satisfied with the services he is rendering you, Mr. Dukes? </s> "The Accused: Yes, sir. </s> "The Court: You are. And now you know of course, Mr. Dukes, that - you know of course that the State of Connecticut has the burden of proving you guilty on the charge and you are free to go to trial but you still wish to change your plea, is that correct? </s> "The Accused: Yes, sir. </s> "The Court: And do you do this of your own free will, Mr. Dukes? </s> "The Accused: Yes, sir. </s> "The Court: And you know the probable consequences of it? </s> "The Accused: Yes, sir. </s> "The Court: Very well, and no one has induced you to do this, influenced you one way or the other? You are doing this of your own free will? </s> "The Accused: Yes. </s> "The Court: Very well then. We will accept the change of plea." </s> The court set June 2, 1967, for sentencing petitioner. But the documents transferring the New Haven County and Fairfield County charges had not arrived, and the presentence report had not been completed, on that day, and the date was therefore continued to June 16, 1967. By coincidence, however, the judge's calendar for June 2 also listed the case of the two girls who, on Mr. Zaccagnino's advice, had pleaded guilty to the false pretenses charges and were to be sentenced. That proceeding [406 U.S. 250, 254] did not involve petitioner because the disposition of the charges as to him was part of the plea bargain. In urging leniency for the two girls, Mr. Zaccagnino made statements putting the blame on petitioner for the girls' plight. These statements are the primary basis of petitioner's claim of divided loyalty on the part of Mr. Zaccagnino that he alleges rendered his guilty plea of May 16 involuntary and unintelligent. Mr. Zaccagnino said: </s> "[B]oth of them came under the influence of Charles Dukes. Now how they could get in a position to come under the influence of somebody like him, if Your Honor pleases, creates the problem here that I think is the cause of the whole situation. </s> "Both these girls left their homes, came under the influence of Dukes and got involved. I think, Your Honor, though, that the one thing . . . that should stand in their good stead, as a result of their willingness to cooperate with the State Police they capitulated Dukes into making a plea. I think, Your Honor, since I was on both sides of the case, having been on the other side on the other case I can tell Your Honor that it was these girls that because of their refusal . . . to cooperate with Dukes and to testify against him that capitulated him into taking a plea on which he will shortly be removed from society . . . ." </s> Mr. Zaccagnino appeared on June 16 to represent petitioner in the proceedings to complete the plea bargain. He was surprised to be told by petitioner that petitioner had obtained new counsel and intended to withdraw his guilty plea and stand trial. It appears from petitioner's cross-examination at the state habeas hearing that he had learned on June 2 of Mr. Zaccagnino's statements [406 U.S. 250, 255] about him when the girls were sentenced. 1 Yet he did not tell Mr. Zaccagnino that this was why he was changing lawyers, nor did he tell the court that this was why he wanted to withdraw his plea. When pressed by the court to give a reason, he answered, "At the time I pleaded, I just came out of the hospital, I think it was a day, and I was unconscious for three days, and I didn't realize at the time actually what I was pleading to." 2 His explanation for wanting another lawyer was that he thought an out-of-town lawyer would give him better service: "I would rather have an attorney out of town for certain reasons of the case." The court refused to permit petitioner to withdraw the plea and heard counsel on the question of the sentence to be imposed. The State's attorney, despite the collapse of the plea bargain, recommended, and the court imposed, a first offender's sentence of five to 10 years on the narcotics count and two years on the larceny count; that is the precise sentence the State's Attorney had agreed to recommend as part of the plea bargain. Mr. Zaccagnino, however, was concerned that petitioner's unwillingness to go through with the plea bargain left [406 U.S. 250, 256] petitioner vulnerable to the prosecution on the outstanding charges in the various counties: "[I]t was a matter that Your Honor would normally . . ., in a situation like this, enter concurrent sentences, if, in fact, it was so recommended by the State's Attorney; but since [petitioner] doesn't want to plea to these other matters, I would like to make that note for the record, because I feel at some later date he may have to come back to this court and see Your Honor or see another judge on these other matters now pending before it." 3 </s> On this state of facts, the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that petitioner had not sustained his claim that a conflict of interest on the part of Mr. Zaccagnino rendered his plea involuntary and unintelligent. The court said, 161 Conn., at 344-345, 288 A. 2d, at 62: </s> "There is nothing in the record before us which would indicate that the alleged conflict resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel and did in fact render the plea in question involuntary and unintelligent. [Petitioner] does not claim, and it is nowhere indicated in the finding, nor could it be inferred from the finding, that either Attorney Zaccagnino or Attorney Delaney induced [petitioner] to plead guilty in furtherance of a plan to obtain more favorable consideration from the court for other clients. . . . Neither does the finding in any way disclose, nor is it claimed, that [petitioner] received misleading advice from Attorney Zaccagnino or Attorney Delaney which led him to plead guilty. . . . Moreover, the trial court specifically found that when [petitioner] engaged Zaccagnino as [406 U.S. 250, 257] his counsel, he knew that Zaccagnino was representing two defendants in the unrelated case in which he was a codefendant, that he never complained to the court that he was not satisfied with Attorney Zaccagnino because of this dual representation, that he was not represented at the entry of his plea by Attorney Zaccagnino, that he was represented by Attorney Delaney at the entry of his plea, that he had a lengthy conversation with Attorney Delaney prior to entering his plea which he recalled completely, and that on specific inquiry by the court before he pleaded guilty, he told the court that he was satisfied with the representation by Attorney Delaney. The court did not err in concluding that [petitioner's] plea was not rendered involuntary and unintelligent by the alleged conflict of interest." </s> We fully agree with this reasoning and conclusion of the Connecticut Supreme Court. Since there is thus no merit in petitioner's sole contention in this proceeding - that Mr. Zaccagnino's alleged conflict of interest affected his plea - that conflict of interest is not "a reason for vacating his plea." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 267 (1971) (MARSHALL, J., concurring and dissenting). </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 "Q. . . . On June 2nd, weren't you in Court with Mr. Zaccagnino when your case had to be postponed . . . ? . . . . . "A. I'm trying to think of the day that the girls got sentenced, because I was not in Court the day they got sentenced, because I know that I wasn't in Court that specific day, because that's when I was told what was said about me, and so forth and so on, in Court, so I'm quite sure I wasn't in Court that day." App. to Petitioner's Brief 162-163 (emphasis supplied). </s> [Footnote 2 The state habeas court took evidence on the question whether his plea was involuntary as the product of the after-effects of his suicide attempt and found against petitioner. Petitioner has not sought review on this question. The only issue before us is his claim that the alleged conflict of interest rendered the plea involuntary and unintelligent. </s> [Footnote 3 As events proved, all other charges pending in the various counties were dismissed, although after the decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court affirming petitioner's conviction on direct appeal. Petitioner thus received the benefits of the plea bargain without paying the cost of pleading guilty to the other offenses. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART, concurring. </s> In Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 267 , I joined MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL'S separate opinion because I agree that "where the defendant presents a reason for vacating his plea and the government has not relied on the plea to its disadvantage, the plea may be vacated and the right to trial regained, at least where the motion to vacate is made prior to sentence and judgment." Id., at 267-268. </s> If a defendant moves to withdraw a guilty plea before judgment and if he states a reason for doing so, I think [406 U.S. 250, 258] that he need not shoulder a further burden of proving the "merit" of his reason at that time. Before judgment, the courts should show solicitude for a defendant who wishes to undo a waiver of all the constitutional rights that surround the right to trial - perhaps the most devastating waiver possible under our Constitution. Any requirement that a defendant prove the "merit" of his reason for undoing this waiver would confuse the obvious difference between the withdrawal of a guilty plea before the government has relied on the plea to its disadvantage, and a later challenge to such a plea, on appeal or collaterally, when the judgment is final and the government clearly has relied on the plea. </s> But I do not believe that these problems are presented in this case. Certiorari was granted to consider the petitioner's contention that his plea was made involuntarily and unintelligently because of his lawyer's alleged conflict of interest. This conflict-of-interest claim was not raised until a habeas corpus proceeding, years after judgment had been pronounced. The petitioner does not now challenge the refusal of the trial court to permit him to withdraw his guilty plea before judgment. Rather, he challenges a later refusal by the trial court to vacate his plea on a motion made well after judgment and sentence, presenting a claim not previously raised. </s> Thus, I agree with the Court that the petitioner's claim should be evaluated under the standards governing an attack on a guilty plea made after judgment, not under the far different standards governing a motion to withdraw a plea made before judgment has been pronounced. I also agree with the Court that, evaluated under the former standards, the petitioner's claim of involuntariness attributable to his counsel's conflict of interest lacks merit. </s> It is on this understanding that I join the opinion and judgment of the Court. [406 U.S. 250, 259] </s> MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS joins, dissenting. </s> I dissent. Before sentencing, petitioner stated that he was innocent, and sought to vacate his guilty plea so that he could proceed to trial with new counsel in whom he had confidence. He claims, with ample support in the record, that he was advised to plead guilty - and indeed pressured to do so - by lawyers who did not devotedly represent his interests. I agree with petitioner that he should have been permitted to withdraw his guilty plea. </s> I </s> Petitioner, Charles Dukes, was arrested on March 14, 1967, and charged by Hartford, Connecticut, authorities with a violation of the Uniform State Narcotic Drug Act and with receiving stolen goods. From the beginning, there was a sharp conflict between petitioner and his lawyers over whether he should plead guilty. Two partners from the law firm that petitioner retained, each of whom handled the case on different occasions, tried to convince petitioner to plead guilty to both charges. They argued that because there were several other outstanding charges against him, petitioner's best hope was to secure an agreement to consolidate all the charges for disposition together, so that he could receive reasonable concurrent sentences. But petitioner maintained that he was innocent and would not agree to plead guilty. App. 39, 112, 119-120. </s> Although petitioner had not yet pleaded to either of the charges, the narcotics case was called for trial on May 9, 1967. The conflict between lawyer and client surfaced dramatically when petitioner's attorney immediately sought to withdraw from the case "because there happens to be a slight conflict between my client and myself, and it's not financial, Your Honor, it is one [406 U.S. 250, 260] basically that goes to the heart of my representing him . . . ." Noting his view that an advocate "must believe in the cause" of his client, the lawyer went on to reiterate that the disagreement might "prejudice the defendant." He reported that petitioner "either wants to represent himself or get counsel outside of the county that he can have more confidence in for some reason or other." App. 9, 10, 17. The majority concedes that this announced "conflict" was over the lawyer's insistence on pleading the client guilty. Then petitioner himself addressed the court to explain that "with local counsel I am afraid, well, I know there is going to be resentment. I have reasons to believe that through conversations, and I'd like the opportunity to hire an attorney from another state that don't [sic] have no knowledge of the case . . . . Otherwise . . . I intend to try my own case." App. 18. Petitioner's lawyer spoke again concluding with the judgment that he, for one, could not "do this man justice in this particular issue." App. 19-20. But the court denied counsel's motion to withdraw "at this time." Petitioner then pleaded not guilty, and trial was scheduled for the following morning. </s> Proceedings did not actually resume until a week later, on May 16. 1 After conversations in the courthouse that morning, App. 131-132, Dukes agreed to follow the advice of his lawyers, who admittedly had been applying "pressure" on him, App. 112, 140: he pleaded guilty to both the narcotics charge and the larceny-receiving charge. Prior to entry of the pleas, the judge asked petitioner whether he was "fully satisfied with the services [your lawyer] is rendering you . . . ." App. 24, 41. [406 U.S. 250, 261] Petitioner said that he was. But this satisfaction, such as it was, was short lived. </s> On June 16, 1967, petitioner appeared for sentencing. His lawyer immediately informed the court that petitioner wished to withdraw his plea and had secured other counsel, from New Haven. Noting the lateness of these developments, petitioner's lawyer conceded that "I had a suspicion . . . that this [might] take place because of the problem when he entered the plea. I was maybe a little forceful." And although he disputed petitioner's claim that his present lawyers did not "properly represent him," counsel once again informed the court that petitioner "doesn't have any confidence in me." App. 28, 31. Petitioner himself told the court about his difficulty in getting a lawyer who would, he thought, do him justice. He also explained that when he pleaded guilty he was still recuperating from his recent suicide attempt, see n. 1. supra, and "didn't realize at the time actually what I was pleading to." App. 32. See n. 8, infra. Thus, contrary to the majority's description, petitioner, through his lawyer and in his own voice, gave several specific reasons for wanting to withdraw his plea. </s> Following the prosecutor's statement opposing petitioner's request, and without any further inquiry, the judge refused to let petitioner withdraw the guilty plea. When the judge asked Dukes what he wished to say before being sentenced, Dukes replied: "I am rather flabbergasted really, because I didn't expect this this morning. It just puzzles me. I am not guilty of the charges. I am not guilty." App. 33. 2 Petitioner was sentenced to [406 U.S. 250, 262] five to 10 years on the narcotics count and two years on the receiving-stolen-property count, as the prosecutor had recommended. The alleged reason for the plea - to gain consolidation of all outstanding charges against petitioner, and thereby secure concurrent sentences on the pending charges - was never fulfilled. On the day of sentencing, petitioner refused to plead guilty to any charges, and consolidation was impossible. App. 30-33, 157. </s> As just noted, the sentencing judge did not inquire into the facts surrounding either petitioner's legal representation or his plea. But these facts were developed at a state habeas corpus hearing, 3 and petitioner's lack of confidence in his lawyer finds striking support in the hearing record. </s> That record details the sharp conflict between lawyer and client over the decision to plead guilty. But, more significantly, it reveals that the lawyer who advised petitioner to plead guilty had a gross conflict of interest. Ancillary to the instant proceedings, petitioner's lawyer was representing two young women charged with conspiracy to obtain money by false pretenses. Petitioner was a codefendant in this second case, and was represented by another attorney. This second prosecution was unrelated to the matter now before our Court. The two young women pleaded guilty to the false pretenses charges on April 18, 1967, and on June 2, 1967, appeared for sentencing. The sentencing judge was the same judge who was to sentence petitioner two weeks later. [406 U.S. 250, 263] </s> In his remarks to the judge on behalf of the two women, the lawyer told the court that these women had come "under the influence of Charles Dukes," who had led them astray. He pointed out that their cooperation with the state police had "led to the downfall of Dukes" and "capitulated [Dukes] into taking a plea [of guilty] on which he will shortly be removed from society." 4 He placed on Dukes the blame for the offenses committed by the women, saying that he was "the most culpable since he had all the instruments with which to dupe the girls." App. 43-44, 68-71. 5 The two women were then sentenced to short prison terms. [406 U.S. 250, 264] </s> In short, to secure lighter sentences for one set of clients, the lawyer denigrated another of his clients who was to appear before the same judge for sentencing in two weeks. Even absent any showing that the lawyer's "pressure" on petitioner to plead guilty was improperly motivated, the gross conflict of interest obvious from counsel's remarks lends strong support to petitioner's presentence claim that he was not receiving devoted representation from his attorney. </s> II </s> I would permit petitioner to withdraw his guilty plea. AS JUSTICE DOUGLAS has recently reminded us, </s> "However important plea bargaining may be in the administration of criminal justice, our opinions have established that a guilty plea is a serious and sobering occasion inasmuch as it constitutes a waiver of the fundamental rights to a jury trial, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 , to confront one's accusers, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 , to present witnesses in one's defense, Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 , to remain silent, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 , and to be convicted of proof beyond all reasonable doubt, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 ." Santobello [406 U.S. 250, 265] v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 264 (1971) (concurring opinion). </s> See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969). The precondition for all these rights is the constitutional "right not to plead guilty." United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968). A defendant may waive his constitutional rights through a guilty plea, but such waivers are not quickly presumed, and, in fact, are viewed with the "utmost solicitude." Boykin v. Alabama, supra, at 243. Our decisions, constitutional and statutory, have all recognized that, consistent with the requirements of law enforcement, adequate safeguards can and should exist to give meaning to the right not to plead guilty. E. g., Santobello v. New York, supra; Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, supra; McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941); Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927). </s> I would not view a guilty plea as an irrevocable waiver of a defendant's federal constitutional right to a full trial, even where the plea is, strictly speaking, "voluntarily" entered. I adhere to the view that "where the defendant presents a reason for vacating his plea and the government has not relied on the plea to its disadvantage, the plea may be vacated and the right to trial regained, at least where the motion to vacate is made prior to sentence and judgment." Santobello v. New York, supra, at 267-268 (opinion of MARSHALL, J., concurring and dissenting, with whom BRENNAN, J., and STEWART, J., joined). </s> Such a rule is a sensible part of the constitutional law of waiver. We view guilty pleas with the "utmost solicitude" because they involve the simultaneous waiver of so many constitutional rights; our system of [406 U.S. 250, 266] law favors the assertion of constitutional rights, not their waiver. It is inconsistent with that basic viewpoint for guilty pleas to be irrevocable even before sentencing. Usually because of new information or new insights, defendants may have "sober second thoughts" about their pleas. Where the sentencing itself is postponed beyond the day of pleading, the door should not be slammed shut to formal reconsideration of the decision to plead guilty. A guilty plea is not a trap. Ordinarily, a defendant who changes his mind for sufficient reason and in timely fashion should not be deemed to have waived his right to a full trial. In short, absent the government's showing specific and substantial harm, I would generally permit withdrawal of the plea before sentencing. </s> Such a rule would not compromise the government's interests. "[I]n the ordinary case where a motion to vacate is made prior to sentencing, the government has taken no action in reliance on the previously entered guilty plea and would suffer no harm from the plea's withdrawal." Santobello v. New York, supra, at 268 (opinion of MARSHALL, J., concurring and dissenting). The defendant seeks only the basic opportunity to contest the original charges against him. A full trial could be promptly held, and, since the period between plea and sentencing is usually short, there will have been no substantial delay. Where the government can show specific and substantial harm, the defendant may be held to his plea. But, ordinarily, the government can claim only disappointed expectations. In such a case, the balance of interests must favor vindication of the individual's most basic constitutional rights. </s> In the instant case, petitioner tendered a specific reason for vacating his guilty plea. Protesting his innocence, he claimed that he was not getting satisfactory legal representation and had retained new counsel. The record as already made by June 16, 1967, showed an admitted [406 U.S. 250, 267] and longstanding conflict between lawyer and client over the course of the litigation. Properly advised by loyal counsel, the defendant himself, of course, must have the ultimate decision about pleading guilty. The lawyer admitted that he had been "a little forceful" in urging petitioner to plead guilty. Given all these things, petitioner, in my view, had ample justification for rescinding the plea before sentencing. </s> But we need not be limited to the bare record already made by June 16, 1967. The trial judge then did not even minimally inquire into the facts behind petitioner's rather inarticulate claims. He should have done so, rather than quickly and simply denying the motion to vacate the plea. It was not until the state habeas action that the facts surrounding petitioner's representation were developed. As this subsequent record shows, petitioner's fears that he was not getting devoted representation had strong objective basis. (It is of course irrelevant that the evidence of a clear conflict of interest may have exceeded even petitioner's earlier fears of inadequate representation. 6 ) As the court below concluded, </s> "Obviously, the derogatory remarks by [the attorney] on behalf of his clients in one case about [406 U.S. 250, 268] a client whom he is representing in another case were highly improper. `When a client engages the services of a lawyer in a given piece of business he is entitled to feel that, until that business is finally disposed of in some manner, he has the undivided loyalty of the one upon whom he looks as his advocate and his champion.'" 161 Conn. 337, 345-346, 288 A. 2d 58, 62-63 (1971). </s> This finding of "improper" conduct gives graphic support to petitioner's presentence claim that his lawyers were not properly representing his interests, the main reason petitioner gave for wanting to withdraw his plea. </s> There is no need to decide whether this conflict of interest deprived petitioner of his Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel, or functioned to make his guilty plea "involuntary." It is sufficient to conclude here that, before sentencing, petitioner's plausible dissatisfaction with counsel constituted a sufficient reason for withdrawing his guilty plea. 7 The majority appears to equate the questions, suggesting by its analysis that if the plea was neither involuntary nor secured and "affected" by unconstitutionally ineffective counsel, it may not be vacated. But this is to equate the situations before and after sentencing. I think we are required to apply a much less rigorous standard before sentencing. The point in this case is that (1) petitioner sought to vacate his plea [406 U.S. 250, 269] before sentencing because he questioned the representation he was receiving, and that (2) petitioner's conclusions, on this record, were plausible, to say the least. This, it seems to me, is enough to permit withdrawal of the plea before sentencing. The majority totally ignores the fact that the record demonstrates a longstanding conflict between lawyer and client, that the lawyer himself admitted being forceful in securing the plea, and that the lawyer engaged in what the court below found to be "highly improper" conduct in conflict with the loyalty a client rightfully expects from his lawyer. As if he did not understand whose choice it is to go to trial, petitioner's own lawyer gave this extraordinary account of his relationship with petitioner, who throughout protested his innocence: </s> "[Dukes] claimed consistently to me that he didn't make any sale of narcotics, and so I told him what I thought about the case, after reviewing the evidence. So from the beginning, Dukes wanted a trial, and I probably thought I might have been too forceful, but it sometimes happens that your judgment, you're trying to impose upon a client, knowing that it's in his best interest, at least in your opinion it is, and I told Charlie it would be winning the battle and clearing the way, because there was no way, with these five felony warrants pending against him, that I was able to win them all, because I said no matter what you think about this case, it's my opinion that it's your best interest to plead guilty, and at no time did I have a conversation whether he was guilty or not. Mr. Delaney handled that at the time of the change of plea, but I know when I talked to him, he maintained he was innocent. At some later date he changed his plea, so I assume there was some conversation about that, and I don't know what took place in the meantime, but basically, there [406 U.S. 250, 270] was the reason that I made that statement to the Court, because he was insistent that he wanted to try the case, and I kept trying to get the matter put down, because I didn't think it was in his best interest to try it." App. 120. </s> Of course, on my view, it is of no real significance that on the day of the guilty plea petitioner expressed satisfaction with counsel. Where the loyalties of counsel are questioned even after the plea is entered, a defendant undercuts the premise of his prior guilty plea and the waiver of rights that plea entailed. Surely the same is true where, as here, the defendant specifically asserts his innocence after pleading. 8 </s> When a defendant gives a reason for withdrawing his plea before sentencing, and the reason is a good one, he should be allowed to withdraw the plea and regain his right to a trial. Here, petitioner's reason was conflict of interest of his lawyer. A part of this conflict was his lawyer's insistence that he plead guilty and petitioner's insistence that he was innocent. This is certainly a conflict. No wonder the last words of petitioner before sentencing were: </s> "I am rather flabbergasted really, because I didn't expect this this morning. It just puzzles me. I am not guilty of the charges. I am not guilty." [406 U.S. 250, 271] </s> The State in our case has never claimed that it would suffer any harm beyond disappointed expectations about the plea itself. 9 Where the defendant has presented a plausible reason for withdrawing his plea, this mere disappointment cannot bar him from regaining his constitutional rights before sentencing. </s> I would remand the case with instructions that the plea be vacated and petitioner given an opportunity to replead to the charges in the information. </s> [Footnote 1 The record discloses that on May 10 the case was continued until May 16 for trial. On May 9, as petitioner left the courtroom, he was arrested by Hartford police on other charges. Petitioner attempted suicide while in police custody, and was hospitalized for several days. </s> [Footnote 2 The New Haven attorney was not in the courtroom, although he had telephoned the prosecutor that morning from out of town. Petitioner apparently expected his new lawyer to be present in the courtroom and to "take over" after the guilty plea was withdrawn. App. 150-151. That lawyer did represent petitioner on his [406 U.S. 250, 262] direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Connecticut. 157 Conn. 498, 255 A. 2d 614 (1969). </s> [Footnote 3 I express no view on the subject of whether further evidentiary development might be appropriate were petitioner to pursue this case on federal habeas corpus. See nn. 4 and 7, infra. Given the way I view this case, enough is present in the record to vindicate petitioner's position. </s> [Footnote 4 It is not clear from the lawyer's words whether he meant that Dukes had been "capitulated" into pleading guilty to the offense allegedly committed with the two women. At the habeas hearing, the lawyer testified that he did not remember Dukes' ever taking a plea in that case. App. 122. There is a strong basis for thinking that the lawyer was in fact referring to the guilty plea entered in our case. At the women's sentencing, he specifically stated that "since I was on both sides of the case, having been on the other side on the other case I can tell Your Honor that it was these girls that . . . capitulated [Dukes] into taking a plea . . . ." App. 68 (emphasis added). However, the court below found that all the "remarks by [the attorney] concerning the plaintiff had only to do with the relationship of the plaintiff and the two girls in that particular case where all three of them were codefendants, and in no way referred to the present case for which he was later to be sentenced." 161 Conn. 337, 341, 288 A. 2d 58, 60. Nevertheless, certified court records sent to our Court make clear that Dukes never pleaded guilty to the offenses involving the women, and those charges were nolled in February 1970. A direct connection between the false pretenses case and our case is apparently conceded by today's majority when it notes that the plea bargain in our case included a deal in which petitioner would plead guilty to the false pretenses charge. See ante, at 253-254. Obviously, if counsel was in fact reporting the women's role in "capitulating" Dukes to plead guilty in our case, his own conflict of interest would be even more pernicious than that now clear from the record. </s> [Footnote 5 The court below observed that these "improper remarks made by counsel on June 2, 1967, were a repetition of what had already [406 U.S. 250, 264] been told to the court in substance by the state's attorney." 161 Conn., at 347, 288 A. 2d, at 63. (The court made a similar observation about the presentence report, which is not in our record.) This, of course, is irrelevant to the question of whether petitioner was represented by an attorney loyal to his interests. But, in any event, it is incorrect to say that counsel's remarks merely repeated the statements of the prosecutor. The prosecutor simply reported that the two women "became associated with one Charles Dukes . . . Charles Dukes had paraphernalia with respect to checks and money orders and they agreed to cash these checks with false credentials furnished by him." App. 65. This is a far cry from the vivid and pointedly argumentative remarks of the women's (and petitioner's) lawyer. </s> [Footnote 6 The majority suggests that on June 16 petitioner knew about his lawyer's remarks at the women's sentencing, but didn't tell the court. Ante, at 254-255. The majority gives us no clue why petitioner would possibly want to withhold this information, if he had it. Rather, its factual conclusion rests on a single phrase in petitioner's habeas corpus testimony, and burdens this rather inarticulate petitioner with the linguistic precision of Justices of this Court. Read in context and with what I think is more common sense, petitioner's awkward phrasing clearly refers to the day "when" the lawyer's remarks were made, not when petitioner was subsequently "told" about them. I think it apparent that when petitioner sought to vacate his plea on June 16, he did not know about his lawyer's particular act of betrayal on June 2. What is clear, however, is that the judge who sentenced Dukes was fully aware of the lawyer's remarks, having heard them two weeks earlier before sentencing the women. </s> [Footnote 7 The majority intimates that we are restricted to deciding this case on a "voluntariness" theory. It is true that, since precedent suggested that petitioner's only possible line of constitutional attack was to challenge the "voluntariness" of his plea, his papers have focused on this approach, although not exclusively. See Brief for Petitioner 16, 19, 22. But we are not restricted to the precise formulation petitioner has favored. At all relevant times in this action, petitioner claimed that he should have been permitted to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing because his lawyer was not rendering satisfactory representation. Ibid. This is the claim, raised here and below, which I would reach and decide. </s> [Footnote 8 Petitioner also claimed that on the day of the plea he was in a weakened physical state because of his recent hospitalization and in a confused state of mind. This claim was explored at the state habeas hearing, where petitioner also testified that when he pleaded guilty he thought that the plea was merely "temporary." App. 149-150, 154. Although the habeas court found that petitioner's plea was "voluntarily and intelligently made," App. 46, petitioner had clearly gone through a trying week before the plea. See n. 1, supra. In my view, the uncontradicted facts about his recent hospitalization, App. 40, would themselves entitle petitioner to a "sober second thought," and to withdraw his plea before sentencing. </s> [Footnote 9 Ours is not a case in which, prior to the defendant's motion to vacate his plea, the government had performed its part of a plea bargain and could not be restored to the status quo ante. Since petitioner had pleaded guilty to the original charges filed against him, no counts had been irrevocably dismissed prior to petitioner's motion to vacate. When, on the day of sentencing, petitioner refused to plead guilty to pending charges in other cases, he could not receive the benefits of an agreement concerning those pending charges; but the government was not thereby hurt. See supra, at 262. Obviously, where the government has simply agreed to recommend a specific sentence, withdrawal of the plea before sentencing would not compromise the government's position. </s> [406 U.S. 250, 272]

United States Supreme Court IMBLER v. PACHTMAN(1976) No. 74-5435 Argued: November 3, 1975Decided: March 2, 1976 </s> Petitioner, convicted of murder, unsuccessfully petitioned for state habeas corpus on the basis of respondent prosecuting attorney's revelation of newly discovered evidence, and charged that respondent had knowingly used false testimony and suppressed material evidence at petitioner's trial. Petitioner thereafter filed a federal habeas corpus petition based on the same allegations, and ultimately obtained his release. He then brought an action against respondent and others under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking damages for loss of liberty allegedly caused by unlawful prosecution, but the District Court held that respondent was immune from liability under 1983, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: A state prosecuting attorney who, as here, acted within the scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution and in presenting the State's case, is absolutely immune from a civil suit for damages under 1983 for alleged deprivations of the accused's constitutional rights. Pp. 417-431. </s> (a) Section 1983 is to be read in harmony with general principles of tort immunities and defenses rather than in derogation of them. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 . Pp. 417-419. </s> (b) The same considerations of public policy that underlie the common-law rule of absolute immunity of a prosecutor from a suit for malicious prosecution likewise dictate absolute immunity under 1983. Although such immunity leaves the genuinely wronged criminal defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty, the alternative of qualifying a prosecutor's immunity would disserve the broader public interest in that it would prevent the vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor's duty that is essential to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system and would often prejudice criminal defendants by skewing post-conviction judicial decisions that should be made with the sole purpose of insuring justice. Pp. 420-428. </s> 500 F.2d 1301, affirmed. [424 U.S. 409, 410] </s> POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and STEWART, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 432. STEVENS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. </s> Roger S. Hanson argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. </s> John P. Farrell argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was John H. Larson. </s> Solicitor General Bork argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae. With him on the brief were Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, Deputy Solicitor General Friedman, Harry R. Sachse, and Jerome M. Feit. * </s> [Footnote * Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, Jack R. Winkler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, S. Clark Moore, Assistant Attorney General, and Russell Iungerich and Edward T. Fogel, Jr., Deputy Attorneys General, filed a brief for the State of California as amicus curiae urging affirmance. </s> Joseph P. Busch and Patrick F. Healy filed a brief for the National District Attorneys Association as amicus curiae. </s> MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The question presented in this case is whether a state prosecuting attorney who acted within the scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution is amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for alleged deprivations of the defendant's constitutional rights. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that he is not. 500 F.2d 1301. We affirm. </s> I </s> The events which culminated in this suit span many years and several judicial proceedings. They began in [424 U.S. 409, 411] January 1961, when two men attempted to rob a Los Angeles market run by Morris Hasson. One shot and fatally wounded Hasson, and the two fled in different directions. Ten days later Leonard Lingo was killed while attempting a robbery in Pomona, Cal., but his two accomplices escaped. Paul Imbler, petitioner in this case, turned himself in the next day as one of those accomplices. Subsequent investigation led the Los Angeles District Attorney to believe that Imbler and Lingo had perpetrated the first crime as well, and that Imbler had killed Hasson. Imbler was charged with first-degree felony murder for Hasson's death. </s> The State's case consisted of eyewitness testimony from Hasson's wife and identification testimony from three men who had seen Hasson's assailants fleeing after the shooting. Mrs. Hasson was unable to identify the gunman because a hat had obscured his face, but from police photographs she identified the killer's companion as Leonard Lingo. The primary identification witness was Alfred Costello, a passerby on the night of the crime, who testified that he had a clear view both as the gunman emerged from the market and again a few moments later when the fleeing gunman - after losing his hat - turned to fire a shot at Costello 1 and to shed his coat 2 before continuing on. Costello positively identified Imbler as the gunman. The second identification witness, an attendant at a parking lot through which the gunman ultimately escaped, testified that he had a side and front view as the man passed. Finally, a customer who was leaving Hasson's market as the robbers entered [424 U.S. 409, 412] testified that he had a good look then and as they exited moments later. All of these witnesses identified Imbler as the gunman, and the customer also identified the second man as Leonard Lingo. Rigorous cross-examination failed to shake any of these witnesses. 3 </s> Imbler's defense was an alibi. He claimed to have spent the night of the Hasson killing bar-hopping with several persons, and to have met Lingo for the first time the morning before the attempted robbery in Pomona. This testimony was corroborated by Mayes, the other accomplice in the Pomona robbery, who also claimed to have accompanied Imbler on the earlier rounds of the bars. The jury found Imbler guilty and fixed punishment at death. 4 On appeal the Supreme Court of California affirmed unanimously over numerous contentions of error. People v. Imbler, 57 Cal. 2d 711, 371 P.2d 304 (1962). </s> Shortly thereafter Deputy District Attorney Richard Pachtman, who had been the prosecutor at Imbler's trial and who is the respondent before this Court, wrote to the Governor of California describing evidence turned up after trial by himself and an investigator for the state correctional authority. In substance, the evidence consisted of newly discovered corroborating witnesses for Imbler's alibi, as well as new revelations about prime witness Costello's background which indicated that he was less trustworthy than he had represented originally to Pachtman and in his testimony. Pachtman noted that leads to some of this information had been available to Imbler's counsel prior to trial but apparently [424 U.S. 409, 413] had not been developed, that Costello had testified convincingly and withstood intense cross-examination, and that none of the new evidence was conclusive of Imbler's innocence. He explained that he wrote from a belief that "a prosecuting attorney has a duty to be fair and see that all true facts, whether helpful to the case or not, should be presented." 5 </s> Imbler filed a state habeas corpus petition shortly after Pachtman's letter. The Supreme Court of California appointed one of its retired justices as referee to hold a hearing, at which Costello was the main attraction. He recanted his trial identification of Imbler, and it also was established that on cross-examination and re-direct he had painted a picture of his own background that was more flattering than true. Imbler's corroborating witnesses, uncovered by prosecutor Pachtman's investigations, also testified. </s> In his brief to the Supreme Court of California on this habeas petition, Imbler's counsel described Pachtman's post-trial detective work as "[i]n the highest tradition of law enforcement and justice," and as a premier example of "devotion to duty." 6 But he also charged that the prosecution had knowingly used false testimony and suppressed material evidence at Imbler's trial. 7 In a through opinion by then Justice Traynor, the Supreme Court of California unanimously rejected these contentions and denied the writ. In re Imbler, [424 U.S. 409, 414] 60 Cal. 2d 554, 387 P.2d 6 (1963). The California court noted that the hearing record fully supported the referee's finding that Costello's recantation of his identification lacked credibility compared to the original identification itself, id., at 562, 387 P.2d, at 10-11, and that the new corroborating witnesses who appeared on Imbler's behalf were unsure of their stories or were otherwise impeached, id., at 569-570, 387 P.2d, at 14. </s> In 1964, the year after denial of his state habeas petition, Imbler succeeded in having his death sentence overturned on grounds unrelated to this case. In re Imbler, 61 Cal. 2d 556, 393 P.2d 687 (1964). Rather than resentence him, the State stipulated to life imprisonment. There the matter lay for several years, until in late 1967 or early 1968 Imbler filed a habeas corpus petition in Federal District Court based on the same contentions previously urged upon and rejected by the Supreme Court of California. </s> The District Court held no hearing. Instead, it decided the petition upon the record, including Pachtman's letter to the Governor and the transcript of the referee's hearing ordered by the Supreme Court of California. Reading that record quite differently than had the seven justices of the State Supreme Court, the District Court found eight instances of state misconduct at Imbler's trial, the cumulative effect of which required issuance of the writ. Imbler v. Craven, 298 F. Supp. 795, 812 (CD Cal. 1969). Six occurred during Costello's testimony and amounted in the court's view to the culpable use by the prosecution of misleading or false testimony. 8 The other two instances were suppressions of [424 U.S. 409, 415] evidence favorable to Imbler by a police fingerprint expert who testified at trial and by the police who investigated Hasson's murder. 9 The District Court ordered that the writ of habeas corpus issue unless California retried Imbler within 60 days, and denied a petition for rehearing. </s> The State appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, claiming that the District Court had failed to give appropriate deference to the factual determinations of the Supreme Court of California as required by 28 U.S.C. 2254 (d). The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the District Court had merely "reached different conclusions than the state court in applying federal constitutional standards to [the] facts," Imbler v. California, 424 F.2d 631, 632, and certiorari was denied, 400 U.S. 865 (1970). California chose not to retry Imbler, and he was released. </s> At this point, after a decade of litigation and with Imbler now free, the stage was set for the present suit. In April 1972, Imbler filed a civil rights action, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and related statutes, against respondent Pachtman, the police fingerprint expert, and various other officers of the Los Angeles police force. He alleged [424 U.S. 409, 416] that a conspiracy among them unlawfully to charge and convict him had caused him loss of liberty and other grievous injury. He demanded $2.7 million in actual and exemplary damages from each defendant, plus $15,000 attorney's fees. </s> Imbler attempted to incorporate into his complaint the District Court's decision granting the writ of habeas corpus, and for the most part tracked that court's opinion in setting out the overt acts in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. The gravamen of his complaint against Pachtman was that he had "with intent, and on other occasions with negligence" allowed Costello to give false testimony as found by the District Court, and that the fingerprint expert's suppression of evidence was "chargeable under federal law" to Pachtman. In addition Imbler claimed that Pachtman had prosecuted him with knowledge of a lie detector test that had "cleared" Imbler, and that Pachtman had used at trial a police artist's sketch of Hasson's killer made shortly after the crime and allegedly altered to resemble Imbler more closely after the investigation had focused upon him. </s> Pachtman moved under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12 (b) (6) to have the complaint dismissed as to him. The District Court, noting that public prosecutors repeatedly had been held immune from civil liability for "acts done as part of their traditional official functions," found that Pachtman's alleged acts fell into that category and granted his motion. Following the entry of final judgment as to Pachtman under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54 (b), Imbler appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. That court, one judge dissenting, affirmed the District Court in an opinion finding Pachtman's alleged acts to have been committed "during prosecutorial activities which can only be characterized as an `integral part of the judicial process,'" 500 F.2d, at 1302, quoting [424 U.S. 409, 417] Marlowe v. Coakley, 404 F.2d 70 (CA9 1968). We granted certiorari to consider the important and recurring issue of prosecutorial liability under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 420 U.S. 945 (1975). </s> II </s> Title 42 U.S.C. 1983 provides that "[e]very person" who acts under color of state law to deprive another of a constitutional right shall be answerable to that person in a suit for damages. 10 The statute thus creates a species of tort liability that on its face admits of no immunities, and some have argued that it should be applied as stringently as it reads. 11 But that view has not prevailed. </s> This Court first considered the implications of the statute's literal sweep in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). There it was claimed that members of a state legislative committee had called the plaintiff to appear before them, not for a proper legislative purpose, but to intimidate him into silence on certain matters of public concern, and thereby had deprived him of his constitutional rights. Because legislators in both England and this country had enjoyed absolute immunity for their official actions, Tenney squarely presented the issue of whether the Reconstruction Congress had intended to [424 U.S. 409, 418] restrict the availability in 1983 suits of those immunities which historically, and for reasons of public policy, had been accorded to various categories of officials. The Court concluded that immunities "well grounded in history and reason" had not been abrogated "by covert inclusion in the general language" of 1983. 341 U.S., at 376 . Regardless of any unworthy purpose animating their actions, legislators were held to enjoy under this statute their usual immunity when acting "in a field where legislators traditionally have power to act." Id., at 379. </s> The decision in Tenney established that 1983 is to be read in harmony with general principles of tort immunities and defenses rather than in derogation of them. Before today the Court has had occasion to consider the liability of several types of government officials in addition to legislators. The common-law absolute immunity of judges for "acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction," see Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872), was found to be preserved under 1983 in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 -555 (1967). 12 In the same case, local police officers sued for a deprivation of liberty resulting from unlawful arrest were held to enjoy under 1983 a "good faith and probable cause" defense co-extensive with their defense to false arrest actions at [424 U.S. 409, 419] common law. 386 U.S., at 555 -557. We found qualified immunities appropriate in two recent cases. 13 In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), we concluded that the Governor and other executive officials of a State had a qualified immunity that varied with "the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action. . . ." Id., at 247. 14 Last Term in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), we held that school officials, in the context of imposing disciplinary penalties, were not liable so long as they could not reasonably have known that their action violated students' clearly established constitutional rights, and provided they did not act with malicious intention to cause constitutional or other injury. Id., at 322; cf. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 (1975). In Scheuer and in Wood, as in the two earlier cases, the considerations underlying the nature of the immunity of the respective officials in suits at common law led to essentially the same immunity under 1983. 15 See 420 U.S., at 318 -321; 416 U.S., at 239 -247, and n. 4. [424 U.S. 409, 420] </s> III </s> This case marks our first opportunity to address the 1983 liability of a state prosecuting officer. The Courts of Appeals, however, have confronted the issue many times and under varying circumstances. Although the precise contours of their holdings have been unclear at times, at bottom they are virtually unanimous that a prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from 1983 suits for damages when he acts within the scope of his prosecutorial duties. 16 These courts sometimes have described the prosecutor's immunity as a form of "quasi-judicial" immunity and referred to it as derivative of the immunity of judges recognized in Pierson v. Ray, supra. 17 Petitioner focuses upon the "quasi-judicial" characterization, and contends that it illustrates a fundamental illogic in according absolute immunity to a prosecutor. He argues that the prosecutor, as a member of the executive branch, cannot claim the immunity reserved for the judiciary, but only a qualified immunity [424 U.S. 409, 421] akin to that accorded other executive officials in this Court's previous cases. </s> Petitioner takes an overly simplistic approach to the issue of prosecutorial liability. As noted above, our earlier decisions on 1983 immunities were not products of judicial fiat that officials in different branches of government are differently amenable to suit under 1983. Rather, each was predicated upon a considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the interests behind it. The liability of a state prosecutor under 1983 must be determined in the same manner. </s> A </s> The function of a prosecutor that most often invites a common-law tort action is his decision to initiate a prosecution, as this may lead to a suit for malicious prosecution if the State's case misfires. The first American case to address the question of a prosecutor's amenability to such an action was Griffith v. Slinkard, 146 Ind. 117, 44 N. E. 1001 (1896). 18 The complaint charged that a local prosecutor without probable cause added the plaintiff's name to a grand jury true bill after the grand jurors had refused to indict him, with the result that the plaintiff was arrested and forced to appear in court repeatedly before the charge finally was nolle prossed. Despite allegations of malice, the Supreme Court of Indiana dismissed the action on the ground that the prosecutor was absolutely immune. Id., at 122, 44 N. E., at 1002. [424 U.S. 409, 422] </s> The Griffith view on prosecutorial immunity became the clear majority rule on the issue. 19 The question eventually came to this Court on writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (1926), the claim was that the defendant, a Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States, maliciously and without probable cause procured plaintiff's grand jury indictment by the willful introduction of false and misleading evidence Plaintiff sought some $300,000 in damages for having been subjected to the rigors of a trial in which the court ultimately directed a verdict against the Government. The District Court dismissed the complaint, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. After reviewing the development of the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity, id., at 399-404, that court stated: </s> "In our opinion the law requires us to hold that a special assistant to the Attorney General of the United States, in the performance of the duties imposed upon him by law, is immune from a civil action for malicious prosecution based on an indictment and prosecution, although it results in a verdict of not guilty rendered by a jury. The immunity is absolute, and is grounded on principles of public policy." Id., at 406. </s> After briefing and oral argument, this Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in a per curiam opinion. Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U.S. 503 (1927). </s> The common-law immunity of a prosecutor is based upon the same considerations that underlie the common-law [424 U.S. 409, 423] immunities of judges and grand jurors acting within the scope of their duties. 20 These include concern that harassment by unfounded litigation would cause a deflection of the prosecutor's energies from his public duties, and the possibility that he would shade his decisions instead of exercising the independence of judgment required by his public trust. One court expressed both considerations as follows: </s> "The office of public prosecutor is one which must be administered with courage and independence. Yet how can this be if the prosecutor is made subject to suit by those whom he accuses and fails to convict? To allow this would open the way for unlimited harassment and embarrassment of the most conscientious officials by those who would profit thereby. There would be involved in every case the possible consequences of a failure to obtain a conviction. [424 U.S. 409, 424] There would always be a question of possible civil action in case the prosecutor saw fit to move dismissal of the case. . . . The apprehension of such consequences would tend toward great uneasiness and toward weakening the fearless and impartial policy which should characterize the administration of this office. The work of the prosecutor would thus be impeded and we would have moved away from the desired objective of stricter and fairer law enforcement." Pearson v. Reed, 6 Cal. App. 2d 277, 287, 44 P.2d 592, 597 (1935). </s> See also Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d, at 404-406. </s> B </s> The common-law rule of immunity is thus well settled. 21 We now must determine whether the same considerations of public policy that underlie the common-law rule likewise countenance absolute immunity under 1983. We think they do. </s> If a prosecutor had only a qualified immunity, the threat of 1983 suits would undermine performance of his duties no less than would the threat of common-law suits for malicious prosecution. A prosecutor is duty bound to exercise his best judgment both in deciding which suits to bring and in conducting them in court. The public trust of the prosecutor's office would suffer if he were constrained in making every decision by the consequences in terms of his own potential liability in a [424 U.S. 409, 425] suit for damages. Such suits could be expected with some frequency, for a defendant often will transform his resentment at being prosecuted into the ascription of improper and malicious actions to the State's advocate. Cf. Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall., at 348; Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S., at 554 . Further, if the prosecutor could be made to answer in court each time such a person charged him with wrongdoing, his energy and attention would be diverted from the pressing duty of enforcing the criminal law. </s> Moreover, suits that survived the pleadings would pose substantial danger of liability even to the honest prosecutor. The prosecutor's possible knowledge of a witness' falsehoods, the materiality of evidence not revealed to the defense, the propriety of a closing argument, and - ultimately in every case - the likelihood that prosecutorial misconduct so infected a trial as to deny due process, are typical of issues with which judges struggle in actions for post-trial relief, sometimes to differing conclusions. 22 The presentation of such issues in a 1983 action often would require a virtual retrial of the criminal offense in a new forum, and the resolution of some technical issues by the lay jury. It is fair to say, we think, that the honest prosecutor would face greater difficulty in meeting the standards of qualified immunity than other executive or administrative officials. Frequently acting under serious constraints of time and even information, a prosecutor inevitably makes many decisions that could engender colorable claims of constitutional deprivation. Defending these decisions, often years after they were made, could impose unique [424 U.S. 409, 426] and intolerable burdens upon a prosecutor responsible annually for hundreds of indictments and trials. Cf. Bradley v. Fisher, supra, at 349. </s> The affording of only a qualified immunity to the prosecutor also could have an adverse effect upon the functioning of the criminal justice system. Attaining the system's goal of accurately determining guilt or innocence requires that both the prosecution and the defense have wide discretion in the conduct of the trial and the presentation of evidence. 23 The veracity of witnesses in criminal cases frequently is subject to doubt before and after they testify, as is illustrated by the history of this case. If prosecutors were hampered in exercising their judgment as to the use of such witnesses by concern about resulting personal liability, the triers of fact in criminal cases often would be denied relevant evidence. 24 </s> [424 U.S. 409, 427] </s> The ultimate fairness of the operation of the system itself could be weakened by subjecting prosecutors to 1983 liability. Various post-trial procedures are available to determine whether an accused has received a fair trial. These procedures include the remedial powers of the trial judge, appellate review, and state and federal post-conviction collateral remedies. In all of these the attention of the reviewing judge or tribunal is focused primarily on whether there was a fair trial under law. This focus should not be blurred by even the subconscious knowledge that a post-trial decision in favor of the accused might result in the prosecutor's being called upon to respond in damages for his error or mistaken judgment. 25 </s> We conclude that the considerations outlined above dictate the same absolute immunity under 1983 that the prosecutor enjoys at common law. To be sure, this immunity does leave the genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty. But the alternative of qualifying a prosecutor's immunity would disserve the broader public interest. It would prevent the vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor's duty that is essential to the proper functioning [424 U.S. 409, 428] of the criminal justice system. 26 Moreover, it often would prejudice defendants in criminal cases by skewing post-conviction judicial decisions that should be made with the sole purpose of insuring justice. With the issue thus framed, we find ourselves in agreement with Judge Learned Hand, who wrote of the prosecutor's immunity from actions for malicious prosecution: </s> "As is so often the case, the answer must be found in a balance between the evils inevitable in either alternative. In this instance it has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation." Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950). </s> See Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d, at 404; cf. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S., at 320 . 27 </s> We emphasize that the immunity of prosecutors from [424 U.S. 409, 429] liability in suits under 1983 does not leave the public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs. This Court has never suggested that the policy considerations which compel civil immunity for certain governmental officials also place them beyond the reach of the criminal law. Even judges, cloaked with absolute civil immunity for centuries, could be punished criminally for willful deprivations of constitutional rights on the strength of 18 U.S.C. 242, 28 the criminal analog of 1983. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974); cf. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 627 (1972). The prosecutor would fare no better for his willful acts. 29 Moreover, a prosecutor stands perhaps unique, among officials whose acts could deprive persons of constitutional rights, in his amenability to professional discipline by an association of his peers. 30 These checks undermine the argument that the imposition of civil liability is the only way to insure that prosecutors are mindful of the constitutional rights of persons accused of crime. [424 U.S. 409, 430] </s> It remains to delineate the boundaries of our holding. As noted, supra, at 416, the Court of Appeals emphasized that each of respondent's challenged activities was an "integral part of the judicial process." 500 F.2d, at 1302. The purpose of the Court of Appeals' focus upon the functional nature of the activities rather than respondent's status was to distinguish and leave standing those cases, in its Circuit and in some others, which hold that a prosecutor engaged in certain investigative activities enjoys, not the absolute immunity associated with the judicial process, but only a good-faith defense comparable to the policeman's. 31 See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S., at 557 . We agree with the Court of Appeals that respondent's activities were intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, and thus were functions to which the reasons for absolute immunity apply with full force. 32 We have no occasion to consider whether like or similar reasons require immunity for those aspects of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an administrator or investigative [424 U.S. 409, 431] officer rather than that of advocate. 33 We hold only that in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under 1983. 34 The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit accordingly is </s> Affirmed. [424 U.S. 409, 432] </s> MR. JUSTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 This shot formed the basis of a second count against Imbler for assault, which was tried with the murder count. </s> [Footnote 2 This coat, identified by Mrs. Hasson as that worn by her husband's assailant, yielded a gun determined by ballistics evidence to be the murder weapon. </s> [Footnote 3 A fourth man who saw Hasson's killer leaving the scene identified Imbler in a pretrial lineup, but police were unable to find him at the time of trial. </s> [Footnote 4 Imbler also received a 10-year prison term on the assault charge. See n. 1, supra. </s> [Footnote 5 Brief for Respondent, App. A, p. 6. The record does not indicate what specific action was taken in response to Pachtman's letter. We do note that the letter was dated August 17, 1962, and that Imbler's execution, scheduled for September 12, 1962, subsequently was stayed. The letter became a part of the permanent record in the case available to the courts in all subsequent litigation. </s> [Footnote 6 Brief for Respondent 5. </s> [Footnote 7 See generally Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). </s> [Footnote 8 The District Court found that Costello had given certain ambiguous or misleading testimony, and had lied flatly about his criminal record, his education, and his current income. As to the misleading testimony, the court found that either Pachtman or a [424 U.S. 409, 415] police officer present in the courtroom knew it was misleading. As to the false testimony, the District Court concluded that Pachtman had "cause to suspect" its falsity although, apparently, no actual knowledge thereof. See 298 F. Supp., at 799-807. The Supreme Court of California earlier had addressed and rejected allegations based on many of the same parts of Costello's testimony. It found either an absence of falsehood or an absence of prosecutorial knowledge in each instance. See In re Imbler, 60 Cal. 2d 554, 562-565, and n. 3, 387 P.2d 6, 10-12, and n. 3 (1963). </s> [Footnote 9 See 298 F. Supp., at 809-811. The Supreme Court of California earlier had rejected similar allegations. See In re Imbler, supra, at 566-568, 387 P.2d, at 12-13. </s> [Footnote 10 Title 42 U.S.C. 1983, originally passed as 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, reads in full: </s> "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." </s> [Footnote 11 See, e. g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 559 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 382 -383 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting). </s> [Footnote 12 The Court described the immunity of judges as follows: </s> "Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction, as this Court recognized when it adopted the doctrine, in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872). This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly, and it `is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences.'" 386 U.S., at 553 -554 (citation omitted). </s> [Footnote 13 The procedural difference between the absolute and the qualified immunities is important. An absolute immunity defeats a suit at the outset, so long as the official's actions were within the scope of the immunity. The fate of an official with qualified immunity depends upon the circumstances and motivations of his actions, as established by the evidence at trial. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238 -239 (1974); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 320 -322 (1975). </s> [Footnote 14 The elements of this immunity were described in Scheuer as follows: </s> "It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct." 416 U.S., at 247 -248. </s> [Footnote 15 In Tenney v. Brandhove, of course, the Court looked to the [424 U.S. 409, 420] immunity accorded legislators by the Federal and State Constitutions, as well as that developed by the common law. 341 U.S., at 372 -375. See generally Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973). </s> [Footnote 16 Fanale v. Sheehy, 385 F.2d 866, 868 (CA2 1967); Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (CA3 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021 (1967); Carmack v. Gibson, 363 F.2d 862, 864 (CA5 1966); Tyler v. Witkowski, 511 F.2d 449, 450-451 (CA7 1975); Barnes v. Dorsey, 480 F.2d 1057, 1060 (CA8 1973); Kostal v. Stoner, 292 F.2d 492, 493 (CA10 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 868 (1962); cf. Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249, 1255-1256 (CA1 1974); Weathers v. Ebert, 505 F.2d 514, 515-516 (CA4 1974). But compare Hurlburt v. Graham, 323 F.2d 723 (CA6 1963), with Hilliard v. Williams, 465 F.2d 1212 (CA6), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1029 (1972). See Part IV, infra. </s> [Footnote 17 E. g., Tyler v. Witkowski, supra, at 450; Kostal v. Stoner, supra, at 493; Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608 (CA7 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974). See n. 20, infra. </s> [Footnote 18 The Supreme Court of Indiana in Griffith cited an earlier Massachusetts decision, apparently as authority for its own holding. But that case, Parker v. Huntington, 68 Mass. 124 (1854), involved the elements of a malicious prosecution cause of action rather than the immunity of a prosecutor. See also Note, 73 U. Pa. L. Rev. 300, 304 (1925). </s> [Footnote 19 Smith v. Parman, 101 Kan. 115, 165 P. 663 (1917); Semmes v. Collins, 120 Miss. 265, 82 So. 145 (1919); Kittler v. Kelsch, 56 N. D. 227, 216 N. W. 898 (1927); Watts v. Gerking, 111 Ore. 654, 228 P. 135 (1924) (on rehearing). Contra, Leong You v. Carden, 23 Haw. 362 (1916). </s> [Footnote 20 The immunity of a judge for acts within his jurisdiction has roots extending to the earliest days of the common law. See Floyd v. Barker, 12 Coke 23, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (1608). Chancellor Kent traced some of its history in Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282 (N. Y. 1810), and this Court accepted the rule of judicial immunity in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872). See n. 12, supra. The immunity of grand jurors, an almost equally venerable common-law tenet, see Floyd v. Barker, supra, also has been adopted in this country. See, e. g., Turpen v. Booth, 56 Cal. 65 (1880); Hunter v. Mathis, 40 Ind. 356 (1872). Courts that have extended the same immunity to the prosecutor have sometimes remarked on the fact that all three officials - judge, grand juror, and prosecutor - exercise a discretionary judgment on the basis of evidence presented to them. Smith v. Parman, supra; Watts v. Gerking, supra. It is the functional comparability of their judgments to those of the judge that has resulted in both grand jurors and prosecutors being referred to as "quasi-judicial" officers, and their immunities being termed "quasi-judicial" as well. See, e. g., Turpen v. Booth, supra, at 69; Watts v. Gerking, supra, at 661, 228 P., at 138. </s> [Footnote 21 See, e. g., Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (CA2 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950); Cooper v. O'Connor, 69 App. D.C. 100, 99 F.2d 135, 140-141 (1938); Anderson v. Rohrer, 3 F. Supp. 367 (SD Fla. 1933); Pearson v. Reed, 6 Cal. App. 2d 277, 44 P.2d 592 (1935); Anderson v. Manley, 181 Wash. 327, 43 P.2d 39 (1935). See generally Restatement of Torts 656 and comment b (1938); 1 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts 4.3, pp. 305-306 (1956). </s> [Footnote 22 This is illustrated by the history of the disagreement as to the culpability of the prosecutor's conduct in this case. We express no opinion as to which of the courts was correct. See nn. 8 and 9, supra. </s> [Footnote 23 In the law of defamation, a concern for the airing of all evidence has resulted in an absolute privilege for any courtroom statement relevant to the subject matter of the proceeding. In the case of lawyers the privilege extends to their briefs and pleadings as well. See generally 1 T. Cooley, Law of Torts 153 (4th ed. 1932); 1 F. Harper & F. James, supra, 5.22. In the leading case of Hoar v. Wood, 44 Mass. 193 (1841), Chief Justice Shaw expressed the policy decision as follows: </s> "Subject to this restriction [of relevancy], it is, on the whole, for the public interest, and best calculated to subserve the purposes of justice, to allow counsel full freedom of speech, in conducting the causes and advocating and sustaining the rights, of their constituents; and this freedom of discussion ought not to be impaired by numerous and refined distinctions." Id., at 197-198. </s> [Footnote 24 A prosecutor often must decide, especially in cases of wide public interest, whether to proceed to trial where there is a sharp conflict in the evidence. The appropriate course of action in such a case may well be to permit a jury to resolve the conflict. Yet, a prosecutor understandably would be reluctant to go forward with a close case where an acquittal likely would trigger a suit against him for damages. Cf. American Bar Association Project on Standards [424 U.S. 409, 427] for Criminal Justice, Prosecution and Defense Function 3.9 (c) (Approved Draft 1971). </s> [Footnote 25 The possibility of personal liability also could dampen the prosecutor's exercise of his duty to bring to the attention of the court or of proper officials all significant evidence suggestive of innocence or mitigation. At trial this duty is enforced by the requirements of due process, but after a conviction the prosecutor also is bound by the ethics of his office to inform the appropriate authority of after-acquired or other information that casts doubt upon the correctness of the conviction. Cf. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-13 (1969); ABA, Standards, supra, 3.11. Indeed, the record in this case suggests that respondent's recognition of this duty led to the post-conviction hearing which in turn resulted ultimately in the District Court's granting of the writ of habeas corpus. </s> [Footnote 26 In addressing the consequences of subjecting judges to suits for damages under 1983, the Court has commented: </s> "Imposing such a burden on judges would contribute not to principled and fearless decision-making but to intimidation." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S., at 554 . </s> [Footnote 27 Petitioner contends that his suit should be allowed, even if others would not be, because the District Court's issuance of the writ of habeas corpus shows that his suit has substance. We decline to carve out such an exception to prosecutorial immunity. Petitioner's success on habeas, where the question was the alleged misconduct by several state agents, does not necessarily establish the merit of his civil rights action where only the respondent's alleged wrongdoing is at issue. Certainly nothing determined on habeas would bind respondent, who was not a party. Moreover, using the habeas proceeding as a "door-opener" for a subsequent civil rights action would create the risk of injecting extraneous concerns into that proceeding. As we noted in the text, consideration of the habeas petition could well be colored by an awareness of potential prosecutorial liability. </s> [Footnote 28 "Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if death results shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life." </s> [Footnote 29 California also appears to provide for criminal punishment of a prosecutor who commits some of the acts ascribed to respondent by petitioner. Cal. Penal Code 127 (1970); cf. In re Branch, 70 Cal. 2d 200, 210-211, 449 P.2d 174, 181 (1969). </s> [Footnote 30 See ABA Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-13. See generally ABA, Standards, supra, n. 24, 1.1 (c), (e), and Commentary, pp. 44-45. </s> [Footnote 31 Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d, at 1256; Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d, at 608-609; Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 537 (CA9 1965); cf. Madison v. Purdy, 410 F.2d 99 (CA5 1969); Lewis v. Brautigam, 227 F.2d 124 (CA5 1955). But cf. Cambist Films, Inc. v. Duggan, 475 F.2d 887, 889 (CA3 1973). </s> [Footnote 32 Both in his complaint in District Court and in his argument to us, petitioner characterizes some of respondent's actions as "police-related" or investigative. Specifically, he points to a request by respondent of the police during a courtroom recess that they hold off questioning Costello about a pending bad-check charge until after Costello had completed his testimony. Petitioner asserts that this request was an investigative activity because it was a direction to police officers engaged in the investigation of crime. Seen in its proper light, however, respondent's request of the officers was an effort to control the presentation of his witness' testimony, a task fairly within his function as an advocate. </s> [Footnote 33 We recognize that the duties of the prosecutor in his role as advocate for the State involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom. A prosecuting attorney is required constantly, in the course of his duty as such, to make decisions on a wide variety of sensitive issues. These include questions of whether to present a case to a grand jury, whether to file an information, whether and when to prosecute, whether to dismiss an indictment against particular defendants, which witnesses to call, and what other evidence to present. Preparation, both for the initiation of the criminal process and for a trial, may require the obtaining, reviewing, and evaluating of evidence. At some point, and with respect to some decisions, the prosecutor no doubt functions as an administrator rather than as an officer of the court. Drawing a proper line between these functions may present difficult questions, but this case does not require us to anticipate them. </s> [Footnote 34 MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in the judgment, would distinguish between willful use by a prosecutor of perjured testimony and willful suppression by a prosecutor of exculpatory information. In the former case, MR. JUSTICE WHITE agrees that absolute immunity is appropriate. He thinks, however, that only a qualified immunity is appropriate where information relevant to the defense is "unconstitutionally withheld . . . from the court." Post, at 443. </s> We do not accept the distinction urged by MR. JUSTICE WHITE for several reasons. As a matter of principle, we perceive no less an infringement of a defendant's rights by the knowing use of perjured testimony than by the deliberate withholding of exculpatory information. The conduct in either case is reprehensible, warranting criminal prosecution as well as disbarment. See supra, at 429 nn. 29 and 30. Moreover, the distinction is not susceptible of practical application. A claim of using perjured testimony simply may be reframed and asserted as a claim of suppression of the evidence upon which the knowledge of perjury rested. That the two types of claims can thus be viewed is clear from our cases discussing the constitutional prohibitions against both practices. Mooney v. Holohan, [424 U.S. 409, 432] 294 U.S. 103, 110 (1935); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31 -32 (1957); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963); Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 4 -6 (1967); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 151 -155 (1972). It is also illustrated by the history of this case: at least one of the charges of prosecutorial misconduct discussed by the Federal District Court in terms of suppression of evidence had been discussed by the Supreme Court of California in terms of use of perjured testimony. Compare Imbler v. Craven, 298 F. Supp., at 809-811, with In re Imbler, 60 Cal. 2d, at 566-567, 387 P.2d, at 12-13. Denying absolute immunity from suppression claims could thus eviscerate, in many situations, the absolute immunity from claims of using perjured testimony. </s> We further think MR. JUSTICE WHITE'S suggestion, post, at 440 n. 5, that absolute immunity should be accorded only when the prosecutor makes a "full disclosure" of all facts casting doubt upon the State's testimony, would place upon the prosecutor a duty exceeding the disclosure requirements of Brady and its progeny, see 373 U.S., at 87 ; Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795 (1972); cf. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647 -648 (1974). It also would weaken the adversary system at the same time it interfered seriously with the legitimate exercise of prosecutorial discretion. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL join, concurring in the judgment. </s> I concur in the judgment of the Court and in much of its reasoning. I agree with the Court that the gravamen of the complaint in this case is that the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony; and that a prosecutor is absolutely immune from suit for money damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for presentation of testimony later determined to have been false, where the presentation of such testimony is alleged to have been unconstitutional solely because the prosecutor did not believe it or should not have believed it to be true. I write, however, because I believe that the Court's opinion may be read as [424 U.S. 409, 433] extending to a prosecutor an immunity broader than that to which he was entitled at common law; broader than is necessary to decide this case; and broader than is necessary to protect the judicial process. Most seriously, I disagree with any implication that absolute immunity for prosecutors extends to suits based on claims of unconstitutional suppression of evidence because I believe such a rule would threaten to injure the judicial process and to interfere with Congress' purpose in enacting 42 U.S.C. 1983, without any support in statutory language or history. </s> I </s> Title 42 U.S.C. 1983 provides: </s> "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." </s> As the language itself makes clear, the central purpose of 1983 is to "give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an official's abuse of his position." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961) (emphasis added). The United States Constitution among other things, places substantial limitations upon state action, and the cause of action provided in 42 U.S.C. 1983 is fundamentally one for "[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law." United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941). It is manifest then that all state [424 U.S. 409, 434] officials as a class cannot be immune absolutely from damage suits under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and that to extend absolute immunity to any group of state officials is to negate pro tanto the very remedy which it appears Congress sought to create. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 243 (1974). Thus, as there is no language in 42 U.S.C. 1983 extending any immunity to any state officials, the Court has not extended absolute immunity to such officials in the absence of the most convincing showing that the immunity is necessary. Accordingly, we have declined to construe 1983 to extend absolute immunity from damage suits to a variety of state officials, Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (school board members); Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra (various executive officers, including the State's chief executive officer); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (policemen); and this notwithstanding the fact that, at least with respect to high executive officers, absolute immunity from suit for damages would have applied at common law. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896); Alzua v. Johnson, 231 U.S. 106 (1913). Instead, we have construed the statute to extend only a qualified immunity to these officials, and they may be held liable for unconstitutional conduct absent "good faith." Wood v. Strickland, supra, at 315. Any other result would "deny much of the promise of 1983." Id., at 322. Nonetheless, there are certain absolute immunities so firmly rooted in the common law and supported by such strong policy reasons that the Court has been unwilling to infer that Congress meant to abolish them in enacting 42 U.S.C. 1983. Thus, we have held state legislators to be absolutely immune from liability for damages under 1983 for their legislative acts, Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), 1 and state [424 U.S. 409, 435] judges to be absolutely immune from liability for their judicial acts, Pierson v. Ray, supra. 2 </s> In justifying absolute immunity for certain officials, both at common law and under 42 U.S.C. 1983, courts have invariably rested their decisions on the proposition that such immunity is necessary to protect the decisionmaking process in which the official is engaged. Thus legislative immunity was justified on the ground that such immunity was essential to protect "freedom of speech and action in the legislature" from the dampening effects of threatened lawsuits. Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, at 372. Similarly, absolute immunity for judges was justified on the ground that no matter how high the standard of proof is set, the burden of defending damage suits brought by disappointed litigants would "contribute not to principled and fearless decisionmaking but to intimidation." Pierson v. Ray, supra, at 554. In Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347 (1872), the Court stated: </s> "For it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself. Liability to answer to every one who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the judge, would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom, and would destroy that independence [424 U.S. 409, 436] without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful. . . ." </s> See also cases discussed in Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 399-401 (CA2 1926), summarily aff'd, 275 U.S. 503 (1927). </s> The majority articulates other adverse consequences which may result from permitting suits to be maintained against public officials. Such suits may expose the official to an unjust damage award, ante, at 425; such suits will be expensive to defend even if the official prevails and will take the official's time away from his job, ante, at 425; and the liability of a prosecutor for unconstitutional behavior might induce a federal court in a habeas corpus proceeding to deny a valid constitutional claim in order to protect the prosecutor, ante, at 427. However, these adverse consequences are present with respect to suits against policemen, school teachers, and other executives, and have never before been thought sufficient to immunize an official absolutely no matter how outrageous his conduct. Indeed, these reasons are present with respect to suits against all state officials 3 and must necessarily have been rejected by Congress as a basis for absolute immunity under 42 U.S.C. 1983, for its enactment [424 U.S. 409, 437] is a clear indication that at least some officials should be accountable in damages for their official acts. Thus, unless the threat of suit is also thought to injure the governmental decisionmaking process, the other unfortunate consequences flowing from damage suits against state officials are sufficient only to extend a qualified immunity to the official in question. Accordingly, the question whether a prosecutor enjoys an absolute immunity from damage suits under 1983, or only a qualified immunity, depends upon whether the common law and reason support the proposition that extending absolute immunity is necessary to protect the judicial process. </s> II </s> The public prosecutor's absolute immunity from suit at common law is not so firmly entrenched as a judge's, but it has considerable support. The general rule was, and is, that a prosecutor is absolutely immune from suit for malicious prosecution. 1 F. Harper & F. James. The Law of Torts 4.3, p. 305 n. 7 (1956) (hereafter Harper & James), and cases there cited; Yaselli v. Goff, supra; Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (CA2 1949); Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270 (CA3 1970); Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (CA3 1965); Tyler v. Witkowski, 511 F.2d 449 (CA7 1975); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (CA7 1973); Barnes v. Dorsey, 480 F.2d 1057 (CA8 1973); Duba v. McIntyre, 501 F.2d 590 (CA8 1974); Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533 (CA9 1965). But see Leong Yau v. Carden, 23 Haw. 362 (1916). The rule, like the rule extending absolute immunity to judges, rests on the proposition that absolute immunity is necessary to protect the judicial process. Absent immunity, "`it would be but human that they [prosecutors] might refrain from presenting to a grand jury or prosecuting a matter which in their judgment called for action; but [424 U.S. 409, 438] which a jury might possibly determine otherwise.'" 1 Harper & James 4.3, pp. 305-306, quoting Yaselli v. Goff, 8 F.2d 161, 162 (SDNY 1925). Indeed, in deciding whether or not to prosecute, the prosecutor performs a "quasi-judicial" function. 1 Harper & James 305; Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d, at 404. Judicial immunity had always been extended to grand jurors with respect to their actions in returning an indictment, id., at 403, and "`the public prosecutor, in deciding whether a particular prosecution shall be instituted . . . performs much the same function as a grand jury.'" Id., at 404, quoting Smith v. Parman, 101 Kan. 115, 165 P. 633 (1917). The analogy to judicial immunity is a strong one. Moreover, the risk of injury to the judicial process from a rule permitting malicious prosecution suits against prosecutors is real. There is no one to sue the prosecutor for an erroneous decision not to prosecute. If suits for malicious prosecution were permitted, 4 the prosecutor's incentive would always be not to bring charges. Moreover, the "fear of being harassed by a vexatious suit, for acting according to their consciences" would always be the greater "where powerful" men are involved, 1 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 349 (6th ed. 1787). Accordingly, I agree with the majority that, with respect to suits based on claims that the prosecutor's decision to prosecute was malicious and without probable cause - at least where there is no independent allegation that the prosecutor withheld exculpatory information from a grand jury or the court, see Part III, infra - the judicial process is better served by absolute immunity than by any other rule. [424 U.S. 409, 439] </s> Public prosecutors were also absolutely immune at common law from suits for defamatory remarks made during and relevant to a judicial proceeding, 1 Harper & James 5.21, 5.22; Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d, at 402-403; and this immunity was also based on the policy of protecting the judicial process. Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Judicial Proceedings, 9 Col. L. Rev. 463 (1909). The immunity was not special to public prosecutors but extended to lawyers accused of making false and defamatory statements, or of eliciting false and defamatory testimony from witnesses; and it applied to suits against witnesses themselves for delivering false and defamatory testimony. 1 Harper & James 5.22, pp. 423-424, and cases there cited; King v. Skinner, Lofft 55, 98 Eng. Rep. 529, 530 (K. B. 1772) (per Lord Mansfield); Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d, at 403. The reasons for this rule are also substantial. It is precisely the function of a judicial proceeding to determine where the truth lies. The ability of courts, under carefully developed procedures, to separate truth from falsity, and the importance of accurately resolving factual disputes in criminal (and civil) cases are such that those involved in judicial proceedings should be "given every encouragement to make a full disclosure of all pertinent information within their knowledge." 1 Harper & James 5.22, p. 424. For a witness, this means he must be permitted to testify without fear of being sued if his testimony is disbelieved. For a lawyer, it means that he must be permitted to call witnesses without fear of being sued if the witness is disbelieved and it is alleged that the lawyer knew or should have known that the witness' testimony was false. Of course, witnesses should not be encouraged to testify falsely nor lawyers encouraged to call witnesses who testify falsely. However, if the risk of having to defend a civil damage suit is added to the deterrent against such [424 U.S. 409, 440] conduct already provided by criminal laws against perjury and subornation of perjury, the risk of self-censorship becomes too great. This is particularly so because it is very difficult if not impossible for attorneys to be absolutely certain of the objective truth or falsity of the testimony which they present. A prosecutor faced with a decision whether or not to call a witness whom he believes, but whose credibility he knows will be in doubt and whose testimony may be disbelieved by the jury, should be given every incentive to submit that witness' testimony to the crucible of the judicial process so that the fact finder may consider it, after cross-examination, together with the other evidence in the case to determine where the truth lies. </s> "Absolute privilege has been conceded on obvious grounds of public policy to insure freedom of speech where it is essential that freedom of speech should exist. It is essential to the ends of justice that all persons participating in judicial proceedings (to take a typical class for illustration) should enjoy freedom of speech in the discharge of their public duties or in pursuing their rights, without fear of consequences." Veeder, supra, 9 Col. L. Rev., at 469. </s> For the above-stated reasons, I agree with the majority that history and policy support an absolute immunity for prosecutors from suits based solely on claims 5 that they knew or should have known that the testimony of a witness called by the prosecution was false; and I would not attribute to Congress an intention to remove such immunity in enacting 42 U.S.C. 1983. [424 U.S. 409, 441] </s> Since the gravamen of the complaint in this case is that the prosecutor knew or should have known that certain testimony of a witness called by him was untrue and since - for reasons set forth below - the other allegations in the complaint fail to state a cause of action on any other theory, I concur in the judgment in this case. However, insofar as the majority's opinion implies an absolute immunity from suits for constitutional violations other than those based on the prosecutor's decision to initiate proceedings or his actions in bringing information or argument to the court, I disagree. Most particularly I disagree with any implication that the absolute immunity extends to suits charging unconstitutional suppression of evidence. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). </s> III </s> There was no absolute immunity at common law for prosecutors other than absolute immunity from suits for malicious prosecution and defamation. There were simply no other causes of action at common law brought against prosecutors for conduct committed in their official capacity. 6 There is, for example, no reported case of a suit at common law against a prosecutor for suppression or nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence. Thus, even if this Court had accepted the proposition, which [424 U.S. 409, 442] it has not, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), that Congress incorporated in 42 U.S.C. 1983 all immunities existing at common law, it would not follow that prosecutors are absolutely immune from suit for all unconstitutional acts committed in the course of doing their jobs. Secondly, it is by no means true that such blanket absolute immunity is necessary or even helpful in protecting the judicial process. It should hardly need stating that, ordinarily, liability in damages for unconstitutional or otherwise illegal conduct has the very desirable effect of deterring such conduct. Indeed, this was precisely the proposition upon which 1983 was enacted. Absent special circumstances, such as those discussed in Part II, supra, with respect to actions attacking the decision to prosecute or the bringing of evidence or argument to the court, one would expect that the judicial process would be protected - and indeed its integrity enhanced - by denial of immunity to prosecutors who engage in unconstitutional conduct. </s> The absolute immunity extended to prosecutors in defamation cases is designed to encourage them to bring information to the court which will resolve the criminal case. That is its single justification. Lest they withhold valuable but questionable evidence or refrain from making valuable but questionable arguments, prosecutors are protected from liability for submitting before the court information later determined to have been false to their knowledge. 7 It would stand this immunity rule on its head, however, to apply it to a suit based on a claim that [424 U.S. 409, 443] the prosecutor unconstitutionally withheld information from the court. Immunity from a suit based upon a claim that the prosecutor suppressed or withheld evidence would discourage precisely the disclosure of evidence sought to be encouraged by the rule granting prosecutors immunity from defamation suits. Denial of immunity for unconstitutional withholding of evidence would encourage such disclosure. A prosecutor seeking to protect himself from liability for failure to disclose evidence may be induced to disclose more than is required. But, this will hardly injure the judicial process. 8 Indeed, it will help it. Accordingly, lower courts have held that unconstitutional suppression of exculpatory evidence is beyond the scope of "duties constituting an integral part of the judicial process" and have refused to extend absolute immunity to suits based on such claims. Hilliard v. Williams, 465 F.2d 1212, 1218 (CA6), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1029 (1972); Haaf v. Grams, 355 F. Supp. 542, 545 (Minn. 1973); Peterson v. Stanczak, 48 F. R. D. 426 (ND Ill. 1969). Contra, Barnes v. Dorsey, 480 F.2d 1057 (CA8 1973). </s> Equally important, unlike constitutional violations committed in the courtroom - improper summations, introduction of hearsay evidence in violation of the Confrontation Clause, knowing presentation of false testimony - which truly are an "integral part of the judicial process," ante, at 416, the judicial process has no way to prevent or correct the constitutional violation of suppressing evidence. The judicial process will by definition be ignorant of the violation when it occurs; and it is [424 U.S. 409, 444] reasonable to suspect that most such violations never surface. It is all the more important, then, to deter such violations by permitting damage actions under 42 U.S.C. 1983 to be maintained in instances where violations do surface. </s> The stakes are high. In Hilliard v. Williams, supra, a woman was convicted of second-degree murder upon entirely circumstantial evidence. The most incriminating item of evidence was the fact that the jacket worn by the defendant at the time of arrest - and some curtains - appeared to have bloodstains on them. The defendant denied that the stains were bloodstains but was convicted and subsequently spent a year in jail. Fortunately, in that case, the defendant later found out that an FBI report - of which the prosecutor had knowledge at the time of the trial and the existence of which he instructed a state investigator not to mention during his testimony - concluded, after testing, that the stains were not bloodstains. On retrial, the defendant was acquitted. She sued the prosecutor and the state investigator under 42 U.S.C. 1983 claiming that the FBI report was unconstitutionally withheld under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and obtained a damage award against both after trial. The prosecutor's petition for certiorari is now pending before this Court. Hilliard v. Williams, 516 F.2d 1344 (CA6 1975), cert. pending, No. 75-272. The state investigator's petition, in which he claimed that he had only followed the prosecutor's orders, has been denied. Clark v. Hilliard, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976). It is apparent that the injury to a defendant which can be caused by an unconstitutional suppression of exculpatory evidence is substantial, particularly if the evidence is never uncovered. It is virtually impossible to identify any injury to the judicial process resulting from a rule permitting suits for such unconstitutional [424 U.S. 409, 445] conduct, and it is very easy to identify an injury to the process resulting from a rule which does not permit such suits. Where the reason for the rule extending absolute immunity to prosecutors disappears, it would truly be "monstrous to deny recovery." Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d, at 581. </s> IV </s> The complaint in this case, while fundamentally based on the claim that the prosecutor knew or should have known that his witness had testified falsely in certain respects, does contain some allegations that exculpatory evidence and evidence relating to the witness' credibility had been suppressed. Insofar as the complaint is based on allegations of suppression or failure to disclose, the prosecutor should not, for the reasons set forth above, be absolutely immune. However, as the majority notes, the suppression of fingerprint evidence and the alleged suppression of information relating to certain pretrial lineups is not alleged to have been known in fact to the prosecutor - it is simply claimed that the suppression is legally chargeable to him. While this may be so as a matter of federal habeas corpus law, it is untrue in a civil damage action. The result of a lie-detector test claimed to have been suppressed was allegedly known to respondent, but it would have been inadmissible at Imbler's trial and is thus not constitutionally required to be disclosed. The alteration of the police artist's composite sketch after Imbler was designated as the defendant is not alleged to have been suppressed - and in fact appears not to have been suppressed. The opinion of the California Supreme Court on direct review of Imbler's conviction states that "the picture was modified later, following suggestions of Costello and other witnesses," and that court presumably had before it only the trial record. The other items allegedly suppressed [424 U.S. 409, 446] all relate to background information about only one of the three eyewitnesses to testify for the State, and were in large part concededly known to the defense and thus may not be accurately described as suppressed. The single alleged fact not concededly known to the defense which might have been helpful to the defense was that the State's witness had written some bad checks for small amounts and that a criminal charge based on one check was outstanding against him. However, the witness had an extensive criminal record which was known to but not fully used by the defense. Thus, even taken as true, the failure to disclose the check charges is patently insufficient to support a claim of unconstitutional suppression of evidence. 9 The Court [424 U.S. 409, 447] has in the past, having due regard for the fact that the obligation of the government to disclose exculpatory evidence is an exception to the normal operation of an adversary system of justice, imposed on state prosecutors a constitutional obligation to turn over such evidence only when the evidence is of far greater significance than that involved here. See Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972). Thus, the only constitutional violation adequately alleged against the prosecutor is that he knew in his mind that testimony presented by him was false; and from a suit based on such a violation, without more, the prosecutor is absolutely immune. For this reason, I concur in the judgment reached by the majority in this case. </s> [Footnote 1 The Court emphasized that the immunity had a lengthy history at common law, and was written into the United States Constitution [424 U.S. 409, 435] in the "Speech or Debate Clause" and into many state constitutions as well. 341 U.S., at 372 -373. </s> [Footnote 2 The Court concluded that "[f]ew doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction, as this Court recognized when it adopted the doctrine in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872)." 386 U.S., at 553 -554. </s> [Footnote 3 Even the risk that decisions in habeas corpus proceedings will be skewed is applicable in the case of policemen; and if it supplies a sufficient reason to extend absolute immunity to prosecutors, it should have been a sufficient reason to extend such immunity to policemen. Indeed, it is fair to say that far more habeas corpus petitions turn on the constitutionality of action taken by policemen than turn on the constitutionality of action taken by prosecutors. We simply rely on the ability of federal judges correctly to apply the law to the facts with the knowledge that the overturning of a conviction on constitutional grounds hardly dooms the official in question to payment of a damage award in light of the qualified immunity which he possesses, and the inapplicability of the res judicata doctrine, ante, at 428 n. 27. </s> [Footnote 4 I agree with the majority that it is not sufficient merely to set the standard of proof in a malicious prosecution case very high. If this were done, it might be possible to eliminate the danger of an unjust damage award against a prosecutor. However, the risk of having to defend a suit - even if certain of ultimate vindication - would remain a substantial deterrent to fearless prosecution. </s> [Footnote 5 For the reasons set forth in Part III, infra, absolute immunity would not apply to independent claims that the prosecutor has withheld facts tending to demonstrate the falsity of his witness' testimony where the alleged facts are sufficiently important to justify a finding of unconstitutional conduct on the part of the prosecutor. </s> [Footnote 6 Immunity of public officials for false arrest was, unlike immunity of public officials for malicious prosecution, not absolute, 1 Harper & James 3.17 and 3.18; and when prosecutors were sued for that tort, they were not held absolutely immune. Schneider v. Shepherd, 192 Mich. 82, 158 N. W. 182 (1916). A similar result has obtained in the lower courts in suits under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against prosecutors for initiating unconstitutional arrests. Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533 (CA9 1965); Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (CA7 1973); Wilhelm v. Turner, 431 F.2d 177, 180-183 (CA8 1970) (dictum); Balistrieri v. Warren, 314 F. Supp. 824 (WD Wis. 1970). See also Ames v. Vavreck, 356 F. Supp. 931 (Minn. 1973). </s> [Footnote 7 The reasons for making a prosecutor absolutely immune from suits for defamation would apply with equal force to other suits based solely upon the prosecutor's conduct in the courtroom designed either to bring facts or arguments to the attention of the court. Thus, a prosecutor would be immune from a suit based on a claim that his summation was unconstitutional or that he deliberately elicited hearsay evidence in violation of the Confrontation Clause. </s> [Footnote 8 There may be circumstances in which ongoing investigations or even the life of an informant might be jeopardized by public disclosure of information thought possibly to be exculpatory. However, these situations may adequately be dealt with by in camera disclosure to the trial judge. These considerations do not militate against disclosure, but merely affect the manner of disclosure. </s> [Footnote 9 The majority points out that the knowing use of perjured testimony is as reprehensible as the deliberate suppression of exculpatory evidence. This is beside the point. The reason for permitting suits against prosecutors for suppressing evidence is not that suppression is especially reprehensible but that the only effect on the process of permitting such suits will be a beneficial one - more information will be disclosed to the court; whereas one of the effects of permitting suits for knowing use of perjured testimony will be detrimental to the process - prosecutors may withhold questionable but valuable testimony from the court. </s> The majority argues that any "claim of using perjured testimony simply may be reframed and asserted as a claim of suppression." Our treatment of the allegations in this case conclusively refutes the argument. It is relatively easy to allege that a government witness testified falsely and that the prosecutor did not believe the witness; and, if the prosecutor's subjective belief is a sufficient basis for liability, the case would almost certainly have to go to trial. If such suits were permitted, this case would have to go to trial. It is another matter entirely to allege specific objective facts known to the prosecutor of sufficient importance to justify a conclusion that he violated a constitutional duty to disclose. It is no coincidence that petitioner failed to make any such allegations in this case. More to the point - and quite apart from the relative difficulty of pleading a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 </s> [424 U.S. 409, 447] (1963) - a rule permitting suits based on withholding of specific facts unlike suits based on the prosecutor's disbelief of a witness' testimony will have no detrimental effect on the process. Risk of being sued for suppression will impel the prosecutor to err if at all on the side of overdisclosure. Risk of being sued for disbelieving a witness will impel the prosecutor to err on the side of withholding questionable evidence. The majority does not appear to respond to this point. Any suggestion that the distinction between suits based on suppression of facts helpful to the defense and suits based on other kinds of constitutional violations cannot be understood by district judges who would have to apply the rule is mystifying. The distinction is a simple one. </s> Finally, the majority states that the rule suggested in this concurring opinion "would place upon the prosecutor a duty exceeding the disclosure requirements of Brady and its progeny." The rule suggested in this opinion does no such thing. The constitutional obligation of the prosecutor remains utterly unchanged. We would simply not grant him absolute immunity from suits for committing violations of pre-existing constitutional disclosure requirements, if he committed those violations in bad faith. </s> [424 U.S. 409, 448]

United States Supreme Court CIA v. SIMS(1985) No. 83-1075 Argued: December 4, 1984Decided: April 16, 1985 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 83-1249, Sims et al. v. Central Intelligence Agency et al., also on certiorari to the same court. </s> Between 1953 and 1966, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) financed a research project, code-named MKULTRA, that was established to counter Soviet and Chinese advances in brainwashing and interrogation techniques. Subprojects were contracted out to various universities, research foundations, and similar institutions. In 1977, respondents in No. 83-1075 (hereafter respondents) filed a request with the CIA under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), seeking, inter alia, the names of the institutions and individuals who had performed the research under MKULTRA. Citing Exemption 3 of the FOIA - which provides that an agency need not disclose "matters that are . . . specifically exempted from disclosure by statute . . . provided that such statute . . . refers to particular types of matters to be withheld" - the CIA declined to disclose the requested information. The CIA invoked, as the exempting statute referred to in Exemption 3, 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947, which states that "the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." Respondents then filed suit under the FOIA in Federal District Court. Applying, as directed by the Court of Appeals on an earlier appeal, a definition of "intelligence sources" as meaning only those sources to which the CIA had to guarantee confidentiality in order to obtain the information, the District Court held that the identities of researchers who had received express guarantees of confidentiality need not be disclosed, and also exempted from disclosure other researchers on the ground that their work for the CIA, apart from MKULTRA, required that their identities remain secret. The court further held that there was no need to disclose the institutional affiliations of the individual researchers whose identities were exempt from disclosure. The Court of Appeals affirmed this latter holding, but reversed the District Court's ruling with respect to which individual researchers satisfied "the need-for-confidentiality" aspect of its formulation [471 U.S. 159, 160] of exempt "intelligence sources." The Court of Appeals held that it was error automatically to exempt from disclosure those researchers to whom confidentiality had been promised, and that an individual qualifies as an "intelligence source" exempt from disclosure under the FOIA only when the CIA offers sufficient proof that it needs to protect its efforts in confidentiality in order to obtain the type of information provided by the researcher. </s> Held: </s> 1. Section 102(d)(3) qualifies as a withholding statute under Exemption 3. Section 102(d)(3) clearly refers to "particular types of matters" within the meaning of Exemption 3. Moreover, the FOIA's legislative history confirms that Congress intended 102(d)(3) to be a withholding statute under that Exemption. And the plain meaning of 102(d)(3)'s language, as well as the National Security Act's legislative history, indicates that Congress vested in the Director of Central Intelligence broad authority to protect all sources of intelligence information from disclosure. To narrow this authority by limiting the definition of "intelligence sources" to sources to which the CIA had to guarantee confidentiality in order to obtain the information, not only contravenes Congress' express intention but also overlooks the practical necessities of modern intelligence gathering. Pp. 166-173. </s> 2. MKULTRA researchers are protected "intelligence sources" within 102(d)(3)'s broad meaning, because they provided, or were engaged to provide, information that the CIA needed to fulfill its statutory obligations with respect to foreign intelligence. To force the CIA to disclose a source whenever a court determines, after the fact, that the CIA could have obtained the kind of information supplied without promising confidentiality, could have a devastating impact on the CIA's ability to carry out its statutory mission. The record establishes that the MKULTRA researchers did in fact provide the CIA with information related to its intelligence function, and therefore the Director was authorized to withhold these researchers' identities from disclosure under the FOIA. Pp. 173-177. </s> 3. The FOIA does not require the Director to disclose the institutional affiliations of the exempt researchers. This conclusion is supported by the record. The Director reasonably concluded that an observer who is knowledgeable about a particular intelligence research project, such as MKULTRA, could, upon learning that the research was performed at a certain institution, deduce the identities of the protected individual researchers. Pp. 177-181. </s> 228 U.S. App. D.C. 269, 709 F.2d 95, affirmed in part and reversed in part. [471 U.S. 159, 161] </s> BURGER, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 181. </s> Acting Assistant Attorney General Willard argued the cause for petitioners in No. 83-1075 and respondents in No. 83-1249. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Geller, David A. Strauss, Robert E. Kopp, Leonard Schaitman, and Stanley Sporkin. </s> Paul Alan Levy argued the cause for respondents in No. 83-1075 and petitioners in No. 83-1249. With him on the briefs were Alan B. Morrison and David C. Vladeck. </s> CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> In No. 83-1075, we granted certiorari to decide whether 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947, as incorporated in Exemption 3 of the Freedom of Information Act, exempts from disclosure only those sources of intelligence information to which the Central Intelligence Agency had to guarantee confidentiality in order to obtain the information. In No. 83-1249, the cross-petition, we granted certiorari to decide whether the Freedom of Information Act requires the Agency to disclose the institutional affiliations of persons whose identities are exempt from disclosure as "intelligence sources." </s> I </s> Between 1953 and 1966, the Central Intelligence Agency financed a wide-ranging project, code-named MKULTRA, concerned with "the research and development of chemical, biological, and radiological materials capable of employment in clandestine operations to control human behavior." 1 The [471 U.S. 159, 162] program consisted of some 149 subprojects which the Agency contracted out to various universities, research foundations, and similar institutions. At least 80 institutions and 185 private researchers participated. Because the Agency funded MKULTRA indirectly, many of the participating individuals were unaware that they were dealing with the Agency. </s> MKULTRA was established to counter perceived Soviet and Chinese advances in brainwashing and interrogation techniques. Over the years the program included various medical and psychological experiments, some of which led to untoward results. 2 These aspects of MKULTRA surfaced publicly during the 1970's and became the subject of executive and congressional investigations. 3 </s> On August 22, 1977, John C. Sims, an attorney, and Sidney M. Wolfe, M.D., the director of the Public Citizen [471 U.S. 159, 163] Health Research Group, 4 filed a request with the Central Intelligence Agency seeking certain information about MKULTRA. Respondents invoked the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552. Specifically, respondents sought the grant proposals and contracts awarded under the MKULTRA program and the names of the institutions and individuals that had performed research. 5 </s> Pursuant to respondents' request, the Agency made available to respondents all of the MKULTRA grant proposals and contracts. Citing Exemption 3 of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. 552(b) (3)(B), 6 however, the Agency declined to disclose the names of all individual researchers and 21 institutions. 7 Exemption 3 provides that an agency need not disclose "matters that are . . . specifically exempted from disclosure by statute . . . provided that such statute . . . refers to particular [471 U.S. 159, 164] types of matters to be withheld." Ibid. The Agency relied on 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 498, 50 U.S.C. 403(d)(3), which states that </s> "the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." </s> Dissatisfied with the Agency's limited disclosure, respondents filed suit under the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B), in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. That court ordered disclosure of the withheld names, holding that the MKULTRA researchers and affiliated institutions were not "intelligence sources" within the meaning of 102(d)(3). 479 F. Supp. 84 (1979). </s> On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals concluded, as had the District Court, that 102(d)(3) qualifies as a withholding statute under Exemption 3 of the FOIA. The court held, however, that the District Court's analysis of that statute under the FOIA lacked a coherent definition of "intelligence sources." Accordingly, it remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the following definition: </s> "[A]n `intelligence source' is a person or institution that provides, has provided, or has been engaged to provide the CIA with information of a kind the Agency needs to perform its intelligence function effectively, yet could not reasonably expect to obtain without guaranteeing the confidentiality of those who provide it." 206 U.S. App. D.C. 157, 166, 642 F.2d 562, 571 (1980). </s> On remand, the District Court applied this definition and ordered the Agency to disclose the names of 47 researchers and the institutions with which they had been affiliated. The court rejected respondents' contention that the MKULTRA research was not needed to perform the Agency's intelligence function, explaining that </s> "[i]n view of the agency's concern that potential foreign enemies could be engaged in similar research and the [471 U.S. 159, 165] desire to take effective counter-measures, . . . [the Agency] could reasonably determine that this research was needed for its intelligence function." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 83-1075, pp. 22a-23a. </s> The court then turned to the question whether the Agency could show, as the Court of Appeals' definition requires, that it could not reasonably have expected to obtain the information supplied by the MKULTRA sources without guaranteeing confidentiality to them. The court concluded that the Agency's policy of considering its relationships with MKULTRA researchers as confidential was not sufficient to satisfy the Court of Appeals' definition because "the chief desire for confidentiality was on the part of the CIA." Id., at 24a. The court recognized that some of the researchers had sought, and received, express guarantees of confidentiality from the Agency, and as to those held that their identities need not be disclosed. The court also exempted other researchers from disclosure on the ground that their work for the Agency, apart from MKULTRA, required that their identities remain secret in order not to compromise the Agency's intelligence networks in foreign countries. Id., at 26a-27a, 30a-31a. Finally, the court held that there was no need to disclose the institutional affiliations of the individual researchers whose identities were exempt from disclosure; this withholding was justified by the need to eliminate the unnecessary risk that such intelligence sources would be identified indirectly. Id., at 27a, 34a. </s> Both the Agency and respondents appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed that part of the District Court's judgment exempting from disclosure the institutional affiliations of individual researchers found to be intelligence sources. However, it reversed the District Court's ruling with respect to which individual researchers satisfied "the need-for-confidentiality" aspect of its formulation of exempt "intelligence sources." 228 U.S. App. D.C. 269, 275, 709 F.2d 95, 101 (1983). [471 U.S. 159, 166] </s> At the outset, the court rejected the suggestion that it reconsider the definition of "intelligence sources." Id., at 271, 709 F.2d, at 97. The court then criticized the District Court for focusing its inquiry on whether the Agency had in fact promised confidentiality to individual researchers. The court held that the District Court's decision automatically to exempt from disclosure those researchers to whom confidentiality had been promised was erroneous; it directed the District Court on remand to focus its inquiry on whether the Agency offered sufficient proof that it needed to cloak its efforts in confidentiality in order to obtain the type of information provided by the researcher. Only upon such a showing would the individual qualify as an "intelligence source" exempt from disclosure under the FOIA. 8 </s> We granted certiorari, 465 U.S. 1078 (1984) and 467 U.S. 1240 (1984). We now reverse in part and affirm in part. </s> II </s> No. 83-1075 </s> A </s> The mandate of the FOIA calls for broad disclosure of Government records. 9 Congress recognized, however, that [471 U.S. 159, 167] public disclosure is not always in the public interest and thus provided that agency records may be withheld from disclosure under any of the nine exemptions defined in 5 U.S.C. 552(b). Under Exemption 3 disclosure need not be made as to information "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute" if the statute affords the agency no discretion on disclosure, 552(b)(3)(A), establishes particular criteria for withholding the information, or refers to the particular types of material to be withheld, 552(b)(3)(B). </s> The question in No. 83-1075 is twofold: first, does 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 constitute a statutory exemption to disclosure within the meaning of Exemption 3; and second, are the MKULTRA researchers included within 102(d)(3)'s protection of "intelligence sources." </s> B </s> Congress has made the Director of Central Intelligence "responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." 50 U.S.C. 403(d)(3). As part of its postwar reorganization of the national defense system, Congress chartered the Agency with the responsibility of coordinating intelligence activities relating to national security. 10 In order to carry out its mission, the Agency was expressly entrusted with protecting the heart of all intelligence operations - "sources and methods." </s> Section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947, which calls for the Director of Central Intelligence to protect "intelligence sources and methods," clearly "refers to particular types of matters," 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3)(B), and thus qualifies as a withholding statute under Exemption 3. The "plain meaning" of the relevant statutory provisions is sufficient to resolve the question, see, e. g., Garcia v. United [471 U.S. 159, 168] States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984); United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. 792, 798 (1984). Moreover, the legislative history of the FOIA confirms that Congress intended 102(d)(3) to be a withholding statute under Exemption 3. 11 Indeed, this is the uniform view among other federal courts. 12 </s> Our conclusion that 102(d)(3) qualifies as a withholding statute under Exemption 3 is only the first step of the inquiry. Agency records are protected under 102(d)(3) only to the extent they contain "intelligence sources and methods" or if disclosure would reveal otherwise protected information. </s> C </s> Respondents contend that the Court of Appeals' definition of "intelligence sources," focusing on the need to guarantee confidentiality in order to obtain the type of information desired, draws the proper line with respect to intelligence sources deserving exemption from the FOIA. The plain meaning of the statutory language, as well as the legislative history of the National Security Act, however, indicates that Congress vested in the Director of Central Intelligence very [471 U.S. 159, 169] broad authority to protect all sources of intelligence information from disclosure. The Court of Appeals' narrowing of this authority not only contravenes the express intention of Congress, but also overlooks the practical necessities of modern intelligence gathering - the very reason Congress entrusted this Agency with sweeping power to protect its "intelligence sources and methods." </s> We begin with the language of 102(d)(3). Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345, 356 (1982); Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 97 (1981). Section 102(d)(3) specifically authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence to protect "intelligence sources and methods" from disclosure. Plainly the broad sweep of this statutory language comports with the nature of the Agency's unique responsibilities. To keep informed of other nations' activities bearing on our national security the Agency must rely on a host of sources. At the same time, the Director must have the authority to shield those Agency activities and sources from any disclosures that would unnecessarily compromise the Agency's efforts. </s> The "plain meaning" of 102(d)(3) may not be squared with any limiting definition that goes beyond the requirement that the information fall within the Agency's mandate to conduct foreign intelligence. Section 102(d)(3) does not state, as the Court of Appeals' view suggests, that the Director of Central Intelligence is authorized to protect intelligence sources only if such protection is needed to obtain information that otherwise could not be acquired. Nor did Congress state that only confidential or nonpublic intelligence sources are protected. 13 Section 102(d)(3) contains no such limiting language. Congress simply and pointedly protected all sources [471 U.S. 159, 170] of intelligence that provide, or are engaged to provide, information the Agency needs to perform its statutory duties with respect to foreign intelligence. The plain statutory language is not to be ignored. Weber Aircraft Corp., supra, at 798. </s> The legislative history of 102(d)(3) also makes clear that Congress intended to give the Director of Central Intelligence broad power to protect the secrecy and integrity of the intelligence process. The reasons are too obvious to call for enlarged discussion; without such protections the Agency would be virtually impotent. </s> Enacted shortly after World War II, 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 established the Agency and empowered it, among other things, "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security." 50 U.S.C. 403(d) (3). The tragedy of Pearl Harbor and the reported deficiencies in American intelligence during the course of the war convinced the Congress that the country's ability to gather and analyze intelligence, in peacetime as well as in war, must be improved. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 961, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 3-4 (1947); S. Rep. No. 239, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1947). </s> Congress knew quite well that the Agency would gather intelligence from almost an infinite variety of diverse sources. Indeed, one of the primary reasons for creating the Agency was Congress' recognition that our Government would have to shepherd and analyze a "mass of information" in order to safeguard national security in the postwar world. See ibid. Witnesses with broad experience in the intelligence field testified before Congress concerning the practical realities of intelligence work. Fleet Admiral Nimitz, for example, explained that "intelligence is a composite of authenticated and evaluated information covering not only the armed forces establishment of a possible enemy, but also his industrial capacity, racial traits, religious beliefs, and other related aspects." National Defense Establishment: [471 U.S. 159, 171] Hearings on S. 758 before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 132 (1947) (Senate Hearings). General Vandenberg, then the Director of the Central Intelligence Group, the Agency's immediate predecessor, emphasized that "foreign intelligence [gathering] consists of securing all possible data pertaining to foreign governments or the national defense and security of the United States." Id., at 497. 14 </s> Witnesses spoke of the extraordinary diversity of intelligence sources. Allen Dulles, for example, the Agency's third Director, shattered the myth of the classic "secret agent" as the typical intelligence source, and explained that "American businessmen and American professors and Americans of all types and descriptions who travel around the world are one of the greatest repositories of intelligence that we have." National Security Act of 1947: Hearings on H. R. 2319 before the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 22 (1947) (Closed House Hearings). 15 In a similar vein, General Vandenberg spoke of "the great open sources of information upon which roughly 80 percent of intelligence should be based," and identified such sources as "books, magazines, technical and scientific surveys, photographs, commercial analyses, newspapers, and radio broadcasts, and general information from [471 U.S. 159, 172] people with knowledge of affairs abroad." Senate Hearings, at 492. </s> Congress was also well aware of the importance of secrecy in the intelligence field. Both General Vandenberg and Allen Dulles testified about the grim consequences facing intelligence sources whose identities became known. See Closed House Hearings, at 10-11, 20. Moreover, Dulles explained that even American citizens who freely supply intelligence information "close up like a clam" unless they can hold the Government "responsible to keep the complete security of the information they turn over." Id., at 22. 16 Congress was plainly alert to the need for maintaining confidentiality - both Houses went into executive session to consider the legislation creating the Agency - a rare practice for congressional sessions. See n. 15, supra. </s> Against this background highlighting the requirements of effective intelligence operations, Congress expressly made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for "protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." This language stemmed from President Truman's Directive of January 22, 1946, 11 Fed. Reg. 1337, in which he established the National Intelligence Authority and the Central Intelligence Group, the Agency's predecessors. These institutions were charged with "assur[ing] the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security," ibid., and accordingly made "responsible [471 U.S. 159, 173] for fully protecting intelligence sources and methods," id., at 1339. The fact that the mandate of 102(d)(3) derives from this Presidential Directive reinforces our reading of the legislative history that Congress gave the Agency broad power to control the disclosure of intelligence sources. </s> III </s> A </s> Applying the definition of "intelligence sources" fashioned by the Congress in 102(d)(3), we hold that the Director of Central Intelligence was well within his statutory authority to withhold the names of the MKULTRA researchers from disclosure under the FOIA. The District Court specifically ruled that the Agency "could reasonably determine that this research was needed for its intelligence function," 17 and the Court of Appeals did not question this ruling. Indeed, the record shows that the MKULTRA research was related to the Agency's intelligence-gathering function in part because it revealed information about the ability of foreign governments to use drugs and other biological, chemical, or physical agents in warfare or intelligence operations against adversaries. During the height of the cold war period, the Agency was concerned, not without reason, that other countries were charting new advances in brainwashing and interrogation techniques. 18 </s> Consistent with its responsibility to maintain national security, the Agency reasonably determined that major research [471 U.S. 159, 174] efforts were necessary in order to keep informed of our potential adversaries' perceived threat. We thus conclude that MKULTRA researchers are "intelligence sources" within the broad meaning of 102(d)(3) because these persons provided, or were engaged to provide, information the Agency needs to fulfill its statutory obligations with respect to foreign intelligence. </s> Respondents' belated effort to question the Agency's authority to engage scientists and academic researchers as intelligence sources must fail. The legislative history of 102(d)(3) indicates that Congress was well aware that the Agency would call on a wide range and variety of sources to provide intelligence. Moreover, the record developed in this case confirms the obvious importance of scientists and other researchers as American intelligence sources. Notable examples include those scientists and researchers who pioneered the use of radar during World War II as well as the group which took part in the secret development of nuclear weapons in the Manhattan Project. See App. 43; App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 83-1075, p. 88a. 19 </s> B </s> The Court of Appeals narrowed the Director's authority under 102(d)(3) to withhold only those "intelligence sources" who supplied the Agency with information unattainable without guaranteeing confidentiality. That crabbed reading of the statute contravenes the express language of 102(d)(3), the statute's legislative history, and the harsh realities of the present day. The dangerous consequences of that narrowing of the statute suggest why Congress chose to vest the [471 U.S. 159, 175] Director of Central Intelligence with the broad discretion to safeguard the Agency's sources and methods of operation. </s> The Court of Appeals underestimated the importance of providing intelligence sources with an assurance of confidentiality that is as absolute as possible. Under the court's approach, the Agency would be forced to disclose a source whenever a court determines, after the fact, that the Agency could have obtained the kind of information supplied without promising confidentiality. 20 This forced disclosure of the identities of its intelligence sources could well have a devastating impact on the Agency's ability to carry out its mission. "The Government has a compelling interest in protecting both the secrecy of information important to our national security and the appearance of confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence service." Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 , n. 3 (1980) (per curiam). See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981). If potentially valuable intelligence sources come to think that the Agency will be unable to maintain the confidentiality of its relationship to them, many could well refuse to supply information to the Agency in the first place. </s> Even a small chance that some court will order disclosure of a source's identity could well impair intelligence gathering and cause sources to "close up like a clam." To induce some sources to cooperate, the Government must tender as absolute an assurance of confidentiality as it possibly can. "The continued availability of [intelligence] sources depends upon the CIA's ability to guarantee the security of information [471 U.S. 159, 176] that might compromise them and even endanger [their] personal safety." Snepp v. United States, supra, at 512. </s> We seriously doubt whether a potential intelligence source will rest assured knowing that judges, who have little or no background in the delicate business of intelligence gathering, will order his identity revealed only after examining the facts of the case to determine whether the Agency actually needed to promise confidentiality in order to obtain the information. An intelligence source will "not be concerned with the underlying rationale for disclosure of" his cooperation if it was secured "under assurances of confidentiality." Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S., at 361 . Moreover, a court's decision whether an intelligence source will be harmed if his identity is revealed will often require complex political, historical, and psychological judgments. See, e. g., Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 578 F. Supp. 704 (DC 1983). There is no reason for a potential intelligence source, whose welfare and safety may be at stake, to have great confidence in the ability of judges to make those judgments correctly. </s> The Court of Appeals also failed to recognize that when Congress protected "intelligence sources" from disclosure, it was not simply protecting sources of secret intelligence information. As noted above, Congress was well aware that secret agents as depicted in novels and the media are not the typical intelligence source; many important sources provide intelligence information that members of the public could also obtain. Under the Court of Appeals' approach, the Agency could not withhold the identity of a source of intelligence if that information is also publicly available. This analysis ignores the realities of intelligence work, which often involves seemingly innocuous sources as well as unsuspecting individuals who provide valuable intelligence information. </s> Disclosure of the subject matter of the Agency's research efforts and inquiries may compromise the Agency's ability to gather intelligence as much as disclosure of the identities of intelligence sources. A foreign government can learn a great deal about the Agency's activities by knowing the [471 U.S. 159, 177] public sources of information that interest the Agency. The inquiries pursued by the Agency can often tell our adversaries something that is of value to them. See 228 U.S. App. D.C., at 277, 709 F.2d, at 103 (Bork, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For example, disclosure of the fact that the Agency subscribes to an obscure but publicly available Eastern European technical journal could thwart the Agency's efforts to exploit its value as a source of intelligence information. Similarly, had foreign governments learned the Agency was using certain public journals and ongoing open research projects in its MKULTRA research of "brainwashing" and possible countermeasures, they might have been able to infer both the general nature of the project and the general scope that the Agency's inquiry was taking. 21 </s> C </s> The "statutory mandate" of 102(d)(3) is clear: Congress gave the Director wide-ranging authority to "protec[t] intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." Snepp v. United States, supra, at 509, n. 3. An intelligence source provides, or is engaged to provide, information the Agency needs to fulfill its statutory obligations. The record establishes that the MKULTRA researchers did in fact provide the Agency with information related to the Agency's intelligence function. We therefore hold that the Director was authorized to withhold the identities of these researchers from disclosure under the FOIA. </s> IV </s> No. 83-1249 </s> The cross-petition, No. 83-1249, calls for decision on whether the District Court and the Court of Appeals correctly [471 U.S. 159, 178] ruled that the Director of Central Intelligence need not disclose the institutional affiliations of the MKULTRA researchers previously held to be "intelligence sources." Our conclusion that the MKULTRA researchers are protected from disclosure under 102(d)(3) renders unnecessary any extended discussion of this discrete issue. </s> In exercising the authority granted by Congress in 102(d)(3), the Director must, of course, do more than simply withhold the names of intelligence sources. Such withholding, standing alone, does not carry out the mandate of Congress. Foreign intelligence services have an interest in knowing what is being studied and researched by our agencies dealing with national security and by whom it is being done. Foreign intelligence services have both the capacity to gather and analyze any information that is in the public domain and the substantial expertise in deducing the identities of intelligence sources from seemingly unimportant details. </s> In this context, the very nature of the intelligence apparatus of any country is to try to find out the concerns of others; bits and pieces of data "may aid in piecing together bits of other information even when the individual piece is not of obvious importance in itself." Halperin v. CIA, 203 U.S. App. D.C. 110, 116, 629 F.2d 144, 150 (1980). Thus, </s> "`[w]hat may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to one who has a broad view of the scene and may put the questioned item of information in its proper context.'" Halkin v. Helms, 194 U.S. App. D.C. 82, 90, 598 F.2d 1, 9 (1978), quoting United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). </s> Accordingly, the Director, in exercising his authority under 102(d)(3), has power to withhold superficially innocuous information on the ground that it might enable an observer to discover the identity of an intelligence source. See, e. g., [471 U.S. 159, 179] Gardels v. CIA, 223 U.S. App. D.C. 88, 91-92, 689 F.2d 1100, 1103-1104 (1982); Halperin v. CIA, supra, at 113, 629 F.2d, at 147. </s> Here the Director concluded that disclosure of the institutional affiliations of the MKULTRA researchers could lead to identifying the researchers themselves and thus the disclosure posed an unacceptable risk of revealing protected "intelligence sources." 22 The decisions of the Director, who must of course be familiar with "the whole picture," as judges are not, are worthy of great deference given the magnitude of the national security interests and potential risks at stake. It is conceivable that the mere explanation of why information must be withheld can convey valuable information to a foreign intelligence agency. </s> The District Court, in a ruling affirmed by the Court of Appeals, permitted the Director to withhold the institutional affiliations of the researchers whose identities were exempt from disclosure on the ground that disclosure of "the identities of the institutions . . . might lead to the indirect disclosure of" individual researchers. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 83-1075, p. 27a. This conclusion is supported by the record. 23 The Director reasonably concluded that an observer [471 U.S. 159, 180] who is knowledgeable about a particular intelligence research project, like MKULTRA, could, upon learning that research was performed at a certain institution, often deduce the identities of the individual researchers who are protected "intelligence sources." The FOIA does not require disclosure under such circumstances. </s> Respondents contend that because the Agency has already revealed the names of many of the institutions at which MKULTRA research was performed, the Agency is somehow estopped from withholding the names of others. This suggestion overlooks the political realities of intelligence operations in which, among other things, our Government may choose to release information deliberately to "send a message" to allies or adversaries. 24 Congress did not mandate the withholding of information that may reveal the identity of an intelligence source; it made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible only for protecting against unauthorized disclosures. </s> The national interest sometimes makes it advisable, or even imperative, to disclose information that may lead to the identity of intelligence sources. And it is the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence, not that of the judiciary, to weigh the variety of complex and subtle factors in determining whether disclosure of information may lead to an unacceptable risk of compromising the Agency's intelligence-gathering process. Here Admiral Turner, as Director, decided that the benefits of disclosing the identities of institutions that had no objection to disclosure outweighed the costs [471 U.S. 159, 181] of doing so. But Congress, in 102(d)(3), entrusted this discretionary authority to the Director, and the fact that Admiral Turner made that determination in 1978 does not bind his successors to make the same determination, in a different context, with respect to institutions requesting that their identities not be disclosed. See, e. g., Salisbury v. United States, 223 U.S. App. D.C. 243, 248, 690 F.2d 966, 971 (1982). </s> V </s> We hold that the Director of Central Intelligence properly invoked 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 to withhold disclosure of the identities of the individual MKULTRA researchers as protected "intelligence sources." We also hold that the FOIA does not require the Director to disclose the institutional affiliations of the exempt researchers in light of the record which supports the Agency's determination that such disclosure would lead to an unacceptable risk of disclosing the sources' identities. </s> Accordingly, we reverse that part of the judgment of the Court of Appeals regarding the disclosure of the individual researchers and affirm that part of the judgment pertaining to disclosure of the researchers' institutional affiliations. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, S. Rep. No. 94-755, Book I, p. 389 (1976) (footnote omitted) (Final Report). MKULTRA began with a proposal [471 U.S. 159, 162] from Richard Helms, then the Agency's Assistant Deputy Director for Plans. Helms outlined a special funding mechanism for highly sensitive Agency research and development projects that would study the use of biological and chemical materials in altering human behavior. MKULTRA was approved by Allen Dulles, then the Director of Central Intelligence, on April 13, 1953. </s> [Footnote 2 Several MKULTRA subprojects involved experiments where researchers surreptitiously administered dangerous drugs, such as LSD, to unwitting human subjects. At least two persons died as a result of MKULTRA experiments, and others may have suffered impaired health because of the testing. See id., at 392-403. This type of experimentation is now expressly forbidden by Executive Order. Exec. Order No. 12333, 2.10, 3 CFR 213 (1982). </s> [Footnote 3 See generally Final Report, at 385-422, 471-472; Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States 226-228 (June 1975); Project MKULTRA, the CIA's Program of Research in Behavioral Modification: Joint Hearings before the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research of the Senate Committee on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Human Drug Testing by the CIA, 1977: Hearings on S. 1893 before the Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research of the Senate Committee on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). </s> An internal Agency report by its Inspector General had documented the controversial aspects of the MKULTRA project in 1963. See Report of Inspection of MKULTRA (July 26, 1963). </s> [Footnote 4 Sims and Wolfe are the respondents in No. 83-1075 and the cross-petitioners in No. 83-1249. In order to avoid confusion, we refer to Sims and Wolfe as respondents throughout this opinion. </s> [Footnote 5 Twenty years after the conception of the MKULTRA project, all known files pertaining to MKULTRA were ordered destroyed. Final Report, at 389-390, 403-405. In 1977, the Agency located some 8,000 pages of previously undisclosed MKULTRA documents. These consisted mostly of financial records that had inadvertently survived the 1973 records destruction. Upon this discovery, Agency Director Stansfield Turner notified the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and later testified at a joint hearing before the Select Committee and the Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Resources of the Senate Committee on Human Resources. Although the Joint Committee was given a complete list of the MKULTRA researchers and institutions, the Committee honored the Agency's request to treat the names as confidential. Respondents sought the surviving MKULTRA records that would provide this information. </s> [Footnote 6 The Agency also cited Exemption 6, 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6), which insulates from disclosure "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." This claim, rejected by the District Court and the Court of Appeals, is no longer at issue. </s> [Footnote 7 The Agency tried to contact each institution involved in MKULTRA to ask permission to disclose its identity; it released the names of the 59 institutions that had consented. Evidently, the Agency made no parallel effort to contact the 185 individual researchers. See n. 22, infra. </s> [Footnote 8 Judge Bork wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part. He criticized the majority's narrow definition of "intelligence sources," urging in particular that there is "no reason to think that section 403(d)(3) was meant to protect sources of information only if secrecy was needed in order to obtain the information." 228 U.S. App. D.C., at 277, 709 F.2d, at 103. He noted that "[i]t seems far more in keeping with the broad language and purpose of [ 403(d)(3)] to conclude that it authorizes the nondisclosure of a source of information whenever disclosure might lead to discovery of what subjects were of interest to the CIA." Ibid. He also took issue with the majority's conclusion that the FOIA sometimes requires the Agency to break a promise of confidentiality it has given to an intelligence source. This is "not an honorable way for the government of the United States to behave," and would produce "pernicious results." Id., at 276-277, 709 F.2d, at 102-103. </s> [Footnote 9 The Court has consistently recognized this principle. See, e. g., Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345, 352 (1982); NLRB v. Robbins Tire & [471 U.S. 159, 167] Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 220 (1978); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973). </s> [Footnote 10 See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 961, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1947); S. Rep. No. 239, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1947). </s> [Footnote 11 See H. R. Rep. No. 94-880, pt. 2, p. 15, n. 2 (1976). See also H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1380, p. 12 (1974); S. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1200, p. 12 (1974); S. Rep. No. 93-854, p. 16 (1974). For a thorough review of the relevant background, see DeLaurentiis v. Haig, 686 F.2d 192, 195-197 (CA3 1982) (per curiam). </s> Recently, Congress enacted the Central Intelligence Agency Information Act, Pub. L. 98-477, 98 Stat. 2209, exempting the Agency's "operational files" from the FOIA. The legislative history reveals that Congress maintains the position that 102(d)(3) is an Exemption 3 statute. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 98-726, pt. 1, p. 5 (1984); S. Rep. No. 98-305, p. 7, n. 4 (1983). </s> [Footnote 12 See, e. g., Miller v. Casey, 235 U.S. App. D.C. 11, 15, 730 F.2d 773, 777 (1984); Gardels v. CIA, 223 U.S. App. D.C. 88, 91, 689 F.2d 1100, 1103 (1982); Halperin v. CIA, 203 U.S. App. D.C. 110, 113, 629 F.2d 144, 147 (1980); National Comm'n on Law Enforcement and Social Justice v. CIA, 576 F.2d 1373, 1376 (CA9 1978). </s> [Footnote 13 Congress certainly is capable of drafting legislation that narrows the category of protected sources of information. In other provisions of the FOIA and in the Privacy Act, Congress has protected "confidential source[s]," sources of "confidential information," and sources that provided information under an express promise of confidentiality. See 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(D), 552a(k)(2) and (5). </s> [Footnote 14 Congressmen certainly appreciated the special nature of the Agency's intelligence function. For example, Representative Wadsworth remarked that the "function of [the Agency] is to constitute itself as a gathering point for information coming from all over the world through all kinds of channels." 93 Cong. Rec. 9397 (1947). Representative Boggs, during the course of the House hearings, commented that the Director of Central Intelligence "is dealing with all the information and the evaluation of that information, from wherever we can get it." National Security Act of 1947: Hearings on H. R. 2319 before the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 112 (1947). </s> [Footnote 15 These hearings were held in executive session. The transcript was declassified in 1982. The Senate also held hearings behind closed doors. See S. Rep. No. 239, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1947). </s> [Footnote 16 Secrecy is inherently a key to successful intelligence operations. In the course of issuing orders for an intelligence mission, George Washington wrote to his agent: </s> "The necessity of procuring good intelligence, is apparent and need not be further urged. All that remains for me to add is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon secrecy, success depends in most Enterprises of the kind, and for want of it they are generally defeated . . . ." 8 Writings of George Washington 478-479 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1933) (letter from George Washington to Colonel Elias Dayton, July 26, 1777). </s> [Footnote 17 App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 83-1075, pp. 22a-23a. </s> [Footnote 18 For example, Director of Intelligence Stansfield Turner explained in an affidavit that the MKULTRA program was initiated because the Agency was confronted with "learning the state of the art of behavioral modification at a time when the U.S. Government was concerned about inexplicable behavior of persons behind the `iron curtain' and American prisoners of war who had been subjected to so called `brainwashing.'" Id., at 89a. </s> [Footnote 19 Indeed, the legislative history of the recently enacted Central Intelligence Agency Information Act, Pub. L. 98-477, 98 Stat. 2209, in which Congress exempted the Agency's "operational files" from disclosure under the FOIA, 50 U.S.C. 431 (1982 ed., Supp. III), reveals Congress' continued understanding that scientific researchers would be valuable intelligence sources. See H. R. Rep. No. 98-726, pt. 1, p. 22 (1984). </s> [Footnote 20 Indeed, the Court of Appeals suggested that the Agency would be required to betray an explicit promise of confidentiality if a court determines that the promise was not necessary, or if a court concludes that the intelligence source to whom the promise was given was "unreasonably and atypically leery" of cooperating with the Agency. 228 U.S. App. D.C., at 273, 709 F.2d, at 99. However, "[g]reat nations, like great men, should keep their word." FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting). </s> [Footnote 21 In an affidavit, Director of Central Intelligence Turner stated that "[t]hroughout the course of the [MKULTRA] Project, CIA involvement or association with the research was concealed in order to avoid stimulating the interest of hostile countries in the same research areas." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 83-1075, pp. 89a-90a. </s> [Footnote 22 During the congressional inquiries into MKULTRA, then Director of Central Intelligence Turner notified the 80 institutions at which MKULTRA research had been conducted. Many of these institutions had not previously been advised of their involvement; Director Turner notified them as part of "a course of action [designed to] lead to the identification of unwitting experimental subjects." Id., at 92a, n. 1. As a result of inquiries into the MKULTRA program, many of these institutions disclosed their involvement to the public. Others advised the Agency that they had no objection to public disclosure. Director Turner disclosed the names of these institutions; he did not disclose the names of any institutions that objected to disclosure. See n. 7, supra. </s> [Footnote 23 For example, an affidavit filed by an Agency operations officer familiar with MKULTRA stated that disclosure of the institutions at which MKULTRA research was performed would pose "a threat of damage to existing intelligence-related arrangements with the institutions or exposure of past relationships with the institutions." App. 27. </s> [Footnote 24 Admiral Turner provided one well-known example of this phenomenon: </s> "[D]uring the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy decided to release a great deal of sensitive intelligence information concerning Soviet missile installations in Cuba. It was clear, at that time, that the Soviets had to be told publicly that the United States Government had precise information on the extent of the Soviet threat in order to justify the strong countermeasures then taken by our Government." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 83-1075, p. 90a. </s> JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, concurring in the result. </s> To give meaning to the term "intelligence source" as it is used in 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947, the Court today correctly concludes that the very narrow definition offered by the Court of Appeals is incorrect. 1 That the [471 U.S. 159, 182] Court of Appeals erred does not, however, compel the conclusion that the Agency's sweeping alternative definition is in fact the correct one. 2 The Court nonetheless simply adopts wholesale the Agency's definition of "intelligence source." That definition is mandated neither by the language or legislative history of any congressional Act, nor by legitimate policy considerations, and it in fact thwarts congressional efforts to balance the public's interest in information and the Government's need for secrecy. I therefore decline to join the opinion of the Court. </s> I </s> The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA or Act) established a broad mandate for disclosure of governmental information by requiring that all materials be made public "unless explicitly allowed to be kept secret by one of the exemptions . . . ." S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1965). The Act requires courts to review de novo agency claims of exemption, and it places on the agency the burden of defending its withholding of information. 5 U.S.C. 552(a) (4)(B). Congress, it is clear, sought to assure that the Government would not operate behind a veil of secrecy, and it narrowly tailored the exceptions to the fundamental goal of disclosure. </s> Two of these few exceptions are at issue in this case. The first, on which the Court focuses, is Exemption 3, which exempts information "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute," if the statute affords the agency no discretion on disclosure, 552(b)(3)(A), establishes particular criteria for withholding the information, 552(b)(3)(B), or refers to the particular types of material to be withheld, ibid. The Court [471 U.S. 159, 183] quite rightly identifies 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act as a statutory exemption of the kind to which Exemption 3 refers; that section places with the Director of Central Intelligence the responsibility for "protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." </s> A second exemption, known as Exemption 1, covers matters that are "(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order." 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1). This latter Exemption gives to the Executive Branch the authority to define material that will not be disclosed, subject of course to congressional amendment of the Exemption. Agency decisions to withhold are subject to de novo review in the courts, which must ascertain whether documents are correctly classified, both substantively and procedurally. </s> Exemption 1 is the keystone of a congressional scheme that balances deference to the Executive's interest in maintaining secrecy with continued judicial and congressional oversight. In the past, Congress has taken affirmative steps to make clear the importance of this oversight. See n. 5, infra. Exemption 1 allows the Government to protect from the scrutiny of this Nation's enemies classes of information that warrant protection, as long as the Government proceeds through a publicly issued, congressionally scrutinized, and judicially enforced executive order. See Hearings on Executive Order on Security Classification before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations of the House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (Hearing). </s> Exemption 1 thus plays a crucial role in the protection of Central Intelligence Agency information. That the Court does not mention this Exemption even once, in the course of its lengthy analysis on the policy reasons for broadly interpreting [471 U.S. 159, 184] the "intelligence source" provision, is extraordinary. By focusing myopically on the single statutory provision on which the Agency has chosen to rely in asserting its secrecy right, the Court rewards the Agency's decision not to invoke Exemption 1 in these cases. 3 Of course, the Agency may fairly assert any possible ground for decision, and it has no duty to select that which is narrowest. But the Court, intent to assure that important information is protected, today plays into the Agency's hands by stretching the "intelligence source" exception beyond its natural limit; it does so while simply ignoring the fact that the information sought could properly have been withheld on other grounds - on which the Agency chose not to rely. The cost of acceding to the Agency's litigation strategy, rather than undertaking a thorough analysis of the entire statutory scheme, is to mangle, seriously, a carefully crafted statutory scheme. </s> II </s> I turn, then, to consider in light of this statutory framework the Court's analysis of Exemption 3. After concluding that Exemption 3 incorporates 102(d)(3) as a withholding provision, the Court sets out to define the term "intelligence source." First, it looks to the "plain meaning" of the phrase and concludes that an "intelligence source" is self-evidently the same as an "information source." Ante, at 169-170. Second, the Court looks to the legislative history. Pulling [471 U.S. 159, 185] together pieces of testimony from congressional hearings on the need to establish a centralized agency to gather information, it concludes that Congress knew that the Agency would collect information from diverse sources, and that "Congress was plainly alert to the need for maintaining confidentiality" so as not to lose covert sources of information. Ante, at 172; see also Brief for Petitioners in No. 83-1075, pp. 18-21. Third, the Court chastises the Court of Appeals for adopting a "crabbed" reading of the statute and explains how, as a policy matter, the "forced disclosure of the identities of its intelligence sources could well have a devastating impact on the Agency's ability to carry out its mission." Ante, at 175; see also Brief for Petitioners in No. 83-1075, p. 31. The Court offers examples of highly sensitive information that, under the lower court's reading, might be disclosed. See ante, at 176-177; see also Brief for Petitioners in No. 83-1075, pp. 34-37. </s> Before this Court, the Agency argued against the lower court's definition of "intelligence source," substituted its own sweeping offering, and then recounted a litany of national security nightmares that would surely befall this Nation under any lesser standard; today the Court simply buys this analysis. But the Court thereby ignores several important facts. First, the holding today is not compelled by the language of the statute, nor by the legislative history on which the Court relies. Second, the Court of Appeals' definition is not the sole alternative to the one adopted by the Court today. Third, as noted, supra, other broad exemptions to FOIA exist, and a holding that this Exemption 3 exception does not apply here would in no way pose the risk of broad disclosure the Agency suggests. The Court's reliance on the Nation's national security interests is simply misplaced given that the "intelligence source" exemption in the National Security Act is far from the Agency's exclusive, or most potent, resource for keeping probing eyes from secret documents. In its haste to adopt the Agency's sweeping definition, [471 U.S. 159, 186] the Court completely bypasses a considerably more rational definition that comports at least as well with the statutory language and legislative history, and that maintains the congressionally imposed limits on the Agency's exercise of discretion in this area. </s> To my mind, the phrase "intelligence source" refers only to sources who provide information either on an express or implied promise of confidentiality, and the exemption protects such information and material that would lead to disclosure of such information. This reading is amply supported by the language of the statute and its history. </s> First, I find reliance on "plain meaning" wholly inappropriate. The heart of the issue is whether the term "intelligence source" connotes that which is confidential or clandestine, and the answer is far from obvious. The term is readily susceptible of many interpretations, and in the past the Government itself has defined the term far less broadly than it now does before this Court. In testimony before the House Subcommittee on Government Operations on President Reagan's Exemption 1 Executive Order, Steven Garfinkel, Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, explained that the term "intelligence source" is narrow and does not encompass even all confidential sources of information: </s> "[C]ertain of these sources are not `intelligence sources.' They are not involved in intelligence agencies or in intelligence work. They happen to be sources of information received by these agencies in confidence." Hearing, at 204. </s> The current administration's definition of the term "intelligence source" as used in its Executive Order does not, of course, control our interpretation of a longstanding statute. But the fact that the same administration has read the phrase in different ways for different purposes certainly undercuts the Court's argument that the phrase has any single and readily apparent definition. [471 U.S. 159, 187] </s> "[P]lain meaning, like beauty, is sometimes in the eye of the beholder," Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 737 (1985), and in an instance such as this one, in which the term at issue carries with it more than one plausible meaning, it is simply inappropriate to select a single reading and label it the "plain meaning." The Court, like the Government, argues that the statute does not say "confidential source," as it might were its scope limited to sources who have received an implied or express promise of confidentiality. See ante, at 169, and n. 13; Brief for Petitioners in No. 83-1075, p. 16. However, the statute also does not say "information source" as it might were it meant to define the class of material that the Court identifies. I therefore reject the Court's basic premise that the language at issue necessarily has but a single, obvious interpretation. </s> Nor does the legislative history suggest anything other than a congressional desire to protect those individuals who might either be harmed or silenced should their identities or assistance become known. The congressional hearings quoted by the Court, and by the Government in its brief, focus on Congress' concern about the "deadly peril" faced by intelligence sources if their identities were revealed, and about the possibility that those sources would "`close up like a clam'" without protection. See ante, at 172; Brief for Petitioners in No. 83-1075, p. 20. These concerns are fully addressed by preventing disclosure of the identities of sources who might face peril, or cease providing information, if their identities were known, and of other information that might lead an observer to identify such sources. That, to my mind, is the start and finish of the exemption for an "intelligence source" - one who contributes information on an implicit understanding or explicit assurance of confidentiality, as well as information that could lead to such a source. 4 </s> [471 U.S. 159, 188] </s> This reading of the "intelligence source" language also fits comfortably within the statutory scheme as a whole, as the Court's reading does not. I focus, at the outset, on the recent history of FOIA Exemption 1 and particularly on the way in which recent events reflect Congress' ongoing effort to constrain agency discretion of the kind endorsed today. The scope of Exemption 1 is defined by the Executive, and its breadth therefore quite naturally fluctuates over time. For example, at the time this FOIA action was begun, Executive Order 12065, promulgated by President Carter, was in effect. That Order established three levels of secrecy - top secret, secret, and confidential - the lowest of which, "confidential," was "applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause identifiable damage to the national security." 3 CFR 191 (1979). </s> The Order also listed categories of information that could be considered for classification, including "military plans, weapons, or operations," "foreign government information," and "intelligence activities [and] sources." Id., at 193. As it is now, nondisclosure premised on Exemption 1 was subject to judicial review. A court reviewing an Agency claim to withholding under Exemption 1 was required to determine de novo whether the document was properly classified and whether it substantively met the criteria in the Executive Order. If the claim was that the document or information in it contained military plans, for example, a court was required to determine whether the document was classified, whether it in fact contained such information and whether disclosure of the document reasonably could be expected to cause at least identifiable damage to national security. The burden was on the Agency to make this showing. At one time, this [471 U.S. 159, 189] Court believed that the Judiciary was not qualified to undertake this task. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973), discussed in n. 5, infra. Congress, however, disagreed, overruling both a decision of this Court and a Presidential veto to make clear that precisely this sort of judicial role is essential if the balance that Congress believed ought to be struck between disclosure and national security is to be struck in practice. 5 </s> Today's decision enables the Agency to avoid making the showing required under the carefully crafted balance embodied in Exemption 1 and thereby thwarts Congress' effort to limit the Agency's discretion. The Court identifies two categories of information - the identity of individuals or entities, whether or not confidential, that contribute material related [471 U.S. 159, 190] to Agency information gathering, and material that might enable an observer to discover the identity of such a "source" - and rules that all such information is per se subject to withholding as long as it is related to the Agency's "intelligence function." The Agency need not even assert that disclosure will conceivably affect national security, much less that it reasonably could be expected to cause at least identifiable damage. It need not classify the information, much less demonstrate that it has properly been classified. Similarly, no court may review whether the source had, or would have had, any interest in confidentiality, or whether disclosure of the information would have any effect on national security. No court may consider whether the information is properly classified, or whether it fits the categories of the Executive Order. By choosing to litigate under Exemption 3, and by receiving this Court's blessing, the Agency has cleverly evaded all these carefully imposed congressional requirements. 6 </s> If the class thus freed from judicial review were carefully defined, this result conceivably could make sense. It could [471 U.S. 159, 191] mean that Congress had decided to slice out from all the Agency's possible documents a class of material that may always be protected, no matter what the scope of the existing executive order. But the class that the Court defines is boundless. It is difficult to conceive of anything the Central Intelligence Agency might have within its many files that might not disclose or enable an observer to discover something about where the Agency gathers information. Indeed, even newspapers and public libraries, road maps and telephone books appear to fall within the definition adopted by the Court today. The result is to cast an irrebuttable presumption of secrecy over an expansive array of information in Agency files, whether or not disclosure would be detrimental to national security, and to rid the Agency of the burden of making individualized showings of compliance with an executive order. Perhaps the Court believes all Agency documents should be susceptible to withholding in this way. But Congress, it must be recalled, expressed strong disagreement by passing, and then amending, Exemption 1. In light of the Court's ruling, the Agency may nonetheless circumvent the procedure Congress has developed and thereby undermine this explicit effort to keep from the Agency broad and unreviewable discretion over an expansive class of information. </s> III </s> The Court today reads its own concerns into the single phrase, "intelligence source." To justify its expansive reading of these two words in the National Security Act the Court explains that the Agency must be wary, protect itself, and not allow observers to learn either of its information resources or of the topics of its interest. "Disclosure of the subject matter of the Agency's research efforts and inquiries may compromise the Agency's ability to gather intelligence as much as disclosure of the identities of intelligence sources," ante, at 176, the Court observes, and the "intelligence source" [471 U.S. 159, 192] exemption must bear the weight of that concern as well. That the Court points to no legislator or witness before Congress who expressed a concern for protecting such information through this provision is irrelevant to the Court. That each of the examples the Court offers of material that might disclose a topic of interest, and that should not be disclosed, could be protected through other existing statutory provisions, is of no moment. 7 That the public already knows all about the MKULTRA project at issue in this case, except for the names of the researchers, and therefore that the Court's concern about disclosure of the Agency's "topics of interest" argument is not appropriate to this case, is of no consequence. And finally, that the Agency now has virtually unlimited discretion to label certain information "secret," in contravention of Congress' explicit efforts to confine the Agency's discretion both substantively and procedurally, is of no importance. Instead, simply because the Court can think of information that it believes should not be disclosed, and that might otherwise not fall within this exemption, the Court undertakes the task of interpreting the exemption to cover that information. I cannot imagine the canon of statutory construction upon which this reasoning is based. [471 U.S. 159, 193] </s> Congress gave to the Agency considerable discretion to decide for itself whether the topics of its interest should remain secret, and through Exemption 1 it provided the Executive with the means to protect such information. If the Agency decides to classify the identities of nonconfidential contributors of information so as not to reveal the subject matter or kinds of interests it is pursuing, it may seek an Exemption 1 right to withhold. Under Congress' scheme, that is properly a decision for the Executive. It is not a decision for this Court. Congress has elsewhere identified particular types of information that it believes may be withheld regardless of the existence of an executive order, such as the identities of Agency employees, or, recently, the contents of Agency operational files. See 50 U.S.C. 403g (exempting from disclosure requirements the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency); Central Intelligence Agency Information Act, Pub. L. 98-477, 701(a), 98 Stat. 2209, 50 U.S.C. 431 (1982 ed., Supp. III) (exempting the Agency's operational files from disclosure under FOIA). Each of these categorical exemptions reflects a congressional judgment that as to certain information, the public interest will always tip in favor of nondisclosure. In these cases, we have absolutely no indication that Congress has ever determined that the broad range of information that will hereinafter be enshrouded in secrecy should be inherently and necessarily confidential. Nevertheless, today the Court reaches out to substitute its own policy judgments for those of Congress. </s> IV </s> To my mind, the language and legislative history of 102(d)(3), along with the policy concerns expressed by the Agency, support only an exemption for sources who provide information based on an implicit or explicit promise of confidentiality and information leading to disclosure of such sources. That reading of the "intelligence source" exemption poses no threat that sources will "clam up" for fear of [471 U.S. 159, 194] exposure, while at the same time it avoids an injection into the statutory scheme of the additional concerns of the Members of this Court. The Court of Appeals, however, ordered the release of even more material than I believe should be disclosed. Accordingly, I would reverse and remand this case for reconsideration in light of what I deem to be the proper definition of the term "intelligence source." </s> [Footnote 1 The Court of Appeals defined an "intelligence source" as "a person or institution that provides, has provided, or has been engaged to provide the CIA with information of a kind the Agency needs to perform its intelligence function effectively, yet could not reasonably expect to obtain without guaranteeing the confidentiality of those who provide it." 206 U.S. App. D.C. 157, 166, 642 F.2d 562, 571 (1980) (Sims I). </s> [Footnote 2 The Court today defines an "intelligence source" as one that "provides, or is engaged to provide, information . . . related to the Agency's intelligence function," ante, at 177, and holds also that the Director may withhold, under this definition, information that might enable an observer to discover the identity of such a source. Ante, at 178. </s> [Footnote 3 Indeed, these cases present a curious example of the Government's litigation strategy. Despite the repeated urging of the District Court, the Agency steadfastly refused to invoke Exemption 1 to withhold the information at issue. The lists of names of MKULTRA researchers were in fact once classified under an Executive Order and were therefore within the potential scope of Exemption 1, but the Agency elected to declassify them. See 479 F. Supp. 84, 88 (DC 1979). The District Court went so far as to postpone the effective date of its disclosure order, so the Agency could "act on the possibility of classifying the names of institutions and researchers which would otherwise be disclosable," ibid., and thereby withhold the information under Exemption 1. The Agency refused to do so, however. </s> [Footnote 4 The fact that Congress established an Agency to collect information from anywhere it could does not mean that it sought through the phrase "intelligence source" to keep secret everything the Agency did in this [471 U.S. 159, 188] regard. Far from it, as the Court and the Agency both acknowledge, the early congressional expressions of concern about secrecy all focused on the need to maintain the anonymity of persons who would provide information only on an assurance of confidentiality. </s> [Footnote 5 In EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973), the Court held that when an agency relied on Exemption 1, which at the time covered matters "specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy," 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1) (1970 ed.), a reviewing court could affirm the decision not to disclose on the basis of an agency affidavit stating that the document had been duly classified pursuant to executive order. The Court held that in camera inspection of the documents was neither authorized nor permitted because "Congress chose to follow the Executive's determination in these matters." 410 U.S., at 81 . </s> Shortly thereafter, Congress overrode a Presidential veto and amended the Act with the express purpose of overuling the Mink decision. Exemption 1 was modified to exempt only matters that are "(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order." 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1). In addition, Congress amended the judicial review language to provide that "the court shall determine the matter de novo, and may examine the contents of such agency records in camera to determine whether such records or any part thereof shall be withheld under any of the exemptions set forth in subsection (b) of this section, and the burden is on the agency to sustain its action." 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B). The legislative history unequivocally establishes that in camera review would often be necessary and appropriate. See S. Rep. No. 93-1200, p. 9 (1974). </s> [Footnote 6 The current Executive Order moves Exemption 1 a step closer to Exemption 3, given the manner in which the Court interprets the National Security Act exemption. Like its predecessor, the Order establishes three classification levels, but unlike the prior Order, the "confidential" classification no longer requires a reasonable possibility of identifiable damage. Instead, the label "confidential" now shall be applied to "information the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security." Exec. Order No. 12356, 3 CFR 166 (1983). In addition, the new Order not only lists "intelligence sources" as a category subject to classification, but it also creates a presumption that such information is confidential. This presumption shifts from the Agency the burden of proving the possible consequence to national security of disclosure. As a result, if the Agency defines "intelligence source" under the Executive Order as broadly as the Court defines the term in 102(d)(3), the Agency need make but a limited showing to a court to invoke Exemption 1 for that material. In light of this new Order, the Court's avid concern for the national security consequences of a narrower definition of the term is quite puzzling. </s> [Footnote 7 For example, the Court suggests that disclosure of the fact that the Agency subscribes to an obscure but publicly available Eastern European technical journal "could thwart the Agency's efforts to exploit its value as a source of intelligence information." Ante, at 177; see Brief for Petitioners in No. 83-1075, p. 36. Assuming this method of obtaining information is not protected by Exemption 1, through an executive order, it would surely be protected through Exemption 3's incorporation of 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act. That provision, in addition to protecting "intelligence sources," also protects "intelligence methods," and surely encompasses covert means of obtaining information, the disclosure of which might close access to certain kinds of information. Similarly, the fact that some unsuspecting individuals provide valuable intelligence information must be protected, see ante, at 176; Brief for Petitioners in No. 83-1075, p. 39, n. 15, but again, because it is a covert means of obtaining information, not because the "source" of that information needs or expects confidentiality. </s> [471 U.S. 159, 195]

United States Supreme Court HOFFMAN PLASTIC COMPOUNDS, INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD(2002) No. 00-1595 Argued: January 15, 2002Decided: March 27, 2002 </s> Petitioner hired Jose Castro on the basis of documents appearing to verify his authorization to work in the United States, but laid him and others off after they supported a union-organizing campaign at petitioner's plant. Respondent National Labor Relations Board (Board) found that the layoffs violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and ordered backpay and other relief. At a compliance hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to determine the amount of backpay, Castro testified, inter alia, that he was born in Mexico, that he had never been legally admitted to, or authorized to work in, this country, and that he gained employment with petitioner only after tendering a birth certificate belonging to a friend born in Texas. Based on this testimony, the ALJ found that the Board was precluded from awarding Castro relief by Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, and by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), which makes it unlawful for employers knowingly to hire undocumented workers or for employees to use fraudulent documents to establish employment eligibility. The Board reversed with respect to backpay, citing its precedent holding that the most effective way to further the immigration policies embodied in IRCA is to provide the NLRA's protections and remedies to undocumented workers in the same manner as to other employees. The Court of Appeals denied review and enforced the Board's order. </s> Held:Federal immigration policy, as expressed by Congress in IRCA, foreclosed the Board from awarding backpay to an undocumented alien who has never been legally authorized to work in the United States. Pp.4-14. </s> (a)This Court has consistently set aside the Board's backpay awards to employees found guilty of serious illegal conduct in connection with their employment. See, e.g., Southern S. S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 40-47. Since Southern S.S. Co., the Court has never deferred to the Board's remedial preferences where such preferences potentially trench upon federal statutes and policies unrelated to the NLRA. See, e.g., Sure-Tan, supra, in which the Court set aside an award of reinstatement and backpay to undocumented alien workers who were not authorized to reenter this country following their voluntary departure when their employers unlawfully reported them to the Immigration and Naturalization Service in retaliation for union activity. Among other things, the Court there found that the Board's authority with respect to the selection of remedies was limited by federal immigration policy as expressed in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and held that, in order to avoid a potential conflict with the INA with respect to backpay, the employees must be deemed "unavailable" for work (and the accrual of backpay therefore tolled) during any period when they were not "lawfully entitled to be present and employed in the United States." 510 U.S. 317, 325, distinguished. Pp.4-8. </s> (b)As a matter of plain language, Sure-Tan's express limitation of backpay to documented alien workers forecloses the backpay award to Castro, who was never lawfully entitled to be present or employed in the United States. But the Court need not resolve whether, read in context, Sure-Tan's limitation applies only to aliens who left the United States and thus cannot claim backpay without lawful reentry. The question presented here is better analyzed through a wider lens, focusing on a legal landscape now significantly changed. The Southern S.S. Co. line of cases established that where the Board's chosen remedy trenches upon a federal statute or policy outside the Board's competence to administer, the Board's remedy may have to yield. Whether or not this was the situation at the time of Sure-Tan, it is precisely the situation today. Two years after Sure-Tan, Congress enacted IRCA, a comprehensive scheme that made combating the employment of illegal aliens in the United States central to the policy of immigration law. INS v. National Center for Immigrants' Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 194, and n.8. Among other things, IRCA established an extensive "employment verification system," 8 U.S.C. §1324a(a)(1), designed to deny employment to aliens who (a)are not lawfully present in the United States, or (b)are not lawfully authorized to work in the United States, §1324a(h)(3). It also makes it a crime for an unauthorized alien to subvert the employer verification system by tendering fraudulent documents, §1324c(a), an offense that Castro committed when obtaining employment with petitioner. Thus, allowing the Board to award backpay to illegal aliens would unduly trench upon explicit statutory prohibitions critical to federal immigration policy. It would encourage the successful evasion of apprehension by immigration authorities, condone prior violations of the immigration laws, and encourage future violations. However broad the Board's discretion to fashion remedies when dealing only with the NLRA, it is not so unbounded as to authorize this sort of an award. Lack of authority to award backpay does not mean that the employer gets off scot free. The Board here has already imposed other significant sanctions against petitioner, including orders that it cease and desist its NLRA violations and conspicuously posta notice detailing employees' rights and its prior unfair practices, which are sufficient to effectuate national labor policy regardless of whether backpay accompanies them, Sure-Tan, supra, at 904, and n.13. Pp.8-14. </s> 237 F.3d 639, reversed. </s> Rehnquist, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. </s> HOFFMAN PLASTIC COMPOUNDS, INC.,PETITIONER v. NATIONAL LABORRELATIONS BOARD </s> on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit </s> [March 27, 2002] </s> Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The National Labor Relations Board (Board) awarded backpay to an undocumented alien who has never been legally authorized to work in the United States. We hold that such relief is foreclosed by federal immigration policy, as expressed by Congress in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). </s> Petitioner Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. (petitioner or Hoffman), custom-formulates chemical compounds for businesses that manufacture pharmaceutical, construction, and household products. In May 1988, petitioner hired Jose Castro to operate various blending machines that "mix and cook" the particular formulas per customer order. Before being hired for this position, Castro presented documents that appeared to verify his authorization to work in the United States. In December 1988, the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum, and Plastic Workers of America, AFL-CIO, began a union-organizing campaign at petitioner's production plant. Castro and several other employees supported the organizing campaign and distributed authorization cards to co-workers. In January 1989, Hoffman laid off Castro and other employees engaged in these organizing activities. </s> Three years later, in January 1992, respondent Board found that Hoffman unlawfully selected four employees, including Castro, for layoff "in order to rid itself of known union supporters" in violation of §8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).1 306 N.L.R.B. 100. To remedy this violation, the Board ordered that Hoffman (1)cease and desist from further violations of the NLRA, (2)post a detailed notice to its employees regarding the remedial order, and (3)offer reinstatement and backpay to the four affected employees. Id., at 107-108. Hoffman entered into a stipulation with the Board's General Counsel and agreed to abide by the Board's order. </s> In June 1993, the parties proceeded to a compliance hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to determine the amount of backpay owed to each discriminatee. On the final day of the hearing, Castro testified that he was born in Mexico and that he had never been legally admitted to, or authorized to work in, the United States. 314 N.L.R.B. 683, 685 (1994). He admitted gaining employment with Hoffman only after tendering a birth certificate belonging to a friend who wasborn in Texas. Ibid. He also admitted that he used this birth certificate to fraudulently obtain a California driver's license and a Social Security card, and to fraudulently obtain employment following his layoff by Hoffman. Ibid. Neither Castro nor the Board's General Counsel offered any evidence that Castro had applied or intended to apply for legal authorization to work in the United States. Ibid. Based on this testimony, the ALJ found the Board precluded from awarding Castro backpay or reinstatement as such relief would be contrary to Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984), and in conflict with IRCA, which makes it unlawful for employers knowingly to hire undocumented workers or for employees to use fraudulent documents to establish employment eligibility. 314 N.L.R.B., at 685-686. </s> In September 1998, four years after the ALJ's decision, and seven years after Castro was fired, the Board reversed with respect to backpay. 326 N.L. R. B. 1060. Citing its earlier decision in A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 408 (1995), the Board determined that "the most effective way to accommodate and further the immigration policies embodied in [IRCA] is to provide the protections and remedies of the [NLRA] to undocumented workers in the same manner as to other employees." 326 N.L.R.B., at 1060. The Board thus found that Castro was entitled to $66,951 of backpay, plus interest. Id., at 1062. It calculated this backpay award from the date of Castro's termination to the date Hoffman first learned of Castro's undocumented status, a period of 31/2 years. Id., at 1061. A dissenting Board member would have affirmed the ALJ and denied Castro all backpay. Id., at 1062 (opinion of Hurtgen). </s> Hoffman filed a petition for review of the Board's order in the Court of Appeals. A panel of the Court of Appeals denied the petition for review. 208 F.3d 229 (CADC 2000). After rehearing the case en banc, the court again denied the petition for review and enforced the Board's order. 237 F.3d 639 (2001). We granted certiorari, 533 U.S. 976 (2001), and now reverse.2 </s> This case exemplifies the principle that the Board's discretion to select and fashion remedies for violations of the NLRA, though generally broad, see, e.g., NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Miami, Inc., 344 U.S. 344, 346-347 (1953), is not unlimited, see, e.g., NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 257-258 (1939); Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 46-47 (1942); NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 532-534 (1984); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, supra, at 902-904. Since the Board's inception, we have consistently set aside awards of reinstatement or backpay to employees found guilty of serious illegal conduct in connection with their employment. In Fansteel, the Board awarded reinstatement with backpay to employees who engaged in a "sit down strike" that led to confrontation with local law enforcement officials. We set aside the award, saying: </s> "We are unable to conclude that Congress intended to compel employers to retain persons in their employ regardless of their unlawful conduct,--to invest those who go on strike with an immunity from discharge for acts of trespass or violence against the employer's property, which they would not have enjoyed had they remained at work." 306 U.S., at 255. </s> Though we found that the employer had committed serious violations of the NLRA, the Board had no discretion to remedy those violations by awarding reinstatement with backpay to employees who themselves had committed serious criminal acts. Two years later, in Southern S.S. Co., supra, the Board awarded reinstatement with backpay to five employees whose strike on shipboard had amounted to a mutiny in violation of federal law. We set aside the award, saying: </s> "It is sufficient for this case to observe that the Board has not been commissioned to effectuate the policies of the Labor Relations Act so single-mindedly that it may wholly ignore other and equally important [c]ongressional objectives." 316 U.S., at47. </s> Although the Board had argued that the employees' conduct did not in fact violate the federal mutiny statute, we rejected this view, finding the Board's interpretation of a statute so far removed from its expertise entitled no deference from this Court. Id., at 40-46. Since Southern S.S. Co., we have accordingly never deferred to the Board's remedial preferences where such preferences potentially trench upon federal statutes and policies unrelated to the NLRA. Thus, we have precluded the Board from enforcing orders found in conflict with the Bankruptcy Code, see Bildisco, supra, at 527-534, 529, n.9 ("While the Board's interpretation of the NLRA should be given some deference, the proposition that the Board's interpretation of statutes outside its expertise is likewise to be deferred to is novel"), rejected claims that federal antitrust policy should defer to the NLRA, Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers, 421 U.S. 616, 626 (1975), and precluded the Board from selecting remedies pursuant to its own interpretation of the Interstate Commerce Act, Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 108-110 (1958). </s> Our decision in Sure-Tan followed this line of cases and set aside an award closely analogous to the award challenged here. There we confronted for the first time a potential conflict between the NLRA and federal immigration policy, as then expressed in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 66 Stat. 163, as amended, 8 U.S.C. §1101 etseq. Two companies had unlawfully reported alien-employees to the INS in retaliation for union activity. Rather than face INS sanction, the employees voluntarily departed to Mexico. The Board investigated and found the companies acted in violation of §§8(a)(1) and (3) of the NLRA. The Board's ensuing order directed the companies to reinstate the affected workers and pay them six months' backpay. </s> We affirmed the Board's determination that the NLRA applied to undocumented workers, reasoning that the immigration laws "as presently written" expressed only a "`peripheral concern'" with the employment of illegal aliens. 424 U.S. 351, 360 (1976)). "For whatever reason," Congress had not "made it a separate criminal offense" for employers to hire an illegal alien, or for an illegal alien "to accept employment after entering this country illegally." Sure-Tan, supra, at 892-893. Therefore, we found "no reason to conclude that application of the NLRA to employment practices affecting such aliens would necessarily conflict with the terms of the INA." 467 U.S., at893. </s> With respect to the Board's selection of remedies, however, we found its authority limited by federal immigration policy. See id., at 903 ("In devising remedies for unfair labor practices, the Board is obliged to take into account another `equally important Congressional objective'") (quoting Southern S.S. Co., supra, at47)). For example, the Board was prohibited from effectively rewarding a violation of the immigration laws by reinstating workers not authorized to reenter the United States. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S., at 903. Thus, to avoid "a potential conflict with the INA," the Board's reinstatement order had to be conditioned upon proof of "the employees' legal reentry." Ibid. "Similarly," with respect to backpay, we stated: "[T]he employees must be deemed `unavailable' for work (and the accrual of backpay therefore tolled) during any period when they were not lawfully entitled to be present and employed in the United States." Ibid. "In light of the practical workings of the immigration laws," such remedial limitations were appropriate even if they led to "[t]he probable unavailability of the [NLRA's] more effective remedies." Id., at904. </s> The Board cites our decision in ABF Freight System, Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317 (1994), as authority for awarding backpay to employees who violate federal laws. In ABF Freight, we held that an employee's false testimony at a compliance proceeding did not require the Board to deny reinstatement with backpay. The question presented was "a narrow one," id., at 322, limited to whether the Board was obliged to "adopt a rigid rule" that employees who testify falsely under oath automatically forfeit NLRA remedies, id., at 325. There are significant differences between that case and this. First, we expressly did not address whether the Board could award backpay to an employee who engaged in "serious misconduct" unrelated to internal Board proceedings, id., at 322, n.7, such as threatening to kill a supervisor, ibid. (citing Precision Window Mfg. v. NLRB, 963 F.2d 1105, 1110 (CA8 1992)), or stealing from an employer, 371 U.S. 156, 172 (1962). Third, the employee misconduct at issue, though serious, was not at all analogous to misconduct that renders an underlying employment relationship illegal under explicit provisions of federal law. See, e.g., 237 F.3d, at 657, n.2 (Sentelle,J., dissenting) ("The perjury statute provides for criminal sanctions; it does not forbid a present or potential perjurer from obtaining a job") (distinguishing ABF Freight)). For these reasons, we believe the present case is controlled by the Southern S.S. Co. line of cases, rather than by ABF Freight. </s> It is against this decisional background that we turn to the question presented here. The parties and the lower courts focus much of their attention on Sure-Tan, particularly its express limitation of backpay to aliens "lawfully entitled to be present and employed in the United States." 467 U.S., at 903. All agree that as a matter of plain language, this limitation forecloses the award of backpay to Castro. Castro was never lawfully entitled to be present or employed in the United States, and thus, under the plain language of Sure-Tan, he has no right to claim backpay. The Board takes the view, however, that read in context, this limitation applies only to aliens who left the United States and thus cannot claim backpay without lawful reentry. Brief for Respondent 17-24. The Court of Appeals agreed with this view. 237 F.3d, at 642-646. Another Court of Appeals, however, agrees with Hoffman, and concludes that Sure-Tan simply meant what it said, i.e., that any alien who is "not lawfully entitled to be present and employed in the United States" cannot claim backpay. See DelRey Tortilleria, Inc. v. NLRB, 976 F.2d 1115 1118-1121 (CA71992); Brief for Petitioner 7-20. We need not resolve this controversy. For whether isolated sentences from Sure-Tan definitively control, or count merely as persuasive dicta in support of petitioner, we think the question presented here better analyzed through a wider lens, focused as it must be on a legal landscape now significantly changed. </s> The Southern S.S. Co. line of cases established that where the Board's chosen remedy trenches upon a federal statute or policy outside the Board's competence to administer, the Board's remedy may be required to yield. Whether or not this was the situation at the time of Sure-Tan, it is precisely the situation today. In 1986, two years after Sure-Tan, Congress enacted IRCA, a comprehensive scheme prohibiting the employment of illegal aliens in the United States. §101(a)(1), 100 Stat. 3360, 8 U.S.C. §1324a. As we have previously noted, IRCA "forcefully" made combating the employment of illegal aliens central to "[t]he policy of immigration law." INS v. National Center for Immigrants' Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 194, and n.8 (1991). It did so by establishing an extensive "employment verification system," §1324a(a)(1), designed to deny employment to aliens who (a)are not lawfully present in the United States, or (b)are not lawfully authorized to work in the United States, §1324a(h)(3).3 This verification system is critical to the IRCA regime. To enforce it, IRCA mandates that employers verify the identity and eligibility of all new hires by examining specified documents before they begin work. §1324a(b). If an alien applicant is unable to present the required documentation, the unauthorized alien cannot be hired. §1324a(a)(1). </s> Similarly, if an employer unknowingly hires an unauthorized alien, or if the alien becomes unauthorized while employed, the employer is compelled to discharge the worker upon discovery of the worker's undocumented status. §1324a(a)(2). Employers who violate IRCA are punished by civil fines, §1324a(e)(4)(A), and may be subject to criminal prosecution, §1324a(f)(1). IRCA also makes it a crime for an unauthorized alien to subvert the employer verification system by tendering fraudulent documents. §1324c(a). It thus prohibits aliens from using or attempting to use "any forged, counterfeit, altered, or falsely made document" or "any document lawfully issued to or with respect to a person other than the possessor" for purposes of obtaining employment in the United States. §§1324c(a)(1)-(3). Aliens who use or attempt to use such documents are subject to fines and criminal prosecution. 18 U.S.C. §1546(b). There is no dispute that Castro's use of false documents to obtain employment with Hoffman violated these provisions. </s> Under the IRCA regime, it is impossible for an undocumented alien to obtain employment in the United States without some party directly contravening explicit congressional policies. Either the undocumented alien tenders fraudulent identification, which subverts the cornerstone of IRCA's enforcement mechanism, or the employer knowingly hires the undocumented alien in direct contradiction of its IRCA obligations. The Board asks that we overlook this fact and allow it to award backpay to an illegal alien for years of work not performed, for wages that could not lawfully have been earned, and for a job obtained in the first instance by a criminal fraud. We find, however, that awarding backpay to illegal aliens runs counter to policies underlying IRCA, policies the Board has no authority to enforce or administer. Therefore, as we have consistently held in like circumstances, the award lies beyond the bounds of the Board's remedial discretion. </s> The Board contends that awarding limited backpay to Castro "reasonably accommodates" IRCA, because, in the Board's view, such an award is not "inconsistent" with IRCA. Brief for Respondent 29-42. The Board argues that because the backpay period was closed as of the dateHoffman learned of Castro's illegal status, Hoffman could have employed Castro during the backpay period without violating IRCA. Id., at 37. The Board further argues that while IRCA criminalized the misuse of documents, "it did not make violators ineligible for back pay awards or other compensation flowing from employment secured by the misuse of such documents." Id., at 38. This latter statement, of course, proves little: The mutiny statute in Southern S.S. Co., and the INA in Sure-Tan, were likewise understandably silent with respect to such things as backpay awards under the NLRA. What matters here, and what sinks both of the Board's claims, is that Congress has expressly made it criminally punishable for an alien to obtain employment with false documents. There is no reason to think that Congress nonetheless intended to permit backpay where but for an employer's unfair labor practices, an alien-employee would have remained in the United States illegally, and continued to work illegally, all the while successfully evading apprehension by immigration authorities.4 Far from "accommodating" IRCA, the Board's position, recognizing employer misconduct but discounting the misconduct of illegal alien employees, subvertsit. </s> Indeed, awarding backpay in a case like this not only trivializes the immigration laws, it also condones and encourages future violations. The Board admits that had the INS detained Castro, or had Castro obeyed the law and departed to Mexico, Castro would have lost his right to backpay. See Brief for Respondent 7-8 (citing A.P.R.A. Fuel Buyers Group, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B., at 416). Cf.INS v. National Center for Immigrants' Rights, Inc., 313 U.S. 177, 198 (1941)), without triggering new IRCA violations, either by tendering false documents to employers or by finding employers willing to ignore IRCA and hire illegal workers. The Board here has failed to even consider this tension. See 326 N.L.R.B., at 1063, n.10 (finding that Castro adequately mitigated damages through interim work with no mention of ALJ findings that Castro secured interim work with false documents).5 </s> We therefore conclude that allowing the Board to award backpay to illegal aliens would unduly trench upon explicit statutory prohibitions critical to federal immigration policy, as expressed in IRCA. It would encourage the successful evasion of apprehension by immigration authorities, condone prior violations of the immigration laws, and encourage future violations. However broad the Board's discretion to fashion remedies when dealing only with the NLRA, it is not so unbounded as to authorize this sort of an award. </s> Lack of authority to award backpay does not mean that the employer gets off scot-free. The Board here has already imposed other significant sanctions against Hoffman--sanctions Hoffman does not challenge. See supra, at2. These include orders that Hoffman cease and desist its violations of the NLRA, and that it conspicuously posta notice to employees setting forth their rights under the NLRA and detailing its prior unfair practices. 306 N.L.R.B., at 100-101. Hoffman will be subject to contempt proceedings should it fail to comply with these orders. NLRB v. Warren Co., 350 U.S. 107, 112-113 (1955) (Congress gave the Board civil contempt power to enforce compliance with the Board's orders). We have deemed such "traditional remedies" sufficient to effectuate national labor policy regardless of whether the "spur and catalyst" of backpay accompanies them. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S., at 904. See also id., at 904, n.13 ("This threat of contempt sanctions ... provides a significant deterrent against future violations of the [NLRA]"). As we concluded in Sure-Tan, "in light of the practical workings of the immigration laws," any "perceived deficienc[y] in the NLRA's existing remedial arsenal," must be "addressed by congressional action," not the courts. Id., at 904. In light of IRCA, this statement is even truer today.6 </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. </s> It is so ordered. </s> HOFFMAN PLASTIC COMPOUNDS, INC., PETITIONER v. NATIONAL LABORRELATIONS BOARD </s> on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit </s> [March 27, 2002] </s> Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting. </s> I cannot agree that the backpay award before us "runs counter to," or "trenches upon," national immigration policy. Ante, at 9, 10 (citing the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). As all the relevant agencies (including the Department of Justice) have told us, the National Labor Relations Board's limited backpay order will not interfere with the implementation of immigration policy. Rather, it reasonably helps to deter unlawful activity that both labor laws and immigration laws seek to prevent. Consequently, the order is lawful. See ante, at 4 (recognizing "broad" scope of Board's remedial authority). </s> * * * </s> The Court does not deny that the employer in this case dismissed an employee for trying to organize a union--a crude and obvious violation of the labor laws. See 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(3) (1994 ed.); NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 398 (1983). And it cannot deny that the Board has especially broad discretion in choosing an appropriate remedy for addressing such violations. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 612, n. 32 (1969) (Board "draws on a fund of knowledge and expertise all its own, and its choice of remedy must therefore be given special respect by reviewing courts"). Nor can it deny that in such circumstances backpay awards serve critically important remedial purposes. NLRB v. J. H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258, 263 (1969). Those purposes involve more than victim compensation; they also include deterrence, i.e., discouraging employers from violating the Nation's labor laws. See ante, at 13 (recognizing the deterrent purposes of the NLRA); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 904, n. 13 (1984) (same). </s> Without the possibility of the deterrence that backpay provides, the Board can impose only future-oriented obligations upon law-violating employers--for it has no other weapons in its remedial arsenal. Ante, at 13. And in the absence of the backpay weapon, employers could conclude that they can violate the labor laws at least once with impunity. See A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 408, 415, n. 38 (1995) (without potential backpay order employer might simply discharge employees who show interest in a union "secure in the knowledge" that only penalties were requirements "to cease and desist and post a notice"); cf. Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 185 (1973); cf. also EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. ___, ___ (2002) (slip op., at 16 n. 11) (backpay award provides important incentive to report illegal employer conduct); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-418 (1975) ("It is the reasonably certain prospect of a backpay award" that leads employers to "shun practices of dubious legality"). Hence the backpay remedy is necessary; it helps make labor law enforcement credible; it makes clear that violating the labor laws will not pay. </s> Where in the immigration laws can the Court find a "policy" that might warrant taking from the Board this critically important remedial power? Certainly not in any statutory language. The immigration statutes say that an employer may not knowingly employ an illegal alien, that an alien may not submit false documents, and that the employer must verify documentation. See 8 U.S.C. §§1324a(a)(1),1324a(b); 18 U.S.C. §1546(b)(1). They provide specific penalties, including criminal penalties, for violations. Ibid., 8 U.S.C. §§1324a(e)(4), 1324a(f)(1). But the statutes' language itself does not explicitly state how a violation is to effect the enforcement of other laws, such as the labor laws. What is to happen, for example, when an employer hires, or an alien works, in violation of these provisions? Must the alien forfeit all pay earned? May the employer ignore the labor laws? More to the point, may the employer violate those laws with impunity, at least once--secure in the knowledge that the Board cannot assess a monetary penalty? The immigration statutes' language simply does not say. </s> Nor can the Court comfortably rest its conclusion upon the immigration laws' purposes. For one thing, the general purpose of the immigration statute's employment prohibition is to diminish the attractive force of employment, which like a "magnet" pulls illegal immigrants towards the United States. H. R. Rep. No. 99-682, pt. 1, p.45 (1986). To permit the Board to award backpay could not significantly increase the strength of this magnetic force, for so speculative a future possibility could not realistically influence an individual's decision to migrate illegally. See A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., supra, at 410-415 (no significant influence from so speculative a factor); Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d 700, 704 (CA11 1988) (aliens enter the country "in the hope of getting a job," not gaining "the protection of our labor laws"); Peterson v. Neme, 222 Va. 477, 428, 281 S.E. 2d 869, 872 (1981) (same); Arteaga v. Literski, 83 Wis. 2d 128, 132, 265 N.W. 2d 148, 150 (1978) (same); H.R. Rep. No. 99-682, supra, at 45 (same). </s> To deny the Board the power to award backpay, however, might very well increase the strength of this magnetic force. That denial lowers the cost to the employer of an initial labor law violation (provided, of course, that the only victims are illegal aliens). It thereby increases the employer's incentive to find and to hire illegal-alien employees. Were the Board forbidden to assess backpay against a knowing employer--a circumstance not before us today, see 237 F.3d 639, 648 (CADC 2001)--this perverse economic incentive, which runs directly contrary to the immigration statute's basic objective, would be obvious and serious. But even if limited to cases where the employer did not know of the employee's status, the incentive may prove significant--for, as the Board has told us, the Court's rule offers employers immunity in borderline cases, thereby encouraging them to take risks, i.e., to hire with a wink and a nod those potentially unlawful aliens whose unlawful employment (given the Court's views) ultimately will lower the costs of labor law violations. See Brief for Respondent 30-32; Tr. of Oral Arg. 41, 47; cf. also General Accounting Office, Garment Industry: Efforts to Address the Prevalence and Conditions of Sweatshops 8 (GAO/HEHS-95-29, Nov. 1994) (noting a higher incidence of labor violations in areas with large populations of undocumented aliens). The Court has recognized these considerations in stating that the labor laws must apply to illegal aliens in order to ensure that "there will be no advantage under the NLRA in preferring illegal aliens" and therefore there will be "fewer incentives for aliens themselves to enter." Sure-Tan, supra, at 893-894. The Court today accomplishes the precise opposite. </s> The immigration law's specific labor-law-related purposes also favor preservation, not elimination, of the Board's backpay powers. See A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., supra, at 414 (immigration law seeks to combat the problem of aliens' willingness to "work in substandard conditions and for starvation wages"); cf. also Sure-Tan, 467 U.S., at 893 ("[E]nforcement of the NLRA ... is compatible with the policies" of the Immigration and Nationality Act). As I just mentioned and as this Court has held, the immigration law foresees application of the Nation's labor laws to protect "workers who are illegal immigrants." Id., at 891-893; H. R. Rep. No.99-682, supra, at 58. And a policy of applying the labor laws must encompass a policy of enforcing the labor laws effectively. Otherwise, as Justice Kennedy once put the matter, "we would leave helpless the very persons who most need protection from exploitative employer practices." NLRB v. Apollo Tire Co., 604 F.2d 1180, 1184 (CA9 1979) (concurring opinion). That presumably is why those in Congress who wrote the immigration statute stated explicitly and unequivocally that the immigration statute does not take from the Board any of its remedial authority. H. R. Rep. No.99-682, supra, at 58 (IRCA does not "undermine or diminish in any way labor protections in existing law, or ... limit the powers of federal or state labor relations boards ... to remedy unfair practices committed against undocumented employees"). </s> Neither does precedent help the Court. Indeed, in ABF Freight System, Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317 (1994), this Court upheld an award of backpay to an unlawfully discharged employee guilty of a serious crime, namely perjury committed during the Board's enforcement proceedings. Id., at 323. See also id., at 326-331 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment while stressing seriousness of misconduct). The Court unanimously held that the Board retained "broad discretion" to remedy the labor law violation through a backpay award, while leaving enforcement of the criminal law to ordinary perjury-related civil and criminal penalties. See ABF Freight, supra, at 325; see also 18 U.S.C. §1621 (criminal penalties for perjury). </s> The Court, trying to distinguish ABF Freight, says that the Court there left open "whether the Board could award backpay to an employee who engaged in `serious misconduct' unrelated to internal Board proceedings." Ante, at 7. But the Court does not explain why (assuming misconduct of equivalent seriousness) lack of a relationship to Board proceedings matters, nor why the Board should have to do more than take that misconduct into account--as it did here. 326 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1060-1062 (1998) (thoroughly discussing relevance of immigration policies); see also A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B., at 412-414 (same). The Court adds that the Board order in ABF Freight "did not implicate federal statutes or policies administered by other federal agencies." Ante, at 7. But it does not explain why this matters when, as here the Attorney General, whose Department--through the Immigration and Naturalization Service--administers the immigration statutes, supports the Board's order. Nor does it explain why the perjury statute at issue in ABF Freight was not a "statute ... administered by" another "agenc[y]." See ABF Freight, supra, at 329 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (noting Department of Justice officials' responsibility for prosecuting perjury). </s> The Court concludes that the employee misconduct at issue in ABF Freight, "though serious, was not at all analogous to misconduct that renders an underlying employment relationship illegal." Ante, at 8. But this conclusion rests upon an implicit assumption--the assumption that the immigration laws' ban on employment is not compatible with a backpay award. And that assumption, as I have tried to explain, is not justified. See, supra, at 3-5. </s> At the same time, the two earlier cases upon which the Court relies, NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939), and Southern S. S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942), offer little support for its conclusion. The Court correctly characterizes both cases as ones in which this Court set aside the Board's remedy (more specifically, reinstatement). Ante, at 4. But the Court does not focus upon the underlying circumstances--which in those cases were very different from the circumstances present here. In both earlier cases, the employer had committed an independent unfair labor practice--in the one by creating a company union, Fansteel, supra, at 250, in the other by refusing to recognize the employees' elected representative, Southern S. S. Co., supra, at 32-36, 48-49. In both cases, the employees had responded with unlawful acts of their own--a sit-in and a mutiny. Fansteel, supra, at 252; Southern S.S. Co., supra, at 48. And in both cases, the Court held that the employees' own unlawful conduct provided the employer with "good cause" for discharge, severing any connection to the earlier unfair labor practice that might otherwise have justified reinstatement and backpay. Fansteel, supra, at 254-259; Southern S.S. Co., supra, at 47-49. </s> By way of contrast, the present case concerns a discharge that was not for "good cause." The discharge did not sever any connection with an unfair labor practice. Indeed, the discharge was the unfair labor practice. Hence a determination that backpay was inappropriate in the former circumstances (involving a justifiable discharge) tells us next to nothing about the appropriateness as a legal remedy in the latter (involving an unjustifiable discharge), the circumstances present here. </s> The Court also refers to the statement in Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 442 U.S. 330, 341 (1979) ("[L]anguage of an opinion" must be "read in context" and not "parsed" like a statute). Sure-Tan involved an order reinstating (with backpay) illegal aliens who had left the country and returned to Mexico. Sure-Tan, 476 U.S., at 888-889. In order to collect the backpay to which the order entitled them, the aliens would have had to reenter the country illegally. Consequently, the order itself could not have been enforced without leading to a violation of criminal law. Id., at 903. Nothing in the Court's opinion suggests that the Court intended its statement to reach to circumstances different from and not at issue in Sure-Tan, where an order, such as the order before us, does not require the alien to engage in further illegal behavior. </s> Finally, the Court cannot reasonably rely upon the award's negative features taken together. The Court summarizes those negative features when it says that the Board "asks that we ... award backpay to an illegal alien [1] for years of work not performed, [2] for wages that could not lawfully have been earned, and [3] for a job obtained in the first instance by a criminal fraud." Ante, at 10. The first of these features has little persuasive force, given the facts that (1) backpay ordinarily and necessarily is awarded to a discharged employee who may not find other work, and (2) the Board is able to tailor an alien's backpay award to avoid rewarding that alien for his legal inability to mitigate damages by obtaining lawful employment elsewhere. See, e.g., Sure-Tan, supra, at 901-902, n.11 (basing backpay on "representative employee"); A.P.R.A. Fuel, supra, at 416 (providing backpay for reasonable period); 326 N.L.R.B., 1062 (cutting off backpay when employer learned of unlawful status). </s> Neither can the remaining two features--unlawfully earned wages and criminal fraud--prove determinative, for they tell us only a small portion of the relevant story. After all, the same backpay award that compensates an employee in the circumstances the Court describes also requires an employer who has violated the labor laws to make a meaningful monetary payment. Considered from this equally important perspective, the award simply requires that employer to pay an employee whom the employer believed could lawfully have worked in the United States, (1) for years of work that he would have performed, (2) for a portion of the wages that he would have earned, and (3) for a job that the employee would have held--had that employer not unlawfully dismissed the employee for union organizing. In ignoring these latter features of the award, the Court undermines the public policies that underlie the Nation's labor laws. </s> Of course, the Court believes it is necessary to do so in order to vindicate what it sees as conflicting immigration law policies. I have explained why I believe the latter policies do not conflict. See, supra, at 3-5. But even were I wrong, the law requires the Court to respect the Board's conclusion, rather than to substitute its own independent view of the matter for that of the Board. The Board reached its conclusion after carefully considering both labor law and immigration law. 326 N.L.R.B., at 1060-1062; see A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B., at 412-414. In doing so the Board has acted "with a discriminating awareness of the consequences of its action" on the immigration laws. Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 174 (1962). The Attorney General, charged with immigration law enforcement, has told us that the Board is right. See 8 U.S.C. §1324a(e) (Immigration and Naturalization Service placed within the Department of Justice, under authority of Attorney General who is charged with responsibility for immigration law enforcement); cf. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 258-259, n. 6 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Solicitor General's statements represent agency's position); Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 856 and n.3 (1985) (agency's position with respect to its regulation during litigation "arrives with some authority"). And the Board's position is, at the least, a reasonable one. Consequently, it is lawful. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984) (requiring courts to uphold reasonable agency position). </s> For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. </s> FOOTNOTES Footnote 1 </s> Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA prohibits discrimination "in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." 49 Stat. 452, as added, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(3). </s> Footnote 2 </s> The Courts of Appeals have divided on the question whether the Board may award backpay to undocumented workers. Compare NLRB v. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 134 F.3d 50, 56 (CA2 1997) (holding that illegal workers could not collect backpay under the NLRA), and Local 512, Warehouse and Office Workers' Union v. NLRB, 795 F.2d 705, 723 (CA9 1986) (same), with DelRey Tortilleria, Inc. v. NLRB, 976 F.2d 1115 (CA7 1992) (holding that illegal workers could collect backpay under the NLRA). The question has a checkered career before the Board, as well. Compare Felbro, Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. 1268, 1269 (1985) (illegal workers could not be awarded backpay in light of Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984)), with A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 408, 415 (1995) (illegal workers could be awarded backpay notwithstanding Sure-Tan); Memorandum GC87-8 from Office of General Counsel, NLRB, The Impact of the Immigration and Reform and Control Act of 1986 on Board Remedies for Undocumented Discriminatees, 1987 WL109409 (Oct. 27, 1988) (stating Board policy that illegal workers could not be awarded backpay in light of IRCA), with Memorandum GC98-15 from Office of General Counsel, NLRB, Reinstatement and Backpay Remedies for Discriminatees Who May Be Undocumented Aliens In Light of Recent Board and Court Precedent, 1998 WL1806350 (Sept. 4, 1998) (stating Board policy that illegal workers could be awarded backpay notwithstanding IRCA). </s> Footnote 3 </s> For an alien to be "authorized" to work in the United States, he or she must possess "a valid social security account number card," §1324a(b)(C)(i), or "other documentation evidencing authorization of employment in the United States which the Attorney General finds, by regulation, to be acceptable for purposes of this section," §1324a(b) (C)(ii). See also §1324a(h)(3)(B) (defining "unauthorized alien" as any alien "[not] authorized to be so employed by this chapter or by the Attorney General"). Regulations implementing these provisions are set forth at 8 CFR §274a (2001). </s> Footnote 4 </s> Justice Breyer contends otherwise, pointing to a single Committee Report from one House of a politically divided Congress, post, at 5 (dissenting opinion) (citing H.R Rep. No. 99-682, pt. 1 (1986)), which is a rather slender reed, e.g., Bank One Chicago, N. A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 279 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Even assuming that a Committee Report can shed light on what Congress intended in IRCA, the Report cited by Justice Breyer says nothing about the Board's authority to award backpay to illegal aliens. The Board in fact initially read the report as stating Congress' view that such awards are foreclosed. Memorandum GC88-9 from Office of General Counsel, NLRB, Reinstatement and Backpay Remedies for Discriminatees Who Are "Undocumented Aliens," 1988 WL236182 *3 (Sept. 1, 1988) ("[T]he relevant committee report points out [that] Sure-Tan was the existing law and that decision itself limited the remedial powers of the NLRB. Clearly Congress did not intend to overrule Sure-Tan"). Other courts have observed that the Report "merely endorses the first holding of Sure-Tan that undocumented aliens are employees within the meaning of the NLRA." Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc., 976 F.2d, at 1121 (citation omitted). Our first holding in Sure-Tan is not at issue here and does not bear at all on the scope of Board remedies with respect to undocumented workers. </s> Footnote 5 </s> When questioned at oral argument about the tension between affirmative mitigation duties under the NLRA and explicit prohibitions against employment of illegal aliens in IRCA, the Government candidly stated: "[T]he board has not examined this issue in detail." Tr.of Oral Arg.32. Justice Breyer says that we should nonetheless defer to the Government's view that the Board's remedy is entirely consistent with IRCA. Post, at 9-10 (dissenting opinion). But such deference would be contrary to Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 40-46 (1942), where the Government told us that the Board's remedy was entirely consistent with the federal maritime laws, and NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 529-532 (1984), where the Government told us that the Board's remedy was entirely consistent with the Bankruptcy Code, and Sure Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892-894 and 902-905 (1984), where the Government told us that the Board's remedy was entirely consistent with the INA. See also Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 108-110 (1958) (rejecting Government position that we should defer to the Board's interpretation of the Interstate Commerce Act). We did not defer to the Government's position in any of these cases, and there is even less basis for doing so here since IRCA--unlike the maritime statutes, the Bankruptcy Code, or the INA--not only speaks directly to matters of employment but expressly criminalizes the only employment relationship at issue in this case. </s> Footnote 6 </s> Because the NLRB is precluded from imposing punitive remedies, Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 9-12 (1940), it is an open question whether awarding backpay to undocumented aliens, who have no entitlement to work in the United States at all, might constitute a prohibited punitive remedy against an employer. See DelRey Tortilleria, Inc. v. NLRB, 976 F.2d, at 1119 (finding that undocumented workers discharged in violation of the NLRA have not been harmed in a legal sense and should not be entitled to backpay, because the "`award provisions of the NLRA are remedial, not punitive, in nature, and thus should be awarded only to those individuals who have suffered harm'" ) (quoting Local 512, Warehouse and Office Workers Union v. NLRB, 795 F.2d, at 725 (Beezer,J., dissenting in part)). Because we find the remedy foreclosed on other grounds, we do not address whether the award at issue here is "`punitive' and hence beyond the authority of the Board." Sure-Tan, supra, at 905, n.4.

United States Supreme Court RAY v. BLAIR(1952) No. 649 Argued: March 31, 1952Decided: April 3, 1952 </s> Article II, 1, and the Twelfth Amendment of the Constitution do not compel issuance of the order entered by an Alabama state court in this mandamus proceeding directing petitioner, as Chairman of the State Democratic Executive Committee of Alabama, to certify to the Secretary of State of Alabama the name of respondent as a candidate for nomination for Presidential and Vice-Presidential elector in the primary election of the Democratic Party to be held on May 6, 1952. Pp. 154-155. </s> 257 Ala. ___, 57 So.2d 395, reversed. </s> Marx Leva and Harold M. Cook argued the cause for petitioner. With them on the brief were James J. Mayfield, George A. LeMaistre and Louis F. Oberdorfer. </s> Horace C. Wilkinson argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> In this proceeding, an Alabama circuit court entered an order directing petitioner to certify to the Secretary of State of Alabama the name of respondent as a candidate for nomination for Presidential and Vice-Presidential elector in the primary election of the Democratic Party to be held on May 6, 1952. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed on the single ground that the order was compelled by Article II, Section 1 and the Twelfth Amendment of the United States Constitution. </s> Petitioner applied to this Court for a stay of the judgments and mandates of the Alabama courts and filed a petition for writ of certiorari to review the judgment of [343 U.S. 154, 155] the Alabama Supreme Court. On March 24, 1952, we granted certiorari and ordered the judgments and mandates of the courts below stayed pending further consideration and disposition of the case by this Court. The case was assigned for argument on the stay as well as the merits on March 31, 1952. 343 U.S. 901 . </s> The question raised in this case has been thoroughly briefed and argued. The Court has fully considered the question and has reached its conclusion. It now announces its decision and enters its judgment in advance of the preparation of a full opinion which, when prepared, will be filed with the Clerk. [See post, p. 214.] </s> The Court holds that Article II, Section 1 and the Twelfth Amendment of the Constitution do not compel issuance of the order and judgment entered below. </s> The judgment below is reversed. The mandate of this Court is directed to issue forthwith. </s> Reversed. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE JACKSON dissent. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> [343 U.S. 154, 156]

United States Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. WISE(1962) No. 488 Argued: April 16, 1962Decided: June 25, 1962 </s> A grand jury indicted appellee and a corporation of which he was an officer for engaging in a combination and conspiracy to eliminate price competition in the sale of milk in the Kansas City area, in violation of 1 of the Sherman Act. In a bill of particulars, the Government charged that appellee had been acting "solely in his capacity as an officer, director, or agent who authorized, ordered, or did" some of the acts constituting a violation. The District Court dismissed the indictment as to appellee, on the ground that 1 of the Sherman Act does not apply to corporate officers acting in a representative capacity. Held: A corporate officer is subject to prosecution under 1 of the Sherman Act whenever he knowingly participates in effecting an illegal contract, combination or conspiracy - be he one who authorizes, orders or helps to perpetrate the crime - regardless of whether he is acting in a representative capacity. Pp. 406-416. </s> (a) An officer of a corporation acting solely in his representative capacity is a "person" within the meaning of 1 of the Sherman Act, which imposes criminal sanctions upon "every person" who violates its provisions. Pp. 407-408. </s> (b) A different conclusion is not required by 8, which defines "person" to include "corporations and associations." Pp. 408-411. </s> (c) A different conclusion is not required by 14 of the Clayton Act or its legislative history. Pp. 411-415. </s> (d) Nothing in the language or legislative history of the 1955 amendment to the Sherman Act, increasing the penalty for violation thereof from $5,000 to $50,000 without making a corresponding increase in the $5,000 penalty under the Clayton Act, indicates that Congress intended to restrict the applicability of the increased fine to corporations. P. 415. </s> 196 F. Supp. 155, reversed. </s> Robert L. Wright argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Loevinger, Daniel M. Friedman and Richard A. Solomon. [370 U.S. 405, 406] </s> John T. Chadwell argued the cause for appellee. With him on the briefs were Richard W. McLaren, James A. Rahl, James E. Hastings, Martin J. Purcell and John H. Lashly. </s> MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> A grand jury returned an indictment charging the National Dairy Products Corporation with engaging "in a combination and conspiracy to eliminate price competition in the sale of milk in the Greater Kansas City market in unreasonable restraint of . . . trade and commerce, in violation of Section 1" of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. Two counts incorporated by reference the alleged illegal acts of the corporation and named the appellee as codefendant. In a bill of particulars the Government charged that the appellee had "been acting solely in his capacity as an officer, director, or agent who authorized, ordered, or did some of the acts" constituting the violation. The appellee moved for a dismissal on the ground that the indictment, as particularized by the bill, failed to charge a crime. According to appellee, the Sherman Act does not apply to corporate officers acting in a representative capacity; he contends that the statute exclusively applicable to these officers is 14 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 24. Over the Government's opposition the dismissal was ordered by the district judge. 196 F. Supp. 155. An appeal was perfected pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3731, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 368 U.S. 945 . </s> Although the Sherman Act has been in existence for over 70 years and although corporate officers have been indicted under that Act for almost as long, see, e. g., United States v. Greenhut, 50 F. 469 (D.C. D. Mass. 1892); United States v. Patterson, 55 F. 605 (D.C. D. [370 U.S. 405, 407] Mass. 1893), 1 this question is one of first impression for this Court. The impetus for raising this issue at such a late date comes from the fact that in 1955 the Congress raised the penalty provision in the Sherman Act from $5,000 to $50,000 without making a corresponding increase in the $5,000 penalty found in the Clayton Act. </s> Section 1 of the Sherman Act imposes criminal sanctions upon "every person" who violates that provision, 15 U.S.C. 1. 2 The Government contends that a corporate officer is obviously a "person" within the Act. The appellee, however, distinguishes between a corporate officer who represents his corporation and one who acts on his own account. In the latter case the appellee agrees that the Sherman Act applies. But, when the officer is acting solely for his corporation, the appellee contends that he is no longer a "person" within the Act. The rationale for this distinction is that the activities of an officer, however illegal and culpable, are chargeable to the corporation as the principal but not to the individual who perpetrates them. </s> No substantial support for such an artificial interpretation of a seemingly clear statute is provided by the legislative history. The most that can be said for the appellee's position is that the Reagan Bill, an unsuccessful competitor of the Sherman Bill, specifically included corporate [370 U.S. 405, 408] officers in its penal section while the Sherman Bill had no penal section at one time. The penal provision of the Reagan Bill was offered as an amendment to the Sherman Bill, and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary then redrafted and resubmitted a bill in the form which became the Sherman Act. 21 Cong. Rec. 2731, 3152. That Act outlawed certain acts by "persons," and there is nothing to indicate that the Congress intended to restrict the meaning as applied to corporate officers. See Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U.S. 40, 61 . </s> The appellee points to 8 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 7, which defines "person" "to include corporations and associations." He argues that, since corporations are included within the term, individual corporate officers are thereby excluded. This is a non sequitur. The mere fact that the term is given a broad construction does not alter its basic meaning, and no such inference can be drawn from the express inclusion of corporations as "persons." The reason for this inclusion is readily understandable. The doctrine of corporate criminal responsibility for the acts of the officers was not well established in 1890. See New York Central & H. R. R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 . When a criminal statute proscribed conduct by "persons," corporate defendants contended that only natural persons were included. United States v. Amedy, 11 Wheat. 392. The same issue raised in other cases was not always resolved by a unanimous Court. Beaston v. Farmers' Bank of Delaware, 12 Pet. 102. Cf. United States v. Shirey, 359 U.S. 255 . The dissent by Mr. Justice Story in the Beaston case would be sufficient reason for a careful draftsman to avoid the whole problem of a provision such as 8. Further reason for caution lay in the language found in cases then recent. Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718 -719, and Canada Southern R. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 542 (dissenting opinion), which distinguished between persons [370 U.S. 405, 409] and corporations when considering the application of the Fourteenth Amendment's protection to "persons." See Philadelphia Fire Assn. v. New York, 119 U.S. 110, 120 (dissenting opinion). Therefore, we attribute no significance to the specific inclusion of corporations in the definition of "persons" in determining whether a corporate officer is within the term. </s> This Court was faced with the same problem in United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 , involving the construction of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 301-392. An earlier version of the Act stated that the acts of a corporate officer would be chargeable both to him and to the corporation. In a 1938 revision the statute made any "person" responsible and specifically included corporations within that term. 52 Stat. 1040. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction of a corporate officer on the ground that only a corporation was a "person" within the Act. This Court reversed the Court of Appeals, rejecting substantially the same argument that is advanced by the appellee in this case. The reason for the rejection is equally applicable to the case at bar. No intent to exculpate a corporate officer who violates the law is to be imputed to Congress without clear compulsion; else the fines established by the Sherman Act to deter crime become mere license fees for illegitimate corporate business operations. Following Dotterweich, we construe 1 of the Sherman Act in its common-sense meaning to apply to all officers who have a responsible share in the proscribed transaction. Cf. Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 21 . </s> This construction is supported by the decisions of the lower federal courts which considered the problem of whether corporate officers were "persons" within the Sherman Act in the interim before the passage of the Clayton Act. The most significant case is United States v. MacAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 F. 823 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. [370 U.S. 405, 410] 1906), in which the Court considered the joint indictment of a corporation and some of its officers for violations of the Sherman Act. The defendants demurred to the joinder, the corporation pleading that only the human agents could be held responsible for the misdemeanor while the officers pleaded that only the corporation was responsible. The Court refused to hold as a matter of law that either proposition was correct because responsibility was, in each case, a matter of fact. The Court noted that the officers may or may not be convicted, depending upon whether they were personally responsible for the crime. 3 </s> In United States v. Winslow, 195 F. 578 (D.C. D. Mass. 1912), the same contention by corporate officers was given short disposition: </s> "The indictment, however, expressly charges them [the corporate officers] as actors, and two fundamental principles are thoroughly settled. One is that neither in the civil nor the criminal law can an officer protect himself behind a corporation where he is the actual, present, and efficient actor; and the second is that all parties active in promoting a misdemeanor, whether agents or not, are principals." 195 F., at 581. [370 U.S. 405, 411] </s> We have found no case between 1890 and 1914 in which a corporate officer successfully secured the dismissal of an indictment or the reversal of a conviction on the ground that he was not a "person" within the Sherman Act when he acted solely as a representative of the corporation. </s> Unless subsequent statutes have repealed or amended this aspect of the Sherman Act, our inquiry is at an end. </s> The appellee seeks succor in the subsequent legislative history accompanying attempts to amend the Sherman Act between 1890 and 1914. He particularly relies upon H. R. 10539, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. (1900). This bill would have expressly included corporate officers and agents in the definition of "persons" found in 8. The report accompanying that bill stated that the existing law did not subject agents, officers, and attorneys to penalties. H. R. Rep. No. 1506, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. However, statutes are construed by the courts with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of the passage. The interpretation placed upon an existing statute by a subsequent group of Congressmen who are promoting legislation and who are unsuccessful has no persuasive significance here. United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 ; United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 415 , n. 14; Fogarty v. United States, 340 U.S. 8, 13 -14; Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 47 ; United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 281 -282; Gemsco, Inc., v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244, 265 . Logically, several equally tenable inferences could be drawn from the failure of the Congress to adopt an amendment in the light of the interpretation placed upon the existing law by some of its members, including the inference that the existing legislation already incorporated the offered change. </s> In 1914 the Congress passed "An Act To supplement existing laws against unlawful restraints and monopolies, [370 U.S. 405, 412] and for other purposes," commonly called the Clayton Act. Section 14 of that Act provided: </s> "That whenever a corporation shall violate any of the penal provisions of the antitrust laws, such violation shall be deemed to be also that of the individual directors, officers, or agents of such corporation who shall have authorized, ordered, or done any of the acts constituting in whole or in part such violation, and such violation shall be deemed a misdemeanor, and upon conviction therefor of any such director, officer, or agent he shall be punished by a fine of not exceeding $5,000 or by imprisonment for not exceeding one year, or by both, in the discretion of the court." 38 Stat. 736. </s> The appellee contends that 14 is an entirely new provision added by Congress to provide for the criminal responsibility of corporate officers who act in a representative capacity. The Government contends that 14 is merely supplemental and that appellee's construction results in an implied repeal of part of 1 of the Sherman Act. 4 </s> Appellee asserts that 14 would not literally apply to the officer who acted on his own account because his misconduct would not be attributed to the corporation. From this premise he argues that since 14 of the Clayton Act applies only to an officer acting in a representative capacity, 1 of the Sherman Act only applies to an officer acting on his own account. </s> We do not agree. The reasons for 14 are sufficiently revealed by the legislative history. The provision originated [370 U.S. 405, 413] in the House, and after conferences with the Senate, survived substantially intact. The reports provide no assistance, but the debates do. Whether any supplementary legislation was necessary was the essence of the debates. As Senator Shields, an opponent, said, "[ 14] is merely a reenactment of the Sherman law, sections 1, 2, and 3. In other words, it has always been held that the officers of corporations violating the law were punishable under these sections . . . ." 51 Cong. Rec. 14214. See 51 Cong. Rec. 9079, 9080, 9169, 9201, 9202, 9595, 9610, 14225, 15820, 16143. The proponents of the bill agreed that the Sherman Act did cover officers whose conduct constituted the offense (without distinction as to the capacity in which the officer was acting), but were disappointed in the sympathy shown to corporate officers by judges, juries, and prosecutors. Second, the proponents feared that the present Sherman Act did not cover officers who merely authorized or ordered the commission of the offense. These ideas were clearly expressed by Representative Floyd, a House manager: </s> "The purpose we had was to make it clear that, when a corporation had been guilty, those officers, agents, and directors of the corporation that either authorized, ordered, or did the thing prohibited should be guilty. Under the existing law, and without that provision of the statute, the person who did the things would undoubtedly be guilty; but in the enforcement of the criminal provisions of the Sherman law, experience has demonstrated that both juries and courts are slow to convict men who have simply done acts authorized or ordered by some officers of the concern higher up, and the words `authorized' and `ordered' were introduced to reach the real offenders, the men who caused the things to be done . . . ." 51 Cong. Rec. 9609. See 51 Cong. Rec. 9074, 9185, 9676, 9677, 9678, 9679, 16317. [370 U.S. 405, 414] </s> Third, the proponents were fearful that the Sherman Act might not cover the activities of an officer which made a single "link" in the "chain" of events constituting the antitrust violation. Hence, the provision fixing responsibility for an act constituting "in whole or in part" the violations. 51 Cong. Rec. 9679, 16275, 16317. </s> We examine this legislative history in order to ascertain the intent of Congress as to the ultimate purpose of 14 of the Clayton Act. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 591 -592; Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 390 -395; Federal Trade Comm'n v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 43 -46, 49; Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 324 U.S. 726, 734 -737. How members of the 1914 Congress may have interpreted the 1890 Act is not of weight for the purpose of construing the Sherman Act. Federal Housing Administration v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84 ; Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590 ; Koshkonong v. Burton, 104 U.S. 668 ; Ogden v. Blackledge, 2 Cranch 272, 277. See United States v. Stafoff, 260 U.S. 477 ; Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lederer, 252 U.S. 523 ; Levindale Lead & Zinc Mining Co. v. Coleman, 241 U.S. 432 ; Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cranch 1, 35. But see Sioux Tribe v. United States, 316 U.S. 317 ; Stockdale v. Insurance Co., 20 Wall. 323, 331 (separate opinion); United States v. Freeman, 3 How. 556. Cf. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 . </s> Section 14 was intended to be a reaffirmation of the Sherman Act's basic penal provisions and a mandate to prosecutors to bring all responsible persons to justice. In the light of the congressional purpose revealed on the face of the statute and by the legislative history, this Court cannot construe 14 as a restriction of 1 of the Sherman Act. Thus, insofar as 14 relates to the corporate officer who participates in the Sherman Act violation, whether or not in a representative capacity, no change was either intended or effected. [370 U.S. 405, 415] </s> The cases subsequent to the Clayton Act reveal an understanding in accord with our own. The Government continued to seek indictments of corporate officers under the Sherman Act, not the Clayton Act, and many convictions were obtained. See, e. g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 ; United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 ; American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 93 (C. A. 6th Cir.), affirmed, 328 U.S. 781 . </s> The appellee does not call to our attention any case during this time in which the contention he now makes was successfully urged. He suggests that the dearth of cases on this point reflects the belief on the part of corporate officers that, because of the identical penalties of the Clayton Act, the successful challenge to a Sherman Act indictment would be an academic victory. We cannot even attempt to evaluate the motives of individual defendants in raising or not raising defenses, even if we regarded the matter as being significant, which we do not. </s> The Government, on the other hand, relies upon United States v. Atlantic Comm'n Co., 45 F. Supp. 187 (D.C. E. D. N.C.); United States v. General Motors Corp., 26 F. Supp. 353 (D.C. N. D. Ind.), affirmed, 121 F.2d 376 (C. A. 7th Cir.); and United States v. National Malleable & Steel Castings Co., 6 F.2d 40 (D.C. N. D. Ohio), holding that nothing in 14 of the Clayton Act altered the existing liability for prosecution of all officers who participate in the violation of the Sherman Act. With this, we agree. </s> We also agree that there is nothing in the 1955 amendment to the Sherman Act nor in its legislative history to indicate that the Congress intended to restrict the applicability of the increased fine to corporations. See 69 Stat. 282; S. Rep. No. 618, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R. Rep. No. 70, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. [370 U.S. 405, 416] </s> Based upon the foregoing, we hold that a corporate officer is subject to prosecution under 1 of the Sherman Act whenever he knowingly participates in effecting the illegal contract, combination, or conspiracy - be he one who authorizes, orders, or helps perpetrate the crime - regardless of whether he is acting in a representative capacity. It follows that the District Court erred when it dismissed the indictment against the appellee. The case is reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> Reversed and remanded. </s> MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 In the Government's brief the Solicitor General cites 40 cases in which corporate officers were indicted under the Sherman Act between 1890 and 1914. Brief for Appellant, pp. 69-72. </s> [Footnote 2 "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal . . . . Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy declared . . . to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court." </s> [Footnote 3 "It is not without significance that offenses as serious, in congressional opinion, as those created by this statute are made misdemeanors. When the statute declares that certain acts notoriously to be accomplished under modern business conditions only through corporate instrumentality shall be misdemeanors [sic], and further declares that the word `person' as used therein shall be deemed to include corporations, such statute seems to me clearly passed in contemplation of the elementary principle that in respect of a misdemeanor all those who personally aid or abet in its commission are indictable as principals. . . . I am compelled to the conclusion that, under this statute, if the officer or agent of a corporation charged with fault be also charged with personal participation, direction, or activity therein, both may be so charged in the same indictment." 149 F., at 832. </s> [Footnote 4 Appellee also argues, "[t]he Government in this case has not expressly relied on an aider and abettor theory, but . . . it has sought tacit support from the theory." Brief for Appellee, pp. 62-68. Under the view we take of the case, it is unnecessary to consider the application of the general aider and abettor statute, 18 U.S.C. 2. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring. </s> I join in the opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE with some additional observations, believed warranted by the circumstance that the holding below has since been followed by five District Courts, with only two others to the contrary. 1 </s> [370 U.S. 405, 417] </s> The language of 1 of the Sherman Act, providing a penalty for "every person" who engages in a conspiracy or makes a contract in restraint of trade, of course presents a serious obstacle to appellee's contention that he cannot be prosecuted thereunder. I agree with the Court that 8, defining "person" to include corporations and associations, does not imply the exclusion of natural persons. Moreover, the fiction of corporate entity, operative to protect officers from contract liability, had never been applied as a shield against criminal prosecutions when the Sherman Act was passed. In fact I think there can have been no serious doubt even as early as 1890 that officers could be punished for crimes committed for their corporations. Until well into the nineteenth century the corporation itself could not be convicted; the individuals who acted in its name of course could be. See the anonymous note of Holt, C. J., 12 Mod. 559, Case 935, 88 Eng. Rep. 1518 (K. B. 1701); Rex v. Medley, 6 Car. & P. 292, 297, 299, 172 Eng. Rep. 1246, 1249-1250 (K. B. 1834); State v. Great Works Milling & Mfg. Co., 20 Me. 41, 44 (1841); Ballantine, Corporations (rev. ed. 1946), 113. However, it was recognized that corporate officers could be convicted for "representative" crimes even after the corporation's immunity was worn away, Regina v. Great North of England R. Co., 1846. 9 Q. B. 315, 325-327, 115 Eng. Rep. 1294, 1298; State v. Morris & E. R. Co., 23 N. J. L. 360, 369 (1852); State v. Patton, 26 N.C. 16 (1843), in line with the rule stated in 1 Bishop, Criminal Law (7th ed. 1882), 892, that an agent might be punished for crimes committed for his principal. Cf. United [370 U.S. 405, 418] States v. Mills, 7 Pet. 138, 142. A substantial volume of convictions of individuals for corporate crimes had accumulated by 1890. 2 Congress legislated against this background; it used words sufficiently broad that representative crimes fell within their ordinary meaning; and the normal inference would be that Congress intended to punish those responsible for acts which it declared unlawful. </s> The legislative history discloses no intention on the part of Congress to exempt the representative offenses of corporate officers. The Sherman bill, S. 1, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., was reported to the Senate with criminal penalties expressly extending to corporate officers and agents, but Senator Sherman soon omitted the criminal provisions altogether. 21 Cong. Rec. 1765, 2455. Senator Reagan then offered a substitute bill which, among other things, reinstated the criminal provisions, again expressly naming corporate agents in slightly different language. Id., at 2456. Appellee relies on statements made by Senator Sherman in the debate: </s> "Whether this law should extend to mere clerks, as was proposed in the third section [as reported by the Committee], is a matter of grave doubt. . . . To restrain and prevent the illegal tendency of a corporation is the proper duty of a court of equity. To punish the criminal intention of an officer is a much [370 U.S. 405, 419] more difficult process and might be well left to the future. . . . These corporations do not care about your criminal statutes aimed at their servants. . . ." Id., at 2456, 2457, 2569. </s> However, the issue before the Senate at that time was not whether to exempt corporate officers from criminal prosecution but whether to omit criminal sanctions entirely. The objections raised - that the addition of criminal penalties would result in strict construction in favor of legality and would inflict punishment for violations of vague and uncertain provisions - applied as well to persons acting for their own account, admittedly included within the Act as passed, as to those acting for corporations. Moreover, Senator Sherman was promptly overruled by a vote of 34-12, adopting the Reagan amendment as an amendment to the Sherman bill. Id., at 2611. A number of additional amendments rendered the bill quite unwieldy, see id., at 2655 (Senator Sherman), and it was submitted to the Committee on the Judiciary for tailoring, id., at 2731. The bill was redrafted in committee to its approximate present form and passed by a 52-1 vote, id., at 2901, 3145, 3153. </s> I am not persuaded, as argued by the appellee, that the greater margin of support for the final bill than for the Reagan bill indicates that the criminal liability of corporate officers was narrowed. Opposition to the Reagan bill was based in part on its specification of unlawful purposes that would render a combination a trust, id., at 2469 (Senator Reagan), 2561 (Senator Teller), which was omitted by the Committee, and in part on the inclusion of any criminal penalties at all, a feature common to the Reagan and the final bills which was accepted at the end in a spirit of compromise, as it was by Senator Sherman himself, id., at 2604, 2655. No Senator ever suggested, so far as can be found, that criminal penalties should be provided for corporations and for self-employed or "ultra [370 U.S. 405, 420] vires" individuals alone. Thirty-four Senators - a majority of the whole body - voted to include, via the Reagan bill, sanctions against officers acting for the corporation. The Committee's reduction of the explicit, but cumbersome, language of the Reagan bill to the simple and on its face equally all-encompassing "every person" appears to have been simply a part of the general streamlining of the bill that took place in the Committee, with no intention of changing substance. </s> These and the further considerations dealt with in the opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE 3 lead to the conclusion that the indictment in this case must be sustained. </s> [Footnote 1 The opinion below is reported at 196 F. Supp. 155 (W. D. Mo. 1961). In accord are United States v. A. P. Woodson Co., 198 F. Supp. 582 (D. D.C. 1961), appeal pending, No. 1019, O. T. 1961; United States v. Milk Distributors Assn., 200 F. Supp. 792 (D. Md. 1961); United States v. American Optical Co., 1961 Trade Cases, par. 70, 156 (E. D. Wis. 1961), reversed sub nom. United States v. Kniss, post, p. 719; United States v. General Motors Corp., 1962 Trade Cases, par. 70,203 (S. D. Cal. 1962), reversed sub nom. United States v. Staley, post, p. 719; and United States v. Engelhard-Hanovia, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 407 (S. D. N. Y. 1962), appeal pending sub nom. United States v. Brown, No. 983, O. T. 1961. </s> In United States v. North American Van Lines, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 639 (D. D.C. 1962), the court refused to dismiss an indictment of corporate officers, holding that they were not charged with acting solely in a representative capacity. It went on to say that in any [370 U.S. 405, 417] event the Sherman Act applied to representative acts. We are informed by the parties here that in United States v. Packard-Bell Electronics Corp., Cr. No. 30158, S. D. Cal., a motion to dismiss was denied without opinion. The indictment, see 5 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1961), par. 45,061, case 1632, charged violations of 14 as well as of 1. </s> [Footnote 2 Moore v. State, 48 Miss. 147 (1873); Elsberry v. State, 52 Ala. 8, 10 (1875); Ex parte Schmidt, 2 Tex. App. 196 (1877); Cowley v. People, 83 N. Y. 464, 469 (1881); State v. Parsons, 12 Mo. App. 205 (1882); City of Wyandotte v. Corrigan, 35 Kan. 21, 26, 10 P. 99, 102 (1886). The only decision found to the contrary is Commonwealth v. Demuth, 12 S. & R. 389, 392 (Pa. 1825), in which a particular statute was read not to impose a duty on individual officers. That this did not state a general rule even in Pennsylvania was made clear by the Supreme Court of that State in Commonwealth v. Ohio & P. R. Co., 1 Grant 329, 350 (1856) (dictum). </s> [Footnote 3 I find little support, however, for our conclusion in United States v. MacAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 F. 823 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1906), or United States v. Winslow, 195 F. 578 (D. Mass. 1912), despite some of the language in those opinions. Neither case squarely upholds criminal responsibility in a "representative" capacity. Among other things the court in MacAndrews & Forbes declared it possible to infer from the indictment that the corporations were "doing one thing and the individuals another at or about the same time, which things were utterly different . . . . It is conceivable that the evidence may show that the individual defendants were not free agents, but acted under a species of corporate coercion, for which they should not be held personally responsible; but it is impossible to arrive at this conclusion on demurrer." 149 F., at 832. In Winslow, the indictment charged the officers with controlling the industry "by the device and means of and through and in the names of" certain corporations. 195 F., at 591. Thus all that was held in MacAndrews & Forbes, and all that needed to be held in Winslow, was that corporate officers are not shielded from criminal responsibility when they act on their own individual account or when they use a sham corporation as a means of furthering their personal ends. </s> Nor do I find much weight in the decisions since 1914 upholding the applicability of the Sherman Act to representative crimes of corporate officers; while the penalties for violating the two statutes were identical there was little incentive to argue to the contrary. The most that can be said of the decisions since 1890 is that they have suggested no doubt of the applicability of the Sherman Act to corporate officers acting only in a representative capacity. </s> [370 U.S. 405, 421]

United States Supreme Court FIRST NAT. BANK v. WALKER BANK(1966) No. 51 Argued: Decided: December 12, 1966 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 73, First Security Bank of Utah, N. A. v. Commercial Security Bank, and No. 88, Saxon, Comptroller of the Currency v. Commercial Security Bank, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. </s> The provisions of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. 36 (c), which authorize a national banking association, with the Comptroller of the Currency's approval, to establish and operate branch banks if such operation is "at the time expressly authorized to State banks by the law of the State in question," place national and state banks on a basis of "competitive equality" as far as branch banking is concerned, and national banks may establish branches only in accordance with all requirements and conditions applicable to state banks by state law. Pp. 256-262. </s> No. 51, 352 F.2d 90; and Nos. 73 and 88, affirmed. </s> Theodore S. Perry argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner in No. 51. John J. Wilson argued the cause for petitioner in No. 73. With him on the briefs was Charles J. Steele. Richard A. Posner argued the cause for petitioner in No. 88. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Douglas, David L. Rose and Kathryn H. Baldwin. </s> Joseph S. Jones argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent in No. 51. James F. Bell argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent in Nos. 73 and 88. </s> Robert Y. Button, Attorney General, and Kenneth C. Patty, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for the Commonwealth of Virginia, as amicus curiae, urging [385 U.S. 252, 253] affirmance in all cases. Henry T. Wickham filed a brief for the Virginia Bankers Association, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance in Nos. 73 and 88. </s> MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> These cases involve the construction of those portions of the National Bank Act, 44 Stat. 1228, 12 U.S.C. 36 (c), which authorize a national banking association, with the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency, to establish and operate new branches within the limits of the municipality in which the bank is located, if such operation is "at the time expressly authorized to State banks by the law of the State in question." 1 Two national banks with their main banking houses in Logan and Ogden, Utah, respectively, seek to open branches in those municipalities. The Utah statute prohibits Utah banks, with certain exceptions not here relevant, from establishing branches except by taking over an existing bank which has been in operation for not less than five years. Utah Code Ann., Tit. 7, c. 3, 6 (1965 Supp.). 2 In No. 51, [385 U.S. 252, 254] First National Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., the petitioner seeks to establish a new branch in Logan, where its principal banking house is located, without taking over an established bank. The District Court approved its doing so but the Court of Appeals reversed. 352 F.2d 90 (C. A. 10th Cir.), sub nom. Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Saxon. In No. 73, First Security Bank of Utah, N. A. v. Commercial Security Bank, and No. 88, Saxon v. Commercial Security Bank, First Security seeks to establish a new branch in Ogden, in which its home office is situated, without taking over an established bank. The District Court held that state law must be complied with, 236 F. Supp. 457, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in a judgment, without opinion, citing Walker Bank & Trust Co., supra. In view of a conflict between these holdings and the decision in First National Bank of Smithfield v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267 (C. A. 4th Cir.), we granted certiorari, and consolidated the three cases for argument. 384 U.S. 925 . We affirm the judgments. </s> 1. The Facts. </s> In No. 51, the petitioner maintains its principal banking house in Logan, Utah, which is a second class city [385 U.S. 252, 255] under Utah law (Utah Code Ann., Tit. 10, c. 1, 1 (1953, as amended), and is therefore subject to 7-3-6 of the Utah Code, supra. It applied to the Comptroller of the Currency for a certificate to establish an "inside" branch office in Logan. At the time of the application there were no other banks with their main banking offices in Logan. However, there were two branches of banks whose home offices were situated outside of Logan, one of which belonged to respondent, Walker Bank & Trust Co., whose home office was located in Salt Lake City. After a hearing, the Comptroller ordered the certificate issued. The respondent subsequently filed this suit seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Comptroller and First National claiming the action of the Comptroller to be void since the proposed branch was not taking over an established bank in Logan, as required by Utah law. The District Court dismissed the complaint. It found "express authority" under Utah law for state banks to establish branch offices in Logan, relying on the general authority of the statute and holding that the subsequent conditions, such as the acquisition of another bank, did not "change the `express authority' into a lack of authority on the part of State banks or a lack of a statutory expression of such authority, and [did] not add to the Federal statute a requirement that compliance be made by National banks with all State conditions." 234 F. Supp. 74, 78, n. 8. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Congress in enacting 36 (c) (1) acceded to state law and created "a competitive equality between state and national banks." Finding that the trial court's interpretation was to the contrary, it declared "the proper approach is for the Comptroller to look at all the State law on branch banking not just part of it." 352 F.2d 90, 94. [385 U.S. 252, 256] </s> In Nos. 73 and 88, the First Security Bank of Utah, a national bank, applied for a certificate from the Comptroller to establish a branch bank in Ogden, where it maintained its principal banking house. Its proposal was to open a new branch and not to take over an existing bank in Ogden. Under Utah law, Ogden is also a second class city and the "take over" provision of 7-3-6, supra, was therefore applicable. Two other banks have their main offices in Ogden. After the Comptroller approved the issuance of the certificate, respondent filed suit in the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia asking for injunctive and other relief. The District Court imposed all of the restrictions of 7-3-6 of Utah law on the establishment of national banks and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, by a judgment without opinion, but cited the opinion of the 10th Circuit, Walker Bank & Trust Co., supra. </s> 2. The National Bank Act: Its Background. </s> There has long been opposition to the exercise of federal power in the banking field. Indeed, President Jefferson was opposed to the creation of the first Bank of the United States and President Jackson vetoed the Act of Congress extending the charter of the second Bank of the United States. However, the authority of Congress to act in the field was resolved in the landmark case of McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819). There Chief Justice Marshall, while admitting that it does not appear that a bank was in the contemplation of the Framers of the Constitution, held that a national bank could be chartered under the implied powers of the Congress as an instrumentality of the Federal Government to implement its fiscal powers. The paramount power of the Congress over national banks has, therefore, been settled for almost a century and a half. [385 U.S. 252, 257] </s> Nevertheless, no national banking act was adopted until 1863 (12 Stat. 665), and it was not until 1927 that Congress dealt with the problem before us in these cases. This inaction was possibly due to the fact that at the turn of the century, there were very few branch banks in the country. At that time only five national and 82 state banks were operating branches with a total of 119 branches. By the end of 1923, however, there were 91 national and 580 state banks with a total of 2,054 branches. 3 The Comptroller of the Currency, in his Annual Report of 1923, recommended congressional action on branch banking. The report stated that if state banks continue to engage "in unlimited branch banking it will mean the eventual destruction of the national banking system . . . ." H. R. Doc. No. 90, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1924). Soon thereafter legislation was introduced to equalize national and state branch banking. The House Report on the measure, H. R. Rep. No. 83, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1926), stated among other things: </s> "The bill recognizes the absolute necessity of taking legislative action with reference to the branch banking controversy. The present situation is intolerable to the national banking system. The bill proposes the only practicable solution by stopping the further extension of state-wide branch banking in the Federal reserve system by State member banks and by permitting national banks to have branches in those cities where State banks are allowed to have them under State laws." </s> This bill failed to pass in the Senate and, although Congress continued to study the problem, it was not until [385 U.S. 252, 258] 1927 that the McFadden Act was adopted. The bill originated in the House and, in substance, proposed that both national and state banks be permitted to establish "inside" branches within the municipality of their main banking facilities in those States that permitted branch banking at the time of the enactment of the bill. H. R. Rep. No. 83, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 4-5 (1926). The intent of the Congress to leave the question of the desirability of branch banking up to the States is indicated by the fact that the Senate struck from the House bill the time limitation, thus permitting a subsequent change in state law to have a corresponding effect on the authority of national banks to engage in branching. The Senate Report concluded that the Act should permit "national banks to have branches in those cities where State banks are allowed to have them under State laws." S. Rep. No. 473, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 14 (1926). In the subsequent Conference Committee, the Senate position was adopted. State banks which were members of the Federal Reserve System were also limited to "inside" branches. A grandfather clause permitted retention of branches operated at the date of enactment. H. R. Rep. No. 1481, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1926). The Act was finally passed on February 25, 1927, and became known as the McFadden Act of 1927, taking its name from its sponsor, Representative McFadden. At the time of its enactment he characterized it in this language: </s> "As a result of the passage of this act, the national bank act has been so amended that national banks are able to meet the needs of modern industry and commerce and competitive equality has been established among all member banks of the Federal reserve system." (Emphasis added.) 68 Cong. Rec. 5815 (1927). [385 U.S. 252, 259] </s> During the economic depression there was much agitation that bank failures were due to small undercapitalized rural banks and that these banks should be supplanted by branches of larger and stronger banks. The Comptroller of the Currency advocated that national banks be permitted to branch regardless of state law. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency pursuant to S. Res. No. 71, 71st Cong., 3d Sess., 7-10 (1931). Senator Carter Glass held a similar belief and introduced a bill that would authorize national banks to organize branches irrespective of state law beyond and "outside" the municipality of its principal banking house. His proposal was strenuously opposed and was eventually defeated. It was not until the Seventy-third Congress that the Banking Act of 1933 was adopted. Senator Glass, the ranking member of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency and the dominant banking figure in the Congress, was sponsor of the Act. In reporting it to the Senate for passage, he said, the Act "required that the establishment of branch banks by national banks in States which by law permit branch banking should be under the regulations required by State law of State banks." 77 Cong. Rec. 3726 (1933). In a colloquy on the floor of the Senate with Senator Copeland as to the purpose of the Act (with reference to branch banking by national banks), Senator Glass said that it would be permissible "in only those States the laws of which permit branch banking, and only to the extent that the State laws permit branch banking." Moreover, to make it crystal clear, when Senator Copeland replied that "it permits branch banking only in those States where the State laws permit branch banking by State banks," Senator Glass was careful to repeat: "Only in those States and to the extent that the State laws permit branch banking." (Emphasis added.) 76 Cong. Rec. 2511 (1933). Remarks of other [385 U.S. 252, 260] members of Congress also indicate that they shared the understanding of Senator Glass. For example, Senator Vandenberg stated that 36 (c) (1) provides "that the branch-banking privilege so far as national banks are concerned shall follow the status established by State law in respect to the State privilege." 76 Cong. Rec. 2262 (1933). Likewise, Senator Long, who had joined a filibuster against an earlier version of the bill, stated at final passage that "[w]e have only undertaken to secure equal treatment for State banks" and that the bill had substantially achieved that result. 77 Cong. Rec. 5862 (1933). In similar tone, Representative Bacon stated that branches of national banks may be established provided "this is permitted by the laws of that State and subject to them." (Emphasis added.) 77 Cong. Rec. 3949 (1933). And Representative Luce, a member of the Conference Committee, reported to the House: </s> "In the controversy over the respective merits of what are known as `unit banking' and `branch banking systems,' a controversy that has been alive and sharp for years, branch banking has been steadily gaining in favor. It is not, however, here proposed to give the advocates of branch banking any advantage. We do not go an inch beyond saying that the two ideas shall compete on equal terms and only where the States make the competition possible by letting their own institutions have branches." 77 Cong. Rec. 5896 (1933). </s> As finally passed, the Act permitted national banks to establish outside branches if such branches could be establish by state banks under state law. It is well to note that the same Act also removed the restriction on outside branch banking by state member banks previously imposed by the McFadden Act. [385 U.S. 252, 261] </s> 3. The Policy of Competitive Equality. </s> It appears clear from this resume of the legislative history of 36 (c) (1) and (2) that Congress intended to place national and state banks on a basis of "competitive equality" insofar as branch banking was concerned. Both sponsors of the applicable banking Acts, Representative McFadden and Senator Glass, so characterized the legislation. It is not for us to so construe the Acts as to frustrate this clear-cut purpose so forcefully expressed by both friend and foe of the legislation at the time of its adoption. To us it appears beyond question that the Congress was continuing its policy of equalization first adopted in the National Bank Act of 1864. See Lewis v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 292 U.S. 559, 565 -566 (1934); McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U.S. 347 (1896); Chase Securities Corp. v. Husband, 302 U.S. 660 (1938); Anderson Nat. Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944). </s> The Comptroller argues that Utah's statute "expressly authorizes" state banks to have branches in their home municipalities. He maintains that the restriction, in the subsequent paragraph of the statute limiting branching solely to the taking over of an existing bank, is not applicable to national banks. It is a strange argument that permits one to pick and choose what portion of the law binds him. Indeed, it would fly in the face of the legislative history not to hold that national branch banking is limited to those States the laws of which permit it, and even there "only to the extent that the State laws permit branch banking." Utah clearly permits it "only to the extent" that the proposed branch takes over an existing bank. </s> The Comptroller also contends that the Act supersedes state law only as to "whether" and "where" branches may be located and not the "method" by which this is effected. [385 U.S. 252, 262] We believe that where a State allows branching only by taking over an existing bank, it expresses as much "whether" and "where" a branch may be located as does a prohibition or a limitation to the home office municipality. As to the restriction being a "method," we have concluded that since it is part and parcel of Utah's policy, it was absorbed by the provisions of 36 (c) (1) and (2), regardless of the tag placed upon it. </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The National Bank Act, 44 Stat. 1228, 12 U.S.C. 36 (c) (1) and (2) provides: </s> "(c) A national banking association may, with the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency, establish and operate new branches: (1) Within the limits of the city, town or village in which said association is situated, if such establishment and operation are at the time expressly authorized to State banks by the law of the State in question; and (2) at any point within the State in which said association is situated, if such establishment and operation are at the time authorized to State banks by the statute law of the State in question by language specifically granting such authority affirmatively and not merely by implication or recognition, and subject to the restrictions as to location imposed by the law of the State on State banks." </s> [Footnote 2 Utah Code Ann., Tit. 7, c. 3, 6 (1965 Supp.), provides: </s> "7-3-6, Business conducted at banking house - Branching of offices - Violation of section a misdemeanor. - The business of every [385 U.S. 252, 254] bank shall be conducted only at its banking house and every bank shall receive deposits and pay checks only at its banking house except as hereinafter provided. </s> . . . . . </s> "Except in cities of the first class, or within unincorporated areas of a county in which a city of the first class is located, no branch bank shall be established in any city or town in which is located a bank or banks, state or national, regularly transacting a customary banking business, unless the bank seeking to establish such branch shall take over an existing bank. No unit bank organized and operating at a point where there are other operating banks, state or national, shall be permitted to be acquired by another bank for the purpose of establishing a branch until such bank shall have been in operation as such for a period of five years." </s> [Footnote 3 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Banking Studies 15, 428 (1941). </s> [385 U.S. 252, 263]